LD-85-063, Forwards Corrected Final Draft CESSAR Sys 80 Sts.Certifies That Tech Specs Adequately Envelope Design Basis Events & Consistent W/Cessar Up to & Including Amend 10 & Ssers 1 & 2

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Forwards Corrected Final Draft CESSAR Sys 80 Sts.Certifies That Tech Specs Adequately Envelope Design Basis Events & Consistent W/Cessar Up to & Including Amend 10 & Ssers 1 & 2
ML20138P236
Person / Time
Site: 05000470
Issue date: 12/20/1985
From: Brewer S
ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LD-85-063, LD-85-63, NUDOCS 8512260001
Download: ML20138P236 (26)


Text

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C-E Power Cystems Tel. 203/688-1911 Combustion Engineering. Inc. Telex 99297 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095 M POWER SYSTEMS December 20, 1985 LD-85-063 Mr. Harold R. Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Certification of CESSAR Standard Technical Specifications

Reference:

(A) NRC Letter, Cecil 0. Thomas to A. E. Scherer, Docket STN-50-470, August 14, 1985.

t

Enclosure:

(1) Corrections to the Final Draf t CESSAR System 80'" Technical Specifications 8

Dear Mr. Denton:

In Reference (A), the NRC issued the final draft of the CESSAR System 80'" NSSS Standard Technical Specifications and requested our certification. We have reviewed the Reference (A) draft Technical Specifications and have found only a few minor corrections. The corrections presented in Enclosure (1) to this letter have been discussed with, and agreed to, by Mr. J. Donohew of the NRR Staff.

Combustion Engineering certifies, therefore, that the Technical Specifications of Reference (A), along with the corrections of Enclosure (1), adequately envelop the design basis events and are consistent with CESSAR up to and including Amendment 10, and the NRC Safety Evaluation Report including Supplements 1 and 2. As discussed with Mr. Donohew, the consistency of CESSAR, including amendments, with the System 80 " design documents" is assured by virtue of Combustion Engineering's Quality Assurance Program. In addition, the bases for the Technical Specifications are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, belief and information, it is also recognized that the staff has requested additional information concerning the auxiliary spray issue for 8512260001 851220 $

PDR ADOCK 05000470 A PDR ($ I L

t - - - - - - -

c Mr. Harold R. Denton LD-85-063 December 20, 1985 Page 2 CESSAR and that the technical specificatons may be subject to change following NRC resolution of that issue.

If you have ony questions, pledse feel f ree to contact me or Mr. G. A. Davis of my staff at (203) 285-5207. .

Very truly yours, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING, INC.

f..__

S. T. Brewer Senior Vice President Nucledr Power Systems STB /bkn Enclosures cc: D. M. Cr tchfield C. O. Th< mas H. L. Thompson C. P. Patel Sworn to before me oh

- this M day of hrtoa,3 19 3

-Ib usM h.Ohthn hotary Public

( *',. s I

Enclosure (1)

LD-85-063 Corrections to the Final Drdft of the CESSAR System 80 Tecnnical Specifications Page* Bdsis for Chdnge 2-3 The setpoint vdlue removed from this table is pldnt specific dnd should be removed to be consistent with the remdinder of the table.

3/4 3-3 An asterik should be ddded to Modes 3 ond 4 associated with Pressurizer Pressure-Low for consistency.

3/4 3-9 The items deleted from this table duplicate information on the next page.

3/4 3-11 The note added to the center of this tdble, "Ste Core Protection Calculation System", applies to both line items 8 dnd 9.

3/4 3-15 The CIAS on Pressurizer Pressure - Low is applicable to Modes 1, 2, and 3 only, consistent with the footnote on page 3/4 3-20. The applicdbility to Mode 4 was mistokenly ddded in the Final Draft; it was not included in the Proof dnd Review Copy.

3/4 3-18 Correction of typing error.

3/4 3-19 AFAS (duxt liary feedwater EFAS (emergency feedwaterdctuation dctuation signal signal J} to be1s changed to consistent with CESSAR terminology.

3/4 3-24 This footnote was added to be consistent with the corresponding notdtion on page 3/4 3-20.

3/4 3-28 Correction of typing error.

3/4 3-38, 3-39 The GESSAR 80 identifier in the lower lef t-hand corner wds dnd 3-40 corrected to CESSAR 80.

