Text

TSTF-542 Marked-Up Technical Specifications and Bases for Hatch Nuclear Plant
	ML17076A434
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	03/23/2017
From:	; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
	Orenak M D
Shared Package
ML17076A433	List: ML17076A432; ML17076A434; ML17079A101;
References
	Download: ML17076A434 (264)
	v • d • e

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 ii Amendment No.

266 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC

-RPT) Instrumentation

............ 3.3-28 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS

-RPT) Instrumentation

.............................................. 3.3-31 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

......................... 3.3-34 3.3.5.2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

............................................ 3.3-44 3.3.5.23 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

................. 3.3-44XX 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

........................................... 3.3-48XX 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

...................................... 3.3-56XX 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation

............................................................ 3.3-60XX 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation

..................................................................................... 3.3-64XX 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

......................................................... 3.3-66XX 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

...................... 3.3-69XX 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

..................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.................................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

.................................................................................................. 3.4-3 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)

...................................................................... 3.4-5 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

....................................................................... 3.4-7 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

.................................................... 3.4-9 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity

.................................................................................. 3.4-11 3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown

....................................................................................... 3.4-13 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown

..................................................................................... 3.4-16 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

.............................................. 3.4-18 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

.................................................................. 3.4-25 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

........... 3.5-1 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

....................................................................................... 3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

....................................... 3.5-6 3.5.3 RCIC System

.............................................................................................. 3.5-9XX 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

....................................................................... 3.6-1 3.6.1.1 Primary Containment

.................................................................................. 3.6-1 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock

.................................................................... 3.6-3 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

........................................... 3.6-7 3.6.1.4 Drywell Pressure

........................................................................................ 3.6-14 3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature ............................................................................. 3.6-15

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3- Amendment No.

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control

LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.2-1. ACTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel. Immediately B. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. B.1 Declare associated penetration flow path(s) incapable of automatic isolation.

AND B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME.

Immediately

Immediately C. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. C.1 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. D.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3- Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met. E.1 Declare associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3- Amendment No.

Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1) RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE 1. Core Spray System

a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) 4, 5 4 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 476 psig b. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow

- Low (Bypass) 4, 5 1 per subsystem(a) D SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 610 gpm and 825 gpm 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

- Low (Injection Permissive) 4, 5 4 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 476 psig b. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) 4, 5 1 per subsystem(a), (c) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 1670 gpm and 2205 gpm 3. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low, Level 3 (b) 2 in one trip system B SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 0 inches 4. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low Low, Level 2 (b) 2 in one trip system B SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 -47 inches (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

(b) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. (c) Function not required to be OPERABLE while associated pump is operating in decay heat removal when minimum flow valve is closed and deactivated.

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-1 Amendment No.

281 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six of seven safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam

ACTIONS ----------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------- LCO 3.0.4

.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-6 Amendment No. 195 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown LCO 3.5.2 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall b 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . AND Two One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem s shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, MODE 5, except with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and r pressure vessel flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One rRequired ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Initiate action to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power.

Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

Immediately C. Two required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs. AND C.2 Restore one ECCS injection/spray subsystem to Immediately

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-7 Amendment No. 195 OPERABLE status.

C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months and 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . C.1 Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.2 Verify each secondary containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.3 Verify required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) are capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME

. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .Required Action C.2 and associated Completion Time not met. D.1 --------- NOTE ------------- Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power.

D.1 Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.Initiate action to establish an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water level > TAF AND D.2 Initiate action to

Immediately

(continued)

Immediately

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-8 Amendment No. 195 establish secondary containment boundary.

AND D.3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room. AND

Immediately

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-9 Amendment No.

266 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued)

D.24 Initiate action to restore verify required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE statusare capable of being placed in operation. AND D.3 Initiate action to restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

Immediately

Immediately E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME

< 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . E.1 Initiate action to restore 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

12 Verify, for each a required low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem, the suppression pool 146 inches.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

23 Verify, for each a required core Core spray Spray (CS) subsystem, the:

a. Suppression pool water level is In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-10 Amendment No.

266 146 inches; or

b. -------------------------NOTE------------------------

Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.

Condensate storage tank water level is 13 ft. (continued)

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-8 Amendment No.

278 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.

34 Verify, for each the required ECCS injection/ spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

45 ----------------------------NOTES-----------------------------

1. One A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

2. Not required to be met for system vent flowpaths opened under administrative control.

Verify each for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

56 Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line for 10 minutes Verify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.

SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS 1 LPCI 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control ProgramIn accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.5.2.7 Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-9 Amendment No.

278 SR 3.5.2.

68 ---------------------------NOTE--------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify each the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signalcan be manually operated.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RCIC System 3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-9 Amendment No.

281 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATIONCOOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS ----------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------- LCO 3.0.4

.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 ------------NOTE--------- LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-34 Amendment No.

281 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2,

or 3. A.1 Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. C.1 ------------NOTE--------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND

Immediately

(continued)

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-35 Amendment No.

280 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued)

C.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND C.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.3 -----------------------------NOTE-----------------------------

The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in 10 minutes.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-40 Amendment No.

279 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

LCO 3.6.4.3 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystems required to support LCO 3.6.4.1, "Secondary Containment," shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required Unit 1 SGT

subsystem inoperable while:

1. Four SGT subsystems required OPERABLE, and

2. Unit 1 reactor building

-

to-refueling floor plug not installed.

A.1 Restore required Unit 1 SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.

30 days from discovery of failure to meet the L CO B. One required Unit 2 SGT subsystem inoperable.

OR One required Unit 1 SGT subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore required SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-41 Amendment No.

281 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

C.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when

entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE---------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.1 Place remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem(s) in operation.

OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND D.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND D.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately E. Two or more required SGT subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-42 Amendment No.

266 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two or more required SGT subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. F.1 -----------NOTE-------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for 15 continuous minutes. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). In accordance with the VFTP SR 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each required SGT subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-8 Amendment No.

268 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3.7.4 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System

LCO 3.7.4 Two MCREC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

The main control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MCREC subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

A.1 Restore MCREC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. One or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.1 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions. AND B.2 Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

90 days (continued)

MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-9 Amendment No.

281 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

C.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment or, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.1 Place OPERABLE MCREC subsystem in pressurization mode.

OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in th e secondary containment.

AND D.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND D.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately E. Two MCREC subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B.

E.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-10 Amendment No.

268 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. OR One or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. -----------------NOTE-------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Operate each In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

In accordance with the VFTP SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-12 Amendment No.

270 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System

LCO 3.7.5 Three control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

30 days B. Two control room AC subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Verify control room area temperature < 90°F. AND B.2 Restore one control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

7 days C. Three control room AC subsystems inoperable. C.1 Verify control room area temperature < 90

°F. AND C.2 Restore one control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-13 Amendment N

o. 281 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, or

3. D.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE----------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

E.1 Place OPERABLE control room AC subsystems in operation. OR E.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. AND E.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND E.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-14 Amendment No.

270 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B or C not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.

NOTE------------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate actions to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-21 Amendment No. 227 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required offsite circuit(s) inoperable.

NOTE------------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, with one required 4160 V ESF bus de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected required feature(s),

with no offsite power available, inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

AND A.2.43 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

Immediately (continued)

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-22 Amendment No. 227 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more required DG(s) inoperable.

B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND B.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND B.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

AND B.43 Initiate action to restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1

NOTE------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.2.b, SR 3.8.1.7 through SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.11 through SR 3.8.1.14, SR 3.8.1.16, and SR 3.8.1.17.

For required Unit 1 AC sources, the SRs of LCO 3.8.1, except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.18, are applicable.

In accordance with applicable SRs SR 3.8.2.2 For required Unit 2 AC sources, SR 3.8.2.1 of Unit 2 Specification 3.8.2 is applicable.

In accordance with Unit 2 SR 3.8.2.1

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-32 Amendment No. 227 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND A.2.43 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

Immediately Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1

NOTE----------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.7 and SR 3.8.4.8.

For required Unit 1 DC sources, the following SRs are applicable:

SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6

In accordance with applicable SRs SR 3.8.5.2 For required Unit 2 DC sources, SR 3.8.5.1 of Unit 2 Specification 3.8.5 is applicable.

In accordance with Unit 2 SR 3.8.5.1

Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.8 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-40 Amendment No.

266 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND A.2.43 Initiate actions to restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

AND A.2.54 Declare associated required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLA NCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 ii Amendment No. 210 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC

-RPT) Instrumentation

..................................................................................... 3.3-28 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS

-RPT) Instrumentation

.............................................. 3.3-31 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation

..................................................................................... 3.3-34 3.3.5.2 RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation

............................................ 3.3-44 3.3.5.32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

..................................................................................... 3.3-44XX 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

........................................... 3.3-48XX 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

...................................... 3.3-56XX 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation

............................................................ 3.3-60XX 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation

..................................................................................... 3.3-64XX 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

......................................................... 3.3-66XX 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

............................................................................................. 3.3-69XX 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

..................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

.................................................................... 3.4-1 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

.................................................................................................. 3.4-3 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)

...................................................................... 3.4-5 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKA GE ....................................................................... 3.4-7 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

.................................................... 3.4-9 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity

.................................................................................. 3.4-11 3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown

........................................................................ 3.4-13 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown ....................................................................... 3.4-16 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

.............................................. 3.4-18 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

.................................................................. 3.4-25 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

........... 3.5-1 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

....................................................................................... 3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS - ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

......................................... 3.5-7 3.5.3 RCIC System

.............................................................................................. 3.5-10XX

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3- Amendment No.

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control

LCO 3.3.5.2 The RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.5.2-1. ACTIONS ------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1 for the channel. Immediately B. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. B.1 Declare associated penetration flow path(s) incapable of automatic isolation.

AND B.2 Calculate DRAIN TIME.

Immediately

Immediately C. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. C.1 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D. As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. D.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3- Amendment No.

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met. E.1 Declare associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3- Amendment No.

Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1) RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation FUNCTION APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED CONDITIONS REQUIRED CHANNELS PER FUNCTION CONDITIONS REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED ACTION A.1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ALLOWABLE VALUE 1. Core Spray System

a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive) 4, 5 4 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 476 psig b. Core Spray Pump Discharge Flow

- Low (Bypass) 4, 5 1 per subsystem(a) D SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 570 gpm and 745 gpm 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

- Low (Injection Permissive) 4, 5 4 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 476 psig b. Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) 4, 5 1 per subsystem(a), (c) C SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 1675 gpm and 2215 gpm 3. RHR System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low, Level 3 (b) 2 in one trip system B SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 0 inches 4. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low Low, Level 2 (b) 2 in one trip system B SR 3.3.5.2.1 SR 3.3.5.2.2 -47 inches (a) Associated with an ECCS subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control."

(b) When automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path(s) is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. (c) Function not required to be OPERABLE while associated pump is operating in decay heat removal when minimum flow valve is closed and deactivated.

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-1 Amendment No.

225 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six of seven safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------- LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable. A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. Required Action and

associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-7 Amendment No.

210 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown LCO 3.5.2 DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the top of active fuel (TAF) shall b 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . AND Two One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem s shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5, MODE 5, except with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and 22 ft 1/8 inches over the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One rRequired ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore required ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 Initiate action to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power.Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

Immediately C. Two required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

AND C.2 Restore one ECCS injection/spray subsystem to Immediately

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-8 Amendment No.

210 OPERABLE status.

C. DRAIN TIME < 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . C.1 Verify secondary containment boundary is capable of being established in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.2 Verify each secondary containment penetration flow path is capable of being isolated in less than the DRAIN TIME.

AND C.3 Verify required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) are capable of being placed in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months D. DRAIN TIME < 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .Required Action C.2 and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1 --------- NOTE ------------- Required ECCS injection/spray subsystem or additional method of water injection shall be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. --------------------------------D.1 Initiate action to establish an additional method of water injection with water sources capable of maintaining RPV water hours.Initiate action to restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

AND

Immediately

(continued)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-9 Amendment No.

210 D.2 Initiate action to establish secondary containment boundary.

AND D.3 Initiate action to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path or verify it can be manually isolated from the control room. AND Immediately

Immediately

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-10 Amendment No.

210 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. (continued)

D.24 Initiate action to restore verify required standby gas treatment subsystem(s) to OPERABLE statusare capable of being placed in operation. AND D.3 Initiate action to restore isolation capability in each required secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated.

Immediately

Immediately E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met.

OR DRAIN TIME

< 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . E.1 Initiate action to restore DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.1 Verify DRAIN TIME 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

12 Verify, for each a required low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystem, the suppression pool 146 inches.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

23 Verify, for each a required core Core spray Spray (CS) subsystem, the:

a. Suppression pool water level is In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-11 Amendment No.

210 146 inches; or

b. --------------------------NOTE------------------------

Only one required CS subsystem may take credit for this option during OPDRVs.

Condensate storage tank water level is 15 ft. (continued)

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-12 Amendment No.

210 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.2.

34 Verify, for each the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

45 --------------------------NOTES-------------------------------

1. One A Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

2. Not required to be met for system vent

flowpaths opened under administrative control.

Verify each for the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem, each manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.2.

56 Operate the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line for 10 minutesVerify each required ECCS pump develops the specified flow rate against a system head corresponding to the specified reactor pressure.

SYSTEM HEAD CORRESPONDING NO. OF TO A REACTOR SYSTEM FLOW RATE PUMPS PRESSURE OF CS 1 LPCI 1 In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control ProgramIn accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.5.2.7 Verify each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RPV Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-13 Amendment No.

222 SR 3.5.2.

68 ---------------------------NOTE-------------------------------

Vessel injection/spray may be excluded.

Verify each the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated automatic initiation signal can be manually operated.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program RCIC System 3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-10 Amendment No.

225 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure >

150 psig.

ACTIONS ---------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------- LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. RCIC System inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

14 days B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 ------------NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-33 Amendment No. 225 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment

LCO 3.6.4.1 The secondary containment shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Secondary containment inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3. A.1 Restore secondary containment to OPERABLE status.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. B.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C. Secondary containment inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. C.1 -----------NOTE------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND

Immediately

(continued)

Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-34 Amendment No.

224 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued)

C.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND C.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs. Immediately

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.1.1 Verify all secondary containment equipment hatches are closed and sealed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.2 Verify one secondary containment access door in each access opening is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.1.3 -----------------------------NOTE-----------------------------

The number of standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) required for this Surveillance is dependent on the secondary containment configuration, and shall be one less than the number required to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," for the given configuration.

Verify required SGT subsystem(s) will draw down the secondary containment to 0.20 inch of vacuum water gauge in 10 minutes.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-39 Amendment No. 135 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System

LCO 3.6.4.3 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystems required to support LCO 3.6.4.1, "Secondary Containment," shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRV).

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------- When two Unit 1 SGT subsystems are placed in an inoperable status solely for inspection of the Unit 1 hardened vent rupture disk, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , provided both Unit 2 SGT subsystems are OPERABLE.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required Unit 1 SG T subsystem inoperable while: 1. Four SGT subsystems required OPERABLE,

and 2. Unit 1 reactor building-to-refueling floor plug not installed.

A.1 Restore required Unit 1 SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.

30 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-40 Amendment No.

225 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One required Unit 2 SGT subsystem inoperable.

OR One required Unit 1 SGT subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore required SGT subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days

C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

C.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE----------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.1 Place remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystem(s) in operation.

OR D.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment. AND D.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND D.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately (continued)

SGT System 3.6.4.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-41 Amendment No.

225 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Two or more required SGT subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

E.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F. Two or more required SGT subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment or, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. F.1 -----------NOTE------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.4.3.1 Operate each required SGT subsystem for 15 continuous minutes. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.4.3.2 Perform required SGT filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). In accordance with the VFTP (continued)

MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-8 Amendment No.

