ML17262A409

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LER 90-017-01:on 901212,two DC Switches Opened Causing Disabling of Manual Automatic Actuation of Safeguards Sequence Initiation.Caused by Inadequate Procedures. Procedures revised.W/910308 Ltr
ML17262A409
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/08/1991
From: BACKUS W H, MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-017, LER-90-17, NUDOCS 9103130115
Download: ML17262A409 (34)


Text

ACCELERATEDDISJBUTIONDEMONST~IONSYSTEMREGULATORYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RXDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9103130115DOC.DATE:91/03/08NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit,1,RochesterGAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONBACKUS,W.H.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDOCKET05000244

SUBJECT:

LER90-017-01:on901212,twoDCswitchesopenedcausingdisablingofmanualautomaticactuationofsafeguardssequenceinitiation.Causedbyinadequateprocedures.Proceduresrevised.W/910308ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22DCOPXESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).D05000244ADRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3LAJOHNSON,AINTERNAL:ACNWAEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DET/ECMB9HNRR/DLPQ/LHFB11NRR/DOEA/OEABNRR/DST/SELB8DNLBBD102RGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:EG&GBRYCE,J.HNRCPDRNSICMURPHY,G.ACOPIESLTTRENCL1111221111111111111111331111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-3PDAEOD/DOAAEOD/ROAB/DSPNRR/DET/EMEB7ENRR/DLPQ/LPEB10NRR/DREP/PRPB11NRR/DST/SICB7ENRR/DST/SRXB8ERES/DSIR/EIBLSTLOBBYWARDNSXCMAYS,GNUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL11112211112211.11'1111111DRtyfl'tY+~fDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR31ENCL31DD n

C~'iltd~~~lfllkl!Ill!~ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidentCinnaNuclearProducrionrroarsrAsc~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTERN.Y.14649-0001TELEPHONEAREACOOET16546'2700March8,1991U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskWashington,DC20555

Subject:

LER90-017,(Revision1)OpeningofDCSwitches(ProceduralInadequacy)DisablesManualandAutoActuationofSafeguardsSequenceInitiationCausingaConditionOutsidetheDesignBasisofthePlantR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),whichrequiresareportof,"anyeventorconditionthatresultedintheconditionofthenuclearpowerplant,includingitsprincipalsafetybarriers,beingseriouslydegraded,orresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeinginaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER90-017isherebysubmitted.ThisrevisionisnecessarytorevisesectionIV(AnalysisofEvent)duetonewinformationbeingreceived.Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Vertrulyyours,OLcRobertC.Mecedyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaUSNRCSeniorResidentInspector910313011591030SPDRADOCK05000244SPDR

