ML20195J103

Appeal Brief of Lilco on Contentions Ex 15 & 16.* Requests Reconsideration of 871207 Partial Initial Decision LBP-87-32 Holding That FEMA 860213 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise Not Sufficient for Full Power OL

ML20195J103
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	01/19/1988
From:	Irwin D HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#188-5381 OL-5, NUDOCS 8801210166
Download: ML20195J103 (266)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Lleensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercisc)

(Shorcham Nuclear Power Station, ) '

Unit 1) )

APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND LIGilTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 Donald P. Irwin Lcc B. Zeugin liunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 January 19,1988 O

8801210166 880119 Hb PDR ADOCK 05000' . E

E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of ) i

)

LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Excrcise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 Donald P. Irwin .

Lee D. Zeugin i3 IIunton & Williams ..

707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 January 19,1988 h

l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 TABLE OF CONTENTS P_agg 1

I N T R O D U C TIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

S TA T E M E N T O F F A C TS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 The Exercise ...............................................7 Contentions EX 15/16 ........................................ 13 The Litigation of Contentions EX 15/16 ........................... 16 ARGUMENT....................................................22 I. The Licensing Board Erred in Admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16 f o r Li tiga t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 II. The Board Erred When it Adopted a "Reasonably Achievable" Test Test for Judging the Sufficiency of the Scope of the Shoreham Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A. The Licensing Board Erred in Focusing Only on Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 in Defining the Legal Standard for Resolving Contentions EX 15 and 16 .........................28 B. The Board's Interpretation of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 Reads Substantive Material Out of that Pmvision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

11 Page C. The Licensing Board Erred in Concluding that the 1984 Rulemaking Erected Special, Additional Requirements for Initial Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............33 D. The Licensing Board Erred in Refusing to ConsiC *he Regulatory History of Appendix E 1 IV.F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 E. The Board Erred in Dismissing Regulatory Guidance Issued by FEMA and NRC on the Scope and Conduct of Exercises

...... .............................................38 III. The PID's Conclusion that the 1986 Exercise was Inadequate as a Full Partic!pation Exercise For Licensing Fails to Give Due Deference to il gency Experts' Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 IV. Assuming the Licensing Board Was Correct in Its Interpretation of 10 CFR Paii 30 Appendix E, the Board Incorrectly Conclud-ed That the Four Items Should Have Been Included in the Exer-che.....................................................44 A. EBS Station Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 B. School Participa tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 C. Inges t io n P a t hw a y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............48 D. S pecial Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 CONCLUSION ..................................................52

ill TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Page Campesinos Unidos v. United States Department of Labor,803 F.2d 32 10 6 3 ( 9 t h C ir. 19 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cuomo v. LILCO,127 ' T'. 2d 626,511 N.Y. S.2d 867 (2d Dep't 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 GUARD v. NRC,753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.1985) ....................... 20,27 In re Timbers of Inwood Forest,793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir.1986) ................32 Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suf folk,628 F.Supp. 654

( E . D . N .Y . 19 8 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,2,8 Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. United States,648 F.Supp.

37 1017 ( D . C . Md. 19 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

McCuin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,817 F.2d 161 (1st 32 C ir. 19 8 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Shepherd 011. Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 734-23,29-30 (Em. App.

1984) ....................................................32 Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC,735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984)

............................................ 1,2,3,14,23,28,29,34 United States v. New Castle County,642 F.Supp.1258 (D.C. Del.1986)

........................................................37 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Decisions Long Island Lighting Co. tShoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-87-32,26 NRC L '7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p assi m Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

A LA B-8 61, 25 N R C 129 (198 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,6,16,2 6,4 2 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LB P-8 6-3 8 A , 2 4 N R C 819 ( 12 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,15,24,44 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CL1-86-11,23 N RC 577 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3,14,15,16,2 3,2 4,25,2 8,3 0,33.3 4 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

CLl-86-13,24 NRC 22 (1986) ...................................29 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Staiton, Unit 1),

Prehearing Conferenco Order (unpublished)(October 3,1986) ...........15

iv PELe Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station.

U nit 3), A LAB-732,17 N RC 1076 (198 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Regulations 25,26 10 C F R S 2.7 5 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 10 C F R S 2.7 62(d)( 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10 C F R S 5 0. 4 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passi m 10 CFR Part 5 0, A ppendix E 1 IV.F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) ...........................................2,30 10,11 44 C.F.R. Part 350 .............................................

5 2 Fed. Reg. 4 2,078 (November 3,19 8 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,29 52 Fed. Reg.16,823 (May 6,1987) .....................................2 50 Fed. Reg.19,323 (May 8,1985) ................................. 24,29 49 Fed. Reg. 27,733 (July 6,1984) ............................... 12,35,36 4 8 Fed. R eg. 3 3,3 0 7 (July 21, 19 8 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35,36 4 7 Fed. Reg. 3 0,2 32 (July 13, 19 8 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 47 Fed. Reg. 29,251. (July 6,1982) ....................................32 46 Fed. Reg. 61,132 (December 15, 1981) ...............................34 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402-12 ( August 19, 1980) ............................ 33,36 Other Authorities

]

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Of fsite Radiological Emergen-cy Response Plan and Implementing Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Memorandum of Understanding Between Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission,50 Fed. Reg.

15,4 8 5 ( A pril 18,1985) . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,8,9,25,41

v Page NURCG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November,1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,19,22,27,41 NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1 (November, 1987); 52 Fed.

Reg. 45,866 (December 2,1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 , 1 1, 12 FEM A Guidance Memorandum PR-1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,18 FEM A Guidance Memorandum EX-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

LILCO, January 19,1988 INTRODUCTION In 1980 the Commission, in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency, revised its regulations to require that offsite emergency preparedness or-ganizations conduct exercises, supervised by FEMA, to demonstrate their preparedness prior to issuance of full power licenses for nuclear power plants. Since that time, liter-ally hundreds of offsite exercises have been supervised and graded by FEMA, and nu-merous plants have been issued operating licenses based on those exercises.

Pursuant to a 1984 decision of the Court of Appeals,I the Commission revised its regulations to permit litigation of the results of exercises in its licensing dockets.

