ML17264A605

From kanterella
Revision as of 12:53, 3 May 2018 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A605
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/19/1996
From: MECREDY R C, ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: VISSING G S
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-96-012, LER-96-12, NUDOCS 9609270247
Download: ML17264A605 (17)


Text

CATEGORYREGULA'YINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSYSTEM(RIDS)'lACCESSIONNBR:9609270247DOC.DATE:96/09/19NOTARIZED:NODOCKETg.FACIL:50-244RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,RochesterG05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONSTMARTIN,J.T.RochesterGasaElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C.RochesterGasaElectricCorp.RECIP.NAMERECIPIENTAFFIIIATIONVISSING.G.S.

SUBJECT:

LER96-012-00:on960820,feedwatertransientoccurred,duetoclosureoffeedwaterregulatingvalve,causinglolosteamgeneratorlevelreactortrip.SGswererestoredamissingscrewin1/p-476wasreplaced.W/960919ltr.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRJENCLJSIZE:TITLE:50.73/50.9LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.CENOTES:LicenseExpdateinaccordancewith10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).Q050002440RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD1-1PDINTERNAL:AEODSPD/RABILECE~NRR/DE/EELBNRR/DRCH/HHFBNRR/DRCH/HOLBNRR/DRPM/PECBNRR/DSSA/SRXBRGN1FILE01EXTERNAL:LSTLOBBYWARDNOACMURPHY,G.ANRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEVISSING,G.AEOD/SPD/RRABNRR/DE/ECGBNRR/DE/EMEBNRR/DRCH/HICBNRR/DRCH/HQMBNRR/DSSA/SPLBRES/DSIR/EIBLITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOOREgW.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1111111111111111111111D0UNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT~415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSIONREQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR'23ENCL23 ANDROCHESTERGASANDE1ECTRICCORPORAT1ON~89EASTAVENUF,ROCHESTER,N.Y1d6d9.0D01AREACODE716546-27MROBERTC.MECREDYVeepresidentseuc~eorOpesotionsU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionDocumentControlDeskAttn:GuyS.VissingProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555September191996

Subject:

LER96-012,FeedwaterTransient,DuetoClosureofFeedwaterRegulatingValve,CausesaLoLoSteamGeneratorLevelReactorTripR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244

DearMr.Vissing:

Inaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorconditionthatresultedinamanualorautomaticactuationofanyengineeredsafetyfeature(ESF),includingthereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER96-012isherebysubmitted.Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredxc:Mr.Guy'S.Vissing(MailStop14C7)PWRProjectDirectorateI-1Washington,D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionRegionI475AllendaleRoadKingofPrussia,PA19406GinnaSeniorResidentInspector9b092702479b09i9PDRADQCK05000244SPDR 1hlbII'lrI'(~S NRCFORM366(4-95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIOLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/charactersforeachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150<104EXPIRES04/30/9BESTIMATEDBURDENPERRESPONSEToCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORYINFORMATIONCOLLECTIONREQUEST:50.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONSLEARNEDAREINCORPORATEDINTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEDBACKTOINDUSTRY.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDINGBURDENESTIMATEToTHEINFORMATIONANDRECORDSMANAGEMENTBRANCHIT.6F33),U.S.NUCI.EARREGULATORYCOMMISSION,WASHINGTON,Dc20555.0001,ANDTOTHEPAPERWORKREDUCTIONPROJECTFACIUTYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantOOCKETNUMBERIR)05000244PAGE)3)1OF8TITLEI4)FeedwaterTransient,DuetoClosureofFeedwaterRegulatingValve,CausesaLoLoSteamGeneratorLevelReactorTripEVENTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIESINVOLVED(6)MONTHDAY0820YEAR96SEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00MONTH09DAYYEAR96FACILITYNAMEFACKJTYNAMEDOCKETNUMBEROOCKETNUMBEROPERATINGMODE(9)POWERLEVEL(10)20.2201(b)20.2203(a)(1)20.2203(a)(2)(i)20.2203(a)(2)(ii)20.2203la)(2)(iii)20.2203(a)(2)(iv)20.2203(a)(2)(v)20.2203(a)(3)(i)20.2203(a)l3)BI)20.2203(a)(4)50.36(c)(I)50.36(c)(2)50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(ii)50.73(a)(2)(iii)X50.73(a)(2)(iv)50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)50.73(a)(2)(viii)50.73(a)(2)(x)73.71OTHERWSpecifyinAbstractboloorinNRCForm366ASUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTSOF10CFR5)(Checkonoormote)(11)THISREPORTISSUBMITTEDPURNAMELICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLERl12)TELEPHONENUMBER(IoolodeAreeCode)JohnT.St.Martin-TechnicalAssistant(716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENTFAILUREDESCRIBEDINTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERTONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENTMANUFACTURERREPORTABLETONPRDSSJTDR369SUPPLEMENTALREPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSuBMISSIONDATE).XNOEXPECTED6UBMIssl0NDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.o.,approximately15single.spacedtypewrittenlines)(16)OnAugust20,1996,atapproximately1442EDST,withtheplantinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower,the"B"mainfeedwaterregulatingvalvewenttothefullyclosedposition.At1443EDST,thereactortrippedonLoLolevelinthe"B"SteamGenerator.TheControlRoomoperatorsperformedtheactionsofproceduresE-0andES-0.1.Followingthereactortrip,allsystemsoperatedasdesigned,andthereactorwasstabilizedinMode3.Theunderlyingcauseoftheclosureofthe"B"mainfeedwaterregulatingvalvewasdeterminedtobealossofelectricalcontinuity,causedbyamissingscrewinthecurrent-to-pressuretransducerforthe"B"mainfeedwaterregulatingvalve.Correctiveactionwastoreplacethemissingscrew.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(A).CorrectiveactiontopreventrecurrenceisoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(4.95)

NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGE(3)2OF8TEXTilfmorespaceisrequired,useaddidonalcopiesofftVRCForm386Ai(17)PRE-EVENTPLANTCONDITIONS:OnAugust20,1996,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Atapproximately1442EDST,theControlRoomoperatorsreceivedseveralMainControlBoardAnnunciatoralarms.ThesealarmsindicatedthattherewasaproblemintheAdvancedDigitalFeedwaterControlSystem(ADFCS),andthatamainfeedwaterregulatingvalve(MFRV)wasnowinmanualcontrol.TheControlRoomoperatorsobservedthatthe"B"MFRVhadclosedandfeedwaterflowtothe"B"SGwasnotadequatefor100%steadystatepoweroperation.TheControlRoomoperatorsrespondedtothesealarmsandattemptedtorestoreadequateflowtothe"B"SteamGenerator(SG)byopeningtheMFRV.Attemptswereunsuccessful,andwaterlevelinthe"B"SGwasrapidlydecreasingduetothelossoffeedwaterflowtothatSG.DESCRIPTIONOFEVENT'.DATESANDAPPROXIMATETIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:August20,1996,1442EDST:Valvepositionerfailure.August20,1996,1443EDST:Eventdateandtime.August20,1996,1443EDST:Discoverydateandtime.August20,1996,1444EDST:ControlRoomoperatorsverifybothreactortripbreakersopenandverifyallcontrolandshutdownrodsinserted.August20,1996,1450EDST:ControlRoomoperatorsmanuallyclosebothmainsteamisolationvalvestolimitareactorcoolantsystemcooldown.August20,1996,1453EDST:ControlRoomoperatorsmanuallystopbothmainfeedwaterpumpstolimitareactorcoolantsystemcooldown.August20,1996,1545EDST:PlantisstabilizedinMode3.EVENT:OnAugust20,1996,atapproximately1443EDST,theplantwasinMode1atapproximately100%steadystatereactorpower.Feedwaterflowtothe"B"SGwasinadequate,andwaterlevelinthe"B"SGwasrapidlydecreasing.Whenthe"B"SGlevelwasat20%(andstilldecreasing),theControlRoomForemanorderedamanualreactortrip.BeforetheControlRoomoperatorsperformedamanualreactortrip,thereactorautomaticallytrippedonLoLolevelinthe"B"SG((17%)NRCFORM366A(4-95)

