ML23157A066
| ML23157A066 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Aerotest |
| Issue date: | 05/24/2023 |
| From: | Slaughter D Aerotest |
| To: | Brooke Clark, Lummis C, Padilla A NRC/SECY, US SEN (Senate) |
| References | |
| 21-012 | |
| Download: ML23157A066 (16) | |
Text
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC.
3455 FOSTORIA WAY
- SAN RAMON, CA 94583 * (925) 866-1212
- FAX (925) 866-1716
May 24, 2023
US Senator Cynthia Lummis Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510
US Senator Alex Padilla 112 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510
RE: Inadequate Oversight of Non-Power Reactor OIG Case No.21-012, and requested payment for Damages caused by the NRC's Inadequate Oversight
=
Background===
5/30/12 Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC put in an application for direct transfer of License of Aerotest Operations ARRR license R-98 7/24/13 NRC denied the Indirect Transfer 8/13/13 Aerotest Operations, Inc and Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC put in a joint demand for a hearing on the Denial (Docket 50-228-LT) 2/28/17 Order Issued Approving the Indirect Transfer (Docket id NRC-2012-0286) 7/17/17 Sales and Transfer of ownership to Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC 1/22/19 Letter to Maureen E. Wylie, NRC CFO for reimbursement for NRC fees for activities that were not performed in a satisfactory manner.
(ML19030A581) 11/11/20 Letter to Cherish K Johnson, NRC CFO Reply to Maureen E. Wylie's letter on detailed information by invoice for activities that were not performed in a satisfactory manner. (ML20325Al 76) 1/19/21 NRC IG Office Investigation Begins (IG's office copied on documents to NRC starting on 1/22/19) 4/30/21 Letter from Cherish K Johnson denying reimbursement ofNRC Fees for activities associated with the fees that were not performed in a satisfactory manner. (ML21056A317) 3/29 /23 Letter to Mariam Zober, Deputy General Counsel, NRC claiming
$9,836,645.97 in damages from the NRC (ML23094A070) 5/2/23 FOIA Request OIG Case 21-012 (8/17/22) 5/4/23 Letter from Mariam Zober, Deputy General Counsel, NRC denying claiming of $9,836,645.97 in damages from the NRC (ML23124A084) 5/12/23 Received the JG report 21-012 dated 8/17/22 showing NRC's Inadequate Oversight in 5 areas.
US Senator Letter Dated May 24, 2023 Page 1 of 3
Dear US Senators Cynthia Lummis (Wy) and Alex Padilla (Ca):
I appreciate your continued attention to what occurred with Aerotest Operations Inc and the NRC staff. The NRC had a fiduciary duty to ensure that Aerotest ' s operated safely and complied with NRC regulations. As seen from NRC own staff documents, AO documents, and the OIG investigation (Case No.21-012) that the NRC failed, over a number of years both in safety and enforcing the NRC regulations, which left me with a reactor with 22 damaged elements and policies and procedures that did not meet NRC regulations although the prior inspections said they were in compliance. Also, some of the actions of the NRC staff perpetuated an environment of fear of retaliation among the operators.
My damages total over $9,836,645.97. For a resolution of the dispute, I proposed in the letter to Mariam Zober, Deputy General Counsel, NRC. an out-of-court settlement of
$2,000,000 in cash to assist in the purchase of fuel elements and $3,000,000 in NRC Credits for their future work if settled by June 30, 2023. Unfortunately, she declined the offer with no counteroffer. I am preparing for litigation and want your assistance in having the NRC Commission reconsider their position and take responsibility for their agency's actions. While you both are members of the NRC oversight committee, Senator Lummus, represents the State of Wyoming that is embarking on a design build of a new nuclear-power reactor. and Senator Padilla represents the State of California where Diablo Canyon power plants are to be relicensed. Given your responsibilities, it is important that you be aware of how this agency complies with its duties and obligations.
As your staff members have requested previously, I have attached the OIG investigation report Case 21-012. It is interesting that this OIG C21-012 report summarizes inadequate oversight of the Aerotest Reactor in 5 specific areas. The report is based on reviewing the past NRC and Aerotest operations and regulatory documents of activities, interviews with relevant Aerotest Operations and NRC staff. The report only provided a small number of representative examples of the NRC staff failures (the tip of the iceberg). The OIG investigators chose not to investigate the NRC Staffs numerous financial improprieties.