~IACAeeaeIN>>O$1LICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)UAIIVCLIAAAIOVLATOAVCOINIMAINAceAovlooNIINL$IN0lovCA&VIIII/$1/~ICACIUTYNAeellllR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCAITNve>>IAQl06000244TOf15"'~'"OpeningofDCSwitchesDisablesManualandAutoActuationoSafeguardsenceIn>.tiation,CausinaConditionOutsidetheDesiBasisofthePlantUONTIIOAYYCA1IVCNTOATSIIIYCAILCANVe>>CAIIIII0UIeIe>AL~eUUe~1AevAaUewlweAAleOATOATIIhUONTNOAYYIAAOOCAITNVUICA>>I06000~ACIUTYN*ULIOTNI1CACIUTIIIINVOLVIOell121290900170103089106000OeIAATINOIIOOCI~I~OIVCALCVILppIILINNIIIILIIO.CNIeIllIIllIO.ANWIIII>>IIOANWIIII>>I$O.CNWIIIIIIXTN>>ACCOAT>>WIUITTIOeVAIUAN'fTIl.eOIIIITl.eNleINMlellllNMWQIN.f$WQIIIIN.f$4IQIIIIN.TSleIQIIWlN.TIWQIININ.NNIQhetN,fIIIIQlleelNPINIQIIIAAIAI~O.f$NIIIIIe>>I>>lIO.TIWQllal0TIIC1lovl1CUINTIoeIlcJAIIIceaeaeee<<aUaeelVU'Ua<<wel11111LTIILITATIWoTIIIA/CaaaafIeAAaaeateaN<<eaclaTeeLNAc/N<<SCCA/lICINICICONTACTCOATNIILC1ILTINAUITILCIUONINUUIIAWesleyH.BackusAAIACOOlTechnicalAssistanttotheOperationsManager315524-446COeeellfIONILINCCOACACNCoeeeONCNTCAILUACOIICAIIIOUeTN>>AICOAT11$1CAUIIIYITIUcoee/oNINTUANU/ACiTVIICACAUIIlVlflieCOUIONINTUANUCACTUAIAleOATAILTONTIIOIWAWIVYYLIUINTALAIIOATIAeICTIOIleeYll/I/fee,aaeUeeNCCJCCTCOCVCNIIIIONOATC/~ACTAACT/LeaeeeeleoIUea<<,I.A,eA<<eeeaeaea/IINaaIUceewcelfceeaIINaAeevliceIxeICTIOWIIIICCIONOATIIIII1:Ygaa'(%j""'$>gg~UONTIICAYYCANOnDecember12,1990,at2310EST,withthereactoratapproximately34fullpower,theControlRoomForemanopenedtwoDCswitches,asdirectedbyaMaintenanceprocedure,causingthedisablingofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiation.ThetwoDCswitcheswereclosed,asdirectedbytheMaintenanceprocedure,approximatelytwenty(20)minuteslater,restoringmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationinitiation.Theunderlyingcauseoftheeventwasprocedureinadequacyduetoinsufficientattentiontodetail.Extensivecorrectiveactionsarebeingtakentopreventrecurrence,includingcommunicationofmanagementexpectations,HPESevalua-tions,identifyingproceduralinadequacies,andacomprehensiveupgradeoftheprocedurechange'process.IIACe<<eIN>>4$l

MACfons$00AI00$ILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATIONV.$,IIVCLTAIIACOULATOIIYCOMMISSIONAffAOV$0OM$HOTI$0MIOOf$IIfIA%$$ITI4$fACILITYIIAM0IIIOOCIIKTIIVM0$IIITILTIIIIVM0$III~IoeQVTnTIALSUMsovlsslnSM~SfAO$ITIR.E.GinnaNuclear~PlantTSCTIJfesseONCeeNeoooe.seeOeeeesolJVIICfons~'elIITIosooo244900170102orl5PRE-EVR2lTPLANTCONDITIONSTheplantwasintheprocessofstartingupsubsequent'totheplanttripof12/ll/90(discussedinLER90-013).Thereactorwasatapproximately34fullpower,awaitingclearancethatsecondarychemistryparameterswerewithinspecification.ThetwoControlRoomreactoroperatorswereprovidingfulltimeattentiontomaintainingsteamgeneratorwaterlevel(i.e.using"manual"controloffeedwateraddition)andcontrollingreactivityduetoaXenontransient(i.e.withmanualcontrolofboronconcentration).Atapproximately2044EST,December12,1990,theControlRoomreceivedMainControlBoardAlarmL-14(Bus14UnderVoltageSafeguards).Duetothisundervoltagefailure,the"A"EmergencyDieselGeneratorautomaticallystarted.Bydesign,itdidnotcloseintoBus14asBus14wasstillpoweredbyitsnormalsupply.TheControlRoomoperatorsdispatchedauxiliaryoperators(AO)tochecktheBus14UndervoltageMonitoringSystemCabinetsintheAuxiliaryBuildingandRelayRoom.OneoftheAO'sreportedtotheControlRoomoperatorsthattheBus14UndervoltageMonitoringSystemCabinetintheAuxiliaryBuildinghadaburntodorandtherelayindicatinglightsindicatedthatatleastonerelaywasnotoperable.ThiseventisdiscussedinLER90-015.TheOperationsShiftSupervisor.(SS)notifiedstationelectriciansoftheaboveindications.ThestationelectriciansthencheckedtheBus14UndervoltageMonitoringSystemCabinetsandfoundafaultysolidstateswitchprintedcircuitboardintheAuxiliaryBuildingBus14UndervoltageMonitoringSystemCabinet.ThesefindingswerereportedtotheControlRoom.vsCfOAQ$00Ateal