Such litigation was to be limited to the question of whether the exercise demonstrated any "fundamental flaws" in an offsite emergency plan, and was to be expedited. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577, 581 (1986).2/ -

On February 13,1986 an exercise, designed and intended by LILCO and FEMA to be sufficient to satisfy the Commission's licensing requirements for nuclear plants, was

, held on Long Island for the Shoreham plant. The State of New York refused to take any part in the exercise. The only participation by Suffolk County was an attempt to block the exercise by enactment of an unconstitutional criminal ordinance, enjoined by a fed-I eral court some 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> before the exercise. Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of i Suffolk, 628 F. Supp. 654 (E.D.N.Y.1986). The Shoreham exercise has been in sup-posedly expedited litigation virtually continuously ever since.

1/ Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert, denied 469 U.S.1132 (1985).

2/ Even so, the dissent in UCS clearly and prophetically pointed out the possibilities for delay inherent in such litigation. UCS,735 F.2d at 1454-56 (MacKinnon, J., dissent-ing).

l At the time of the 1986 exercise, the Commission requirements (which predated the UCS decision) mandated that a prelicensing exercise be held no more than 12 months before issuance of an initial license to exceed 5% power. During the ongoing Shoreham litigation the licensing window was extended to 24 months.E This appeal, now some 23 months af ter the 1986 exercise, involves the design scope of the exercise.

The Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision on LILCO's performance in the exercise still has not been issued.

The Partial Initial pecision which forms the basis of this appeal, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-32, 26 NRC (De-cember 7,1987) (hereinaf ter "P!D"), holds that a FEMA-supervised offsite emergency preparedness exercise for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, conducted some 22 months previously on February 13,1986, had not been sufficient in scope to serve as the basis for issuance of a full power operating license to the plant. That PID, involving two contentions filed by Intervenors Suffolk County and New York State and labeled EX 15 and 16, involved solely the issue whether the February 1986 exercise had tested cnough of the Shoreham offsite emergency plan to satisfy the Commission's pertinent regulations,10 CFR SS 50.47(a) and (b)(14) and portions of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1IV.F.1.M The issue of the adequacy of the scope of an emergency planning exercise 3/ 52 Fed. Reg.16,823 (May 6,1987).

y The possibility that the scope of the exercise could even present litigable issues arises solely out of the f act that New York State and Suffolk County, the units of gov-crnment which normally would be responsible for offsite emergency preparedness around the Shoreham plant, have refused to undertake such planning. They persist in that refusal even though its asserted basis - the "impossibility" of adequate emergency planning for Shoreham - has been consistently rejected by this agency's tribunals af ter long factual deliberation. Not being able to change the facts, these units of govern-ment have instead attempted to use their powers under state law to disable LILCO from fulfilling the functions on which they have defaulted. S_ee, gg,, Lone Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, supra. At least three of the four respects in which the PID found the scope of the February 1986 exercise deficient - EBS activation, public school (footnote continued)

has never before been litigated in an NRC proceeding, to the best of LILCO's knowl-edge.

The PID at issue does not treat at all the adequacy of the performance of the more than 1100 emergency workers who participated in the 1986 exercise. While it re-jected literally dozens of criticisms by Intervenors of the exercise's scope, it neverthe- (

less agreed with them on four points - extent of activation of EBS system, degree of participation by public school districts, performance of ingestion pathway activities, and degree of testing of special facility, ambulance and ambulette personnel and man-agers.

Because the Licensing Board committed reversible error with respect to those is-sces, LILCO has taken this appeal. The bases of error, which are numerous, are sum-marized below:

At the outset, the contentions currently under appeal should nevar have been ad-mitted for litigation by the Licensing Board, for two reasons. They do not focus on the approved ambit of post-exercise litigation - the performance of an emergency organization in response to an emergency real or simulated - but rather on the design of an exercise. As a result they do not focus on the only issue admissible for potential litigation under the UCS case or the Commission's subsequent guidance in this case, CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986): whether an exercise demonstrates any fundamental flaws in an emergency plan. Even assuming that the f airness or adequacy of a FEMA-supervised exercise as a test of an emergency plan is a legitimate matter for inquiry, (footnote continued) participation and ingestion pathway - spring directly from the spoiler actions of state and local governments. The Licensing Board, correctly, largely discounted these ef forts by the state and local governmental units, and this brief is premised not on the nature of the actions of New York State and Suffolk County but on errors in the Licensing Board's standards of decision and their application to the f acts of the exercise.

4 the contentions never allege that the Shoreham exercise was framed in any but the usual manner, or otherwise impugn the integrity of the exercise planning process. Thus rather than questioning a plant-specific exercise, they inherently impeach an entire regulatory methodology W Even assuming the contentions were properly admitted, the PID erred in several fundamental ways.

First, it neglects the fundamental principle that the scope of emergency pre-paredness exercises is testing of "major observable portions" of emergency plans, and substitutes for it merely the question of whether the exercise included literally every-thing "reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" by ex post-f acto standards. In doing so, the PID is forced to dismiss, either as incorrect or as "merely guidance," a substantial and well established body of NRC-FE51A technical literature that defines a body of objectives which correspond to observable portions of emergency plans and provides for their testing over a six year cycle.

Second, the PiD f ails to assess the materiality of any of the matters it believes should have been included in the 1986 exercise. As a result, the PID contains no analy-sis of whether any or all of the four omitted matters would, if exercised unsatisfactorily, have even demonstrated a "fundamental flaw" in the Shoreham emer-gency plan. Since the sole purpose for which litigation - supposedly expedited - was permitted by the Court of Appeals was to detect the existence of such major plan 5/ This Appeal Board refused, almost a year ago, an interlocutory request by FE51A to reject Contentions EX 15 and 16 prior to their litigation; but it never reached the merits of the arguments for their exclusic.1 and concluded only that FE51A, the appel-lant, had not met the standards for interlocutory review. ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129 (1987). Judge Edles' separate opinion, which contained the only expression of views on the merits of this issue, expressed sympathy with the dilemma of an applicant stuck with performing in an exercise designed by FESTA which is determined by hindsight to have been inadequate in scope. Id. at 143 n.9. He would not, however, have automat-

- ically barred all challenges to the scope of an exercise.

defects, the PID's f ailure to engage this analysis is fatal to its reasoning and results.

Rellance merely on an "as much as reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" standard also produces an inherently retroactive and unworkable test which is of little guidance to planners, regulators or regulatecs.