Also, the OIG investigation did not include the "chilling effect" that the NRC staff actions had on Aerotest operating staff. This included the belief that some of the actions by the NRC staff were punitive and retaliatory in nature.
I am mandated by law to pay for the services of the NRC staff and their associated costs.
The investigation, supports my claim of maleficence and demonstrated NRC staff performance and actions in critical areas were substandard, and were not done in a reasonable and fair way that provided value to us as required in 31 USC 9701 "Fees and charges for Government services and things of value."
Please assist me in obtaining from the NRC an out-of-court settlement of $2,000,000 in cash to assist in the purchase of fuel elements and $3,000,000 in NRC Credits for their future work. (To expedite the possibility of reconsideration, I have included the NRC Commission in this communication.) In preparation for litigation, I will be in Washington DC the week of June 19, 2023, and can meet with you and/or your staff. Please let me know your interest.
US Senator Letter Dated May 24, 2023 Page 2 of 3 If you need any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me at dmsra *en<a,gm a il.com or (801) 631-5919
I declare under the penalty of perjury that the statement made in this letter and enclosures are correct and truthful to the best of my knowledge.
Respectfully,
~~\\--
David M Slaughter, PhD AO President, Reactor Administrator, General Manager. NRC-RO and Manager CEO Nuclear Labyrinth LLC.
Enclosures:
OIG Case No.21-012 Report dated 8-17-22
CC:
Brooke P. Clark Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-16 B33 Washington, DC 20555-0001
NRC Exec Sec @nrc.gov
Commissioners Christopher T. Hanson, Jeff Baran, David A. Wright, Annie Caputo, and Bradley R. Crowell
Howard K Osborne CFO U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Chief Financial Officer Division of the Comptroller Labor Administration and Fee Billing Branch Mail Stop T9 850 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Marian Zober Deputy General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop 0-15 D-21 Washington, DC 20555-0001
US Senator Letter Dated May 24, 2023 Page 3 of 3 OFFICIAL USE 6NLY OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
DATE: August 17, 2022
TO: Concur: Case Closed Malion A Bartley Assistant Inspector General for Investigations
THROUGH:
THROUGH: rb)(7)(C)
FROM:
SUBJECT:
INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT OF NON-POWER REACTOR (OIG CASE NO.21-012)
ALLEGATION
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG), NRC, received several allegations over the past few years regarding the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR). While the alleger also expressed concerns regarding inappropriate billing and ineffective licensing processes, the investigation focused on the allegations that the NRC failed to provide adequate regulatory oversight and inspections at the ARRR until it voluntarily ceased operations in 2010.
POTENTIAL VIOLATIONS
The potential violations relevant to this investigation are 10 C.F.R. 20.1101, Radiation Protection Programs; 10 C.F.R. 20.1201, Occupational Dose Limits for Adults; 10 C.F.R. 50.36, Technical Specifications; 10 C.F.R. 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments; 10 C.F.R. 50.90, Application for Amendment of License, Construction Permit, or Early Site Permit;Section I 04( c) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA); lnspection Manual Chapter 2545; Research and Test Reactor Inspection Program; and Inspection Procedure 69001, Class ll Research and Test Reactors.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION fNFORMATION THIS DOCUMENT IS TifE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENER.\\L (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED OUTSLDE THE RECEIVING AGENCY WITHOUT OIG'S PERMISSION.
NRC Headquarters I 115S5 Rockville Pike I Rockville, Maryland 20852 I 301.415.5930 www.nrcoig.oversight.gov OFFlCIAL USE ONLY=OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
FINDINGS
FINDING#!: THENRC FAILEDTOADEOUATELY OVERSEE DAMAGED FUEL
Despite the NRC' s December 2013 issuance of a Severity Level IV violation for willfully operating the reactor with damaged fuel from approximately 2006 through 2010, the OIG found the NRC failed to adequately oversee damaged fuel at the ARRR even though NRC inspection reports and an inspector follow-up item issued in 2005 identified that ARRR's reactor fuel elements showed signs of wear typically associated with long term use. During routine inspection activities between 2000 and 2010, the NRC identified potential precursors to fuel cladding damage through records review of the ARRR's annual reports and periodic fuel element inspections. Furthennore, in 2007, the licensee identified a cracked fuel element noted in the fuel inspection records that was not reported in the NRC Inspection Report.
Figure 1: Cracked fuel element at the AAAR
Source: Image obtained from video provided by the licensee.
