IR 05000228/2023001
| ML23219A188 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Aerotest |
| Issue date: | 08/24/2023 |
| From: | Greg Warnick NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS/DIOR |
| To: | Slaughter D Aerotest |
| Anderson S | |
| References | |
| IR 2023001 | |
| Download: ML23219A188 (9) | |
Text
August 24, 2023
SUBJECT:
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00228/2023-001, AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
Dear David Slaughter:
This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) in San Ramon, California. The NRC inspectors discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with you and members of your staff on June 27, 2023. A final exit meeting was conducted via Microsoft Teams on July 13, 2023, to inform you of the final inspection results. The inspection results are documented in the enclosure to this letter.
During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative records, tour of the reactor and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
The violations are cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report, Enclosure 2. The violations are being cited in the Notice because they were identified by the NRC and corrective actions had not been fully articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting.
Therefore, you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
If you have any questions concerning this inspection report, please contact Stephanie Anderson at 817-200-1213, or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.
Sincerely, Signed by Warnick, Gregory on 08/24/23 Gregory G. Warnick, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Docket No. 050-00228 License No: R-98
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001
ML23219A188 SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002 OFFICE DRSS/DIOR DRSS/DIOR NMSS/RDB DRSS/DD NAME SAnderson MLaFranzo JParrott GMiller SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
DATE 08/17/23 08/10/23 08/17/23 08/14/23 OFFICE C:DIOR NAME GWarnick SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 08/24/23
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Aerotest Operations, Inc. Docket No: 050-00228 Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor License No: R-98 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, two violations of NRC requirements of greater than minor significance were identified. In a
REGION IV==
Docket No: 050-00228 License No: R-98 Report No: 050-00228/2023-001 Licensee: Aerotest Operations, Inc.
Facility: Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
Location: 3455 Fostoria Way San Ramon, California Dates: June 27, 2023 Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Michael M. LaFranzo Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Jack D. Parrott Senior Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Accompanied By: Nathan A. Fuguet Health Physicist Reactor Decommissioning Branch Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Enclosure 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Aerotest Operations, Inc.
NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection of licensed activities being conducted at the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
of Aerotest Operations, Inc. (licensee). The inspectors identified two Severity Level IV violations, one minor violation, and opened one unresolved item. Other than the identified violations and the one unresolved item, the licensee was conducting site activities in accordance with site procedures, license requirements, and applicable NRC regulations.
Staffing and Audits The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with its technical specifications and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Certified Fuel Handler training and requalification program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the technical specification requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually. (Section 1.2)
Radiological Surveys The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings.
One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration program. (Section 2.2)
Emergency Preparedness The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercise and drills as required by the emergency plan and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with their emergency plan commitments. (Section 3.2)
Report Details Summary of Plant Status On October 15, 2010, Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO or licensee), notified the NRC that they will voluntarily not operate the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) reactor until further decisions were made concerning the ownership issue (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140289). By letter dated December 6, 2021, (ML21242A463), license amendment number 6 was issued, which revised Facility Operating License No. 98 and the associated technical specifications to remove the authority to operate ARRR, to authorize possession-only of the reactor and fuel, and removed all operational requirements not needed for possession-only status.
By letter dated July 20, 2021 (ML21230A304), and supplemented by letter dated January 20, 2022 (ML22025A200), the licensee submitted a license amendment to the NRC for approval of the Decommissioning Plan (DP) for ARRR. These submittals were made pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.82, Termination of license, paragraph (b)(1),
which requires AO to apply for license termination within 2 years of permanently ceasing operations and that each application for termination of a license be accompanied or preceded by a proposed DP.
By letter dated April 11, 2022 (ML22098A092), the NRC accepted the amendment request application to perform the technical review to approve the proposed DP.
1 Staffing and Audits (IP 69002)
1.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed that the staffing was maintained and that required audits were conducted in accordance with the technical specification requirements.
1.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the licensees administrative requirements for staffing and audits as required by the site license and technical specifications (TSs) 12.0. The licensee organization was fully staffed except for a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and a CFH Supervisor.
License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the CFH and CFH Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies. During review of the licensees organization chart and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined the licensee failed to implement the requirements of the ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program to have a qualified CFH and CFH Supervisor, this is considered a violation of Licensee Condition 2.C.(4) (VIO 050-00228/2023001-01).
The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor safeguards committee requirements and verified the licensee maintained at least five members, of whom no more than three are members of AO. The licensees records indicated that the reactor safeguards committee consisted of five members, of which two were outside of AO. The requirements further state that the committee shall meet on the call of the chairman and they shall meet at least annually. The inspectors reviewed the committee meeting records and determined that the committee did meet annually in 2018, 2019, 2020, and January and December of 2022. The committee was not able to meet annually in 2021, but the committee did meet in January 2022 to review the 2021 activities. Technical Specification 12.1.6 requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually.
Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a minor violation of TS 12.1.6.
1.3 Conclusions The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with the TSs and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the ARRR CFH Training and Requalification Program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the TS requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually.
2 Radiological Surveys (IP 69002)
2.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed if required radiological surveys were performed in accordance with approved licensee procedures.
