ML17334A523

Facility Conceptual Design Description for Technical Support Ctr & Emergency Operations Facility.

ML17334A523
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	09/15/1982
From:	INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
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ML17334A522	List: ML17334A521 ML17334A523
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NUDOCS 8404030229
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INDIANA&MICHIGANEXZCTRICCCMPMYCONALDC.QXKNKXZRRPLANTKETHETSZBGCAGSUPPORTCENTERMDTHEKF.ATTAGBKÃT K)AEP:NRC:0533ARevised:September 15,1982andincorporated asAttachment 2toAEP:NRC:0531E'hangesareindicated byabarintheright-hand margin.'Ihisdccunntcontainsiafornation pxcpxietazy toWestinctmuse Elect~Co~zation andAn~canElec"~PowerSezv'ceCozpozaticn; itissuhnitted inconfidence ardistoheusedsole+forNwpurposeforwhichitIsfuz2LLshed

~dccQm'.?It andsuchinfozIGaticn Lsnottohezepzoduced, tzananitted, disclosed orusedat2~vtseinwholeorinpar"8404030229 820929PDRADOCK050003l5FPDR gESTtr<grOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS2'his.documentcontainsmaterialthatisproprietary totheMestinghouse Electric'orporation.

Theproprietary information hasbeenmarkedbymeansofbrackets.

Thebasisformarkingthematerialproprietary isidentified bymarginalnotesreferring tbthestandards inSection8oftheaffidavit ofR.A.Miesemann ofrecord"IntheMatterofAcceptance CriteriaforEmergency CoreCoolingSystemsforLightMaterCooledNuclearPowerReactors(OocketNo.RH-50-1)"

attranscript pages3706through3710(February 24,1972).Ouetotheproprietary natureofthematerialcontained inthisreport:which.wasobtainedatconsiderabIe Mestinghouse expenseandtherelease-ofwhichwouldseriously affectourcompetitive

position, werequestthisinformation tobewithheldfrompublicdisclosure inaccordance withtheRulesofPractice, 10CFR2.790,andthattheinformation pre-sentedthereinbesafeguarded inaccordance with10CFR2.903.Mebelievethat-withholding thisinformation willnotadversely affectthepublic.interest.

Thisinformation isforyourinternal-use onlyandshouldnotbereleasedtopersonsororganizations outsidetheOirec.orate ofRegula-tionandtheACRSwithoutpriorapprovalofWestinghouse ElectricCorporation.

Shoulditbecomenecessary toreleasethisinformation to.suchpersonsaspartofthereviewprocedure, pleasecontactMesting-houseElectricCorporation andtheywillmakethenecessary arrangements requiredtoprotecttheirproprietary interests.

4RRlA Section1.1.11.1.21.1.31.1.41.2TitleZntzxduction SystemFul~ions'Zechnical SupportCenterSafetyParm~xsDisplaySystemNuclearDataLinkBypass6Znoperable StatusZr~tion.SystemEb~rtBasis~cCAEP-1AEP-1AEP1AEP-2AEP-2AEP-32.2.12.22.32.3.12.3;22.3.3~DataAcquisition aDisplaySystemCat@uterSystemSystemEhtaDisplaySystemCnsiteTechnical SupportCenterContxolHocmBtarger~Cpezating Facilities 3.3e13.23.3CnsiteTechnical supportCenterDesianBasisZnputDetexminatian OTSCCcexatorZntexaceAEP-9AEP-9AEP-10AEP-1144.14.24.3SafetyPazaratexs DisplaySystemPurposeZnputDetemunation Man-<~hixm ZntexfaceAEP-30AEP-30AEP-30AEP-335.5715.25.3Bypass&Jr~ableStatusZndication SystemPurposeManW~>eZntexfaceAEP-47AEP-47AEP47AEP-476.

SectionTitle7.7.17.1.17.1.2TSC~SupplySystems~totheTSCCatguter~UPSSystemCons~RaofPm'upplyAEP-56AEP-56AEP-56AEP-567.2PamrtotheTSCComplexAEP-578.8.18.1.18.1.28.1.38.1.48.1.58.28.2.18.2.28.2.38.3TaskFunctions Perfoznad byEnLLviduals intheTSC.Technical SupportYanageaant

~ztEmergency Functions Pexfozmed intheTSC/ECPforeachErargency Class.ChusualEventAlertSiteandGenialBmzgehcyFunctions ofIndividuals Reporting totheECF.AEP-58AEP-58AEP-58AEP-58AEP58AEP-59AEP-59AEP59AEP-59AEP-60AEP-61AEP-629.9.19.29.3TSCRecordandDataAvailabil'ty AEP-63Controlled PlantSpecificBeferer~i<wterial AEP-63Chca~lled Enfozma~andTec.'nical AEP-64Referer~Ywtexial.

OtherMta,Records,arZZnfonraticn

~5 1.ZBZEGDKZICH 11SYST124FCKTECNS:

TheD.C.CookPlantTechnical

~xtCenterDataSystemisbeingdeveloped anddesignedusingtheguidelines ofNUB'696topzovidetheplantcpexating andtechnical

~xtpezsannel withtMpm~ntplantinformation tofacilitate theend~nayresponsetoanaccident.

'IbisSystem,whichutilizesthe-Westinc~se P2500TSCCan@uterSystans,canalsobeusedduxingnozmalplantagezaticn foratherfhrctians suchas-plantpezfonmxa

analysis, pezsonnel Dmin~etc.systemcansistsaf~similarcaagutezized dataacquisition, pzccessing anddisplaysystems,ereforeachD.C.CookUnit.The=fournavarfunctions pzavidedbythisccmputersystemare:1.1.1TZGKXCALSGPPORCCENTER(TSC):Theccngutersystemwillreceive,stoze,prccessanddisplayoncolor~tmanix~and/orcnhard-copy teaninals therealtimedataacquixedfxcmvaxiousplantsyst~.Pre-tripandpost-~dataarealsocollected ardcanbepzocessed anddisplayed bythecancuter.

Thissystemwillfacilitate theassessnant afttmplant'scondition byp1antoperating ardtechnical smpoxtcexsonrml.

ThedatadisplaysafthTe&nical~xtCmzterfur~ionwillpzenridesuficientinfozmation todeterrnirw:

'~-Plantsteadystatecgamting-canditians.

priortaNmunittrip-Transient conditions pxcducing Nminitiating eventandsystem1x8zavior duz~the~eaftheaccident.

-Pxesentconditions aftheplant.TheTSCdatadzsp1aysystanmayheusedfor.-Reviewing theaccidentsecnzence..

-Detezznizuz@

apprcpxiate mitigating actions.-Evaluating thee'xtmztafanydamage.-Detezznizzizg plantstatusduringrecoverycgexaticm.

functionwillhedesc~RindetailsinSection3.011.2~M~FETYSTATICDISPLAY(PSSD):ThisPSSDsystenwasdesignedinaccordance withtheguidelines fortheSafetyPaxamteDisp1aySystem(SOS)ofNGREG0696.ThisPSSDsystem,~displaysthesafetystatusafNmplantinafaxmatthat.canheeasilyxeax~edhy+~contxolroamoperators, willhelptheoperators todetectanyahnoznnal ccnditian ina~lytnanmr.Pdditiar~l featuresafthisPSSDsystemwillhe1ptheoperators andtechnical supportpersonnel tochtaiz>detailedinformation an&~safetysystemsafNmplant.Detaileddescriptions afthissystanareplaidedinSecticn4.113NXZZARDATALINK(NDL)TheTSCcartcuter systemhasahuilt-inaff-sitedatatxazmnissian capahili.ty whichcanheusedforizztexfacing withafutureNuclearDataLink(NDL)Sub-Systm.l1AZP2 1.1.4am'rmeZWBrZSTATtaINDICATESwam(BISI):TheBISXsystemprovidestheoperators andtechnical supportpersonnel withaclearindicatian af.theavailability oCNuplantsafetysystems(ESFSystems).

Detaileddescrq~ns ofthissystemazeprovidedinSection5.1.2REPCBTBASIS:Thisreportis~ontheproprietary Westingbmxse KRPHegort9725"Westinghouse Technical SupportCamlex,"whichwassubmitted totheHRC.'-Appropriate mxiifiaatians wexettedetoreflectthespecificdesignofD.C.CcakM.ts1aeR2.

2.THEDOZEACQUISITZCH

&DISPELSYSTEM2.1GSECOMP~SYSTEM:F~2.1showsthecangutersystemhaxdwaxeforeachCcokUnit.Multiple16-bithighspeedminicomputer andttenaxydevicesareusedtoprocessplantdata,generatedisplaysandpexfoxmotherman~chine interface functions.

Thesystemisconfigured inafault~tolerantchsign.Zfacantxalprocessing unit(CPU)ora~rtionofaamxyfails,thesystemwillautomatically reconf'uxe itselftoperformitschsignated functions.

2.2ZNPOZSYSTEMFigure2.2showsNnschematic diagramfortheTSCcomputerSystem.Inputsignalsfrcmthecontxolxccmardotherplantlocations aretakentothexemoteInput/Output (I/O)cabinets.

Signalisolation isprovidedintheI/OcabinetssothatnofailureontheoutputsideoftheI/Ocabinetswillaffecttheinputsignals.InadditiontoJ~seisolators, allsignalsconungfromthesafetysystaraaretakenaftertheexistingamlifiedisolators onthesesyst~.'Iheinputsignals,aftergoing+~ghtheisolators, willbeconvertstobina~information onthei~cardsandthenaxerultiplexed tothecomputer.

EachanalogsignalchannelhasitscwnAnalog/Digital Conver~,thusproviding ahighdegreeofreliability fortheinputsystem.

C,PpssCIJ4ApSL&4se*(,'ss.4as,tA1-.Ssr2.3DATADZSPIAYSYSTEMIssI2.3.1Technical rtCenterRxxnEachD.C.CbokUnithasadedicated corrrrrand consolelocatedin'theOnsiteTechnical SupportCenter.EachcormendconsoleisecguppedwithtwocolorCRCdisplaysandavideohardcopier(whichcanbeusedtoobtainahardcopyoftt~screenimage).OneCRTisdedicated tothePSSDfunctionandthesecondCRPisageneralpurposedisplay.Threesatellite

stations, eachwithacolorCRPdisplay,arealsoprovided.

'Ihesatellite stationscanbeconnected toeitherCcokUnit1orUnit2TSCCcaguterSystem.Asharedvideohardccpierisprovidedforthethreesatellite Cps.Thesatellite stationsarearrangedsothatvisualaccessfromtheccrmrandstationcanbehmaintained whilestillproviding sufficient xccmtominimizenoiseanddistrutanoe.

ForprintinglengttFreports,alineprinterisprovided.

2.3.2ControlRnn.Tworedundant PSSDdisplayCRTsandtworedundant BISZCpsareprovidedinea&controlroom.AvideohardcopierisalsoprovidedtocbtainhadccpyoutputfrcmtheCRTscreenimage.hss2.3.3EEOoeratinFacilities (EOP):AcolorCRTterminal, whichcanbeconnected toeitherCcokunitTSCccmputer, isprovidedintheEmergency QgemtirgFacilities.

'QmremoteCRTcanbeusedtodisplayallofthedisplaysavailable onAEP-5

~~thePSSD,TSCandBZSZfunctions exceptforthetopleveliconicdisplayafthePSSDfunctian.

Thisiconicdisplaywasdesignedforearlyxeaxpu.tion afaneventbytiecontxolnxxncpamtorsandtherefoxe isnotincludedinN~EOF.

~pr@ele'<<e~qt

~Ie~gaggef>>e~yCtASIIS5SIOI5Ilet!.I.I,IIISLSIIIII@~AOeeeeoees I00eA'IOIIAef~Ae<<OSAeccotteltS~eeetlACA<<III~FjIZOPCH(sharedbyl+lIIt~IIII~OSOSI4AACCIIIIII~III~etSAtAIIQOOOlltLA~CtllIOettlAr<<e<<Ol04elc<<(CSEr'v0OfPlAectleI5IOOISCIIOttA<<SIOO~ye000r0letcArCI<<IASSAtAASIOOIIIIIII~IIItII3S2$200HDL',5III5lIIIII5COIISOOLLA5IIr'IIeAIIIIIItIIIII'0&%<<h&W<<CCrSISIStfSOIAOCAIIIII~e'SOAAOteOIaftete~eeeeAOOSAfaosaAAeeeeOAAOCefJr40~IeeQAAO'IIOI0Ccthl1teSOswlArwlArCIA~CCR~oveArCIAOCOII0Ih<<heO4Ah%AIOIIOI~IAIIO'%>>4telA~I<<II<<el~~e0lh<<e~fe<<ehe0~IheOhe0\SetttI555CIIIIIL'OL Iltfretfl ICIIIII0~tIlI~IfIIIIIIIIIItFigurc2.1.Tt.'chnical SUpportComplexSYstcmConfiguration

<<SensorSignalsnon-'safety Saetysyst.syst.,sianalssianalsisolators<<I<<.~~ControlBoardIndication IIIIGISXDisplaysIPSSDDisplaysICONTROLROO14rL'PSSDDisplaysPlantProcessComputerIsolatorX/0CaninerainAIIIlILtors~-</OCa@inc.lTrainBIIIIIteIIBISIDisplaysIrIITscDisplaysITECsiSUPPOFTCENTERTSCCO><PUTTER SYSE.'lsite8oundaryE'igue2.2:TSCComputerSystemSchematic.