Third, the PID's conclusion that the 1986 Shoreham exercise lacked sufficient scope to qualify as an initial licensing exercise is premised on the incorrect legal con-clusion that initial "full participation" exercises are intended under NRC regulations to be more comprehensive than subsequent ones. There is simply no basis to support this conclusion, and ample evidence to reject it both in the regulations, their regulatory his-tory and supporting guidance, and in seven years of joint NRC-FEMA practice involving literally hundreds of exercises.EI Fourth, the PID pays at best selective deference to agency expertise, and in par-ticular the deference due to FEMA witnesses functioning under the NRC-FEMA Memo-randum of Understanding. The PID acknowledges the forthrightness and expertise of agency, and in particular FEMA, witnesses, and acknowledges their testimony (sup-ported also by NRC witnesses) that the Shoreham exercise was designed in accordance with usual practices, that it was intended to be a full participation exercise, and that it was at least as cumprehensive as any conducted previously in the pertinent FEMA re-gion, Region II. Nevertheless, the PID simply gives that testimony no effect in concluding that the Shoreham exercise was insufficient as an initial licensing exercise.

The Board's failure to give effect to this testimony without proper explanation is both contrary to the record and inconsistent with the intended functioning of the s/ Indeed, the PID uses an exclusive reliance on an "as much as reasonably achievable" test in an attempt to finesse entirely - but improperly - the question of what constitutes a "full participation exercise," despite the f act that term is central to the pertinent regulations and was a major issue among the parties which the Board never hinted was not of interest to it. See PID at 20-21.

i FEMA-NRC emergency planning relationship.2!

Finally, as to each of the four areas in which the PID finds the exercise's design to have been insufficient, that finding is incorrect on the facts in the record.

All but the last of these major areas involve questions of law, pure and simple.

If the P!D was incorrect on all or any of them, it should be simply reversed as to its conclusion that the February 1986 exercise was insufficient in design. Even if the Ap-peal Board finds that the PID's conclusions are incorrect only as applied to the facts of the exercise, it should decide the case without remanding it for further factual pro-ceedings. There were few areas of factual dispute on Contentions EX 15 and 16, and the respects in which the PID disregarded the record can be corrected without further evidentiary proceedings below.

Finally, there remains need for expedition in resolution of this appeal. The Shoreham exercise was conducted over 23 months ago. Commission regulations require that, in the absence of a waiver or exemption, an exercise for the first license to ex-ceed 5% of rated power for a given site be held not more than 24 months before the 3

date of issuance of that license.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1. Becauce of f ac-tors beyond LILCO's control,it appears likely that more than the 24 months nominally permitted will elapse before an agency decision will be produced on the 1986 exercise.

As a result LILCO may be forced to hold another exercise before it can obtain a full power license.E Yet until a decision has been rendered on the principles governing the J/ In this regard, this brief does not comment directly on the PID's effects on that relationship, since those can better be spoken to by the agencies themselves. LILCO addresses this matter simply as a regulatee attempting to function within existing structures which can apparently be confounded af ter the fact. g. ALAB-861,25 NRC at 143 n.9 (separate opinion ci Judge Edles).

8/ On December 23, the Appeal Board rejected LILCO's December 17 request for expedited review or certification of the Licensing Board's PID. One apparently major reason for that refusal was the Appeal Board's perception that even if the relief re-(footnote continued)

_7 design scope of the exercise, LILCO and agency planners cannot know even what will be necessary to ensure its having a chance of passing muster. LILCO, by letter dated December 18, 1987 requesting another exercise, has already undertaken to get the ex-ercise planning process (normally 90-120 days long) underway. However, a decision f rom this Appeal Board is essential to enabling whatever planning process is required to proceed in an informed f ashion.EI STATEMENT OF FACTS The Exercise On February 13, 1986, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) held what was contemplated as the final step in the NRC-required process for review and approval of the offsite radiological emergency response plan for Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station: a "full participation" exercise of the Shoreham offsite plan, supervised and graded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Shoreham exercise, like the basic offsite emergency plan on which it was premised, differed structurally from other exercises in only one respect: State and local governments (New York State and Suffolk County) did not participate in it. In-deed, as with emergency planning for Shoreham, they strenuously opposed it.N (footnote continued) quested by LILCO were granted, there were still substantial obstacles in the way of achieving a full power license by February 13, 1988. However, as is illustrated by this brief, solution to given problems of ten depends on prior solution to others, and thus ex-pedition in disposition of pacing problems is important.

2/ This brief is limited to the questions presented f acially by the PID. Significant policy questions are presented, however, by two of its other aspects: first, that a sup-posedly expedited agency process has not yet produced, nearly two years later, any de-cision on the merits of a 10-hour exercise, meanwhile forcing the applicant to contem-plate another exercise; and second, that the one issue on which a decision has been rendered penalizes the applicant retroactively for a matter over which it had absolute-ly no control.

10/ Suffolk County went so f ar as to enact a criminal ordinance about 75 days before the exercise which would have made it a crime punishable by up to a year in Suffolk (f ootnote continued)

LILCO's efforts to conduct the required exercise of the Shoreham plan began in November 1984 when it asked the NRC to request FEMA to schedule a full participation exercise of the Shoreham plan.N On June 4,1985, the Commission responded to (footnote continued)

County jail and a fine of up to $1000 to participate in the exercise (or potentially even in drills leading up to the exercise). This chilling ordinance, which was in effect during the final exercise preparation period, was enjoined as unconstitutional by a federal court on the evening of February 10 just 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> before the start of the exercise.

Long Island Lighting Co. v. County of Suffolk, 628 F.Supp. 654,659 (E.D.N.Y.1986).

11/ Under a Memorandum of Understanding between FEMA and the NRC, the most recent version of which was publisned in the Federal Register on April 18,1985, 50 Fed.

Reg.15,485 (1985), the responsibilities for assessing offsite emergency preparedness for nuclear reactors have been established. The agencies' general responsibilitics include the following:

FEMA coordinates all Federal planning for the offsite im-pact of radiological emergencies and takes the lead for as-sessing offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness, makes findings and determinations as to the adequacy and capability of implementing offsite plans, and communicates those findings and determinations to the NRC. The NRC reviews those FEMA findings and determi-nations in conjunction with the NRC onsite findings for the purpose of making determinations on the overall state of emergency preparedness. These overall findings ano deter-minations are used by NRC to make radiological health and safety decisions in the issuance of licenses and the continued operation of licensed plants to include taking enforcement actions as notices of violation, civil penalties, orders, or shutdown of operating reactors.

