ML12355A034

SNCV061-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0, Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 1 of 14

ML12355A034
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	11/26/2012
From:	Volodarsky D Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-12-2271 SNCV061-RPT-02, Ver 1.0
Download: ML12355A034 (50)

Text

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant -Unit 2 Seismic Recommendation

2.3 Walkdown

Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Enclosure 1 Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 49 Vogtle Unit 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC432485 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by: (ENERCON)Pmject Manager or Deignee David Volodarsky Bick Kelly Heey%Bill Henne Date: Date: Date:/-Z0- Z01/Z I)- U -20)Jz//1-Z IC-t8/.L Approved by: (SNC)Technical Lead or Designedt Feer Review Team Leader Yeg,> ~Date://- Z 2tZ Melanie Brown Approved by:.(SNc)David Whitman Date: 1.2 ftject Manager ar Dedgnee VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHEIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 49 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

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4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ..................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

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6 3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE

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6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ........................................................

7 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

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8 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

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9 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES

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11 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

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17 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

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18 6.1 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL I ...........................................................................................

18 6.2 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 2 ............................................................................................

20 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ..........................................................

22 7.1 IN A CCESSIBLE ITEM S ..................................................................................................

24 8.0 RE SU LTS ..................................................................................................................................

31 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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31 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERA BILITY ...........................................................................................

41 8.3 PLAN T CH A N G ES ............................................................................................................

42 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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42 9.0 PEER REVIEW ........................................................................................................................

43 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS ................................................................................................

43 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

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43 10.0 REFERE NCES .........................................................................................................................

48 11.0 ATTACH M ENTS .....................................................................................................................

49 VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM V 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 49 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 49 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at Vogtle Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Vogtle Unit 2 are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 49 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:* Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);" Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);" Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);" Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);* Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and* Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit 2 walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened. Further discussion is provided in Section 7.0.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 49 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.20g and 0.12g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 (Reference 10.7).The VEGP site design response spectra are provided in Figures 3.7.B.1-1 and 3.7.13.1-2 for the horizontal and vertical components of the SSE and in Figures 3.7.B.1-3 and 3.7.B.1-4 for the horizontal and vertical components of the OBE (Reference 10.7). The design response spectra are in conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants (Reference 10.5). The ground spectra were applied to models of the various structures and amplified in-structure response spectra were generated taking into account the flexibility of the soil and structure.

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after an SSE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and SSE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category II SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is based on the response spectra method, time-history method, or equivalent static method.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 49 All Seismic Category I safety-related instrumentation and mechanical and electrical equipment meet the requirements and recommendations of IEEE 344-1975.

Damping values are consistent with those specified in Regulatory Guide 1.61 (Reference

10. 10).3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS The design codes and standards for seismic qualification are listed in Chapter 3 of the Vogtle FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used in the original design of Vogtle Unit 2 are listed below." ANSI B3 1.1, Power Piping" ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Rules for Construction of Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 1" ANSI/ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division ]-A, Appendix N, Dynamic Analysis Methods* IEEE 317-1976, Standard for Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class I E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" IEEE 344-1975, Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class I E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* Manual of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 49 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1. Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection

/ Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)Justo Chacon X X X James Dovel X X Parimal Gandhi X X Jose Hernandez X X X X Thomas Petrak X X Winston Stewart* X X David Volodarsky X X Matthew X X Wilkinson Frank Yao X X VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 49 Table 4-2. Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review Peer aeer Basis Report Name Peer Peer TeamPer Pr Leader Reviewer Reviewer Peer Peer Leader Reviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth

• X X X X Melanie Brown

• X X X X Richard Starck

• X X Kenneth Whitmore

• X X X X Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW

OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF 49 associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Vogtle Unit 2 project, the Plant Operations Personnel (POP) is a former licensed Senior Reactor Operator.The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs that had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Vogtle.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 11 OF 49 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses, and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for resolution of unresolved safety issue (USI) A-46.Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including: " Management of the seismic design bases,* Seismic equipment qualification,* Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,* Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.Justo S Chacon, SWE (SNC)Mr. Chacon is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Modification Group in the Civil/Mechanical area. Mr. Chacon has a degree in Industrial Engineering and has worked on numerous site projects associated with civil/mechanical applications.