TSCBXSIPSSD(non-iconic)NUCLEARDATALIDKAEP-8 3ONSITETE'CHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER3.1DESIGNBASIS:Tt~QnsiteTechnical SupportCenter(OTSC)savesasthefocalpointforpost-accident recoverymanageaant.

Assuch,itmusthavethechili~toaccess,displayandtransmitpertinent plantstatusinformation independent ofactionsinthecontxolzccm.Technica1 SupportCenterSu~ionoftheTSCCanpxterSystanwasj1.PexmnnelintheOTSCmathaveaccesstotherealtimeinformation definix~thejumentstatusofcritica1plantsystansandfunctions.

2.TfuTSCfur~immthavethecapability tostorehistorical

~ventandpost-event datainordertoenab1eadiagncsis andevaluation aftheventtodeteanine t!mextentafanypossibleplantsystemdana<a.3.TheTSCQzmticnnusthavethecapability toacornsanddisplayplantgararetezs irdependent ofactionsinthcontxolroom.4.Theinterface oftbeTSCsystemequipment withexisiting plantprotection system,controlroanor~~func~5.Pazanatars tot?mextentpossibleshouldbefran<wsana~ethatisusedforcontrolrocmirZications toensuredatacons~cy~6.TlmTSCsystannusthavethecapability ofinterfacing withcamrnnication equizztant fortheoffmitetzansaussicn ofpertinent.

plantdata.

'.'Iheusersmastbeabletocr~teormodifydisplaystonaet;tomneedsasconditions maydictate.Inordertodefinetheinformation whichnust:heavailable intheOTSC,agenericstudyafcriticalplantsystemsandkeysafety8uwtions(asListedinTable3.1)wasconducted byWestinghouse.

Thisstudyresultedina.Listafpazanaters tobemonitored bythecarputerfortheTechnical SupportCenterSuction.ThisWest~ouse paraaater listwasreviewedandmade~PlantspecificbyAEP.Table3.2Liststhepmnaipalparanatms andTable3.3liststhebasisforinputselection.

Bedtm3ancy anddiversity afprocessir~tionsareutilizedtosatisfyconcernsassociated withunavailable signalsduetosensorfailure.Sana.refixmaent afthinputparanaters ListmayhemadeafterthesuhnittaL of'hisconceptual designreportAEP-10 MESHN6HOUSK NOPRHYARY CIJ5523.3OTSCOPERATORINTERFACE TheabilityoftheOTSCtobeaneffective Mo]fnpost-accfdent recoverymanagement isafunctionoftheinputsprovidedandtheabf1ftytopresentinformation inameaningful andorganized manner.Asstatedpreviously, theman-machine interface fsthroughtheuseoffnteractfv'e

~aphiccolorCRTdisplays.

Theinterface AnctionsfntheOTSCconsistofdisplaysandconsolefunctions.

.Thedisplaytypesavailable forOTSCpersonnel useconsistofgraphi'candalphanumeric displayswhicharebothpreformatted anduserconstruc-tible.Examplesofthetypesofdfsp1aysavaf1able areshownfnFigures3li32and3-3Figure3.l.fsanexamp]eofapreformatted systemstatusdisplay,g~thering important systemandloopparameters ontoasfnglepageofdisplay.Figure3.2showsmoredetailedinformation onindividual parameters suchasinformation onsensorstatus,current~value,andhighandlowlimits..Figure3.3isanexampleofagraphictrenddisplayshowingatimehistoryofre]atedparameters.

Highlight-

-ingtechniques forind~cating parameters vrconditions of)nterestutil-.4zebothcolorandachraaatfc means.Byproviding acombination ofbothpreformatted anduserconstructible displaystheOTSCpersonnel areprovidedwithprearranged quicklyacces-sfblesyseminformation andtheflexibility topermitthetailoring ofinformation prmentation tomeetspecificneedsasconditions.

dictate.Thespecificcontentofpreformatted displayswillbedetermined bymalyzingposaccidentdatarequirements intermsofeventevaluation, thesafetysitusoftheplant,andlong-term recoveryplanning.

Ois-playswillalso.bedesignedtoreflee.plantspecificdesigndetails.8~Oisplayaccessisprovidedbothbydedicated functional consolepush-buttonsandstandardkeyboardentries.Ocdicated keysprovideaccesstothemostfrequently useddisplaysorfunctions.

Forotherfunctions accesscanbeeitherdirectbyenteringshortcodesorbyutilizing

~ninstruction func.iontodetermine theidentification codeforadisplayifitisunknown.~51A27 0

1gESTI~IGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS2~Othertypesofinformation isavailable throughtheconsolekeyboard.

.Theseconsistoffunctions suchaspointrevie~,logs,post-trip histor-1caldatareview,andoffsitedatatransmission.

Thepaintreviewfunctions enabletheconsoleoperator,to

'reviewplantsensorinformation.

Thetypesofreviewfunctions available are:Valuesofindividual points.~2.Pointsremovedfromscan.3.Pointsremovedfranlimitchecking.

4Pointsfailedunderqualitycheckingroutines.

$.Pointswhose'can frequencies havebeenchangedfmnthenormalscanfrequencies.

Therearelog<unctions available totheOTSCpersonnel whichcanbedisplayed onCRTswithperiodicupdatesoroutputontoahardcopydevicesuchasalineprinter.Thesefunctions canbepreprograrmed andautomatically initiated orspecified andinitiated hyconsoleoperatorinput.I~Thepost-trip reviewfunctionprovidesthecapability toreviewhistor-yicaldatatoaidinaneventevaluation.

Thisfunctioncontinuously storesinmemoryanupdatedtableofpreassigned sensorvaluesfora,predefined period.Upontheoccurrence ofadisturbance

{e.g.,planttrip)thesystemcontinues tostoredataforadefinedtimeperiod.Afterthisperiod,theentire,datarecordcanbereviewedbytheOTSCpersonnel onCRTsand/oroutputtohardcopydevicesforpermanent recordstoragepurposes.

CAC11'=8AEP-12 Ip-.,iNGHOJSE PROPRIETARY CLASSZ,Theoffsitedatatransmission functionenablesQTSCpersonnel to'trans-

.mitplantdatatooffsite',ocations viaownersuppliedcomnunications systems.TheOTSCoperatorcaninitiatetransmission ofdataeitherona"one-shot" orperiodic"asis.Thetransmitted datacanbearrangedhntofoureditedversionsforthespecificneedsofseparateoffsite:.ccnmunications receivers suchastheNRC.\2-9 iIII"545YZGHGHOUSE PROPRlEFARY CLASS2TABLE3.1,4-CRITICALP'LANTSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS

.Reactivity Control,VrimarySystemInventory 5555rI5hgc;355.55CoreHeatRemovalCapabilities Availability andCapacityofHeatSinks5~,Containment Integrity

-'PrimarySystemPressureandTemperature Availability andCapacityofAlternate RaterSourcesAvailability andOperability ofCriticalSupportSystems-Radioactivity Control454~I'5h'55*-2-10AEP14

,Table3.2TSCPaxarratmrs ListVariables Min.NoafSignalsbetlegtarp-RCScoldlegtarp-BCSpressuxe-BeactorwaterLevel-KSlxxcnconcentxation

-Pressurizer waterLevel-Steamgenerator LevelWidexangeNanna'ancp

-SteamLinepressure~ntainFient pxesssuxe0-700degF0-700degF0-3000psig0-100%0-5000pcm0-10000-10000-1000O-a4OOpsig-5-+36psig~denotestoracptanklevel2-2oxicacidtanklevel-Auxfeedwarmflac'eedwaterflow~gh~injection f1cw589'-599'lev.599'-614'lev.0-10000-1000o-aoo~0-250KLbs/hr0-5000K1bs/hr0-200cpmAEP-15

~"4Table3.2TSCParanaters ListVaziablesMin.NoofSignals444'4e-Lowheadinjection flew416~Neutronflux-Contmlrodposition53-Prirrary systemrelief&.4anentcoolingwaterflow2~agormntccolingwatertemp.2-Contaimnent targerature 80-5500gptn0-2500degF0-10000gptn32-200degF0-30%0-100degF0-120%pramPallinorrotClosed-not closed,4-Sec.syst.reliefvalves4-P2Rrelief~pressure1-PZRrelief~3c1m'.1-BCSdegreofsubcooling N/A-Accunulator level-Accunaxlator pressure-AcaxaQator isolation valves4-Auxbuildingsumplevel-BHRsystemflowClosed-not closedClosed-not closed0-100psigO-10OS50-350degF200sub-5super0'-10080-700psigClosed-r~

clcsed0-flccdlevel0-7000apn Table3.2TSCPaxarretars ListVariables Min.NoofSicnmls~heat,ex.outlettemp.~ricacidchaupir@flaw-KSlet-dawnflaw-BCSnake-upflaw~xgvBDtilatich dcntKer-Statusafstandby~-Kighradioactivity liquidtanklevel-Badiaactive gasdecaytkpress4-BeactorCoolantPunpsstatus4-PZRneaterbankstatus<<Wtmrolcxy Minddizection Atm.deltatemp.-Badiation 2Car~antareaxadia~11Containmzt airauriculate QCitVentradiogasChitVentiodine0-400degF0-10pe0-200gpn0-200cdclosed-nat closedEmxgizedornot0-10080-150psig0-1200anps0-200anps0-360deg0-100miles/hr0-50PegF.1-10E4mR/hr10-10E6~~10-10E6axn1O-1OE6~10-10E6cdAEP-17 Table3.2TSCPazaneters ListVariables Min.No.ofSils-Radiation (continued)

Steamgen.blowdownCondenser airejectorCoolingwaterEastCcolingwaterWestServicewaterEastServicewaterWestWasteZiquidoff-gasWastegasdecayControlrccmareaSpentfuelareaClarLzgpproomarea10-10E6cpn.1-10E4mR/hr.10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn10-10E6cpn.1-10E4mR/hr.1-10E4mR/hr.1-10E4mR/hrNcrta1:Degreeofsubcooling willheindependently calculated bytheTSCccnauter.

Note2:Weradiation signalslistedabovearesignalsfromthe'Iexistirgradiation detectors.

AEPisintheprocessofirmlementing anewRadiation RonitorSystematCookUnits1and2,andwillprovideaseparateRadiation DataDisplaySystemfortheTSCandEOF.AEP-18 hJrh'A~Ahw~hh~r~A8hhr4~PARAHETER tYES1'INAllOUSE PltOPAlEfAQ'LASS 2TABLE23I'SCINSTRUHENT BASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS+

uBASIS.(b,c)Containment PressureSteamlinePress.ure

-Determine ifbreakisinsideoroutsideofcontairunent

-Determine ifhiqhenergysecondary l)neruptureoccurred-Honitorcontainment conditions

-Haintainanadequatereactorheatsink-Honitorsecondary sidepressureto:.-verifyoperation ofpressurecontrolsteamdumpsystem-monitorRCScooldownrateNarrowRangeSteamGenerator WaterLevelWideRangeSteamGenerator WaterLevelBoricAcidTankLevelCondensate StorageTankLevelRefueling WaterStorageTankLeveI-Determine ifmalfunction ofsecondary sidesystemhasoccurred-None-None-None-None-Honitorheatsink-Haintainsteamgenerator waterlevel-Determine ifheatsinkisbeingmaintained

-VerifyRCSborationsystemfunctions foradequatereactivity control-Haintainadequatewatersupplyforauxiliary feedwater pumps-Verifyadequatesupplyofemergency corecoolingwater-VerifyECCSandcontainment spraysystemarefunctioning

>Certain.indications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident

Recovery, 525lhYIF~SIlNMl""'E I'"ONIFJARY'LASS 2h

PARAHETER WideRangeThandTc-None'PfYiTIHGNONE PAOPAIHAN VMS2IAOLE2-3(Continued3 TSCINSTRUHENT OASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*

IIOASIS(b,c)I-Haintainadequatereactorheatsink-Haintaintheproperrelationship betweenRCSpressureandtemperature

-verifyvesselNDTTcriteria-maintainprimaryinventory subcooled

-maintainsafeshutdowncon-dition-maintainRHRconsiderations forcooldown-monitorRCSheatupandcooldownratePressurizer HaterLevel-None-Confirmifplantisinasafeshutdowncondition

-Determine abilitytocontrolRCSpressure-HonitorRCSinventory

-Haintainpressurizer waterlevel*Certainindications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident Recovery.

