IR 05000228/2012201
| ML13309A017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Aerotest |
| Issue date: | 11/01/2013 |
| From: | Mary Anderson Aerotest |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| EA-13-108, IR-12-201 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML13309A017 (7) | |
Text
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC.3455 FOSTORIA WAY * SAN RAMON, CA 94583 ° (925) 866-1212 ° FAX (925) 866-1716November 1, 2013ATTN: Document Control DeskU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-0001Re: Response to Apparent Violation in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228/2012-201; EA-13-108References:1. Letter from Mr. Lawrence (USNRC) to Ms. Sandra Warren, dated October 4,2013, Aerotest Operations, Inc. -Requesting Response to an Unresolved Item Identified inNRC Inspection Report No. 50-228/2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML1 3254A074).2. Letter from Sandra L. Warren to Mr. Spyros Traiforos (USNRC) dated August 15, 2013(ADAMS Accession No. ML1 3247A668).3. Letter from Sandra L. Warren to Mr. Spyros Traiforos (USNRC), dated January 11, 2012(ADAMS Accession No. ML12018A336).4. Letter from Johnny H. Eads (USNRC) to Ms. Sandra Warren, dated February 7, 2012,Aerotest Operations, Inc. -NRC Non-Routine Inspection Report No. 50-228/2012(ADAMS Accession No. ML 120310173).
Dear Mr. Kokajko:
The purpose of this letter is to provide Aerotest Operations, Inc.'s (Aerotest) response to theapparent violation described in the NRC's October 4, 2013 letter (Reference 1). In Reference 1,the NRC offered Aerotest the opportunity to respond to this apparent violation in writing beforethe NRC makes its enforcement decision and indicated that this response is due within 30 days ofthe date of Reference 1. Reference 1 also states that if Aerotest chooses to provide a writtenresponse, it should include (I)-the reason for the apparent violation or, if contested, the basis fordisputing the apparent violation; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the resultsachieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance willbe achieved. The following sections provide the requested information.Aerotest accepts the apparent violation and has taken prompt corrective action to return tocompliance. Aerotest believes the apparent violation was of low significance and should beassessed as a Severity Level IV violation. Further, Aerotest believes the circumstancesA subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
surrounding the apparent violation meet the criteria for a non-cited violation (NCV) and shouldbe disposed of as such.Section V of this letter provides the basis for Aerotest's request as tosignificance and severity level.However, as discussed in Section VI below, should the NRC assess the apparent violation'ssignificance as greater than a Severity Level IV and issue a Notice of Violation (NOV), Aerotestbelieves that no civil penalty should be assessed.I. REASON FOR THE APPARENT VIOLATIONIn December 2011 during annual fuel inspections, Aerotest identified non-displaced cracks in thecladding of four aluminum fuel. elements. Aerotest promptly reported this circumstance to theNRC via telephone and documented this conversation in a follow-up letter to the NRC.' OnJanuary 17 and 18, 2012, the NRC carried out a non-routine inspection of selected activities andidentified an Unresolved Item associated with the cracks in the cladding. Aerotest TechnicalSpecification 1.0.2 provides that "the reactor shall not be operated whenever there are significantdefects in fuel elements, control rods or control circuitry." Because it could not be determinedwhen the cracks in the cladding occurred, the NRC Staff concluded that it was possible that thereactor had been in violation of Technical Specification 10.2.Aerotest fuel inspection procedures require that 20 percent of the fuel be inspected every yearand that 100 percent of the fuel be inspected after every fifth repositioning of the fuel elements.The December 2011 inspection was a 100 percent fuel inspection. To monitor for any possiblechanges in the fuel, Aerotest carried out another 100 percent fuel inspection in 2012. In the 2012inspection, Aerotest identified an additional 17 fuel elements with cracked cladding. In 2013,Aerotest inspected all non-canned aluminum fuel elements and identified two additionalassemblies with cracked cladding.Most of the fuel elements with cracked cladding were last inspected in 2006, the last time, priorto 2011, that a 100 percent fuel inspection was performed. Inspections prior to 2011 did notidentify the cladding cracks, and thus, the cracks likely developed sometime between 2006 and2011. From 2006 through October 15, 2010, the reactor had been operated to performradiography, surveillance testing, and training. Since most of the fuel identified with crackedcladding had not been inspected since 2006, it is possible that this cracked cladding existedduring the time that the reactor was in operation, which would be a violation of TechnicalSpecification 10.2. The reason that this violation occurred is that Aerotest's fuel inspectionprocedures did not identify fuel cladding indications that could develop into cladding cracksduring operation and prior to the next scheduled inspection. Thus, the inspection program onlyidentified such defects after the fact.II. THE CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND THE RESULTSACHIEVEDAerotest developed a project plan and procedures to address the affected fuel assemblies. Asdescribed in Reference 1, Aerotest took prompt corrective action upon identifying the crackedSee Reference 3.A subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
