ML17261A138

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LER 79-016/01T-0 on 790804:14-h Interval of Reactor Operation Lapsed Prior to Trip During Trip Testing Following Maint Outage & Restoration of Criticality.Caused by Unclear Checkoff procedure.On-shift Training Held
ML17261A138
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1979
From: PECK C H
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML17244A769 List:
References
LER-79-016-01T, LER-79-16-1T, NUDOCS 7908210524
Download: ML17261A138 (4)


Text

U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION 79-016/01T-0 LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(CAR1231)Q)(PLEASEPRINTORTYPEALLREQUIREDINFORMATION) 60000000Q341111Q4~QsLICENSENUMBER2526LICENSETYPE3057CAT58NRCFOQM366{7.7I+CONTROLBLOCK:INYREG1Q2009LICENSEECODE1415~078CON'T~0178soURcE~LQB050002447080479QB081679Qe6061DOCKETNUMBEREVENTDATE7475REPORTDATE80EVENTDESCRIPTION ANDPROBABLECONSEQUENCES Q10Following amaintenance outaeandrestoration ofcriticalit a14hr.intervalofreac-~03toroperation lapsedpriortoatripduringtriptesting,inwhichA.C.powerwasonforaccumuinjection MOV'sandRWSTdeliverytoRHRMOV.(T.S.3.3.1.1g).

Thiscon-ditionwasnotedduringprecritical checkoffperformance aftertriptesting.Valves~06~08wereinpropersafeguard positionduringthisintervalofoperation.

Before14hr.intervalcktbkrpositions hadbeenreportedbutcheckoffdidnotdirectrepositioning.

Cktbkrswererechecked ba2ndoeratoronbasisofoerabilitforalinmentsandnothingunusualwasreported.

Controloperatorcompleted procedure assumingpre-criticalrequirement wasfulfilled.

8078~oeSYSTEMCAUSECAUSECOMP.VALVECODECODFSUBCODECOMPONENT CODESUBCODESUBCODERQll~DQ12~ZQ13CKTBRKQE~AQls~ZQs78910111213181920SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REPORTREVISIONLERiROEVENTYEARREPORTNO.CODETYPENO.Q17REPQRT~79~~010~W~01~T~~021222324262728293031ACTIONFUTUREEFFECTSHUTDOWNATTACHMENT NPRDQPRIMECOMP,COMPONENT TAKENACTIONONPLANTMETHODHOURSQ22SUBMITTED FORMSUB.SUPPLIERMANUFACTURER

~GQlg~HQlg~ZQEo~ZQET0000~YQ33~NQ34~NQEsW120QER3334353637404142434447CAUSEDESCRIPTION ANDCORRECTIVE ACTIONSQ270Unclearprecritical checkoffprocedure.

Cktbkrsforthesevalvesareclosedforpre-startuplineupandstrokingduringheatup.Laterprecritical checkoffspecifies valvepositionwithcktbkr"open"whilecktbkrpanelmarked"on"and"off."Thereisno3direction toreposition cktbkr.A.C.powerwasremoved.Checkoffwaschangedtodirectrepositioning andtogiveconsistent nomenclature.

On-shifttrainingonpowerremovalreuirementwasheldandfuhtaiib789FACILITYSTATUS%POWEROTHERSTATUS)6C280002eNAMETHODOFDISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Q32LJQ3)Performing pre-critical rocedure4546LOCATIONOFRELEASE36NACClMQ~QACTIVITYCONTENTRELEASEDOFRELEASEAMOUNTOFACTIVITYQQ33ZQ34NA789101144PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBERTYPEDESCRIPTION Q3e7~000Q37ZQ33NA789111213PERSONNEL INJURIES789II12LOSSOFORDAMAGETOFACILITY43TYPEDESCRIPTION e~zQ42NA8910PUBLICITY ISSUEDDESCRIPTION o~NQ44NA8910804580808090821O5Z80NRCUSEONLY80NAMEOFPREPARERCarlH.Peck686980oPHQNE716/'546-2700, ext.291-205 0

Attachment toLER79-016/01T-0 Rochester GasandElectricCorporation R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,UnitNo.1DocketNo.50-244Afteramaintenance outagethereactorwastakencriticalAugust4,1979at0425hours.Laterthatdayturbinetriptestingwasperformed inaccordance withthemanufacturer's recommendations, andduringthisareactortripoccurred, at1824hours.Duringperformance oftherestartpre-criticalcheckoffithadbeendiscovered thattheA.C.powerwas"on"forsafetyinjection accumulator injection valvesMOV-841andMOV-865andtherefueling waterstoragetankdeliverytoresidualheatremovalpumpsuctionvalveMOV-856.Thisindicated thatafourteenhourintervalhadelapsedinwhichthereactorhadbeenmadecriticalandwasoperatedwiththeA.C.poweravailable tothesevalvescontrarytoPlantTechnical Speci-fications whichrequireA.C.powertoberemoved.Duringthatinterval, however,thevalveswereintheirpropersafeguards positionandwouldhaveperformed theirintendedfunction.

Investigation revealedthat,asaresultoftheprecritical checkforthefirststartup,thecircuitbreakerpositions forthevalveshadbeenreported, butsincetheprecritical checkoffdidnotdirectchangingthebreakerpositions, theywerenotimmediately repositioned.

Thesepositions werenecessary tooperatethesevalvestoestablish properalignment forsafeguards operation priortoheatupandforvalvestrokingduringtheheatup.Anotheroperatorwaslaterorderedtocheckthebreakerstatusforthesevalves.Heviewedtheircondition asnormalforoperability, reportednothingunusual,anddidnotreposition themforremovalofA.C.power.Further,theprecritical checkoffintroduced confusion tooperators byspecifying thatthebreakersaretobe"open"whilethebreakerpanelsaremarked"on"and"off."Theprecritical checkoffhasbeencorrected todirectrepositioning ofcircuitbreakerswhereremovalofA.C.powerisrequiredbeforereactorcriticality, andtoprovidenomenclature consistent tothebreakerpanels.Inaddition, theOperations Engineerinstructed eachshifttoconducton-'shiftdiscussions ontherequirement forremovalofA.C.powertothesevalves.Furtherformalclassroom trainingdevotedtothisrequirement hasbeeninitiated fortheoperators intheirregularly scheduled trainingperiods.

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