3/4 3-43 Actions 29 and 30 were deleted to be consistent with the NRC/C-E dgreement to delete the informotion in this table dnd repidCe it Witn "See Applicdnts SAR".

3/4 4-10 The note "This Technical Specificdtion may be subject to change following NRC resolution of the dux111 dry spray issue for CESSAR" is added at the NRC's request.

Enclosure (1) cont.

LD-85-063 t

3/4 5-1 The # note unnecessdrily complicdtes the specification without changing the intent and should be deleted.

3/4 5-5 Values for the high and low pressure safety injection pumps die pldnt spec 1f1C dnd have been repidced by "See Applicant's SAR".

3/4 5-6 liot leg injection vdives SI-604 and SI-609 dre not throttle volves and should be removod from the table.

3/4 7-5 Tne parenthetical item in Action item b is closed after "diternate wdter source", consistent with the Proof and Review Copy.

3/4 10-8 Correction of a section number.

B 3/4 4-2 The last sentence should be deleted as it does not dCCurdtely represent the sdfety endlyses.

B 3/4 4-7 The phrase "with the exception of the reactor pressure vessel" should be deleted to more occurdtely reflect the existing situdtion.

5-6 The Idst two items were added to idble 5.7-1 for consistency with Table 3.9.1-1.

  • The corrected pdge is dttached.

e a

____._____-_-_________m.______________.____._

a I '

I' 1 * .

,a TAbtE 2.2-T REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTR $JNENTATION TRIP SETP0iKT LINITS 3, . s y FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES 3 1. TRIP GENERATION U A. Process 1.

g 4 Pressurizer Pressure - High g ?"' ;;;e -

2.

_' ?'** p;;;

Pressurizer Pressure - Low (2) * *

3. Steae Generator Level - Low (4) * *
4. Steam Generator Level - High(9) * *
5. Steam Generator Pressure - Low (3) * *
6. Containment Pressure - High *
a. Rate (6)
  • i
b. Floor (6) * *
c. Band (6) * *
8. Local Power Density - High 1 21.0 kW/ft (5) $ 21.0 kW/ft (5)
9. DNBR - Low 1 1.231 (5) 1 1.231 (5)

B. Excore Neutron Flux

1. Variable Overpower Trip (10)
a. Rate (8) .
  • s
b. Ceiling (8) *
  • c'. ~ Band (8) * *
  • _

.* See Applicant's SAR.

setpoint methodology. The values shall be consistent with CESSAR FSAR and the Applicant's 23 M

H

a TABLE 3.3-1 n I

^

O REACTOR PROTECTJVE INSTRUMENTATION y .

A

  • a.

MININUN

? - I TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE F

u,. FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERA 8LE MODES ACTION Y. I. TRIP GENERATION v

U A. Process

1. Pressurizer Pressure - High 4 - 2 3 1, 2 2,3# #
2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low 4 2 (b) 3 1,2,3 4 # #

2,3 #

3. Steam Genarator Level - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2,3 #
4. Stease Generator Level - High 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 2,3 #
5. Steam Generator Pressure - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2, 3* , 4*

2,3 #

6. Containment Pressure - High 4 2 3 1, 2 2,3 #

1 7. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 4/SG 2/SG 3/SG 1, 2 #

2,3 #

y

8. Local Power Density - High 4 2 (c)(d) 3 1, 2 #

2,3 # '

9. DNBR - Low 4 2 (c)(d) 3 1, 2 2,3 #
8. Excere Neutron Flux
1. Variable Overpower Trip 4 2 3 1, 2 #

2,3 #

2. Logarithmic Power Level - High
a. Startup and Operating 4 2 (a)(d) 3 1, 2 2,3 #

4 2 3 3*, 4*, 5* 8

b. Shutdown 4 -

0 2 3, 4, 5 4 C. Core Protection Calculator System ,- ' , . - -

. 1. CEA Calculators 2. 1 2 (e) 1, 2 N

6, 7 g

2. Core Protection Calculators 4 2 (c)(d) 3 1, 2 2,3,7 # 8 4"U

.. P3 m

H

,, g i. *-

TABLE 3.3-2 , ,

REACTOR Pft0TECTIVE INSTRtMENTATION RESPONSE TINES 1 5

E FUNCTIONAL IMIT RESPONSE TINE o u le w

I. TRIP GENERATION y A. Process y 1. Pressurizer Pressure - High 5 seconds

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low ~

< seconds

3. Steam Generator Level - Low _Eseconds
4. Steam Generator Level - High < seconds
5. Steam Generator Pressure - Low < seconds
6. Containment Pressure - High < seconds
7. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 5 seconds 1 8. Local Power Density - High **

