ML23219A188
ML23219A188 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Aerotest |
Issue date: | 08/24/2023 |
From: | Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS/DIOR |
To: | Slaughter D Aerotest |
Anderson S | |
References | |
IR 2023001 | |
Download: ML23219A188 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000228/2023001
Text
August 24, 2023
Dr. David M. Slaughter, President
and Reactor Administrator
Aerotest Operations, Inc.
3455 Fostoria Way
San Ramon, CA 94583
SUBJECT: AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
050-00228/2023-001, AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear David Slaughter:
This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on
June 27, 2023, at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) in San Ramon,
California. The NRC inspectors discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with you and
members of your staff on June 27, 2023. A final exit meeting was conducted via Microsoft Teams
on July 13, 2023, to inform you of the final inspection results. The inspection results are
documented in the enclosure to this letter.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses
as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the
Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative
records, tour of the reactor and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and
interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV
violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with
the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the
NRCs website at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
The violations are cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances
surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report, Enclosure 2. The
violations are being cited in the Notice because they were identified by the NRC and corrective
actions had not been fully articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting.
Therefore, you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified
in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that
you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The
NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement
action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements.
D. Slaughter 2
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a
copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for
public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs
website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response
should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made
available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this inspection report, please contact Stephanie Anderson
at 817-200-1213, or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.
Sincerely,
Signed by Warnick, Gregory
on 08/24/23
Gregory G. Warnick, Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating
Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Docket No. 050-00228
License No: R-98
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation
2. Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001
SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword
By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002
OFFICE DRSS/DIOR DRSS/DIOR NMSS/RDB DRSS/DD
NAME SAnderson MLaFranzo JParrott GMiller
SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 08/17/23 08/10/23 08/17/23 08/14/23
OFFICE C:DIOR
NAME GWarnick
SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 08/24/23
NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Aerotest Operations, Inc. Docket No: 050-00228
Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor License No: R-98
During an NRC inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, two violations of NRC requirements of
greater than minor significance were identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement
Policy, the violations are listed below:
A. NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that
whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition
2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the
NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.
Contrary to the above, from December 6, 2021, to June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to
maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel
Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel
elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to have a
qualified Certified Fuel Handler and a qualified Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor and
implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR CFH
Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the
qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel
Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the
reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of
spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant
emergencies.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.3).
B. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2, states, in part, detailed written procedures shall be
provided and followed for normal operating of all systems and components involving
nuclear safety at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor facility.
Technical Specifications Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron Survey Instrument as a
system.
Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5,
2021, section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if the meter is more
than 20 percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for
adjustment and/or repair.
Contrary to the above, on January 11, 2023, the licensee failed to route the survey meter
to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair when a meter was more than 20
percent off expected readings. Specifically, the licensee noted during a calibration of a
neutron monitor that the surface reading was expected to be 102 mrem/hr but rather was
150 mrem/hr, more than 20 percent of expected readings, and the survey meter was not
routed to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair. The neutron meter is a
component involving nuclear safety at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor
facility.
Enclosure 1
This is a Severity Level IV violation (NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.3).
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) 2.201,
Aerotest Operations, Inc. is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation
to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Director, Division of Radiological Safety
and Security, Region IV, 1600 E. Lamar Blvd., Arlington, TX 76011-4511, within 30 days
of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be
clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation and should include for each violation:
(1) the reason for the violation, or if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or
severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3)
the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be
achieved.
Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence if the
correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate reply is not
received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or a Demand for Information may be
issued requiring information as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or
revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is
shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.
If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with
the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.
Your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public
Document Room or in the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS), accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To
the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary or
safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.
If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,
then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that
should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you
request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response
that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding
(e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for
withholding confidential commercial or financial information).
Dated this 24th day of August 2023.
2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No: 050-00228
License No: R-98
Report No: 050-00228/2023-001
Licensee: Aerotest Operations, Inc.
Facility: Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
Location: 3455 Fostoria Way
San Ramon, California
Dates: June 27, 2023
Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson
Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Michael M. LaFranzo
Senior Health Physicist
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Jack D. Parrott
Senior Project Manager
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Accompanied By: Nathan A. Fuguet
Health Physicist
Reactor Decommissioning Branch
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Chief
Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch
Division of Radiological Safety and Security
Enclosure 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Aerotest Operations, Inc.
NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001
This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection
of licensed activities being conducted at the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
of Aerotest Operations, Inc. (licensee). The inspectors identified two Severity Level IV violations,
one minor violation, and opened one unresolved item. Other than the identified violations and the
one unresolved item, the licensee was conducting site activities in accordance with site
procedures, license requirements, and applicable NRC regulations.