5251AQf'Slla<n<IQI<t

~~no~nI~4n<<

n~"c<<2 0ICSTIHGIIOUSE IAOPRIDARY CIASS2TABLE2-3(Continued)

TSCINSTRUMENT OASISPARAMETER SystemWideRangePressure-NoneINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*

BASIS(b,c)-Determine ifplantisinasafe,shutdowncondition

-Maintaintheproperrelationship betweenRCSoressureapdtempera-ture-verifyvesselNDTTcriteria-maintainprimaryinventory subcooled (particularly withlossofol'fsitepower)-maintainl?NRconsiderations forcooldownContainment BuildingWaterLevel-')etermine whetherh'ighenergy'linerupture>asoccurredinsideoroutsidecontainment

-Determine NPSllforrecirculation modecooling-Determine whichequipment incon-tainmentissubmerged Condenser AirEjectorRadiation SteamGenerator BlowdownRadiation Contaienent Radiation

-Determine ifsteamgenerator tubeleak.hasoccurred-Determine ifsteamgenerator tubeleakhasoccurred-Determine ifhighenergylinebreakorfuelmishandling accident-Monitorradioactivity releasepathtoenvironment

-Monitorradioactivity releasepathtoenvironment

-Monitorradioactivityreleasepathtoenvironment

-Determine accessibility tocon-tainmentbuilding*Certainindications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incldpnt Recnvery.

525lAlVBTlHG!lOUSE

.",".A."."I:.'.r; CrPSSP MSIIHCIIOIISE PIIOPIIIHAW CLASS2TABI.E2-3(Continued)

TSCIHSTRIINENT BASISPARAHETER IHITIALEVENTDIAGHOSIS*

(b,c)-Determine ifsignificant fueldamagehasoccurredpl&IhJh)Auxiliary Feedwater FlowIlightleadSafetyInjection FlowLowlleadSafetyInjection FlowAreaRadiation Honltoring inAuxiliary BuildingandControlRoom-Hone-Hone-Hone-'etermine ifsourceofaccidentisoutside',

contaIrunentbuilding-Honitorenvironmental conditions aroundequipment incontainment

-Determine ifsufficient flowexiststomaintainheatsink-Determine thatECCSisdeliyer-ingflow-Honitorabilitytokeepcorecovered-Determine thatECCSisdeliver-ingflow-Honitorabilitytokeepcorecovered-Infersprayoperation

-Honitoraccessibility toplantzones/equipment

-Honitorradioactivity releasepathtoenvironment

-Honitoreffectiveness ofcleanupholdupsystems-Honitorintegrity of.long-term coolingsystemI*Certain.indications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident Recovery.

5251AWESTIHOIIOUSE PIIOPAIETARY CLASS2 PARAMETER gf.'ftttQIIOUSE IAOPNITARY CLASSgTABLE2-3(Continued)

TSBIRSTRBMBRT BASISINITIALEVENTDIAG1IOSIS+

BASIS(b,c)[IAI-Honitorhabitability ofthecontrolroom7CoreExitThermocouples NeutronI'lux-None-None-Determine ifcoreisbeingcooled-Monitorabilityofreactivity controlsystemstokeepthecoresubcritical

-Determine ifplantisinasafeshutdowncondition IIDegreeofSuLcooling ofPrimaryCoolantPrimarySystemSafetyandReliefValvePositionPressurizer ReliefTankPressure, Temperature, andLevelContainment Isolatton ValvePosition-None-None-None-None-Haintainadequatereactorheatsink-Haintainsafeshutdowncondi-tionsI-Haintainprimarysysteminventory

-Monitorradioactivity releasepathsintothecontainment

-Monitorcapacitytorelieveprimarycoolantpressure-Monitorradioactivity releasepathsintothecontainment

-Monitorradioactivity releasepathstotheenvironment

-Monitorstatusofcontainment isolation I*Certaintndtcattcns onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident Recovery.

5251A5fSIINGIIOIISE Pl'OPIllETNY ClASS2 PARAHETERSecondary Safety,Reliefs,andAtmospheric DumpValves-Hone0WESTINGIIOUSE PROPRIETARY CUSS2TA""E~.3(Continued)

TSCINSTRUHENT BASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*

(b,c))-Honitorsecondary systemintegrity BASIS-Honitor.radioactivity releasepathstotheenvironment Accumulator TankLevelAccumulator Isolation ValvePositionRllRSystemFitsRllRIleatExchanger OutletTemperature Component CoolingMaterFlwandTemperature

-None-None-None-None-None-Honitorprimarysysteminventory

-Determine whethertheaccumulator tankshavein5ectedintotheRCS-Determine systemoperation

-Hopitorprimarysysteminventory

-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapabilities

-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapabilities

-Honitorsystemoperation ofacriticalsupportsystem*Certainindications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident Recovery.

551ASESTINGIIOUSE PROMJETAB'LASS 2

PARAHfTER WESIINGIIOIISE PROPRIETARY CQSSgTABLE33(Continued3 TSCIHSTRUHfHT OASISINITIALfVftITDIAGtlOSIS*

BASIS(b,c)BoricAcidChargingFlowLetdownflowWaterLevelinClosedSpacesAroundSafetyfquipmcnt

)nAuxiliary BuildingEmergency Ventilation DamperPositionltighLevelRadioactive Liquid,TankLevel-tlone-None-ttone-Hone-tlone-Honitorprimarysysteminventory

-Determine boronconcentration forreactivity control-HonitorabilitytocontrolRCSpressureorpri~~rysysteminve,,or-HonitorabilitytocontrolRCSpressure-Honitorcoreheatremovalcapability-Determine boronconcentration forreactivity control-Honitorenvironmental conditions aroundrequiredsafetyequipment outsideofcontainment

-Ensureproperventilation tovitalareasunderpost-accident conditions

-Honitorcapacitytocontainandstoreradioactive liquids'Certainindications onthistableRecovery.

5251AIareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident gfg]NIIOIISE P.".".0"IQ'ARYClh.S2~~

PARAMETER Radioactive GaslloldupTankPressure'tatusofAllElectricPowerSuppliesandSystemsEffluentRadioactivity NobleGases,Radiohalogens, andParticulates PlantandEnvironsRadioactivity (Permanent andPortableInstruments)

SamplingSystemMeteorology (windspeedanddirection temperature proflie,andprecipitation)

-tlone-None-None-tlone-NoneVlf."TltlGllOUSE PROPAIETAAY CLASS2TABLE2-3(Continued)

TSCINSTRUMENT BASISINITIALEVENTDIAGNOSIS*

BASIS(b,c)-Honitorcapacitytocontainandstareradiaactive gases-Ensureadequateelectricpowertasafetyandsuppartsystems-Honitorradioactivity releasepathstotheenviranment

-Monitorreleaseofradioactive materials notcoveredbyeffluentmonitors-Oetermine RCSchemistry forreactivity controlandextentoffuelcladdamage-Monitorradioactive effluenttransportation foremergency

planning, doseassessments, andsourceestimates Containment Atmosphere temperature

-Noneandttydrogen Concentration

-Monitorcontainment integrity

-Honitorenvironmental conditians aroundequipment incontainment

• Certainindications onthistableareusedassecondary diagnoses astheoperatorproceedsthroughPost-Incident Recovery.

5251AVIESTlrlcttOUSE PROP;;tETNW CLASS2

iNgiiNGHOUSi PROPRIEMRY CLASS2SystemsStatus-ReactorCoolantSystemLoop1Loop2Loop3Loop4Taverage('F)Overpower DTPoPWR)Overtemp.

DT(%PWR)Coldlegtemp.(narrowrange)('F)Hotlegtemp.(narrowrange))'F)Reactorcoolantflow(%)Reac'.orcoolantpressure-WR(PSlG)Pressurizer pressure(PSlA)Pressurizer vaportemp.(')Pressurizer liquidtemp.('F)Pressurizer relieftankpr.ssure(PSlG)Pressurizer relieftanklevel('h)Pressurizer relieftanktemp.('F)Pressurizer safetyrelieftemp.('F)595.2595,2110.0110.0110.0110.0559.8559.8624.0624.01000'G~02250.02250.02250.0563.8565.21.577.6110.3120.0595.2110,0110.0559.8624.0100.02250.0595.2110.0110.0559.8624.01GO.O2250.0Figure3.1'SystemStatusDisplayatQnsiteTechnical SupportCenter(Example)

AZP-27 yIggHGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CUSSZParameter SummaryPointQescription Yaiue..RangeUnitsStatusTO400RCSLoop1HotLegT593.40:700.OEGFNormalPO480RCSPressure2234.1OOOOLO421StmGen2NarrowRangeLevel39.10:100PO549Steamline PressureLO103RWSiLevelLO114BoricAcidTankLevel893.00:1100100.00;10098.80:100LO119Condensate StorageTankLevel58.40:100LO947Containment Bldg.'Vater Level3.30:160.TO406RCSLoop1ColdLegT54720:700OEGF.NormalPSlGNormalPCLowPSlGNormalPCNormalPCNormalPCNormalPCHighFigure3.2:Parameter!n'ormation OisplayatOnsiteTechnical SupportCenter(Example)

AEP-28 16108-2WEST)HGHQUSE

?ROPRlETARY CLASS2RCSCOLDLEGTElNP(oF)100700RCSHOTLEGTEMP(4R'100100PRZRLEYEL(~o)402500PRZRPRESSURE(PSlG)190002468101214161820T)ME(SECONDS)

Rgure3.3GraphicDisplayatOnsiteTechnical SupportCanter(Example)

AEP-29

/<<'.s'wxA'aa<<~P 4airw<<<<<<.,'/<<./

<<-.ms<<w~-/t:.'/ga.~<<aasm/~as,a/~

wt'<<<<4iv~

wm/weaww'<<c4~

V/Ella(GHOIJSK PROFRIEfARY CLASS2'.0PLAI'lTSAFETYSTATUSDISPLAY4.SPURPOSEThefunctianofthePlantSafetyStatusDisplay(PSSD)istopresentasuccinctaccountoftheoverallplantsafetystatustothecontrolroomoperator(orsupervisor).

Theentiredatabaseshouldbeavailable totheoperatorarrangedinaformatthatwillenhancehisresponsetoeventsandthediagnoses ofthecauseoftheevent.BecausethePSSDservesasani~aortantinterface betweentheplantprocessandtheoperator, theinformation presentation shouldbedefinedintermsofparameters andlogicsupportive ofdefinedoperating.

procedures fordealingwithabnormalevents.4.2INPUTDETERMINATION Inurdartudetermine the".squired cperatinna1 madesfnrthePSSDgenemustfirstconsider'he varioustypesoftransients whichmayoccur.Areviewafpostulated planttransients (events)indicated thattheycanbedividedintotwobasiccategories:

(b,c,e)1.Slawtransienats wnichdanotresultinimnediate protection systemsactuation andforwhichthecontrolroomoperatorhasanopportunity toreacttopossiblyterminate theeventbeforesafetysystemsarerequiredtofunction.

Z.Fasttransients whichresultinalmostimmediate reactortripandposs'.bly safeguards acuationandforwhichthecontrolroomoperator's resporsse istoreacttoensurethatappropriate safetymeasureshavebeentakenandtodiagnosetheevent(.BecausecfthefactthatLdi-;-erect parameters andsignalrangesaraassociated withthetwopotential eventtypegsthePSSOincorparatesLtwocperating mades.The',ir'tmade(TERMIRATE MODE)isitivewhi1e:hge (b,c,e)!b,c,e)4-15435AAEP-30 IIIESTll'lGHGUSE PRQPRlEl'nRY CL(SS2At(b,c.e)LpIantis1nanormaloperating cond1tion andthesecondmode(MITIGATE MDOE)isactivefollowing areactortrgp,Theparameters available for'3(b.c-)Leachmodewerechosentomaximizetheusefulamountof1nformat1on tobe(btc.e)displayed totheoperateTheroleforwhichthe:pSSDprovidesLsupport foreachoftheoperating mode/a1sasfoll'ows:

t(bce)lcEMIMATEMODE1.Monitortheplantprocessforabnormalities indicative ofslowtransients thatdonotresultinimediatereactortripsandforwhichthecontrolroomoperatormighttakecorrective orprotective action.2.Monitortheintegrity

-ofthevariousboundaries toradioactive release.MITIf)ATEKOOE1.Monitorthesafetystatu"oftheastrippedcondition.

2.Monitorforconditions whichmightleadtoabreachofanyofthelevelsofdefenseagainstradioactive release.3.Monitorthecondition ofthebarrierstoradioactive release.Foranyevent,thesafetystatusoftheplantcanbeevaluated intermsofsixbasicsafetyconcms.Theseconcernscanbestatedasfollows;1.Saturation ofReactorCoolant2.ReactiviyExcursion 3.LossofPrimaryCoolantInventory a.LossofPressureandTemperature Contre/142AEP-31 LB.Radioactive Release(VESTNGHQUSE PRQPRlETARy CLASS2(b,c,e)5.Containment Environmengt Byaddressing Lacysafetyconcerns, theconsequences ofabnormaleventscanbelimitedormitigatgd, (b,c,e)tTheteysafetyconcernscanberelatedtospecificabnormaloccur-rences..Tables4-Iand4-2indicatekeysafetygoalsforsometypicalpostulated eventsintermsofthePSSDoperating mode.Itmustbenotedthattheseeventsaretypicalanditisconceivable formultipleeventstooccurinundefinable sequences.