2.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiological survey program as required by the site license and TS 12.2. The licensee had procedures associated with the radiological survey program.
During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensees survey meter calibration program associated with portable gamma and neutron detectors. The licensee demonstrated the calibration program with a portable neutron survey instrument used by the licensee detected approximately 150 mrem/hr on the surface of a neutron source and the expected reading was 102 mrem/hr. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2 states, in part, detailed written procedures shall be provided and followed for normal operation of all systems and components involving nuclear safety at ARRR facility. Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5, 2021, section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if a meter is more than 20 percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair. Technical specification in Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron Survey Instrument as a system. A review of calibration records for 2022 and 2023 showed that the neutron meter had detected approximately 150 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102 mrem, a difference of approximately 47 percent. The licensee stated that the neutron survey meter was appropriately calibrated as the radiation readings were consistent with past measurements. However, the calibration records for
January 5, 2021, were approximately 125 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102, a difference of approximately 22.5 percent.
Although the values read were more than 20 percent of the expected reading, the neutron survey instrument was not adjusted and/or sent for repair. Failure of the licensee to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings is a violation of TS 12.2.1.2 (VIO 050-00228/2023001-02). The licensee committed to send the neutron meter for repairs to an appropriate contractor that could adjust and/or repair the instrument.
In addition, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI 050-00228/2023001-003)
regarding the licensees calibration program. Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures references the use of NIST-traceable source for the calibration of radiation detection instrumentation. A selected review of the NIST-traceable source records indicated that the sources have Certificate of Calibration dates for Thorium-230, Cesium-137, and Strontium/Yttrium-90 of December 15, 1989, January 3, 1990, and December 19, 1989, respectively. Within the Thorium-230 and Strontium/Yttrium-90 Certificate of Calibration record is a statement that it is recommended that the source be recertified on an annual basis. Industry standards regarding the certification of accuracy for NIST-traceable sources is typically one year.
However, the sources referenced above have calibration dates that exceed 30 years and, in discussions with the licensee, these sources had not been recertified pursuant to the recommendations on the Certificate of Calibration. The NRC has questioned the accuracy of the NIST-traceable sources, barring radioactive decay, over such a long period of time beyond recommended recertification. This unresolved item remains under NRC review.
2.3 Conclusions The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings. One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration program.
3 Emergency Preparedness (IP 69002)
3.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed if the licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the emergency plan and if the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with the emergency plan commitments.
3.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Section III of the licensees procedures entitled General Emergency and Emergency Plan, dated as last reviewed by the licensee on April 27, 2023, and the Emergency Plan for Possession Only dated June 30, 2021. Specifically evaluated were completion of emergency preparedness exercises and drills and emergency preparedness training and interaction with offsite agencies that may be needed to assist in a radiological emergency.
The licensee had established emergency action levels in both the General Emergency and Emergency Plan procedure and the Emergency Plan (EP). The inspectors verified that, per the EP, unannounced emergency drills were held on a twice-yearly basis and that there is a monthly test of the various automatic alarms associated with an emergency (fire, earthquake resulting in damage to the fuel storage pool, bomb threat, and reactor tank rupture). The inspectors verified that the emergency alarm system is continuously monitored and that the alarm company monitors unauthorized entry, fire, and radiation. The alarm company has instructions to notify pre-designated ARRR personnel, the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and local law enforcement. The inspectors also verified that annual refresher training of personnel with emergency response responsibilities had been conducted within the last year, that drills, as required by the EP, had been conducted twice yearly, and that a company vehicle was available to transport contaminated personnel to the designated medical facility.
Two outside agencies are required by the EP to be notified in event of an emergency requiring offsite assistance: the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center in Pleasanton, CA. The inspectors verified that the fire protection district personnel had visited the facility in the last year as part of an annual inspection and interacted with the Radiation Safety Officer who is the alternate Emergency Coordinator in the case of a radiological emergency. The inspectors verified that the licensee had contacted the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center and had a signed agreement with them to admit radiation-exposed or contaminated individuals requiring medical treatment. That agreement had been renewed on May 23, 2023. In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified the NRC on the notification list of agencies to be contacted in the event of a facility emergency.
3.3 Conclusions The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the EP and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with its EP commitments.
4 Exit Meeting Summary On July 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to the Dr.
David M. Slaughter, President. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified.
SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee D. Slaughter, President and Reactor Administrator T. Richey, Radiological Safety Officer T. Holt, Radiation Safety Analyst M. McCarthy, Nuclear Analyst K. Reichert, Office Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURE IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000228/2023001-001 VIO Failure to implement the ARRR CFH Training and Requalification Program. (Section 1.2)05000228/2023001-002 VIO Failure to route a neutron monitor to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair if meter is more than 20% off expected readings. (Section 2.2)05000228/2023001-003 URI NIST-Traceable sources recertification. (Section 2.2)
Closed None Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems AO Aerotest Operations, Inc.
ARRR Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor CFH Certified Fuel Handler CFR Code of Federal Regulations DP Decommissioning Plan EP Emergency Plan NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NOV Notice of Violation POL Possession-Only License TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic TS Technical Specification URI Unresolved Item VIO Violation 7