Y a. Neutron Flux Power from Excore Neutron Detectors < second*

b. CEA Positions 2 second**
c. CEA Positions: CEAC Penalty Fa-tor 7

_ second**

9. DMER - Low'**
a. Neutron Flux Power from Excore Neutron Detectors < second*
b. CEA Positions i second**
c. Cold Leg Temperature 7 secon##
d. Hot leg Temperature 7 second##
e. Primary Coolant Pump Shaft Speed . E secons
f. Reactor Coolant Pressure from Pressurizer _7 second### ETj
g. CEA Positions: CEAC Penalty Factor < second** =

B. Excore Neutron Flux .

1. 1/ariable Overpower Trip 5 second*

' .' p

2. Logarithmic -

Powertevel - Hi'ght- ~ ~

N

a. Starth and Operating / /

$ second* D

- b. Shutdown ( Q secohd* @

8 See ApplicantTSARN values shall be consisteat with CESSAR FSAR anti-the Applicant's setpoint methodology.

M EF1 N

~

REL MMY TAELE 4.3-1  :

2 m

REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS

=

8 CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH 4 CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE y FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED J.

-e I. TRIP GENERATION

  • A. Process
1. Pressurizer Pressure - High 5 R M 1, 2
2. Pressurizer P-essure - Low S R M 1,2,3,4
3. Steam Generator Level - Low S R M 1, 2
4. Steam Generator Level - High S R M 1, 2
5. Steam Generator Pressure - Low 5 R M 1, 2, 3*, 4*

w 6. Containment Pressure - High S R M 1, 2

7. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low S R M 1, 2

,'. 8. Local Power Density - High 5 1, 2

9. DNBR - Low S '. See Core Protection 1, 2

~ Calculation System B. Excore Neutron Flux

1. Variable Overpower Trip. 5 D (2, 4), M (3, 4) M 1, 2 l Q (4)
2. Logarithmic Power Level - High 5 R (4) M and S/U (1) 1,2,3,4,5 and
  • C. Core Protection Calculator System I

~

1. CEA Calculators S R M, R (6) 1, 2 l
2. Core Protection Calculators S D (2, 4), R (4, 5) M (9), R (6) 1, 2 M (8), S (7) i

TABLE 3.3-3 2

M ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E

E

-I MINIMUM M i . TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS AFPLICABLE T ESFA Si$ TEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP. OPERA 8LE M00ES ACTION O

'^

I. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS) .

A. Sensor / Trip Units

1. Containment Pressure - High 4 2 3 1,2,3,4 13*, 14*
2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low 4 2 3 1,2,3(a),4(a) 13*, 14*

B. ESFA System Logic g 1. Matrix Logic 6 1 3 1,2,3,4 17 Y 2. Initiation Logic 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12 M

3. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12 C. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 16 II. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

A. Sensor / Trip Units

1. Containment Pressure - High 4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14*, D8J
2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low 4 2 3 1,2,3(a) 3 ) 13*, 14*  %

B. ESFA System Logic Dbt

, b

1. Matrix Logic 6 1 3 1,2,3 17 Qty.
e. , -
2. Initiation Logic 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12 4M kl.'_S Ni t h; m_

.o -

TABLE 3.3-3 (Contia ed) n .e -

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION YSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

=

m .

? 8 HININUM 5 TOTAL NO. CHANN LS CHANNELS APPLICABIE N ESFA SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TR P OPERABLE MODES AC1 ION w

d V. RECIRCULATION (RAS)

A. Senscr/ Trip Units '

Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low 4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14*

8. ESFA System Logic
1. Matrix Logic 6 1 3 1,2,3 17
2. Initiation Logic 4(c) 2(d) - 4 1,2,3,4 12 3* ""'I E 4fCI 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12 C. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 16 VI. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (SG-1)(EFAS-1)

A. Sensor / Trip Units

1. Steam Generator #1 Level - M umumm Low 4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14* 2
2. Steam Generator A N
  • Pressure - SG2 SG1 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 '

13*, 14*

y i

=::,

.. M

.- M m

W

a . .