Being part of Modification Group, he is exposed to the seismic engineering issues as they apply to nuclear power plants. His extensive experience also as a Reactor Operator (roughly 6 years) provides experience with nuclear power equipment.

Mr. Chacon completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 12 OF 49 James Dovel, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Dovel is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 20 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants, and in commercial and Industrial design. Mr.Dovel is a Civil Lead Engineer.

In this capacity he has provided structural support of modification packages for numerous Entergy plants including Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), River Bend Station, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, and Waterford

3. Mr. Dovel also supported the extended power uprate (EPU) for FPL's Turkey Point plant, pipe stress analysis for DC Cook and the design of new power plants for China. Mr. Dovel completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Parimal Gandhi, SWE (SNC)Mr. Gandhi is a senior engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. For the past 25 years, he has been working with the design and modifications of numerous Nuclear Power Plants and other industrial facilities including evaluating the condition of structural steel and concrete.

His experience includes static and dynamic analysis of steel frames, platforms, towers, crane girders, and various miscellaneous structures and finite element analysis of pressure vessel and lifting devices. Mr.Gandhi completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Jose Hernandez, SWE (SNC)Mr. Hernandez is an engineer with Southern Nuclear Operating Company. He is working at Vogtle Nuclear Plant in the Site Design department.

Mr. Hernandez is a registered professional engineer in the state of Georgia. His experience consists of 8 years in reinforced concrete analysis and design, elastic design, seismic rehabilitation, nonlinear analysis, nuclear design engineering, and geotechnical elements on reinforced concrete structures.

Mr. Hernandez is familiar in-depth with structural and civil construction codes. Mr. Hernandez managed the internal project team and subcontractors on numerous site projects.

Mr. Hernandez's previous experience includes participation in several researches that investigated the seismic vulnerability of existing school and hospital buildings located in high intensity activity seismic zones. Mr. Hernandez completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VRSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13 OF 49 Thomas Petrak (SNC)Mr. Petrak has 30 years of nuclear power plant experience with 26 years at Plant Vogtle. Mr.Petrak's current assignment is the Fukushima Project Manager -Vogtle. During his time at Plant Vogtle, Mr. Petrak maintained an active SRO license for twenty years, 1989 -2009. Positions held by Mr. Petrak include:* Engineering Systems Manager" Shift Manager* Unit Shift Supervisor

• Support Shift Supervisor" Maintenance Superintendent

• I&C Team Leader* Engineering Supervisor Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr. Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG Generic Implementation Procedure, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program.This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 14 OF 49 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, IOCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components, as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

He also served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.Mr. Stewart completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.David Volodarsky, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Volodarsky is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 30 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear power plants. Mr. Volodarsky is a civil supervisor with Enercon Services.

His design experience includes field survey; piping design and stress analysis; seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; design of supports for various systems (piping, ductwork, raceways) for nuclear power plants. His recent work is associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Farley, Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Volodarsky supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse, Crystal River Unit 3, McGuire Nuclear Station Unit I & 2, Catawba Nuclear Station Unit I & 2, Indian Point Unit 2 & 3, Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit I and Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant Unit 3. Mr. Volodarsky completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSH1MA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 15 OF 49 Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr. Whitmore completed his EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.Matthew Wilkinson, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Wilkinson is a Civil Engineer with over 5 years of experience.

He has a B.S. in Civil Engineering.

As a civil engineer, he is responsible for the development of engineering packages, calculations, analyses, drawings, and reports. Mr. Wilkinson has significant design experience with Florida Power and Light, primarily providing his services for Turkey Point Nuclear Station (PTN) on several modification packages and calculations.

