ML20005B938
| ML20005B938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1981 |
| From: | Reynolds J JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8109160152 | |
| Download: ML20005B938 (44) | |
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IlE!ATED COltitESPONDENCF %
UAt# ED E usuno e SEP1019%
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
Offico cf the Secretary S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 'hk88"IE' BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BO g
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In the Matter of )
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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275 O.L.
) 50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
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'~151ggg g h JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF INTERROGATORIES 5
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Joint Intervenors hereby respond to the NRC Staff's August 12, 1981 Interrogatories to Joint Intervenors, as follows:
General Comments The information requested by these interrogatories is information which is more readily available to the propounding party, rather than to Joint Intervenors, and Joint Intervenors are informed and believe that the information requested can be obtained from the propounding party's own files, records, documents, personnel, etc.
Because Joint Int?rvenors have only recently initiated discovery in this proceeding and no responses have yet been received, the responses herein are submitted without
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prejudice to their right to raise legal or factual issues regarding any information or legal matters subsequently discovered by them.
Response to Interrogatory No. 1 (a) It is the Applicant's burden to demonstrate compliance with all applicable provisions of the Commission's emergency planning requirements. Until such compliance has been demonstrated by the Applicant, Joint Intervenors do not concede that any of the provisions of the Commission's emergency planning regulations has been met, either by the Applicant or by offsite agencies, and this applies to 10 C.F.R. SS50.33(g), 50.47, and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.
Joint Intervcnors are informed and believe and on the basis of such information and belief respond that at the present time, all of the relevant emergency plans --
Applicant, State, and local -- are being substantially revised in an attempt to achieve compliance with the
! Commission's revised regulations, effective November 3, 1980.
l Therefore, neither the NRC nor FEMA has issued its findings regarding the adequacy of the various plans. Until each has been submitted, approved, and adopted by the responsible authorities, the requirements of 10 C.F.R. S50.33(g) clearly cannot be met. Moreover, until Joint Intervenors have had an opportunity to examine the revised plans for sufficiency, no definitive determination can be made regarding compliance with that section.
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The Applicant has failed to demonstrate the existence of onsite or offsite preparedness either within the LPZ or to the full extent of the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ and 50 mile ingestion pathway planning zone. During the low power test hearing, held May 19-22 in San Luis Obispo, California, the evidence demonstrated -- and the Applicant conceded -- that the combined Applicant, State, and local plans for Diablo Canyon fail to meet even one of the emergency planning standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. 5 50. 47 (b) and addressed by specific criteria in NUREG-0654. In addition, all parties conceded that the relevant plans fail to consider and allow for the effects of a major earthquake occurring simultaneously with a radiological emergency at the site. In their. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed June 16, 1981, Joint Intervenors submitted a detailed analysis (including citations) of the numerous deficic.7cies of the various plans in compliance with the regulations. That discussion -- set forth at pp. 11-38 -- is hereby incorporated by reference in partial response to this interrogatory. (See Appendix A hereto.)
Also at that hearing, the Applicant indicated through testimony that Revision 3 of its onsite emergency plan was being prepared and that it was expected to be completed by mid-June 1981. Similerly, the Staff stated through testimony that an analysis of the effects of earthquakes on emergency preparedness, being prepared by PGandE pursuant to Staff directive, could be completed in mid-May 1980. Neither document has been completed or, if
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completed, neither has been served on Joint Intervenors.
g Thorough examination of sach 13 critical to a determination 1
} of the adequacy of emergency preparedness at Diablo Canyoa.
- f. The Applicant has yet even to address -- much less f demonstrate compliance with -- Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part i 50. None of the relevant plans as they currently exist --
1 Applicant, State, or local -- contains the requisite i
! information needed to demonstrate compliance with the i
l criteria for organization, assessment action, activation of
) emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency a facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and response. Moreover, as stated supra, the plans fail to meet the criteria set forth in 10 C.F.R. ,
S50.47 (b) . Because that is also a requirement of Appendix E, -
all of the deficiencies discussed in connection with the 1
planning standards of 10 C.F.R. S50.47 (b) (including the r
l incorporated sections of the Proposed Findings) apply equally to the Applicant's failure to demonstrate compliance with Appendix E. l 4 Appendix E explicitly requires a full-scale j
exercise "which tests as much of the licensee, State, and 4 local emergency plan as is reasonably achievable . . . .
' Joint Intervenors are informed that on August 19, 1981 a
" full scale exercise" was held to test the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon emergency plans. Despite repeated attempts to l gain access to that exercise as observers,-Joint Intervenors i'
and their counsel were excluded and, therefore, have no way of judging at the presant time either the adequacy of the 1
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6 drill or the level of preparedness demonstrated by it.
Further discovery is essential to obtain such information.
Joint Intervenors are informed and believe, however, that the exercise failed to provide a true test of response capability in that the scenario upon which it was based did not even remotely recemble circumstances likely to exist in the event of a real emergency, especially if initiated or accompanied by a major seismic event.
(b) The documents relied upon include, but are not necessarily limited to, those documents attached as exhibits to Joint Intervenors' April 27, 1981 Response in Opposition to NRC 5taff and PGan6E Motions for Summary Disposition (and those incorporated therein by reference); all documents marked for identification or offered into evidence by Joint Intevenors during the low power test hearing; and all documents cited by Joint Intervenors in their June 16, 1981 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed in the low power test proceeding. This response is given without prejudice to Joint Intervenors' right to rely upon any documents subsequently discovered by them.
(c) Joint Intervenors object to this request on the ground that it is unspecific, burdensome and oppressive, not calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, and irrelevant to the subject matter of this action.
l (d) At this time, Joint Intervenors have not decided what persons, if any, they may call or subpoena as witnesses at the hearing to be held on the admitted emergency preparedness contention.
(e) At this time, Joint Intevenors have not decided what persons, if any, will serve as advisor, witness, or consultant to them on the issue addressed in this interrogatory. As the Staff is well aware, Joint Intervenors have from time to time in the past relied upon MHB Technical Associates, 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, San Jose, California 95125.
Response to 7nterrogatory No. 2 See Response to Interrogatory No. 1 Response to Interrogatory No. 3 See Response to Interrogatory No. 1.
Response to Interrogatory No. 4 (a) Joint Intervenors are informed and believe and on the basis of such information respond that the specific provisions of the Commission's emergency planning regulations which have not been complied with include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
10 C.F.R. S 50.33 (g) ;
10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a) (1) , (a) (2) , (b) (1) through (b) (16 ) , (c) (1) , (c) (2) ; and
t 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E See Response to Interrogatory No.1(a) . [
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(b) .
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
(d) See Response to Interogatory No.1(d) .
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(e) .
Response to Interrogatory No. 5 .
(a) 42 U.S.C. S2011 et seg.;
10 C.F.R. S50.47; 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E.
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(d) .