212 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System

LCO 3.7.4 Two MCREC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------- The main control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MCREC subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

A.1 Restore MCREC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days B. One or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, or 3. B.1 Initiate action to implement mitigating actions. AND B.2 Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards will not exceed limits.

AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

90 days (continued)

MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-9 Amendment No.

225 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

C.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.

NOTE------------------ LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

D.1 Place OPERABLE MCREC subsystem in pressurization mode.

OR

D.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND D.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND D.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately E. Two MCREC subsystems inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than Condition B.

E.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

MCREC System 3.7.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-10 Amendment No.

212 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Two MCREC subsystems inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. OR One or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE------------------ LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. --------------------------------------------

F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 15 minutes.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.7.4.2 Perform required MCREC filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP).

In accordance wi th the VFTP SR 3.7.4.3 Verify each MCREC subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-12 Amendment No.

214 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System

LCO 3.7.5 Three control room AC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, During CORE ALTERATIONS, During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One control room AC subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

30 days B. Two control room AC subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Verify control room area temperature < 90°F. AND B.2 Restore one control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

7 days C. Three control room AC subsystems inoperable. C.1 Verify control room area temperature < 90

°F. AND C.2 Restore one control room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

Once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-13 Amendment No. 225 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, o r

3. D.1 ------------NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not m et during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs. ------------------NOTE----------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

E.1 Place OPERABLE control room AC subsystems in operation.

OR E.2.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND E.2.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND E.2.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

Immediately (continued)

Control Room AC System 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-14 Amendment No. 214 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B or C not met during movement

of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs.

NOTE------------------- LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

F.1 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND F.2 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND F.3 Initiate actions to suspend OPDRVs.

Immediately

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-21 Amendment No. 169 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required offsite circuit(s) inoperable.

NOTE------------------

Enter applicable Condition and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.8, with one required 4160 V ESF bus de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected required feature(s), with no offsite power available, inoperable.

OR A.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND A.2.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

AND A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

AND A.2.43 Initiate action to restore required offsite power circuit(s) to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

Immediately (continued)

AC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-22 Amendment No. 169 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more required DG(s) inoperable.

B.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS.

AND B.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment.

AND B.3 Initiate action to suspend OPDRVs.

AND B.43 Initiate action to restore required DG(s) to OPERABLE status. Immediately

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1

NOTE--------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.1.2.b, SR 3.8.1.7 through SR 3.8.1.9, SR 3.8.1.11 through SR 3.8.1.14, SR 3.8.1.16, and SR 3.8.1.17.

For required Unit 2 AC sources, the SRs of LCO 3.8.1, except SR 3.8.1.6, SR 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.18, are applicable.

In accordance with applicable SRs SR 3.8.2.2 For required Unit 1 AC sources, SR 3.8.2.1 of Unit 1 Specification 3.8.2 is applicable.

In accordance with Unit 1 SR 3.8.2.1

DC Sources - Shutdown 3.8.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-32 Amendment No. 169 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND A.2.43 Initiate action to restore required DC electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

Immediately SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.5.1

NOTE------------------------------

The following SRs are not required to be performed: SR 3.8.4.7 and SR 3.8.4.8.

For required Unit 2 DC sources, the following SRs are applicable:

SR 3.8.4.1 SR 3.8.4.4 SR 3.8.4.7 SR 3.8.4.2 SR 3.8.4.5 SR 3.8.4.8.

SR 3.8.4.3 SR 3.8.4.6

In accordance with applicable SRs SR 3.8.5.2 For required Unit 1 DC sources, SR 3.8.5.1 of Unit 1 Specification 3.8.5 is applicable.

In accordance with Unit 1 SR 3.8.5.1 Distribution Systems - Shutdown 3.8.8 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-41 Amendment No.

210 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2.3 Initiate action to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. AND A.2.43 Initiate actions to restore required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

AND A.2.54 Declare associated required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

Immediately

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage to required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems. In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 ii Revision 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

.......................................................................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation

............................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation

..................................... B 3.3-33 B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

....................................................... B 3.3-42 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-53 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

................................. B 3.3-59 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System

................................................................... B 3.3-70 B 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC

-RPT) Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-75 B 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation

..................................................... B 3.3-84 B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

.................. B 3.3-92 B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

.......... B 3.3-125 B 3.3.5.23 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

.......... B 3.3-125XX B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

.................................... B 3.3-135XX B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

............................... B 3.3-161XX B 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation

..................................................... B 3.3-171XX B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-179XX B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

.................................................. B 3.3-185XX B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

............... B 3.3-193XX (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 iii Revision 69 TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

.............................................. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

............................................................. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

............................................................................................ B 3.4-6 B 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)

............................................................... B 3.4-10 B 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

................................................................ B 3.4-13 B 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

............................................. B 3.4-18 B 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity

........................................................................... B 3.4-24 B 3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown

............................................................................. B 3.4-28 B 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown

........................................................................... B 3.4-34 B 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

....................................... B 3.4-39 B 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

........................................................... B 3.4-49 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

.......... B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

................................................................................ B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

................................ B 3.5-14 B 3.5.3 RCIC System

....................................................................................... B 3.5-21 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-113 REVISION 8 BASES ACTIONS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory (continued) measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the same feature(s) in both divisions. Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For low pressure ECCS, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated low pressure ECCS, DGs, and PSW System to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both associated low pressure ECCS subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS, DGs, and PSW System being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1), Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower.

However, as stated on page 95 of the Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for Unit 1 Amendment 195 and Unit 2 Amendment 135, Georgia Power Company committed to not use the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.3 for Function 1.a (for CS

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-114 REVISION 8 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

Level 1 initiation) and Function 2.a (for LPCI Level 1 initiation) when in MODE 4 or 5. Instead, the ACTIONS of TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Shutdown, will be entered immediately for the inoperable ECCS subsystems. This commitment does not apply to the Function 1.a and Function 2.a initiation of the associated DG and the isolation of the associated PSW turbine building isolation valves.

There is no similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus, a Note is not necessary.

Notes are also provided (the Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed. Required Action B.1 (the Required Action for certain inoperable channels in the low pressure ECCS subsystems) is not applicable to Function 2.e, since this Function provides backup to administrative controls ensuring that operators do not divert LPCI flow from injecting into the core when needed. Thus, a total loss of Function 2.e capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed, since the LPCI subsystems remain capable of performing their intended function.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that features in the same system (e.g.,

both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-116 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

The Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two

-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the sam e feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability i s acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. In this situation (loss of automatic ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-118 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

same feature(s) in both divisions. For Required Action E.1, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.d and 2.g (e.g., low pressure ECCS). Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump(s) to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this results in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of minimum flow capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the subsystem associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Action E.1), Required Action E.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (the Note 2 to Require d Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low pressure ECCS Functions. Required Action E.1 is not applicable to HPCI Function 3.f since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (one

-out-of-one logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 7 days allowed by Required Action E.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

If the instrumentation that controls the pump minimum flow valve is inoperable, such that the valve will not automatically open, extended pump operation with no injection path available could lead to pump overheating and failure. If there were a failure of the instrumentation, such that the valve would not automatically close, a portion of the

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures tha t the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," or LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation".

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from th e DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control," and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2. APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required SAFETY to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV ANALYSES, LCO, water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect and APPLICABILITY Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. This function ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. While it is assured during MODES 4 and 5 that the reactor steam dome pressure will be below the ECCS maximum design pressure, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low signals are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The transmitters are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one

-out-of-two taken twice logic.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS.

The four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when ECCS manual initiation is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2. 1.b, 2.b. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow lin e valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump.

One flow transmitter per ECCS subsystem is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Discharge Flow - Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow - Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated Core Spray or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel w hen manually initiated.

A note is added to TS Table 3

.3.5.2-1 for Function 2

.b to clarify the intent of allowing credit for an OPERABLE Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem when it is aligned and operating in the decay heat removal mode of RHR. This note is appropriate since the associated RHR pump minimum flow valve (while operating in the decay heat removal mode) is closed and deactivated to prevent inadvertent vessel drain down events. RHR System Isolation 3.a - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RHR System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. This Function isolates the Group 11 valves.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 4.a - Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low, Level 2 The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Secti on 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1 and B.2 RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating Drain Time. If the instrumentation is inoperable, Required Action B.1 directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Required Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME.

The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. If the permissive is inoperable, manual initiation of ECCS is prohibited. Therefore, the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . With the permissive in the trip condition, manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip.

D.1 If a Core Spray or Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low bypass function is inoperable, there is a risk that the associated low pressure ECCS pump could overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open.

In this condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable, the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually, but this is not the preferred condition.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completio n Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat.

E.1 With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met, the associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem may be incapable of performing the intended function, and must be declared inoperable immediately.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPV Water REQUIREMENTS Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3- REVISION BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. Information Notice 84

-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86

-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 9 2-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93

-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 199

3. 5. Information Notice 94

-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-125 REVISION 1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is unavailable, such that RCIC System initiation occurs and maintains sufficient reactor water level such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."

The RCIC System may be initiated by automatic means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2. The variable is monitored by four transmitters that are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one

-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.

The RCIC test line isolation valve is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow.

The RCIC System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool since these are the two sources of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction valves from the suppression pool are open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. The suppression pool suction valves also automatically open and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool (one

-out-of-two logic similar to the CST water level logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-126 REVISION 7 BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the (continued) reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level 8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply and cooling water supply valves close (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve). The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System to provide makeup coolant to the SAFETY ANALYSES, reactor is used to respond to transient events. The RCIC System LCO, and is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken APPLICABILITY in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system, and therefore its instrumentation, meets Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 2). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions (nominal trip setpoint).

Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Each Allowable Value specified accounts for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the Function. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure >

150 psig since this is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-127 REVISION 22 BASES APPLICABLE

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal APPLICABILITY feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level (continued) and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.

Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel. The top of active fuel is defined in "Applicable Safety Analyses" for Safety Limit 2.1.1.3, "Reactor Vessel Water Level," found in the Bases for Safety Limit 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs."

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure coolant injection assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level 1.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the RCIC steam supply and cooling water supply valves to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). (The injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve.)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is high enough to preclude isolating the injection valve of the RCIC

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-128 REVISION 1 BASES APPLICABLE

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and during normal operation, yet low enough to trip the RCIC System prior APPLICABILITY to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally, the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of RCIC from the CST to

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-129 REVISION 1 BASES APPLICABLE

4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of RCIC continuing to APPLICABILITY provide additional water from a source outside primary containment.

This Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High signals are initiated from two level switches.

The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is set low enough to ensure that RCIC will be aligned to take suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-130 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 channels as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

C.1 A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (Ref. 1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1) limiting the allowable out of service time, if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-131 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result in a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability (loss of high water level trip capability). As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-132 REVISION 69 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued)

suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 3, and 4, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-133 REVISION 69 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.2 and SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-134 REVISION 69 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS x The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out

-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"

February 1991.

2. NRC No. 93

-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-154 REVISION 85 BASES APPLICABLE 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions APPLICABILITY to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System. The top of active fuel is defined in "Applicable Safety Analyses" for Safety Limit 2.1.1.3, "Reactor Vessel Water Level," found in the Bases for Safety Limit 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs."

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted [footnote (d) to Table 3.3.6.1

-1], only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE S 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

This Function isolates the Group 6 valves (and 1E1 1-F009). Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

- Low, Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the primary containment are isolated to limit the release of fission Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-161 REVISION 85 BASES ACTIONS J.1 and J.2 (continued)

If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary REQUIREMENTS Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1

-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNI T 1 B 3.3-166 REVISION 85 BASES APPLICABLE In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in SAFETY ANALYSES, the MODES or other specified conditions when SCIVs and the SGT LCO, and System are required.

APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis. 1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation and initiation signals. The isolation and initiation systems on Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis (Refs. 3 and 4).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Coolant Injection/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (HPCI/RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1 and LCO 3.3.5.2), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNI T 1 B 3.3-167 REVISION 85 BASES APPLICABLE

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of APPLICABILITY leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

2. Drywell Pressure - High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis.

However, the Drywell Pressure - High Function associated with isolation is not assumed in any FSAR accident or transient analyses.

It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell Pressure - High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude performance of the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Function Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) since this is indicative of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. This Function is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

3., 4. Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High High secondary containment exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release may have originated from the primary containment due to a break in the RCPB or the refueling floor due to a fuel handling accident. When Exhaust

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNI T 1 B 3.3-168 REVISION 85 BASES APPLICABLE 3., 4. Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High SAFETY ANALYSES, (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Radiation - High is detected, secondary containment isolation and actuation of the SGT System are initiated to limit the release of fission products as assumed in the FSAR safety analyses (Ref. 4).

The Exhaust Radiation - High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located near the ventilation exhaust ductwork coming from the reactor building and the refueling floor zones, respectively. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Four channels of Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High Function and four channels of Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to ensure radioactive releases do not exceed offsite dose limits.

The Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. The Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High Function is also required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs (in MODE 4 and MODE 5) because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. The Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Function is also required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, MODE 5

, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (e.g., due to a dropped fuel assembly) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 (continued

) HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.3-183 REVISION 85 BASES APPLICABLE setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.7.1.3. A SAFETY ANALYSES, channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required LCO, and Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable APPLICABILITY setpoint methodology assumptions (nominal trip setpoint).

(continued) Allowable Values are specified for the MCREC System Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are

selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environmental effects (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The control room air inlet radiation monitors measure radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR. A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel; thus, automatically initiating the MCREC System.

The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function consists of two independent monitors. Two channels of Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude MCREC System initiation.

The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-1 REVISION 0 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

BASES BACKGROUND The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS) System, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI and CS Systems.

On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start. Simultaneously, the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as well as vessel level while the RCS is still pressurized. If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence could be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core.

Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool may be circulated through a heat exchanger cooled by the RHR Service Water System. Depending on the location and size of the break, portions of the ECCS may be ineffective; however, the overall design is effective in cooling the core regardless of the size or location of the piping break.

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-5 REVISION 85 BASES LCO subsystems and ADS must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the (continued) single failure criterion required by Reference

10. (References 9, 15, and 16 takes no credit for HPCI.) HPCI must be OPERABLE due to risk consideration.

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, 150 psig, ADS and HPCI are not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure. ECCS rRequirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

." ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable HPCI subsystem. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable HPCI subsystem and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1 If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, or if one LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 7 day Completion Time is

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-15 REVISION 84 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating."

APPLICABLE The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of SAFETY ANALYSES break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Refs. 1, 4, and 5) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown. It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

3). With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur.

A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is considered in which single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-15 REVISION 84 the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

Two One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are is required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense

-in- depth should an unexpected draining event occur

. The A low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems consist s of either two one Core Spray (

CS) subsystem s or and two one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem

s. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. Only a single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the larger injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System cross tie valve is not required to be closed. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY

. The necessary portions of the Plant Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required ECCS subsystem.

One LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-16 REVISION 83 BASES LCO realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise (continued) inoperable. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN TIME, sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior to the RPV water level reaching the TAFlow pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. APPLICABILITY RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5

. Requirements on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3, Instrumentation, and other LCOs in Section 3.5, ECCS, RCIC, and RPV Water Inventory Control. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.OPERABILITY of the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the vessel. Requirements for ECCS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the 22 ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange (equivalent to 21 ft of water above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks; the point from which the water level is measured is shown in Figure B 3.5.2

-1). This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is 150 psig, and the CS System and the LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the primary system.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-16 REVISION 83 If any the one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this condition, the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem, however the defen se-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost.the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel flooding capability to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-17 REVISION 83 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) based on engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystemconsiders the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draininga vessel draindo wn event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory. With If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immediately initiated to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be able to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, and C.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a controlled volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.1 requires verification of the capability to establish the secondary containment boundary [at least including: the Unit 1 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if in MODE 5] in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when the required Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) are capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-17 REVISION 83 Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment. Secondary containment penetration flow paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time. Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

The required SGT subsystem(s) (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION) are capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place the required SGT subsystem(s) in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to place the required SGT subsystem(s) in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that the required SGT subsystem(s) can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.1 is also applicable.

