ML070320074
| ML070320074 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/2006 |
| From: | Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Power Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML070320074 (95) | |
Text
Enclosure 3 Trip Report Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Presentation Handouts NFPA 805 Transition Pilot Plant Program 1 -
Handout Reference 1 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 2 -
Duke Duke Power NFPA-805 Transition Pilot Observation Project Status Oconee (ONS)
Harry Barrett October 17, 2006 1
Duke Agenda 1 7.77 --7 7,77ý , 7,757777717ý
" Reconstitution Project Status
" NFPA-805 Project Status
" Fire PRA Status
" Duke 3-Site Transition Schedule
" Oconee Transition Schedule.
" Near Term Tasks 2
Duke Reconstitution Project Status m ONS Units 2 -&3 /Common Reconstitution Analysis is complete
- Need to review Mods since analysis snapshot MVNS is approximately 67% complete with expected completion date of April 2007 m CNS is approximately 55% complete with expected completion date of June 2007 3
Duke NFPA-805 Transition Status
- Fire Protection Program Fundamental Program Elements (Chapter 3)
- mHave completed Fire Hazards Analysis validation walkdowns
" Data currently under review
" Ignition Source walkdowns to be discussed later this week
- Chapter 3 element mapping into the NEI 04-02 Table B-I is approximately 80% complete 4
Duke NFPA-805 Energysm Transition Status Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Transition (Chapter 4)
Have completed mapping Appendix R (NEI 00-01) methodology to NFPA-805 mAlternate approach referenced in parking lot has been developed
- Information placed in Table B-I is abbreviated for better clarity 5
DukeNFPA-805 Transition Energy.,Status - continued "Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Transition (Chapter 4) -.continued
" Fire Area Assessment in progress for first fire area Working on Table B-3 for Fire Area BHI12
" Continuing to work on Recovery Action Feasibility
" Pilot of CAFTA EFW Logics completed
" Non-Power Operational Mode Transition
" Developed Philosophy and Methodology
" Finalized list of components for additional analysis
" Performed circuit analysis and cable routing on added components 6
Duke Fire PRA Status
- Sub-Task 5.1 - Plant Boundary Definition and Partitioning
- Complete - to be discussed later this week
" Sub-Task 5.2 - Fire Ignition Frequencies
- In draft form - to be discussed later this week
" Sub-Task 5.3 - Fire PRA Component Selection
- In draft form - to be discussed later this week
" Sub-Task 5.4 - Fire PRA Cable Selection m In Progress - to be discussed later this week
" Sub-Task 5.5 - Qualitative Screening
- Not going to perform Qualitative Screening. (will quantify all Fire Compartments) 7
Duke Fire PRA Status
- Sub-Task 5.6 - Fire-Induced Risk Model - to be discussed later this week
- Sub-Task 5.7 - Quantitative Screening
- Sub-Task 5.8 - Scoping Fire Modeling
- Sub-Task 5.9 - D etailed Circuit Failure Analysis (combined wI 5.10)
- Sub-Task 5.14 )-Circuit Failure Mode Likelihood Analysis
- Sub-Task 5.11- Detailed Fire Modeling
- Sub-Task 5.11 2- Post-Fire Human Reliability Analysis
- Sub-Task 5.13- Seismic-Fire Interactions Assessm ent
- Sub-Task 5.1~ I - Fire Risk Quantification
- Sub-Task 5.1~ 5 - Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
- Sub-Task 5.14 3- Fire PRA Documentation 8
Duke Armored Cable Energy..FioreTesting