.f 1 s ,

TABLE 3.3-3 (C:ntinued) g ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIDN SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

  • w .

E i' MI'NIMUM E TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE ESFA SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT 0 0F CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

[

$ VI. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (SG-1)(EFAS-1) (Continued) tj B. ESFA System Logic

1. Matrix Logic 6 1 3 1,2,3 17
2. Initiation Logic 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12
3. 4(c)

Manualh5 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 15 C. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 16 VII. EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (SG-2)(EFAS-2) y A. Sensor / Trip Units .

1. Steam Generator #2 Level -

{

2.

Low Steam Generator a 4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14*

Pressure - SG1 > SG2 4 2 3 1,2,3 13*, 14*

B. ESFA System Logic

1. Matrix Logic 6 1 3 1,2,3 17
2. Initiation Logic 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 12 3.

ManualkAS b 4(c) 2(d) 4 1,2,3,4 15 "T1 C. Automatic Actuation Logic 2 '1 2 1,2,3,4 16 VIII. LOSS OF POWER (LOV) p A. '(Loss of Voltage) See Applicant's SAR '. 7' F B. (Degraded Voltage) See Applicant's SAR IX. CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR ,, N CLEANUP See Applicant's SAR y y

==4

n  :.

+

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

EM.DNFT TABLE NOTATIONS (1)

InMODES3-4*,valuemaybedecreasedmanually,toaminimum4f100 psia, as pressurizer pressure is reduced, provided the margin betdeen the pres-surizer pressure and this value is maintained at less than or equal to 400 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as pressurizer Trip may be pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

s manually bypassed below 400 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed whenever pressurizer pressure is greater than or equal to 500 psia.

(2) % of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level narrow range instrument nozzles.

(3) 'isIn MODES 3-4, value may be decreased manually as steam generator pressure reduced, provided the margin between the steam generator pressure and this value is maintained at less than or equal to 200 psi; the setpoint shall be increased automatically as steam generator pressure is increased until the trip setpoint is reached.

(4) % of the distance between steam generator upper and lower level wide .

range instrument nozzles.

  • See Applicant's SAR. The values shall be consistent with CESSAR FSAR and the Applicant's setpoint methodology.
    • Balance of Plant (B0P) m.

F N Tlvs ap only h m,), 3 g' don +an~phes d Isol d ,w ( a ,,g ,

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 3-24 i _ _ _- _

TABLE 4.3-2  :

i 9

, 8; ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E '

8 CHANNEL MODES FOR WHICH 4 CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE 0; ESFA SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED I. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

Ut A. Sensor / Trip L' nits

1. Containment Pressure - High S R H 1,2,3,4
2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S R M 1,2,3,4 B. ESFA System Logic
1. Matrix Logic NA NA M 1,2,3,4 w 2. Initiation Logic NA NA M 1,2,3,4 s

[ 3. Manual SIAS NA NA M 1,2,3,4 C. Automatic Acttation Logic NA . NA M(1) (2) (3) 1, 2, 3, 4 II. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

A. Sensor / Trip Units  ; ,.

1. Containment Pressure - High S R H 1,2,3 g@

J-  %

m

2. Pressurizer Pressure - Low S R H 1,2,3g@

B. ESFA System Logic g

1. Matrix Logic NA NA M 1, 2, 3,'4" i P""
2. Initiation Logic NA NA M 1,2,3,4 @
3. Manual CIAS NA NA M 1,2,3,4 m

W

,e i .: - ; .

~

TABLE . 3-9.,

qh - n < -

l g REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRJJMENTATION .

MINIMUM

{ g READOUT CHANNELS o INSTRUMENT

1. Logarithmic Neutron Channel Remote Shutdown Panel 1
2. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature Remote Shutdown Panel 1/ loop
3. Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature Remote Shutdown Panel 1/ loop
4. Pressurizer Pressure Remote Shutdown Panel 1
5. Pressurizer Level Remote Shutdown Panel 1
6. Steam Generator Pressure Remote Shutdown Panel 1/ steam generator
7. Steam Generator Level Remote Shutdown Panel 1/ steam generator
8. Refueling Water Tank Level Remote Shutdown Panel 1
9. Charging Line Pressure Remote Shutdown Panel 1
10. Charging Line Flow Remote Shutdown Panel 1
11. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Temperatures Remote Shutdown Panel 1
12. Shutdown Cooling Flow Remote Shutdown Panel I w 13. Emergency Feedwater Flow Rate ,, Remote Shutdown Panel 1/ steam generator D

CONTROL CIRCUIT

  • SWITCH LOCATION *
1. Emergency Generator (BOP)
2. Emergency Generator Fuel Storage and Transfer System (BOP)
3. Emergency Power Distribution System (BOP)
4. Nuclear Service Water System (BOP)
5. Component Cooling Water System (BOP)
6. Emergency Feedwater System (BOP)
7. Reactor coolant pump trip pushbuttons 8.

9.

Backup heater groups 1 and 2 Atmospheric steam dump valve control switches M

10. Pressurizer auxiliary spray valves controls N 11.

12.

Letdown' isolation valves controls Reactor coolant pump seal bleed off valve controls

,.' M F

  • See Applicant's SAR.

g m

M ..

u ,

Il I

,i i

l-  ;  ! I .

TABLE 3.3-9fContjnued)

%O a'

g

,, REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRU. MENTATION [ . .

= 3 .

CONTROL CIRCUIT

  • i SWITCH-LOCATION
  • i E 13. MSIS actuation pushbuttons

[ 14. Low pressurizer pressure setpoint reset and

--e

  • bypass
15. LPSI pumps
16. SIT vent valves
17. SIT isolation valves
18. LPSI/CS pumps cross-connect values
19. Shutdown cooling heat exchanger intake and exit valves
20. LPSI pump mini-flow valves
21. LPSI pump suction valves
22. LPSI isolation valves y 23. Shutdown cooling heat exchanger spray bypass

.>. valves to 24. Shutdown cooling heat exchanger flow control O

valves

25. Shutdown cooling warm-up bypass valves
26. Shutdown cooling suction line valves; and
27. Shutdown heat exchanger bypass flow control valves.
  • . M

=

Et p

r= a

.- t::p

  • See applicant's SAR ,- TJ g

M M

O ' '

s i  ;- ; .

s , s TABLE 4.3-6 -

REMOTESHUTDOWNINSTRUME4TATION y SURVEILLANCE' REQUIREMENTS ',

5

? *

$ CHANNEL CHANNEL g, INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION

1. Logarithmic Neutron Channel M R
2. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature (2) M R
3. Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature (2) M R
4. Pressurizer Pressure M R
5. Pressurizer Level M R w 6. Steam Generator Pressure M

,, R 1

m 7. Steam Generator Level M R E

o 8. Refuelir.g Water Tank Level M R

9. Charging Line Pressure M R
10. Charging Line Flow M R
11. Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Temperatures M R
12. Shutdown Cooling Flow M Emergency Feedwater Flow Rate R
  • q

r,

,, 13. M R (BOP)

Q

.., . ;. - e%

r~

W lmc;:=

m

===f

r-TABLE 3.3-10 ACTION STATEMENTS M N 29 - With th6 number o( OPERABWChanDMTeis7tfhn the Required Number of Channels'in Table 3.3-10, either festore the Inoperabl(

Ch'annel(s) to OPERABCEsittatus withinydays, obbe -in HOT

^

'SliUTD0 N within the next'l hours _

ACTION 30 - With the no er of OPERABLE-Chan s one less than ,t e ~ imum Channels'0PER BtE s in Tabl6 3.3-10, either restor vthe Inop ble Cha,nfl(s) n to OPERA status within 4bhour f be in at le '

HOT SHUTDOWN within th 'next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

~ _-_

b A p e b c e d 's SMR

.e

.,eg .

as=

  • W 3

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 3-43

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AUXILIARY SPRAY Y j LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -

i 3.4.3.2 Both auxiliary spray valves shall be OPERABLE. --

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With only one of the above required auxiliary spray valves OPERABLE,

.,~

restore both valves to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. .

b. With none of the above required auxiliary spray valves OPERABLE, l restore at least one valve to OPERABLE status within the next I 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. .

