01-23-2017 | At 1514 EST on January 6, 2016, while operating at 100 percent Reactor Thermal Power ( RTP), the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves ( TBV) automatically opened as expected for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve ( TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open due to an actuator malfunction.
Per Technical Specification (TS) Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while RTP is at or above 29.5 percent to consider all channels of the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) functions operable.
Reactor Operators lowered RTP to 91.0 percent and at 1518 EST the TBV automatically closed and the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions were no longer considered inoperable. TS 3.3.1.1 requires that the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions be operable at or above 29.5 percent RTP. In this event, during the period of time while TBVs were open, reactor power was maintained above 91 percent and the RPS functions were confirmed to be enabled.
The actuator malfunction was caused by faulty connectors within the actuator. The faulty connectors were replaced. |
---|
Similar Documents at Fermi |
---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000341/20230042024-02-0505 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023004 ML23341A1852023-12-0808 December 2023 Acknowledgement of Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000341/2023402 and Disputed Non-Cited Violation ML23310A1492023-12-0808 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 227 Regarding Revision of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency Surveillance Requirements IR 05000341/20230102023-12-0808 December 2023 Nbsp;Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000341/2023010 IR 05000016/20230012023-12-0101 December 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 050-00016/2023-001 (Drss) - Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 ML23334A1902023-12-0101 December 2023 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000341/2024010 ML23335A0062023-12-0101 December 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000341/2024002 IR 05000341/20230032023-11-0707 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023003 and 07200071/2023001 ML23297A0512023-10-30030 October 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 226 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating (Exigent Circumstances) ML23311A3482023-10-20020 October 2023 DTE Electric Company (DTE) - Submittal of the Renewed Fermi 3 Michigan Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. MI0058892 ML23272A1552023-10-10010 October 2023 Letter to Licensee and Federal Register Notification of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination (Exigent Circumstances) (EPID L-2023-LLA-0134) (Letter) ML23283A0222023-10-0909 October 2023 Follow Up to Fermi Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for the Fourth 10-Year Inspection Interval ML23276B4542023-10-0505 October 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000341/2023402 ML23243A8852023-09-18018 September 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 225 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water, Emergency Equipment Service Water and System and Ultimate Heat Sink (Exigent Circumstances) ML23248A2242023-09-0707 September 2023 Regulatory Audit in Support of Review of License Amendment Request for a Risk-Informed Approach for Addressing the Effects of Debris on ECCS Strainer Performance ML23223A2242023-08-29029 August 2023 Individual Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for Hearing (Exigent Circumstances) ML23237B4332023-08-25025 August 2023 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and RFI IR 05000341/20230052023-08-24024 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2023005) ML23229A0122023-08-17017 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 224 to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-568, Revise Applicability of BWR TS 3.6.2.5 and TS 3.6.3.2 (Emergency Circumstances) IR 05000341/20233012023-08-16016 August 2023 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000341/2023301 ML23227A2212023-08-15015 August 2023 Emergency Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 568, Revise Applicability of BWR TS 3.6.2.5 and TS 3.6.3.2 ML23219A1792023-08-0707 August 2023 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 IR 05000341/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023002 ML23216A1872023-08-0404 August 2023 Submittal of Relief Request RR-A25 for Extended License Period ML23206A1272023-07-26026 July 2023 NOED for Fermi Power Plant, Unit Two Technical Specification 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Emergency Equipment Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink ML23200A2552023-06-28028 June 2023 Post-Exam Letter with Comments and Exam Analysis IR 05000341/20230012023-06-28028 June 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023001 ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III ML23122A2332023-06-26026 June 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 223 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements IR 05000341/20220102023-06-21021 June 2023 Reissue Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000341/2022010 ML23166A0892023-06-15015 June 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval Fermi Power Plant, June 2023 ML23158A1332023-06-0808 June 2023 Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for Fermi Power Plant, Unit Two (EPID L-2023-LLD-0000) Technical Specification 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Eecw)/ Emergency Equipment Service Water (Eesw) System and Ultimate Heat Sink ML23130A1032023-05-17017 May 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Relating to Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency IR 05000341/20234022023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000341/2023402 ML23118A3612023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000341/2023402 ML23114A1172023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection ML23115A4152023-04-25025 April 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 ML23124A2032023-04-10010 April 2023 DTE Electric Company Submittal of Fermi 3 Periodic Reports ML23200A1842023-04-0606 April 2023 Proposed Exam Submittal Letter IR 05000341/20230112023-04-0606 April 2023 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000341/2023011 IR 05000341/20234012023-03-17017 March 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2023401 ML23074A1972023-03-16016 March 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination February 2024 IR 05000341/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2022006) ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities ML22325A2992023-02-24024 February 2023 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Relating to Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency ML23039A1552023-02-14014 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2022004 IR 05000341/20224032023-02-13013 February 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2022403 ML23200A2162023-01-20020 January 2023 Outline Submittal Letter 2024-02-05