- We have performed additional fire damage testing to more accurately determine spurious actuation probabilities for our armored cable
" Testing was performed at Intertek Testing Laboratories (Omega Point Labs) in Te xas
" Test Plan was reviewed and commented on by NRC
" Testing was observed by NRC
" Testing Results x 120V AC grounded control circuits are very robust - NO observed s~purious actuations u Ungrounded 120V AC and 125V DC control circuits exhibit hot short probabilities inthe range of normal thermoset cables m Unjacketed Armored Cable is not an effective approach to achieve itno intervening combustibles"5 9
Duke Duke 3-Site Transition Schedule ONS 2009 11 2nd 2
J
~ept 09)
I~ 1 ~ I~9I I ICNS .Tranisitiou to (,-05Jul
.06
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MNS and CNS Fire PRA Tasks have been extended by 6 months due to Peer Review MNS and CNS Transition have been extended 9 months beyond PRA to allow time for addressing major peer review issues and submittal of LAR 10
Duke Oconee NFPA-805 Transition Schedule so.Y f,2ýa - - YpranU~asio 94 OCCOW.,tM2-nTask*i f2ýAM&Ifl IMMbE 4220O~nTnk~2 T i -hcnrL*Pln4 b.~J2 IC 0 2.T"kMM 2EIn&EM., O~wEDa~Ik &Zkko fl ~~ ~f ~ . , a11mp mnahtinn. r-o 1.7 ' U-,
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11
Duke Near Term Tasks (Next SIx Months)
- Chapter 4 Transition (Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria) mChapter 3 Transition (Fundamental Fire Protection Program Elements)
" Transient Analysis
" Manual Action Feasibility 12
Handout Reference 2 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 -19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 3 -
NFPA 805 Pilot Observations Meeting Prog ress Energy Transition Status October 6, 2006 Jeff Ertman Dave Miskiewicz Nuclear Generation Group Progress Energy Page 1
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status Introductions -Oconee 10114 to 10119 9Progress Energy Participants this week:
DDave Miskiewicz. Fire PRA Lead DAndy Spotts, PRA Engineer DBob Rhodes, Harris SSA Program Manager P Mike Fletcher, Harris FP Program Manager DJack Curham, Crystal FP Program Manager D Ken Heffner, Corp Licensing DBob Rishel, Corp PSA Supervisor
ýO"G Page 2 Page 2 Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status Discussion Points
- General project information
- H-arris transition plant status
- Summary of outlook upcoming months
- PE Goals of this meeting
(~1~Page 3 Progress Energy
P1"E NFPA 805 Transition Status General Information -Scope_
eProject Scope includes three major work areas:
D Fire NSA (previously SSA), NFPA 805 Chapter 4 oComplete SSAlAppendix R Validation and 1 ransition of the analysis to Nuclear Safety Analysis 8Includes Non Power Operations and Circuit Analysis / Cable Selection of PRA components not analyzed by NSA b Fire PRA/PRA
" Develop Fire PRAs using NUREG 6850 as guidance
" Assess, revise Internal Events PRA to support NFPA 805 quality requirements o Classical FP and Program Transition, Chapter 3
- Includes Fire Modeling Support and Radioactive Release
- Includes Change Evaluations Page 4 Progress Energy Page24
RIE NFPA 805 Transition Status General Information =Priorities aw
- SSA Validation
- NFPA 805 Transition
- Modifications Page 5 t~C Progress Energy Page