(e) See Response to Interogatory No. l(e).
Response to Interrogatory No. 6 See Response to Interrogatory No. 1 and Appendix A
! hereto.
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Response to Interrogatory No. 7 l
See Response to Interrogatory No. 1 and Appendix A hereto.
I Response to Interrogatory No. 8 See Response to Trterrogatory No. 1 and Appendix A l
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hereto.
4 Response to Interrogatory No. 9
- (a) The training and coordination of offsite personnel i
9 has been virtually nonexistent at Diablo Canyon. Because of the extensive revision of the various plans still in progress, little if anything has been done to implement l
existing plans. .In addition, neither PGandE nor the NRC Staff has made any significant effort to train offsite -
personnel or coordinate the onsite emergency response J
organization with responsible offsite personnel throughout the plume exposure EPZ and the ingestion pathway EPZ. No
! training or coordination has been attempted with respect to preparedness in the event of an earthquake. The personnel i referred to herein include, but are not necessarily limited to, government officials, medical personnel, transport i
- personnel, fire fighters, law enforcement officers, technical personnel, media, and the public generally. See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(a).
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(b) .
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
! (d) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(e).
, Response to Interrogatory No. 10 (a) 42 U.S.C. SS2011 et seq.;
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (a) (1) ;
J
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (b) ;
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No. 1(c).
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(d) .
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(e) .
Response to Interrogat'ory No. 11 Joint Intervenors object on the ground that the request is overbroad, burdensome and oppressive, not calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence, and irrelevant to the subject matter of this action. Moreover, the information requested is more readily available to the propounding party than to Joint Intervenors.
However, to the extent that relevant information is requested, see Response to Interrogatory No. 9.
Response to Interrogatory No. 12 Joint Intervenors object for the reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No 11. However, the equipment needed would include, but is not necessarily limited to, adequate medical facilities for the treatment and care of all persons likely to be injured in the event of a radiological emergency; adequate means of transporting such persons; communications systems which will function in the event of a radiological emergency even if accompanied by a major arthquake which severs all normal communications links; radiological monitoring equipment in sufficient amounts and located throughout the plume exposure EPZ and the ingestion pathway EPZ to provide the earliest possible warning of the location and extent of onsite or offsite releases; an adequate public notification system capable of providing prompt notification to all members of the public including those located in Montana de Oro State Park or other rugged and relatively inaccessible areas surrounding the plant; an adequate provision of equipment to control significant radiological exposure to officials and other members of the public, including respirators, protective clothing, potassium iodide tablets, and other equipment necessary to prevent exposure or reduce its effects. See Response to Interrogatory No. 1 and Appendix A hereto.
Response to Interrogatory No. 13 See Responses to Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 12.
Response to Interrogatory No. 14 (d) 42 U.S.C. SS2011 et seq.;
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (a) ;
i l 10 C.F.R. S 50. 47 (b) ;
l 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E.
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenros object for reasons stated in i
l Response to Interrogatory No. 1(c).
l (d) See Response to Interrogatory No,1(d) .
l (e) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(6e .
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Response to Interrogetory 15 I (a) 42 U.S.C. S$20ll et seg,;
10 C.F.R. 5 50. 47 (b) ;
(b) See Response to Intarrogatory No. 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(d).
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(e) .
Response to Interrogatory No. 16 (a) Neither the Applicant, the Staff, nor San Luis Obispo County has demonstrated any capability to evacuate persons promptly from Montana de Oro State Park, part,icularly persons located in remote areas of the Park. Those areas, some of which are less than three miles from the plant site, are rugged in terrain and are subject to only limited access even during the best weather. Absent special provision for notification, medical care, communication, sheltering, monitoring, and evacuation of such persons, there can be no reasonable expectation that they coulu be protected in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant. In addition, there has been no attempt to plan for evacuation in the event of an accident occurring simultaneously with a major I
See Response No. 1 and Appendix A hereto.
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(b).
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l (c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in !
Response to Interrogatory 1(c) .
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
(e) See Response .to Interrogatory No.1(e) .
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i Response to Interrogatory No. 17 l
1 (a) 42 U.S.C. SS2011 et seg.;
i, j 10 C.F.'R. S 50. 47 (a) ; -
I 10 C.F.R. S 50. 47 (b) ;
1 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E.
i I (b) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(b) .
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in i
). Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) . i (d) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(d) .
- (e) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(e) .
v j Response to' Interrogatory No. 18-
! (a) Joint Intervenors have never received a copy of l "the proposed information program of PGandE . . . .
To our
.l l knowledge, neither PGandE nor the Staff has done anything
! toward compliance with the public information requirement established by 10 C.F.R. S50.47 (b) and described in NUREG-
) 0654.
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(b) .
! (c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated.in I Response to Interrogatory No. 1(c).
(d) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
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(e) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(e) .
Response to Interrogatory No. 19 (a) 42 U.S.C. SS20ll et seg.;
(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
(d ) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No. 1(e).
Response to Interrogatory No. 20 (a) Joint Intervenors have not yet completed their investigation and analysis of PGandE's emergency operating procedures. However, at this time, as far as is known, those procedures are inadequate in many respects, including but not necessarily limited to, their failure to consider and allow for the effects of an earthquake occurring simultaneously with an emergency at the plant; their failure to provide assurance that actions to protect the public can and will be taken promptly; their failure to require that public notification and other actions to protect the public will be taken soon enough to assure that they can be accomplished successfully; and their failure to provide assurance that the procedures specified will, in fact, be carried out. In addition, PGandE has at no time demonstrated that the Diablo
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Canyon operators understand the procedures or will be able to S implement them in the event of an emergency.
j (b) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in .
l_
Response to Interrogatory No.1(c) .
l (d) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
(e) See Response to Interrogatory No. l(e) .
Response to Interrogat'ory No. 21 (a) 42 U.S.C. SS2011.et seg.;
10 C.F.R. S 50. 47 (a) ;
10 C.F.R. S50.47 (b) ;
(b)- See Response to Interrogatory _No. 1(b).
(c) Joint Intervenors object for reasons stated in i ~
Response to Interrogatory No. 1(c).
- (d) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(d) .
i (e) See Response to Interrogatory No.1(e) .
f Response to Document Requests f
Joint Intervenors believe that all documents-referred to hereinoor relating to emergency' planning for Diablo Canyon are available on this docket or are otherwise i
' in the possession of the propounding party.
Dated: August 31, 1981
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_ _ _ __._m . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . _
Respectfully submitted, JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.
JOHN R. PHILLIPS,'ESQ.
Center for Law in the Public Interest 10203. Santa Monica Blvd.
Fifth Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 DAVID S. FLEISCHAKER, ESO.
' 17 35 Eye Stree.t , N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 638-6070 .
By ,
4 DEL R/RIiflNOLDS Attorneys for Joint Intervenors SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION
' CONFERENCE, INC.
ECOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA SILVER ELIZABETH APPELBERG JOHN J. FORSTER
h' nycaweta r f h f
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requirements, it has the burdon o? proof to demonstrate that the exemption'~ criteria set f o r th aHOTF-R .-S 50. 41(.c)_
have b'eIan satisfied.
B. Adecuacy of Diablo Canyon Emercency Plans
- 15. The board finds that the existing applicant, State, and local cuergency response plans are ir. adequate to assure protection of the health and s~afety.cf the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon during 1cw pcwer testing.
- 16. It is undisputed that existing applicant, State, and local emergency plans for Diablo Canyon do not meet the Commission's revised regulations or the NUREG-0654 criteria.
(Joint Intervenors' Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10614; Buckley, Tr. 11056; Sears, Tr. 11062.) Indeed, in response to the prcmulgation of new regulations, significant revision of the relevant Diablo Canyon plans has become necessary and is currently in prcgress. None of these revisions is expected to be completed prior to fuel loading for low power testing. (SER Supplement 12, at III-3; Shiffer, Tr. 10660; Jorgensen, at 3. ) 14 /-
1981, l4 / By letter to the MRC Staff dated February 27, PGandE requested "talief" from the Commicsion's revised emer-gency planni ne; rc,;uirement:Iloweve for purposa cf loading fuel and r , PGendC cited no authority cenducting 10w power tests.
for such relief in the regulations themselves; indeed, the Ccnmission's emergency planning regulations contain no exemption Accordingly, fer oW ration of a facility at less than full pcwer.
this board rejects any requests by PGandC for relief from the Cc mi: aion' a emergency planning regulations. See note 46 infra.
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- 17. primary legal responsibility for evacuation and other offsite c=ergency response measures rests with the local jurisdiction, the County of San Luis Obispo. (Shif fer, Tr.
10746.) The principal testimony offered regarding local emergency planning was that of Jeffrey Jorgensen, a member of t'~ San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors. With respect
- the general adequacy of the local plans, he testified that although they have never been formally rescinded, they are in essence nothing more than paper plans; because they have not been implemented, they would not provide substantial protection to the public in the event of a radiological emergency.
(Jorgensen, at 1-2; Tr. 10917.) Supervisor Jorgensen testified that prior to the TMI-2 accident, emergency planning was not perceived to be a high level priority for the county government; after the accident, however, it became extremely clear that the ccunty's plans would have to be substantially changed. Conse-quen:17, the County in effect shelved the existing plans and embarked on a new planning effort to devise plans which comply with the Cc mission's revised regulations. (Tr. 10918.)
Since the TMI-2 accident, no action has been taken to implement the existing plans in any way. (Tr. 10917.) The draft revised plan is not scheduled for formal adoption by the Board of Supervisors until December 1981. (Tr. 10921.) In short, Superv cor Jorgensen testified that J
[ t ] o dat:c , no actual preparedness has been developed and will not be until the County's e,
current planning effort is completed.
(Jorgensen, at 3.) 15/
- 18. More specifically, the board finds that the extent of noncompliance with 10 C.F.R. S50.47(b) is substantial.
Through interrogatory responses offered into evidence by Joint Intervenors and received by the board, PGandE admitted that the existing combined applicant, State, and local emergency plans fail to comply with any of the sixteen planning standards contained in that subsection. (Joint Intervenors' Exh. 111.)16/
This fact is not attributable to the inadequacy of any single plan; on the contrary, PGandE's onsite plan fails to comply with thirteen of the regulatory standards, the State plan with fifteen, and the local plans with fourteen. PGandE did not even attempt to demonstrate specifically the insignificance of any but a very few of the deficiencies. Nevertheless, as is evident from tiie discussion below of the individual standards, numerous deficiencies relate to critical aspects of the emergency 15/ This testimony of Supervisor Jorgensen was virtually uncontradicted by PGandE and the Staff. Although PGandE offered testimony of County Sheriff George Whiting in rebuttal to Jorgensen's testinony, the board notes that the response plan produced by the Sheriff and received in evidence as Board Enh. 5 has not been revised since 1977, two years prior to the T:1I-2 accident. Rather than contradicting Supervisor Jcrgensen's testimony, this is consistent with his statement that no action has been taken to implement the existing county plans since :: arch 1979.
If6/ The Staff repeatedly stated its view that the ccmbinea Applicant, State and local emergency plans do not ccroly ' lith the Commission's revised emergency planning regula-tiens. (Buckley, Tr. 11056; Sears, Tr. 11062; Olmstead, Tr. 10697.)
The Staff did not challenge or contradict PGandE's admissions
' in Joint I n te rveno rs ' Enh. 111.
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response capability, regardless of whether the facility is operating at low rather than full power.
- 19. Further deficiencies in compliance with 10 C.F.R.
S 50.47(b) were revealed on cross-examination of the PGandE and Staff witnesses and through the direct testimony of 32pervisor Jorgensen, County Health Director Howard Mitchell, and California Department.of Forestry official Robert Paulus.
Most significant of these deficiencie's, together with those admitted by PGandE in Joint Intervenors' Exhibit 111 ("J. I.
Exh. 111"), are summarized briefly as follows:
(A) Assicnment of Responsibility (Orcanization Control)17/
(1) Interf aces between enaite un i of fsite emer-sufficiently defined gency response organizations are not or diagrammed in applicant, State, or local plans. (J.I.
Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10667.)
(2) Letters of agreement with offsite emergency response organizations, set forth in Appendix 7 to PGandE's onsite plan, are out-of-date and insufficiently specific, contain no criteria for implementation, include unverified information (e.g., phone numbers), and do not comply with JUREC-0654 criteria. They are not set forth in the State or loc.il plans. (J.I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, 10668-73,
~]7/ Titlen for each of the ntandards are drawn from
- IC:'::G IiG 5 4.
. i ,
t Paulus, at 4.)
(3) PGandE onsite plan doesn't require 24-hour manning of communication links (Shiffer, Tr. 10682),
and State plan centains no commitment to 24-hour per day response or manning of cc=munication links with local officials and applicant. (J.I. Exh. 111.)
(4) Title of persons to be contacted at the State and local levels in the event of an emergency is not specified in the onsite plan nor does plan contain phone numbers of persons to contact. (J.I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10630-82.)
(5) The relationship of FEMA to the emergency response effort is not specified. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) Onsite Emergency Orcanization (1) Responsibilities and authority of Site Emergency Cecrdinator are not suf ficiently defined, particularly with regard to delegation of duties and the critical ultimate decisionmaking authority in the control room during an emergency. (J. I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10662.)
(2) Staffing requirements set forth in NUREG-0654 are not sufficiently addressed in PGandE's onsite plan, including the fact that on weekends and off-hours a fire brigade of five members will be drawn from the minimum fourteen pcrsons cnitte. (J. h. Exh. 111; Patterson, Tr. 10802-03.)