Mr. Wilkinson has significant site support experience at PTN, McGuire Nuclear Station and River Bend Nuclear Station. Moreover, Mr. Wilkinson worked directly at PTN for the majority of 2010 to support the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) construction and 2011 to 2012 to support the Extended Power Uprate (EPU) project design phase. Mr. Wilkinson completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 16 OF 49 Frank Yao, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Yao is a Registered Professional Engineer with over 40 years of Civil/Structural experience in the design and construction of nuclear and fossil power plants and highway bridge design. His design experience includes structural steel design (including anchorages);

supports for suspended systems (piping, ductwork, raceways);

seismic qualification of equipment, parts and structures; rigging and scaffold; and retaining walls, cooling towers concrete slabs, beams and foundations.

His recent work associated with 10 CFR 73.55 nuclear plant security upgrades at Plant Hatch, and Plant Vogtle. Mr.Yao supported modification packages for the installation of the Emergency Sump Strainer for Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Catawba Unit I & 2, McGuire Unit I & 2, Qinshan Unit 3 & 4 (China), and Ling Ao Unit 3 & 4 (China). He has also supported several plants during the implementation phase of the strainers, providing engineering support, resolving construction issues and performing structural evaluation to qualify changes made during the installation phase of the project. Mr. Yao completed his training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Seismic Walkdowns as a SWE.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 17 OF 49 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program is reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability, and specifies whether the configuration management program has maintained the IPEEE action (including procedural changes) to ensure that the vulnerability continues to be addressed.

As part of a Seismic PRA/IPEEE update, in May 2012, Plant Vogtle conducted a walkdown of Equipment modified under the IPEEE -Seismic. As a result of this walkdown, Document No.12L0075-RPT-001 was issued (Reference 10.9). That walkdown revisited systems and components that have been either significantly modified or replaced since the issuance of the original VEGP IPEEE- Seismic Report to NRC (Reference 10.8). The findings of the walkdown conducted in May are documented in Appendix A-2 (Previous IPEEE Open Item Walkdown Resolution Notes) (Reference 10.9). Appendix A-2 is included in Attachment

5. The purpose of these walkdowns was to ensure that the IPEEE vulnerabilities had been resolved.

During those walkdowns, one outlier was discovered that was potentially unresolved (either had never been resolved or were currently no longer resolved, i.e., the problem had "re-occurred).

The item dealt with clearance for an air regulator and air pump associated with component 2-HV-15196 (See CR 502493).The seismic walkdown equipment list (SWEL) for Vogtle Unit 2 included 5 components that had seismic vulnerabilities previously identified during the IPEEE program. Even though the items identified as IPEEE vulnerabilities had been walked down in May 2012, implementation of these modifications for SWEL items was verified again during the walkdowns performed for resolution of the NTTF Recommendations 2.3, Seismic. During the walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the recommended resolutions to the IPEEE vulnerabilities associated with these five items had been implemented, with the exception of the valve clearance issue discussed in the preceding paragraph.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF 49 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Vogtle systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used a SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment I reflect the final SWELs after all changes were incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT

OF SWEL I SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens I to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance (page 3-3), Screens I through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Vogtle Nuclear Plant IPEEE Unit 2 (Reference 10.8) was used as Base List 1 for the development of SWEL 1.The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.12). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE -Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 19 OF 49 EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Seismic Safe Shutdown Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List I if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions: " Reactor reactivity control* Reactor coolant pressure control* Reactor coolant inventory control" Decay heat removal, and* Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.5 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8).Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List, it was determined that the list did satisfy the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) which is a list comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the five safety functions described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which are used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment cooling integrity.

Base List I is presented in Attachment

1. However, before proceeding any further with the subsequent screens for the base list, it was necessary to confirm that the components satisfied screens I to 3. Hence, screens I to 3 were applied to the base list and a small number of components were identified and screened out of the base list.Screen 4 Screen 4 provides the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286).

Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to POP for review and input. The POP identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:* Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment" Classes of equipment VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR VERSION 1.0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 49" Variety of environments" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program" Risk significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286. SWEL I includes components from each equipment class except Class 12 (Air Compressors) and Class 13 (Motor Generators).

Vogtle does not contain any safety-related Air Compressors or Motor Generators.

Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL I includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g.Containment Building, Main Steam Valve Room), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Auxiliary Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. valve boxes, Service Water Intake Structure).

IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL I includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Reference 10.8.Risk Significance

-Information from the Vogtle Unit 2 PRA and the Maintenance Rule implementation documentation were used to determine whether items were risk significant.

Representative samples of Risk Significant items are included in the SWEL.6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also accessible for a walkdown.

For Vogtle Unit 2, VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM V 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 21 OF 49 the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System. The SSCs in the Spent Fuel Cooling and Purification System that are accessible and available for a walkdown comprise Base List 2.Screen 3 Screen 3 provides the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment included in SWEL 2. These considerations include: " Variety of systems" Major new or replacement equipment" Classes of equipment" Variety of environments For Vogtle Unit 2, SWEL 2 is developed from the Base list 2 which is provided in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Vogtle Unit 2, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP. Based on the fact that there are no penetrations within 10 feet of the fuel and accompanied with the design of the anti-siphon hole in the SFP discharge piping, no rapid drain-down items exist.Therefore, there are no components associated with rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool included on SWEL 2.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 49 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL. A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 seismic walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses: " "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;" "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;" "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 23 OF 49 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions." As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation.

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until the piece of equipment was available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at that time and deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection.

In cases where the seismic walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a Condition Report (CR) was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment 4.SWEL I Walkdowns A total of 100 Component Walkdowns were performed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 24 OF 49 SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 4 component walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 3 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys are not complete for these items.Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 1. 2-1606- Reactor Trip No cabinet door opening Inspect Outage 2R 16 S6-002 Switchgear was allowed during plant anchorage operation 2. 2-1804- 4160V Switchgear No cabinet door opening Inspect Outage 2R116$3-A02 2AA02 was allowed during plant anchorage operation 3. 2-1501- CTB Cooling Unit Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 A7-001- & Motor accessible during plant AWC 000 operation (see Note 1)4. 2-HV- Reactor Head Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 0442A Letdown Line accessible during plant AWC Control SOV operation (see Note I)

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECONMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 49 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 5. 2-HV- Accumulator Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 0943B Nitrogen HDR accessible during plant AWC Vent- Solenoid operation(see Note 1)Operated Valve 6. 2-HV- ACCW Supply to Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R 16 1978 RCP Coolers MOV accessible during plant AWC operation (see Note 1)7. 2-HV- Normal CTB Purge Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 2626B Supply and accessible during plant AWC Equalizing AOV operation (see Note 1)8. 2-HV- Accumulator 3 Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 8875C Nitrogen Vent -accessible during plant AWC Solenoid Operated operation (see Note 1)Valve 9. 2-LT- SG I Wide Range Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 0501 Level accessible during plant AWC operation (see Note 1)10. 2-1511- CTB Reactor Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 E7-001- Cavity Cooling accessible during plant AWC 000 Coil operation (see Note 1)11. 2-1515- CTB Aux Air Inside containment.

Not SWC & Outage 2R16 A7-001- Cooling Unit (Coil) accessible during plant AWC 000 operation (see Note 1)

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 49 Table Notes: 1) With the exception of the Reactor Trip Switchgear and 4160V Switchgear 2AA02, all components determined to be inaccessible during the initial walkdowns were located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation, such as inside Containment.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.Inspection of the cabinet internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment.

Opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the initial Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.Supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

At the time of this supplemental guidance/clarification, the Vogtle Unit 2 Seismic Walkdowns were complete.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.The following table provides a list of components that had to be opened in order to inspect for "other adverse conditions" inside the cabinets.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 27 OF 49 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 1. 2-1500-Q5-HVC HVAC PANEL Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 2. 2-1604-Q5-PC I PROCESS CONTROL GROUP I Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals 3. 2-1604-Q5-PS1 PROCESS I&C PROTECT I Inspect Outage 2RI 6 Internals 4. 2-1605-C5-ASI ALTERNATE SHDN IND EAGLE 21 Inspect Outage 2R16 CAB Internals 5. 2-1605-P5-SDA SHUTDOWN PANEL TRN A Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 6. 2-1605-Q5-STA SAFEGUARD TEST CAB-TRN A Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 7. 2-1606-S6-002 REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals 8. 2-1623-D5-001 REMOTE PROCESSING UNIT A CAB Inspect Outage 2R16 i Internals 9. 2-1804-S3-A02 4160V SWITCHGEAR 2AA02 Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 10. 2-1805-S3-ABA 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2ABA Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 28 OF 49 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 1I. 2-1805-S3-ABB 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2ABB Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 12. 2-1805-S3-BBC 480V MOT CONTROL CTR 2BBC Inspect Outage 2RI 6 Internals 13. 2-1806-$3-DCC 125 VDC MCC 2CDIM Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 14. 2-1805-S3-B04 480V SWITCHGEAR 2AB04 Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 15. 2-1805-S3-RHRIA STARTER/RHR 2-HV-8701B Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 16. 2-1805-Y3-IC5 RHR ISO VLV INVERTER Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals 17. 2-1807-Y3-ID4R VITAL AC INVERTER 2DD114 Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 18. 2-1806-B3-CAA BATTERY CHARGER 2AD ICA Inspect Outage 2R116 Internals 19. 2-1806-Q3-DAI 125 VDC DISTR. PANEL 2ADI I Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 20. 2-1806-S3-DSA 125 VDC SWITCHGEAR 2AD1 Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 29 OF 49 Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Completion Walkdown Date Scope 221. 2-1807-Q3-VI6 120 VAC VITAL DIST PANEL 2BY2B Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals 22. 2-1807-Q3-VI4 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 2DY 11B Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 23. 2-1807-Q3-VII 120 VAC VITAL PANEL 2AY1A Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 24. 2-1816-U3-001 AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL A Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 25. 2-1816-U3-014 AUXILIARY RELAY PANEL Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 26. 2-1821-U3-001 SF SEQUENCER BOARD TRAIN A Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 27. 2-2403-P5-DG1 DG IA GEN CTL PNL Inspect Outage 2R16 Internals 28. 2-1805-S3-BBF 480V MCC 2BBF Inspect Outage 2R 16 Internals I ablle Notes: 1) Vogtle Unit 2 has 3 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-I. The transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 49 guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. The transformers are as listed below: 2-1807-Y3-14 Regulated Transformer 2BBC42RX Feeds 2BYC I 2-1807-Y3-10 Regulated Transformer 2ABC09RX Standby Feed to 2AY1A 2-1807-Y3-15 Regulated Transformer 2ABE5IRX Feeds 2AYE I VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF 49 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY

ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely manner. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs were deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Vogtle Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Vogtle seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 15 Unit 2 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 4 were entered that are Common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Materials/equipment (under a tarp) were found 500988 Perform an evaluation Cart is properly Closed Control stored in a temporary storage area in the U2 to identify the need for secured with all Bldg 325 Control Building Room 325. According to a any corrective actions. four wheels Temp Storage Sign, the materials were stored clamped.there under MWO SNC142333.

It could not be Temporary storage determined what was under the tarp, however, it is now in full was noted only one wheel on the cart was compliance with restrained which is not consistent with the 00352-C.procedure 00352-C "General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control".

The storage area was near MCC 2-1805-S3-ABA.