~<<ACSccNcSSSA$4SI'LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.NVCLSAIIASOULATOIIYCOMMISSIONAft<<OVSOOMSNOSISOMIOCS)tPIIISS4ISI/ISSACILITYHAM%IIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTKXTIllcNrr<<WcerctowecI.uMCcNH<<crlITIC%%d~'CIIITIOOClcKTHVMISAITIosooo244LSIINVMSSIIISINSAIISCOVCNTIALASV<<IONNvccTN~NvrCr9001701AAOSISI03pal5TheStationElectricalPlannertheninitiated,"WorkRequestorTroubleReport"Number9024136,reviewedapplicabledrawingsandpreparedaworkpackage(i.e.workordernumber9024136)whichincludedPORCapprovedMain-tenanceprocedureM-48.14(XsolationofBus14UndervoltageSystemforMaintenance,Troubleshooting,ReworkandTesting).TheworkpackagewasthenreviewedbythePlannerSchedulerforcomplianceswithadministrativerequirements.TheElectricalPlannerthenperformedrequirednotificationsoftheQCEngineerandaResultsandTesttechnician,andbriefedthemonthecontentsoftheworkpackage.TheElectricalPlannertooktheworkpackagetotheElectricShopandrevieweditwiththetwoelectricianswhoweretoperformthework.TheElectricalPlannerandtwoelectricianswenttotheControlRoomandreviewedtheM-48.14.procedurewiththeSS.TheSSperformedareviewoftheM-48.14proceduretoapprovethestepsfortransferringelectricalloadsonBus14tothe"A"EmergencyDieselGenerator.TheSSthengavetheM-48.14proceduretotheControlRoomForeman(CRF)toactuallyperformtheoperationalsteps.WhentheCRFbegantoreadstep5.5.1ofM-4814,hestoppedandquestionedtheElectricalPlannerconcerningthisstep.Step5.5.1requiredtheopeningoftwoDCswitches.TheCRFwasconcernedwiththeeffectofopeningthesetwoDCswitches,giventhecurrentplantconditions.Therefore,theCRFandElectricalPlannerreviewedtheXnitialConditionsofM-48.14,andre-verifiedthattheywereadheringtotheprocedurerequirements.TheElectricalPlannerstatedtotheCRFthatthisprocedurehadbeenperformedbefore.NACAOAMSSSAI04)I

MACterm444A(044ILICENSEEEVENTREPORT{LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.4.IIUCL4*II14OULATOAYCOMMI44IOHAttAOYEOOM4HO4I50&1044IItIII4$4I414$tACILITYIIAM4IIIOOCK4TIIUM44ALTIL4IIIIUM44III4I$4OV4rTIAI.rvr114VISIOrM~1tAO4I4IR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIJIrrttrrcerrrvteAt>>trrr4trtNIICAtnr~'tIlIllo5ooo24490-01701040Fl5DESCRIPTIONOFEVENTA.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAZOROCCURRENCES:oDecember12,1990,2310ST:EventDateandTime(i.e.SIDCswitchesopened)oDecember12,1990,2330EST:SIDCswitchesclosedoDecember13,1990,0102EST:EventDiscoveryDateandTimeoDecember13,1990,0150EST:NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)notifiedviaEmergencyNotificationSystem(ENS)B.FASTOnDecember12,1990at2310EST,withthereactoratapproximately34fullpower,theCRFopenedthe.twoDCswitches(requiredbystep5.5.1ofM-48.14)inthe'DCdistributionpanelsonthebackoftheControlBoard.TheopeningoftheseswitchescausedControlBoardAlarmL-31(SafeguardsDCFailure)toannunciate.Thereceiptofthisalarmwasquestionedatthe,time,buttheresponsefromtheCRFwasthatthealarmwasanexpectedresultofperformingstep5.5.1ofM-48.14.FurtherevaluationofthisalarmwasdeferredtocontinuewithM-48.14.TheCRF,continuingwithM-48.14,openedtheBus14NormalFeedBreakertoallowthe"A"EmergencyDieselGeneratortotieintoBus14.Thisactionresultedinmomentarilyde-energizingthe1BInstrumentBus.ThereactortriprelayfromNuclearInstrumentationSystemIntermediateRangeChannelN-36(poweredfromthisBus)de-energizedandareactortripoccurred.ThereactortripisdiscussedinLER90-016.MACtOAM444Ai444I