Forthesereasons,thePSSDmustbedesignedonthebasisofkeysafetyconcernsratherthanspecificscenario/a

/IndefiningtheinputsforthePSSQ,ttuorequirements havetobeme+~tiasfo11ows:.(b,c,e)-(b,c,e)Ll.Theinputsselectedmustrepresent aminimumsatsufficient formonitoring allpossibleeventsincluding thosewhichmightnothavebeenanticipated.

(b,c,e)2.Theselection ofinputsmustaddressconditions withpotentially erroneous signals,conflicting indications, andparameters outofrange(I.e.,redundancy anddiversity)g InresponsetotheLfirstrequirement, thefunctionofthePSSOhasbeenconsidered intwoways.Theprimaryfunctionistomonitortheplantprocssintermsofsatisfying thekeysafetyconcerns.

Asstatedabove,byguaranteeing thattheseconcernsareaddressed, theconditions ofunanticipated eventsoreventsequencscanbesatisfied.

ThesecondfunctionofthePSSDistosupportthemonitoring functionoftheplantforpostulated eventsandtoprovideaman-machine interface designthatsupportsa.definedevaluation processandprocedures forresponding toabnormalevents(b,c,e)"43"84-3AEP-32

'NEST!!1B!

HOUSEPROPRIETARY CLA$$2fnordertosatisfytheLsecondconsideration ofevaluating erroneous signalsandtheneedforredundancy and"diversity, thePSSOmustperform-operations uponmulti-sensor inputstoevaluateerroneous signalsandbeabletoprovidetheoperatorwithadiversemethodofindicating theplantprocess.TheinputstothePSSOarechosenuponthebasisoftheirdirectrelevance tothekeysafetyconcerns.

Tables4-3and4-4listsomespecificinputsrelatedtokeysafetyconcernsforseveralevents4.3MAN-i%CHINE INTERFACE (a,b,c)(a,c)ThePSSOsystemwill-processthedefinedinputdatasetofplantparam<<,stereatftwosecondinterval/sand generatedisplaysforredundant PSSDdedicated CRTslocatedinthecontrolroom.QAdedicated CRTwillalsobelocatedintheOnsiteTechnical SupportCentaurInordertoachieveaneffective man-machine interface, thedisplaysystemmustbedesignedtoprovidealogicalandhumanengineered dis-playstructure andselection processinamannerwhichsupportsdefinedrolesinwhichtheoperatorisexpectedtoperformduringanabnormaloccurrence.

(b,c)TheroleofthecontrolroomoperatorinLdatecting andreacting".oanabnormaloccurrence isexpectedtofollowtherourbasicactivitieQs depictedinFigure4-1.Thedisplaysystemstructure shouldbe.definedsuchthatitLsupports anidentifiable goalforeachofthegeneralactivities showninthefigureThe.segoalgsaredefinedasfollows:IActivity:Detection Goal:Thecontrolroomoperatorshouldbeinastateofreadiness tomakearapiddetection ofincipient threatsoractualeventswhichmayaffectplantsafety.Theresponseoftheoperatorwouldbebaseduponhisknowledge ofexpectedplantperformance andhisskillincontrolling theplantprocess!.

Nay."4Jvsaa's'w4aActivity:

ReactionV'-"SIflGHGUSE PROPS!EERY CLASS2(b,c)Goal:Thecontrolroomoperatormustimmediately reacttothedetection ofanevent.Hisirstobjective istoassurethatappropriate safetysystemresponses havebeentakenandthatkeysafetyconcernsarebeingaddressed byobserving criticalplantparameters.

Activity:

Diagnosis Goal:Following thecontrolroomoperator's inmediate reactionitisthennecessary todiagnosethecause{s)oftheeventanddetermine ifanydamagetothevariousbarrierstoradioactive releasehasoccurred.

Theoperational modeatthistimewouldbebasedontheoperator's knowledge supported byreference tovariousabnormalandemergency operating procedures.

0Activity:

Terminate/Mitigate Goal:Atthelaterstagesoftheeventthecontrolroomopera-torwillneedtoimplement therulesorstrategies thathavebeenidentified asaresultofthediagnosis activ-ity.Theoperator's goalistoverifythatcorrective actionsarasatisfying thekeysafetyconcern/a Thedisplaystructure shovtninFigure4-s/supports thespecified controlroomoperatoractivities andgoals.Thedisplaysarestructured intothreelevelsofinformation rangingfromgeneralplantsystensumaryinformation withabroadfieldofat.ention, secondlytoalevelofinformation withanarrowerfieldofattention andmoredefinitive information onsubsystems andfunctions, andfinallytoalevelofinformation containing irdividual sensorvaluesandstatuQs(a,c,f)r,34gAEP-34

'hil'G~JSCPQ,laTAR(CLASSQLeveI1wouldcontaininformation intheformofacontinuous graphicdisplayforeachofthetwooperating modesofthePSSO.Information contained inthedisplaywouldsupportthedetection activityI Amajorproblemassociated withtheman-machine interface isthe/requirement thattheplantoperatorsampleandprocessa'largenumberofplantparameters andperformwhataretermedmulti-parameter decisionprocesses.

AnadvancedconceptingraphicCRTdisplaydesignedtoaidtheoperator,,

isemployedforLevel1information inthePSSTFigure4-3isanillustration ofthedisplay.IEachrayinthefigurerepre-sentsthescaleforaprocessparameter.

Whenthenormaloperating valuesfortheparameters areplottedonthescalesandlinesaredrawnconnecting thepoints,ageometric patternisdeveloped.

Positivedeviations fromthenormalvaluesresultinpointsfurtherawayfromthecente~ofthefigurewhilenegativedeviations resultinpointsclosertothecenterofthefigure.Whentheactualvaluesofparameters aredifferent fromthenormalorreference values,theresultisageometric patterndifferent fromtheoriginalpatter/aFigures4-4and4-5arepreliminary versionsof[Level1displaysforeachofthePSSDoperationaI mode/afortwosampleevents:PrimarytoSecondary CoolantSystemLeakandPrimaryCoolantSystanLeaktoContainment.

Theparameters chosenforthedisplayswerechosento/permitanevaluation oftheteysafetyconcern/a

/ThisadvancedgraphicdispIayprovidestwodistinctadvantaoes overconventional controlrocmindicators:

aconcise,systemsleveloriented, integration ofparameters andsecondly, agraphicdisplayformat.Thedetection ofanabnormalcondition isenhancedastheoperatortaskisnowbaseduponthediscrimination oftwogeometric figures.NuIti-parameter decisions andeventevaluation isfacili-tatedbytheintegrated natureofthedisplayandthefactthatonlydifferences inparameters arehighlighted bythedisplay.Theoperatorupondetecting abnormalities isthenabletosekmorespecificinforma-tionatotherinformation levelstosupportthereaction, diagnosis, andterminate/mitigate activitiegs 5435A4-6AEP-35

)';-ST!,'su,",OUSE PROPrltTAnY CLASS2The'inforaation atfLeve12isanexpansion ofeachofthekeysafetyconcernsandsystems.blaredetailedinformation isprovidedonthestatusoftheprocess.Forexample,the'valuesofpressures andwaterlevelsinindividual steamgenerators couldbeprovidedatthislevel.Inaddition, trenddisplaysfortheprevious5minutesofoperation ofLevel1primarydisplayparameters areprov',ded.

Diversity inprocessindications atthislevelwillbeemployedtoenabletheoperatortoverifyconclusions.

AtLevel3,thedataisdetailedfurthertoprovideinformation onthestatusofindividual sensors,multiplemeasurement points,anddataanomalies.

Thesensorvaluesareannotated toinclude'suchthingsasdata-out-of-range andprocesslimits.Information onsuspectdataqua11tyiscarriedintoupperdisp1ayleve1@(a,c,f)543""A4~7AZP-36

• ee'ejÃESTlHQHOUSE P!OPRfET'qY Ct~SSZTASLE4-1(b,c,e)PLANTSAFETYSTATUS..OISPLAY>>

SAFETYGOALS-TERMINATE MOOETRANSIENTS ReactorControlSystemsMalfunction eee4e.'*C'~1C--+iAStoprodmotionMaintaincorethermalandnuclearparameters withinlimitsReactorCoolantSystemMakeupControlPreventcorethermalandnuclearparameters fromexceeding limitse'Maintain-pressurizer pressureandlevelInadvertent Oepressurization (Slow)Terminate depressurization RestoresystanpressureReactorCoolantSystemLeakLimitradioactive releaseegMaintainpressurizer pressureandlevel'e0543514-8AEP-37 V/EST1HGHOUSE PRCPRluARY CLASS2TABLE4-2ReactorTripPLANTSAFETYSTATUSOISPLAY-SAFETYGOALS-MITIGATEMOOETRANSIENTS (b,c,e)Maintainheatsinkviasteamgenerators

-,.Maintainsubcooling bycontrolling steampressureMaintainpressurizer levelStationBlackoutProvidesecondary heatsinkMaintainsubcooling Maintainpressurizer levelEmergency EorationPreventreturntocriticality Operation withNaturalCirculation ProvideheatsinkControlsubcoo1ingMaintainpressurizer levelSpuriousSafetyInjection Oetermine safetyinjection isnotrequiredandterminate actionLossofReactorCoolantVerifyandestablish shorttermcorecoolingMaintainlongtermshutdownandcooling5435A4-9AEP-38 V<ESTtfsGHOUSE POPHIET:RYCLASS2TABLE4-2.(Continued)

PLANTSAFETYSTATUSDISPLAY-SAFETY'OALS

-MITIGATEMODETRANSIENTS',

Lossof'econdary CoolantEstablish stabilized reactorcoolantsystemandsteamgenerator conditions MinimizeenergyreleasePreventliftingof.pressurizer safetyvalvesIsolate,auxiliary feedtoaffectedsteam.generator BoratetomaintainreactorshutdownmarginSteamGenerator TubeRuptureMinimizeradioactive materialreleaseEstablish feedwater tounaffected steamgenerators andisolate.faultedunitMaintainresidualheatremovalcapability

-*-Maintain RCS'ubcooling Preventover-flooding offaultysteamgenerator VVC'43GA4-10AEP-39QVC'C IYBOllCHG"SE FROPRtci~7l'LASS 2TABLE4-3PLANTSAFETYSTATUSOISPLAYTERMINATE MOOEPARAMETERS (b,c,e)VariableTransient ReactorControlSystemMalfunction ReactorCoolantReactor'akeupCoolantControlSystemInadvertent SystemMalfunction Oepressurization LeakavgrefRodpositionOeltaTStartuprateCountratePzr.pressur0ChargingflowPzr.levelComp.coolH20radContainment radAirejectrad.Blowdownrad.Cont.humidityCont.temperatures Cont.oressurePrz.discharge pipingtempsPRTpressurePRTlevelPRTtempsRCPsealtempera-tureRCPsealflowRCPseallevelYCTflowXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXjJimp4-11.AEP-40

Y~wRCHOVSE PRCPRIETAC CLASS7PLANTSAPPYSTATUSOISPLAY"IlTTGATE WOEPARAvETERS VWableTrans1cnt ReactorTripStationBlackoutGnergency Bar'ation Operation with'laturalClrculatlonlossofCeolantAccidentLossafSecondary CoolantSteamGenerator TubeRuature.ReactartripbreakerStartuprateReutranfluxRodpos1tfonTurbinetHpBlackoutsignalTavg(thermacoup 1es)Radbottom3nd.PrimarypressureStcamflexFeedflowPressurfterlevelCarethcrmacoup lesCont.radarat<anAfrQectarrad$at5anSlowdownradiation Cont.pressurePri.M.R.tanp.StcampressureCant.sumplevelCant.temperature-Cant.huahdltyChargingflawS.G.levelB.A.tankleveiAux.fmdflawSa'lawRMSTlevelCSTlevelXXXXI~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX"XXXXXXXXa-lZ.)cSBAAEP-41 16708-1ygggtfGHOUSE PROPRtH'ARY CLOS2(a,c)CONDITIONS NORMAL?DETECTION IMPLEMENT RESPONSEIDENTIFYRESPONSEYESSAPETYLIMITSVIOLATEDREACTIONNODIAGNOSEPROBLEMDIAGNOSIS TAKECORRECTIV'EACTIONTERMINATE

/MITIGATE Figure4-1.OperatorResponseMadelAEP-42 1664310WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY, CLASS2Qrepftie, OlsplayTpC'yXLEVEL1OISPLAYLoop,TSATTAVQTHTCPR.PressSTIjf/FOFlowPSteamRCP'sPressureReliefVlv.SafetyVlv.SprayHeatersPER.TCSReactorCoolantInventory PrzrLevelCte.LeatownW.R.TH.TC.CoreTC'sTSAT.Etc.,LEVEL2OISP'LAYS Sensors,Comparisons ofRedurufant IVleasurernent ErrorCtteeksLEVEL3OISPLAYSjInputsFigure4-2.DisplayStructure ofPlantStatusDisplayAEP-43