FINDING #2: THE NRC FAILED TO IDENTIFY CHANGES TO THE FACILITY LICENSING BASIS
The NRC staff did not identify that the licensee made several changes to the facility that may not have been in accordance with IO C.F.R. 50.59 or IO C.F.R. 50.90. For example, the ARRR operated with a mixed core in the 1990s or earlier, and it continued to do so between 2000 and 2010, the time of the OIG investigation's focus.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OlG INVESTIGATION JNFORJ\\ilA TION THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OP THE INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG). lF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CO:"ITENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE RECEIVlNG AGENCY WITHOLT OIG'S PERMISSIOK 2
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OlG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
FINDING #3: THE NRC FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE EXCEEDANCE OF A DOSE LIMIT AND THE LICENSEE'S DEPARTURE FROM AN AS LOW AS REASONABLY ACHIEVABLE CULTURE
While the reactor operated within the regulatory limits of radiation exposure, the licensee had departed from an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) culture. The NRC was not able to take action in this area because the inspector did not identify a violation of federal dose limits or license condition. However, the OIG ' s review of personnel exposure levels revealed one employee that may have been above the NRC's occupational dose limit, which could have been a violation had it been identified at the time.
FINDING #4: THE ARRR HAD INADEQUATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PER TITLE 10 C.F.R. 50.36
Although the regulatory framework allows licensees to operate with the technical specifications approved with the granting of the initial operating license, the OIG found the ARRR ' s technical s pecifications missed specific values or actions that would ensure safety.
FINDING #5: THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT PROVIDED TO NON-POWER REACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED
Although the AEA guides the NRC to provide the "minimum amount of regulation" required for the NRC to fulfill its regulatory obligations, the OIG found less than adequate training, guidance documents, and subject matter experts (i.e., a non-power reactor equivalent to the project engineer for power reactors) in the NRC to assist research and test reactor (RTR) inspectors.
BASIS OF FINDINGS
BACKGROUND
The ARRR is a non-power reactor located in San Ramon, California, whose initial license was granted in July 1965. The ARRR used the Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) fuel design elements inside its core. The reactor's primary use was a neutron source for neutron or ' 'N-ray" radiography and was licensed for a maximum thermal power level of250 kilowatts. Its products and services included analysis, criticality, irradiation, non-destructive testing, and radiographic equipment. For example, neutron radiography can ensure the correct assembly and positioning of small explosive devices, detect hidden corrosion in aluminum components, inspect mechanical systems, and verify the integrity of welds. Figure 2 provide s a chronology since 2000.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=-OIG INV ESTIGATION INFORMATIO N T HI S DO CUMENT IS TH E PROPERT Y OF THE U. S. NU CL EAR REG ULA T ORY COM M ISSIO N, OFFI CE O f T H E l NS P ECr OR GENE R 4.L (OI G). IF L O AN ED TO AN OTH E R A GE NCY, IT AND IT S C O NT EN T S ARE NOT T O BE RE PR O DUCED OR DI STR I BUTED O UTS ID E TH E R EC E IV ING AG ENCY WITHOl 'T OIG 'S PERMI SS IO N.
3 OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION lNFORMATION
Figure 2: Recent chronology
2000 Autoliv, Inc., a foreign entity, acquired ARRR through intermediate acquisition of several wholly owned companies as part of a distressed asset sale.
April 2005 ARRR applied timely for its license renewal in 2005, with supplemental letters to the NRC in 2008, 2009 and 2010, and continued to operate under the timely renewal provisions of 10 C.F.R. 2.109, Effect of Timely Renewal Application, after its license expired on April 15, 2005.
July 2009 Due to ARRR's foreign ownership, the NRC issued a proposed denial of the license renewal.
October 2010 ARRR voluntarily ceased commercial operations.
February 2011 The NRC issued Confirmatory Action Letter No. NRR-2011-001.
December 2011 ARRR discovered four cracked fuel elements during its fuel element inspection.
January 2012 ARRR reported cracks to the NRC and then conducted a 100 percent fuel element inspection, which identified 22 cracked fuel elements.
December 2013 The NRC issued ARRR a Notice of Violation based on the Apparent Violation, EA-13-108, for operating the reactor between 2006 and 2010 with fuel elements that had significant cracks in the cladding.
November 2017 ARRR was purchased and granted a license transfer to Nuclear Labyrinth, LLC, which became the new licensee.
March 2019 ARRR submits License Amendment Request to prepare for fuel storage and decommissioning activities.