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status General Information - Project Goals Transition to risk informed, performance based licensing basis for an improved safety focus eAddress recent NRC guidance relative to SSA Circuit Analysis and Manual Operator Actions eAddress PE Hemyc applications eEstablish a common Fire Protection Program across fleet - as soon as practical Advance Fire Protection and PSA personnel skill and knowledge NRC/Industry buy-in on interpretations to guidance during pilot (e.g. use of NEI/NRC FAQ process)
Page 6 Q, Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition. Status General Information - Fleet Plan LARs
ýDHNP LAR May 2008 CR3 LAR August 2009
- RNP LAR August 2010
- BNP LAR August 2011 Page 7 Progress Energy Page17
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status General Information TOverview Plan I
I I 12005
- 2t~6 2t7 20~8 20P9 2c{1 0 2Q(11 20121 a j~~Areasa Prepare- A Cjmplete SSA "ýVransitic;l'7 Y' ARS Su mit a Rece 'e Receive
.~&,RR UP Np" LIR RAI *LA V , Upgrade PRA Ipe D7one dbrnsto-Rpr Amend ient T Harris I
a- a-I A. ~ A. A. A Complete SSA "Wransitio?V -'repare Sub i Receive Re ,'eive RAts -A
ýUpgrade FV\M -Implement gwDo le
ý\mendment STransition Report Crwsta[ River' I - & h- I h i ~~I -
Complete SSA i"Transi ion W' ePear(' LAR *
.bmit f ,ec'eie T~eceive 4 SI aLA FE 8& .AR RAls
- ,- Upgradej PRA 0-=n A. P1 TFIone
'V T1'insItion Report
- p. > An~endmenta hri in-,nn
- I ~0 0~. ~ I J*ý Conjplete SSA MWransitioRF' Prepare LAbR Sbit up rade PRA Transition Report -
Brunswick:
Start Transition Page 8 Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status General Information -Project Planning
- Rolling Wave project planning method utilized P Plan includes all four plants P Lessons learned from lead plant will be applied across the fleet on a task basis P RAI/SER received prior to LAR for next plant
- Dedicated resources at corporate level
- Committed resources at site level
- Funding at the Fleet Initiative level Page 9 rk,' Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status Harris StatusT- October 6, 2.006 eFire NSA (SSA), NFPA 805 Chapter 4 P Completed initial SSA Validation Fire Area reviews D Initiated tasks to select cables of PRA components
@Fire PRA/PRA D Fire PRA Ignition Source calculation iscomplete D Fire PRA Component selection iscomplete D Internal Events PRA Gap Closure, In Process eClassical FP and Program Transition, Chapter 3 DChapter 3 initial review in progress o HNP MT Fire Test field complete, Hemyc in planning Page 10 Progress Energy
mPE NFPA 805 Transition Status Harris -Highlights, Upcoming Tasks o6Fire NSA (SSA), NFPA 805 Chapter 4 o Detailed NEPA 805 Fire Area review o Perform circuit analysis/cable routing for additional PRA related components P Review Manual Actions draft NUREG 1852 for impact o Review Circuit Analysis GL for impact when issued b Start Non-power Operations January 2007
- Fire PRA/PRA o Fire Scenario scoping and Detailed Fire Modeling D Model updates for Internal Events and Fire Sequences
- Classical FP and Program Transition, Chapter 3 o Work off open items from Chapter 3 review o Review Tech Evaluations (e.g. GL 86-1 Os)
Page 11 Cj Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status Our Goals for This Meeting_
- Discussion Iinitial feedback on Fire PRA Results to date
- Parking Lot items D Clear Old Parking Lot items - Close to FAQs D Resolution schedule for those can't close D Identification of new Parking Lot items
- Identify FAQs with near term Pilot impacts D Establish schedule with NEI task force! NRC
- Establish schedule next 12 months o NRC Fire PRA Audit schedule
- Next Pilot Observation meeting (beyond HNP in Nov.)