The Temp Storage area should be reviewed to ensure it is in full compliance with Procedure 00352-C.Component An improperly restrained light fixture was found 500990 The Vogtle site design Replace/repair Open 2LT-51 11 above level transmitter 2-1302-LT-51 Il located at group performed an light restraint.

Due the bottom ofRWST. It is judged by the evaluation of the as 1/31/2013 Area walkdown team that the light could become found condition and CST dislodged during a seismic event and impact the concluded that no transmitter.

This should be further evaluated for seismic interaction significance.

hazards exists that could affect equipment operability.

Repair/replace hook.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Components The chains of a monorail crane above both 502483 The seismic team The hoist has been Closed 2PV-3000 & Atmospheric Relieve Valves 2-PV-3030 and 2- judged no operability secured.2PV-3030 PV-3000 were in contact with such valves. It was concerns for this the judgment of the Seismic Walkdown Team that condition.

Secure Area in a seismic event the chains could possibly strike hoist.Aux Bldg, or become entangled with the ARVs. This is not in RI59 accordance with procedure 00352-C which states that safety-related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts from chain or controllers of hoists and cranes during a seismic event.Component A component associated with the valve operator 2- 502493 Analysis is in progress Complete analysis Open 2HV-15196 HV-15196 was measured to be less than 14 inch to determine final and implement Due from the wall. The seismic team judged that in corrective actions, corrective actions. 11/30/2012 case of a seismic event the component would have the potential to collide with the wall due to proximity.

This concern was previously identified in the IPEEE list and a solution was provided to resolve the condition, however, it has not being implemented.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUK1USHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic team raised a concern regarding the 502509 Seismic adequacy of None required Closed 2HV-3006B adequacy of the fire protection pipe supports fire protection piping located in the U2 South Main Steam Isolation was confirmed.

Valve room, located near and above the Main Steam Safety Relief Valves 2-PSV-3001 to 3005, the 2-HV-3006A and 2-HV-3006A outboard MSIV and the 2-PV-3000 Atmospheric Relieve Valve, among other components.

This fire protection piping was judged by the walkdown team to have a potential of loss of pressure boundary capability during a seismic event. This is due to the very long unsupported spans and extremely long flexible rod hanger supports.While it is unlikely that this pipe will fall and damage any safety-related components, especially if the system is normally dry, a seismic event could cause the piping system to collapse during a seismic event. There are no operability concerns for this area if the piping is normally dry. If the piping is normally wet, further investigation is required to determine if the resulting spray would create any operability concerns.

Even if the system is normally dry, the configuration appears not to be consistent with normal practice for seismic II/I configurations.

Analysis is required to show that the piping meets seismic 11/I conditions.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR N Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area The seismic team along with the NRC Inspector 502522 The seismic walkdown Seismic adequacy Closed Diesel Gen Resident identified a potential issue regarding a team concluded that the of the cover plate Bldg, RI 01 floor cover plate near the Engine Control Panel for bent plate was presently confirmed.

the I B Diesel Generator (location 1-2403-P5-not a seismic/structural DG4). This plate is not required to be bolted down, concern based on the but the walkdown team identified some minor configuration (shape), deflection in the plate. (Note: D/G's IA, 2A and the location of the 2B all have the same condition) cover, and proximity to surrounding equipment.

However, this CR is to initiate an evaluation to determine the long-term adequacy of the cover plate and identify the need for any corrective actions.Component A lighting hook was found that was not fully 504862 Perform seismic Complete seismic Open 2-1807-Q3-closed. It was found in Room R147 in the analysis.

Repair/replace analysis.

Due V16 Auxiliary Building Unit 2. The light was above hook. Repair/replace 1/31/2013 the panel 2-1807-Q3-VI6.

This condition needs to hook.Area be investigated to determine the adequacy of this Aux Bldg, connection.