MACTerna$44AISAILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIVCLSAA1SOULATOAYCOMMISSIOMA99AOVSOOMSMOSISOWIOl/SIItllISSSISI4$/ACILITYIIAM4IIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTscTwrrr9racerrrrrAvieeeeeewsACerr~SIIITIOOCIISTMVMSSIII!Iosooo24490LSIIMVMSSIIISITaovlrnALHUMAaSYOIQ>~yM10,5QF15TheControlRoomoperatorsimmediatelyperformedtheapplicableactionsofE-0(ReactorTriporSafetyInjection)andES-0.1(ReactorTripResponse)andstabilizedtheplantinhotshutdown.AftercompletingtheapplicablestepsofE-0andES-0.1,theControlRoomoperatorscompletedtheirpartofM-48.14,byclosingthetwoDCswitchesthathadbeenopenedinstep5.5.1ofM-48.14.Thiswasaccomplishedatapproximately2330EST,December12,1990.TheoncomingSS,whohadbeenintheControlRoomduringthisevent,resumedtheevaluationoftheconsequencesofalarmL-31afterplantconditionshadstabilized.(Thecauseofthealarmhadalreadybeendetermined.)HeperformedanotherreviewofM-48.14andcalledotherknowledgeablemembersoftheplantstaffattheirhomes(atapproximately0100EST,December13,1990)todiscusshisconcernsabouttheeffectofopeningthesetwoDCswitches.Afterreceivingconfirmationthathisconcernswerelegiti-mate,hemadethepropernotificationstohighersupervisionandtheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).C.D.E.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES4COMPONENTS4ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHELRG%T:None.OEMSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:None.METHOD'OFDIScommY:TheeventwasmadeapparentduringtheoncomingSSreviewoftheconsequencesofControlBoardAlarmL-31(SafeguardsDCFailure)andsubsequentdiscussionswithknowledgeableplantstaff.MACSOAM$44A>94$I 0

MACtorwaaaAIS4alLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIVCLSAIIASOVLATOIIYCOMMISSIOHAffAOVSOOMSHOSISO&104arflASSSISI4SfACILITYNAMaIIIoocraTIlvMaarIalI,allIIVMaallIalSCOVCHTIAL%VMARa+IQIOHMSA~AOaIalR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTaxTIIIneveMMfee~~oeaecverA'cfonsIa'llII'5ooo24490-0170106ovl5POPERATORACTION:Factorsthatinfluencedoperatoractionsduringtheeventwereasfollows:0TheControlRoomoperatorsquestionedstep5.5.1inprocedureM-48.14,butinformationinM-48.14,theDCswitchlabels,andAlarmResponseprocedure.AR-L-31didnotprovidesufficientoperationalinformationtodeterminetheconsequencesofopeningthesetwoswitches.oTheControlRoomoperatorshadconfidenceinaPlantOperatingReviewCommittee(PORC)approvedprocedurethathadalsobeenreviewedbytheElectricalPlanner.Astheeventwasoverpriortodiscovery,nooperatoractionsotherthannormalwereperformed.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:None.XXXCAUSEOPEMBFZA.IMl69)IATECAUSE:Aconditionoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplantwascausedbythedisablingofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiation(i.e.autoandmanualSZ).INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Thedisablingofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiationwascausedbyswitchf12inthelADCDistributionPanelandswitchg9inthe1BDCDistributionPanelbeingopenatthesametime.BothofthesepanelsareonthebackoftheMainControlBoard.41CSOAQSSSAla0SI