P Approximate meeting dates next 12 months M-aPage 12 Co Progress Energy
PE NFPA 805 Transition Status Fire PRAINFPA 805 Application Interface All products to be developed and controlled by existing approved ptant procedures:
Hydralics Engineering Changes FireModlingFir Modlin Calculations (address sutb- (copliance) (scenarios) (system success -Software CD F/LE i)____________
Colnec)HRA timing -Databases Shared Database Information:
-Fire Compartment Data
-Ignition Source Data
-Component Scoping
-Cable/Circuit Routing PRA -FHA data FPPormRisk/Scoping Relationhp,.. . . . Fire Scenario Data Mitigation Systemns Models Rslcpn xmls
____ -Compartment Risk Ranking Dataase mpac Int Component Importances r latCags FP Programi IR iing Info Fires Internal Events HRImoane
- - impaCted? ;a E Impated Plant changes Industry Standards and Related Guidance:
-ASME RA-Sb-2005 (ehiaadqay(technical adequacy -ANS 58.23 cotoldb op Abased on Industry -NIJREGICR-6850 MnaanSieStandards with NEI 04-02 Fire PRA /Fire Protection Program Interface Pag 13 &j Progress Energy
Handout Reference 3 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 -19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 4 -
Duke Energysm Task 1 Duke Power FPRA Pilot Meeting Oconee (ONS)
October 16, 2006 1
NUREG/CR- 6850 TASK 1, Plant Boundary Definition &
Partitioning 2
Duke FPRA Boundary Definition Morn-The area within the plant protected area fence isthe starting point for the Fire PRA boundary definition Within the plant protected area, selected locations were excluded:
'iIf a fire would not cause a plant trip or require shutdown iIf the structure is not directly connected with the primary plant power block structures
~iIf the structure contained no PRA components 3
V~neavsm Plant Partitioning Started with IPEEE compartment list Pq Most compartments correspond to single FZ TB comprised of 3 compartments (TBOI, TBO2, & TBO3) r:Refined compartment list
_ESV Building (contained PRA components) mKeowee Dam (emergency power)
I'ntake Structure (include with Yard FC)
Multi-compartment analysis considerations u, Maintenance Support Building Shares boundary with NE end of TB a Service Building Shares boundary with North end of TB 4
Handout Reference 4 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 5 -
Duke%Fff
) Enerov..
Task 6 Duke Power FPRA Pilot Meeting Oconee (ONS)
October 16, 2006 1
NUREG/CR- 6850 TASK 6 FIRE IGNITION FREQUENCIES 2
Duke Fixed Ignition Source Coun~ting Initial walkdown lacke-d detailed criteria Benchmarking meeting Potential outlier with respect to HEAF Verification walkdown performed to refined criteria SLatest results still being reconciled 3
... Inery,.Counting Criteria
.HEAF (Bin 16) m If less than 1000 V, count entire load center or switchgear as one HEAF
~iIf greater than 1000 V, count each vertical segment of the load center or switchgear as one HEAF Bus Duct - no longer based on linear feet MOO'Is as HEAF (include or not include)
Lr,Breakers in MCCs are typically molded case and not the type that hang up and cause problems MCC's are not high energy - too far removed from the switchyard energy 4
Enerav.Counting.Criteria Electrical Cabinets (Bin 15) ai Considered pro-rating based on size (similar to vertical stack counting for an MCC, Load Center, or Switchgear)
SSince 6850 is not explicit; all cabinets counted the same aa~Exclude cabinets less than I 'xl 'xl' and less than 440 V Main Control Board (Bin 4) - Back Panels SCount as Bin 4 -panels have control functions similar to Bin 4 consoles Count as Bin 15 - cabinet function is not really part of the 6850 counting criteria for Bin 15 5
Enegy. ISDS Workbook Imported walkdown Information gi Reviewed for consistency eAdditional refinement likely Transient Fire Frequency Influence Factors -determined SWeighting factors for "Cutting and Welding" bins applied to "Cable Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting" bins (5, 11, 31) muOconee utilizes armored cables; no Bin 12 (self igniting cable fires)
Bayesian update Reviewed site data for potentially challenging fires SOnly 1 event met criteria s Performed Bayesian update for Bin 21 Compartment frequencies determined 6
Handout Reference 5 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 6 -
.NFPA 805 Transition Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
Ignition Frequency Calculation'
-I Andrew Spotts 10/17/06 Nuclear Generation Group Progress Energy
Methodology:
.NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2: Detailed Methodology HNP Ignition Source Caic provides official documentation for:
- TASK 1 - PLANT BOUNDARY DEFINITION AND PARTITIONING
- TASK 4 - QUALITATIVE SCREENING
- TASK 6 - FIRE IGNITION FREQUENCIES LNJ% & Progress Energy
TASK 1 PLANT BOUNDARY DEFINITION AND PARTITIONING
- Selection of Global Plant Analysis Boundary SHNP Global Boundary isthe plant's Protected Area
- Plant Partitioning o 51 Fire Compartments
- 38 identical to Fire Areas
- 10 >are identical to Fire Zones - Large Fire Areas divided up into smaller analysis areas.