R147 VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 oF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

I Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Area Two lighting hooks were found to be not fully 504862 Perform seismic Complete seismic Open Aux Bldg, closed. It was found in Room R147 in the analysis.

Repair/replace analysis.

Due R147 Auxiliary Building Unit 2. Both lights were above hook. Repair/replace 1/31/2013 Room the panel 2-1805-S3-BBB.

hook.Area An exit sign hook was found to be not fully closed. 505324 It was judged by the Complete seismic Open Aux Bldg, This was found in Room RB 130 in the Auxiliary Seismic walkdown team analysis.

Due RB130 Building.

This sign was nearby the rack location that this does not Repair/replace 1/31/2013 number 2-1407-P5-SG5.

represent a seismic hook.concern. There are no operability concerns for these conditions.

This CR is written to initiate the investigation of the condition and identify the need for any corrective actions.Repair/replace hook.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Cisd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component A discrepancy was found between the as-built 505327 There is no operability Subsequent to the Closed 2-1604-Q5-condition and the drawing anchorage details. The concerns related to this initial walkdown.PCI drawing shows the connection to be bolted while condition.

The seismic the correct the as-built condition was found to be welded. team judged that in case anchorage of a seismic event the drawings were component would not obtained and a have the potential to fail second walkdown and the connection does confirmed that the not show any sign of as built anchorage degradation.

matched the drawing details.Component A fluorescent lighting fixture is inside the "spatial 509115 This CR is to initiate an Complete seismic Open 2-1807-Q3-interaction" of cabinet 2-1807-Q3-VI

1. This evaluation to determine analysis and Due Outage VI1 means that the lightning fixture could have the adequacy of the implement 2R17 physical contact with this cabinet on a seismic condition and identify corrective actions.Area event. Unistrut for light fixture is within -2" of 2- the need for any Control 1806-S3-DSA (125VDC MCC 2ADIM) and could corrective actions.Bldg, RB29 impact top of panel during seismic event. There is no operability concerns related to this condition.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR REV. 0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component The base of the U2 NSCW Exhaust Fan 2-1540- 513338 The seismic walkdown Repair concrete.

Open 2-1540-B7-B7-003-000 has voids in the concrete where the judged that this Due 003 anchor bolts that support this fan are installed, condition does not 10/12/2013 represent a seismic concern or operability.

However, this condition does meet the Vogtle standards per procedure 25026-C Installation of Concrete.Area The Seismic Walkdown team found that none of 517075 The seismic walkdown The trashcan Open Control the trashcans barrels on the control room (R163 & judged that this barrels are not Due Bldg. R 164 R 164) are secured or unrestrained, condition does not located near any 1/31/2013 represent an operability SR equipemt;concern. However, this trashcans to be condition does meet the replaced with Vogtle standards per suitable trashcans.

procedure 00352-C General Plant Housekeeping and In-Process Materials Control.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component The Seismic Walkdown team found an apparent 517082 The seismic walkdown Confirm seismic Open 2-1606-S6-case of a rigid connection between a cabinet 2- team judged that this adequacy of the Due 002 1606-S6-002 and a conduit. Reactor Trip Breaker. condition does not current design. 1/31/2013 represent a seismic or Area operability concern.Control The equivalent Unit I Bldg, B07 cabinet should also be evaluated to determine if this is a case of an extended condition.

The Vogtle site design group has conformed that the installation is per the current design.Site design group to confirm seismic adequacy of the design.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 49 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Action Taken or Status Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Planned to (Open/Clsd)

/ Area Seismic Condition Analysis/Conclusion Address/Resolve the Condition Component Seismic walkdown team found a fluorescent 540146 The qualified seismic Based on the Closed 2-1806-B3-lightning fixture to be directly above the cabinet walkdown team evaluation CCB with the location number 2-1806-B3-CCB.