T Adl~~~~~~~~egg~0~~~~~~~~~~jjjj~jjjjjj~'j~'~~~~~~~~~'I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~I~~~'~~~~'~~~~,~'~~~II~.:~~~~~~~'~~'~~~,~~~~~~~~~I~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~'~~~~~~~~'~~~I~'~~~,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~II~~~~~~~~.I'~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~I~I~~~~~~~I,~~~~~II~~~~~'~~~~~'~~'~~I~~,~~~~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~j~~~~~~~

1 NRCFORM366A(4-95)LXCENSEEEXTENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER4OF896-012-00TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired,useeddiuonalcopiesofPVRCF'arm366AJ(17)E.METHODOFDISCOVERY:ThiseventwasimmediatelyapparentduetoMainControlBoardindicationofinadequatefeedwaterflowtothe"B"SG.ThereactortripwasimmediatelyapparentduetoplantresponseandalarmsandindicationsintheControlRoom.F.OPERATORACTION:Afterthereactortrip,theControlRoomoperatorsperformedtheappropriateactionsofEmergencyOperatingProceduresE-0andES-0.1.Feedwaterflowtothe"A"SGwasstoppedtomitigatethe'ncreasein"A"SGlevel.TheMSIVsweremanuallyclosedandbothMFWpumpsstoppedtolimitfurtherRCScoo!down.Appropriateactionsweretakentorestorelevelinthe"B"SGandtominimizelevelincreaseinthe"A"SG.ThesettingforliftingoftheSGatmosphericreliefvalves(ARV)wasloweredfrom1050PSIGtominimizeasubsequentRCSheatup(andpreventPRZRoverpressure).TheplantwasstabilizedinMode3.Subsequently,theControlRoomoperatorsnotifiedhighersupervisionandtheNRCper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii),non-emergencyfourhournotification,atapproximately1755EDSTonAugust20,1996.G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES:AIIsafeguardsequipmentfunctionedproperly.Bothmotor-drivenAFWpumpsstartedwhen"B"SGleveldecreasedbelow17%afterthereactortrip.Theturbine-drivenAFWpumpstartedasperdesign,duetoastartingsignaIfromAMSAC.Mainfeedwaterisolationoccurredonhighlevelinthe"A"SG(i.e.,)85%narrowrangelevel).III.CAUSEOFEVENT:A.IMMEDIATECAUSE:Theimmediatecauseofthereactortripwasdueto"B"SGLoLolevel((17%),causedbyinadequatefeedwaterflowtothe"B"SG.B.INTERMEDIATECAUSE:Theintermediatecauseoftheinadequatefeedwaterflowtothe"B"SGwastheclosureofthe"B"MFRV,causedbythecurrent-to-pressure(I/P)transducernotrespondingtotheinputdemandsignal.Thisresultedinlossofinputdemandsignaltothe"B"MFRVvalvepositioner.NRCFORM366A(4-95)