WESTlHGHOUSE PROPRlETARY CLASS2Pressurizer Pressure(Value)psiPrimaryTavg(Value)FStartupRate(Value)Oec/MinPressurizer Level(Value)4k/////////Containment Humid(Value)o/oTemp(Value)'FChargingFlow(Value)GPMSteamGenLevel(Value)IoRadiation ContmtBlwdnAirEjectFig"~4-3.S~pieDisplay-plantSafetySttusDl~tayAEp-44

NESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS2-~k4Pressurizer Pressure(Value)psiPrimaryTavg(Value)'FStartupRate(Value)Dec/MinPressurizer Level(Value)%IIIIIIIContainment Humid(Value)'6'emp(Value)'F ChargingFlow(Value)GPMSteamGenLevel(Value)%Radiation ContmtBtwdnAirEjectFigure44.SamplePlantSafetyStatusDisplay-Terminate Mode-PrimarytoSecondary CoolantSys;emLeak(SGTubelak)AEP-45 WESTINGHOUSE PROPRIETARY CLASS2RCSW.R.Pressure(Value)psiRCSW.R.Temp(Value)oF(Value)'FTsatStartupRate(Value)Dec/Min(a,c,f)4~'\Pressurizer Level(Value)%IIIIIIIrr~r\\\IIIIIIIContainment Pressure(Value)psiR.V.Level(Value)%SteamGenLevel(Value)%Radiation ContmtBiddnAirEjectFigure4-KSamplePlantSafetyStatusDisplay-MitigateMode-PrimaryCoolantSystemLeaktoContainment mx-46

'EVESTlNQHOOSE PROPRIETARY CLASS25.0.BYPASSEDANOINOPERA8LE STATUSINDICATION FOR.PLANTSAFETYSYSTEMS5.1PURPOSEThepurposeoftheBypassedandInoperable StatusIndication (BISI)systemistoprovidethecontrolroomoperatorwithacontinuous systemslevelindication ofabypassedorinoperable condition forthesystemscomprising theengineered safetyfeatures.

Thesystemconsiders the,actualstatusofindividual components including systemslevelbypassesandcontrolroomoperatorenteredinputsforcomponents removedfromservice.5~2INPUTOETERNINATION Bypassedandinoperable statusindication isprovidedforthesystemscomprising theengineered safetyfeaturesandtheircriticalsupoortsystems.Thesesystemsareidentified inTableS.l.Thistablealsoidentifies thetypesofcomponents forwhichmonitoring isrequired, theapproximate numberofeachtypeofcomponent, andthetypeofstatus.information needed.Thislistisgenericinnatureandwillberevisedtomeetindividual plantspecificdesigns.Ietheevaluation ofsysteminputs,thecomponents ineachsystanare.considered inthelightofbeinginaproperstatetoperformorsupoorttheoperation ofasafetyfunction.

Thesystemslevelbypassfunctions thatmustalsobeconsidered arelistedinTable:5.2.Inadditiontoautomatically monitored inputs,thesystemalsoconsiders theeffectofcomponent orsys.emoutofserviceinputsmanuallyenteredbythecontrolroomoperator.5.3MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE Theinterface betweentheoperatorandthissystemisprovidedbyredun-dantCRTdisplaysandkeyboardconsoleslocatedinthecontrolroom.Personnel locatedintheOnsiteTechnical SupportCenterwillalsobeAEP-47

~Ve'FSTlhGHOUSE PRO?RlH'hI1Y CLASS2abletoaccessthesameinformation.

The6IGluti1izesastructured displayhierarchy fortheoperator'.'nterface.

Thedisplayhierarchy isshowninFigure3.1.Theprimarydisplay,anexampleofwhichisshowninFigure3.2pcon-tainsthefollowing information foreachofthesystemscomprising theengineered safetyfeatures:

LSypassedorinope~able statu"indication foreachaffectedsubsystem oneitherasystemsleveland/ortrainlevelbasis.Z.identification ofwhetherthecondition isduetotheinoperable statusofacomponent orauxiliary supportsuchascoolingwater,powersupply,tc.OtherlevelsofdisplayssuchasshowninFigure.3.3providesupporting information onindividual components withineachsubsystem andsupportsystem.Lnnadditional displayprovidesa".abulation ofallcontrolroomoperatorenteredinputsrorinoperable components forwhichautomatic monitoring cannotbeaccommodated orforwhichmonitoring doesnotcurrently existwheneverthestatusofasystembecomesinoperable orbypassed, theontrolroanoperatorwillbealertedbyanaudiblealarmandtheprimarydisplaywillindicateviavideohighlighting (e.g.,flashing, colorchange,reversevideo,etc.)theaffectedsystenandsubsys.em.

Theoperatorcanthenaccesssupporting displaystcdetermine thecauseofthebypassedorinoperable condition.

Theontrolroomoperatormustacknowledge theabnormalcondition inordertosilencetheaudiblealarm.Reinstatement ofnormalsystenfunctionwi11alsogenerateadifferent audiblesignal.Twoadditional capabilities oftheSISIarethetimingandtestfunc-tionssAEP48

WESTltsGHQUSE PI'.OPHl~iARY CL".SSg/Thetimingi'unction enab'lesthecontrolromaperatortasetupacount-downtimingfunctionforasystemwhichisbypassedorinoperable.

Anaudiblealarmwouldbegenerated attheexpiration oftheoperatorspecified timelimit.-Thisfeat'urewouldaidthecontrolroomoperatorincomplying withTechnical Specification timelimitsforsystemsunavailable forservice.(a,cThetestfunctionenablesthecontrolroomoperatortotesttheefectonsystemslevelstatusofachangeincomponent, statuspriortochang-ingthecomponent's status.Inresponsetothecontrolroomoperatorenteredinput,simulating theaffectofchangingacomponent's orsys-tem'sstatus,thesystemdetermines tneresultant effectonsystemoperability andindicates theresulttothecentralracmoperator3~3AEP-49

• ITABLES.l-~BYPASSEDAt10ItsOPRABLSTATUSItsOICATIOt1 COMPOttEHT INPUTS~t$y,'I~'ao"a('.c)~SstemEmergency corecooling.Auxiliary feedwater Comoonents Yalves=Pumps~.Process(level,pressure)

Valves.Pumps.ProcessStatusOpen/Shut OperableHigh/L'o~,

etc.Open/Shut

.OperableNigh/Low, etc.0Containment spray'ontainment iso1ationValvesPumpsProcessValvesOpen/Shut Operable=High/Low, etcOpen/Shut Auxiliary powersystemBreakers'enerators VoltagesOpen/Closed/Out Operab.leHigh/Low'Containment ventilation YalvesMotorsOpen/Shut OperableContainment hydrogenrecombiners ValvesMotorsOpen/ShuOperableComponent coo1ingValvesPumpsOpen/Shut OperableServicewaterYalvesPumpsOpen/Shut Operable3~AEP-50~.'~~o~~~~4~

AWESTINGHOUSE PROPRjETARY CL4SS2TABLE5.2YrqBYPASSEDANDINOPERABLE STATUS,INOICATION-SYSTEMLEVELBYPASSFUNCTIONS Safetyinjection Lowpressurizer pressureLowsteamline pressureManualreset~s44Steamlincisolation Steamdumpinterlock Steamgenerator blowdownisolation 3-5AEP-515251A

IESTINGHOUSF.

PROPRIETARY CLASS2OperatorInputsSystemsLevelStatuscCCSHlHeadSlAccumulators Etc.PrfrnaryQteplaySafetylntecuonContinent SpraylOtnerslPump1ReadyPump2OutValvetOpenStthsystern ContponentLevelQtapksyContainment SpraySucpotComoonent CoolingESPPowerEtc.SupportSystornlComponent LovelPisplayFigure5.1DisplayStructure

-8ypasseCandinoperable Statusindication AEP-52 IESTINGHpUSE pRppRIETARY CLASS28YPASSEDANDINOPERABLE STATUSDISPLAYSYSTEMSEmergency CoreCooling-HighHeadSIIntermediate HeadSlLowHeadSIAccumulators Auxiliary FeedwatrContainment Isolation Containment SprayContaioment Ventilation Safeguards PowerSourceOperableOperableOperableOperableOperableOperableInoperable

-TrainAComponent OperableOperableFigure.5.2Primary Disofay-Bypauedandinoperable Statusindication AZP53 WESTINGHOUSE PROPRlETARY CLAS)gTrainACONTAINMENT SPPAyTrain8TrainCVLY101PumpASuetYLV111NAOHSupplyPumpAOpenOpenOperableVLY102PumpAOutletClosedVLY103HeadrAOutletVLV121RecircAClosedClosedRefueling WaterStorageTankVLV201Pump8SuetVLV211NAOHSupplyPump8VLV202Pump8OutletVLV203Headr8OutletVLV221Recirc8OpenOpenOperableOpenClosedClosedVLV301PumpCSuetVLV311NAOHSupplyPumpCVLV302PumpCOutletVLV303HeadrCOutletVLY321RecircCOpenOpenOperableOpenClosedClosedLS1COLevelLS101LevelLS102LeveiLS103LevelNormalNormalNormalNormalNAOHSprayAdditiveLS200LevelNormalLS201LevelNormalLS202LevelNormalTS200TempNormalTS201TempNormalTS202TempNormalFigure5.3Secondary Display-BypassedandInoperable St-tusInformation AEP-54 6TSCZNSTRUiiENTATZON Asdescribed inSection2,mostoftheinputsignalsttieTSCcomputeraretakenfromtheexistinginstruments whichalsoprovidesignalsfortheControlRoomindicators.

Thisapproachwillprovideconsistent datainboththecontrolroom,OnsiteTechnical SupportCenterandtheEOF.TheinputsignalstotheTSCcomputertherefore havethesamehighquality,accuracyandreliability asthecontrolroomsignal.ZnputstotheTSCcomputerprovidetransformer isolation forallanaloginputsignalsandalldigitalinputsignalsareoptically isolated.

Znaddition, allsignalsfromtheReactorProtection Channelsaretakenaftertheexistingsafetygradeisolators.

Theinterfacing oftheTSCComputertotheexistingplantinstrumentation wasdesignedsoasnottoresultinanydegradation ofthecontrolroom,protection system,controlsorotherplantfunctions.

Anydegre'dation thatisqnotedduringcheckoutandintegrated systemstestingwillbecorrected.

AEP-55 7..TSCKWERSUPPLYSYSTEPS7.1POWERYOTHETSCCCMPUPERSYSTl24:1bg~y(UPS).ThisUPSsystemwillprovidetheTSCc~ezsarBpexiphexal egal@~<withahighquality,transient fxepowersource.7.1.1THEUPSSYSTEM:Figuxe7.1showsaone-linediagram(schematic) fortheUPSsystem.-Thesystemconsistsofxedundar&

battezychairs,.battezy,staticinvextexs, andstatictxansferswitches.

~ruxmalconditions, thebattezychargerconvertsACtoCCandsuppliesittotheimaxter.'Ihebattexychargeralsokemsthebattezyat,fiQlcharge.Theinvexter.

convertstheCCtoACinordertosupplythe7.1.2COHSHQ~SCFPCNERSUPPLYINTERRUPTIGH:

thexeisapowerxeduction (dipordegradation) orloss(failure) oftheACpcwersouxce,theUPSbattezy?eccnest".wpr'unarysourceofD"to&aumexter,ratherthan51mbattezychargerwhichhaslostitsnormals~ofACpowersupply.Tt~hFforapexicdof30minutes.Thisallowsasufficient tineintervalinwhichadiesel.genexator (badmpACsource)canbemadeavailable toprovidepowertotheinverter.

Intheunli3cely eventoflossorAEP-56 TSCPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEM(CONCEPTUAL OESIGN)IEMERGENCY SOURCENORMALSOURCEBACK-UP'OURCE INOEPENOENT600VOLTBUSINOEPENOENT 600VOLTBUSINOEPENOENT600VOLTBUSO'C.C.BREAKER225AM.C.C.BREAKER225AM.C,C.BREAKER225AAUTOMATIC TRANSFERSWITCH260A600'5KVA120~700A~MPIBATTERYCHARGERI(ALTERNATE}

700AMPBATTERYCHARGERBATTERY927A40KVAINVERTER40KVAINVERTERSTATICSNITCHSTATICSWITCHFIGURE7.IUNITWITSCCOMPUTER8P'ERIPHERALS UNITW2TSCCOMPUTER8PERIPHERALSAEP-56o

unavailability afboththerurmalandbadcupACsources,thestaticswi~willbeusedfortransfer, ifnecessary, totheenaxcpncy ACsource~7;2PONERTOTHETSCCDMPLZX:Standardbalan-plant (BOP)sourceswillprovidetheTSCwithpowerforlightingandcowmnience receptacles.