December 2021 The NRC issued ARRR partial approval for a Possession Only License.
The reactor is in the decommissioning process.
FINDING# l: THE NRC FAILED TO ADEQUATELY OVERSEE DAMAGED FUEL
Our review of documents revealed that on December 18, 2013, the NRC issued the ARRR a Notification of Violation against Technical Specification 10.2 for operating the reactor "from an indeterminate period of time beginning at a point after the last full inspection in 2006 up until October 15, 2010, when the facility ceased reactor operation, the licensee operated the reactor with significant defects in the fuel elements." The first four cracked elements were discovered in late 2011, and in a subsequent fuel inspection, 22 fuel elements were identified as having varying degrees of discoloration, blistering, swelling, and/or cracking in the aluminum cladding. These characteristics represented a significant defect in the fuel elements and the potential loss of the integrity of a fission product barrier.
OFFECIAL USE ONLY=OIG INVESTIGA TlON INFORJ\\1A TION THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSION, OFFICE OF TIIE INSPECroR GENERAL (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CONTE!'.TS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE RECEIVING AGENCY WITH OCT OIG'S PERMISSION.
4 OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OIG lNVESTIGATION INFORMATION
NUREG /CR-2387, Credible Accident Analyses for TRIGA and TRIGA-Fueled Reactors, states on page 35:
"The usual evaluation criteria for fuel elements are based on bowing, elongation or visual changes in the cladding. These parameters are used to estimate fuel serviceability an apparently give a reliable indication of thermal gradients to which the fuel element has been subjected during its operating history. In addition, the long-term effects of fuel bumup create swelling of the fuel moderator that presumably would also be indicated by changes in fuel element dimensions. Fuel elements that have been pulsed may have cracking or fracturing of the fuel-moderator, which would not be observed during the fuel inspections."
The NRC's Technical Training Center does not provide training to RTR inspectors on fuel inspection s, and any information on fuel element damage would be in Course R-800,
"Perspectives on Reactor Safety." TTC staff told us that it was exceedingly rare in a non-power reactor to reach a point of damage, and it was such an unlikely event that other areas of non power reactors were covered instead. The staff also told the OIG that if an RTR inspector was unsure about a topic not covered in training, the inspector should ensure the topic is addressed through mentoring. RTR inspectors have 3 months of basic training, and then 2 years oflearning in the field before they are certified. A current RTR inspector told the OIG that the qualification process depends on the individual, but it takes at least 6 months to a year.
Inspection Procedure 69001, Class II Research and Test Reactors, is applicable to NRC inspections conducted at the ARRR. Its references include Regulatory Guide 2.3, Quality Verification for Plate-Type Uranium-Aluminum Fuel Elements for Use in Research Reactors,
July 1967, and ANSI/ANS-15.2, Quality Control for Plate-Type Uranium-Aluminum Fuel Elements, 1974. These documents are provided to assist in the receipt of new fuel, focusing on their quality requirements, but the guidance does not address irradiated fuel inspection, similar to the criteria discussed in NUREG /CR-2387, Credible Accident Analysis for TRIGA and TRIGA Fueled Reactors, April 1982.
The NRC RTR inspector who performed inspections at the ARRR between 2000 and 2020 said he and other R TR inspectors were not trained on damaged fuel, and he had not seen NUREG /CR-2387 before we provided it to him to review the parameters for fuel evaluat ion.
The RTR inspector said he was not aware of fuel damage issues when he took over the ARRR from the previously assigned inspector.
The NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228 /2005-20 l states the inspector reviewed data sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer forms for 2003, 2004, and 2005. It also states that although reactor fuel was not required to be inspected, the licensee continued to inspect 20 percent of the fuel elements annually to remain cognizant of the physical status of the fuel. The licensee noted that several fuel elements had been deformed such that they were stuck in the reactor core, making them difficult to move.
The RTR inspector stated it was the licensee's responsibility " to keep up with their fuel," and he
OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG I NVESTIGATIO N INFORMATIO N THIS DO CUMENT IS T HE PROP E R TY OF T H E U.S. NUC L EAR REG UL ATORY C O MM IS SIO N, O FF ICE OF T II E lNSPECTO k GENERAL (OI G). IF LO ANED TO AN O T HER AGE NCY, IT A ND ITS CONTE NT S ARE NOT T O BE RE PROD UCE D OR DI STRJ BUTED O UTS ID E THE RECE IVI NG AG ENCY WITHO UT OIG ' S P E RMI SS IO N.