- 3 >>
Outside areas where vital equipment is located jProgress Energy
TASK 4 QUALITATIVE SCREEING ooSeveral buildings within the Global Boundary screened from further analysis qualitatively.
D No PSA or Safe Shutdown equipment (or circuits)
D Fire in building will not lead to:
" Automatic plant trip
" Manual plant trip (per procedure, policy, or practices)
" Controlled shutdown per tech specs
" Fire will not spread to another area and cause any of the above three things D Examples:
v Security Building v Paint Shop v Bulk Warehouse
~jProgress Energy
TASK 6 FIRE IGNITION FREQUNCY
.eUnused bins
- Fixed ignition sources b Walkdown documentation b Fixed source cou'nts
- Transient frequencies
) Weighting Factors P Cable Loading b Cable Run & Junction Boxes 42Progress Energy
Unused Bins
- Bin 23A - Transformer (oil filled)
P 6 oil filled transformers at HNP, all in qualitatively screened or out of scope areas. No oil filled transformers found during compartment walkdowns.
- Bin 30 - Boiler t Only boiler at HNP is in building that was qualitatively screened.
Frequencies from unused bins omitted from analysis SProgress Energy
Transient Frequencies-
- Weighting Factors (maintenance, occupancy, storage) 0 Engineering judgment used to determine factors
- Input solicited from PRA & plant Fire Protection Program personnel
@ Bin 3, 7, 25, 37 - Transient fires
. All three weighting factors used
- Bin 6, 24, 36 - Transient fires from cutting & welding o Only maintenance factor used e Bin 5, 11, 31 - Cable Fires from cutting & welding P Cable loading data from HNP combustible load calculations D Maintenance factor comb ined with cable loading factor
@ Bins 12 - Cable Run & Bin 18 - Junction Box i Combustible load calculations used to determine ratio of cable in each compartment relative to all plant cable o Assumed the number of junction boxes is proportional to the ratio of cable in each compartment nplProgress Energy
Fixed Ignition Sources
- Every Compartment was walked down twice (including Containment).
Once to identify ignition sources, and once for validation of initial walkdown.
- Each ignition source recorded on the walkdown sheets and a photo of each source was taken.
- Once the walkdowns were complete all the sources were added up and the fire frequency per component (per bin type) was calculated.
- Walkdown sheets and validation sheets are included in the Ignition Frequency Calculation in an attachment.
Progress Energy
Electrical Cabinets e There is a wide variety in what was counted for Bin 15 - Electrical Cabinets 0 Some very small, low voltage p anel/cabinets with fewer than 4 switches were not counted (not considerer a significant fire source).
P Free standing electrical cabinets counted by number of vertical sections o Counted each cabinet as T1 regardless of size. Size varies from
.small wall mounted panels to large 'wa~lk-in' size cabinets.
~1Progress Energy
High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF) a480V to 6.9kV switchgears & load centers counted for HEAF.