Foradditional protection,,

thelightizqfixturesareprovidedwithbatterypactumforcontinued operation intheeventoflossaftheEOPpamrsupply.ThePRCequitantwillbesuppliedfrcmanEssential ServicesSystembusQCsource).AEP-57 Section8.0OriginalpagesAEP-58throughAEP-62havebeendeletedfromthissubmittal.

Thedescriptive information thatwascontained thereincanbefoundintheOCCNPEmergency Plan.L?afIC5~CAEP-58

Section9.0OriginalpagesAEP-63throughAEP-65havebeendeletedfromthissubmittal.

Listingsofplantrecords,plantspecificreference

material, generaltechnical reference

material, plantprocedures andreportsthatareavailable topersonnel workingintheTSCareprovidedingeneralcompanyinternaldocuments whichpertaintothesubjectmatter.AEP-63 Attachment 1toAEP:NRC:0916I REASONSAND10CFR50.92ANALYSESFORCHANGESTOTHEDONALDC.COOKNUCLEARPLANTUNIT2TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IIIj,r/II1rr+ktr'flgIPJfenrr~Ab::.,i.jf",",1;i,'j,-';:;,,;

e'It4I).r.,g~Artl11I4~'1ICjIIpI)1.,jII'I1'I11IJI,4iI,Irt'>>jar'lrrjh/trIIl AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page1of18TheTechnical Specification (T/S)changesincludedinthisletterare,ingeneral,thosenecessary tosupportthesafetyanalysesperformed byExxonNuclearCompany(ENC)fortheUnit2Cycle6reload.Inadditiontothesechanges,however,wehaveincludedadditional changeswhichareintendedtomaketheT/Ssclearer,easiertouse,ormoreconsistent withtheStandardTechnical Specifications (STSs)forWestinghouse Pressurized WaterReactors, NUREG-0452, Rev.4(orDraftRev.5,whereapplicable).

AsummaryofthechangeshasbeenincludedasAttachment 10tothisletter.Itincludesabriefdescription ofeachchange,aswellasthereasonforthechange,and,whereapplicable, references tothesafetyanalysesthechangeisbasedon.Thisattachment includesanoverviewofthechanges,aswellasour10CFR50.92justifications fornosignificant hazardsconsideration.

Pleasenotethatthechangeswillbereferredtobytheirnumbers,whicharegiveninthe"Description ofChange"columninAttachment 10.Wehavegroupedthechangesinto12separatetypesforeaseofdiscussion.

Thesechangesarediscussed below.1.Editorial ChangesThefirstgroupofchangestobediscussed consistsofthosethatarepurelyeditorial innature.Thesechangesarenumbered1,2,5,6,12,20/21'4'5'6'5'0~

60~62~69'4'1~83~84'8'"90'3J94'7/98'nd105inAttachment 10.Thesechangesareproposedtoenhancethereadability oftheT/Ss,toachieveconsistency betweentheUnit1and2T/Ss,ortoachieveconsistency withtheSTSs,asdescribed inAttachment 10.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:'(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechanges,beingeditorial innatureandintendedtoimprovethereadability oftheT/Ss,willnotreduceinanywayrequirements orcommitments intheexistingT/Ss.Thus,noincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentwouldbeexpected.

Criterion 2Thesepurelyeditorial changeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated, becauseallaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page2of18Criterion 3Theproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussed above,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochanges.thatarepurelyadministrative innature:forexample,changestoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,correction ofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.

Thisgroupofproposedchangesisintendedtoachieveconsistency betweentheUnit1and2T/Ss,toachievegreaterconsistency withtheSTSformat,ortoimprovetheoverallreadability oftheT/Sdocument.

Asthesechangesarepurelyeditorial anddonotimpactsafetyinanyway,webelievetheFederalRegisterexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

2.Removalof3-LooTechnical Secifications AsecondcategoryofchangesinvolvesremovalofTechnical Specification provisions for3reactorcoolantloopoperation inOperational Modes1and2.Thesearechangesnumbered3,7,16,29,30,31,46,56,59,61,67,91,99,and100inAttachment 10.Thiscategoryincludesallchangesinvolving removalof3-loopprovisions exceptforthoseassociated withFunctional Unitl.e.(Differential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High) onEngineered SafetyFeatures(ESF)Actuation Instrumentation Table3.3-3.Three-loop changesassociated withthisESFsignalarediscussed inCategory5ofthisAttachment.

LicenseCondition 2.C.3(j)forUnit2prohibits operation withlessthan4pumpsatpowerlevelsabovetheP-7permissive (approximately 11%ofratedthermalpower).Asamatterofpractice, wehaveextendedthisrestriction tocoverallofModes1and2.AsT/Sscovering3-loopoperation inModes1and2aretherefore notnecessary, weproposetoremovethemtostreamline thedocument.

IncludedinthisgroupofchangesisthedeletionofT/S3/4.4.1.4.

Althoughthisspecification containsprovisions forlessthan4-loopoperation inmodesotherthan1and2,therequirements forothermodeswhichremainapplicable areaddressed identically inotherT/Ss,asspecified below:ActionStatement (BelowP-7)WhereAddressed abcT/S3'.1.1T/Ss3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3Notneeded,since3-loopoperation inModes1and2willbeprohibited.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page3of18Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thisgroupofchangeswillextendthelicensecondition prohibiting 3-loopoperation abovetheP-7permissive toincludeallofModes1and2.Thus,thechangeswouldbeexpected, asaminimum,toreducetheprobability, orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Sincethesechangesplaceadditional restrictions onplantoperation, theywouldnotbeexpectedtocreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Since3-loopoperation inallofModes1and2willbeprohibited, additional margintoDNBunderaccidentconditions shouldresult.Thus,marginofsafetyshouldbeincreased ratherthandecreased.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Sinceprohibition of3-loopoperation inModes1and2constitutes arestriction whichthecurrentT/Ssdonothave,webelievethisexampleisapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

3.Additional Restrictions BecauseofSafetyAnalysesAthirdgroupofchangesinvolvesinclusion ofproposednewrequirements intheT/Ss.Thenewrequirements areproposedtomaketheT/Ssconsistent withthesafetyanalysesperformed byENCinsupportoftheCycle6reload,ortoachieveconsistency withtheSTS.Thesechangesarenumbered9,22,51,52,55,63,64,70,72,73,80,82,86,92,and102inAttachment 10.Theapplicable references tothesafetyanalysesareincludedtherealso.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page4of18(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechangesconstitute additional restrictions ontheplantintermsofT/Smodeapplicability, surveillance requirements, orActionStatement requirements.

Sincenoneofthesechangesreduceinanywayprevioussafetyrequirements, theywouldnotbeexpectedtoresultinanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Criterion 2Thesechangeswillplaceadditional restrictions onplantoperation andwillincrease, ratherthanreduce,requirements forsafety.Therefore, theyshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesaddadditional safetyrequirements, andinnowayreduceanyexistingrequirements.

Thus,noreduction inmarginofsafetywilloccurbecauseofthesechanges.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.Thesechangesimposeadditional restrictions ontheplantforconsistency withtheCycle6safetyanalysesortheSTSs.Thus,webelievethatthisexampleisapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

4.Refueling WaterStorageTankChanesAfourthgroupofchangesinvolvesT/Ss3.1.1.3,3.1.2.3,3.1.2.5,3.4.1.2,3.4.1.3,and3.9.8.1specifically astheyapplytoboratedwateradditionorpositivereactivity additionfromtheRefueling WaterStorageTank(RWST).Thesearechangesnumbered25,26,27,87,89,and104inAttachment 10.T/S3.1.1.3requiresreactorcoolantflowofatleast3000gpmduringdilutionoftheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)boronconcentration inanymode.T/Ss3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3requireatleastonecoolantlooptobeinoperation duringborondilutioninModes3,4,and5.T/S3.9.8.1requires3000gpmofcoolantflowviatheResidualHeatRemovalSystemduringborondilutioninMode6.T/Ss3.1.2.3and3.1.2.5prohibitpositivereactivity additioninModes5and6withchargingpumpsorboricacidtransferpumpsinoperable, respectively.

BecauseofconcernswithliteralT/Scompliance, questions havearisenastotheapplicability ofthesespecifications duringthetimeswhenweaddwatertotheRCSfromanoperableRWST,specifically whentheboronconcentration oftheRWSTislowerthantheRCS.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page5of18TheRWSTminimumboronconcentrations statedintheT/Sswereestablished toensurethatadequateshutdownmarginismaintained, andareconsistent withnumbersassumedbyENCintheirCycle6reloadanalyses.

Becauseofthis,itisourbeliefthattheborondilutionrestrictions oftheT/Sslistedabovewerenotmeanttobeapplicable duringwateradditionfromtheRWST,providedtheboronconcentration intheRWSTexceedstheminimumrequirements statedintheT/Ss.Wehavedocumented thisinterpretation inthepast(seeourletterAEP:NRC:0975A, datedFebruary28,1986);thischangeissubmitted onlytoformalize thisinterpretation.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Ourreviewhasdetermined thattheT/SRWSTminimumboronconcentrations aresufficient toensurethatadequateshutdownmarginismaintained throughout theentirecorelife.Additionally, theRWSTboronconcentrations areconsistent withthoseassumedintheLOCAanalysesperformed byENC.Thus,weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotsignificantly increasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Criterion 2Theproposedamendment willnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

Ithasbeendetermined thattheRWSTboronconcentration issufficient toensureadequateshutdownmarginfromallexpectedoperating conditions.

Theconsequences ofaddingwaterfromanoperableRWSTwhichisatalowerboronconcentration thantheRCSistherefore bounded,andnonewordifferent kindofaccidentfromthosepreviously evaluated wouldbeexpected.

Criterion 3Becausethesechangeslessenoperating restrictions, itcanbeexpectedthatareduction insafetymarginmayoccur.However,becausetheRWSTminimumboronconcentrations aresufficient toprovideadequateshutdownmarginfromallexpectedoperating conditions, thisreduction insafetymarginwouldbeinsignificant.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesixthoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident, butwherethe,resultsare AEP:NRC:09161 Attachment 1Page6of18clearlywithinlimitsestablished asacceptable.

Asdiscussed above,thesechangesrelaxrequirements relatedtoborondilutionorpositivereactivity

addition, butareclearlyboundedbyourshutdownmarginanalyses.

Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsiderations.

5.ChangestotheDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High ESFActuation SignalThefifthgroupofproposedchangesinvolveFunctional Unitl.e(Differential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High) undertheEngineering SafetyFeature(ESF)Actuation SystemInstrumentation Table3.3-3.Thesechangesarenumbered67,68,and71inAttachment 10.Specifically, weareproposing tochangethefootnotedesignator fortheChannelstoTripcolumnofthe3-loopsectiontoaquadruple poundsign,andtoaddacorresponding newfootnotetotheTable3.3-3notations onT/Spage3/43-21.Additionally, weproposetorevisethefunctional unittoprohibit3-loopoperation inModes1and2,consistent withCategory2ofthisattachment.

TheDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High actuation differsfromotherESFactuation signalsinthatasignalfromoneloopiscomparedtosignalsintheotherloops.Thecurrentfootnoteassociated withthissignalforthe3-loopcasestates:"Thechannelsassociated withtheprotective functions derivedfromtheoutofserviceReactorCoolantLoopshallbeplacedinthetrippedmode."Thiscouldbeconstrued tomeanthatallchannelsintheoutofserviceloopshouldbetripped.ThisinturnwouldresultinanESFactuation.

Itisourbeliefthatthefootnoteasappliedtothisfunctional unitmeanstotripthebistables whichindicatelowactiveloopsteampressurerelativetotheidleloop.ThisactionreducestheESFactuation logicfortheactiveloopdifferential pressures from2outof3to1outof2,andthuspermits3-loopoperation inMode3since2channelspersteamlinearenecessary foratrip.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Theprohibition of3-loopoperation inModes1and2isconsistent withthechangesincludedinCategory2ofthisattachment.

The10CFR50.92analysisisthusidentical andwillnotberepeatedhere.The10CFR50.92analysesincludedinthiscategoryaretherefore onlythoseinvolvedinrewriting theDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High footnoteinT/STable3.3-3.Criterion 1Thechangesincludedinthisgroupareeditorial innature,intendedonlytoclarifytheESFActuation SystemInstrumentation Table(3.3-3)asit AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page7of18appliestotheDifferential PressureBetweenSteamLines-High actuation signal.Thus,nosignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentshouldoccur.Criterion 2Theproposedamendment willnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated becausethesechanges,beingeditorial innature,willnotimpactexistingsafetyanalysesorthenucleardesignbases.Criterion 3Theproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafetybecause,asdiscussed above,allaccident.

analysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged asaresultoftheseproposedT/Schanges.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatarepurelyadministrative innature:forexample,changestoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,correction ofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.