5 OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
was aware the reactor core's older fuel had aluminum cladding and the newer fuel had stainles s steel cladding. He "thought that was unusual that they would have stuck elements." Based on this information and to ensure the deformation was not a precursor to a more significant issue, the inspector told us he opened Inspector Follow-up Item 50-228 /2005-201-02, to rev iew the licensee's conduct of complete inspections of fuel elements in the core. However, the cover letter of the 2005 Inspection Report, dated May 23, 2005, addressed to the licensee stated,
"Based on the results of this inspection, no safety concerns or noncompliances ofNRC requirements were identified."
The NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228 /2007-20 I states that the inspector reviewed data sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer forms for 2005, 2006, and 2007. Again, the inspection report points out that there was no requirement for the licensee to inspect the fuel, stating:
"As a result of the fuel problem, the licensee decided to remove all fuel possible from the core and conduct an inspection of all the fuel elements. In January 2006, those elements that could be removed were placed in storage. The licensee then used a moveable camera and monitor set-up to conduct an inspection of those elements that were "stuck" in place. After that was completed, an inspection of all the remaining elements was also completed and the elements were returned to their original positions in the core. No new or unusual problems were identified."
We reviewed the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer for the ARRR' s 2006 inspection, finding that that 20 fuel elements and 5 graphite elements were indicated as stuck in the reactor core.
During this inspection, the RTR inspector also closed out Inspector Follow-up ltem 228/2005-201-02. In addition to referencing the licensee's 2006 inspection, he wrote:
"To further help with this problem, the licensee had developed a plan to purchase enough new fuel elements over time to replace the ones that cannot be removed from the core. Once enough fuel is on hand, the reactor core will be defueled.
Then the top grid plate will be raised slightly and the remaining "stuck" elements will be worked out of their positions and out of the core. Then the new fuel elements will be placed in their positions. This issue is considered closed."
The cover letter of the 2007 Inspection Report, dated June 22, 2007, addressed to the licensee stated, "Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified" (2007); however, when we reviewed the 2007 Data Sheet for Fuel and Graphite Transfer,
element 631 E listed "crack" in the Comments and was removed from the core and placed into a storage rack. The NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228/2007-201 states the inspector reviewed the 2007 Data Sheet for Fuel and Graphite Transfer during that inspection. However, when the RTR inspector was shown the 2007 Data Sheet for Fuel and Graphite Transfer, he did not recall seeing the fuel element listed with ' 'crack" in the comments, and ifhe had, he said he would have included it in his inspection report and called his branch chief and the ARRR project manager to ask how they wanted him to proceed.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OIG IN VESTIGATION lN F OR l\\tATIO N THIS DO CUMENT IS THE PROP E RT Y OF T UE U.S. NUCLEA R REGULA TORY C O MM ISSIO N, O FF ICE OF T II E I NS P ECrOR G ENERAL (OI G ). IF LOANE D TO AN OTHER AGENCY, IT AN D IT S CO NT EN T S ARE NO T T O B E R E PROD UCE D O R DI ST RIB UTED O UTS IDE TH E RECEIVI NG AG ENCY W IT HO UT OI G'S PE R.1\\-'II SS ION.
6 OFFICIAL USE: ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228 /2009-201 states that the inspector reviewed data sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer forms for 2008 and 2009. The inspector repeated information from prior years' inspection reports, including that the licensee was not required to inspect the reactor fuel and that the licensee had a "fuel 'sticking' problem," which prompted it to remove all fuel possible from the core and inspect those elements stuck in place in January 2006. The cover letter of the 2009 Inspection Report, dated July l, 2009, addressed to the licensee stated, "Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified. "
During the ARRR ' s 2011 fuel inspection, the licensee discovered four cracked fuel elements,
which it reported to the NRC in January 2012. The licensee subsequently conducted a 100 percent fuel element inspection and identified 22 cracked fuel elements. On December 18, 2013,
the NRC issued the ARRR a Notification of Violation against Technical Specification 10.2 for operating the reactor with significant defects in the fuel elements during the time between the last full fuel inspection in 2006 up until October 15, 2010, when the facility ceased reactor operation.