Required Action D.1 requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO. The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.1 states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-17 REVISION 83 may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment.

The secondary containment provides a control volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary [at least including: the Unit 1 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if in MODE 5]. With the secondary containment boundary established, the required SGT subsystem(s) are capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room.

The required SGT subsystem(s) (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION) are capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases.

Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that the required SGT subsystem(s) is capable of being placed in operation.

The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

E.1 If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-17 REVISION 83 D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 With both of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, all coolant inventory makeup capability may be unavailable. Therefore, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. One ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time to restore at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

If at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring:

1) secondary containment [at least including: the Unit 1 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if in MODE 5] is OPERABLE; 2) sufficient standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) are OPERABLE to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION); and

3) secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-18 REVISION 83 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) controls to assure isolation capability. The administrative controls can consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross

-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step

-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event. For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross

-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod blade will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross

-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used. The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-19 REVISION 83 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.7, and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively. However, the LPCI flow rate requirement for SR 3.5.2.5 is based on a single pump, not the two pump flow rate requirement of SR 3.5.1.7.

SR 3.5.2.45 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow path s provides assurance that the proper flow paths will be available exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal.

Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note 1 that allows one a required LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.

The Surveillance is also modified by a Note 2 which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual who can rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.2.6 Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-19 REVISION 83 the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering judgement.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to actuate on a manual initiation signal. This Surveillance verifies that a manual initiation signal will cause the required CS subsystems or LPCI subsystem to start and operate as designed, including pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-20 REVISION 84 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. NEDC-31376P, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR

-LOCA Loss

-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.

Information Notice 84

-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.

3. NRC No. 93

-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. GE-NE-0000-0000-9200-02P, "Hatch Units 1 and 2 ECCS

-LOCA Evaluation for GE

-14," March 2002.

5. GEH Report 000N8505

-R0, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant GNF2 ECCS

-LOCA Evaluation," December 2014.

3. Information Notice 86

-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986. 4. Generic Letter 92

-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), " August 1992.

5. NRC Bulletin 93

-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 1993.

6. Information Notice 94

-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

7. General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388, "RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6," February 1983.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-21 REVISION 83

Figure B 3.5.2

-1 (page 1 of 1)

Top of Irradiated Fuel Assembly

RCIC System B 3.5.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-22 REVISION 8 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of the RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and RCIC systems perform similar functions. The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied. The RCIC System (Ref.

2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, or the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (150 psig to 1185 psig). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed.

As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine control valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV. The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating

RCIC System B 3.5.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.5-23 REVISION 8 BASES BACKGROUND when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery (continued) of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system.

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by SAFETY ANALYSES providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

5). LCO The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event.

Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure >

150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non

-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pre 150 psig, the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

and iIn MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since RPV water inventory is required by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control." the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC subsystem. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC subsystem and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-21 REVISION 85 BASES ACTIONS D.1 (continued)

With the MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be

exceeded by use of one closed and de

-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance to the overall containment function.

E.1 and E.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 and F.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended and the valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR shutdown cooling to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-53 REVISION 1 BASES APPLICABLE water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the SAFETY ANALYSES safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid.

(continued) Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

2). LCO 146 inches and 150 inches is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. The requirements for maintaining suppression pool water level within limits in MODE 4 or 5 are addressed in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

." ACTIONS A.1 With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as main vents are covered, HPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-81 REVISION 87 BASES BACKGROUND

a. Unit 1 is not conducting operations with a potential for draining (continued) the reactor vessel (OPDRV); ba. All hatches separating Zone III from Zone I are closed and sealed; and cb. At least one door in each access path separating Zone III from Zone I is closed.

To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System." When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for the support systems will also change (e.g., securing particular SGT or drain isolation valves).

APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for SAFETY ANALYSES secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref.

1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref.

2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems prior to discharge to the environment. Postulated LOCA leakage paths from the primary containment into secondary containment include those into both the reactor building and refueling floor areas (e.g., drywell head leakage).

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

4).

LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-82 REVISION 87 BASES LCO components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and (continued) processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum (0.20 inch of vacuum) can be established and maintained. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of doors, hatches, refueling floor plugs, SCIVs, and available flow paths to SG T

Systems. The required boundary encompasses the zones which can be postulated to contain fission products from accidents required to be considered for the Condition of each unit, and furthermore, must include zones not isolated from the SGT subsystems being credited for meeting LCO 3.6.4.3. Allowed configurations, associated SGT subsystem requirements, and associated SCIV requirements are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref.

3).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment (the reactor building zone and potentially the refueling floor zone).

Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during OPDRVs, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. (Note: Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.) Since CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are only postulated to release radioactive material to the refueling floor zone, the secondary containment configuration may consist of only Zone III during these conditions. Similarly, during OPDRVs while in MODE 4 (vessel head bolted) the release of radioactive materials is only postulated to the associated reactor building, the secondary containment configuration may consist of only Zone I.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-84 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS C.1, and C.2, and C.3 (continued)

Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, and CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. SR 3.6.4.1.1 also requires equipment hatches to be sealed. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. The intent is not to breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. When the secondary containment configuration excludes Zone I and/or Zone II, these SRs also include verifying the hatches and doors separating the common refueling floor zone from the reactor building(s). The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-86 REVISION 83 BASES APPLICABILITY MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant (continued) radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs),

during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. (Note: Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions. The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2 In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this Criterion are a closed and deactivated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-88 REVISION 85 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1, and D.2, and D.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those isolation devices in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-95 REVISION 87 BASES LCO configurations and associated SGT subsystem requirements are (continued) detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref.

4).

In addition, with secondary containment in modified configurations, the SGT System valves to excluded zone(s) are not included as part of SGT System OPERABILITY (i.e., the valves may be secured closed and are not required to open on an actuation signal).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems OPERABILITY are required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT Systems in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1

With one required Unit 1 or Unit 2 SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this condition, the remaining required OPERABLE SGT subsystems are adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function.

However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in one of the remaining required OPERABLE subsystems could result in the radioactivity release control function not being adequately performed. The 7 and 30 day Completion Times are based on consideration of such factors as the availability of the OPERABLE redundant SGT subsystems and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period. Additionally, the 30 day Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is based on three remaining OPERABLE SGT subsystems, of which two are Unit 2 subsystems, and the secondary containment volume in the Unit 1 reactor building being open to the common refueling floor where the two Unit 2 SGT subsystems can readily provide rapid drawdown of vacuum. Testing and analysis has shown that in this configuration, even with an

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-96 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) additional single failure (which is not necessary to assume while in ACTIONS) the secondary containment volume may be drawn to a vacuum in the time required to support assumptions of analyses.

C.1 If the SGT subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 6), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS

, or during OPDRVs

, when Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the remaining required OPERABLE SGT SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-97 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 (continued) subsystems should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

The Required Actions of Condition D have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore,

in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

E.1 If two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2 or 3, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 6) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.6-98 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, and F.2, and F.3 When two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fue l movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-20 REVISION 74 BASES LCO The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the CRE boundary to be (continued) opened intermittently under administrative controls. This note only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.

Each of the main control room exhaust fan ducts is equipped with only one isolation damper (1Z41

-F018A/B). During normal system operation, the dampers are maintained closed. However, when an exhaust fan is operated and its associated damper is opened, a single failure could prevent isolation of that penetration and adversely impact main control room habitability. Consequently, when a MCREC system exhaust fan (1Z41

-C011A/B) is operated or its associated damper (1Z41

-F018A/B) is opened, one of the two MCREC subsystems must be declared inoperable. Optional allowances for inoperable subsystems do not preclude changing the declared inoperable subsystem to best accommodate other plant circumstances; e.g., inoperable diesel generators, Safety Function Determination Program. However, in these instances, the Condition for one inoperable MCREC subsystem shall not be evaluated for Completion Time extensions, in accordance with Section 1.3.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the MCREC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MCREC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3; and b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-21 REVISION 74 BASES APPLICABILITY

c. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (continued) (OPDRVs). ACTIONS A.1 With one MCREC subsystem inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable MCREC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE MCREC subsystem is adequate to perform the CRE occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the MCREC System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem TEDE), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRE boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days.

During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential hazards of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke, in accordance with the Control Room Habitability Program. Actions must be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected form hazardous chemicals and smoke. These mitigating actions (i.e.,

actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will en sure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-22 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.

C.1 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable MCREC subsystem or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes overall plant risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because th e

plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met.

However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are par t of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-23 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 (continued) while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable MCREC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREC subsystem may be placed in the pressurization mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

E.1 If both MCREC subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition B),

the MCREC System may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 11) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-24 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, and F.2, and F.3 The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two MCREC subsystems inoperable or with one or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPD RVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-30 REVISION 87 BASES APPLICABILITY Room AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, (continued) except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3; and b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and. c. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS A.1 With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystems are adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in an OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation and, the consideration that the remaining subsystems can provide the required protection.

B.1 and B.2 With two control room AC subsystems inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function.

Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained such that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected.

With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a Control Room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the availability of the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem, and the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation.

Alternate methods of maintaining control room temperature, such as non

-safety grade air conditioning systems or fans, can also be used to maintain control room temperature.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-32 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2, and E.2.3 (continued)

The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A is not met, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystems may be placed immediately in operation.

This action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action E.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended. F.1, and F.2, and F.3

The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if Required Actions B.1 and B.2 or Required Actions C.1 and C.2 cannot be met within the required Completion Times, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require protection of the control room operators. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.7-33 REVISION 87 BASES ACTIONS F.1, and F.2, and F.3 (continued)

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. Unit 2 FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.

2. NRC No. 93

-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1. 4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-42 REVISION 85 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down, the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-45 REVISION 85 BASES LCO It is acceptable during shutdown conditions, for a single offsite power (continued) circuit to supply all 4.16 kV ESF buses on a Unit. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core cooling providing adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. ACTIONS A.1 An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF 4160 V bus. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, the remaining buses with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-46 REVISION 85 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, and B.3, and B.4 (continued)

With one or more offsite circuits not available to all required 4160 V ESF buses, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable (per Required Action A.1). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With one or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS

, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LOC 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de

-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a bus is de

-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de

-energized bus.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and

3. SR 3.8.1.6 is not required to be met since only one Unit 1 and one Unit 2 offsite circuits are required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.15 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-67 REVISION 85 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref. 1), and Chapter 14 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

LCO The necessary Unit 1 DC electrical power subsystems

-- with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of two 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-68 REVISION 85 BASES LCO the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling

-- (continued) are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 1 require power from Unit 2 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and LPCI valve load centers).

Therefore, the Unit 2 DG DC and the swing DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 2 components are also required to be OPERABLE. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown

). APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide core coolingadequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel; b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available;

and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4. ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3, and A.2.4

If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-69 REVISION 85 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3, and A.2.

4 (continued)

ALTERATIONS, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel

). Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 2 DC sources are governed by the

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-86 REVISION 85 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapters 5 and 6 (Ref.

1), and Chapter 14 (Ref.

2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3).

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-87 REVISION 85 BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 1 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components

-- both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 1 receive power through Unit 2 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and Low Pressure Coolant Injection valve load centers). Therefore, the Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g.,

fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown

).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core coolingto provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.8-88 REVISION 85 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4, and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS

, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel

). Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal - shutdown cooling (RHR SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may

be without power.

Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-2 REVISION 56 BASES BACKGROUND updates to the RCS P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, (continued) based upon the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel.

Hydrostatic and leak testing may eventually be required with minimum reactor coolant temperatures > 212°F. However, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures 212°F, maintaining RCS temperatures within a small band during the test can be impractical. Removal of heat addition from recirculation pump operation and reactor core decay heat is coarsely controlled by control rod drive hydraulic system flow and reactor water cleanup system non

-regenerative heat e xchanger operation. Test conditions are focused on maintaining a steady state pressure, and tightly limited temperature control poses an unnecessary burden on the operator and may not be achievable in certain instances.

Other testing may be performed in conjunction with the allowances for inservice leak or hydrostatic tests and control rod scram time tests.

APPLICABLE Allowing the reactor to be considered in MODE 4 when the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant temperature is >

212°F, during, or as a consequence of, hydrostatic or leak testing, or as a consequence of control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 requirements, including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems.

Since the tests are performed nearly water solid (except for an air bubble for pressure control), at low decay heat values, and near MODE 4 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment.

In the unlikely event of a any large primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The make-up capability of the low pressure coolant injection Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation B 3.10.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 1 B 3.10-3 REVISION 56 and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, BASES APPLICABLE "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV WIC," would be more than adequate to keep the core SAFETY ANALYSES flooded RPV water level above the TAF under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks (continued) would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs.

A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation at reactor coolant temperatures >

212°F can be in accordance with Table 1.1

-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures >

212°F, while the ASME system hydrostatic test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY. Additionally, even with required minimum reactor coolant temp eratures 212°F, RCS temperatures may drift above 212°F during the performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing or during subsequent control rod scram time testing, which is typically performed in conjunction with inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. While this Special Operations LCO is provided for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and for scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, parallel performance of other tests and inspections is not precluded.

If it is desired to perform these tests while complying with this Special Operations LCO, then the MODE 4 applicable LCOs and specified MODE 3 LCOs must be met. This Special Operations LCO allows changing Table 1.1

-1 temperature limits for MODE 4 to "NA" and suspending the requirements of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown." The additional (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 ii REVISION 79 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

.......................................................................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation ............................... B 3.3-1 B 3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation

..................................... B 3.3-33 B 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation

....................................................... B 3.3-42 B 3.3.2.2 Feedwater and Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-53 B 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation

................................. B 3.3-59 B 3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System

................................................................... B 3.3-70 B 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC

-RPT) Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-75 B 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation ..................................................... B 3.3-84 B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

.................. B 3.3-92 B 3.3.5.2 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation

.................. B 3.3-125 B 3.3.5.23 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation

.......... B 3.3-125XX B 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

.................................... B 3.3-135XX B 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation

............................... B 3.3-161XX B 3.3.6.3 Low-Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation

..................................................... B 3.3-171XX B 3.3.7.1 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System Instrumentation

.......................................................................... B 3.3-179XX B 3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation

.................................................. B 3.3-185XX B 3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring

............... B 3.3-193XX (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 iii REVISION 79 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ............................................. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

............................................................. B 3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Jet Pumps

............................................................................................ B 3.4-6 B 3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs) ............................................................... B 3.4-10 B 3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE

................................................................ B 3.4-14 B 3.4.5 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation

............................................. B 3.4-19 B 3.4.6 RCS Specific Activity

........................................................................... B 3.4-25 B 3.4.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown

............................................................................. B 3.4-29 B 3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown

........................................................................... B 3.4-35 B 3.4.9 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits

....................................... B 3.4-40 B 3.4.10 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure

........................................................... B 3.4-50 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

................................................................................ B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

................................ B 3.5-15 B 3.5.3 RCIC System

....................................................................................... B 3.5-21 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-113 REVISION 9 BASES ACTIONS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory (continued) measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1

-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the same feature(s) in both divisions. Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 2.a, and 2.b (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For low pressure ECCS, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated low pressure ECCS, DGs, and PSW System to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both associated low pressure ECCS subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS, DGs, and PSW System being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability),

the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with theinoperable, untripped channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1),

Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower.