Ld. at 15,486 col.1 (footnote omitted). With regard to exercises of offsite emergency response plans, the Memorandum states:

FEMA and NRC will cooperate in determining exercise re-quirements for licensees, State and local governments. They will also jointly observe and evaluate exercises. NRC and FEMA willinstitute procedures to enhance the review of the objectives and scenarios for joint exercises. This review is to assure that both the onsite considerations of NRC and the offsite considerations of FEMA are adequately addressed and integrated in a man.ier that will provide for a technically sound exercise upon which an assessment of preparedness capabilities can be based.

(footnote continued)

LILCO's request, instructing William Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to re-quest "that FEMA schedule as full an exercise of the LILCO plan as is feasible and law-ful at the present time." Memorandum from Samuel J. Chilk to William J. Dircks, Scheduling of Emergency Plan Exercise for Shoreham (June 4,1985). In giving these in-structions, the Commission speculated that a recent decision by a New York State (

court $ might prevent the conducting of a "full exercise" of the Shoreham plan but that, even so, an exercise would nevertheless yield meaningful results. Id. The NRC Staff forwarded the request for "as full an exercise . . . as is feasible" to FEMA on 5

June 20,1985. Memorandum from Edward L. Jordan to Richard Krimm, Scheduling of Emergency Plan Exercise for Shoreham (June 20,1985). In that memorandum, the Staff stated:

In determining those portions of the LERO plan that might be appropriate for inclusion in an exercise at this time, we suggest that FEMA emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of emergency preparedness related to the demonstra-tion of the response capabilitles within the plume exposure (10 mile) Emergency Planning Zone.

Id.El (footnote continued)

Id. at 15,487 col. 3.

To carry out its responsibilities under the Memorandum of Understanding, FEM A has developed a series of Guidance Memoranda that provide uniform criteria for re-viewing emergency plans and evaluating their implementability during exercises.

Draf t versions of Guidance Memoranda are typically provided to the NRC Staff for its review and NRC comments are incorporated into the final Guidance Memoranda.

, 1_2/

In Cuomo v. LILCO (Consol. Index 84-4615), the New York Supreme Court held that "implementation" of the Shoreham Plan by its Local Emergency Response Organi-zation (LERO), see infra note 8, would involve an unlawful exercise by LILCO of New York State police powers. That decision was affirmed by the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division on February 9,1987,127 A.D. 2d 626, 511 N.Y S. 2d 867 (2d Dep't 1987), and has been appealed by LILCO to the New York Court of Appeals. Briefing was completed on October 13,1987 and oral argument was held on January 5,1988.

M/ While the NRC Staff offered no explanation for this instruction,it is conceivable that it was prompted by the Staff's knowledge that the State of Connecticut, a govern-(footnote continued)

FEMA replied to the Staff's request by noting that the refusal of New York State and Suffolk County officials to participate in the exercise would place "special parameters" on the exercise and would prevent FEMA itself from reaching a reasonable assurance finding.M/ Letter, Samuel W. Speck to William J. Dircks (Oct. 29,1985). But FEMA added that its stated inability to reach a reasonable assurance finding does not preclude the conduct of an exercise that would pro-vide an indication to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as to utility onsite and of fsite emergency capabilities.

We believe such a report would have value in decisions to continue the licensing process or possibly provide a basis on whlah the NRC could make predictive findings.

Ld. (emphasis supplied). FEMA then offered the NRC Staff two basic options for the ex-ercise. The first option would have excluded from the exercise all functions and exer-cise objectives related to issues of legal authority and State and local participation. Ld.

The second option offered to exercise "all functions and normal exercise objectives" (footnote continued) mental entity willing to participate in the Shoreham exercise, had participated in a full participation ingestion pathway exercise for the Haddam Neck station in May 1984 and was soon to have a full-participation ingestion pathway exercise for the Millstone Point station in Novemt'er 1986. The Millstone Point ingestion pathway EPZ overlaps that of Shoreham.

M/ FEMA's statement that it could not reach a reasonable assurance finding on the Shoreham exercise stems from the f act that FEMA's emergency planning regulations for nuclear power plant emergencies 44 CFR Part 350, contemplated the submittal of emergency plans by State and local governments, but not by utilities where State and local governments refuse to participate in emergency planning and preparedness. The legal significance of FEMA's decision not to make a reasonable assurance finding was the subject of Contention EX 19, on which the Licensing Board has yet to issue a deci-slon and which, accordingly, is nnt before this Board. Since the hearing on the Shoreham exercise, the NRC has amended its emergency regulations,10 CFR S 50.47 and Appendix E, to recognize the f act that states and localities occasionally refuse to submit offsite plans, and specifically accounting for their non participation in offsite exercises. 52 Fed. Reg. 42,078, 42,086 (amendment to 10 CFR Eart 50 Appendix E)

(November 3,1987). In addition, the NRC Staff and FEMA have jointly developed criteria for evaluation of utility-prepared offsite emergency plans, and have promul-gated them for interim use and comment by February 29, 1988. NI] REG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1 Supp.1 (Nov.1987); 52 Fed. Reg. 45,866 (December 2,1987).

with exercise controllers simulating the roles of key State and local officials. M. The Staff, without elaboration, tr' formed FEMA that it should conduct an exercise pursuant to the second option. Letter, William J. Dircks to Samuel W. Speck (Nov. 12, 1985).

FEMA's actions following receipt of the NRC Staff's response were described in the uncontroverted testimony of the FEMA witnesses:

FEMA made every attempt to ensure that preparation for and evaluation of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham was consistent with the i parameters and process established for other full-scale Ra-diological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercises evalu-ated by FEMA Region II. The Region designed the exercise objectives to ensure that the exercise would be of sufficient scope for FEMA to evaluate the following:

• All functions - i.e., FEMA would be able to evaluate LILCO's and LERO's integrated capability to ade-quately assess and respond to an accident at Shore-ham.

• Normal exe reise objectives - i.e., FEMA would be able

'to evaluate major observable portions of the LERO Plan.

FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 92. This was corroborated by NRC Staff witness Weiss, who testified that his communications with the FEMA F AC chairman indicated to him that FEMA attempted to design the Shoreham exercise to be equivalent to all others run in FEMA Region II. Tr. 8852-53 (Weiss), in determining the exercise objectives that it would observe and evaluate, FEMA relled on FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1, enti-t!ed "Policy on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 Periodic Requirements."

FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 89.E 1_5/ Guidance Memorandum PR-1, which was attacheo to LILCO's prefiled testimony, provides that for the biennial offsite exercise required by NRC regulations, "the sce-nario should be varied from exercise to exercise such that the major elements of the plans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six-year period." LILCO EX Exh.12 at Att. E, p. 2. The six-year period over which all of the major observable ele-ments should be tested begins, accord.ng to GM PR-1, with the initiallicensing exercise for an operating plant or an NTOL. M. GM PR-1 incorporates by reference the 35 (footnote continued)

i The February 13,1986 exercise of 'ho Shoreham offsite emergency plan was, as the Licensing Board acknowledged, "as comprehensive as any conducted in FEMA Re-gion 11 up to that time." PID at 51. The exercise objectives, which were set by FEMA and approved by the NRC Staff, included 29 of the 35 standard FEMA exercise objec-tives and seven additional objectives not included within the 35 standard objectives.N The standard objectives not included in the exercise were excluded at FEMA /NRC di-rection; during the scenario preparation LILCO expressed its willingness to (footnote continued) standard FEMA exercise objectives which are contained in an August 5,1983 Memoran-dum from Dave McLoughlin to the FEMA Regional Directors and Acting Regional Di-rectors. LILCO EX Exh.12 at Att. F. These 35 objectives correspond generally to the observable elements of emergency plans described in NUREG-0654 and, according to FEMA, encompass all the major observable elements at offsite emergency plans. See ld. at Att. E, p. 2 and Att. F, p. 2. The August 5,1983 Memorandum was cited f avorably

_by the Commission in its 1984 revision of 10 CFR Part 50 Apperidix E as providing uni-formity in the evaluation of emergency preparedness during exercLses. 49 Fed. Reg.

27,734 cols. 2-3 (1983).

1_6/ LILCO and FEMA witnesses agreed that 26 of FEM A's standard exercise objec-tives were tested and fully observed by FEMA. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 21-22; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 94-104. They also agreed that while Standard Objectives 21 (the ability to make decisions on the issuance of KI to emergency woders and/or to the general pub-lic) and 32 (the cbility to identify and then request federal assistance) were not listed as exercise objectives; they were, nevertheless, demonstrated by LERO and evaluated by FEM A. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 21-22; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 100,103. LILCO witnesses testified tnat Stantiard Objective 23 (the ability to effect an orderly evacuation of onsite personnel) was evalt.ated by NRC perconnel a.s part of their observation of the onsite portions of the exercise. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 21. Further, LILCO and FEMA witnesses concurred that Standard Objective 33 (the ability to relocate to an alternate EOF /EOC) was not applicable to the Sho.enam emergency plan since both the EOF and EOC are located outside the 10-mile EPZ. l.ILCO EX Exh.12 at 21; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 103. Finally FEMA witnesses testified that Standard Objectives 9,11 and 12 (ingestion j pathway testing) and 34 and 35 (recovery / reentry testing) were not tested during the February 13 exercise. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 96,97,103 and 104. LILCO witnesses took the position that these objectives had been partially tested. LILCO EX Exh 12 at 22.

FEMA witncsses also testified that seven non-standard objectives were tested during the Shoreham exercise. FEM A EX Exh. 5 at 104-05; s_ee_ also LILCO EX Exh.12 at 26.

Intervenors did not present comparable testimony on the standard objectives that were tested during the exercise.

demonstrate any and all of the standard cbjectives. See LILCO EX Exh.12 at 18; Tr. 6837 (Daverio).

In addition, the Shoreamc exercise included unprecedented participation by emergency workers. All Local Emergency Response Organization (LEROk personnel were mobilized and, as the scenario dictated, were dispatched to perform their emer-g::ncy functions to the maximum extent possible without impacting on the general pub-i lie. For example, during the exere!'-: all 165 traffic guides specified in the LILCO Plan were sent to their traffic control posts with all necessary :raffic control equipment; all l

333 bus drivers for evacuation of 'he transit-deoendent population in the Shoreham EPZ drove their assigned Dus routes in either actual buses or their own cars. LILCO EX Exh.12 st 18-19.

Contentions EX 15/16 Following the exercise, Intervenors proffered for litigation 50 contentions, comprising 162 pagh of text. Among the proffered contentions were Contentions EX 15 and 16, which challenged the adequacy of the scope of the February 13 exer-cise.N LILCO, the NRC Staff and FEMA objected to the admission of these two conten-tions. Each argued that the contentions impermissibly challenged the scope of the Shoreham exercise and did not address the pertinent standard of whether the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan - a standard established by the 11 / LERO is the organization established by LILCO to implement the LILCO Plan.

At the time of the February 1986 exercise, LERO was composed of more than 1,000 LILCO employees and contractors, working with support organizations such as the American Red Cross, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Department of Energy, and various bus, ambulance and other service companies. S_ee LILCO Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Chap. 2.

1_g/ Contentions EX 15 and 16, as admitted, are Attachment A hereto. Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.762(d)(1), attschments B through E contain copies of portions of the record upon which LILCO relies in support of Us assertions of error.

, k .'

Court of Appeals in Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.

1984), and adopted by the Commission in CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577,581 (1986). LILCO did not argue that the adequacy of a FEMA-approved exercise was completely immune from ASLB review. Instead, LILCO argued that for a contention challenging the scope of an exercise to be admissible it needed to allege that the scope of the exercise was so deficient that it failed to provide a basis for an ultimate licensing decision on "reason-able assurance" as specified in 10 CFR S 50.47(a). LILCO contended that at a minimum, the contentions needed to allege, with adequate basis and specificity, that the exercise was materially different in scope than other FEMA-approved scenarios at other nuclear plants and that Contentions EX 15 and 16 failed to meet this ple.iding burden. FEMA argued that exercise design and conduct are not material to the evaluation of emergen-cy preparedness reflected in an emergency plan and that admission cf Contentions EX 15 and 16 would only engender open-ended litigation about how FEMA applies its ex-pertise to assess emergency preparedness. FEMA Motion for Reconsideration, pp.10-14 (October 27, 1986). In response, Intervenors 6rgued essentially that since the Court of Appeals in UCS permitted exercise results to be litigated, that decision in turn permit-p .ted challenges to the sufficiency of the exercise itself. Intervenors also character ized l

Contentions EX 15 and 16 not as challenges to the exercise scenario, but rather as chal-Innges to the exercise results. Intervenors' Resynse to the LILCO and NRC Staff Ob-jections to the Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13 Exercise,

p. 27 (August 25, 1986).