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000341/LER-2017-0052017-11-0303 November 2017 Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function, LER 17-005-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function 05000341/LER-2017-0042017-10-0909 October 2017 Inadequate Procedural Cuidance for Residual I feat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss if Safety Function, LER 17-004-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Residual Heat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function 05000341/LER-2017-0032017-07-21021 July 2017 Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve, LER 17-003-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve NRC-17-0040, (LER) SER 17-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Granted for Individual Subsequent to Being Denied Unescorted Access at Another Nuclear Facility2017-05-15015 May 2017 (LER) SER 17-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Granted for Individual Subsequent to Being Denied Unescorted Access at Another Nuclear Facility 05000341/LER-2017-0022017-03-16016 March 2017 High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable, LER 17-002-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable 05000341/LER-2017-0012017-03-0606 March 2017 Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box, LER 17-001-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During the Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box 05000341/LER-2016-0012017-01-23023 January 2017 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Reactor Protection System Functions Considered Inoperable Due to Open Turbine Bypass Valves, LER 16-001-01 for Fermi 2 Regarding Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Reactor Protection System Functions Considered Inoperable Due to Open Turbine Bypass Valves ML16138A3352016-05-17017 May 2016 ASP Screening Analysis - Reject Fermi Unit 2 (341-15-002) 05000341/LER-2016-0022016-03-22022 March 2016 Both Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection Divisions Inoperable Due to Inoperable Injection Valve, LER 16-002-00 for Fermi 2, Regarding Both Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection Divisions Inoperable Due to Inoperable Injection Valve NRC-13-0041, Submittal of Initial License Operator Examination2013-07-25025 July 2013 Submittal of Initial License Operator Examination NRC-09-0004, LER 08-S02-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Fitness for Duty (FFD) Drug Testing Results in Reinstated Access Authorization Being Revoked2009-01-26026 January 2009 LER 08-S02-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Fitness for Duty (FFD) Drug Testing Results in Reinstated Access Authorization Being Revoked NRC-08-0062, LER 08-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information2008-09-29029 September 2008 LER 08-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information ML0509505552004-12-17017 December 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - Fermi Grid Loop NRC-04-0083, LER 04-S02-00, Fermi 2 Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information in Background Check2004-11-0808 November 2004 LER 04-S02-00, Fermi 2 Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information in Background Check NRC-03-0020, LER 03-S01-00, Fermi 2, Unescorted Access Granted Prior to Verification of Fitness for Duty Drug Testing Results2003-03-0505 March 2003 LER 03-S01-00, Fermi 2, Unescorted Access Granted Prior to Verification of Fitness for Duty Drug Testing Results 2017-07-21
[Table view] |
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
05000- Fermi 2 341 Initial Plant Conditions Mode 1 Reactor Power 100 percent There were no structures, components, or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event.
Description of the Event
At 1514 EST on January 6, 2016, while operating at 100 percent Reactor Thermal Power (RTP) the East and West Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV) V automatically opened as expected for 3 minutes and 32 seconds in response to the number one High Pressure Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) drifting from full open to 25 percent open due to an actuator malfunction.
Per Technical Specification (TS) Bases 3.3.1.1, TBVs must remain shut while RTP is at or above 29.5 percent to consider all channels of the TSV closure and Turbine Control Valve (TCV) fast closure Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JD] functions operable.
A failure analysis revealed that the valve actuator malfunction and TSV position drift was caused by faulty connectors CON within the actuator. Reactor Operators lowered RTP to 91.0 percent and at 1518 EST, the TBVs automatically closed and the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions were no longer considered inoperable.
TS 3.3.1.1 requires that the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions be operable at or above 29.5 percent RTP.
An event notification and follow up notification (No. 51755) were made to the NRC based on meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) and (D).
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.
In addition, since this event affected all channels of the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions, this event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), as an event where a single cause or condition caused two independent channels to become inoperable in a single system designed to: (A) shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident.
There were no radiological releases associated with this event.
Significant Safety Consequences and Implications There were no significant safety consequences associated with this event. At no time during this event was there a potential for endangering the public health and safety.
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
05000- Fermi 2 341 Per Chapter 15 of the Fermi 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the TCV fast closure function is the primary scram signal for the generator load rejection event. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and ensures that the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit (SL) is not exceeded. TCV fast closure signals are initiated by the de-energization of the solenoid dump valve at each control valve.
This function must be enabled at RTP greater than or equal to 29.5 percent.
Per Chapter 15 of the Fermi 2 UFSAR, the TSV closure function is the primary scram signal for the turbine trip event. For this event, the reactor scram reduces the amount of energy required to be absorbed and ensures that the MCPR SL is not exceeded. TSV closure signals are initiated from position switches located on each of the four TSVs. This function must be enabled at RTP greater than or equal to 29.5 percent.
Four Turbine First Stage Pressure (TFSP) transmitters PT are provided to initiate the automatic bypass of the TCV fast closure and TSV closure scrams, when the first stage pressure is below a preset fraction of rated pressure corresponding to approximately 29.5 percent of rated power.
The TBVs, if open at power levels above 29.5 percent RTP, may cause the TSV closure and TCV fast closure RPS functions to be inadvertently bypassed due to the diversion of steam flow away from the TFSP transmitters. In this event, during the period of time while TBVs were open, reactor power was maintained above 91 percent and the RPS functions were confirmed to be enabled. Therefore, there was no actual impact on safety.
Cause of the Event
The valve actuator malfunction and TSV position drift was caused by a failed Valve Control Module (VCM) servo driver to Unitized Actuator (UA) servo valve loop initiating a valve close position signal. The apparent cause was faulty connectors in the UA due to wear and fatigue. The contributing cause was circuit resistance measurement of the VCM to UA servo loop was not being performed.
Corrective Actions
The faulty connectors were replaced.
Additional corrective actions included: testing continuity of the servo valve circuit to identify and repair degraded conditions, developing a Preventative Maintenance (PM) task to address Extent of Condition on other modulating valves during refueling outages, and adjusting the maintenance frequency on the actuators to limit service time to 6 refueling outages.
This event was documented and evaluated in the Fermi 2 Corrective Action Program. All corrective actions have been completed.
Additional Information
A. Failed Component: UA connectors/wiring Function: Route position demand signal to the servo valve Manufacturer: Amphenol Model Number: MS3106E14S-6P Primary Failure Cause: Wear and fatigue comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
05000- Fermi 2 341 B. Previous Licensee Event Reports (LERs) or Similar Events:
There are no previous similar events for UA connectors or wiring failing due to wear and fatigue.