fuel assemblies, including (1) placing all the undamaged fuel into proper storage locations insidethe reactor tank, (2) fabricating specially designed canisters to contain the damaged fuelelements, (3) placing each fuel element with cracked cladding (with the exception of tworecently identified damaged fuel elements 2) into one of the specially design canisters, and (4)conditioning the fuel with helium gas, sealing the canisters, and placing each of the canisters in aspecially designed and fabricated storage rack.3Aerotest also revised its Critical Assembly and Power Calibration procedure to discontinue therequirement to perform quarterly and semi-annual tests that required raising control rods whilethe reactor is in shutdown mode.Il. THE CORRECTIVE STEPS THAT WILL BE TAKENNo further action is required. The Aerotest reactor has been shut down since October 15, 2010.The core is defueled and all fuel is in the storage racks. The control rods and drives areremoved. As long as Aerotest remains shutdown, there is no further potential to operate withsignificant fuel defects in violation of Technical Specification 10.2.IV. THE DATE WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE ACHIEVEDAerotest is in full compliance.V. THE VIOLATION WAS OF LOW SIGNIFICANCE AND SHOULD BEASSESSED AS A LEVEL IV NON-CITED VIOLATIONThrough its Enforcement Policy,4 the NRC seeks to deter noncompliance with its regulations andto encourage prompt identification and prompt, comprehensive correction of violations of NRCrequirements.5 Application of the Enforcement Policy ensures that enforcement actions reflectthe safety or security significance of a violation.6The first step in the enforcement process is assessing the violations severity or significancelevel.7 The severity levels range from I (highest) to IV (lowest).8 The NRC evaluates fourcriteria in determining a violation's significance: (1) were there actual safety consequences; (2)were there potential safety consequences; (3) did the violation impact the regulatory process; and2 As described in Reference 2, Aerotest has not canned the two fuel elements identified with cracked cladding in the2013 inspections. Aerotest intends to observe these elements over the next year to gather information about cladcracking in aluminum elements.3Reference 1 at 2.4General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions, available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html (last visited October. 22, 2013) (Enforcement Policy).Id. at 5.6 Id.7 Id. at 8.8 Id. at 10-11.A subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
(4) was the violation willful.9 The enforcement policy defines Severity Level IV violations asviolations that "are less serious, but are more than minor concern, that resulted in no or relativelyinappreciable safety or security consequences."'10After assessing a violation's significance, NRC will determine how to disposition the violation.Violations can be dispositioned as NCVs, cited in NOVs, or issued with civil penalties andorders." For example, a Level IV violation at a facility without a corrective action program,such as Aerotest, can be dispositioned as an NCV if it meets four criteria: (1) the licenseeidentified the violation; (2) the licensee corrected or committed to correct the violation within areasonable amount of time committed to by the end of inspection, including immediatecorrective action and comprehensive action to prevent recurrence; (3) the violation is notrepetitive as a result of inadequate corrective action; and (4) the violation is not willful.12Based on these criteria for evaluating the significance and disposition of violations, Aerotestbelieves the apparent violation of Technical Specification 10.2 should be assessed as a SeverityLevel IV violation and disposed of as an NCV.A. NRC should assess the violation's significance as Level IV.Aerotest believes this incident should be assessed as a Severity Level IV violation on the NRC'ssignificance scale.1. Actual Safety ConsequencesThere were no actual safety consequences as a result of the incident. As provided in Reference1, the actual radiological consequences were low in that "no detectable airborne releases or localor environmental contamination were identified in or around the facility." Additionally, theamount of radionuclides identified in the fuel pool water was far below the effluent concentrationlimits provided in 10 C.F.R. Part 20.2. Potential Safety ConsequencesThe potential safety consequences were low because the TRIGA fuel is ceramic and remainsintact. Also, there is continuous air and water monitoring that would alert operators of anysignificant degradation of the fuel during operation or fuel movement and the pool waterchemistry is monitored monthly to identify any degrading trends. Thus, water and air monitoringwould have detected significant releases of fission products prior to impacting workers or theenvironment.9Id. at 8-9.10Id. at 11.I ld. at 13-15.12 Id. at 14-15.A subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