ThisgroupofproposedchangesisintendedonlytoclarifytheT/Ss,toavoidthepossibility thattheymaybemisread.Asthesechangesareeditorial anddonotimpactsafetyinanyway,webelievethattheFederalRegisterexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

6.ChangestothePower-0cratedReliefValve(PORV)Secification, 3/4.11.4ThesixthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvearedraftofT/S3/4.11.4, concerning thePressurizer Power-Operated ReliefValves(PORVs).Thesechangesarenumber95inAttachment 10.Specifically, weareproposing tochangeT/S3/4.11.4torequirethatatleast2PORVsbeavailable inModes1,2,and3.Forpurposesofthisspecification, "available" meansthatthePORVisoperablewithitssolenoiddeenergized andthattheblockvalveisoperableandenergized.

ThisdiffersfromthepresentT/S,whichallowsall3PORVstobeinoperable, providedtheirassociated blockvalvesareclosed.TheproposedchangesareintendedtoensurethatPORVreliefcapability isavailable toassistinRCSdepressurization following asteamgenerator tuberupturewithoutoffsitepower,andtorespondtocommentsmadebymembersofyourstaffatameetingheldwithusinBethesda, MDonDecember13,1984.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofnewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page8of18Criterion 1Thisgroupofchangesconstitutes additional restrictions placedonPORV(andassociated blockvalve)operability requirements.

Sincenorestrictions associated withthePORVsarereducedinanywaybythisgroupofchanges,weconcludethatthesechangeswillnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Criterion 2Sincethesechangesplaceadditional restrictions

'onplantoperation andinnowayreducepresentsafetyrestrictions, theywouldnotbeexpectedtocreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thesechangesaddadditional restrictions onthePORVs,designedprimarily toensurethatPORVreliefvalvecapability isavailable toassistinRCSdepressurization following asteamgenerator tuberupture.Thus,thesechangeswouldbeexpectedtoincrease, ratherthandecrease, safetymargins.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesthatimposeadditional limitations, restrictions, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss.SincethisgroupofchangeswillrequirePORVstobeoperableinModes1through3(wherepreviously nooperability requirement existed),

theyclearlyconstitute additional restrictions.

Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatnosignificant hazardsareinvolved.

7.AdditionofT/S4.0.4ExemtionsTheseventhgroupofproposedchangesarethosewhichaddT/S4.0.4exemptions toexistingT/Ss.Thesechangesarenumbered44,65,66,and103inAttachment 10.Forthefirstofthesechanges,aT/S4.0.4exemption hasbeenproposedfortheflowmeasurement performed aftereachrefueling andforallflowsurveillances fortheDNBT/S,4.2.5.1(seenumbers44inAttachment 10).(Theflowspecification hasbeenmovedfromtheFspecification (3/4.2.3) totheDNBspecification (3/4.2.5.1) forconsistency withUnit1specifications.)

Thisexemption isrequiredHbecauseflowismeasuredusingsecondary calorimetric andprimarytemperature measurements, whichcanonlybeperformed atornearfullpower.Theflowinstrumentation iscalibrated basedonthismeasurement.

Exemptions havealsobeenprovidedforseveralNuclearInstrumentation System(NIS)calibrations (seenumbers65and66inAttachment 10)inT/STable4.3-1.Ofthese,thoseproposedforsourcerangeandintermediate rangedetectorcalibrations appearinSTS,Rev.4.STS,Rev.4alsoprovidesthisexemption fortheincoredetector, excorepowerrange

AEP:NRC:09161 Attachment 1Page9of18detectorcross-calibration performed afterrefueling.

Ourproposalextendsthisexemption tothequarterly incoredetector, excorepowerrangedetectorcross-calibration inordertoaddressthesituation whereanunscheduled outageofsignificant durationcausesthesurveillance intervalforthiscalibration tolapse.Thisexemption isproposedforthedailypowerrange,neutronfluxheatbalancebecauseitisrequiredtobeperformed above15%ratedthermalpowerbyT/S.Itisalsoproposedforthemonthlyincore-excore axialoffsetcomparison forthesamereason.Theseexemptions areneededtoaddressunscheduled outagesforwhichthesurveillance intervalhaslapsed.Anexemption fromT/S4.0.4forthesourcerangechannelfunctional testisproposed.

Thisexemption addresses thesituation thatresultsfromareactortripaftercontinuous poweroperation ofmorethan1.25times31days.Thissurveillance cannotbeperformed atpowerwithoutdamagingthesourcerangedetectors.

Exemptions fromT/S4.0.4areproposedforthesingle-loop andtwo-looploss-of-flow tripcalibrations ofT/STable4.3-1.Thesearerequiredbecausethesecalibrations arebasedontheprimaryflowmeasurement takenatornearfullpowerwhichwasdiscussed aboveinrelationtoflowinstrumentation.

Thesechangesarenumbered65and66inAttachment 10.Exemptions fromT/S4.0.4areproposedforthef(D,I)penalties associated withtheOverpower 5TandOvertemperature b,Ttrips.Theseexemptions arerequiredbecausethef(5I)moduleiscalibrated todataobtainedfromtheincoredetector, excorepowerrangedetectorcross-calibration.

Asisimpliedbytheexemption ofthiscalibration fromT/S4.0.4onarefueling frequency, whichisalreadyavailable inSTS,Rev.4,thiscalibration mustbeperformed atpower,intheapplicable mode.Thecalibration isperformed atpowersothatanappreciable signalcanbeobtainedontheincoredetectors andtheexcoredetectors.

Thesechangesarenumbered65and66inAttachment 10.Lastly,anexemption fromT/S4.0.4isproposedforSurveillance 4.7.1.5(seenumber103inAttachment 10.)Thisexemption isrequiredbecauseT/S3.7.1.5,SteamGenerator StopValves,isapplicable toMode3,andSurveillance 4.7.1.5,whichmeasuresstopvalveclosuretime,mustbeperformed inMode3.Inordertodemonstrate therequiredclosuretimeforthesteamgenerator stopvalves,steampressuremustbeinthenormaloperating rangecorresponding toprimarytemperature abovetheP-12setpoint.

Therefore, secondary pressureforthistestmustbeaboveapproximately 800psigforwhichsaturation temperature iswellabovethe350FMode3boundary.

Anexemption isalsoproposedforBeginning ofCycletoenterMode2forphysicstestingprovidedthesteamgenerator stopvalvesareclosed.Thisprovision allowscontinuation ofthestartupprogramwithsteamgenerators isolatedintheeventthatsecondary sideworkisnotcomplete.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated,

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page10of18(2)createthepossibility ofnewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thechangesinthissectionarenecessary tomaketheT/Ssaccurately reflectlimitations associated withsurveillances whichmustbeperformed intheapplicable mode.Additionally, thechangesareneededtoaddressthefactthatunscheduled outagescananddooccur,andwhentheydosurveillances canexpirewithnowaytocorrectthesituation untiltheunitreturnstopower.WherepossiblewehavefollowedtheguidancegivenbytheSTSs,expanding itasnecessary toaddressthesituations justdescribed.

Asthesechangesareconsistent withtheguidanceprovidedbytheSTSs,webelievethatanyincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, oranyreduction inmarginsofsafety,wouldbeinsignificant.

Criterion 2Sincethesechangesrequireneitherphysicalchangestotheplantnorchangestothesafetyanalyses, itisconcluded thattheywillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Pleaseseeourdiscussion onCriterion 1,above.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant, hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Example6referstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzed,accident, butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinacceptable limits.Itisourbeliefthatthesechangesarenecessary toreflectlimitations inherentinsurveillance testingmethodsemployedbytheCookPlant,andthechangesreflectfurtherclarification oftheintentoftheoriginalT/Sasisindicated bythetypeofT/Sintheseareasthatispermitted bylaterrevisions oftheSTS.Inlightofthis,webelievethereasonsforthisgroupofchangestobeconsistent withExample6.8.ChangestoExistingT/SValuesTheeighthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvevaluesofparameters presently includedintheT/Ssthatarebeingrevisedtoreflecttheassumptions usedinthevarioussafetyanalysesperformed insupportoftheUnit2Cycle6reload.Thesechangesarenumbered4,8,10,11,13,14'5,17,18,19,23,28,34,40,42,47,48,49,54,76,78,79,and101inAttachment 10.Thatattachment alsoincludesreferences tothespecificsectionsoftheaccidentanalysesonwhichthechangesarebased.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page11of18Twotypesofchangesincludedinthisgroupneedfurtherexplanation.

The~firstarechangestoallowances topermitoperation withRdFRTDs.Theseareincludedinthechangesnumbered8,10,14,19,42,47,48,76,and78inAttachment 10.DuringtheUnit2Cycle6refueling outage,wewillbereplacing allofourexistingRosemount RTDswithRTDsmanufactured bytheRdFCorporation.

Becausetheuncertainties associated withthesenewRTDsaredifferent fromthoseassociated withtheolderRosemount RTDs,itisnecessary torevisesomeT/Svaluesaccordingly.

Weusedthereviseduncertainties toobtainTechnical Specification setpoints fromtheanalysisvaluescalculated byExxonNuclearCompany.Certainsetpoints wereaffectedbybothachangeinanalysisvalueandtherevisedallowances.

Foryourconvenience, wehaveincludedtheWestinghouse ElectricCorporation safetyevaluation fortheRdFRTDinstallation (WCAP-11080) asAttachment 3tothisletter.Thesecondgroupofchangesneedingclarification arechangesinvolvedwiththef(5I)penaltywhichisappliedtotheOvertemperature 5TandOverpower 5Treactortripsetpoints.

(Thesearechangesnumbered15and18inAttachment 10.)Thereisonlyonef(~I)module,whichservesbothofthesetrips.Thismoduleplacesapenaltyonthesetripfunctions intheeventofanaxialimbalance inneutronfluxbetweenthetopandbottomhalvesofthecore.Thef(~I)penaltywasnotrequiredasaninputtotheOverpower LTtripforpreviousUnit2cycles,andthusf(LI)ispresently setequaltozeroinT/STable2.2-1.Thenewanalysesperformed byENCapplythef(5I)penaltytobothOverpower and2Overtemperature 5T.TheENCanalysesresultedindifferent f(5I)functions forthesetwotrips.However,becausetheysharethesamef(~I)module,asinglef(5I)functionthatconservatively boundsthesetwofunctions waschosenfortheproposedT/Ss.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident.

previously evaluated, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or'(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thechangesincludedinthisgrouparenecessary tosupportsafetyanalysesperformed byENCandWestinghouse ElectricCorporation (asreferenced byAttachment 10)insupportoftheCycle6reload.TheseanalyseshavenotyetbeenacceptedbytheCommission.

Ourconclusion ofnosignificant hazardsconsiderations, whichissupported below,istherefore contingent uponCommission acceptance.

Criterion 1Thesafetyanalysesperformed forCycle6addressed allpreviously analyzedaccidents.

Theanalyses, whicharereferenced inAttachment 10,demonstrated thatnosig'nificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentisexpectedtooccur.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page12of18Criterion 2Thesafetyanalysesperformed forCycle6addressed allapplicable accidents foundintheStandardReviewPlanforrelevancy toCook.Manyofthoseaddressed hadnotpreviously beenevaluated forD.C.CookUnit2.Therefore, weconcludethat,tothebestofourknowledge, thisgroupofchangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzed.

Criterion 3Thesafetyanalysesperformed forCycle6(asreferenced byAttachment 10)havedemonstrated thatacceptable marginsofsafetyaremaintained forallaccidents whichwereaddressed.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesecondoftheseexamplesreferstochangesresulting fromanuclearreactorcorereloading, ifnofuelassemblies significantly different fromthosefoundpreviously acceptable totheNRCforapreviouscoreatthefacilityinquestionareinvolved.

ThesechangesaresimilartothisexampleinthattheCycle6reloadisverysimilartopreviousreloadsintermsofenrichment, powerdistribution, andfueltype.Althoughminorchangeshaveoccurred(e.g.,Fwasincreased from2.04to2.10),thechangeswereanalyzedandfoundn8ttosignificantly impactapplicable marginstosafety.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisrelevantandthatnosignificant hazardsconsideration isinvolved.

N9.SearationofFlowRateandFTheninthgroupofchangersinvolverevisions toT/S3/4.2.3,NuclearEnthalpyHotChannelFactor(F).Thesechangesarenumbered41,42,43,48inAttachment 10.InthepresentT/Ss,RCSflowrateandFmaybehH"tradedoff"againstoneanother(i.e.,alowermeasuredRCSflowrateisacceptable providedFisalsoacceptably lower).IntheproposedTgS3/4.2.3,wehaveeliminated theabilitytotradeoffflowforF.FishHnowdefinedinT/S3.2.3onlyasafunctionofratedthermalpower.RSflowrateinMode1hasbeenmovedtoproposedT/S3/4.2.5.1, whichcontainstheMode1DNBparameters.

AlthoughtheActionStatements andsurveillance requirements havebeenrevisedtoreflectthisseparation, norequirement appropriate foreitherofthetwohasbeendeletedormadelesssevere.NofluxmappingisrequigedintheDNBAction'tatement, becausefluxmappingisusedtomeasureF<,notflow.Theproposedchangesincludedin)hisgroupareonlythosechangesinvolvedinseparating flowrateandFintheT/S.ChangestoexistingfHT/SvaluesforflowareincludedinCategory8ofthisattachment.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page13of18(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thisgroupofproposedchangesinnowayremovesorreducesanysafetyrequirements, nordoesitrequirephysicalchangestotheplant.Thus,itisnotexpectedtoinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accident.