concluded that in case performed, the as-that a seismic event found condition occurs, the lightning provides tubes could dislodge reasonable from the fixture and expectation that no impact the cabinet since seismic hazard they were installed exists that could directly above the adversely affect cabinet. This CR is to the safety related initiate an evaluation to component 2-determine the adequacy 1806-B3-CCB of the condition and operability if it is identify the need for impacted by the any corrective actions. fluorescent bulb There is no operability tubes.concerns related to this condition.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM IZEV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF 49 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are warranted.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR 537446: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to properly secure hoist and cranes following use. 00352-C requires that "that safety related equipment will not be vulnerable to impacts, from chains or controllers of hoists and monorail cranes, during a seismic event. Place any hoist or monorail cranes in the vicinity of the safety related equipment in a location where, during a seismic event, the chains and controllers cannot strike or become entangled with the equipment." Contrary to the requirements of 00352-C, 3 of 4 hoist controllers near the D/G electrical panels and a hoist near Unit 2 Loops 1&4 ARV's were not properly secured. All controllers have seen been secured. Reference CR's 502483 & 504859.CR 537451: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the failure of plant personnel to maintain housekeeping and temporary storage areas in accordance with procedure 00352-C. Reference CR's 500988, 504853, 504860, 504882, 504895, 504901,511980, 513336 & 517075.CR 537453: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to the management of seismic restraints of lighting fixtures.

Reference CR's 500990, 501548, 504862, 504868, 505324 & 505954.CR 537454: While performing a review of the Condition Reports resulting from the SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, a possible trend was identified with regards to fasteners and hardware.

Several CR's were generated which identified missing or loose fasteners and hardware.

Reference CR's 501546, 501650, 504850, 505329, 507939, 509102, 513331, 524560, 524568, 525039, 525046, 525340 & 525343.8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Vogtle Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 49 8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 49 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation

2.3 Seismic

Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

• review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);* review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;* review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse seismic conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and* review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic

Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) were met. Specifically, the Peer Reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 49" Reactor Reactivity Control" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control* Reactor Coolant Inventory Control" Decay Heat Removal and* Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

• Various types of systems* Major new and replacement equipment" Various types of equipment* Various environments

• Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and* Risk insight consideration The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL I contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in the development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Vogtle Unit 2 are Seismic Category I and all different types of components are represented on the SWEL 2. No items that could cause rapid drain down of the Spent Fuel Pool for Vogtle Unit 2 were identified.

Therefore, SWEL 2 does not contain any components associated with potentially rapid drain down of the pool. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIIMA NEAR-TERM REV 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 49 In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL I and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in most cases equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELS with respect to the provisions contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows: " Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by under the observation of the other teams and the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.* During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A member of the Peer Review Team accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it, as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic walkdowns and Area Walk-bys." Finally, the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages completed during the first week to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM

-EV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 49 Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, and other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team inspected all the checklists completed during the first week of Seismic Walkdowns, which represents approximately 30% of the total number of the checklists.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at the early stages of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Subsequently, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review Team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the seismic walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed as part for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM REV. 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 49 9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to provide guidance and input and verify the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(0 letter.

VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR FOR REV. 0 RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 49

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 1OCFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Regulatory Guide 1.60, Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, December 1973 10.6 NMP-GM-033-GLOI Ver. 1.0, SAM NTTF Seismic Walkdowns Guide 10.7 VEGP FSAR, Rev.18, September2012 10.8 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) -Seismic, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Unit 1 and Unit 2 10.9 Document No. 12L0075-RPT-001, Revision 0, May 18, 2012, "Southern Nuclear Company Seismic IPEEE Walkdown of Modified Equipment in Support of 1OCFR50.69 Risk Informed Project -Plant Vogtle" 10.10 Regulatory Guide 1.61, Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants, October 1973 10.11 NUREG/CR-0098, Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, May 1978 10.12 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Revision 1, August 1991 VOGTLE UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCV061-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHINIMA NEAR-TERM REV 0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 49 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR THE SWEL I AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS