LD-88-068, Forwards Response to Request for Addl Info Re CESSAR-DC Chapters 1 & 5 Re Sabotage Protection,Per

Forwards Response to Request for Addl Info Re CESSAR-DC Chapters 1 & 5 Re Sabotage Protection,Per

ML20151Q066
Person / Time
Site:	05000470
Issue date:	08/01/1988
From:	Scherer A ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
To:	Vissing G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LD-88-068, LD-88-68, NUDOCS 8808100308
Download: ML20151Q066 (8)

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l COMBUSTION ENGINEERING August 1,1988 LD-88-068 )

I Docket No. STN 50 470-F (Project No. 675)

Mr. Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Response to Request for Additional Information Concerning CESSAR-DC Chapters 1 and 5, Reactcr Safeguards Branch.

Reference:

(A) Letter, G. S. Vissing (NRC) to A. E. Scherer (C-E),

dated June 1,1988.

(B) Letter, LD-88-026, A. E. Scherer (C-E) to F. J. Miraglia (NRC), dated April 11, 1988.

Dear Mr. Vlasing:

Reference (A) requested that Combustion Engineering provide additional information concerning Sabotage Protection as described in CESSAR-DC, Chapters 1 and 5. Enclosure (1) to this letter provides our responses, and Enclosure (2) provides the corresponding revisions to our submittal of Reference (B).

Should you have any questions, please feel free to contact me or Dr. M. D. Green of my staff at (203) 285-5204.

Very truly yours, COMBUSTlON ENGINEERING, INC.

i gRO8100308 880801 '

A ADOCK 05000470 PNU

-A.- Ei cherer l Director Nuclear Licensing AES:ss

Enclosures:

As Stated %O I cc: '

Mr. Frank Ross (DOE-Germantown)

Power Systems 1000 Prospect H:ll Road (203) 688 1911 Combustion Ergneenng, Inc. Post Offce Box 500 Telex: 99297 Windsor, Connectcut 06095-0500 1

', Enclosure (1) to LD-88-068 P ge 1 of 4 RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING CESSAR-DC CHAPTERS 1 AND 5 i

, Enclosure (1) to LD-88-068

. Pago 2 of 4 Question 500.4 Section 1.1.3.1 Interface Definitions: At many current generation PWRs, protection of essential service water systems and AC power supplies are u the most demanding security system requirements. In order to facilitate the reviews of licenses applied for under the Commission's Standardization Policy, it could be important that sabotage protection interface requirements, as appropriate for the inherent sabotage i resistance features being planned for the CESSAR-DC advanced standard design, be established for these site specific systems. Similarly, site specific requirements for security systems _uninterruptable power and

' lighting, in-plant communications, vital area barriers, etc. might be more efficiently incorporated and avoid impacts on CESSAR design scope safety systems if considered in the standard plant design stage rather than merely as "add-ons" later on. Although it is recognized that C-E understands and intends to incorporate these needs as their design submittals progress, the interface definition could be revised to more explicitly note that. For example, the definition could be reworded to state:

"An interface is a requirement that the site specific design have a certain standardized configuration necessary for assuring that a CESSAR design scope system will fulfill its safety functions, considering nocmal operating environments and also floods, sabotage attempts, etc."

Response 500.4 Standardized Functional Descriptions (SFDs) for auxiliary and support systems will be presented in CESSAR-DC. These SFDs will include requirements for sabotage protection of site-specific support systems, as well as requirements for the plant security system. Also, these SFDs will reflect consideration of those EPRI ALWR Requirements Document chapters which are being developed to address sabotage protection and plant security.

The definition of an interface provided in CESSAR-DC, Section 1.1.3.1, will be revised e ansistent with the above question, to state that normal operation, plant transients, external events, and potential sabotage will be considered in the interfaces for site-specific systems to assure i l

that plant systems will perform their safety functions. i 1 -_ _ - - - . - - -. - . - -. --.- .

Enclosure (1) to LD-88-068 Pigs 3 of 4 Question 500.5_

Section 1.1.3.4 Severe Acciden; Policy: In addition to the four major points of the Severe Accident Policy addressed by this section, the Severe Accident Policy includes the following statement that should be added to this section:

"The Commission also recognizes the importance of such potential contributors to severe accident risk as human performance and sabotage. The issues of both insider and outsider sabotage threats will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be emphasized in the design and in the operating procedures developed for new plants."

Response 500.5 CESSAR-DC, Section 1.1.3.4, will be revised consistent with the above question.

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Enclo ure (1) to LD-88-068 P ge 4 of 4 Question 500.6 Section 5.1.4 Nuclear Steam Supply System - Balance of Plant Interface Requirements. E. Separation: If physical separation is intended to be used to enhance the inherent sabotage resistance of the design, specific criteria should be included for the barriers and distance to be used for this purpose.