Criterion 2Theseproposedchangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident, fromanypreviously

analyzed, because,beingprimarily editorial innature,theyimpactneithertheaccidentanalysesnorthenucleardesignbases.Criterion 3Theproposedchangeswillnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussed above,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

Sincethesechangesactuallyrepresent additional restgictions (inthatwewillnolongerbeabletotradeoffRCSflowrateforF)itcouldbeanticipated thatanincrease, ratherthandecrease, inthemargintoDNBunderaccidentconditions mightactuallyAHresult.Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstexamplereferstopurelyadministrative changestotheT/S:forexample,changestoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,correction ofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.

ThesechangesaresimilartothisexampleinthatRCSflowrateandFarebeingseparated withnoreduction inrequirements, primarily tomakeKeUnit2T/SsmoresimilartothoseforUnit1.Thesecondexamplepublished intheFederalRegisterreferstochangesthatconstitute additional limitations, restriction's, orcontrolsnotpresently includedintheT/Ss:forexample,morestringent surveillance requirements.

Thesechangesaresimilartothisexampleigthatwewillbeprohibiting ourselves fromtradingoffRCSflowrateforF<Forthereasonsprovidedabove,weconcludethattheexamplescitedarexelevantandthatthisgroupofproposedchangesinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

10.ChanestotheP-12Interlock DescritionThetenthgroupofproposedchangesinvolvestheP-12Interlock description includedinT/STable3.3-3.Thesechangesarenumbered75and77inAttachment 10.TheP-12Interlock receivesinputfromtheTlow-lowbistables.

Thesebistables arecalibrated totripwhentheave0temperature decreases to541Fasspecified inT/STable3.3-4.

AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page14of18With2outof4bistables tripped,P-12permitsthemanualblockoftheLowSteamLinePressureSafetyInjection, causessteamlineisolation underconditions ofhighsteamflow,andremovesthearmingsignaltocondenser steamdump.With3of4Tchannelsabovetheresetpoint,whichisgreaterthan541F,themanual.blockofLowSteamline Pressure0aveSafe'tyInjection isdefeatedorprevented andthecondenser steamdumpisenabled.ThepresentT/Sdescription oftheP-12Interlock isconfusing inthatitneglectsthetripandresetpoints,andinsteaddescribes P-12intermsofconditions above544Fandbelow540F.Ifthisdescription isread00literally, itcouldbeinferredthatP-12isestablished whenTis0oavegreaterthanorequalto544FandwhenTislessthan540F.aveAdditionally, themanualblockofsafetyxn3ection actuation wouldnotbe00permitted untilbelow540F,wheninfactthesetpointis541F.WeproposetorewriteP-12intermsofthe541Fsetpoint, whichissimilarto0themethodology utilizedinRev.4oftheSTS,inordertobetterreflectthefunctioning ofthisinterlock.

Inadditiontothechangesdescribed above,wehaverevisedtheP-12functiondescription.

Thecurrent,description statesthattheSafetyInjection associated withP-12occursonhighsteamlineflowandlowsteamlinepressure.

TheD.C.CookUnit2ESFdesignprovidesaSafetyInjection onLowSteamLinepressurewhichdoesnotrequireacoincident signalfromP-12LowLowT.Thisparticular SafetyInjection maybeblockediftheP-12LowLowf.'ignalispresent.Highsteamlineflowaveavecoincident withP-12LowLowTdoesnotprovideaSafetyInjection; itavedoeshowevercauseasteamline xsolation.

Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thesechanges,beingeditorial innatureandintendedonlytomoreaccurately describethefunctioning oftheP-12interlock, willnot,reduceinanywayrequirements orcommitments whicharepresently includedintheT/Ss.Thus,noincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentwouldbeexpected.

Criterion 2Thesechanges,beingpurelyeditorial, willnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously evaluated becauseallaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

AEP:NRC:09161 Attachment 1Page15of18Criterion 3Theproposedamendment willnotinvolveasignificant reduction inmarginofsafety,because,asdiscussed above,allaccidentanalysesandnucleardesignbasesremainunchanged.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered not,likelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrative innature:forexample,achangetoachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,correction ofanerror,orachangeinnomenclature.

Thisgroupofproposedchangesissimilartothisexampleinthatthechangesarepurelyeditorial, intendedtomaketheT/Ssmoreaccurately reflectthefunctioning oftheP-12interlock.

Nophysicalchangestotheplantoritsprocedures willbenecessary becauseofthesechanges.Thus,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthisgroupofchangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

11.Simlifications toPowerDistribution andAPDMST/SThepurposeoftheeleventhgroupofproposedchangesistodeletereference totheAxialPowerDistribution Monitoring System(APDMS)fromtheT/SsandtosimplifythePowerDistribution LimitsT/Ss.Thesechangesarenumbered32,33,37,38,39,53,and85inAttachment 10.TheAPDMSisanoptioncurrently providedintheT/Ss.ItisrequiredtobeoperablebyT/S3.3.3.7whenitisbeingusedformonitoring axialpowerdistribution.

Poweroperation ispermitted abovetheAllowable PowerLevel(APL)andbelowRatedThermalPowerprovidedadditional surveillance isperformed usingtheAPDMSinaccordance withT/S4.2.6.1.Inpractice, however,theAPDMScanbesomewhatmorelimitingthanAPL.Moreimportantly, experience hasshownthatAPDMScausesextensive wearandtearontheMovableIncoreDetectorSystem,whichtheAPDMSusesfordataacquisition.

Thiseffectresultsinseriousmaintenance problemsonasystemwhichcontainspartswhicharehighlyradioactive.

Forthese'easons,itwasdecidednottooperatewithAPDMS.Therefore, weareproposing todeleteT/S3/4.3.3.7, andtoreviseT/Ss3/4.2.2(F(Z))and3/4.2.6(AxialPowerDistribution) toremovematerialrelatedtoAPDMS.Inconjunction withtheabove,wehaverewritten T/S3/4.2.6.TheproposedT/Scontainsthelimitsandsurveillances requiredtoestablish andmaintainAPL,andhasalsobeenrenamedaccordingly.

Mostofthesurveillance requirements ofT/S4.2.2havebeenmovedtoT/S4.2.6inordertofurthersimplifytheseT/Ss.Itshouldbenotedthatthe2%penaltyappliedtoF(Z)forincreasing FbyT/S4.2.2.2.e hasbeenincorporated intothedefinition ofAPLin%heproposedT/S3.2.6.NoQrequirements orlimitscurrently inT/Ss3/4.2.2or3/4.2.6,otherthanthoserelatedtoAPDMSandthosediscussed inthenextparagraph, havebeenremovedorreducedinourproposedrevisions.

Inadditiontothechangesdescribed above,T/S3.2.2hasalsobeenrevisedtoeliminate theneedtoplacethereactorinHotStandbytoperformtheOverpower hTtripsetpointreduction whenthissetpointis AEP:NRC:0916X Attachment 1Page16of18requiredtobereducedbyActionStatement a.Ourreviewofthisrequirement hasdetermined thatthereduction canbeperformed whilethereactorisatpower.Thechangeinsetpointcanbeaccomplished onechannelatatimewithbistables ontheaffectedchannelinthetrippedconfiguration; therefore, thereisnoneedtoimposeatransient onthereactorsystems,whichisinherentinchangingfromNodes1to3.Thischangeisconsistent withguidanceprovidedinDraftRev.5oftheSTS.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Thechangesincludedinthisgroup(withtheexception oftheOverpowers Ttripsetpointreduction) shouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Thesechangesareadministrative innatureanddonotdeleteanyrequirements otherthanthoseassociated withAPDMS.Asdescribed earlier,APDMSisanoptionandisnotrequiredbyT/Ss.FortheOverpower 5Ttripsetpointreduction, thechangeisconsistent withguidanceprovidedbytheCommission throughtheissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Althoughthechangesmayincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident, theresultsshouldbenoworsethanthosepreviously acceptedbytheCommission throughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Criterion 2ThechangesotherthantheOverpower LTtripsetpointreduction areadministrative innature.Theydonotintroduce anynewmodesofplantoperation, nordotheyrequirephysicalchangestotheplant.Thechangesassociated withtheOverpower 5Ttripsetpointareconsistent withguidanceprovidedbytheCommission throughtheissuanceofDraftRev.5oftheSTSsandarepresumedtobeacceptable onthatbasis.Thus,weconcludethatthechangeswillnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzedorevaluated.

Criterion 3Thechangesincludedinthisgroup(otherthantheOverpower

~Ttripsetpointreduction) shouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction insafetymargins,sincetheyarepurelyadministrative andinnowayreducepreviousrequirements forsafety.Changesassociated withtheOverpower

~Ttripsetpointreduction mayinvolvereductions insafetymargins,buttheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinlimitsfoundacceptable totheCommission throughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5oftheSTSs.

AEP:NRC:0916I

'ttachment 1Page17of18Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thefirstoftheseexamplesreferstochangeswhicharepurelyadministrative innature:forexample,toachieveconsistency throughout theT/Ss,tocorrectanerror,ortomakeachangeinnomenclature.

Thechangesinthisgroup(otherthantheOverpower 6Ttripsetpointreduction) arepurelyadministrative innature.Theyareintended'toimproveT/Sreadability byeliminating theAPDMSoptionnotcurrently exercised, andbyrearranging theT/Sstomakethemeasiertouse.Noreductions insafetyrequirements willoccurasaresultofthesechanges.AsfortheOverpower 6Ttripsetpointreduction, thischangeissimilartoExample6published intheFederalRegister.

Thisexamplereferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteria.

Theelimination oftherequirement toplacethereactorinHotStandbytoperformthereduction doesconstitute arelaxation ofapr'evious requirement, buttheresultsofthechangehavebeenfoundacceptable bytheCommission throughtheirissuanceofDraftRev.5totheSTSs.Basedontheabove,weconcludethattheexamplescitedareapplicable andthatthechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsideration.

12.ChangesforConsistenc WithSTSThetwelfthgroupofproposedchangesconsistofthosethatarerequested'o makeourT/Ssmoreconsistent withRev.4oftheSTS.Thesearethechangesnumbered57,58,and96inAttachment 10,whichalsoincludesadescription ofthechanges.Per10CFR50.92,aproposedamendment willinvolveanosignificant hazardsconsideration iftheproposedamendment doesnot:(2)(3)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccident, previously evaluated, createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously analyzedorevaluated, orinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Criterion 1Asthesechangesingeneralrepresent relaxation ofcurrentT/Srequirements, theymayinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously analyzed.

Theresultsofthechanges,however,havebeenreviewedandfoundacceptable bytheCommission throughtheirissuanceofRev.4totheSTSs.Thus,weconcludethatanyincreaseinprobability orconsequences wouldnotbesignificant.

14 AEP:NRC:0916I Attachment 1Page18of18Criterion 2AsthesechangeswillinvolvenophysicalplantchangesandnoT/Schanges.whicharenotconsistent withRev.4oftheSTSs,weconcludethattheyshouldnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.

fromanypreviously evaluated.

Criterion 3Becausethesechangesrepresent relaxation ofpresentT/Srequirements, theycouldpotentially involveareduction insafetymargin.However,thesechangesareallconsistent withthosefoundacceptable bytheCommission inRev.4oftheSTSs.Thus,weconcludethatanyreduction inmarginsofsafetyareinsignificant.

Lastly,wenotethattheCommission hasprovidedguidanceconcerning thedetermination ofsignificant, hazardsbyproviding certainexamples(48FR14870)ofamendments considered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration.

Thesixthexamplereferstochangeswhichmayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously analyzedaccidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteria.

Thechangesincludedinthisgroupareconsistent withRev.4oftheSTSs.Althoughtheymayreducesafetyrequirements, theresultsofthischangehavebeenevaluated andfoundacceptable bytheCommission.

Basedontheabove,weconcludethattheexamplecitedisapplicable andthatthechangeinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.

ChanestotheBasesInadditiontothechangestotheT/Ssdescribed above,wehavealsoproposedchangestotheBasessectiontoreflectbothchangesinthesafetyanalysesandchangesintheT/Ss.Descriptions ofthesechangeshavebeenincludedinAttachment 10.Conclusion Inconclusion, webelievethattheproposedchangesdonotinvolvesignificant hazardsconsideration becauseoperation ofD.C.CookUnit2inaccordance withthesechangeswouldnot:(1)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

analyzed, (2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.

fromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thisconclusion isbasedonourevaluation ofthechanges,whichhasdetermined thatallproposedchangeswhicharenotadministrative innature,consistent withtheSTS,orconsistent withthedesignbasisoftheplantareclearlytraceable totheCycle6safetyanalyses, asreferenced byAttachment 10.AssumingCommission acceptance oftheseanalyses, itisourbeliefthattheysuccessfully demonstrate thatapplicable safetylimitsandmarginstosafetywillbemaintained.

h