(3) Interf aces between onsite and of fsite emergency response organizations and personnel are not outlined as
l t required by NUREG-0654. (J. I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10667.)
(4) PGand"'s onsite plan fails to discuss adequately the long-term augmentation of the emergency organization.
(J. I. Exh. 111.)
(5) PGandE's onsite plan fails to identify in sufficient detail the services to be provided by local and/or State agencies in the event of a radiological emergency at the facility. Letters of agreement to provide cch services fail to detail the authorities, responsibilities, and limitatigns on actions of contractors, private organizations, and local support groups. The onsite plan provides inadequate assurance l
of necessary ambalance service, does not provide for a means to transport injured persons to St. Francis Hospital in San Francisco, and fails to describe adequately the capacity, trained personnel, and facilities available at St. Francis Hospital. (J. I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 10668-73, 10800, 10864-65.
(C) Emercency Resnonse Supnort and Resources (1) The applicant, Stato, and local plans do not specify the federal resources expected in the event of an emergency, t!.e time of a:cival of resources, or the persons responsible for requesting federal assistance. (J. I. Exb. 111.)
(2) The applicant and State plans do not specify all available radiological laboratories which might be utilized in the evene of an emergencf. (J. I. E:<h . 111.)
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(3) Agreements which exist are out-of-date and insufficiently specific regarding authority, responsibilities, and limitations of assisting organizations. (J. I. Exh. 111; Shiffer, Tr. 1066S-73; Paulus, at 4.)
(4) There has been no adequate coordination of County personnel who would be required to implement the plans.
(Jorgensen, at 2.)
(D) Emercenc'. Classification System (1) The relevant applicant, State, and local plans do not contain a standardized emergency classification system 18/
to determine, implement, and coordinate response measures.--
None of the plans complies with the classification scheme set forth in Appendix I of NUREG-0654. While PGandE's onsite plan may require additional quantification of parametric values, neither the State nor local classification scheme is consistent with NCREG-0654. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
( 2) Meither the State nor local plans contain procedures prov. ding for emergency action which take into account local offsite conditions at the time of the emergency.
(J. I. Enh. 111.) None of the plans considers and allows for the occurrence of an earthquake simultaneously with a radio-18/ The Kemeny Co::qission noted the absence of coordinated emergeEcy plans and accident classification systems as a contributor to the inadequacy of emergency preparedness at T:iI . (J. I. Exh. ll4A, at 38.)
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- s. s logical emergency.19/ - (Jorgensen, at 2; Sears, at 3; Sears, Tr. 11060.)
(E) Notification Methods and Procedures (1) The early warning system described in Appendix III of NUREG-0654 is not projccted for completion prior to fuel load. (Shif fer, Tr. 10696.)
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(2) None of the relevant plans contain the actual wording of emergency measures or the standard format for '
detailed initial and follow-up communications. (J. I. Exh. 111:
Shiffer, Tr. 10699:.)2'0/
(3) Although PGandE and the Staff rely on the ability of the County Sheriff to n,otify all persons in the LPZ in the event of an accident at low power, the Sheriff has never attempted to notify all residents and visitors in that area nor is there any estimate based on actual experience of the time such notification would take. The Sherif f has not prepared a written statement to give to persons in the LPZ upon notification in explanation of what actions to take, 19/ See discussion infra at 29-31 regarding the failure of e:.:istIEg plans to allow for a radiological emergency occurring simultaneously with an earthquake.
ers' M/ The Memony Commission criticised the NRC Commission role in the TMI-2 accident renponse in part because theyI.were (J.
preoccupied with Exn. 1147, at 40.) the drafting of a press release.The Kemeny Commission rec a radiological emergency such things as the wording of notifi-cation messages n' uld not require significant attention.
1
i i .
how much time is available, and what is actually occurring.
Adverse weather cor ditions could preclude the use of helicopters for notification purposes. The feasibility or notification by helicopter in remote areas of Montana de Oro State Park has not been demonstrated. (Shif fer, Tr. 10866, 10871; Sears, Tr. 11068, 11252.)21/ -
(4) The S' tate plan contains no information on procedures or systems for. notification, alerting, or mobilizing emergency personnel and no detailed discussion of the time required' to instruct the public. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(5) Neither the State nor local plans incorporate an Early Warning System which satisfies Appendin III of NUREG-06 5 4.
(J. I. Exh. 111.)
(F) Emercency Communications (1) Applicant, State, and local plans contain insufficient description of communication plans, including NUREG-06 54 criteria. Neither the State nor local plans discuss communication capability with State, local, and federal emergency response organizations. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(2) None of the relevant plans discusses a periodic communications testing program. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) The County does not have adequate comm.unica-tions equipment to reach headquarters and other personnel.
In fact, during a drill in 1979, County Health Department 2'/ See discussion infra at 32-34.
. s .
personnel were forced to use a pay telephone to communicate the results of their findings. (Mitchell, at 1; Mitchell, Tr. 10916, 10953, 10960; Jorgensen, at 2.)
(G) Public Education and Information22/-
(1) PGandE has not implemented a public information program. _PGandE has taken no action to inform the LPZ resi-dents that medical facilities to contact in the event of radiation-related injury, what actions to take in the event of a radiological emergency, what the risks of low power testing are, and, aside from publishing its emergency plan, wnat the evacuation routes are. (Sears, at 5; Sears, Tr. 11064; Shiffer, Tr. 10874-75.) .
(2) The State and local plans contain no discussion of a public information program. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) At the local levci, there has been no system-atic public information program designed to educate the public on necessary actions, including evacuation and shelter, to be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
(Jorgensen, at 2.)
(H) Emeracncy Facilities and Eauipment (1) At the time of fuel loading for low power testing, the three principal emergency facilities will not comply with all criteria set forth in NUREG-0696, entitled 32-34.
_2/ 9 - diccussion infra at s
" Functional Criterin for Emergency Response Facilities, Final Report." (Sal f fer, Tr. 19674.)
(2) The interim offsite emergency sperations facility is a trailer, and the permanent facility is not projected for completion prior to fuel load. The interim facility is not a seismic Class I structure. (Shiffer, at 10; Shiffer, Tr. 10680, 10698.)23/ -
(3) Although the operational support center ("OSC")
is the staging area for emergency support personnel, PGandy does not intend to compy with the NUREG-0654 requirement that certal pecified supplies i? stored there, including respiratory protection, protective clothing, portable lighting, monitoring cquipment, cameras, and cc=munications equipment. (Shiffer, at 10; Shiffer, Tr. 10676.) The OSC is not a seismic Class I structure. (Shiffer, Tr. 11306.)
(4) The State plan contains no discussion of an emergency operations center, the timely activation cif staffing for such a facility, or identification of emergency equip-ment. (J. I. Enh. 111.)