II NRCFORM366A(4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)DOCKETLERNUMBER(6)PAGE(3)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant05000244YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER5OF896-012-00TEXTllfmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm386'A/(17)ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlyingcauseofthelossofinputdemandsignaltothe"B"MFRVvalvepositionerwasalossofelectricalcontinuityfromtheterminalblocktothecircuitboardontheterminalblockinsidethecurrent-to-pressuretransducer(I/P-476)thatsuppliesairpressuretothe"B"MFRV.Thislossofcontinuitywastheresultofamissingscrewwhichcausedanunreliableinputsignalconnection,resultinginlossofthesignaltothetransducer,andcausedtheoutputairsignaltodecreasetominimum.Onminimumairpressure,theMFRVgoesfullyclosed.ThebasicdesignoftheRosemountModel3311I/Ptransducer(I/P-476)issignificantlydifferentwhencomparedtootherinstrumentation.Themountingofthecircuitboardtotheterminalblockisunique,andspecialinstructionsorguidancewereabsentinthemanufacturer'stechnicalmanual.FourscrewsareinstalledintheterminalblockintheseRosemounttransducers.Twoareusedforfieldwireconnections,andtwoareusedtoholddowntheterminalblockconnectionboard.ThiseventisNUREG-1022CauseCode(A),"PersonnelError".AHumanPerformanceEnhancementSystem(HPES)evaluationwasinitiatedforthisevent.TheHPESevaluationconcludedthat,intheeventascrewwasdiscoveredmissingontheterminalblockforthesetransducers,ithadbeenapreviouslyacceptedpracticeforInstrumentandControl(I(AC)techniciansnottoreplacethescrew,andtoreconnectanywiringontoadifferentscrew,aslongasitwasthesameelectricalpoint,sameterminalblock,andsameterminalnumber.Thispracticedoesnotaffectelectricalcontinuityfortransducersofadifferentdesign,sincenoscrewsontheterminalblockholddowntheterminalblockconnectionboard.However,onRosemounttransducers,ailfourscrewsarerequiredfortheirspecificfunction.Thiserrorwasacognitiveerror,inthattheIRCtechniciansdidnotunderstandthedetailedfunctionofeachscrew,anddidnotrecognizethattheirpracticecouldcauseunreliableconnectionsinthetransducer.Thiserrorwasnotcontrarytoanyapprovedproceduresandisnotcoveredindetailinanyprocedure.Therearenounusualcharacteristicsofthelocationsforanyofthesetransducers.Thefailureofthe"B"MFRVI/PtransducermeetstheNUMARC93-01,"IndustryGuidelineforMonitoringtheEffectivenessofMaintenanceatNuclearPowerPlants",definitionofa"MaintenancePreventableFunctionalFailure".NRCFORM366A(4-95)

II NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEE%WENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGE(3)6OF8TEXTiifmorespeceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366Aj(17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportableinaccordancewith10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorconditionthatresultedinamanualorautomaticactuationofanyengineeredsafetyfeature(ESF),includingthereactorprotectionsystem(RPS)".The"B"SGLoLolevelreactortripwasanautomaticactuationoftheRPS,andMFWisolationandAFWpumpstartsareactuationsofanESFcomponent.Anassessmentwasperformedconsideringboththesafetyconsequencesandimplicationsofthiseventwiththefollowingresultsandconclusions:Therewerenooperationalorsafetyconsequencesorimplicationsattributedtothereactortripbecause:oThetworeactortripbreakersopenedasrequired.oAIIcontrolandshutdownrodsinsertedasdesigned.oTheplantwasstabilizedinMode3.TheGinnaStationImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(ITS)LimitingConditionsforOperation(LCOs)andSurveillanceRequirements(SRs)werereviewedwithrespecttotheposttripreviewdata.Thefollowingaretheresultsofthatreview:PRZRpressuredecreasedbelow2205PSIGduringthetransientafterthereactortrip.Duringthistimeathermalpowerstep>10%occurredduetothereactortrip,whichiswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.1.Therefore,compliancewithITSwasmaintained.TheRCStemperatureDNBlimit(577.5degreesF)wasnotapproached.AdditionalmitigationwasprovidedbyclosingtheMS)VsandstoppingtheMFWpumps.MinimumPRZRpressurewasapproximately2092PSIG.Afterthereactortrip,theRCScooleddowntoapproximately539degreesFandwassubsequentlystabilizedat547degreesF.ThecooldownwaswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.3.Inaddition,therequiredshutdownmarginwasmaintainedatalltimesduringtheRCScooldown.BothSGlevelsdecreasedfollowingthereactortrip."B"SGleveldecreasedbelow16%indicatednarrowrangelevel~SR3.4.5.2statesthatinordertodemonstratethatareactorcoolantloopisoperable,theSGwaterlevelshallbe>/=16%.Thus,the"B"coolantloopwasinoperable,eventhoughitwasstillinoperationandperformingitsintendedfunctionofdecayheatremoval.BothSGswereavailableasaheatsink,andsufficientAFWflowwasmaintainedforadequatesteamreleasefrombothSGs.The"8"coolantloopwasrestoredtooperablestatuswhenSGlevelwasrestoredto>/=16%,inapproximatelythirty-five(35)minutes.ThisiswithinthelimitsofITSLCO3.4.5ACTIONA.NRCFORM366A(4-95)