Response 500.6 Physical separation will be used to enhance the inherent sabotage resistance of the System 80+DStandard Design. For example, the principle of physical separation has been used in the design of the shield building, which surrounds the spherical steel containment structure. The controlled-access annulus and subsphere region are  ;

protected from the outside by three-foot thick concrete walls and are bounded by the containment pressure boundary on the inside. This design provides a sabotage resistant arrangement. The bunkered subsphere region is divided into separate sections which house the different trains of safety systems such as the Shutdown Cooling System, the Safety Injection System, and the Emergency Feedwater System. As a result of this design, a sabotage attempt would be thwarted by not only the I controlled-access status of the shield building, but also by the physical separation of safety system trains in the bunkered subsphere region. l l

l For protection of site-specific systems, criteria will be included in the Standardized Functional Descriptions for those systems to ensure that I adequate sabotage protection is assured. The specific criteria to be applied will be identified as part of our sabotage protection program, which will include criteria from the EPRI ALWR Requirements Document.

It is anticipated that the majority of such criteria will be presented in Chapters 9 and 13 of CESSAR-DC after those criteria are defined. l Revision of these chapters is planned for CESSAR-DC Submittal Group E, I which will be submitted to the NRC Staff in December 1988, i

Enclosure (2) to LD-88-068

. P ge 1 of 3 PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TIIE COMBUSTION ENGINEERING STANDARD SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT

Enclosure (2)

CESSARnuh m S M **; j*

(

The design pressure of the System 80+ Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) has been increased to provide greater operational flexibility and alleviate concerns regarding overpressurization. A A dedicated Safety Depressurization System has been added to System 80+.

No longer performing any accident mitigation or safe shutdown lB functions, the System 80+ chemical and Volume Control System has been reclassified as a non-safety grade system, providing a much A simpler design. The new CVCS design also fc,d.ur ' s two-stage ,

letdown and centrifugal charging pumps. The Oxiden mitigation B and safe shutdown functions are now perforted by the Safety Depressurization and Safety Injection Systems.

The service life for System 80+ will be sixty # W years. A 1.1.2 POWER LEVELS The System 80+ Standard Design, described herein, includes a reactor core designed to operate at a maximum core power levol of 3800 MWt. While the System 80+ design is independent of power B level, the maximum core power level licensable in the United

(' Statps was selected for the analysis described herein to provide

(- limiting design and safety analysis parameters.

powir level, the total thermal output is 3817 MWt.

For this core I

1.1.3 INTERFACES The requirements for the site specific design, known as interfaces, are provided in terms of Standardized Functional B Descriptions. These present functional design requirements in sufficient detail to asuure that the CESSAR design scope systems, A as listed in Table 1.2-1, will fulfill their safety functions as detailed in the system descriptions. A matrix of sections in 'B CESSAR which provide the functional design requirements and  !

descriptions of the interface systems designates e performing a A

safety function is provided in Table 1.2-2.

1 1.1.3.1 Interface le_f_ipitions i

1 A CESSAR interface is a requirement that the s. -specific design have a certain standardized configuration necebsary' for assuring A that a 4;E8F?.R h ig r. ng system will fulfill its safety functions Requirements that are part of Technical Specificai. ions are not separately identified as interface requirements.

co n.5 /de-rine[ MCrN! Ofu lo S p b krMUen Sj uh m\aL+s, & pkeshA sA>h p. J Amendment B 1.1-3 March 31, 1988

- * Enclosure (2)

To L D - 8 8 -068

• g {@C@C M A ER D DESIGN CERTIFICATl3N Page 3 of 3

d. Completion of a staff review of the design with a conclusion B of safety acceptability using an approach that stresses deterministic engineering analysis and judgement complemented by PRA.

CESSAR-DC will address the Severe Accident Policy and the unresolved generic issues. The resolution of these issues will be summarized in Appendix A and they will take into full consideration the acceptance criteria from EPRI ALw" and DOE ARSAP Topic Papers. A Level III PRA will be performed. Thie PRA will be described in Appendix B. Degraded core pnalyses will be included in the PRA. TesM f 'fAe fresedel in CGSSAA-o c, a sNel .s Shah,Y Md ebat./3 will 9<-de c-Ts'm P~0 ram h<.

1.1.4 CESSAR ORGANIZATION CESSAR is organized to respond to Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 2, "Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants", since CESSAR-F was originally prepared in A accordance with Rev. 2. In preparing future amendments, however, additional information will be provided as appropriate.

1.1.5 SITE RELATED INFORMATION Site related information is provided to the maximum extent .

practicable. This site related information, where it affects

> System 80+ design and safety analyses, is assumed as a series of envelopes for certain site-related parameters (see Chapter 2.0) which will encompass most of the current nuclear power plant locations in the continental United States.

or details related to a specific and/or rnmber of sites is Non-NPM information l8 deferred to the site specific safety analysis report, unless A otherwise noted in CESSAR.

1.1.6 PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION SYMBOLS Figure 1.1-1 and Table 1.1-1 provide a summary of the standard symbols used for the engineering flow, piping and instrumentation 1 diagrams, and valve lists presented in CESSAR. Table 1.1-2 provides a cross reference list between CESSAR figure numbers and C-E piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) numbers. System V 80+ P& ids will be revised and submitted with the appropriate A chapter revisions.

An AN* %)e. Seve.re kcc.'clek 0 NCy $ eS :

"The Commission also recognizes the importance of such potential contributors to severe accident risk as human performance and sabotage. The issues of both insider and outsider sabotage threats ,

will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be emphasizedVin lhe design and in the operating procedures developed for new plahts." Mets spee.1 andem%Q

_' ..~odment B

-- egg- _

1.1-8 March 31, 1988