P Example: A 4.16kV load center with three vertical sections and a transformer counts:
- 3 Electrical Cabinets
- 3HEAF
- 1 Transformer (dry)
Mjk3 LýProgress Energy
Results 1 1-G 8.48E-02 Turbine Generator Building 2 5-W-BAL 3.30E-02 Waste Processing Building 3 1-D-DGB 1.22E-02 Diesel Generator 1B 4 1-D-DGA 1.22E-02 Diesel Generator 1A 5 1-C 1.06E-02 Containment Building, All Levels 6 1-A-BAL-A 9.70E-03 Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevations 236, and 261 ft 7 1-A-BAL-B 7.63E-03 Reactor Auxiliary Building El 261 and 286 ft 8 12-A-CRC 1 6.87E-03 Control Room Complex 9 5-F-BAL 6.01 E-03 Fuel Handling Building, Balance of Areas 10 12-A-CR 5.56E-03 Control Room, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) 117A-GB5.3-3 SicherRo 12 1-A-S WGRA 5.23E-03 Switchgear Room A 13 12-A-BAL 3.45E-03 Reactor Auxiliary Building Units 1 and 2 Balance 14 1-A-BAL-J 2.73E-03 Reactor Auxiliary Building - HVAC room 15 1-A-BAL-C 2.72E-03 Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286 ft Progress Energy
Handout Reference 6 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 7 -
Duke Energysm Task 2 Duke Power FPRA Pilot Meeting Oconee (ONS)
October 16, 2006 1
NUREG/CR- 6850 TASK 2 COMPONENT SELECTION 2
Duke Task 2 Elements FPRA Component List PRA I~SSEL (with cables)
MVSO ISLOCA Containment Isolation gm Instrumentation Disposition of PRA basic events Disposition of Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) 3
Enegy. Scope of F-PRA Component List Components:
Whose fire-induced failure will cause an initiating event (e.g., ADVs and PORVs)
That support mitigating functions credited in the PRA (e.g., pumps, MOVs)
Whose spurious actuation could cause an adverse effect on mitigating functions credited in the PRA (e.g.,
normally closed MOVs that could open & cause flow diversion)
That support operator actions credited inthe PRA or whose spurious actuation or failure could likely induce undesirable operator action (instrumentation) 4
Duke PIEnergy~. Dispositioning of PRA Basic Events wv.ý-',,-,Z,!ý -1 -,,. " -_._-,-,ý,ý ýý _,It' : ý!ý-ý4 ýIfý,Zo Disposition Action or Result Y1 Link Basic Event to SSE or Appendix R equipment Y2 Link Basic Event to other equipment (assemble cable data)
Fail equipment in every Fire Area or set BE probability to 1.0 Not affected by fire - basic event may be ignored Addressed by another basic event - may be ignored All other justifications -for not mapping a basic event 5
Duke N I - Not Affected by Fire
,Start by identifying basic events involving component failures that are not impacted bya fire ro Passive components Components with no cables Basic events involving maintenance unavailability or misalignment (pre-initiators)
Initiating events Common cause failures 6
Duke N3 - Unrelated to Fire Mitigation WA Start with BE database from internal events PRA SRemove unrelated event tree sequence logic
- SGTR, Large LOCA v Tornado, Flood Use purge utility to remove basic events from the database that no longer appear inthe fault tree to reduce disposition effort SFor identifying basic events that are onyassociated with non-fire related sequences; not for quantification 7
Duke Y1 - Link BE to SSE Remaining basic events involve active functions applicable to fire events Looked for matches on SSEL (ARTRAK Component List)
Functional failure modeled by the BE must be consistent with ARTRAK cable selection Used Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logics to compare with PRA functions 8
Duke Y3 - Ensure Failure of BE Cable location unknown Requires link to a component or variable that is assumed to be located in every compartment Cred it byexclusion still an option Prelim inary Y3 systems imInstrument and Station Air m Emergency Siphon Vacuum High Pressure Service Water Reactor Building Cooling w Recirculating Cooling Water 9
Duke N2 - Addressed by Another BE N2 may be used:
Provided ExamDle The BE is in the A circuit breaker for an MOV same PRA logic The MOV has been linked sequence as another to one or more basic linked BE events a-nd The routing information for The components the complete set of cables for that MOV isknown associated with each BE are related by No additional PRA logic sequences are involved common cables 10
Duke Y2 - Link BE to Other Equipment Requi res assembly of cable routing information Components not credited for Appendix R safe shutdown HPI Instrumentation (modeled in PRA)
EjSuction xfer to the BWST on low LDST level CS-46 & 56, HP-16, and CS-3A &313 Boron Dilution of Letdown Flow MVSO Scenario (new sequence)
RB Purge Inlet/Outlet f-Containment Isolation Review 11