(5) Morr of the plans addresses the periods of inrpection. replacar.nt, and calibration of emergency 23/ The board notes the imnortance of the Emergency Operations Facility to the overall emergency response capability of to the ccmbinem organinations. The purpose of the facility is provide overall directic of the offsite activities from PGandE's s tanri :o in t , and it is i:. . ded to serve as a conduit to(Shiffer, offsite acencies for information garding activities onsite.
Tr. 10753.) The particular vulncrability of the interim facil>ty to inclement weather conditions and to seismic activity is not an insignificant factor.
-- - - . . .~
equipment. The State plan provides no indicaticn of the location of radiological monitoring equipment. PGandE's onsite plan contains an iradequately detailed discussion of meteorological instrumentation. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(I) Accident Assessment (1} The County has inadequate monitoring equipment beyond the site boundaries. (Mi~tchell, at 1.)
(2) The onsite and state plans contain insufficiently detailed discussic n of methods , equipment, and expertise for rapid assessment of the actual or potential magnitude
,nd locations of radiological hazards. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) Monitoring instruments installed by PGandE are located away from where the oblem is -- few, if any, are located in the area of conce.- for low power. (Mitchell, Tr.
10910; PGandE E::hs. 67, 69.)
(4) The County has an inadequate and overly dispersed staff to ccaduct monitoring. (Mitchell, Tr. 10910.)
(5) The maps included in the onsite plaa do not constitute accurate and up-to-date descriptions of the number and location of monitoring instruments. (Shiffer, Tr.
10730.)
(6) None of the monitoring instruments can be interrogated by radio; therefore, the data must be obtained by vehicle and, for all tat the few real time instruments, further analysis must then be performed, either in the field i
or at the facility. (Shiffer, Tr. 10730.)
s (J) Protective Resconse (1) The local plans have not been implemented, and they provide no substantial protection to the general public in the event of a radiological emergency. For the foreseeable futi re, the County will not be able to respond ef fectively to a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon. (Jorgensen, at 1-3.)
. (2) The ons'.te plan does not addre the times necessary to warn the public and take protective actions.
(J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) The County plans don't discuss the effects on emergency response of inclement weather, high traffic density, and specific radiological conditions, nor do such ,
plans address the means for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement. Maps attcched to the State and local plans do not indicate relocation centers and shelter areas.
(J. I. Enh. 111; Mitchell, at 2.)
f 1) The State and local plan fails to discuss projected traffic capacities of evacuation routes under emergency conditions, identification of and means for dealing with potential impediments (i.e., seasonal impassibility of roads) to evacuation routes, and time estimates for evacuation of various areas based on a dynamic analysis.
(J. I. Enh. 111.)
(5) An ability to notify promptly all segments of the transient and resident population of the LPZ has not
. i, been demonstrated, nor has the County Sheriff or PGandE attempted to do so. (Shiffer, Tr. 10867; Sears, Tr. 11068-69.)
(6) The onsite plan should be revised to include new maps, population distribution information, and the bases for choice of recommended protective actions. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(7) The local plan does not provide for use, quantities, storage or distribution of radioprotective drugs.
9 -
(J. I. . Exh. 111.)14/
(8) The letter of understanding between PGandE and the California Department of Forestry for fire fighting support onsite has been rescinded by CDF. (Paulus, at 4.)
(9) :cne of the relevant plans considers and allows for a Diablo Canyon emergency occurring in conjunctica with a major earthquake on the Hosgri Fault. (Jorgensen, at 2; Sears, at 3; Sears, at 11060; J. I. Exh. 117.)
(E) Radiolonical Exposyre Control (1) PGandE's onsite plan contains an insufficiently specific discussion of (a) EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG's) for actions specified in NUREG-0654, (b) application of any existing radiation protection measures to emergency situations, (c) an onsite dosimetry program, (d) radiation control procedures, contamination control measures, and (e) decontamination capability for onsite personnel. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
1;/ Se discussion of radioprotective E <h . Il4A, at 41-42.
druge by Kemony C .misaion in its Report, J. I.
(2) State and local plans contain no detailed discussion, if any, of means for decontamination of personnel and equipment and for waste disposal.
(L) Medical and Public Health Suoport (1) The County has inadequate medical facilities to transport and treat persons in the event of a radiological emergency. (Jorgensen, at 2; Mitchell, at 2.)
(2) The County Health Office is inadequately staffed to respond to a radiological emergency at Diablo i
Canyon. (Mitchell, at 1.)
(3) The County Division of Environmental Health's Standard Operating Procedures for I;uclear Power Plant Emergency Response can't be implemented. (Mitchell, at 2.)
(4) The County is inadequately informed about and has never attempted to evacuate perscns requiring ambulances from the LPZ and immediately surrounding area. Limited ingress and egress presents difficulty in removing persons with spacial needs. (Mitchell, at 2.)
(5) Despite the absence from the letter of agreement between PGandE and the San Luis Ambulance Service of any pledge to treat radiation-related injuries, PGandE's onsite plan improperly states, in reliance upon that letter, that the Ambulance Service has committed to handle personal injury cases involving radioactive contamination. (Shiffer, Tr. 10670-71.)
l 1
. }
, 1
)
(6) The State plan cites reliance upon local
)
authorities for medical services. No further discussion is provided. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(7) The discussion of medical provisions in the local plan is insufficiently specific. (J. I. Exh 111. )
(9) Regarding PGandE's onsite medical preparedness, there is no doctor onsite; no assurance of getting an ambulance promptly; no estimate *of ambulance time or previous drill on the Fi' eld Ranch Road (main alternate route to and from the site);-5/ 2 no plan for transport of injured persons to St. Francis Hospital in San Francisco; no speci-ficatica of the capacity of or numbers of doctors available at St. Francis IIospital; only one NuCon contaminated personnel carrier onsite; and no record of which ambulance personnel have actually been trained. (Shif fer, Tr. 10695, 10865, 106S6, 10693, 10673, 10800, 10688, 10692.)
(9) Because the County is short on ambulances, PGandE and local officials cannot be certain at any particular mcment that any of the ambulances will be available to respond to injuries other than, for example, automobile accidents and heart attacks. (Chiffer, Tr. 10865; Mitchell, Tr. 10912.)
23/ PGandr witness Shif fer stated on cross-examination t'lat the FHld Ranch Road is slippery and muddy in adverse weather cc::d i tie n n . (Tr. 10799.) He also admitted that a member of the Jield family had recently informed him that the road is "i uana:ble in wet weacher and during the winter for as much as t tc etee :s a t a time." (Tr. 10870.)
(M) . Recovery and Reentry Plannina and Pcit-Accident Ogerations (1) Applicant, State, and local plans are insufficiently specific. The State plan contains no description of plans or procedures, and the local plan, while providing general guidance, contains no spec'ific procedures on reentry and recovery. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(U) Exercises and Drills .