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

-4. 4:-3'.'2.1 The auxiliary spray valve,s shall be verified to have power available

. to each valve every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4.4.3.2.2 The auxiliary spray valves shall be cycled at least once per 18 months.

e e W

,"a .

$f(l M h Q.ht F%

e,usw.

NRC Anoes%. m u Ri e igue 4

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 4-10

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System safety injection tank shall be Q)ERABLE with:

p. The isolation valve key-locked open and power to the valye removed,
b. A contained borated water level of between 28% (1802 cubic feet) and I

! 72% (1914 cubic feet)

c. A boron concentration between 4000 and 4400 ppm of boron, and
d. A nitrogen cover pressure of between 600 and 625 psig.
e. Nitrogen vent valves closed and power removed.**
f. Nitrogen vent valves are capable of being operated upon restoration of

, , , power. -

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3*t, and 4*t.

ACTION:

a. With one safety injection tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable ta to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDB ithin the next 6hoursorinHOTSHUTDOWkwithinthefollowing6 ours.
b. With one safety injection tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDB within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOW within

~

the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

,e SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~.~. 4.5.1 Each safety injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

~ 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen

[. cover pressure in the tanks is within the above limits, and tWith pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia. When pressur-izer pressure is less than 1750 psia, at least three safety injection tanks must be OPERABLE, each with a minimum pressure of 254 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig, and a contained borated water volume of between 0% narrow range (corresponding to 60% wide range indication or 1415 cubic feet) and 72%

narrow range indication (corresponding to 81% wide range indication or 1914 cubic feet). With all four safety injection tanks OPERABLE, each tank shall have a minimum pressure of 254 psig and a maximum pressure of 625 psig, and a contained borated water volume of between 0% narrow range (corresponding to 39%

wide range indication or 962 cubic feet) and 72% narrow rangs indication (corre-sponding to 81% wide range indication or 1914 cubic feet). In MODE 4 with pres-surizer pressure less than 430 psia, the safety injection tanks may be isolated.

  • See Special Test Exceptions 3.10.7.
    • Nitrogen vent valves may be cycled as necessary to maintain the required i nitrogen cover pressure per Specification 3.5.1d.

! 91t5 pre::urf::r pre:: r: 10:: th:2 1750 pris. -

l CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 5-1 '

l l _ . _ - - _ _ . -

EMERGENCY. CORE COOLING SYSTEMS $

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

1. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verNying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by. debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no

. evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

2. Verifying that a minimum total of **. (BOP)
e. At least once per 16 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a SIAS and RAS test signal.
2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
a. High Pressure Safety Injection pump.

b b. Low Pressure Safety Injection pump.

3. Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the

, containment sump isolation valves open, the HPSI, LPSI and CS pump minimum bypass recirculation flow line isolation valves

= .' ** and combined SI mini , flow valve close, and the LPSI pumps stop.

~

g f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the indicated differential pressure at or greater then their respective minimum allowable recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specifica-

. . tion 4.0.5:

3 , 1. High pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to

. 1761 ?Sii (See- Ap p bconh'r S/)R),

2. Low pressure safety injection pump greater than or equal to
    • (se Ay I. w g SAR).
    • See Applicant's SAR for means of controlling the pH in the containment sump after an LOCA. ,

e CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 5-5 -

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and'or / mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:
1. Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of each valve s roking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.
2. At least once per 18 months.

HPSI System LPSI System Hot Leo Infection Valve Number Valve Number Valve Number

. ~1; .SI-617, SI-616 1. SI-615, SI-306 fl. SI-604l -

2. .SI-627, SI-626 2. SI-625, SI-307 R ST-609 b-
3. SI-637, SI-636 3. SI-635 i'A SI-321
4. SI-647, SI-646 4. SI-645 24 SI-331
h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown following
i. ccmpletion cf modifications to the ECCS subsystems',that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:

HPSI System - Single Pump The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate,'is greater than'or equal to ** gpm. .

?' LPSI System - Single Pump

,- , 1. Injection Loop 1, total flow equal to ** gpm

2. Injection Legs IA and 1B whei tested individually, with 3 the other leg isolated, shall be within ** gpm of each other.