3. Impact on NRC's Regulatory ProcessThis incident did not adversely impact NRC's regulatory process. According to the EnforcementPolicy, an adverse impact on NRC's regulatory process occurs when a violation consists of anyfailure to provide the NRC with required information or notice of any changes to licensedactivities. This violation does not meet those criteria. Aerotest notified its assigned NRCinspector and Program Manager promptly upon discovery of the cracked cladding and providedfrequent updates both verbally and in writing, including daily status updates during the 2012inspections.4. WillfulnessThe violation was not willful. Aerotest identified the fuel cladding cracks after the reactor hadbeen shut down for over a year and was unaware that the fuel was cracked during any periods ofoperation.5. ConclusionFor the reasons stated above, this non-willful violation should be assessed as a Severity Level IVbecause it resulted in "no or relatively inappreciable safety or security consequences."'14B. NRC should dispose of the violation as an NCV.In addition to being assessed as a Severity Level IV violation, Aerotest believes the violationshould be disposed of as an NCV. Severity Level IV violations are normally dispositioned asNCVs. The Enforcement Policy provides that a Severity Level IV violation will be dispositionedas an NCV if: (1) the licensee identified the violation; (2) the licensee corrected or committed tocorrect the violation within a reasonable period of time; (3) the violation is not repetitive as aresult of inadequate corrective action; and (4) the violation is not willful.15As already detailed in this letter, the violation does not meet any of these criteria. Aerotestidentified the assemblies with cracked cladding, and that technical specifications would notallow operation with these fuel assemblies. Aerotest took prompt action to correct the situation.This apparent violation is not a repeat of a previous violation and this apparent violation was notdue to inadequate corrective action associated with any previous violation. Aerotest followed itsprocedures for inspecting the fuel and these procedures were successful in identifying thedamaged fuel assemblies. However, the procedures were not adequate to identify fuel that coulddevelop cracked cladding during operation prior to the next inspection. The violation was notwillful as Aerotest was unaware that the fuel cladding was cracked during while the reactor wasbeing operated and became aware of the cracking only after the reactor had been shut down forover a year.13d__. at 9.14Id. at 11.15Id. at 14-15.A subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
VI. IF THE NRC ASSESSES THE APPARENT VIOLATION AS LEVEL III, NOCIVIL PENALTY SHOULD BE ASSESSEDShould the NRC assess the significance of the apparent violation as greater than Severity LevelIV, no civil penalty should be assessed. According to the Enforcement Policy, a Severity LevelIII violation that receives credit for both identification and corrective action will be assessed nocivil penalty. 6 Aerotest should receive credit in both regards. As described Aerotest identifiedthe damaged fuel assemblies through its inspection procedures and took prompt correctiveaction. In Reference 1, NRC stated that Aerotest's "corrective actions were completed in atimely manner and with an appropriate focus on occupational radiation safety, and the NRC hasdetermined that credit is warranted for [Aerotest's] corrective actions."17Therefore, Aerotest should not be assessed a civil penalty for this violation.If you have any questions concerning this letter or need further information please contactSandra Warren at 925-866-1212.
Sincerelyyours,Michael AndersonPresidentcc: Lawrence E. Kokajko, DirectorDivision of Policy and RulemakingOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation16 Id. at 17.17 Reference 1 at 2.A subsidiary of Autoliv ASP, INC.
Shipping Memo for 13ATC 162279Page 1 of 1Autoliv ASP, Inc.attn: Mike Anderson1320 Pacific DriveAuburn Hills MI 48326United StatesShipper/Pkg. ListSID Number Date13ATC1622791SHIPT0United States Nuclear Regulatory Commissionattn: Document Control DeskMail Stop 012-G13Office of Nuclear Reactor RegulationWashington, DC 20555-0001United StatesSupplier No. Reimbursable If Return, Property Of Contact Contact Phone Cost CenterIndicateDo Not Bill Company Ruth Wilkening +1-248-276-0722 16050Total Required Total Ship Total Ship Total GrossFreight Carrier Freight Charge Freight Charge Date Containers Cost WeightShippers Discretion 0.0 USD 11/04/2013 1 0 USD 0 lbCost Center160501.0 EA -legal document/CARRIER'S SIGNATURE XSHIPPER/REPRESENTATIVE XSIGNATURE0.0000,: 0.0 lbDATEDATEDATERECEIVED BY SIGNATUREXhttp://ana-web03.na.autoliv.int/DSA/ServShipMemoSave11/1/2013