However, as stated on page 95 of the Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation for Unit 1 Amendment 195 and Unit 2 Amendment 135, Georgia Power Company committed to not use the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.3 for Function 1.a (for CS

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-114 REVISION 9 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

Level 1 initiation) and Function 2.a (for LPCI Level 1 initiation) when in MODE 4 or 5. Instead, the ACTIONS of TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Shutdown, will be entered immediately for the inoperable ECCS subsystems. This commitment does not apply to the Function 1.a and Function 2.a initiation of the associated DG and the isolation of the associated PSW turbine building isolation valves.

There is no similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus, a Note is not necessary.

Notes are also provided (the Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed. Required Action B.1 (the Required Action for certain inoperable channels in the low pressure ECCS subsystems) is not applicable to Function 2.e, since this Function provides backup to administrative controls ensuring that operators do not divert LPCI flow from injecting into the core when needed. Thus, a total loss of Function 2.e capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is allowed, since the LPCI subsystems remain capable of performing their intended function.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that features in the same system (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref.

5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-116 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. The Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two

-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed by Required Action C.2. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref.

5) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition H must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. In this situation (loss of automatic

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-118 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

same feature(s) in both divisions. For Required Action E.1, the features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.d and 2.g (e.g., low pressure ECCS). Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action E.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected low pressure ECCS pump(s) to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for more than one low pressure ECCS pump are inoperable, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels of the low pressure ECCS pumps, this results in the affected low pressure ECCS pumps being concurrently declared inoperable.

In this situation (loss of minimum flow capability), the 7 day allowance of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and the subsystem associated with each inoperable channel must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . As noted (Note 1 to Required Action E.1), Required Action E.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 7 days (as allowed by Required Action E.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. A Note is also provided (the Note 2 to Required Action E.1) to delineate that Required Action E.1 is only applicable to low pressure ECCS Functions. Required Action E.1 is not applicable to HPCI Function 3.f since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (one

-out-of-one logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 5 and considered acceptable for the 7 days allowed by Required Action E.2. The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

If the instrumentation that controls the pump minimum flow valve is inoperable, such that the valve will not automatically open, extended pump operation with no injection path available could lead to pump overheating and failure. If there were a failure of the instrumentation, such that the valve would not automatically close, a portion of the

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.

Technical Specifications are required by 10 CFR 50.36 to include limiting safety system settings (LSSS) for variables that have significant safety functions. LSSS are defined by the regulation as "Where a LSSS is specified for a variable on which a safety limit has been placed, the setting must be chosen so that automatic protective actions will correct the abnormal situation before a Safety Limit (SL) is exceeded." The Analytical Limit is the limit of the process variable at which a safety action is initiated to ensure that a SL is not exceeded. Any automatic protection action that occurs on reaching the Analytical Limit therefore ensures tha t the SL is not exceeded. However, in practice, the actual settings for automatic protection channels must be chosen to be more conservative than the Analytical Limit to account for instrument loop uncertainties related to the setting at which the automatic protective action would actually occur.

The actual settings for the automatic isolation channels are the same as those established for the same functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3 in LCO 3.3.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation," or LCO 3.3.6.1, "Primary Containment Isolation instrumentation".

With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur. Under the definition of DRAIN TIME, some penetration flow paths may be excluded from th e DRAIN TIME calculation if they will be isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

The purpose of the RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation is to support the requirements of LCO 3.5.2, "Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory Control," and the definition of DRAIN TIME. There are functions that are required for manual initiation or operation of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 and other functions that support automatic isolation of Residual Heat Removal subsystem and Reactor Water Cleanup system penetration flow path(s) on low RPV water level.

The RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation supports operation of core spray (CS) and low pressure coolant injection (LPCI). The equipment involved with each of these systems is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.2. APPLICABLE With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required SAFETY to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV ANALYSES, LCO, water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect and APPLICABILITY Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material should a draining event occur.

A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is postulated in which a single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually initiated to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Permissive and interlock setpoints are generally considered as nominal values without regard to measurement accuracy.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low (Injection Permissive)

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. This function ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. While it is assured during MODES 4 and 5 that the reactor steam dome pressure will be below the ECCS maximum design pressure, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low signals are assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The transmitters are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one

-out-of-two taken twice logic.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS.

The four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - Low Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when ECCS manual initiation is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2. 1.b, 2.b. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass)

The minimum flow instruments are provided to protect the associated low pressure ECCS pump from overheating when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open. The minimum flow lin e valve is opened when low flow is sensed, and the valve is automatically closed when the flow rate is adequate to protect the pump.

One flow transmitter per ECCS subsystem is used to detect the associated subsystems' flow rates. The logic is arranged such that each transmitter causes its associated minimum flow valve to open. The logic will close the minimum flow valve once the closure setpoint is exceeded. The LPCI minimum flow valves are time delayed such that the valves will not open for 10 seconds after the switches detect low flow. The time delay is

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) provided to limit reactor vessel inventory loss during the startup of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling mode. The Pump Discharge Flow - Low Allowable Values are high enough to ensure that the pump flow rate is sufficient to protect the pump, yet low enough to ensure that the closure of the minimum flow valve is initiated to allow full flow into the core.

One channel of the Pump Discharge Flow - Low Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 when the associated Core Spray or LPCI pump is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.5.2 to ensure the pumps are capable of injecting into the Reactor Pressure Vessel w hen manually initiated.

A note is added to TS Table 3

.3.5.2-1 for Function 2

.b to clarify the intent of allowing credit for an OPERABLE Low Pressure Coolant Injection subsystem when it is aligned and operating in the decay heat removal mode of RHR. This note is appropriate since the associated RHR pump minimum flow valve (while operating in the decay heat removal mode) is closed and deactivated to prevent inadvertent vessel drain down events. RHR System Isolation 3.a - Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function associated with RHR System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RHR System.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.6.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. This Function isolates the Group 11 valves.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation 4.a - Reactor Vessel Water level - Low Low, Level 2 The definition of Drain Time allows crediting the closing of penetration flow paths that are capable of being isolated by valves that will close automatically without offsite power prior to the RPV water level being equal to the TAF when actuated by RPV water level isolation instrumentation. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with RWCU System isolation may be credited for automatic isolation of penetration flow paths associated with the RWCU System. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. While four channels (two channels per trip system) of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 2 Function are available, only two channels (all in the same trip system) are required to be OPERABLE.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is only required to be OPERABLE when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating DRAIN TIME. This Function isolates the Group 5 valves.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Secti on 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable RPV Water Inventory Control instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.2-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1 and B.2 RHR System Isolation, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Level 3, and Reactor Water Cleanup System, Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 functions are applicable when automatic isolation of the associated penetration flow path is credited in calculating Drain Time. If the instrumentation is inoperable, Required Action B.1 directs an immediate declaration that the associated penetration flow path(s) are incapable of automatic isolation. Required Action B.2 directs calculation of DRAIN TIME.

The calculation cannot credit automatic isolation of the affected penetration flow paths.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual injection functions. If the permissive is inoperable, manual initiation of ECCS is prohibited. Therefore, the permissive must be placed in the trip condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . With the permissive in the trip condition, manual initiation may be performed. Prior to placing the permissive in the tripped condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to inject water into the RPV.

The Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate any discovered inoperabilities and to place the channel in trip.

D.1 If a Core Spray or Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Flow - Low bypass function is inoperable, there is a risk that the associated low pressure ECCS pump could overheat when the pump is operating and the associated injection valve is not fully open.

In this condition, the operator can take manual control of the pump and the injection valve to ensure the pump does not overheat. If a manual initiation function is inoperable, the ECCS subsystem pumps can be started manually and the valves can be opened manually, but this is not the preferred condition.

The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time was chosen to allow time for the operator to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. The Completio n Time is appropriate given the ability to manually start the ECCS pumps and open the injection valves and to manually ensure the pump does not overheat.

E.1 With the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C or D not met, the associated low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem may be incapable of performing the intended function, and must be declared inoperable immediately.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPV Water REQUIREMENTS Inventory Control instrument Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.

SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

RPV Water Inventory Control Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3- REVISION BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests.

Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. Information Notice 84

-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Information Notice 86

-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986.

3. Generic Letter 9 2-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(F), " August 1992.

4. NRC Bulletin 93

-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 199

3. 5. Information Notice 94

-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-125 REVISION 1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.32 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the RCIC System instrumentation is to initiate actions to ensure adequate core cooling when the reactor vessel is isolated

from its primary heat sink (the main condenser) and normal coolant makeup flow from the Reactor Feedwater System is unavailable, such that RCIC System initiation occurs and maintains sufficient reactor water level such that initiation of the low pressure Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) pumps does not occur. A more complete discussion of RCIC System operation is provided in the Bases of LCO 3.5.3, "RCIC System."

The RCIC System may be initiated by automatic means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level

2. The variable is monitored by four transmitters that are connected to four trip units. The outputs of the trip units are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one

-out-of-two taken twice logic arrangement. Once initiated, the RCIC logic seals in and can be reset by the operator only when the reactor vessel water level signals have cleared.

The RCIC test line isolation valve is closed on a RCIC initiation signal to allow full system flow.

The RCIC System also monitors the water levels in the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool since these are the two sources of water for RCIC operation. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a RCIC initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the pump suction valves from the suppression pool are open. If the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. The suppression pool suction valves also automatically open and the CST suction valve closes if high water level is detected in the suppression pool (one

-out-of-two logic similar to the CST water level logic). To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other automatically closes.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-126 REVISION 6 BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System provides makeup water to the reactor until the (continued) reactor vessel water level reaches the high water level (Level

8) trip (two-out-of-two logic), at which time the RCIC steam supply, and cooling water supply valves close (the injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valves). The RCIC System restarts if vessel level again drops to the low level initiation point (Level 2).

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System to provide makeup coolant to the SAFETY ANALYSES, reactor is used to respond to transient events. The RCIC System LCO, and is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken APPLICABILITY in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system, and therefore its instrumentation, meets Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

2). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions (nominal trip setpoint).

Allowable Values are specified for each RCIC System instrumentation

Function specified in the Table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Each Allowable Value specified accounts for instrument uncertainties appropriate to the Function. These uncertainties are described in the setpoint methodology.

The individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure >

150 psig since this is when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for Applicability Bases for the RCIC System.)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-127 REVISION 28 BASES APPLICABLE

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that normal APPLICABILITY feedwater flow is insufficient to maintain reactor vessel water level (continued) and that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result.

Therefore, the RCIC System is initiated at Level 2 to assist in maintaining water level above the top of the active fuel. The top of active fuel is defined in "Applicable Safety Analyses" for Safety Limit 2.1.1.3, "Reactor Vessel Water Level," found in the Bases for Safety Limit 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs."

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is set high enough such that for complete loss of feedwater flow, the RCIC System flow with high pressure coolant injection assumed to fail will be sufficient to avoid initiation of low pressure ECCS at Level

1. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventor y exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel. Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to close the RCIC steam supply and cooling water supply valves to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). (The injection valve also closes due to the closure of the steam supply valve.)

Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 signals for RCIC are initiated from two level transmitters from the narrow range water level measurement instrumentation, which sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Allowable Value is high enough to preclude isolating the injection valve of the RCIC

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-128 REVISION 1 BASES APPLICABLE

2. Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES LCO, and during normal operation, yet low enough to trip the RCIC System prior APPLICABILITY to water overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC initiation. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

3. Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Low level in the CST indicates the unavailability of an adequate supply of makeup water from this normal source. Normally, the suction valve between the RCIC pump and the CST is open and, upon receiving a RCIC initiation signal, water for RCIC injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls below a preselected level, first the suppression pool suction valves automatically open, and then the CST suction valve automatically closes. This ensures that an adequate supply of makeup water is available to the RCIC pump. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. The Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function Allowable Value is set high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of Condensate Storage Tank Level - Low Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. (Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.)

4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High Excessively high suppression pool water level could result in the loads on the suppression pool exceeding design values should there be a blowdown of the reactor vessel pressure through the safety/relief valves. Therefore, signals indicating high suppression pool water level are used to transfer the suction source of RCIC from the CST to

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-129 REVISION 1 BASES APPLICABLE

4. Suppression Pool Water Level - High (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and the suppression pool to eliminate the possibility of RCIC continuing to APPLICABILITY provide additional water from a source outside primary containment.

This Function satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement. To prevent losing suction to the pump, the suction valves are interlocked so that the suppression pool suction valves must be open before the CST suction valve automatically closes.

Suppression Pool Water Level - High signals are initiated from two level switches. The Allowable Value for the Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function is set low enough to ensure that RCIC will be aligned to take suction from the suppression pool before the water level reaches the point at which suppression design loads would be exceeded.

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE when RCIC is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude RCIC swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.3 for RCIC Applicability Bases.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to RCIC System instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable channels. As such, a Note has been provided that allows separate Condition entry for each inoperable RCIC System instrumentation channel.

A.1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the Table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered to be inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-130 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

Required Action B.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic initiation capability for the RCIC System. In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Action B.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 channels as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref.

1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue. Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

C.1 A risk based analysis was performed and determined that an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (Ref.

1) is acceptable to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status (Required Action C.1). A Required Action (similar to Required Action B.1) limiting the allowable out of service time, if a loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability exists, is not required. This

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-131 REVISION 1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

Condition applies to the Reactor Vessel Water Level - High, Level 8 Function whose logic is arranged such that any inoperable channel will result ina loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability (loss of high water level trip capability). As stated above, this loss of automatic RCIC initiation capability was analyzed and determined to be acceptable. The Required Action does not allow placing a channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2

Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in automatic component initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). For Required Action D.1, the RCIC System is the only associated feature. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability. As noted, Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool since, if aligned, the Function is already performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the RCIC System cannot be automatically aligned to the suppression pool due to inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the redundancy of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the fact that the RCIC System is not assumed in any accident or transient analysis, an allowable out of service time of

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months has been shown to be acceptable (Ref.

1) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1, which performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-132 REVISION 79 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued)

suppression pool). Alternatively, Required Action D.2.2 allows the manual alignment of the RCIC suction to the suppression pool, which also performs the intended function. If Required Action D.2.1 or D.2.2 is performed, measures should be taken to ensure that the RCIC System piping remains filled with water. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 (e.g., as in the case where shifting the suction source could drain down the RCIC suction piping),

Condition E must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the RCIC System may be incapable of performing the intended function, and the RCIC System must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC System REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.23.3.5.3-1. The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 2; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1, 3, and 4, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref.

1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-133 REVISION 79 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.2 and SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.3 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations, consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.32 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-134 REVISION 79 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.4 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.5.23.3.5.3.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel.

The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety function.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out

-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications,"

February 1991.

2. NRC No.93-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 (continued) HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-154 REVISION 96 BASES APPLICABLE 6.b. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and System is bounded by breaks of the recirculation and MSL. The APPLICABILITY RHR Shutdown Cooling System isolation on Level 3 supports actions to ensure that the RPV water level does not drop below the top of the active fuel during a vessel draindown event caused by a leak (e.g., pipe break or inadvertent valve opening) in the RHR Shutdown Cooling System. The top of active fuel is defined in "Applicable Safety Analyses" for Safety Limit 2.1.1.3, "Reactor Vessel Water Level," found in the Bases for Safety Limit 2.1.1, "Reactor Core SLs."

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function. As noted (footnote (d) to Table 3.3.6.1

-1), only two channels of the Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 (and must input into the same trip system), provided the RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity is maintained. System integrity is maintained provided the piping is intact and no maintenance is being performed that has the potential for draining the reactor vessel through the system.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the RPS Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.1.1), since the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 Function is only required to be OPERABLE in MODE S 3, 4, and 5 to prevent this potential flow path from lowering the reactor vessel level to the top of the fuel. In MODES 1 and 2, another isolation (i.e., Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High) and administrative controls ensure that this flow path remains isolated to prevent unexpected loss of inventory via this flow path.