The Licensing Board admitted Contentions EX 15 and 16 over LILCO's and the NRC Staff's objections. October 3,1986 Prehearing Conference Order, pp. 5-12 (unpublished). It affirmed that decision upon review of motions for reconsideration by LILCO and FEMA in a Memorandum and Order dated December 11, 1986. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-38A, 24 NRC 819

(1986). The Board accepted Contentions EX 15 and 16 with minor exceptions, reasoning that the adequacy of the exercise itself as designed to be evaluated by FEMA posed po-ttntially material questions of fact, and that Intervenors were therefore entitled under the UCS decision to litigate that issue. October 3 Order, pp. 4-9. In admitting the con-t::ntions, the Board rejected the argument that any admissible contention concerning the exercise design (as contrasted with performance by exercise participants) must at l':ast allege that the exercise departed, in objectives, scenario or other significant ways, from standard FEMA practice in offsite exercises designed and evaluated regular-ly by FEMA for the NRC at the more than 100 commercial nuclear power plants in op-tration. Id. at 7. l In its December 11 Memorandum and Order ruling on motions for reconsid-cration, the Licensing Board appeared to acknowledge the conceptual difference be-tween exercise design and exercise results. 24 NRC at 825-26.E Nevertheless, the Board concluded that the distinction between exercise design and results "does not hold up when viewed in light of the regulatory scheme governing emergency planning." Id.

at 826. In essence, the Board reasoned that:

1. emergency planning exercises are provisions of emergency plans, and the Shoreham exercise was conducted pursuant to a provision in LILCO's emergency plan;

2. the Shoreham exercise wus asserted to be a "full participation exercise" by LILCO; and

3. if the exercise was found not to comply with the NRC's regulations con-cerning

'. the approp)riate

. .[a deficiency scope which preclude (s)of an exercise, a finding that finding of reasonable "may constitute assurance that (a fundamental flaw) protective in the plan,"'measures can and id. at 826, citing will be23 CLI-86-11, taken, NRC i.e.,

577, 581 (1986)

(emphasis supplied).

M/ In recognizing this distinction, the Board rejected Intervenors' characterization of Contentions EX 15 and 16 as merely challenging exercise results. 24 NRC at 825-26.

W

.s Id. at 826.

FEMA sought interlocutory review of the Ecard's adinittance of Contentions

~

EX 15 and 16, arguing that admission of the contentions was foreclosed by the Commis- .

E sion's decision in CLI-86-11. FEMA Petition for. Leave to Appeal (December 31, 1986).S / Yhe Appeal Board denied FEMA's petition on procedural grounds, finding that FEMA had failed to demonstrate that it would' be irreparably harmed if the contentions were not excluded. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129.137-40 (1987). The Appeal Board did not address the substance of FEMA's motion for review or LILCO's arguments in support thereof.E The Litigation of Contentions EX 15/16

The litigatJon of Contentions EX 15 and 16 involved little factual dispute.

LILCO ano FEMA' each provided extensive testimony and documentation about the ex-l tant of testing of each of FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectived. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 20-24; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 90-105. Intervenors did not seriously contest this ,

i testimony. Instead, their factual testimony focused on establishing that the items listed in the subparts 0f Contention EX 15 and 16 were not tested during the February 13 ex-crcise. NYS EX Exh. I at 37-151. Again, there was little factual controversy about this i i i

M/ LILCO filed a motion supporting FEMA's petition, arguing (as it had below) that Contentions EX 15 and 16 went to exercise design, within the discretion of the expert agsncy staff personnel, rather than to exercise performance, which is the indicator of the proficiency of emergency response organizations. LILCO's Memorandum in Support of FEMA's Appeal (January 15, 1987). As a result, LILCO argued, any contentions re-garding exercise design should at least allege a deviation from usual agency practice or specific guidanc9, since expert agency staff were due deference in their judgments. Id.

ac11-12.

M/ In (ootnote 38 of ALAB-861. however, the Appeal Board did note that it dis-

agreed with PEMA's argument that "the Commission's directive [in CLI-86-11) that the Board examine the 'results' of the exercise forecloses any review of the scope or design of the exercise itself." ALAB-861, 25 NRC at 139 n.38. However, the Appeal Board added that "FEMA's professional judgment as to what elements should be tested at the pre-license stage is entitled to substantial deference." [d. (emphasis supplied),

a, __

, - . . . - - . . _ - . , = . . .. _ _. -

.bN 17-testimony.E The major difference of opinion on Contentions EX 15 and 16 focused on the sig-nificance of items not tested, in light of the Commission's emergency planning reguJa-tions in 10 CFR S 50.47 and Part 50 Appendix E and of FEMA and NRC_ guidance on the

' conduct of exercises. All parties presented extensive testimony on this issue. In addi-tion, LILCO, the NRC Staff and Intervenors briefed the issue in their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. L.F.32-156; N.F.17-87; I.F. 43-99.EI A brief summary

'of each party's arguments follows.

LILCO contended that the adequacy of the scope of the Shoreham exercise must be judged by looking at the totality of the exercise objectives tested and the extent of >

participation by the emergency response force. Specifically, LILCO argued that NUREG-0654 and subsequent FEMA ' guidance were helpful in interpreting the general

requirements of 10 CF,R Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 and more importantly in deciding p whether the Shoreham exercise provided a necessary basis for a reasonable assurance l

e M/ ' There was no factual dispute among the parties concerning the extent of partici-pation and testing of: the public notification system (Contentions EX 15.A.16.C and i D), the Coast Guard (15.B 16.B); the 6otification of transients on the beaches (15.H);

! - the distribution of the public information brochure (15.C); the evacuation of EPZ hospi-tais (15.D); the procedures for school sheltering and evacuation (15.E, F and G); the monitoring and decontamination of residents from special facilities (15.K); Marketing Evaluations, Inc. (16.E); bus companies (16.K); ambulance /ambulette companies (16.L);

and Nassau County and the Nassau County Red Cross (18.C).

The only areas where it could be characterized that there was any factual dis- i agreement involved the extent of testing of ingestion pathway activities (15.1) and re-covery/ reentry activities (15.M) and there, the differences in testimony were not sig-

- nificant. LILCO witnesses testified that LERO personnel had performed ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry activities consistent with the requirements of the exer- ,

cise scenario. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 39, 41 and Att. J. However, LILCO's witnesses

- agreed that the scenario was not designed to permit a complete test of either activity.