Staffing and Audits
The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with its technical specifications
and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation
of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the Aerotest
Radiography and Research Reactor Certified Fuel Handler training and requalification
program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the technical specification
requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually. (Section 1.2)
Radiological Surveys
The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved
licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the
licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for
adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings.
One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration
program. (Section 2.2)
The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercise and drills as required by the
emergency plan and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in
accordance with their emergency plan commitments. (Section 3.2)
2
Report Details
Summary of Plant Status
On October 15, 2010, Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO or licensee), notified the NRC that they will
voluntarily not operate the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) reactor until
further decisions were made concerning the ownership issue (Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140289). By letter dated December 6,
2021, (ML21242A463), license amendment number 6 was issued, which revised Facility
Operating License No. 98 and the associated technical specifications to remove the authority to
operate ARRR, to authorize possession-only of the reactor and fuel, and removed all operational
requirements not needed for possession-only status.
By letter dated July 20, 2021 (ML21230A304), and supplemented by letter dated January 20,
2022 (ML22025A200), the licensee submitted a license amendment to the NRC for approval of
the Decommissioning Plan (DP) for ARRR. These submittals were made pursuant to Title 10 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.82, Termination of license, paragraph (b)(1),
which requires AO to apply for license termination within 2 years of permanently ceasing
operations and that each application for termination of a license be accompanied or preceded by
a proposed DP.
By letter dated April 11, 2022 (ML22098A092), the NRC accepted the amendment request
application to perform the technical review to approve the proposed DP.
1 Staffing and Audits (IP 69002)
1.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed that the staffing was maintained and that required audits were
conducted in accordance with the technical specification requirements.
1.2 Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed the licensees administrative requirements for staffing and
audits as required by the site license and technical specifications (TSs) 12.0. The
licensee organization was fully staffed except for a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and a
CFH Supervisor.
License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA
fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect
and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training
and Requalification Program. The document states the qualification, training, and
retraining of the CFH and CFH Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight
commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems
needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent
fuel, and response to plant emergencies. During review of the licensees organization
chart and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined the licensee
failed to implement the requirements of the ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program
to have a qualified CFH and CFH Supervisor, this is considered a violation of Licensee
Condition 2.C.(4) (VIO 050-00228/2023001-01).
3
The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor safeguards committee requirements and
verified the licensee maintained at least five members, of whom no more than three are
members of AO. The licensees records indicated that the reactor safeguards committee
consisted of five members, of which two were outside of AO. The requirements further
state that the committee shall meet on the call of the chairman and they shall meet at
least annually. The inspectors reviewed the committee meeting records and determined
that the committee did meet annually in 2018, 2019, 2020, and January and December
of 2022. The committee was not able to meet annually in 2021, but the committee did
meet in January 2022 to review the 2021 activities. Technical Specification 12.1.6
requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually.
Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at
least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a
minor violation of TS 12.1.6.
1.3 Conclusions
The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with the TSs and
completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation
of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the ARRR CFH
Training and Requalification Program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of
the TS requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually.
2 Radiological Surveys (IP 69002)
2.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed if required radiological surveys were performed in accordance
with approved licensee procedures.
2.2 Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiological survey program as required by the
site license and TS 12.2. The licensee had procedures associated with the radiological
survey program.
During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensees survey meter calibration
program associated with portable gamma and neutron detectors. The licensee
demonstrated the calibration program with a portable neutron survey instrument used by
the licensee detected approximately 150 mrem/hr on the surface of a neutron source
and the expected reading was 102 mrem/hr. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2 states, in
part, detailed written procedures shall be provided and followed for normal operation of
all systems and components involving nuclear safety at ARRR facility. Procedure
Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5, 2021,
section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if a meter is more than 20
percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for
adjustment and/or repair. Technical specification in Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron
Survey Instrument as a system. A review of calibration records for 2022 and 2023
showed that the neutron meter had detected approximately 150 mrem/hr while the
expected reading was 102 mrem, a difference of approximately 47 percent. The licensee
stated that the neutron survey meter was appropriately calibrated as the radiation
readings were consistent with past measurements. However, the calibration records for
4
January 5, 2021, were approximately 125 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102,
a difference of approximately 22.5 percent.