This Function isolates the Group 6 valves (and 2E11

-F009). Traversing Incore Probe System Isolation 7.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level

-Low, Level 3 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. The valves whose penetrations communicate with the Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-160 REVISION 96 BASES ACTIONS I.1 and I.2 (continued)

The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing sufficient time for personnel to isolate the RWCU System. J.1 and J.2 If the channel is not restored to OPERABLE status or placed in trip within the allowed Completion Time, the associated penetration flow path should be closed. However, if the shutdown cooling function is needed to provide core cooling, these Required Actions allow the penetration flow path to remain unisolated provided action is immediately initiated to restore the channel to OPERABLE status or to isolate the RHR Shutdown Cooling System (i.e., provide alternate decay heat removal capabilities so the penetration flow path can be isolated). Actions must continue until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status or the RHR Shutdown Cooling System is isolated.

SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each Primary REQUIREMENTS Containment Isolation instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.1

-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the PCIVs will isolate the penetration flow path(s) when necessary.

SR 3.3.6.1.1

Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-166 REVISION 96 BASES APPLICABLE In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in SAFETY ANALYSES the MODES or other specified conditions when SCIVs and the SGT LCO, and System are required.

APPLICABILITY (continued)

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. An isolation of the

secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of providing isolation and initiation signals. The isolation and initiation systems on Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 support actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis (Refs. 3 and 4).

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the High Pressure Coolant Injection/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (HPCI/RCIC) Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1 and LCO 3.3.5.2), since this could indicate that the capability to cool the fuel is being threatened.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS); thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, this Function is not required. In addition, the Function is also required to be OPERABLE during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-167 REVISION 96 BASES APPLICABLE

1. Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and (OPDRVs) because the capability of isolating potential sources of APPLICABILITY leakage must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded if core damage occurs.

2. Drywell Pressure - High High drywell pressure can indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). An isolation of the secondary containment and actuation of the SGT System are initiated in order to minimize the potential of an offsite dose release. The isolation on high drywell pressure supports actions to ensure that any offsite releases are within the limits calculated in the safety analysis. However, the Drywell Pressure - High Function associated with isolation is not assumed in any FSAR accident or transient analyses.

It is retained for the overall redundancy and diversity of the secondary containment isolation instrumentation as required by the NRC approved licensing basis.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from pressure transmitters that sense the pressure in the drywell. Four channels of Drywell

Pressure - High Functions are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude performance of the isolation function.

The Allowable Value was chosen to be the same as the ECCS Drywell Pressure - High Function Allowable Value (LCO 3.3.5.1) since this is indicative of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).

The Drywell Pressure - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists in the RCS; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. This Function is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES.

3., 4. Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High High secondary containment exhaust radiation is an indication of possible gross failure of the fuel cladding. The release may have originated from the primary containment due to a break in the RCPB or the refueling floor due to a fuel handling accident. When Exhaust

Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-168 REVISION 96 BASES APPLICABLE 3., 4. Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust SAFETY ANALYSES, Radiation - High (continued)

LCO, and APPLICABILITY Radiation - High is detected, secondary containment isolation and actuation of the SGT System are initiated to limit the release of fission products as assumed in the FSAR safety analyses (Ref. 4).

The Exhaust Radiation - High signals are initiated from radiation detectors that are located near the ventilation exhaust ductwork coming from the reactor building and the refueling floor zones, respectively. The signal from each detector is input to an individual monitor whose trip outputs are assigned to an isolation channel. Four channels of Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High Function and four channels of Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Function are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude the isolation function.

The Allowable Values are chosen to ensure radioactive releases do not exceed offsite dose limits.

The Reactor Building and Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Functions are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 where considerable energy exists; thus, there is a probability of pipe breaks resulting in significant releases of radioactive steam and gas. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are low due to the RCS pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES; thus, these Functions are not required. The Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation - High Function is also required to be OPERABLE during OPDRVs (in MODE 4 and MODE 5) because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (due to fuel uncovery) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded. The Refueling Floor Exhaust Radiation - High Function is also required to be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS, MODE 5, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment because the capability of detecting radiation releases due to fuel failures (e.g., due to a dropped fuel assembly) must be provided to ensure that offsite dose limits are not exceeded.

ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to secondary containment isolation instrumentation channels.

Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition.

MCREC System Instrumentation B 3.3.7.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.3-183 REVISION 96 BASES APPLICABLE setpoints within the specified Allowable Value of SR 3.3.7.1.3. A SAFETY ANALYSES, channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is not within its required LCO, and Allowable Value. The setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable APPLICABILITY setpoint methodology assumptions (nominal trip setpoint).

(continued)

Allowable Values are specified for the MCREC System Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations. The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between successive CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS. Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place.

The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter exceeds the setpoint, the associated device (e.g., trip relay) changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environmental effects (for channels that must function in harsh environments as defined by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

The control room air inlet radiation monitors measure radiation levels exterior to the inlet ducting of the MCR. A high radiation level may pose a threat to MCR personnel; thus, automatically initiating the MCREC System.

The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function consists of two independent monitors. Two channels of Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High are available and are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude MCREC System initiation.

The Allowable Value was selected to ensure protection of the control room personnel.

The Control Room Air Inlet Radiation - High Function is required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 and during CORE ALTERATIONS, OPDRVs, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, to ensure that control room personnel are protected during a LOCA, fuel handling event, or

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-1 REVISION 0 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

, RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM

B 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating

BASES BACKGROUND The ECCS is designed, in conjunction with the primary and secondary containment, to limit the release of radioactive materials to the environment following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The ECCS uses two independent methods (flooding and spraying) to cool the core during a LOCA. The ECCS network consists of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System, the Core Spray (CS)

System, the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS). The suppression pool provides the required source of water for the ECCS. Although no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank (CST), it is capable of providing a source of water for the HPCI and CS Systems.

On receipt of an initiation signal, ECCS pumps automatically start. Simultaneously, the system aligns and the pumps inject water, taken either from the CST or suppression pool, into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) as RCS pressure is overcome by the discharge pressure of the ECCS pumps. Although the system is initiated, ADS action is delayed, allowing the operator to interrupt the timed sequence if the system is not needed. The HPCI pump discharge pressure almost immediately exceeds that of the RCS, and the pump injects coolant into the vessel to cool the core. If the break is small, the HPCI System will maintain coolant inventory as well as vessel level while the RCS is still pressurized. If HPCI fails, it is backed up by ADS in combination with LPCI and CS. In this event, the ADS timed sequence could be allowed to time out and open the selected safety/relief valves (S/RVs) depressurizing the RCS, thus allowing LPCI and CS to overcome RCS pressure and inject coolant into the vessel. If the break is large, RCS pressure initially drops rapidly and the LPCI and CS cool the core.

Water from the break returns to the suppression pool where it is used again and again. Water in the suppression pool may be circulated through a heat exchanger cooled by the RHR Service Water System. Depending on the location and size of the break, portions of the ECCS may be ineffective; however, the overall design is effective in cooling the core regardless of the size or location of the piping break.

ECCS - Operating B 3.5.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-5 REVISION 96 BASES LCO subsystems and ADS must therefore be OPERABLE to satisfy the (continued) single failure criterion required by Reference 11. (References 10, 18, and 19 takes no credit for HPCI.) HPCI must be OPERABLE due to risk consideration.

LPCI subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal when below the actual RHR low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and not otherwise inoperable. At these low pressures and decay heat levels, a reduced complement of ECCS subsystems should provide the required core cooling, thereby allowing operation of RHR shutdown cooling when necessary.

APPLICABILITY All ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE during MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is considerable energy in the reactor core and core cooling would be required to prevent fuel damage in the event of a break in the primary system piping. In MODES 2 and 3, 150 psig, ADS and HPCI are not required to be OPERABLE because the low pressure ECCS subsystems can provide sufficient flow below this pressure. ECCS rRequirements for MODES 4 and 5 are specified in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

."

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable HPCI subsystem. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable HPCI subsystem and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, should not be applied in this circumstance.

A.1 If any one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, or if one LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems is inoperable, the inoperable subsystem(s) must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this condition, the remaining OPERABLE subsystems provide adequate core cooling during a LOCA. However, overall ECCS reliability is reduced, because a single failure in one of the remaining OPERABLE subsystems, concurrent with a LOCA, may result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended safety function. The 7 day Completion Time is

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-15 REVISION 95 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Inventory ControlECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The RPV contains penetrations below the top of the active fuel (TAF) that have the potential to drain the reactor coolant inventory to below the TAF. If the water level should drop below the TAF, the ability to remove decay heat is reduced, which could lead to elevated cladding temperatures and clad perforation. Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 requires the RPV water level to be above the top of the active irradiated fuel at all times to prevent such elevated cladding temperatures.A description of the Core Spray (CS) System and the low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS - Operating."

APPLICABLE The ECCS performance is evaluated for the entire spectrum of SAFETY ANALYSES break sizes for a postulated loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The long term cooling analysis following a design basis LOCA (Refs. 1, 4, and 5) demonstrates that only one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is required, post LOCA, to maintain adequate reactor vessel water level in the event of an inadvertent vessel draindown.

It is reasonable to assume, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level. To provide redundancy, a minimum of two low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5. The low pressure ECCS subsystems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

3). With the unit in MODE 4 or 5, RPV water inventory control is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analyses. RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5 to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and the fuel cladding barrier to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment should an unexpected draining event occur. A double-ended guillotine break of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is not postulated in MODES 4 and 5 due to the reduced RCS pressure, reduced piping stresses, and ductile piping systems. Instead, an event is considered in which single operator error or initiating event allows draining of the RPV water inventory through a single penetration flow path with the highest flow rate, or the sum of ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-15 REVISION 95 the drain rates through multiple penetration flow paths susceptible to a common mode failure (e.g., seismic event, loss of normal power, single human error). It is assumed, based on engineering judgment, that while in MODES 4 and 5, one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem can maintain adequate reactor vessel water level.

As discussed in References 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6, operating experience has shown RPV water inventory to be significant to public health and safety. Therefore, RPV Water Inventory Control satisfies Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The RPV water level must be controlled in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure that if an unexpected draining event should occur, the reactor coolant water level remains above the top of the active irradiated fuel as required by Safety Limit 2.1.1.3.

The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requires the DRAIN TIME of RPV water inventory to the TAF to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . A DRAIN TIME of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate unexpected draining of reactor coolant. An event that could cause loss of RPV water inventory and result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

Two One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems are is required to be OPERABLE and capable of being manually started to provide defense

-in- depth should an unexpected draining event occur

. The A low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems consist s of either two one Core Spray (

CS) subsystem s or and two one Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem

s. Each CS subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool or condensate storage tank (CST) to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). Each LPCI subsystem consists of one motor driven pump, piping, and valves to transfer water from the suppression pool to the RPV. Only a single LPCI pump is required per subsystem because of the larger injection capacity in relation to a CS subsystem. In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System cross tie valve is not required to be closed. Management of gas voids is important to ECCS injection/spray subsystem OPERABILITY

. The necessary portions of the Plant Service Water System are also required to provide appropriate cooling to each required ECCS subsystem.

One LPCI subsystem may be aligned for decay heat removal and considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function, if it can be manually

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-16 REVISION 94 BASES LCO realigned (remote or local) to the LPCI mode and is not otherwise (continued) inoperable. Because of the restrictions on DRAIN TIME, sufficient time will be available following an unexpected draining event to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to maintain RPV water inventory prior to the RPV water level reaching the TAFlow pressure and low temperature conditions in MODES 4 and 5, sufficient time will be available to manually align and initiate LPCI subsystem operation to provide core cooling prior to postulated fuel uncovery. APPLICABILITY RPV water inventory control is required in MODES 4 and 5

. Requirement s on water inventory control in other MODES are contained in LCOs in Section 3.3, Instrumentation, and other LCOs in Section 3.5, ECCS, RCIC, and RPV Water Inventory Control. RPV water inventory control is required to protect Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 which is applicable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel.OPERABILITY of the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems is required in MODES 4 and 5 to ensure adequate coolant inventory and sufficient heat removal capability for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the vessel. Requirements for ECCS OPERABILITY during MODES 1, 2, and 3 are discussed in the Applicability section of the Bases for LCO 3.5.1. ECCS subsystems are not required to be OPERABLE during MODE 5 with the spent fuel storage pool gates removed and the 22 ft 1/8 inches above the RPV flange (equivalent to 21 ft of water above the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the spent fuel storage pool racks; the point from which the water level is measured is shown in Figure B 3.5.2

-1). This provides sufficient coolant inventory to allow operator action to terminate the inventory loss prior to fuel uncovery in case of an inadvertent draindown.

The Automatic Depressurization System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 because the RPV pressure is 150 psig, and the CS System and the LPCI subsystems can provide core cooling without any depressurization of the primary system.

The High Pressure Coolant Injection System is not required to be OPERABLE during MODES 4 and 5 since the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the vessel.

ACTIONS A.1 and B.1

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-16 REVISION 94 If any the one required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is inoperable, the inoperable subsystemit must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . In this condition, the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME minimize the possibility that an unexpected draining event could necessitate the use of the ECCS injection/spray subsystem, however the defense

-in-depth provided by the ECCS injection/spray subsystem is lost.the remaining OPERABLE subsystem can provide sufficient vessel flooding capability to recover from an inadvertent vessel draindown. However, overall system reliability is reduced because a single failure in the remaining OPERABLE subsystem concurrent with a vessel draindown could result in the ECCS not being able to perform its intended function.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for restoring the required low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status is

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-17 REVISION 94 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and B.1 (continued) based on engineering judgment that considered the remaining available subsystemconsiders the LCO controls on DRAIN TIME and the low probability of an unexpected draininga vessel draindown event that would result in loss of RPV water inventory. With If the inoperable ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, action must be initiated immediately initiated to establish a method of water injection capable of operating without offsite electrical power.

The method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The method of water injection may be manually initiated and may consist of one or more systems or subsystems, and must be abl e to access water inventory capable of maintaining the RPV water level . If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the necessary water volume.suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

C.1, C.2, and C.3 With the DRAIN TIME less than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months but greater than or equal to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , compensatory measures should be taken to ensure the ability to implement mitigating actions should an unexpected draining event occur

. Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a controlled volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action C.1 requires verification of the capability to establish the secondary containment boundary [at least including: the Unit 2 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if in MODE 5] in less than the DRAIN TIME. The required verification confirms actions to establish the secondary containment boundary are preplanned and necessary materials are available. The secondary containment boundary is considered established when the required Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) are capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-17 REVISION 94 Verification that the secondary containment boundary can be established must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

Secondary containment penetration flow paths form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action C.2 requires verification of the capability to isolate each secondary containment penetration flow path in less than the DRAIN TIME

. The required verification confirms actions to isolate the secondary containment penetration flow paths are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Power operated valves are not required to receive automatic isolation signals if they can be closed manually within the required time. Verification that the secondary containment penetration flow paths can be isolated must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

The required SGT subsystem(s) (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION) are capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases. Required Action C.3 requires verification of the capability to place the required SGT subsystem(s) in operation in less than the DRAIN TIME

. The required verification confirms actions to place the required SGT subsystem(s) in operation are preplanned and necessary materials are available. Verification that the required SGT subsystem(s) can be placed in operation must be performed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

D.1, D.2, D.3, and D.4 With the DRAIN TIME less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , mitigating actions are implemented in case an unexpected draining event should occur

. Note that if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , Required Action E.1 is also applicable.

Required Action D.1 requires immediate action to establish an additional method of water injection augmenting the ECCS injection/spray subsystem required by the LCO.

The additional method of water injection includes the necessary instrumentation and controls, water sources, and pumps and valves needed to add water to the RPV or refueling cavity should an unexpected draining event occur. The Note to Required Action D.1 states that either the ECCS injection/spray subsystem or the additional method of water injection must be capable of operating without offsite electrical power. The additional method of water injection may be manually initiated and ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-17 REVISION 94 may consist of one or more systems or subsystems. The additional method of water injection must be able to access water inventory capable of being injected to maintain the RPV water level above the TAF for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The additional method of water injection and the ECCS injection/spray subsystem may share all or part of the same water sources. If recirculation of injected water would occur, it may be credited in determining the required water volume.

Should a draining event lower the reactor coolant level to below the TAF, there is potential for damage to the reactor fuel cladding and release of radioactive material. Additional actions are taken to ensure that radioactive material will be contained, diluted, and processed prior to being released to the environment. The secondary containment provides a control volume in which fission products can be contained, diluted, and processed prior to release to the environment. Required Action D.2 requires that actions be immediately initiated to establish the secondary containment boundary [at least including: the Unit 1 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if in MODE 5]. With the secondary containment boundary established, the required SGT subsystem(s) are capable of maintaining a negative pressure in the secondary containment with respect to the environment. The secondary containment penetrations form a part of the secondary containment boundary. Required Action D.3 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that each secondary containment penetration flow path is isolated or to verify that it can be manually isolated from the control room. The required SGT subsystem(s) (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION) are capable of maintaining the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment and filter gaseous releases.

Required Action D.4 requires that actions be immediately initiated to verify that the required SGT subsystem(s) is capable of being placed in operation. The required verification is an administrative activity and does not require manipulation or testing of equipment.

E.1 If the Required Actions and associated Completion times of Conditions C or D are not met or if the DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , actions must be initiated immediately to restore the DRAIN TIME to 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . In this condition, there may be insufficient time to respond to an unexpected draining event to prevent the RPV water inventory from reaching the TAF. Note that Required Actions D.1, ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-17 REVISION 94 D.2, D.3, and D.4 are also applicable when DRAIN TIME is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 With both of the required ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable, all coolant inventory makeup capability may be unavailable. Therefore, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. One ECCS injection/spray subsystem must also be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time to restore at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status ensures that prompt action will be taken to provide the required cooling capacity or to initiate actions to place the plant in a condition that minimizes any potential fission product release to the environment.

If at least one low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem is not restored to OPERABLE status within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time, additional actions are required to minimize any potential fission product release to the environment. This includes ensuring:

1) secondary containment [at least including: the Unit 2 reactor building zone if in MODE 4; or the common refueling floor zone if i n MODE 5] is OPERABLE; 2) sufficient standby gas treatment (SGT) subsystem(s) are OPERABLE to maintain the secondary containment at a negative pressure with respect to the environment (dependent on secondary containment configuration, refer to Reference 2; single failure protection is not required while in this ACTION); and

3) secondary containment isolation capability is available in each associated secondary containment penetration flow path not isolated that is assumed to be isolated to mitigate radioactivity releases (i.e., one secondary containment isolation valve and associated instrumentation are OPERABLE or other acceptable administrative

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-18 REVISION 94 BASES ACTIONS C.1, C.2, D.1, D.2, and D.3 (continued) controls to assure isolation capability. The administrative controls can consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.). OPERABILITY may be verified by an administrative check, or by examining logs or other information, to determine whether the components are out of service for maintenance or other reasons. It is not necessary to perform the Surveillances needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the components. If, however, any required component is inoperable, then it must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this case, the Surveillance may need to be performed to restore the component to OPERABLE status. Actions must continue until all required components are OPERABLE.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 and SR 3.5.2.2 REQUIREMENTS This Surveillance verifies that the DRAIN TIME of RPV water 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The period of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months is considered reasonable to identify and initiate action to mitigate draining of reactor coolant. Loss of RPV water inventory that would result in the RPV water level reaching the TAF in greater than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months does not represent a significant challenge to Safety Limit 2.1.1.3 and can be managed as part of normal plant operation.

The definition of DRAIN TIME states that realistic cross

-sectional areas and drain rates are used in the calculation. A realistic drain rate may be determined using a single, step

-wise, or integrated calculation considering the changing RPV water level during a draining event.

For a Control Rod RPV penetration flow path with the Control Rod Drive Mechanism removed and not replaced with a blank flange, the realistic cross

-sectional area is based on the control rod blade seated in the control rod guide tube. If the control rod bla de will be raised from the penetration to adjust or verify seating of the blade, the exposed cross

-sectional area of the RPV penetration flow path is used. The definition of DRAIN TIME excludes from the calculation those penetration flow paths connected to an intact closed system, or isolated by manual or automatic valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, blank flanges, or other devices that prevent flow of reactor coolant through the penetration flow paths

. A blank flange or other bolted device must be connected ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-18 REVISION 94 with a sufficient number of bolts to prevent draining in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake. Normal or expected leakage from closed systems or past isolation devices is permitted. Determination that a system is intact and closed or isolated must consider the status of branch lines and ongoing plant maintenance and testing activities.

The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system when misalignment issues (Reference

7) have been precluded by functional valve interlocks or by isolation devices, such that redirection of RPV water out of an RHR subsystem is precluded. Further, RHR Shutdown Cooling System is only considered an intact closed system if its controls have not been transferred to Remote Shutdown, which disables the interlocks and isolation signals.

The exclusion of penetration flow paths from the determination of DRAIN TIME must consider the potential effects of a single operator error or initiating event on items supporting maintenance and testing (rigging, scaffolding, temporary shielding, piping plugs, snubber removal, freeze seals, etc.). If failure of such items could result and would cause a draining event from a closed system or between the RPV and the isolation device, the penetration flow path may not be excluded from the DRAIN TIME calculation.

Surveillance Requirement 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met between performances. Therefore, any changes in plant conditions that would change the DRAIN TIME requires that a new DRAIN TIME be determined.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.2 and SR 3.5.2.3 The minimum water level of 146 inches required for the suppression pool is periodically verified to ensure that the suppression pool will provide adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) for the CS System andsubsystem or LPCI subsystem pumps, recirculation volume, and vortex prevention. With the suppression pool water level less than the required limit, the required LPCI injection/spray subsystem is inoperable.all ECCS injection/spray subsystems are inoperable unless they are aligned to an OPERABLE CST.

When suppression pool level is <

146 inches, t The required CS System is considered OPERABLE when the suppression pool water 146 inches or when only if it can take suction from the CST, and the CST water level is sufficient to provide the required NPSH for the CS pump. Therefore, a verification that either the suppression ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-18 REVISION 94 pool water level i 146 inches or that a required CS is aligned to 150,000 gallons of water, equivalent to 13 ft, ensures that the CS System can supply at least 50,000 gallons of makeup water to the RPV. The CS suction is uncovered at the 100,000 gallon level. However, as noted, only one required CS subsystem may take credit for the CST option during OPDRVs. During OPDRVs, the volume in the CST may not provide adequate makeup if the RPV were completely drained. Therefore

, only one CS subsystem is allowed to use the CST. This ensures the other required ECCS subsystem has adequate makeup volume.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.4 The Bases provided fo r SR 3.5.1.1 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.4.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-19 REVISION 94 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

The Bases provided for SR 3.5.1.1, SR 3.5.1.7, and SR 3.5.1.10 are applicable to SR 3.5.2.3, SR 3.5.2.5, and SR 3.5.2.6, respectively. However, the LPCI flow rate requirement for SR 3.5.2.5 is based on a single pump, not the two pump flow rate requirement of SR 3.5.1.7.

SR 3.5.2.45 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the required ECCS subsystem flow path s provides assurance that the proper flow paths will be available exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an initiation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve will automatically reposition in the proper stroke time. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. This SR does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

In MODES 4 and 5, the RHR System may operate in the shutdown cooling mode to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor. Therefore, RHR valves that are required for LPCI subsystem operation may be aligned for decay heat removal. Therefore, this SR is modified by a Note 1 that allows one a required LPCI subsystem of the RHR System to be considered OPERABLE for the ECCS function if all the required valves in the LPCI flow path can be manually realigned (remote or local) to allow injection into the RPV, and the system is not otherwise inoperable. This will ensure adequate core cooling if an inadvertent RPV draindown should occur.

The Surveillance is also modified by a Note 2 which exempts system vent flow paths opened under administrative control. The administrative control should be proceduralized and include stationing a dedicated individual who can rapidly close the system vent flow path if directed.

SR 3.5.2.6 Verifying that the required ECCS injection/spray subsystem can be manually started and operate for at least 10 minutes demonstrates that the subsystem is available to mitigate a draining event. Testing ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-19 REVISION 94 the ECCS injection/spray subsystem through the recirculation line is necessary to avoid overfilling the refueling cavity. The minimum operating time of 10 minutes was based on engineering judgement.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. SR 3.5.2.7 Verifying that each valve credited for automatically isolating a penetration flow path actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated RPV water level isolation signal is required to prevent RPV water inventory from dropping below the TAF should an unexpected draining event occur.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.8 The required ECCS subsystem is required to actuate on a manual initiation signal. This Surveillance verifies that a manual initiation signal will cause the required CS subsystems or LPCI subsystem to start and operate as designed, including pump startup and actuation of all automatic valves to their required positions.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

This SR is modified by a Note that excludes vessel injection/spray during the Surveillance. Since all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through the test line, coolant injection into the RPV is not required during the Surveillance.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-20 REVISION 95 BASES (continued)

REFERENCES

1. NEDC-31376P, "E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SAFER/GESTR

-LOCA Loss

-of-Coolant Accident Analysis," December 1986.

Information Notice 84

-81 "Inadvertent Reduction in Primary Coolant Inventory in Boiling Water Reactors During Shutdown and Startup," November 1984.

2. Technical Requirements Manual, Section 8.0.

3. NRC No. 93

-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

4. GE-NE-0000-0000-9200-02P, "Hatch Units 1 and 2 ECCS

-LOCA Evaluation for GE

-14," March 2002.

5. GEH Report 000N8505

-R0, "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant GNF2 ECCS

-LOCA Evaluation," December 2014.

3. Information Notice 86

-74, "Reduction of Reactor Coolant Inventory Because of Misalignment of RHR Valves," August 1986. 4. Generic Letter 92

-04, "Resolution of the Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(

f), " August 1992.

5. NRC Bulletin 93

-03, "Resolution of Issues Related to Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation in BWRs," May 1993.

6. Information Notice 94

-52, "Inadvertent Containment Spray and Reactor Vessel Draindown at Millstone 1," July 1994.

7. General Electric Service Information Letter No. 388, "RHR Valve Misalignment During Shutdown Cooling Operation for BWR 3/4/5/6," February 1983.

ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control B 3.5.2 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-21 REVISION 94

Figure B 3.5.2

-1 (page 1 of 1)

Top of Irradiated Fuel Assembly

RCIC System B 3.5.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-23 REVISION 9 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM B 3.5.3 RCIC System BASES BACKGROUND The RCIC System is not part of the ECCS; however, the RCIC System is included with the ECCS section because of their similar functions.

The RCIC System is designed to operate either automatically or manually following reactor pressure vessel (RPV) isolation accompanied by a loss of coolant flow from the feedwater system to provide adequate core cooling and control of the RPV water level. Under these conditions, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and RCIC systems perform similar functions. The RCIC System design requirements ensure that the criteria of Reference 1 are satisfied.

The RCIC System (Ref. 2) consists of a steam driven turbine pump unit, piping, and valves to provide steam to the turbine, as well as piping and valves to transfer water from the suction source to the core via the feedwater system line, where the coolant is distributed within the RPV through the feedwater sparger. Suction piping is provided from the condensate storage tank (CST) and the suppression pool. Pump suction is normally aligned to the CST to minimize injection of suppression pool water into the RPV. However, if the CST water supply is low, or the suppression pool level is high, an automatic transfer to the suppression pool water source ensures a water supply for continuous operation of the RCIC System. The steam supply to the turbine is piped from a main steam line upstream of the associated inboard main steam line isolation valve.

The RCIC System is designed to provide core cooling for a wide range of reactor pressures (150 psig to 1154 psig). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the RCIC turbine accelerates to a specified speed. As the RCIC flow increases, the turbine control valve is automatically adjusted to maintain design flow. Exhaust steam from the RCIC turbine is discharged to the suppression pool. A full flow test line is provided to route water from and to the CST to allow testing of the RCIC System during normal operation without injecting water into the RPV. The RCIC pump is provided with a minimum flow bypass line, which discharges to the suppression pool. The valve in this line automatically opens to prevent pump damage due to overheating

RCIC System B 3.5.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.5-24 REVISION 9 BASES BACKGROUND when other discharge line valves are closed. To ensure rapid delivery (continued) of water to the RPV and to minimize water hammer effects, the RCIC System discharge piping is kept full of water. The RCIC System is normally aligned to the CST. The height of water in the CST is sufficient to maintain the piping full of water up to the first isolation valve. The relative height of the feedwater line connection for RCIC is such that the water in the feedwater lines keeps the remaining portion of the RCIC discharge line full of water. Therefore, RCIC does not require a "keep fill" system.

APPLICABLE The function of the RCIC System is to respond to transient events by SAFETY ANALYSES providing makeup coolant to the reactor. The RCIC System is not an Engineered Safety Feature System and no credit is taken in the safety analyses for RCIC System operation. Based on its contribution to the reduction of overall plant risk, however, the system satisfies Criterion 4 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 5).

LCO The OPERABILITY of the RCIC System provides adequate core cooling such that actuation of any of the low pressure ECCS subsystems is not required in the event of RPV isolation accompanied by a loss of feedwater flow. The RCIC System has sufficient capacity for maintaining RPV inventory during an isolation event.

Management of gas voids is important to RCIC System OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY The RCIC System is required to be OPERABLE during MODE 1, and MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig, since RCIC is the primary non

-ECCS water source for core cooling when the reactor is isolated and pressurized. In MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure 150 psig, the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

and iIn MODES 4 and 5, RCIC is not required to be OPERABLE since RPV water inventory is required by LCO 3.5.2, "RPV Water Inventory Control."the low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems can provide sufficient flow to the RPV.

ACTIONS A Note prohibits the application of LCO 3.0.4.b to an inoperable RCIC subsystem. There is an increased risk associated with entering a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with an inoperable RCIC subsystem, and the provisions of LCO 3.0.4.b, which allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk PCIVs B 3.6.1.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-21 REVISION 96 BASES ACTIONS D.1 With the secondary containment bypass leakage rate or MSIV leakage rate not within limit, the assumptions of the safety analysis may not be met. Therefore, the leakage must be restored to within limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . Restoration can be accomplished by isolating the penetration that caused the limit to be exceeded by use of one closed and de

-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. When a penetration is isolated, the leakage rate for the isolated penetration is assumed to be the actual pathway leakage through the isolation device. If two isolation devices are used to isolate the penetration, the leakage rate is assumed to be the lesser actual pathway leakage of the two devices. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance to the overall containment function.

E.1 and E.2

If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1 and F.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met, the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. Action must be immediately initiated to suspend operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended and the valve(s) are restored to OPERABLE status. If suspending an OPDRV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to immediately initiate action to restore the valve(s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR shutdown cooling to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

Suppression Pool Water Level B 3.6.2.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-54 REVISION 77 BASES APPLICABLE water level must be maintained within the limits specified so that the SAFETY ANALYSES safety analysis of Reference 1 remains valid. (continued)

Suppression pool water level satisfies Criteria 2 and 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 2).

LCO A limit that suppression pool water level be 146 inches and 150 inches is required to ensure that the primary containment conditions assumed for the safety analyses are met. Either the high or low water level limits were used in the safety analyses, depending upon which is more conservative for a particular calculation.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a DBA would cause significant loads on the primary containment. In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. The requirements for maintaining suppression pool water level within limits in MODE 4 or 5 are addressed in LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV Water Inventory Control

." ACTIONS A.1 With suppression pool water level outside the limits, the conditions assumed for the safety analyses are not met. If water level is below the minimum level, the pressure suppression function still exists as long as main vents are covered, HPCI and RCIC turbine exhausts are covered, and S/RV quenchers are covered. If suppression pool water level is above the maximum level, protection against overpressurization still exists due to the margin in the peak containment pressure analysis and the capability of the Drywell Spray System. Therefore, continued operation for a limited time is allowed. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Completion Time is sufficient to restore suppression pool water level to within limits. Also, it takes into account the low probability of an event impacting the suppression pool water level occurring during this interval.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-83 REVISION 98 BASES BACKGROUND

a. Unit 2 is not conducting operations with a potential for draining (continued) the reactor vessel (OPDRV); ba. All hatches separating Zone III from Zone II are closed and sealed; and cb. At least one door in each access path separating Zone III from Zone II is closed.

To prevent ground level exfiltration while allowing the secondary containment to be designed as a conventional structure, the secondary containment requires support systems to maintain the control volume pressure at less than the external pressure. Requirements for these systems are specified separately in LCO 3.6.4.2, "Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs)," and LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System." When one or more zones are excluded from secondary containment, the specific requirements for the support systems will also change (e.g., securing particular SGT or drain isolation valves).

APPLICABLE There are two principal accidents for which credit is taken for SAFETY ANALYSES secondary containment OPERABILITY. These are a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) (Ref. 1) and a fuel handling accident inside secondary containment (Ref. 2). The secondary containment performs no active function in response to either of these limiting events; however, its leak tightness is required to ensure that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment is restricted to those leakage paths and associated leakage rates assumed in the accident analysis and that fission products entrapped within the secondary containment structure will be treated by the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems prior to discharge to the environment. Postulated LOCA leakage paths from the primary containment into secondary containment include those into both the reactor building and refueling floor zones (e.g., drywell head leakage).

Secondary containment satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4).

LCO An OPERABLE secondary containment provides a control volume into which fission products that bypass or leak from primary containment, or are released from the reactor coolant pressure boundary

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-84 REVISION 98 BASES LCO components located in secondary containment, can be diluted and (continued) processed prior to release to the environment. For the secondary containment to be considered OPERABLE, it must have adequate leak tightness to ensure that the required vacuum (0.20 inch of vacuum

) can be established and maintained. The secondary containment boundary required to be OPERABLE is dependent on the operating status of both units, as well as the configuration of doors, hatches, refueling floor plugs, SCIVs, and available flow paths to SGT Systems. The required boundary encompasses the zones which can be postulated to contain fission products from accidents required to be considered for the condition of each unit, and furthermore, must include zones not isolated from the SGT subsystems being credited for meeting LCO 3.6.4.3. Allowed configurations, associated SGT subsystem requirements, and associated SCIV requirements are detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 3).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment (the reactor building zone and potentially the refueling floor zone). Therefore, secondary containment OPERABILITY is required during the same operating conditions that require primary containment OPERABILITY.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of the LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining secondary containment OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5 to ensure a control volume, except for other situations for which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during OPDRVs, during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. (Note, moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.)

Since CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are only postulated to release radioactive material to the refueling floor zone, the secondary containment configuration may consist of only Zone III during these conditions. Similarly, during OPDRVs while in MODE 4 (vessel head bolted) the release of radioactive materials is only postulated to the associated reactor building, the secondary containment configuration may consist of only Zone II.

Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-85 REVISION 98 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1 If secondary containment is inoperable, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem that is commensurate with the importance of maintaining secondary containment during MODES 1, 2, and 3. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring secondary containment OPERABILITY) occurring during periods where secondary containment is inoperable is minimal. B.1 If secondary containment cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimiz ed. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 5), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

Required Action B.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

C.1 and, C.2, and C.3 Movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, and CORE ALTERATIONS, and OPDRVs can be postulated to cause Secondary Containment B 3.6.4.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-86 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS C.1, and C.2, and C.3 (continued)

fission product release to the secondary containment. In such cases, the secondary containment is the only barrier to release of fission products to the environment. CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must be immediately suspended if the secondary containment is inoperable.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completing an action that involves moving a component to a safe position. Also, action must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action C.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.1.1 and SR 3.6.4.1.2 REQUIREMENTS Verifying that secondary containment equipment hatches and one access door in each access opening are closed ensures that the infiltration of outside air of such a magnitude as to prevent maintaining the desired negative pressure does not occur. Verifying that all such

openings are closed provides adequate assurance that exfiltration from the secondary containment will not occur. SR 3.6.4.1.1 also requires equipment hatches to be sealed. In this application, the term "sealed" has no connotation of leak tightness. Maintaining secondary containment OPERABILITY requires verifying one door in the access opening is closed. An access opening contains one inner and one outer door. The intent is not to breach the secondary containment at any time when secondary containment is required. This is achieved by maintaining the inner or outer portion of the barrier closed at all times. However, all secondary containment access doors are normally kept closed, except when the access opening is being used for entry and exit or when maintenance is being performed on an access opening. When the secondary containment configuration excludes Zone I and/or Zone II, these SRs also include verifying the hatches and doors separating the common refueling floor zone from the reactor building(s). The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-88 REVISION 94 BASES APPLICABILITY MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant (continued) radioactive releases can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. (Note: Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3.)

ACTIONS The ACTIONS are modified by three Notes. The first Note allows penetration flow paths to be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. These controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator, who is in continuous communication with the control room, at the controls of the isolation device. In this way, the penetration can be rapidly isolated when a need for secondary containment isolation is indicated.

The second Note provides clarification that for the purpose of this LCO separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. This is acceptable, since the Required Actions for each Condition provide appropriate compensatory actions for each inoperable SCIV. Complying with the Required Actions may allow for continued operation, and subsequent inoperable SCIVs are governed by subsequent Condition entry and application of associated Required Actions.

The third Note ensures appropriate remedial actions are taken, if necessary, if the affected system(s) are rendered inoperable by an inoperable SCIV.

A.1 and A.2

In the event that there are one or more penetration flow paths with one SCIV inoperable, the affected penetration flow path must be isolated. The method of isolation must include the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected by a single active failure. Isolation barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and de-activated automatic SCIV, a closed manual valve, and a blind flange. For penetrations isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1, the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available device to secondary containment. The Required Action must be completed within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time. The specified time period is reasonable considering the time required to SCIVs B 3.6.4.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-90 REVISION 96 BASES ACTIONS C.1, and C.2 (continued) reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1, and D.2, and D.3 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the LCO does not apply. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be immediately suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also, if applicable, actions must be immediately initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action D.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving fuel while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that each secondary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed. The SR helps to ensure that post accident leakage of radioactive fluids or gases outside of the secondary containment boundary is within design limits. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those isolation devices in secondary containment that are capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position, since these were verified to be in the correct position upon locking, sealing, or securing.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-97 REVISION 98 BASES LCO configurations and associated SGT subsystem requirements are (continued) detailed in the Technical Requirements Manual (Ref. 6).

In addition, with secondary containment in modified configurations, the SGT System valves to excluded zone(s) are not included as part of SGT System OPERABILITY (i.e., the valves may be secured closed and are not required to open on an actuation signal).

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, a LOCA could lead to a fission product release to primary containment that leaks to secondary containment. Therefore, Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems OPERABILITY are required during these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a LOCA are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the SGT Systems in OPERABLE status is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for other situations under which significant releases of radioactive material can be postulated, such as during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs), during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment.

ACTIONS The Actions are modified by a Note to indicate that when both Unit 1 SGT subsystems are placed in an inoperable status for inspection of the Unit 1 hardened vent rupture disk, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , provided both Unit 2 SGT subsystems are OPERABLE. Upon completion of the inspection or expiration of the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance, the Unit 1 SGT subsystems must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Conditions entered and Required Actions taken. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowance is based upon precluding a dual unit shutdown to perform the inspection, yet minimizing the time both Unit 1 SGT subsystems are inoperable.

A.1 and B.1 With one required Unit 1 or Unit 2 SGT subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status. In this condition, the remaining required OPERABLE SGT subsystems are adequate to perform the required radioactivity release control function.

However, the overall system reliability is reduced because a single

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-99 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

In the event that a Unit 1 SGT subsystem is the one not restored to OPERABLE status as required by Required Action A.1 or B.1, operation of Unit 2 can continue provided that Unit 1 is shut down, the Unit 1 reactor building zone is isolated from the remainder of secondary containment and the SGT System, and the Unit 1 Technical Specifications do not require Operability of Zone I. In this modified secondary containment configuration, only three SGT subsystems are required to be OPERABLE to meet LCO 3.6.4.3, and no limitation is applied to the inoperable Unit 1 SGT subsystem. This in effect is an alternative to restoring the inoperable Unit 1 SGT subsystem, i.e., shut down Unit 1 and isolate its reactor building zone from secondary containment and SGT System.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment

, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, when Required Action A.1 or B.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the remaining required OPERABLE SGT subsystems should immediately be placed in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, that no failures that could prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any other failure would be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that represent a potential for releasing radioactive material to the secondary containment, thus placing the plant in a condition that minimizes risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities must not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended. The Required Actions of Condition D have been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action.

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-100 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 (continued)

If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

E.1 If two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2 or 3, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT Systems may not be capable of supporting the required radioactivity release control function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 8) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SGT System B 3.6.4.3 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.6-101 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS F.1, and F.2, and F.3 (continued)

When two or more required SGT subsystems are inoperable, if applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in secondary containment must immediately be suspended. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

Also, if applicable, actions must immediately be initiated to suspend OPDRVs in order to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended.

Required Action F.1 has been modified by a Note stating that LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 4 or 5, LCO 3.0.3 would not specify any action. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, in either case, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies would not be a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.4.3.1 REQUIREMENTS Operating each required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT subsystem for 15 continuous minutes ensures that they are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action.

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.6.4.3.2

This SR verifies that the required Unit 1 and Unit 2 SGT filter testing is performed in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). The VFTP includes testing HEPA filter performance, charcoal adsorber efficiency, minimum system flow rate, and the physical properties of the activated charcoal (general use and following specific operations). Specific test frequencies and additional information are discussed in detail in the VFTP.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-20 REVISION 84 BASES LCO The LCO is modified by a Note allowing the CRE boundary to be (continued) opened intermittently under administrative controls. This Note only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in continuous communication with the operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.

Each of the main control room exhaust fan ducts is equipped with only one isolation damper (1Z41

-F018A/B). During normal system operation, the dampers are maintained closed. However, when an exhaust fan is operated and its associated damper is opened, a single failure could prevent isolation of that penetration and adversely impact main control room habitability. Consequently, when a MCREC system exhaust fan (1Z41

-C011A/B) is operated or its associated damper (1Z41

-F018A/B) is opened, one of the two MCREC subsystems must be declared inoperable. Optional allowances for inoperable subsystems do not preclude changing the declared inoperable subsystem to best accommodate other plant circumstances; e.g., inoperable diesel generators, Safety Function Determination Program. However, in these instances, the Condition for one inoperable MCREC subsystem shall not be evaluated for Completion Time extensions, in accordance with Section

1.3. APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the MCREC System must be OPERABLE to ensure that the CRE will remain habitable during and following a DBA, since the DBA could lead to a fission product release.

In MODES 4 and 5, the probability and consequences of a DBA are reduced because of the pressure and temperature limitations in these MODES. Therefore, maintaining the MCREC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3; and b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-21 REVISION 84 BASES APPLICABILITY

c. During operations with potential for draining the reactor (continued) vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS A.1 With one MCREC subsystem inoperable, for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary, the inoperable MCREC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE MCREC subsystem is adequate to perform the CRE occupant protection function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a failure in the OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the MCREC System function. The 7 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and that the remaining subsystem can provide the required capabilities.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 If the unfiltered inleakage of potentially contaminated air past the CRE boundary and into the CRE can result in CRE occupant radiological dose greater than the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences (allowed to be up to 5 rem TEDE), or inadequate protection of CRE occupants from hazardous chemicals or smoke, the CRE boundary is inoperable. Actions must be taken to restore an OPERABLE CRE boundary within 90 days.

During the period that the CRE boundary is considered inoperable, action must be initiated to implement mitigating actions to lessen the effect on CRE occupants from the potential haza rds of a radiological or chemical event or a challenge from smoke, in accordance with the Control Room Habitability Program. Actions must be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to verify that in the event of a DBA, the mitigating actions will ensure that CRE occupant radiological exposures will not ex ceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected form hazardous chemicals and smoke.

These mitigating actions (i.e., actions that are taken to offset the consequences of the inoperable CRE boundary) should be preplanned for implementation upon entry into the condition, regardless of whether entry is intentional or unintentional. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90 day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-22 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. In addition, the 90 day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most problems with the CRE boundary.

C.1 In MODE 1, 2, or 3, if the inoperable MCREC subsystem or the CRE boundary cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE that minimizes overall plant risk. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

. Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 10), because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low-risk state.

Required Action C.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 The Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-23 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS D.1, D.2.1, and D.2.2, and D.2.3 (continued) operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if the inoperable MCREC subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the OPERABLE MCREC subsystem may be placed in the pressurization mode. This action ensures that the remaining subsystem is OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent automatic actuation have occurred, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action D.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and the subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

E.1 If both MCREC subsystems are inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3 for reasons other than an inoperable CRE boundary (i.e., Condition B),

the MCREC System may not be capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which overall plant risk is minimized. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Remaining in the Applicability of the LCO is acceptable because the plant risk in MODE 3 is similar to or lower than the risk in MODE 4 (Ref. 10) and because the time spent in MODE 3 to perform the necessary repairs to restore the system to OPERABLE status will be short. However, voluntary entry into MODE 4 may be made as it is also an acceptable low

-risk state.

MCREC System B 3.7.4 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-24 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS E.1 (continued)

Required Action E.1 is modified by a Note that states that LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3. This Note prohibits the use of LCO 3.0.4.a to enter MODE 3 during startup with the LCO not met. However, there is no restriction on the use of LCO 3.0.4.b, if applicable, because LCO 3.0.4.b requires performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering MODE 3, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable to, and the Note does not preclude, changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS or that are part of a shutdown of the unit.

The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

F.1, and F.2, and F.3 The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations.

Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, with two MCREC subsystems inoperable or with one or more MCREC subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, action must be taken immediately to suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the

CRE. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes the accident risk. If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. If applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-30 REVISION 98 BASES APPLICABILITY Room AC System OPERABLE is not required in MODE 4 or 5, except (continued) for the following situations under which significant radioactive releases can be postulated:

a. During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment. Moving irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment may also occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3; and b. During CORE ALTERATIONS; and. c. During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).

ACTIONS A.1 With one control room AC subsystem inoperable, the inoperable control room AC subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystems are adequate to perform the control room air conditioning function. However, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in an OPERABLE subsystem could result in loss of the control room air conditioning function. The 30 day Completion Time is based on the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation, the consideration that the remaining subsystems can provide the required protection.

B.1 and B.2 With two control room AC subsystems inoperable, the Control Room AC System may not be capable of performing its intended function.

Therefore, the control room area temperature is required to be monitored to ensure that temperature is being maintained such that equipment in the control room is not adversely affected.

With the control room temperature being maintained within the temperature limit, 7 days is allowed to restore a Control Room AC subsystem to OPERABLE status. This Completion time is reasonable considering that the control room temperature is being maintained within limits, the availability of the remaining OPERABLE control room AC subsystem, and the low probability of an event occurring requiring control room isolation.