Duke EnegySM SSEL Not all entries have cables or known cable routing information (manual valves, relief valves; Unit 1 cables not traced)
PRA function must be consistent with SSEL function from a cable selection perspective Configuration control - incorporation of "additional" (Y2) components in Appendix R database SCertain SSEL functions not modeled in PRA n Control Room HVAC Ventilation for 8SF DG, switchgear, and pump rooms Everything on SSEL is linked or dispositioned; some PRA model changes were required 12
Duke Multiple Spurious
_.New Sequences Unique fire-induced sequences not treated in the PRA model NEI 00-01 & NEI 04-06 Expert Panel Not many iinew "~ compo~nents Most already in ARTRAK
~JScreened Initiating Events New sequences identified m No "6new" components identified 13
Duke ISLOCA Screening Criteria Already inthe PRA model vs. previously screened Flow restrictions would restrict any leak to a rate below the capacity of normal charging No paths leading outside containment (closed loop) 2<Path contains more than three normally closed-valves (including check valves) inseries 14
- Duke OEnergysm Containment Isolation Screening SLow Probability - Pathways containing three or more closed valves in series, or requiring reverse flow through 2 or mo re check valves SClosed Loop inside RB - Pathways from systems that form a closed loop inside the Reactor Building Water Solid - Water solid penetrations are torturous paths and are insignificant with respect to consequence High Awareness.- Pathways whose isolation status was
- deemed highly visible, such as the steam generator drains and equipment hatch Low Consequences - Releases from lines less than or equal to 0.5 inch in diameter are insignificant 15
Duke Instrumentation Treatment of instrumentation and diagnostic equipment 2?Applicable SSEL entries linked to in-Control Room operator actions Simulator review planned Confirm equipment that provides cues to operators for credited actions iIdentify equipment that could lead to fire-induced operator errors of commission 16
Handout Reference 7 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 8 -
NFPA 805 Transition Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
Fire PRA Components Selection David Miskiewicz 10/18/06 Progress Energy
Methodology:
-~ -~---"- -aim NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2: Detailed Methodology HNIP Component Selection provides documentation for:
- TASK 2 - Fire PRA Components Selection D Inputs to Task 3 - Fire Cable Selection D Inputs to Task 5 - Fire-Induced Model Progress Energy
TASK 2 FIRE PRA COMPONENTS SELECTION
- Existing Information
- Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO)
- Dispositioning Safe Shutdown Equip~ment
- Dispositioning PRA Equipment
- Identifying New PRA Sequences
- Identifying Cable Routing Priorities
- Treatment of Operator Actions kf Progress Energy
Existing Information ~,
- PRA Data P IPEEE D Internal Events PRA P Basic Event to Component Mapping used for EOOS/A4 monitoring aSafe Shutdown Data D Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL)
D MSO Investigations
ý2 Progress Energy
MSO Investigation An Expert Panel Methodology was used to identify MSO of concern DSSA (1), OPS (2), Contractor (2)
DReviewed Flow Drawings DIdentified potential component pairs (180)
DReviewed Fire Areas DDispositioned
~Progres Energy
Disposition ing SSEL---------
" Compared to PRA Equipment List P Tag IDs and failure modes (OK)
"Dispositioned remaining tags i Many were in PRA with alternate IlDs (OK)
- Add tag cross reference P Some were in PRA but with different failure modes
P Some were totally new tags
~,Progress Energy
Dispositioning PRA Equipment List o Compared to SSEL D Tag IlDs and failure modes (Y)
- Screened Passive Mechanical Components (P)
- Added Instruments relied upon for Operator Actions (A)
- Dispositioned remaining tags D Some were already inSSEL with alternate IlDs (Y)
- Create tag cross reference D Some were in SSEL but with different failure modes
- Evaluate for Cable routing (A,U,L) b Some were totally new tags
- Evaluate for Cable Routing (A,U,L)
SProgress Energy
Identifying New PRA Sequences_
ý6New Sequences were identified based on:
o The new PRA components or failure modes from SSEL o Comparison of SSA and PRA system functions and end-states D Reviewing previously screened initiators QVProgress Energyt9
Identifying 'Cable Routing Priorities_
- Low Priority Components include D Components which only support pipe break scenarios (such as SGTR)
D Components which sup-port systems with low likelihood of providing mitigation. benefit (such as condensate)
D Components with RAW < 2
- Spurious Events are higher priority even if low RAW.
~jProgress Energy
Treatment of Operator Actions Operator Actions will be addressed as part of later tasks D Errors of commission due to spurious alarms or failed instrumentation o Existing Operator actions which are blocked by fires D New operator (control room I manual) actions and dependencies based on fire procedures
. Could add more components to PRA KProgress En~ergy Mj%
Deliverables
- Report (still draft) aDatabase
- List of SSEL tags for PRA modeling consideration (input to Task 5)
@List of PRA components for Cable Routing consideration (input to Task 3)
&2 Progress Energy
Handout Reference 8 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 9 -
NFPA 805 Transition Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
I-nternal Events PRA Update David Miskiewicz 10/18/06 Nuclear Generation Group Progress Energy
PSA Standards
ý- -:- - i" r-
- ASME PSA Standard (Addendum B)
DRG 1.200 aA self assessment was performed eAformal peer review may be performed
&42ProgressEnergy
Internal Events Updates ePre-Initiator HFEs e.Plant Specific Data eDocumentation Issues o Phenomenology Impacts (OG)
- Key assumptions and sources of uncertainty
&2ProgressEnergy
Handout Reference 9 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 10 -
NFPA 805 Transition Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP)
Next PRA Tasks David Miskiewicz 10/18/06 Nuclear Generation Group 'ProgressEnergy
Task 3 Cable Selection A A ~
DFire I Electrical Support
- Integral with Tasks 9 and 10
- Raceway database KýProgress Energy
Task 5 eýFire Induced PRA Modeling o SSEL Components o New, sequences o Location Mapping JProgress Energy
Task 8 eScoping Fire PRA DIdentify Targets by Ignition Source DUse lookup values for ZOI o Bounding HGL Analyses 9Screen if no targets eOtherwise Develop Scenarios C Progress Energy M-0
Handout Reference 10 NFPA 805 Pilot Plant Observation Visit October 16 - 19, 2006 Enclosure 3 Trip Report 11 -
Duke Looking Ahead Duke Power FPRA Pilot Meeting Oconee (ONS)
October 18 2006 1
NUREG/CR-6 850 TASK 5 FIRE-IND~l,,,UCED. RISKllýf MýýODEL 2
Duke Enegy. New Sequences Fire-induced SBO with spurious PORV opening High point vents (Re-I 55 thru RC-I 58) spuriously open leading to a small LOCA Vessel head vents (RC-I 59/160) spuriously open leading to a small LOCA HPI NPSH is lost due to uncooled letdown SImpact on letdown of a spurious ES signal along with the BWST valves failing all HPI sources SPressurizer heaters spuriously operate (on and off)
Spurious operation of EFW flow control valves (open), FDW-315 and 316, cause SG overcoolin'g Boron dilution of letdown via bleed holdup tank and pumps Model fire impact on pressurizer instrumentation Include RCP failure to trip in RCP seal LOCA sequence 3
Duke Other Model Changes Addmore structure to the COW model so that failures due to fire can be propagated more accurately KAdd power supplies that support operation of the switchyard PCBs Model CC to the letdown heat exchangers Model other valves capable of isolating letdown including HP-I 1-2, -6, and -7 including power, interlocks and signals
ýRename initiators to begin with special character (e.g.,
"%") to support FRANC operation 4