4 ~~ 3. Injection Loop 2, total flow equal to ** gpm

4. Injection Legs 2A and 2B when tested individually, with the other leg isolated, shall be within ** gpm of each other.

Siinultaneous Hot Leg and Cold Leg Injection - Single Pump l

1. Hot Leg, flow equal to ** gpm
2. Cold Leg, flow equal to ** gpm 1
    • See Applicant's SAR CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 5-6 -

l

PLANT SYSTEMS CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION ,

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE witti E level of at least ** feet (300,000 gallons).

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3,# and 4.*#

ACTION:

With the condensate storage tank inoperable, within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> either:

~

s. . a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY.

within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following-6 hours, or 9 XM b'. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the (alth e water source with a water volume of at least 300,000 gallon asabackupsu)pply.tothe

.J emergency feedwater pumps and restore the condensate storage tank to 0.nERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN with a OPERABLE shutdown cooling loop in operation within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS - 4.7.1.3.1 The condensate storage tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying the level (contained water volume) is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the emergency feedwater pumps.

[- 4.7.1.3.2 The (alternate water source)** shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> whenever it is the supply source for the emergency' feedwater pumps by verifying:

a. That the (alternate water source) supply line to the emergency feedwater system is open, and
b. That the (alternate water source) contains a water level of at least
    • feet (300,000 gallons).

"Until the steam generators are no longer required for heat res.oved.

  1. Not applicable when cooldown is in progress.
    • See Applicant's SAR.

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 7-5

SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS 3/4.10 7 SAFETY INJECTION TANK PRESSURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.10.7 The safety injection tank (SIT) pressure of Specification 3.5.1d. may be suspended for low temperature PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER; D
b. The SITS have been filled per Specification 3.5.lb. and pressurized to 175 to 225 psig below the RCS pressure but not less than 254 psig;

- ~" '

- c.

All valves in the injection lines from the SITS to the RCS are open -

and the SITS are capable of injecting into the RCS if there is a decrease in RCS pressure. .

APPLICABILITY: MODES 2,.3 and 4 i i ACTION:

If all the SITS do not meet the level and pressure requirements of Specification 3.10.7, restore all the SITS to meet these requirements or be in

. .HOT.

. . STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

j SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

  • 4.10.7 1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than 5% of RATED

_ THERMAL' POWER at least once per hour during low pressure PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.7.2 Every 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> verify:

a. All the SITS levels meet the requirements of Specification 3.5.lb.

b.

All the SITS pressures meet the requirements of Specificatio

c. The valve alignment from the SITS to the RCS has not changed.

O CESSAR80-NSSS-STS 3/4 10-8

~

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FINAL. DRAFT .

BASES SAFETY VALVES (Continued) .'

During operation, all pressurizer code safety vafves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia.

The combined relief capacity of thet,e valves is sufficient to limit the system

, pressure to within its Safety Limit of 2750 psia following a complete loss of turbine generator load while operating at RATED THERMAL POWER and assuming no reactor trip until the first Reactor Protective System trip setpoint (Pressurizer Pressure-High) is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct reactor trip on the loss of turbine) and also assuming no operation of the steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will rccur only during ihutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section-XI-of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

_ 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER An OPERABLE pressurizer provides pressure control for the Reactor Coolant System during operations with both forced reactor coolant flow and with natural circulation flow. The minimum water level in the pressurizer assures the pressurizer heaters, which are required to achieve and maintain pressure control, .

remain covered with water to prevent failure, which could occur if the heaters

.were. energized uncovered. The maximum water level in the pressurizer ensures T. hat this parameter is maintained within the envelope of operation assumed in

. the safety analysis. The maximum water level also ensures that'the RCS is not

-@ a hydraulically solid system and that a steam bubble will be provided to accommodate pressure surges during operation. The steam bubble also protects the pressurizer code safety valves against water relief. The requirement to verify that on an Engineered Safety Features Actuation test signal concurrent s.

with a loss-of-offsite power the pressurizer heaters are automatically shed from ths. emergency power cources is to ensure that the non-Class IE heaters do

. not reduce the reliability of or overload the emergency power source. The s '-

requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish and maintain natural circulation.