Alternate methods of maintaining control room temperature, such as non

-safety grade air conditioning systems or fans, can also be used to maintain control room temperature.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-32 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS E.1, E.2.1, and E.2.2, and E.2.3 (continued) The Required Actions of Condition E are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition A is not met, the OPERABLE control room AC subsystems may be placed immediately in operation. This action ensures that the remaining subsystems are OPERABLE, that no failures that would prevent actuation will occur, and that any active failure will be readily detected.

An alternative to Required Action E.1 is to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require isolation of the control room. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

F.1, and F.2, and F.3

The Required Actions of Condition F are modified by a Note indicating that LCO 3.0.3 does not apply. If moving irradiated fuel assemblies while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, the fuel movement is independent of reactor operations. Therefore, inability to suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies is not a sufficient reason to require a reactor shutdown.

During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during OPDRVs, if Required Actions B.1 and B.2 or Required Actions C.1 and C.2 cannot be met within the required Completion Times, action must be taken to immediately suspend activities that present a potential for releasing radioactivity that might require protection of the control room operators. This places the unit in a condition that minimizes risk.

Control Room AC System B 3.7.5 HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.7-33 REVISION 98 BASES ACTIONS F.1, and F.2, and F.3 (continued)

If applicable, CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment must be suspended immediately. Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Also, if applicable, action must be initiated immediately to suspend OPDRVs to minimize the probability of a vessel draindown and subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until the OPDRVs are suspended.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.5.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the heat removal capability of the system is sufficient to remove the control room heat load assumed in the safety analysis. The SR consists of a combination of testing and calculation. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.

2. NRC No. 93

-102, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specification Improvements," July 23, 1993.

3. Technical Requirements Manual, Table T2.1-1. 4. NEDC-32988-A, Revision 2, Technical Justification to Support Risk-Informed Modification to Selected Required End States for BWR Plants, December 2002.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-41 REVISION 96 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC sources during MODES 4 SAFETY ANALYSES and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate AC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

In general, when the unit is shut down the Technical Specifications requirements ensure that the unit has the capability to mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents. However, assuming a single failure and concurrent loss of all offsite or loss of all onsite power is not required. The rationale for this is based on the fact that many Design Basis Accidents (DBAs) that are analyzed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 have no specific analyses in MODES 4 and 5. Postulated worst case bounding events are deemed not credible in MODES 4 and 5 because the energy contained within the reactor pressure boundary, reactor coolant temperature and pressure, and corresponding stresses result in the probabilities of occurrences significantly reduced or eliminated, and minimal consequences. These deviations from DBA analysis assumptions and design requirements during shutdown conditions are allowed by the LCO for required systems.

During MODES 1, 2, and 3, various deviations from the analysis assumptions and design requirements are allowed within the ACTIONS. This allowance is in recognition that certain testing and maintenance activities must be conducted, provided an acceptable level of risk is not exceeded. During MODES 4 and 5, performance of a significant number of required testing and maintenance activities is also required. In MODES 4 and 5, the activities are generally

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-43 REVISION 96 BASES LCO between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E (continued)

Electrical Distribution System capable of supplying power to the required LPCI valve load center must be OPERABLE. The circuit can be any of the Unit 1 circuits supplying the 1E and 1G ESF buses and the Unit 2 circuit supplying the 2F ESF bus. Also, one DG capable of supplying power to the required LPCI valve load center must be OPERABLE. The DG can be any one of the Unit 1 DGs (i.e., 1A and 1C DGs) and the swing DG (i.e., DG 1B). It is preferable to use the Unit 1 circuit and a Unit 1 DG to supply power to the LPCI valve load center, since in the case of an LOSP on both units, one LPCI valve load center would be without power if the swing DG was aligned to the opposite unit, thereby rendering one LPCI subsystem inoperable. Together, OPERABILITY of the required offsite circuits and DGs ensures the availability of sufficient AC sources to operate the plant in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and reactor vessel draindown

).

The qualified offsite circuits must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage while connected to their respective ESF buses, and of accepting required loads during an accident. Qualified offsite circuits are those that are described in the FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 offsite circuits consist of incoming breaker and disconnect to the 1C or 1D and the 2C or 2D startup auxiliary transformers (SATs), associated 1C or 1D and 2C or 2D SATs, and the respective circuit path including feeder breakers to all 4.16 kV ESF buses required by LCO 3.8.8. (However, for design purposes, the offsite circuit excludes the feeder breakers to each 4.16 kV ESF bus.)

The required DGs must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated frequency and voltage, connecting to their respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage, and accepting required loads. This sequence must be accomplished within 12 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and must continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby with engine hot and DG in standby with engine at ambient conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances, e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode.

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function for DG OPERABILITY.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-44 REVISION 96 BASES LCO It is acceptable during shutdown conditions, for a single offsite power (continued) circuit to supply all 4.16 kV ESF buses on a unit. No fast transfer capability is required for offsite circuits to be considered OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY The AC sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment to provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core coolingproviding adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

AC power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.1. ACTIONS A.1 An offsite circuit is considered inoperable if it is not available to one required ESF 4160 V bus. If two or more ESF 4.16 kV buses are required per LCO 3.8.8, the remaining buses with offsite power available may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By the allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with no offsite power available, appropriate restrictions can be implemented in accordance with the affected required feature(s) LCOs' ACTIONS.

AC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.2 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-45 REVISION 96 BASES ACTIONS A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, A.2.4, B.1, B.2, and B.3, and B.4 (continued)

With one or more offsite circuits not available to all required 4160 V ESF buses, the option still exists to declare all required features inoperable (per Required Action A.1). Since this option may involve undesired administrative efforts, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made. With one or more required DGs inoperable, the minimum required diversity of AC power sources is not available. It is, therefore, required to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS

, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and activities that could result in inadvertent draining o f the reactor vessel.

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC sources and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary AC power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the requir ed times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required AC electrical power sources should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it are inoperable, resulting in de

-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition A have been modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition A is entered with no AC power to any required ESF bus, ACTIONS for LCO 3.8.8 must be immediately entered. This Note allows Condition A to provide requirements for the loss of the offsite circuit whether or not a bus is de

-energized. LCO 3.8.8 provides the appropriate restrictions for the situation involving a de

-energized bus.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.2.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.2.1 requires the SRs from LCO 3.8.1 that are necessary for ensuring the OPERABILITY of the AC sources in other than MODES 1, 2, and 3. SR 3.8.1.6 is not required to be met since only one Unit 1 and one Unit 2 offsite circuits are required to be OPERABLE. SR 3.8.1.15 is not required to be met because the required OPERABLE DG(s) is not required to undergo periods of

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-66 REVISION 96 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the DC sources is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.

1) and Chapter 15 (Ref.

2), assume that Engineered Safety Feature systems are OPERABLE.

The DC electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the diesel generators (DGs), emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC subsystems is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum DC electrical power sources during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate DC electrical power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 3). LCO The necessary Unit 2 DC electrical power subsystems

-- with: 1) each station service DC subsystem consisting of tw o 125 V batteries in series, two battery chargers, and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling; and 2) each DG DC subsystem consisting of one battery bank, one battery charger, and

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-67 REVISION 96 BASES LCO the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling

-- (continued) are required to be OPERABLE to support required DC distribution subsystems required OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown." In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 require power from Unit 1 sources (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and LPCI valve load centers). Therefore, the Unit 1 DG DC and the swing DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to provide DC power to the required Unit 1 components are also required to be OPERABLE. This requirement ensures the availability of sufficient DC electrical power sources to operate the unit in a safe manner and to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown

).

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Required features to provide core cooling adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel assemblies in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Required features needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Required features necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition. The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.4. ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3, and A.2.4 If more than one DC distribution subsystem is required according to LCO 3.8.8, the DC subsystems remaining OPERABLE with one or more DC power sources inoperable may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE

DC Sources - Shutdown B 3.8.5 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-68 REVISION 96 BASES ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, and A.2.3, and A.2.4 (continued)

ALTERATIONS, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowance of the option to declare required features inoperable with associated DC power sources inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected system LCOs' ACTIONS. In many instances, this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel

). Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required DC electrical power subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary DC electrical power to the plant safety systems.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required DC electrical power subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time during which the plant safety systems may be without sufficient power.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.8.5.1 REQUIREMENTS SR 3.8.5.1 requires performance of all Surveillances required by SR 3.8.4.1 through SR 3.8.4.8. Therefore, see the corresponding Bases for LCO 3.8.4 for a discussion of each SR.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to preclude requiring the OPERABLE DC sources from being discharged below their capability to provide the required power supply or otherwise rendered inoperable during the performance of SRs. It is the intent that these SRs must still be capable of being met, but actual performance is not required.

SR 3.8.5.2 This Surveillance is provided to direct that the appropriate Surveillances for the required Unit 1 DC sources are governed by the

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-86 REVISION 96 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND A description of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is provided in the Bases for LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Operating."

APPLICABLE The initial conditions of Design Basis Accident and transient analyses SAFETY ANALYSES in the FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref.

1) and Chapter 15 (Ref.

2), assume Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) systems are OPERABLE. The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

The OPERABILITY of the AC and DC electrical power distribution system is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and the requirements for the supported systems' OPERABILITY.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum AC and DC electrical power sources and associated power distribution subsystems during MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment ensures that:

a. The facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended periods;

b. Sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status; and

c. Adequate power is provided to mitigate events postulated during shutdown, such as an inadvertent draindown of the vessel or a fuel handling accident.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution systems satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref.

3).

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-87 REVISION 96 BASES (continued)

LCO Various combinations of subsystems, equipment, and components are required OPERABLE by other LCOs, depending on the specific plant condition. Implicit in those requirements is the required OPERABILITY of necessary support required features. This LCO explicitly requires energization of the portions of the Unit 2 electrical distribution system necessary to support OPERABILITY of Technical Specifications required systems, equipment, and components both specifically addressed by their own LCO, and implicitly required by the definition of OPERABILITY. In addition, some components that may be required by Unit 2 receive power through Unit 1 electrical power distribution subsystems (e.g., Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System and Low Pressure Coolant Injection valve load centers). Therefore, the Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support the required equipment must also be OPERABLE.

Maintaining these portions of the distribution system energized ensures the availability of sufficient power to operate the plant in a safe manner to mitigate the consequences of postulated events during shutdown (e.g., fuel handling accidents and inadvertent reactor vessel draindown

).

APPLICABILITY The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems required to be OPERABLE in MODES 4 and 5 and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment provide assurance that:

a. Systems that provide core cooling to provide adequate coolant inventory makeup are available for the irradiated fuel in the core in case of an inadvertent draindown of the reactor vessel;

b. Systems needed to mitigate a fuel handling accident are available;

c. Systems necessary to mitigate the effects of events that can lead to core damage during shutdown are available; and

d. Instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit in a cold shutdown condition or refueling condition.

The AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystem requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in LCO 3.8.7.

Distribution Systems - Shutdown B 3.8.8 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.8-88 REVISION 96 BASES (continued)

ACTIONS A.1, A.2.1, A.2.2, A.2.3, and A.2.4, and A.2.5 Although redundant required features may require redundant electrical power distribution subsystems to be OPERABLE, one OPERABLE distribution subsystem may be capable of supporting sufficient required features to allow continuation of CORE ALTERATIONS

, and fuel movement, and operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel. By allowing the option to declare required features associated with an inoperable distribution subsystem inoperable, appropriate restrictions are implemented in accordance with the affected distribution subsystem LCO's Required Actions. In many instances this option may involve undesired administrative efforts. Therefore, the allowance for sufficiently conservative actions is made, (i.e., to suspend CORE ALTERATIONS, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and any activities that could result in inadvertent draining of the reactor vessel

).

Suspension of these activities shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative condition. These actions minimize the probability of the occurrence of postulated events. It is further required to immediately initiate action to restore the required AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems and to continue this action until restoration is accomplished in order to provide the necessary power to the plant safety systems.

Notwithstanding performance of the above conservative Required Actions, a required residual heat removal

-shutdown cooling (RHR SDC) subsystem may be inoperable. In this case, Required Actions A.2.1 through A.2.4 do not adequately address the concerns relating to coolant circulation and heat removal. Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the RHR SDC ACTIONS would not be entered. Therefore, Required Action A.2.5 is provided to direct declaring RHR SDC inoperable, which results in taking the appropriate RHR SDC ACTIONS.

The Completion Time of immediately is consistent with the required times for actions requiring prompt attention. The restoration of the required distribution subsystems should be completed as quickly as possible in order to minimize the time the plant safety systems may be without power.

(continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-2 REVISION 62 BASES BACKGROUND updates to the RCS P/T limit curves are performed as necessary, (continued) based upon the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens removed from the vessel.

Hydrostatic and leak testing may eventually be required with minimum reactor coolant temperatures > 212°F. However, even with required minimum reactor coolant temperatures 212°F, maintaining RCS temperatures within a small band during the test can be impractical. Removal of heat addition from recirculation pump operation and reactor core decay heat is coarsely controlled by control rod drive hydraulic system flow and reactor water cleanup system non

-regenerative heat e xchanger operation. Test conditions are focused on maintaining a steady state

pressure, and tightly limited temperature control poses an unnecessary burden on the operator and may not be achievable in certain instances. Other testing may be performed in conjunction with the allowances for inservice leak or hydrostatic tests and control rod scram time tests.

APPLICABLE Allowing the reactor to be considered in MODE 4 when the reactor SAFETY ANALYSES coolant temperature is >

212°F, during, or as a consequence of, hydrostatic or leak testing, or as a consequence of control rod scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, effectively provides an exception to MODE 3 requirements, including OPERABILITY of primary containment and the full complement of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the tests are performed nearly water solid (except for an air bubble for pressure control), at low decay heat values, and near MODE 4 conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Specific Activity," limits are minimized. In addition, the secondary containment will be OPERABLE, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit radiation releases to the environment.

In the unlikely event of a any large primary system leak that could result in draining of the RPV, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The make-up capability of the low pressure coolant injection and core spray subsystems, as required in MODE 4 by LCO 3.5.2, APPLICABLE "ECCS -- ShutdownRPV WIC," would be more than adequate to keep the core (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 B 3.10-3 REVISION 62 SAFETY ANALYSES flooded RPV water level above the TAF under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks (continued) would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurr ed.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required MODE 4 applicable LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be met by this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional, and therefore, no criteria of the NRC Policy Statement apply. Special Operations LCOs provide flexibility to perform certain operations by appropriately modifying requirements of other LCOs.

A discussion of the criteria satisfied for the other LCOs is provided in their respective Bases.

LCO As described in LCO 3.0.7, compliance with this Special Operations LCO is optional. Operation at reactor coolant temperatures >

212°F can be in accordance with Table 1.1

-1 for MODE 3 operation without meeting this Special Operations LCO or its ACTIONS. This option may be required due to P/T limits, however, which require testing at temperatures >

212°F, while the ASME system hydrostatic test itself requires the safety/relief valves to be gagged, preventing their OPERABILITY. Additionally, even with required minimum reactor coolant temp eratures 212°F, RCS temperatures may drift above 212°F during the performance of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing or during subsequent control rod scram time testing, which is typically performed in conjunction with inservice leak and hydrostatic testing. While this Special Operations LCO is provided for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and for scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, parallel performance of other tests and inspections is not precluded.

If it is desired to perform these tests while complying with this Special Operations LCO, then the MODE 4 applicable LCOs and specified MODE 3 LCOs must be met. This Special Operations LCO allows changing Table 1.1

-1 temperature limits for MODE 4 to "NA" and suspending the requirements of LCO 3.4.8, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown." The additional requirements for secondary containment LCOs to be met will provide

ML17076A434

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3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

1.3. APPLICABILITY

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ML17076A434

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3.3 INSTRUMENTATION

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1.3. APPLICABILITY

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