ML17264A542

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LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr
ML17264A542
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/20/1996
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-006, LER-96-6, NUDOCS 9606260154
Download: ML17264A542 (10)


Text

CATEGORY1REGULATOYINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESS1'ONNBR:9606260154DOC.DATE:96/06/20NOTARIZED:NOFACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONST.MARTIN,J.T.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENT'AFFILIATIONDOCKETG05000244

SUBJECT:

LER96-006-00:on960521,discoveredcontainmentpenetrationnotinrequiredstatus.Causedbypersonnelerror.Installedflangeinsidecontainmentpenetration2.W/960620ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).A'5000244(IRECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPDl-1PDINTERNAL:AEOD/SPD/RABgF'ZEECENEENRR/DE/EEL'BNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHYFG~ANRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSINGFG.AEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DSIR/EIBLITCOBRYCEFJHNOACPOOREFW.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111221111D.NNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK/ROOMOWFN5D-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR25ENCL25 ANDROCHESTERGASANDElECTRICCORI@RATION~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER,N.Y.IrI64'rrDDTAREACODE7165'-27tXtROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresidentNucteorOperationsJune20,1996U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555

Subject:

LER96-006,ContainmentPenetrationNotinRequiredStatus,DuetoPersonnelErrors,ResultsinPotentialforUncontrolledReleaseofRadioactiveMaterialR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii),(a)(2)(v)(C)and(a)(2)(v)(D),whichrequireareportof,"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications"or"Anyeventorconditionthatalonecouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofthesafetyfunctionofstructuresorsystemsthatareneededto...Controlthereleaseofradioactivematerial;orMitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-006isherebysubmitted.Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verylyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionMr.GuyS.Vissing(MailStop14C7)PWRProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.,20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475Allendale-RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector9606260i54960620PDRADQCK050002448PDRy/~JP NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104EXPIRES04/30/BBESTIMATEDBURDENPERAESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORYINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREQUEST:50.0HRS.REPOATEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKToINDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCHIT-6F33),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSION,WASHINGTON,DC20555.0001,ANDToTHEPAPEAWORKREDUCTIONPROJECTFACILITYkAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244PAGE(3)1OF8B(4)AContainmentPenetrationNotinRequiredStatus,DuetoPersonnelErrors,Results'inPotentialforUncontrolledReleaseofRadioactiveMaterialMONTHDAYYEAR052196EVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBER.,NUMBER96-006-00MONTHDAYYEAR062096REPORTDATE(7)FACILITYNAMEFACILITYNAMEOTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(6)OOCKETNUMBEROOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)kAME000THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURmore)(11)50.73(a)(2)(viii]50.73(a)(2)(x)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2201(b)20.2203ta)tl)73.7150.73(a)(2)(iii)50.73(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(3)(ii)20.2203(a)(4)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbeloworinNRCForm366A20.2203(a)(2)(iii)50.36(c)(1)50.73(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(vii)LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)ELBPIIOkENUMBER(IncludeAreaCoda>SUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFRE:(CheckoneorJohnT.St.Martin-TechnicalAssistant(716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERAEPOATABLETONPADSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLEToNPRDSSUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(lfyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTEDSUBMISSIONDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,l.e.,approximately15single-spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnMay21,1996,atapproximately0900EDST,withtheplantinMode6withcorealterationsandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainmentinprogress,itwasdiscoveredthatacontainmentpenetrationwasnotintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations,allowingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphere.ImmediatecorrectiveactionwastakeninaccordancewithGinnaImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsLimitingConditionsforOperation3.9.3.A.1and3.9.3.A.2tosuspendcorealterationsandsuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment.Thecontainmentpenetrationwasrestoredtotherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations,andrefuelingoperationswerepermittedtoresume.Theunderlyingcauseofthepenetrationnotbeingintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperationswaspersonnelerrors.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(A).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceisoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4-95)

NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER),TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEIl)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGEI3)2OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:Containment(CNMT)penetrationI)'2(referredtoasP-2)isthe"S/GCommunicationsFlangePenetration"normallyusedforsupportofroutinesteamgenerator(S/G)maintenanceandinspectionactivitiesduringrefuelingoutages.WheninModes5or6,normallyroutedthroughP-2areclosed-circuittelevision(CCTV)cablesandothercommunicationscables.Forthe1996Refuelingoutage,P-2wasalsousedtoprovidearouteforadditionalCCTVcablesandrigidpipesfrom'theoutsideintoCNMT,toprovideservices(communications,airandargon)foractivitiesassociatedwithreplacementoftheS/Gs.Thesepipeswerea3"lineforserviceairanda11/2"lineforargon.StationModificationproceduresSM-10034-10.01(TemporaryServiceAirSystemforSGRP)andSM-10034-'l0.03(Installation5RemovalofTemporaryCCTVandCommunications)wereusedtocontrolthetemporaryinstallationandsubsequentremovaloftheseservices.OnMay19,1996,inpreparationforrefuelingthereactor,GinnaplantstaffcheckedtheconfigurationofP-2andverifiedthattheconfigurationcompliedwithGinnaImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)LimitingConditionforOperation(LCO)3.9.3.c,whichstatesthateachpenetrationprovidingdirectaccessfromtheCNMTatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphereshallbeisolated,orclosedbyanequivalentisolationmethod.Thesemethodsincludeuseofmaterialthatcanprovideatemporary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrier.ContractorsupervisionweresubsequentlynotifiednottodisturbtheconfigurationofP-2untilafterthecompletionofrefueling.DuringthedayshiftonMay20,1996,asdirectedbycontractorsupervision,contractormaintenancepersonnelremovedmuchofthetemporaryserviceairandargonlinesinsideCNMT,asdirectedbyprocedureSM-10034-10.01.ContractorsupervisionhadbeencautionedbyGinnastaffnottoremovethe3"and11/2"pipespoolpiecesthatwereinsidethesealforP-2andthefirstvalvesoneachsideofP-2insideandoutsideofCNMT.Nevertheless,attheendoftheirshift(atapproximately1800EDST),thecontractormaintenancepersonnelremovedthesespoolpiecesandvalves.AdditionalpipingoutsideCNMTwasleftinplaceuntilthenextday.OnMay21,1996,atapproximately0300EDST,autilitynon-licensedoperatorwasperformingOperatingProcedure0-15.2(ValveAlignmentforReactorHeadLift,CoreComponentMovement,andPeriodicStatusChecks),inpreparationforthestartofrefuelingoperations.Aspartofthisprocedure,theoperatorperformedStep5.2.1toverifythatP-2was"adequatelysealed",andsignedoffStep5.2.1ofprocedure0-15.2.SatisfactorycompletionofthisstepensurescompliancewithITSLCO3.9.3.c.NRGFORM366AI4-95)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)LXCENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGE(3)TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT:A.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:0May19,1996:GinnastaffverifythattheconfigurationofP-2meetstherequiredstatusofITSLCO3.9.3.c.May20,1996,1800EDST:ContractormaintenancepersonnelremovepipespoolpiecesfrominsidethesealforP-2.P-2configurationdoesnotmeettherequiredstatusofITSLCO3.9.3.c.0May21,1996,0537EDST:TheplantentersMode6andbeginscorealterationsandmovementofirradiatedfuelasemblieswithinCNMT.Eventdateandtime.0May21,1996,0900EDST:Discoverydateandtime.0May21,1996,0937EDST:AllremainingcablesareremovedfromP-2,andP-2isflangedoff.B.EVENT:OnMay21,1996,allpreparationsforrefuelingwerecompleted.Procedure0-15.2hadbeensignedoffatapproximately0505EDST,andtheControlRoomoperatorsnotifiedtheSeniorReactorOperatorassignedtoRefueling(RefuelingSRO)tobeginrefueling.TheplantenteredMode6atapproximately0537EDSTandbeganrefuelingoperations(corealterationsandmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinCNMT).OnMay21,1996,atapproximately0800EDST,contractormaintenancepersonnelcontinuedtheirworkfromthepreviousdayforremovaloflinesasperSM-10034-10.01.Sincetheselineswerepotentiallycontaminated,aRadiationProtection(RP)technicianwasrequestedtosurveytheremovedlinespriortodisposal.OnMay21,1996,atapproximateiy0900EDST,withtheplantinMode6andrefuelingoperationsinprogress,theRPtechnicianapproachedP-2tosurveysomematerialsanddiscoveredthatP-2wasnotintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations.HeobservedthatP-2wasnotcompletelysealedwherethe3"and11/2"spoolpieceshadbeen,appearingtoallowdirectaccessfromtheCNMTatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphere.NRCFORM366A(4.95)

NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGE(3)4OF8TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm386Ai(17)TheRPtechniciannotifiedhissupervision.RPsupervisionnotifiedamemberoftheplantOutageManagementstaff,whoinspectedP-2andconfirmedthatitwasnotadequatelysealed.TheControlRoomoperatorswerenotifiedofthestatusofP-2asobservedfromoutsideCNMT.ImmediateactionsweretakenperITSLCOACTIONs3.9.3.A.1and3.9.3.A.2tosuspendcorealterationsandsuspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithinCNMT.TheRefuelingSROinsideCNMTwasalsonotifiedthatP-2neededtobeinspectedfrominsideCNMTforthepresenceofaflange.TheRefuelingSROinspectedP-2andconfirmedthatthepenetrationwasnotisolatedinsideCNMTbyuseofamaterialthatcanprovideatemporary,atmosphericpressure,ventilationbarrier.TheRPtechnicianverifiedthattheactualflowofairwasfromtheoutsideintoCNMT.GinnaandcontractorelectricianswerenotifiedtoremoveallremainingcablesroutedthroughP-2.WhenthecableswereremovedandthepenetrationwasunobstructedinsideCNMT,GinnapipefittersinstalledaflangeoverP-2.TheseactionsrestoredP-2totherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations,andrefuelingoperationswerepermittedtoresumeatapproximately0937EDSTonMay21,1996.C.INOPERABLESTRUCTURES,COMPONENTS,ORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTEDTOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARYFUNCTIONSAFFECTED:NoneE.METHODOFDISCOVERY:WhileperformingroutinemonitoringactivitiesfortheremovalofpotentiallycontaminatedmaterialsfromCNMT,aRadiationProtectiontechniciandiscoveredthatP-2wasnotcompletelysealedasobservedfromoutsideCNMT.TheRefuelingSROconfirmedthatP-2wasnotintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations.F.OPERATORACTION:TheControlRoomoperators,uponbeingnotifiedthatP-2wasnotintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations,immediatelycompliedwiththerequirementsofITSLCOACTIONs3.9.3.A.1.and3.9.3.A.2,whichrequirethatifoneormoreCNMTpenetrationsarenotinrequiredstatus,"SuspendCOREALTERATIONS"and"Suspendmovementofirradiatedfuelassemblieswithincontainment".Subsequently,theControlRoomoperatorsnotifiedhighersupervisionandtheNRCSeniorResidentInspector.Atapproximately1226EDSTonMay21,1996,a4hournon-emergencynotificationwasmadetotheNRCOperationsCenterasper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C)and10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D).NRCFORM366A(4-95)

NRCFORM366A(495)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGE(3)TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired,usoadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:NoneIII.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:TheimmediatecauseofCNMTpenetrationP-2notbeingintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperationswasopeningsinthefoamsealwherea3"pipeand11/2"pipehadbeenremoved.ThisconditionwasnotidentifiedbyOperationspersonnelduringperformanceofprocedure0-15.2.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:TheintermediatecauseoftheopeningsinthefoamsealforP-2wastheunauthorizedremovalofthepipespoolpiecesandassociatedvalvesfromthepenetration.Theintermediatecauseofnotidentifyingthisconditionduringtheperformanceof0-15.2wasinadequateverificationbyOperationspersonnel.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlyingcauseoftheunauthorizedremovalofthespoolpieceswaspersonnelerror.TheunderlyingcauseoftheinadequateverificationbyOperationspersonnelwasalsopersonnelerror.AHumanPerformanceEnhancementSystem(HPES)evaluationwasperformedtodeterminethecausalfactorsthatcontributedtothesepersonnelerrors.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(A),"PersonnelError".Personnelerrorsweremadebycontractormaintenancepersonnelandautilitynon-licensedoperator.Theseerrorswerecognitivepersonnelerrorsonthepartofbothgroups.ThecontractormaintenancepersonneldidnotrecognizetheimpactonrefuelingoperationsofremovingthepipespoolpiecesfromP-2.TheOperationspersonneldidnotrecognizetheactualconfigurationofthefoamsealinP-2during0-15.2verifications,perceivedthattheyhadaccuratelyverifiedtheconfiguration,andthoughtthatP-2wasintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperations,when,infact,P-2wasnotadequatelysealed.NRCFORM366A(4-95)