Our review of inspection reports for the ARRR revealed there had been reports of stuck fuel rods as far back as 1980 ; likewise, we reviewed Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer from I 994 to 2012 and found that of the 22 cracked elements initially identified, 7 had been stuck in the reactor core since the 1990s. Three of the initial four fuel elements to be identified by the licensee as cracked - 590E, 628E, and 1201E - had been reported on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer as stuck in 2003, 1994, and 1994, respectively. Of the 17 fuel elements that were inside the reactor core at the time of discovery, l 4 of them had been previously indicated as stuck on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer (see Exhibits 1 and 2).
The RTR inspector said that not acting sooner to report and resolve the stuck fuel was his "mistake," and that he should not have closed IFl-50-228 /2005-201-02 until he had verified that the licensee completed its plan of action. He explained he was too reliant on "the experience of the project manager and the people above" him when deciding how to handle issues found during his inspections. The RTR inspector did not say why no violation was issued until 2013, except that the decision would have been a consensus judgement call. The RTR inspector said,
" Typically, if one of these research reactors has a rod that is stuck or they're inspecting them and see a little damage ofany sort, they just put it aside in storage and won't re-use it. This facility was very unique in that they did not do that... So they just operated with the damaged fuel." He said that training and guidance could be improved.
FINDING #2: THE NRC FAILED TO IDENTIFY CHANGES TO THE FACILITY LICENSING BASIS
Our review of annual reports revealed that NRC staff had likely not identified that the licensee 's changes to the facility may not have been in accordance with 10 C.F.R. 50.59 or 10 C.F.R. 50.90 because they did not appear in change documentation or revisions to the license or technical specifications. Some changes include the following:
- Vacuum tube rate meter to solid state rate meter ;
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OIG IN V ESTIGATIO N IN FOR l\\lATIO N THIS DO CUMENT IS TH E PROP ERTY O F TH E U. S. NU C LEA R REGU L ATORY CO MM ISSIO N, O FF ICE OF T II E INS P ECro K GENERAL (OI G). IF LOANE D TO AN OTHE R AG ENCY, IT AN O IT S CO NT ENTS ARE NOT TO BE R E PROD UC ED OR DI ST RI B UT E D O UT S ID E TH E RECE I V ING AG ENCY WITHO UT OIG 'S PER.IVII SS IO!\\.
7 OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG lNVESTIGATION INFORMATION
- BF3 proportional counter to boron-lined proportional counter;
- Use of new rod drop technique;
- Use of TRIG A fuel with different weight percentage and cladding type; and,
- Operation with mixed core of fuel elements with different characteristics.
We asked the RTR inspector about these changes made to the ARRR in the 1990s or earlier before his assignment there, and he said some of these changes in his mind "would have triggered some type of 50.59 review and/or evaluation." He explained that swapping out a component with a duplicate component is a replacement, not a change, and no 10 C.F.R. 50.59 evaluation is required, but if a component is changed to something different, an evaluation must be completed to ensure the functions remain the same.
While the ARRR operated with a mixed core in the 1990s or earlier, it continued to do so during the time of our investigation's focus-between 2000 and 2010. The licensing basis for the reactor was specific to a particular fuel element, and there were no NRC inspection reports identifying the receipt and use of a different fuel element. This investigation did not identify any licensing actions, inspection activities, or licensee 10 C.F.R. 50.59 documentation regarding use of the different model fuel element.
The RTR inspector said he did not think that a 10 C.F.R 50.59 evaluation was required if the licensee merely changed the cladding of the fuel from aluminum to stainless steel, but that if the weight percent of the fuel element changed from 8.5 weight percent to something different or if the type of fuel changed, such an evaluation would need to be completed. He said that if had he noticed the ARRR was operating with a mixed core of aluminum and stainless steel and 8.5 weight percent and 12 weight percent, he would have looked for a 10 C.F.R 50.59 evaluation.
The RTR inspector said the ARRR did not use the IO C.F.R. 50.59 process often as they operated with the same equjpment and same facilities for many years.
Furthermore, the OIG reviewed a May 23, 2019, letter from the Licensee to Senator John Barrasso, in which the licensee reported that its operators had failed to sufficiently review repairs according to the 10 C.F.R. 50.59 requirement, even though the NRC's annual inspection reports suggest differently because they cited no violation. This letter stated that the descriptions of the corrective actions for most of the repairs were incomplete for an effective 10 C.F.R. 50.59 review and approval, that parts had been placed into service without documentation, and "in a small number of instances, unqualified parts were installed." The letter also said that most unplanned scrams were left without an explanation or resolution, and that despite NRC staff's reviews of unplanned scrams during inspections, NRC staff neither noted nor discussed the anomalies.