MACSons494AI94SILICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIUCLSAIIIIEOULATOAYCOMMISSIONA99ROVEOOM4ROSISOMIOAEX9IRES41414$9ACILITYIIAMEIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTlll~CWCeMneee4YA9aANenelCIVICAnn~ElIITIo5ooo24490LEIIHVMCEA191SSQUSNTIALHMAASYOIO>Ap7OFl5ProcedureM-48.14hadbeeninitiallywrittenin1983foruseathotorcoldshutdownconditions.In1985,theprocedurewasmodifiedtoallowuseonlyatcoldshutdownconditions.Theinitialprocedureandtherevisionsweretechnicallycorrectandreceivedamulti-disciplinedreviewandapproval.During1988,M-48.14receivedamajorrewriteandRevision6becameeffectiveMarch23,1989.ThepurposeoftherewritewastochangethemethodoffeedingBus14,andaspartofthisprocesstheplantmodewaschangedto"AnyModeofoperation."Thischangereceivedathoroughreviewpriortobecomingeffective.Onedaylater,itwaserroneouslyconcludedthatcertainsteps,whichhadpreviouslybeenintheprocedureforuseatcoldshutdown,wereinadvertentlyomittedfromthecurrentprocedure.Thus,M-48.14waschangedtoinsertthecurrentstep5.1.1.Thischangeisinappropriateinmodesotherthancoldshutdown,butthiswasnotrecognizedduringthereviewandapprovalprocess.ROOTCAUSE:Therootcausewasdeterminedtobefailureoftheorganizationtoattributesufficientattentiontodetailintheprocedurechangeprocess.00AMaintenanceprocedurewhichwaspreviouslycorrect,waschangedtorequireinappropriateactions,inthattheproceduredirectedtheopeningofswitchesintheDCpowersupplytotheSIsequencesduringallmodesofoperation.TheprocedurewasreviewedbythePlantOperatingReviewCommitteeandapprovedforusebyplantmanagement,forallmodesofplantoperation,althoughtheopeningofthetwoDCswitcheswasclearlyintendedforuseatcoldshutdownconditionstopreventspuriousSIactuationduringBustransfertotheEmergencyDieselGenerators.+ACAOAM444Ai9441

NNCSereM($4SIL'ICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.NVCLSANACOULATOIIYCOMMISSIONASSAOYKOOMSNOS1$0&IOS/$NSIII%$SISI4$FACILITYNANtIIIOOCISKTNUMCSIIISILlllNVMOSIIIIISSQUSNTIAI,M1ASYISIONM~A~AOSIS)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIN'maoMSCeNnerre4~~HIICANM~'SlIIllosooo24490-017-080F15Acontributingfactoristheneedforaquestion-ingattitude.TheCRF,inquestioningtheperformanceofstep5.1.1ofM-48.14,didnotgofarenoughwithhisquestioningattitude.XV.ANALYSTSOFEVENTThiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(ii)(B),whichrequiresareportof"anyeventorconditionthatresultedintheconditionofthenuclearpowerplant,includingitsprincipalsafetybarriers,beingseriouslydegraded,orresultedinthenuclearpowerplantbeinginaconditionthatwasoutsidethedesignbasisoftheplant",inthatthedisablingofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiationplacedtheplantinaconditionoutsideitsdesignbasis.Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:Duringtheaboveevent,manual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiationwasdisabled,however,thevariouspumpsandvalveswereoperableandcouldbeoperatedbytheControlBoard'witches.TheControlRoomoperatorsperformimmediateactionsuponreactortripperprocedureE-0.Throughtheseproceduralimmediateactionstheoperatorsevaluatewhetheraconditionrequiringsafetyinjectionexists,andifrequired,verifyoperationofsafeguardsequipmentormanuallystartandalignthatequipment.Theirevaluationwouldbebasedupontheappropriateannunciatoralarms(allofwhichwereunaffectedbytheDCswitchpositions),orareviewofcontrolboardparameterindications(i.e.RCSpressure,SteamGeneratorpressure,etc.).NACSONMSSSA<~ASI