NRCFORM366A(4-SS)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGE(3)6OF8TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJ(17).ThecontractormaintenanceerrorwascontrarytoapprovedprocedureSM-10034-10.01,andtheoperatorerrorwascontrarytoapprovedprocedure0-15.2.Unusualconditionspresentduringtheperformanceof0-15.2includednighttimedarkness,alightningstorm,limitedaccesstoP-2(P-2wasenclosedbyawoodenprotectiveenclosure),additionalcableroutedthroughP-2forthe1996outage,andsomeoftheremainingpipingandvalvesstillbeingwithintheenclosurearoundP-2.TheseenvironmentalfactorsmayhaveobscuredtheviewofthefoamsealfromoutsideCNMT,wherethe3"and11/2"spoolpieceshadbeen.AccesstoviewP-2frominsideCNMTwaspartiallyblocked,duetoequipmentinsideCNMTfortheS/Greplacement.ThisconditiondoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"IndustryGuidelineforMonitoringtheEffectivenessofMaintenanceatNuclearPowerPlants",definitionofa"MaintenancePreventableFunctionalFailure".IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,items(a)(2)(ii),(a)(2)(v)(C)and(a)(2)(v)(D),whichrequireareportof,"Anyoperationorconditionprohibitedbytheplant'sTechnicalSpecifications"or"Anyeventorconditionthatalonecouldhavepreventedthefulfillmentofthesafetyfunctionofstructuresorsystemsthatareneededto...Controlthereleaseofradioactivematerial;orMitigatetheconsequencesofanaccident".HavingaCNMTpenetrationnotintherequiredstatusforrefuelingoperationswithrefuelingoperationsinprogressisaconditionprohibitedbytheITS.Itispostulatedthat,intheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentatthiscondition,theresultantradioactivereleasecouldbeuncontrolled,andthattheCNMTcouldhavebeenineffectiveinmitigatingtheconsequencesofthispostulatedaccident.iAnassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:Therewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesorimplicationsattributedtothisconditionbecause:0ThoughtheCNMTpenetrationalloweddirectaccessfromtheCNMTatmospheretotheoutsideatmosphere,aconditiondidnotexistthatcouldhaveresultedinanuncontrolledradioactiverelease.AreleasetotheoutsideatmospherewouldhaverequiredCNMTpressurization.Sincethefuelhadalowdecayheatrateduetoasixtydayoffloadandsincetherewasonlyasmallamountoffuelinthecoreatthetime,theenergysourcetoeffectaCNMTpressurizationwaslow,makingapressurizedconditionsunlikely.ItwasverifiedthattheactualflowofairwasfromtheoutsideintoCNMT.0CNMTisolationisnotcreditedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccidentpertheapplicablesafetyanalysesbasesforITSLCO3.9.3.TheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR),Section15.7.3.3,showsthatwithoutcreditforCNMTandutilizingtheconservativeassumptionsofNRCRegulatoryGuide(RG)1.25,theoffsitedoseconsequencesfollowingafuelhandlingaccidentareninety-six(96)REMthyroid,whichiswithin10CFR100limitsforGinnaStation.NRCFORM366A(4.65)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGEI3)7OF8TEXT(lfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366Al(17)0GinnaStationrecentlyreceivedAmendment62totheITS,whichmodifiedtherequirementsfortheCNMTequipmenthatchduringMode6.IncludedwithinthisITSamendmentrequest(datedFebruary9,1996)wasanevaluationofoffsitedoses,withthefollowingassumptions:b.CNMTwasinitiallypressurizedby0.5PSIGabovetheoutsideatmosphereforthefirstthreeminutesfollowingafuelhandlingaccident,aCNMTleakagerate,basedonextremetemperaturedifferencesbetweentheinsideandtheoutsideofCNMT,existedforthenexttwohours,andaholeequivalentto1.83squarefeetexistedtotheoutsideatmosphere.UsingtheseandotherassumptionsofRG1.25,thethyroiddoseattheexclusionareaboundarywascalculatedtobeonly8.1REM,whichiswellwithin10CFR100limits.TheconditionofP-2beingopenduringmovementofirradiatedfuelassembliesisboundedbythisanalysissincenofuelhandlingaccidentoccurred,theCNMTwasnotpressurized,andtheincreasedleakagepaththroughP-2waslessthan0:1squarefoot.Therefore,thisconditionwouldnotleadtoexceedingthedoselimits.Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcludedthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:0AllremainingcableswereremovedfromP-2andaflangewasinstalledonP-2insideCNMT,restoringP-2tocompliancewithITSLCO3.9.3.c.0Refuelingoperationswerepermittedtoresume.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:0Procedure0-15.2willberevisedtorequireadditionalcontrolsatP-2,topreventtheconfigurationofP-2frombeingchangedduringrefuelingoperations.0ANuclearTrainingWorkRequestwillbeinitiatedtotrainonthelessonslearnedfromthisevent.VI.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:NoneIIRCFORM366AI4.95)

NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-006-00PAGEI3)8OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired,useadditionalcopiesofNRCForm366AJI17)B.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricalsearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NoneNACFOAM366AI4.95)