- See LILCO EX Exh.12 at 39-41. Intervenors' witnesses identified a slightly smaller group of exercise activities that had been performed for each activity. NYS EX Exh. I at 144-48,154-55.  :

2_3/ Throughout this brief, LILCO's Proposed Findings are referred to as "L.F.", the NRC Staff's Proposed Findings as "N.F.", and Intervenors' Proposed Findings as "I.F."

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6 I finding under S 50.47(a). With regard to the meaning of 1 IV.F.1, LILCO argued that the term "full participation" contained in footnote 4 of that section:

1. did not require that all major observable elements of a plan be tested in each full participation exercise, and that no single objective is, in isolation, an absolute must, Tr. 6121-23 (Hockert),6808 (Daverio);

2, one must look at an exercise in its entirety to see if the "major portions" requirements was met, Tr. 6130, 6132-34 (Hockert), 6808, 6812-14 (Daverio);

3. FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectives include all the major observable elements of offsite emergency plans, Tr. 6100 (Hockert), 6233-34 (Daverio);

4. testing most or all of these standard objectives thus provides evidence that one has tested "the major observable portions" of the Plan, Tr. 6130 (Hockert), 6234-35 (Daverio, Behr);

5. testing of all the major observable elements of an offsite plan, as required in GM-PR-1 and NUREG-0654, is cumulatively done over the course of several years and not in every full participation exercise or in the very first exercise, Tr. 6833 (Daverio); and

6. not every observable element of the Plan or standard FEMA objective is a "major portion" of a plan, Tr. 6806-08, 6855 (Daverio).

_See_ L.F. 55. LILCO also offered evidence designed to demonstrate that the standard FEMA objectives that were not fully tested during the Shoreham exercise were not such material omissions as to render the exercise unsuitable for licensing.E LILCO also ar-gued that the "full participation" requirements for exercises for operating plants and 2_4/ In particular, LILCO witnesses compared the objectives tested during the Shoreham exercise to the 13 "core" objectives listed in draf t FEMA Guidance Memoran-dum EX-3 (this guidance document has been proposed by FEMA to replace Guidance Memorandum PR-1 and contains a list of 13 "core" objectives that FEM A would require to be included in every exercise) and concluded that all core objectives were tested in the Shoreham exercise. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 24-26. In addition, LILCO presented a report prepared by International Energy Associates Limited (IEAL) which surveyed FEMA and NRC staff, RAC Committee members, and other federal, state and local emergency planners in order to rank, in terms of importance, the 35 standard objec-tives contained in Guidance Memorandum PR-1. LILCO EX Exh.12 at 26-30 and Att. L.

The objectives tested at Shoreham were then compared against this ranking and the conclusion was drawn that the Shoreham exercise included 79% to 87% of the "total im-portance" of the 35 objectives. Ld.; Tr. 6148-49 (Hockert),

l NTOLS have always been and still are identical and that this conclusion is supported by the regulatory history of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1. Based on this reasoning, LILCO concluded that the Shoreham exercise was a "full participation" exercise in keeping with the Commission's regulations and that it could serve as the basis for a reasonable assurance finding.

The FEMA witnesses supported LlLCO's arguments. They agreed that to judge the sufficiency of an exercise one needs to look at the totality of the exercise and that FEMA guidance documents and NUREG-0654 are instructive in making that assessment, see FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 89-90; Tr. 7492 (Keller), 7620-21 (Keller, Kowleski).

Specifically, they testified with regard to the phrase "the major observable portions" contained in 1 IV.F.1 footnote 4 that:

1. FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectives and NUREG-0654 are interrelated, Tr. 7483 (Kowleski);

2. the 3 > objectives encompass all the major co;ervable elements of offsite emergency plans, Tr. 7483, 7516, 7519-20 (Kowieski, Baldwin);

3. the 35 objectives must be tested over a 6-year cycle rather than in each individual exercise, Tr. 7516 (Baldwin);

4. testing most or all of the FEMA objectives provides evidence that "the major observable portions" of a plan have been tested, Tr. 7517-20 (Baldwin, Kowieski); and

5. not every element of a plan is a "major observable portion," see Tr. 7690 (Baldwin).

See L.F. 56. The FEMA wittlesses were unaware of any differences between regulato!y requirements for exercises of NTOLs and operating plants and were itnaware that FEMA had ever, in practice, differentiated between the two ir 'ramitig the scope of an

@xercise. While the FEM A witnesses did not opine on whether the Shoreham exercise  ;

met the NRC's regulatory requirements, they did conclude that the exercise required the mobilization of emergency workers in sufficient number to verify their capability to respond to an accident, that the Shoreham exercise evaluated "the integrated l l

^

capability and a major portion of the basic elements" of the LILCO plan, and that the Shoreham exercise was "equal or greater in scope compared to any other full-scale ex-ercise evaluated by FEMA Region 11 to date." FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 105.

The NRC Staff witnesses testified that FEMA guidance documents and NUREG-0654 are helpfulin assessing the adequacy of the Shoreham exercise. NRC EX Exh. I at 5. They further testified that they were unaware of any difference in the scope of the exercises conducted at NTOLs and operating plants. See Tr. 8835-36 (Schwartz). They concluded that the Shoreham exercise was a "full participation" exer-cise in keeping with NRC regulations. NPC EX Exh. I at 7; Tr. 8851-53 (Weiss, Schwartz).

Intervenors took a cecidedly different tack. Their arguments proceeded from the underlying premise that 1 IV.F.1 of Appendix E establishes an extremely broad set l

of requirements for ini'.lal exercises which must be entirely satisfied or else the entire

! cxtreise is useles in making the reasonable assurance finding required by 10 CFR l

l S 50.47(a). In a result-oriented epproach, Intervenors then attempted to demonstrate that one or more of the alleged omissions in Contentions EX 15 and 16 was a required cisment of a full participation exercise; thus rendering the exercise a regulatory nullity.