ISWCiona00SAI043ILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIuCLSASIASOVLATOIIYCOMMISNOII/ASSAOYlOOM0HO0ISOWIOS%)ttlAllSI314SFACILITYIIAMlIIIOOCIIKTIIUMllAIllLlllMOMOSIII~ISSQMSNTIAL'SVOIO>MA'MS1R.E.GinnaNuclear~PlantTEXTIFWaOCWOtAteyWet,~ASASOASIIYJICAnti~'SIIITIosooo2449001701090sl5Theeffectofthepotentialdelayinactuatingsafeguardsequipmentuponthose.eventsanalyzedintheUFSARwasevaluated.TheaccidentseffectedbythisactionarethoseaccidentswhichresultindepressurizationoftheprimarysystemcausingSI.Theseareprimarilythefollowing:oFeedLineBreak(FLB)oSteamGeneratorTubeRupture(SGTR)oSmallBreakLossofCoolantAccident(SBLOCA)oLargeBreakLossofCoolantAccident(LOCA)oSmallSteamLineBreak(SmallSLB)oLargeSteamLineBreak(SLB)Ananalysisoftheseaccidentswasperformedtodeterminetheeffectofthedisablingofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticactuationofthesafeguardssequenceinitiationwiththefollowingresults:FeedLineBreakThisaccidentwasanalyzedbytheGinnaUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)as'heatupeventwithauxiliaryfeedwateravailableinten(10)minutes.Asaheatupevent,RCSpressureneverdecreasedbelowtheSIsetpoint,butrapidlyincreasedabovetheSIpumpshutoffhead.Therefore,SIwasnotnecessaryandauxiliaryfeedwater,whenavailablewithinten(10)minutes,issufficienttomitigatetheevent.Operatoractionstostartauxiliaryfeedwaterwithinten(10)minutesisconsistentwiththeGinnalicensingbasis.IftheFLBwasre-evaluatedasacooldowneventfrom34powertheresultswouldbeboundedbyaSLB.VAC+0AMSSSA<l00I

MAC4reSSSAITSILICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIUCLEAIIASOULATOIIYCOMMISNOIeASSAOVKOOM9kO9ISONICS/SIISIA9$SISI4$SACILITYIIASSSIllOOCIICTIIUMSKRIllLSIIMUM99llISISSQVSNTIALSVMAA9VISIONMSA~AOSISIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTaXTIIT~MMCSe~eeSSA9SAMAIACrenemaSIIITIosooo2449001701100F15SteamGeneratorTubeRutureSGTRisboundedbySBLOCAfromtheRCSdepressurizationstandpoint.TheleakratefromaSGTRis,smallcomparedtobreakflowforaSBLOCA.Thereisnosignificanteffectduetolackofmanual(pushbutton)orautomaticSIsincethemainstepsintheproceduredealwithisolationoftherupturedSG,depressurizationoftheRCS,andterminationofSI.SmallBreakLossofCoolantAccidentWhenmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticSIwasde-activated,thereactorwasoperatingat34power.Thereactorhadbeenat34powerforapproximatelyten(10)hours.Priortothat,thereactorhadbeensubcriticalfortwenty-two(22)hoursfollowingatrip.WestinghouseOwner'sGroupletterWOG90-113,datedJuly2,1990,"ShutdownLOCAProgram-DraftReport",evaluatedamode4LOCAusingagenerictwo(2)loopplantwithasix(6)inchbreakassumedtooccurtwoandahalf(2.5)hoursaftershutdown.AcceptableresultswereobtainedprovidedSIwasstartedten(10)minutesafterthebreak.Assumptionsofthemode4LOCAanalysis'arecomparedwiththeGinnaEventconditionsbelow:WOGMODE4GINNAEVENTDecayHeat1.34NoaccumulatorsavailableRCSpressure1000psigRCStemperature425oFDecayHeat0.534AccumulatorsavailableRCSpressure2235psigRCStemperature547FTheavailabilityofaccumulatorsandthelowerdecayheatoffsetthehigherRCStemperatureandpressure.SufficienttimeisavailabletomanuallystarttheSIandRHRpumpsandopenappropriatevalvesfromtheControlRoom,andtorecoverfromtheSBLOCA.Inanycase,SBLOCAisboundedbyLOCAbecauselesstimeisavailableforoperatoractionduringaLargeBreakLOCA.Nocreditwastakenforchargingflowwhichbyitselfcouldhaveremovedapproximatelythatlevelofdecay~heat.VACSCAMSSSAi9All

