05000282/FIN-2016002-01
From kanterella
Revision as of 10:54, 30 May 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Prairie Island TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Required Action A.1 required, in part, isolation of the affected penetration flow path within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if one or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. Contrary to the above, since August 4, 2012 on 21 occasions for Unit 1 and 23 occasions for Unit 2 (three year reporting window), the licensee failed to isolate containment spray header penetration flow paths within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> during the performance of quarterly containment spray pump surveillance procedures SP 1090A & 1090B and SP 2090A & 2090B. Specifically, the SPs inappropriately credited Note 1 of TS 3.6.3 and created open flow paths from the Unit 1 and 2 containments under administrative control while vent and/or drain valves connected to the containment spray header were opened. The opening of these valves was to facilitate draining of the header and to verify no leakage past manual isolation valves during containment spray pump operation in recirculation mode. On August 4, 2015, the licensee generated CAP 01488454 which questioned whether use of TS 3.6.3 Note 1 to open the containment spray header vent and drain valves under administrative control was permissible. The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined that because the vent and drain valves were not considered part of a containment penetration flow path, Note 1 could not be applied. A past operability review was performed and it was determined that on multiple occasions (at 1-10 hour durations) over the prior three years, the vent/drain opening resulted in a 3/8 opening in the containment pressure boundary. Because the resultant leakage at peak containment pressure during a design basis accident (approximately 4 percent of the containment volume per day) would have exceeded the maximum allowable leakage rate, conditions that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of the Units 1 and 2 containments and, conditions that were prohibited by TS, had occurred. Because the inspectors answered Yes to question B.1 under Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Because the leak rate through the vent/drain openings would not have exceeded greater than 100 percent of the containment volume per day at calculated peak containment internal pressure, the finding screened as very low safety significance (Green). The issues were entered into the licensees CAP as CAP 01488454. Corrective actions included immediate quarantine of the affected SPs and subsequent revisions to the SPs and TS Bases. |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000282/2016002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2016 (2016Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer L Haeg M Ziolkowski P Laflamme P Zurawski S Bell |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000282/2016002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2016Q2
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||