The RTR inspector said he thinks there is now training on 10 C.F.R 50.59 evaluations in the qualification program, but the guidance he bad available to him at the time was not adequate.
Inspection Procedure 6900 I does not provide guidance on th.is topic; rather, it refers the reader to the NRC Inspection Manual; 10 C.F.R. 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments; and Inspection Procedure 40745, Class l Research and Test Reactor Review and Audit, and Design Change Functions. Regulatory Guide 2.8, Guidance for Implementation of 10 C.F.R. 50.59, Changes, OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION lNFORMA TION THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE lNSPECfOR GENERAL (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE RECEIVING AGENCY WITHOUT OIG'S PERMISSION.
8 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-OIG INVESTIGATION lNFORMA TION
Tests, and Experiments at Non-Power Production or Utilization Facilities, a licensee guidance document on this topic, was not issued until February 2022.
FINDING #3: THE NRC FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE EXCEEDANCE OF A DOSE LIMIT AND THE LICENSEE'S DEPARTURE FROM AN ALARA CULTURE
While the reactor operated within the regulatory limits of radiation exposure, the licensee had departed from an ALARA culture. Our review of personnel exposure levels revealed one employee may have been above the NRC's occupational dose limit. A dosimetry report for 2001 indicated that an employee's culminate dose for his whole body (TEDE) was 5,010 millirem, 10 millirem more than the annual occupational dose limit in 10 C.F.R. 20.120l(a)(l)(i).
The R TR inspector said that although the ARRR tended to have numbers that were higher than other licensees, they were not above regulatory limits. He did speak to the licensee about it, challenging the exposure levels. The RTR inspector acknowledged the ARRR bad issues with ALARA, but because the doses did not exceed the regulatory limits, there was "nothing he could do about it."
Environmental exposure records showed that the Accounting Office ranged from the high 50s to approximately 250 millirems per quarter between October 2010 and June 2017. The current licensee said he would not take over the license unless the previous owner disposed of radioactive waste in the storage room, which was adjacent to the Accounting Office in April 2017. Once the waste was disposed of, the readings in the Accounting Office dropped to none detected in the following quarter. The licensee said that the proximity of the waste storage room to administrative space was a violation of ALARA culture, and it was relocated. The 10 C.F.R. 20.1101 (b) requires licensees to "use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are as low as is reasonably achievable." There are no additional, specific ALARA requirements or radiological dose thresholds included in ARRR's technical specifications. The RTR inspector was not aware of the ALARA issue in the Accounting Office.
FINDING #4: THE ARRR HAD INADEQUATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PER TITLE 10 C.F.R. 50.36
Although the regulatory framework allows licensees to operate with the technical specifications approved with the granting of the initial operating license, the OlG found the ARRR's technical specifications missed specific values or actions that would ensure safety. However, the NRC issued Administrative Letter 98-10, Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety, to operating power reactors in 1998 to reiterate the staff's expectations regarding the correction of facility technical specifications when they are found to contain nonconservative values or specify incorrect actions. Not including non-power reactors in its letter gives an appearance that the non-power reactors' technical specifications are not as important. The non-power reactor licensee is under no obligation to update its technical specifications until it is time to renew its license. Even if the technical specifications become inadequate, they are the standard to which the licensee is held once approved by the NRC.
OFFlClAL USE ONLY=-OIG INVESTIGATION LNFORMA TION THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE lNSPECrOR GENERAL (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE RECEIVING AGENCY WITHOUT OIG'S PERMISSIOJ'i.
9 OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
FINDING #5: THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT PROVIDED TO NON-POWER REACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED
The OIG learned that the NRC has statutory authority under Section 104(c) of the AEA :
" The Commission is authorized to issue licenses to persons applying for utilization and production facilities useful in the conduct of research and development activities of the types specified in section 31 and which are not facilities of the type specified in subsection 104b. The Commission is directed to impose only such minimum amount of regulation of the licensee as the Commission finds will permit the Commission to fulfill its obligations under this Act to promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public and will permit the conduct of widespread and diverse research and development."