NNCfor>>SSSA(S4SIICENSEEEVENTREPORTILERITEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLlAN1SOULATOIIYCOMMISSIONAff1OVSOOMSNOSISO&I04/tllfl1SS'SISI4SfACILITYNAMSIIIOOCKSTNUMSSII11ILt1NUMSSNISISSQUSNTIALASVISIONNUM1INM~A~AOSQIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTSICTIN'a>>Ce>>>>SVfff.vlfOS>>SOANlVACfWse~VIIITIosooo24490Ol70111OF15LareBreakLossofCoolantAccidentAnassessmentofdisablingmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticSIat34powerwasperformedbyWestinghousewithrespecttotheLOCAanalysis.TheassessmentassumedtheRCSwasat547F,2235psig.Thefuelrodswereassumedtobeat600Fwhichwouldbetheapproximatepelletandcladtemperatureattheend-of-blowdownphase.Thevessellowerplenumandthelowerportionofthecorewouldbecoveredwithaccumulatorwater.Further,itwasassumedthat,SImustbeinitiatedwhenthefuelrodsareat1800Ftoturnaroundthecladdingtemperaturebeforeitreaches2200F.Decayheatisbasedonanapproximationofpowerhistorypriortotheevent,usingthe1971ANSModel.Anadiabaticheatupcalculationwasperformedusingpropertiesfora14x14arrayOptimumFuelAssembly(OFA).ThecalculationindicatedSIwasnecessaryinapproximately14minutes.SimulationsontheGinnaspecificsimulatorindicatealessthan2minuteoperatorresponseduringaLOCAisachievable.SmallSteamLineBreakThisaccidentisboundedbytheLargeSLBbecauselongertimesareavailableforoperatorresponse.LareSteamLineBreakWestinghouseassessedtheeffectofnomanual(pushbutton)orautomaticSIontheSteamLineBreakanalysis.BasedontheirexperienceswithSteamLineBreakanalysisaswellasareviewoftheavailablemargintotheacceptancecriteria,itwasjudgedthatiftheaccidentwerere-analyzedat34powerwithnomanual(pushbutton)orautomaticSI,acceptableresultswouldbeobtained.41CfOAQSSSAiSASI

MACSons$$$A1$4$1LICENSEEEVENTREPORTII.ERITEXTCONTINUATIONV.$.HUCL$AIIATOULATOIIYCOMMI$$IOMASSAOVKOOUIIIO$I$0MIOO$)IOIA$$l/$1/8$SACILITYIIAM$111RoE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTSITIII'ssooMMo~nooooY.oMooMMMMAtACASM~$IIITIOOCII$TIIUSM$%11Iosooo244LtllIIVMO$111$l$$CUonTIALsovlslon~IVMS'M~S9001701SAO$1$1120~15RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG&E)performedacomputeranalysisoftheSLBusingtheWestinghouseLOFTRANCode.AbasecasewascomparedtoacasewhereSIwasdelayedforten(10)minutes.ThecomparisonindicatednegligiblechangeinminimumDNBR.Therewasaninsigni-ficantchangeinmassreleasedtocontainmentbecausemassreleaseisdominatedbyinitialsteamgeneratorlevelandauxiliaryfeedwaterflow,neitherofwhichareaffectedbydelayedSI.Comparingenergyoutthebreakforbothcases,showednegligibledifferences.Therefore,delayingSIhasnegligibleeffectonminimumDNBRandmass/energyoutthebreak.Inconclusion,delayofmanual(pushbutton)andautomaticSIwiththereactorat34powerwouldnotcauseNon-LOCAeventstoexceedtheacceptancecriteria.Adelayofapproximately14'inutesintheLOCAcanbetoleratedwithoutunacceptableresults.Basedonoperatortraining,thisissufficienttimeforoperatorresponse.Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTIONACTIONTAKENTORE'ZURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-~9FZNORMALSTATUS:Theaffectedsystemwasrestoredtonormalwhenthetwo(2)DCswitcheswereclosedtwenty(20)minutesaftertheywereopened.VACSCAM$$$A<0'