(1) Bevond reference to an annual exercise, the State plan contains no discussion of drills. The plan does not describe how the exercise is to be carried out, whether observers are to be present, or whether it is consistent with NUREG-0654. (J. I. Enh. 111.)
(2) The local plan contains no specific exercise requirement. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) The existing onsite plan does not provide for drills and exercises censistent with NUREG-0654. (J. I.
Exh. 111.)
(4) No general exercise or drill has been hcid l
involving applicant, State, and local officials with the public participating. (Shiffer, Tr. 10700.)
(5) There have been no full scale exercises to demonstrate the offectiveness of the local plans. (Jorgensen, at 2.)
(6) The County Sheriff has never conducted a drill involving notification of all areas of the LPZ.
According to Dr. :litchell, the Sheriff's personnel did not even gc to See Canyon during the 1977 drill. (Shiffer, Tr.
10S66-67; Mitchell, Tr. 10916.)
(7) The 1977 and 1979 local drills did not demonstrate adequate preparedness. Moreover, neither Eimulated a real-life emergency in that persons involved were not dispersed throughout-the County as they would be in the event of an actual emergency. (Mitchell', Tr. 10916.)
(8) PGandE's onsite plan does not require communications drills. (Shiffer, Tr. 10701.)
(9) ::o full scale exercise is planned prior to fuel load. (Shif fer, at 32.)
(O) Radiolocical Emergency Response Training (1) California Department of Forestry employees have not received the radiation training which PGandE agre-d to provide. (Paulus, at 203; Paulus, Tr. 10986.)
(2) PGandE's onsite plan contains an insufficiently detailed discussion to determine whether requisite training is procided. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) State and local plans contain no specific training requirements. (J. T. Exh. 111.)
(4) There is no adequate training or coordination of local pornonnel. (Jorgensen, at 2.)
(3) Relatively few physicians in San Luis Obispo Count, : ave the training or equipment necessar'/ to handle and treat radiation-related injuries. (:litchell, Tr. 10911.)
(6) State and local plans do not provide for training specified in NUREG-0654, includinc training of coordinators of response organizations, accident assessment personnel, radiological monitoring personnel, police, security personnel, firefighters, maintenance personnel, first aid and rescue personnel, local support services personnel (i.e., Civil Defense), medical support personnel, license headquarters personnel,'and communications personnel.
4 (J. I. Exh. 111.} ,
'P) Rosconsibility for Planninc Effort:_
Develenment and Periodic Review a:d Distribution of Emercency Plans (1) The State plan contains no discussion of this standard. (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(2) The County plc.n is insufficiently specific and hasn't been revised since its issuance. Ucither the State nor local plan is cross-referenced to NUREG-0654.
J (J. I. Exh. 111.)
(3) The phone numbers in the applicant, State, and local plans have not been updated. (J. I. Exh. 111; Shif fer, Tr. 10669.)
(4) The applicant and State plans do not contain Standard Operating Procedures as required by NUREG-0654.
(J. I. D:h . 111.)
- 20. The board finds further that none of the relevant one te or offsite emergency plan *: considers and allows for
the effects of a major earthquake on the Hosgri Fault occurring 26 simultaneously with a radiological emergency at Diablo Canyon.- /
On December 16, 1930, the NRC requested that PGandE evaluate "the potential complicating factors which might be caused by carthquakes which either initiate or follow the initiation of accidents." (J. I. Exh. 117, at 1.) Specifically, the evaluation must consider two general cases:
First, a severe earthquake at the site which could disr6p normal and auxiliary services and thereby cause the plant to be in*** a degraded mcde should be considered.
The facility plan should be capable of functioning under such conditions. Of principal importance under such conditions would be augmentation of the facility staff and supporting resources to assure that a more severe accident did not develop. Factors to be considered for your facility plans should include the impacts due to potential disruption of communications networks and transportation routes. Your concern should be the availability of resources and personnel to augment onsite staff, transit to and among emergency response facilities and communica- * **
tiens with offsite organizations.
The second case which should be considered is an earthquake offsite which disrupts communi-cations networks and transportation routes in particular locales. In California, such occurrences appear to be frequent enough to warrant consideration in your emergency plans. The ;)rocedures to be used to determine the protective actions recommended to offsite authorities should be tovised to incorporate consideration of earthquake effects offsite.
1:vacuation time estimates should incorporate con:i.deration of local transportation route .
disruption. (M. )
2o/ Se- .lo r t:e n n e n , at 2: Sears, at 7; Sears, Tr. 11060, 11233; Shitfer, Tr. 10873-79.
-~
9 In addition, the MRC' requested FE!!A to review the adequacy of State and local capabilities with respect to response during carthquakes.27/ -
- 21. The carthquake analysis requirement is based on the Commission's appreciation of the greater seismic risk associated with nuclear plants located in California relative to facilities in other areas. (Sears, Tr. 11060.) The NRC has not received such an analysis from PGandE, nor has FE:!A reviewed the adequacy of the State and loca'l capabilities with respect to earthquake effects. Although both PGandE and the Staff urge that the seismic evaluations are not required prior to low power operation, no logical justification for such a view was offered at the hearing, and there is nc factual basis to conclude that the~ctfects of an earthquake on emergency response capability will be reduced at power levels below Diablo Canyon's full capacity. Particularly in light of the continued importance of seismic safety in this 1
proceeding (Scars , Tr. 11060), the board considers the absence of any analysis of and preparation for carthquake effects on emergency planning on and offsite to be a critical deficiency in 28 /
cmergency preparedness at Diablo Canyon.
27/ Memorandum from Grimes to McConnell, " Reques t for FEMA Ass i.s t 3nce to Review Effects of Earthquake and Volcanic Eruption on State / Local 1:mergency Plans" (Nov. 3, 1980) (J. I. R .< h . 117).
2'l/ The board notes the recent licensing board decision in In D!atter of Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Muclear senerating : Ration, Memorandum and Order, at 2 (April 8, 1981),
where the board recognized that "[alpplicants, partuularly appli-cants in a ,eismically active area like California, should be prepared to de=cnstrate that thei.r emergency plans can function in a major earthquake situation."
O e .
- 22. Of the numerous emergency planning deficiencies cited above, PGandt and the Staff focussed specifically on the absence of an early warning system and a public information prcgram. In an attempt to mininine the significance of this conceded nonccmpliance with the Commission's regulations, both parties cited (1) increased time to respond which might permit
" house-to-house" notification of LPZ residents by the County Sheriff and (2) PGandE's intention to. circulate a public infor-mation brochure just prior to fuel loading'for low power testing.
~
(Shiffer, Tr. 10840, 10872, 10S74; Sears, at 4-5; Sears, Tr.