This investigation revealed that the minimum amount of regulatory oversight currently provided to non-power reactors could be improved. Some of the areas that would benefit from improvements to the program are training, guidance documents, and subject matter experts (i.e.,
a non-power reactor equivalent to the project engineer for power reactors) in the NRC to assist RTR inspectors. There are also knowledge gaps in the guidance readily available to the RTR Inspectors; for example, Regulatory Guide 2.8 was only recently issued, even though it is primarily a licensee guidance document. Aside from a reference to Inspection Procedure 69007
( Class I Research and Test Reactor Review and Audit Design Change Functions), there does not appear to be any 10 C.F.R. 50.59 training material specific to non-power reactors.
DISPOSITION
The findings from this investigation will be included in the investigative report from 010 Case No. C21-016. Additional issues raised by the allegations or that arose during the in v estigation will be referred to OIG Audits for consideration.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY OIG l NVESTIG ATIO N lNFORl\\tA TIO N THIS DO CUMENT JS TH E PROP ERT Y OF TUE U. S. NUCLEA R RE GULA TORY CO MM lS S IO N, O FF ICE O F T H E I NS PECl"OR GENE RAL (Ol G). IF L O ANE D TO AN OTHER A G ENCY, IT AND IT S C O NT EN T S ARE NOT TO B E R E PR O DUCE D OR DI ST RJB UTED O UTS IDE T HE R ECE IV ING AG ENC Y WI T HO UT OI G'S PER M I SS ION.
10 OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OtG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION
Exhibit 1: Fuel elements in the ARRR core that were indicated as stuck on fuel and graphite transfer forms between 1994 and 2006 and reported as cracked
Stuck Elements from the 1990s are Highlighted in Blue 1994 - 628E, 1192E, and 1201E 1997 -616E 1998 - 626E and 1255 1999 - 591
Stuck Elements from 2000-2006 are Highlighted in Green 2002 - 570E, 624E, 1056E, and 1181 E 2003-590E 2005-2281 2006 -1232E
OFFICIAL USE ONLY=OIG INVESTIGATION INFORMATION nus DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECfOR GENERAL (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DISTRlBUTED OUTSIDE THE RECEIVING AGENCY WITHOUT OIG'S PERMISSION.
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Exhibit 2: Images 1 & Descriptions 2 of four TRIGA elements the ARRR reported to the NRC as cracked
S/N 1201 E : Discolored, almost straight vertical longitudinal crack along the middle section of the fuel region. The crack extends about 80% of the fuel region. This element can be pulled about one inch with a tool.
S/N 590E: Discolored, blister on the bottom ring of the element. Three separate vertical cracks on the same side:
(starting from the bottom of the element) #1 in the lower fourth of the fue l region ; #2 starts to the right of the first crack just before the first crack ends, about the same length
1 l mages obta in ed fro m vi deo provi ded b y th e licensee.
2 Desc r ip t ions ob tai ned from an ARRR letter to th e NRC d ated Janu ary 20, 20 12 (ML l 2026A 344).
OFF I C IA L USE O NLY =OIG INVES TI GATION INF OR MAT IO N THJS DOCUMENT IS T H E PRO PE RTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEA R REGULATO R Y COMM ISS IO N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECfOH GENERAL (O IG). IF LO ANE D TO AN O THER AGENCY, IT AN D IT S CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE RE PR ODUCE D OR DI ST R I B UT ED OUTS lDE T H E R ECE I VING AGENCY W IT H O CT O IG'S P E R M ISSION.
12 OFFICIAL US E ONL"1" OIG INV ESTIGA T ION l NF OR l\\tA TIO N
as the first crack ; #3 starts to the left of the second crack and just before the second crack ends, about three times the length of the other two cracks. This element can be pulled about 20% out with a too l.
SIN 623E : Discolored, very light-colored crack in the upper section of the non - fuel region. Cracks in the other elements are very dark, so this one may be just beg inning. This element can be pulled about 25% out with a tool.
S/N 2281 Instrumented Element: Discolored, multiple blisters in the upper non-fue l section. Y-shaped crack in the upper fourth of the fuel section. Cont inuous vertical, longitudinal crack in the lower two-thirds of the fuel section.
0% of the element can be lifted with a too l.
O FF ICIAL USE O N L Y=O lG INVESTIGATION INFO R l\\fA TION THJS DOCUMENT JS THE PRO PE RTY OF THE U.S. NUCLEA R REGULATORY COMM ISS ION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECroK GENERo\\L (OIG). IF LOANED TO ANOTHER AGENCY, IT AN D ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR DIST RIB UTED OITTSIDE T H E RECE I VING AGENCY WIT HOUT OIG'S PERMISSION.
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