IIAC>wwSSSALICENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATIONV.S.IIUCLSAIIIISOULATOIIYCOMMISSIOIIASSAOYSOOMSIIO)ISO&I04/SXrlASSSISIISSSACILITYIIAMSIIIOOCIISTIIVMSSIIISILSIIIIUMS~IIISISLOMINTIALlllVISIQN~I4144~AOSISIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantosooo244900170113OF15B.ACT?ONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:ShortTermActions00SeniorManagementmetwithkeyplantpersonneltocommunicatemanagementexpecta-tionsforaquestioningattitudeandattentiontodetail.Thesegroupsincludedalltheoperatingshifts,theMaintenanceplanningstaff,andPORCmembers.PolicieswereissuedaddressingtheOpera-tionsShiftSupervisorreviewofprocedurespriortogivingauthorizationtoproceed,andtheMaintenanceplanners'esponsi-bilitiesforWorkPackagereview.0Allplantprocedureswerescreenedforpossibleoperationalimpactinadequacies,andpotentiallydeficientproceduresweremadeunavailableforuse.Proceduresthatweremadeunavailableforuse,butwereimmediatelyrequiredforsafeplantoperation,werecarefullyreviewedpriortobeingmadeavailableforuse.AHumanPerformanceEnhancementSystem(HPES)evaluationwasperformedonControlRoomactivities'associatedwiththisevent,toidentifytheneedforanyadditionalshorttermcorrectiveactions.Additionalactionswereidentified.ActionsidentifiedbytheHPESprocesswereimplementedwhereappropriate,includingadditionalupgradesofswitchlabels,amoredetailedreviewofAlarmResponseprocedures,improvedwordingofpro'ceduralstepsforHumanFactorsconcerns,andadditionalinformationtobemadeavailabletotheoperators.Forallinvolvedoperationspersonnel,theiroperatingexperienceandtraininghistorieswerereviewedforadequacy.SACAOAMSSSA(0ASI

NACro<<MEEEAI04)IrACILITYNAMEIllUCENSEEEVENTREPORTILER)TEXTCONTINUATIONDOCKETNVMEEAIEIVS.NVCLEAIIAEOVLATOIIYCOMMIEEIONArrROVEOOMENO3150&104E)IrIAEEEI31/8$~ACEIEI\R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTExTIh'rrrrNMrr<<Mrr<<EE.<<rEaaseowNOMICfond~'rIIITILEIINVMEEII(EI<<EAASECVENTIALAEVISIQNNMEAosooo24490017014OF10Anindependentassessmentofthestatusofshorttermactions,andoftheprocedurescreening,wasconductedbeforemanagementauthorizedrestartofthereactor.2~LongTermActions0AnHPESevaluationoftheprocedurechangeprocessisbeingperformed.Fromthisevaluation,recommendationsforlongtermimprovementswillbeimplemented.AmongtheseimprovementsaretheincreasedinvolvementofOperationsinthereviewofproposedchanges,requirementsformoreaccuratedescriptionsofproposedchanges,andmorerigorinthereviewofchangesatPORCmeetings.0Toensuretheeffectivenessoftheshorttermcorrectiveactions,follow-upevalua-tionswillbeconducted.Basedontheseevaluations,managementwilldeterminetheneedforadditionalreinforcementoftheseactions.0ThetrainingprogramsforOperationspersonnel,PORCmembers,andMaintenanceplannerswillbere-evaluated.Weexpecttomakelongtermimprovementsintheseprograms,andinthecontentoftheseprograms,and-alsointhetrainingprogramsforotherplantpersonnel.0Proceduresthatarecurrentlyunavailableforusewillbereviewedindetailpriortoreleaseforuse.Weareexpeditingthereviewofthoseprocedures,placinghighestpriorityonthoseprocedureswhichareexpectedtobeneededduringthecourseofroutineoperations,toensuretheiravail-abilityinthenearfuture.NACrOAMEEEA>EATI 0l IIACtoreSSSAIS43IL'ICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATlONV.S.IIUCLEAAAEOULATOIIYCOMMITSIOIIANNAOVEOOMSHO)ISO&IONrEXNIAES>II5145NACILITYIIAMEIIIR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantTEXTIN'4eCeeteerrC~NcMOoeVIVJICAwe~1IIITIOOCKKTIIUMItllI1Iosooo244LEIIIIUMOEXINSNOUNHTIALiNSVOION4VM8HMNi9001701~AOEIll50rl50Policiesthatwereinitiatedasaresultofthiseventwillbereviewedforconsistencywithpre-existingpoliciesandprocedures.whereappropriate,existingpolicieswillbealtered,supersedingthenewpolicies.ADDXTXONALXNFORMATXONA.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:None.B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaStationcouldbeidentified.C.SPECXALCOMMENTSNone.VACNOAMSSSAiSOJI 0I