11067, 11251.) This board disputes such testimony for several reasons. First, the Sheriff's capability for prompt notification of all segments of the resident and transient population in the LPZ Pas never been demonstrated. Although some of his deputies may have been dispatched to See Canyon during a drill in 1977, there is no evidence as to what precisely occurred nor does that action provide any assurance that notification of all persons throughout the LPZ, including Montana de Oro State Park, can be promptly accomplished by the Sheriff. (Shi f fe r , Tr.
10866-7; but see Mitchell, Tr. 10916.)29/-
29/ In addition, although plant operators may have more time during low power operations to prevent a routine transient frca developing into a serious accident, there is no evidence or assurance that such additional time will also be available once it b<rcemes apparent that protective actions ef fsite will be necessary. It is indeed a possibility that, regardless of ,
whether the plant is operating at low or full power, public notifi-cation of the need to evacuate would he delayed as long as peasibic in order to avoid needless public panic or evacuation.
The nemeny Commiasion noted v.at one of the reasons emergency planning had a lov prior.t t;. ;i th the MRC was the desire to a.'oid rainina public concern about the safety of nuclear power.
(J. I. C"h. Il'.A, at 33.)
- = * -ee .
..wr -
,-,,--9.~mm. , ~ , . , ,- .w.., -
- 23. Second, the public understanding -- at icast within the L?3 -- of essential emergency response information is virtually nc7 existent. On cross = examination, James Shiffer, l
- on behalf of PGandE, conceded that PGandE had taken no actions to inform the residents of the LPZ regarding (1) the riaks to them of low power operations, (2) the a'railable medical facilities equipped and staffed to treat radiation-related injuries resulting from an accident at the plant, and (3) the most appro-priate actions to take in the event of such an emergency.
(Shiffer, Tr. 10874-75.) Similarly, John Sears, on behalf of the Staff, testif ed in effect that apart from inclusion of the local plans in its onsite plan, PGandE has not demonstrated that the public kncws whct the evacuation routes are. (Sears, Tr. 11064.) Although PGandE has apparently been preparing a public information brochure, it is only in draft form. (Se ars ,
at 5.)
- 24. In light of such testimony, the beard cannot agree with the view expressed by PGandE and the Staff that at i
the present time there is no real purpose for a public information prograo. (Shif fer, Tr. 10372; Sears, at 5.) We find that l
increased p b'.c understanding and awareness of the kinds of i infc cmati rt'tioned above would greatly facilitate implementation of emergency protective actions when necessary and that dissemina-tion of such information at the earliest possibic date would increar.e the 'ikelihood that all segments of the resident i
i i
l
. - - . . . - - - - , . ~-
(_
- 4 and transient population of the LFZ will be adcquately informed.30/ -
Ilad the Ccmmission intended that a public information and education program regarding emergency response need be instituted only weeks prior to actual operation of a nuclear facility, its regulations certainly would reflect such a view. In order to assure the best possible response by the public this board believes that PGandE chould have instituted a public informat? ,a program long ago. The absence of a final determination as to method of notification is no excuse.
- 26. To demcastrate the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon offsite plans, the Staff, through the Sears testimony, cites an alleged FEMA " finding" documented in (1) a Memorandum for Harold R. Denton and John W. McConnell f rom FEMA /BIRC Steering Cc=mittee and (2) a FEMA /MRC Interim Agreement on Criteria for i
30/ The itemeny Ccamission recognized the direct connection between an adequate public information program and effective emergency preparedness. In its Report, the Commission recommended the following:
If emergency planning and response to a radiation-related emergency is to be effective, the public must be better informed about nuclear power. The Ccmmission recommends a program to educate the pui;lic on ho.i nuclear power plants operate, on radiation and its health effects, and on protec-tive actions against radiation. Those who world he affected by such emergency planning must have clear information on actions they would be required to take in an emergency.
J. I. :: 'h . 1143, at 77.
Low Power Testing at ::cw Commercial Facilities. (Sears , at 6. ) 3' /
2 C:;t cross-examination of Sears, however, a number of significant facts were revealed. First, regarding thc extent of Sears' personal kncwledge of the basis for the documents, (a) he was not a member of the FEMA /::RC Steering Committee at the time the documents were issued (Scars, Tr. 11016); (b) he was not present at the Steering Cc=mittee meetings at.which they were discussed (Sears, Tr. 11069-70): (c) he did not personally know whether FEMA actually reviewed the specific Diablo Canyon offsite plans for adequacy prior to the issuance of those documents (id.); and (d) he had no personal knowledge of the Denton-McConnell corres-pondence cited in the FEMA /::RC Intarim Agreement nor could he recall whether such correspondence contained any reference to an evalua; ion by FEMA of the specific Diablo Canyon offsite plans.
(Sears, Tr. 11081, 11270.) In fact, such correspondence contains no reference to Diablo Canyon or its emergency plans. (Gov.
Brcwn Exhs. 4 and 5.)
- 27. Second, regarding the content of such documents, l (a) there is no indication that FEMA evaluated the Diablo Canyon site-specific offsite plans (Scars, Tr. 11079); (b) the word
" finding" dces not appear in either of the two documents (Sears, Tr. 11264); and (c) they form the basis not only for Sears' conclusion hut also for the Staff's statement in SER Supp. 12, 31/ In its Pronosed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, PGanC: also rolies on FE:'A/ RC documents in support of its claim that the Diablo Canyon offsite plans are adequate. PGandE's
' Preposed F;nd:ngs of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 5-6, 34 (June 1, 1331).
l l
. . ~ . _ , . ~ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ . , . _ , _ _ -, a
. . = ,
4 at III-3, that FEMA had "previously specifically approved the emergency preparedness at Diablo Canyon for low power testing on 32 an interim basis." (Sears, Tr. 112 7 */ . ) - /
- 23. In light of this evidence, the board can only conclude that FEMA, which is the federal agency responsible for review of offsite plans prior to plant licensing by the NRC,33/ has neither 32/ The parties stipulated that'the FEMA /NRC Steering Ccamittee documents relied upon by Sears were issued on March 12, 1930. (Tr. 11034.) Thus, any " finding" by FEMA ~
approving emergency preparedness for low pcwer operations at
~
Diablo Canyon would have to have been made at least eight months prior to the effective date of the Commission's revised emergency planning regulations and four nonths before PGandE even applied for a low power license. Sears was apparently unaware of this, and, similarly, he did not know whether the proposed Diablo Canyon lcw power test program had ever been routed either to (Gears, Tr. 11071, FEMA or the FEMA /NRC Steering Committee.
11091.)
33/ See " Memorandum of Understanding Between NRC and FEMA to Acccmplish a Prcapt Improvement in Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness" ("MOU") (January ll, 1980) (Gov. Brown Exh. 3). This memorandum was entered into in response to the President's December 7, 1979 decision "that FEMA will take the lead in off-site planning and response. . . ." MOU, at D-3.