Although the values read were more than 20 percent of the expected reading, the
neutron survey instrument was not adjusted and/or sent for repair. Failure of the licensee
to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or
repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings is a violation of
TS 12.2.1.2 (VIO 050-00228/2023001-02). The licensee committed to send the neutron
meter for repairs to an appropriate contractor that could adjust and/or repair the
instrument.
In addition, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI 050-00228/2023001-003)
regarding the licensees calibration program. Procedure Instrument Calibration
Instruction - Safety Procedures references the use of NIST-traceable source for the
calibration of radiation detection instrumentation. A selected review of the
NIST-traceable source records indicated that the sources have Certificate of Calibration
dates for Thorium-230, Cesium-137, and Strontium/Yttrium-90 of December 15, 1989,
January 3, 1990, and December 19, 1989, respectively. Within the Thorium-230 and
Strontium/Yttrium-90 Certificate of Calibration record is a statement that it is
recommended that the source be recertified on an annual basis. Industry standards
regarding the certification of accuracy for NIST-traceable sources is typically one year.
However, the sources referenced above have calibration dates that exceed 30 years
and, in discussions with the licensee, these sources had not been recertified pursuant to
the recommendations on the Certificate of Calibration. The NRC has questioned the
accuracy of the NIST-traceable sources, barring radioactive decay, over such a long
period of time beyond recommended recertification. This unresolved item remains under
NRC review.
2.3 Conclusions
The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved
licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the
licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for
adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected
readings. One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees
calibration program.
3 Emergency Preparedness (IP 69002)
3.1 Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed if the licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises
and drills as required by the emergency plan and if the licensee completed emergency
preparedness training in accordance with the emergency plan commitments.
5
3.2 Observations and Findings
The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Section III of the licensees procedures
entitled General Emergency and Emergency Plan, dated as last reviewed by the
licensee on April 27, 2023, and the Emergency Plan for Possession Only dated
June 30, 2021. Specifically evaluated were completion of emergency preparedness
exercises and drills and emergency preparedness training and interaction with offsite
agencies that may be needed to assist in a radiological emergency.
The licensee had established emergency action levels in both the General Emergency
and Emergency Plan procedure and the Emergency Plan (EP). The inspectors verified
that, per the EP, unannounced emergency drills were held on a twice-yearly basis and
that there is a monthly test of the various automatic alarms associated with an
emergency (fire, earthquake resulting in damage to the fuel storage pool, bomb threat,
and reactor tank rupture). The inspectors verified that the emergency alarm system is
continuously monitored and that the alarm company monitors unauthorized entry, fire,
and radiation. The alarm company has instructions to notify pre-designated ARRR
personnel, the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and local law enforcement. The
inspectors also verified that annual refresher training of personnel with emergency
response responsibilities had been conducted within the last year, that drills, as required
by the EP, had been conducted twice yearly, and that a company vehicle was available
to transport contaminated personnel to the designated medical facility.
Two outside agencies are required by the EP to be notified in event of an emergency
requiring offsite assistance: the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and the
Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center in Pleasanton, CA. The inspectors
verified that the fire protection district personnel had visited the facility in the last year as
part of an annual inspection and interacted with the Radiation Safety Officer who is the
alternate Emergency Coordinator in the case of a radiological emergency. The
inspectors verified that the licensee had contacted the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley
Medical Center and had a signed agreement with them to admit radiation-exposed or
contaminated individuals requiring medical treatment. That agreement had been
renewed on May 23, 2023. In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had
identified the NRC on the notification list of agencies to be contacted in the event of a
facility emergency.
3.3 Conclusions
The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the
EP and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with its
EP commitments.
4 Exit Meeting Summary
On July 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to the Dr.
David M. Slaughter, President. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material
examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary information. No
proprietary information was identified.
6
SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
D. Slaughter, President and Reactor Administrator
T. Richey, Radiological Safety Officer
T. Holt, Radiation Safety Analyst
M. McCarthy, Nuclear Analyst
K. Reichert, Office Manager
INSPECTION PROCEDURE
IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000228/2023001-001 VIO Failure to implement the ARRR CFH Training and
Requalification Program. (Section 1.2)05000228/2023001-002 VIO Failure to route a neutron monitor to the electronics shop for
adjustment and/or repair if meter is more than 20% off
expected readings. (Section 2.2)05000228/2023001-003 URI NIST-Traceable sources recertification. (Section 2.2)
Closed
None
Discussed
None
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems
AO Aerotest Operations, Inc.
ARRR Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor
CFH Certified Fuel Handler
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DP Decommissioning Plan
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NOV Notice of Violation
POL Possession-Only License
TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic
TS Technical Specification
URI Unresolved Item
VIO Violation
7