The auxiliary pressurizer spray is required to depressurize the RCS by cool- ,

ing the pressurizer steam space to permit the plant to enter shutdown cooling. l The auxiliary pressurizer spray is required during those periods when normal pressurizer spray is not available, such as during natural circulation and during the later stages of a normal RCS cooldown. The auxiliary pressurizer spray also distributes boron to the pressurizer when normal pressurizer spray is not avail-able. L'x ;f tt.; wilie., p. ;;.ri;;. .; pre,, is , y. . .d Jm. :,,3 ti. . - . .,

fr u ; :t; s ;=;reter t 2; spt r; ;.d :. ; cli 1;;; ef ceeler.t eccid;.t.

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS B 3/a 4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued) ,

s Materials." The heatup and cooldown limit curves Figure 3.4-2 includes pre-dicted adjustments for this shift in RT at the end of the applicable service period,aswellasadjustmentsforpossYbIeerrorsinthepressureand temperature sensing instruments. -

The actual shift in RT of j periodicallyduringoperatisRT,y,thev,,esselmate,rialwill,,beestablished

,,,, , ,n, ,,, ,,1,ng, ,cc,,,,,,, ,,13

  • ASTM E185-73 and Appendix H of 10 CFR 50, reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance s the core area.pecimens installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in Since the neutron spectra at the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are essentially identical, the measured trcnsition shift ,

' -for.a-sample can be applied with confidence to the adjacent section of the. .

reactor vessel. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the delta RT determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the

.calculatgTdelta RT NDT for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The reactor vsssel material irradiation surveillance specimens are removed and examined to determine changes in material properties. The results of these examinations shall be used to update

' Figure 3.4-2 based on the greater of the following:

' (1) tne actual. shift in reference for (Table B 3/4 4-1).as determined by

, impact testing, or (2) the predicted shift in reference temperature for the limiting weld

~~ and plate as determined by RG 1.99, " Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials."

The maximum RT for all Reactor Coolant System pressure-retaining materia 7s , "t' "e NQ

_T.rept'^r -' th rc::ter ;r;;;r; ;;;;;', has been deter-

~~

zined to be 40*F. The Lowest Service Temperature limit shown on Figure 3.4-2 s is based upon this RT since Article NB-2332 (Summer Addenda of 1972) of Section III of the AS$TBoiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires the Lowest Service Temperature to be RT 100*F for piping, pumps, and valves. Below thistemperature,thesystemhe+ssuremustbelimitedtoamaximumof20%of the system's hydrostatic test pressure of 3125 psia.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-3 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

l 1

CESSAR80-NSSS-STS B 3/4 4-7

. 1  ;,- .; .. ,r -

TAILLE 5.7-1 n # *

@ COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIEN~ LIMITS , [

m

? CYtlIC OR DESIGN CYCLE h, COMPONENT TRANSIENT LIMIT OR TRANSIENT u

h Reactor Coolant System 500 system heatup and cooldown Heatup cycle - Temperature from 5 70*F un to > 565*F;

~

cycles at rates i 100*F/hr. cooldown cycle - Temperature from 1 565*F to .<. 70*F.

500 pressurizer heatup and Heatup cycle - Pressurizer temperature cooldown cycles at rates from 1 70*F to 1 653*F; cooldown cycle -

-< 200*F/hr. Pressurizer temperature from 1 653*F to

! i 70*F.

10 hydrostatic testing **

cycles. RCS pressurized to 3125 psia with RCS temperature between 120 F ui . and 400 F.

m 480 reactor trip cycles, turbine Includes combinaticns of reactor trips trip cycles, and loss of reactor due to operator errors, equipment mal -

coolant flow. functions, and total loss of reactor coolant flow.

200 seismic stress cycles. Subjection to a seismic event equal to one-half the design basis earthquake (DBE).

I complete loss of secondary loss of secondary pressure from either steam pressure cycle. generator due to a complete double-ended

,/ break of a steam generator steam or feedwater f[d/M nozzle. o.

9 pjJ +Aaw 15,000 power change cycles Cycles from 15% to 100% full load, at a rate of 2 5% per minute, either increasing or decreasing.

(30,000 cycles total) g p===='

106 step changes of 100 psi and Pressure variations between the pressurizer 10 F (20 F for surge line) pressure setpoint for backup heater actuation D and spray valve opening. Temperature varia- [QS tions due to CEA controller; 2000 step change " ,y of 10% full power, arg w