Under section II of the agreement, FEMA's responsibilities include the following:
- 1. To take the lead in off-site emergency planning and review and assess State and local emergency plans for adequacy. +
- 3. To complete, as soon as possible, the revi of State and local plans in those states affecte.
by planta scheduled for operation in the near future.
- 4. To make findings and determinations as to ahether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of implementation (c.o.,
adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, resources, staffing levels, and qualificatio'ns and equipment adequacy). k k #
MO t' , at D-4.
a
e reviewed the specific Diablo Canyon offsite plans nor found them adecuate for low pcwor testing. The FEMA /MRC Steering Committee documents rel ed upon by the Staff give no indication whatsoever of any substantive finding oy FEMA with respect to either the State or local plans.34/ Moreover, the testir^ny by Sears at the hearing indicated clearly his lack of p'ersonal knowledge concerning the basis for the documents cited by him, thereby undercutting as well the support for his own conclusion that the Diablo Canyon offsite preparedness is adequate.
~
His lack of personal .
}
T familiarity with the basis for the FEMA /NRC documents effectively prevented other parties from enquiring into that issue on cross- .
1 1
)
34/ The Interim Agreement notes that Diablo Canyon is located in a state with an emergency plan which has receAved an MRC cencurrence. This clearly does not, however, relieve FEMA of its obligation to review the specific offsite plans prior to licensing by the MRC. As the Director of FEMA stated in the June 24, 1930 Motice of Proposed Rulemaking entitled " Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness":
[T]hc lead for review of the adequacy of of fsite emergency plans and their capability of implemen-tation has been placed in FEMA and there is no lcnger an :RC voluntary concurrence program for State emergency plans. * *
- The previous MRC
" concurrences" do not satisfy all the reauirements l for PEMA accroval of State and local plans under i this reuulation.
! 45 Fed. Reg. 42341, 43242 (cenhasis added).
i
- .o reo /e r , Mr. shiffer (PGandE) acknowledged on crosc-c: amination that the State plan is only a "back-up" plan, while l
the prf'ar, legal responsibility for of fsite responce rests with the Iccal juricdiction, the County of San Luis Obispo.
(Sn.ffar, Tr. 10746-47.) For obvious reasons, therefore, r e'. ie .- o: ne local plans-is essential to a true understanding of the ut ata of emergency preparedness at Diablo Canyon.
t l 4
I
- ~
examination, an issu2 which the board considers critical in this proceeding.35/ Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence of a substantive review by FE::A of the Diablo Canyon offsite plans, we cannot afford any substantive weight to the so-called FE:G " finding" referred to by the Staff in the Sears testimony and embodied in the FE'A/NRC documents cited therein.
s
-<e-- ---Ri&oFLc'.t9 ewer-Oncration--
In essence, both PGandC and the Staff contend
/
- 29. /
that any c::.clencies in the existing Diabl_o Canyon emergency
\
plans are 2. significant in view of the reduced levef cf risk
/
during low, in\ cmparison to full, power operation. While
/
PGandE concedes that even at low power offsite/ preparedness is
\ /
necessar$ to the outer edge of the low population /
zone (six
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\ ,
\ '
\
35/ Tha board canhot rely upon testimony of a witness unab1T to provide the basis for his' conclusions. In the : tatter oc Vircinia Electric and Mo'.:Or Comoany (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 anu J), ALAI 3- 5 5 57 CCH . Nuc l . Rec; . Rep . 9 30,407, at 29,042 (1979). In Vircinia Electric, the Appeal Board stated this pr:.nciple in una:.s ta.-;aole terms: \
\
- '.an i f e s t ly , it will not do for an expert.
s witness to state his ultimate conclusions on a crucial. aspect of \the issue being
\
tried a: d then to profens an inabilit.
-- for thatever reason -K to provide 'the foundation for them to thegdocision-maker as cell as the other litigants. Indeed, a trier of fact would be der'elict in the c: a: .wroo or its resnonsibilition were it to rest sicnificant findings on expressions c: - ner. on:.nion not susceptible of beina to.> ' :t! <?u e:anination of: the vitnens. A 1;cousing noard decision curitring\ trom
,uch informity would be a Cit candi'date \
for revernal. g
\
_I_d_ . at 29,M3 (e mhasis added). N 9'
l
- e i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD l
)
In the Matter of )
)
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Jos. 50-275 O.L.
) 50-323 0.L.
(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )
Plant, Units 1 and 2) )
)
)
i l
4 i
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! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE i
I hereby certify that on this 31th day of August, 1981, I have served copies of the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO NRC STAFF INTERROGATORIES, mailing them through the U. S. mails, first class, postage prepaid.
i J
t' Richard S. Salzman, William Olmstead, Esq.
Chairman Marc R. Staenberg, Esq.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Edward G. Ketchen, Esq.
Appeal Board Office of the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director - BETH 042 Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20553 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety & Licensing Nancy Culver Appeal Board 192 Luncta U.S. Nuclear Regulatory San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Fredrick Eissler Scenic Shoreline Preservation Dr. John H. Buck Conference, Inc.
Atomic Safety & Licensing 4623 More Mesa Drive I Appeal Board Santa Barbara, CA 93105 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.:ommission Sandra A. Silver Washington, D.C. 20555 1760 Alisal Street San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Admin. Judge John F. Wolf, Chairman Gordon Silver Atomic Sefety & Licensing 1760 Alisal Street Board San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission David S. Fleischaker, Esq.
Washington, D.C. 20555 1735 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 Glenn O. Bright Atomic Safety & Licei. sing Bruce Norton, Esq.
Board 3216 N. Thi J Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Suite 202 Commission Phoenix, Arizona 85012 Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. Yale I. Jones, Esq.
Dr. Jerry R. Kline 100 Van Ness Avenue Atomic Safety & Licensing 19th Floor Board San Francisco, CA 94102 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Andrew Baldwin, Esq.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Friends of the Earth 124 Spcar Street Docket & Service Branch San Francisco, CA 94105 Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Harry M. Willis, Esq.
Co.nmission Seymour and Willia Washington, D.C. 20555 601 California Street Suite 2100 San Francisco, CA 94108
. .e
- s. Raye Meming Janice E. Kerr, Esq. .
1920 Mattle Road Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq. Shell Beach, CA 93449 J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.
California Public Utilities MIIB Technical Associates llamilton Avenue 52 tat uilding te 350 McAllister Street San Jose, CA 95125 San Francisco, CA 94102 arl Nieburger Malcolm II. Furbush, Esq.
9 Vi.cc President and General 0 B San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 Ph Crane, Esq.
Pacific Gas & Electric Company Byron Georgiou, Esq.
9" ^ # * ' #Y Sanhr i CA 94120 the Governor State Capitol Building Arthur C. Gehr, Esq. Sacramento, CA 95814 Snell & Wilmer 3100 Valley Center Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Phoenix, Arizona 85073 11i11, Christopher & Phillips 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 UOEL R #REYNOLDS, ESO.
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