I NRCFORM366A(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONFACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBER(6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00TEXTiifmorespaceisrequired,useedditionelcopiesofNRCForm366A/(17)PAGE(3)7OF8oTheGinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(UFSAR)transient,asdescribedinChapter15.2.6,"LossofNormalFeedwater",describesaconditionwherethereactortripsonLoLoSGlevel.ThisUFSARtransientwasreviewedandcomparedtotheplantresponseforthisevent.TheUFSARtransientisacompletelossofMainFeedwater(MFW)atfullpower,withAFWpumpsavailableone(1)minuteafterthelossofMFW,andsecondarysteamrelief(i.e.,decayheatremoval)throughthesafetyvalvesonly.TheprotectionagainstalossofMFWincludesthereactortriponLoLoSGlevelandthestartofAFWpumps.Theseprotectionfeaturesoperatedasdesigned.Basedontheaboveevaluation,theplanttransientofAugust20,1996,isboundedbytheUFSARSafetyAnalysisassumptions.oTheUFSARtransient,asdescribedinChapter15.1.2,"IncreaseinFeedwaterFlowatFullPower",describesaconditionwheretheautomaticoperationofthemainfeedwaterisolationprovidedprotectionfrompotentialSGoverfillanddamagetotheturbineandsteampipingduetowatercarryover.PrudentoperatoractionprovidedthenecessaryactiontoreduceSGlevel.Thehighlevelinthe"A"SGthatresultedduringthetransientisboundedbytheUFSARSafetyAnalysisassumptions.Basedontheaboveandareviewofposttripdataandpastplanttransients,itcanbeconcludedthattheplantoperatedasdesigned,thattherewerenounreviewedsafetyquestions,andthatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVEACTION:A.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENTNORMALSTATUS:TheSGswererestoredtooperablestatuswhenSGlevelinthe"B"SGincreasedabove16%level,byadditionofAFW.Subsequently,levelswererestoredtotheirnormaloperatinglevels.ThemissingscrewinI/P-476wasreplaced.BothMFRVswereoperatedfullyopenandfullyclosedfromtheMainControlBoardhandcontrollertoverifypropervalvepositioningandresponse.B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:oTherearesix(6)RosemountModel3311I/PtransducersinuseatGinnaStation.All6wereinspected.InadditiontothemissingscrewforI/P-476,abrokenfieldwireconnectionscrewwasfoundinI/P-466(forthe"A"MFRV),andthefieldwirewaslandedononeoftheterminalboardscrews.Aterminalboardscrewwasmissinginthetransducerforthe"B"SGatmosphericreliefvalve,andwaslaterfoundinanearbyconduit.TheconfigurationsofallRosemounttransducerswererestoredtoapprovedconfigurations.ILCtechnicianshavebeenmadeawareoftheunusualarrangementoftheterminalblockscrewsinRosemounttransducers.NRCFORM366A(4-95)

I NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVZRFZREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATIONU.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONFACILITYNAMEI1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKET05000244LERNUMBERI6)YEARSEQUENTIALREVISIONNUMBERNUMBER96-012-00PAGEI3)8OF8TEXTilfmorespeceisrequired,useeddirionalcopiesofNRCForm366A/I17)Calibrationproceduresforall6Rosemounttransducershavebeenchangedtoensurethatallfourscrewsareinplaceandwiresarelandedonthecorrectterminalpoints.NuclearTrainingWorkRequests(NTWR)havebeenwrittentoincorporatethelessonslearnedintothel&Ctrainingprogram.Vl.ADDITIONALINFORMATION:A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:Thefailedcomponent(I/P-476)wasaRosemountModel3311I/Ptransducer.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistoricaisearchwasconductedwiththefollowingresults:NodocumentationofsimilarLEReventswiththesamerootcauseatGinnaNuclearPowerPlantcouldbeidentified.However,LERs93-006(duetoconnectingscrewforlinkagefeedbackarm)and94-007(duetosetscrewbackingoutofvalvepositionsignaldiaphragmassembly)weresimilarevents,inthattherewasalossofabilitytocontrolaMFRVwhichresultedinareactortrip.LERs85-006,88-003,88-005,90-007,90-010,92-002,and92-003weresimilarevents(reactortripfromLoSGlevel)withdifferentrootcauses.C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:NoneNRCFORM366AI4-95)