Intervenors contended that the language of 1 IV.F.1 was clear on its face and that the Court of Appeals decision in GU ARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.1985),

thus precluded the Board from considering FEMA guidance, past FEMA practice or the regulatory history of Appendix E to draw any conclusions that were not totally consis-tent with the clear meaning of Apr.endix E. I F.132. Intervenors then argued that:

1. . "full participation" language of footnote 4 requires an exercise to include all major observable elements (which Intervenors equated with "portions")

of an emergency plan, NYS EX Exh. I at 35. Tr. 7127-28 (Baranski),7219 (Papile);

.i

2. each of FEMA's 35 standard exercise objectives is a "major observable portion" of a plan, see Tr. 7127-28, 7231 (Baranski);

3. all of the major observable portions of an offsite plan are not encom-passed in FEMA's standard objectives, NYS EX Exh. I at 30, Tr. 7122, 7235 (Baranski, Papile);

4. every item alleged in Contentions EX 15 and 16 to have been omitted from the Shoreham exercise is a "major observable portion" of a plan, NYS EX Exh.1 at 42,55, Tr. 7219 (Papile); and

5. the "mobilization of . . . other resources" language in footnote 4 requires the participation of all "critical response personnel" in a full participation exercise, and that for an exercise of the Shoreham plan this includes the participation of the primary EBS station, schools and special facilities, I. F. 12 ".-129.

In addition to arguing for the creation of this seemingly all-encompassing set of re-quirements for a "full participation" exercise,El Intervenors also contended that 1 IV.F.1 imposes higher exercise requirements for NTOLs, like Shoreham, than for sites with full power operating licenses where a "track record" for the facility already ex-ists. NYS EX Exh. I at 25; Tr. 7127 (Baranski).

Af ter considering the proposed findings and reply findings, the Licensing Board concluded that the February 13 exercise did not meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, App. E 1 IV.F.1. The Board reasoned that the "clear" language of 1 IV.F.1 E 1

requires an initial exercise to test "as much as (is] reasonably achievable" without mandatory participation. PID at 19. This overriding mandate in turn requires the testing of all response functions and response personnel absent a demonstration that such testing was not reasonably achievable. The Board found support for its interpre-tation in the Commission's 1984 amendment to Appendix E which, without explanation, it concluded made "substantive changes in the required scope of initial and biennial 25/ The definition of "full participation" in Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 n.4 applies to initial and subsequent biennial exercises.

2_6/ Curiously, earlier in the PID the Board had agreed with LILCO that the sentence structure of 1 IV.F.1 was ambiguous. PID at 15.

(

exercises." Ld. Having established this broad test, the Board disposed of the majority of the testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16 with little or no discussion. Specifically, the Board found it unnecessary to resolve the controversy among the parties as to the meaning of the "full participation" language in 1 IV.F.1 footnote 4, PID at 20-21; dis-missed all FEMA guidance documents and NUREG-0654 as either in conflict with the distinction between initial and biennial exercises or irrelevant as being intended only to apply to biennial exercises and not initial ones, PID at 19-20 n.11; and did not even mention the IEAL Report testified to by LILCO to demonstrate the immateriality of the omissions from the Shoreham exercise.

Applying its "reasonably achievable" test to the Shoreham exercise, the Board found the exercise to be deficient in four respects:

1. Direct contact should have been made with the then-primary EBS station, WALK, rather than a call having been made to a simulated station (PID at 27-28);

2. Participation should have either been secured from'more school districts or more definitive documentation obtained of their refusal to participate (PlD at 37-41);

3. A test of ingestion pathway response should have been undertaken (PID at 42-44); and

4. Testing of the capability to assist special facilities should have included (a) direct evaluation of LlLCO's ability to communicate directly with ac-tual special facilities instead of simulated ones and (b) direct testing of the preparedness of ambulance and ambulette companies (PID at 49).

The Board thus concluded that the February 1986 exercise had not fulfilled the require-ments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1. PID at 61.

ARGUMENT I. The Licensing Board Erred in Admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16 for Litigation In admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16 for litigation, the Licensing Board erred by expanding the scope of litigation of exercises beyond that dictated by the Court of

A i

Appeals in UCS and specified in this case by the Commission's decision in CLi 86-11. In addition, by admitting contentions challenging the scope of the February 13 exercise without requiring any threshold assertion that generic interagency practices for formu-lating exercises had not been followed, the Bo?.rd committed additional error by (1) ignoring the Memorandum of Understanding between the IIRC and FEMA and imple-m:mting technical guidance f rom both agencies, (2) refusing to apply valid presumptions about agency regularity and agency expertise, and (3) permitting generic examination of FEMA's process for establishing the scope of exercises in a specific licensing case.

The Board should have denied admission to Contentions EX 15 and 16.

In the UCS case, the Court of Appeals, recognizing that the Atomic Energy Act requires that issues of material fact cannot be excluded from litigation in nuclear 11-cent,ing proceedings, held that the implementability of offsite emergency plans as mea-suced by exercises raised such issues. Accordingly, the Court held that the subject of the exercise could not be totally foreclosed by the Commission from the opportunity for litigation. UCS,735 F.2d at 1444-45.

However, the Court of Appeals then went to pains to recognize "the Commis-sion's wide discretion to structure its licensing hearings in the interest of speed and ef- ,

ficiency." Ld. at 1448. Noting that the Commission had argued that an "exercise is only relevant to its licensing decision to the extent that it indicates that emergency plans are fundamentally flawed," the Court stated unequivocally that: "Today, we in no way restrict the Commission's authority to adopt this as a substantive licensing standard."

[d. at 1448 (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied).

The Commission,in revising its regulations pursuant to the UCS remand, specifi-cally limited the scope of exercise litigation to exercise results. The Commission stated:

s l

The basic effect of the court's decision and of the rule change which follows is that the results of pre-licensing

,- emergency preparedness exercises may be subject to litiga-tion before the Licensing Board. The revision does not change the general predictive nature of the Commission's findings on emergency planning and preparedness issues.

50 Fed. Reg. 19,323 (1985) col. 2 (emphasis supplied).

Similarly, in defining the parameters of the litigatic.7 of the February 13 1 Shoreham exercise, the Commission did exactly what the Court of Appeals and its re-vised rule permitted. It restricted the scope of admissible contentions to those which, in addition to meeting normal tests of admissibility, also passed the additional threshold test of alleging that the exercise itself demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the emer-g:ncy olan being exercised:

Under our regulatinns and practice, Staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergen-cy planning, and is restricted to determining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of rea-sonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan.

CLI-86-11,23 NRC at 581(emphasis supplied).

An inquiry into the adequacy of exercise design, which is the sole topic of Con-t:ntions EX 15 and 16, cannot be matched to the Commission's limitation in the UCS remand rule change and in CLI-86-11 of the scope of litigation to exercise results. Nor can it be made to square with the frame of reference for the discussion: whether the exerejse itself reveals fundamental flaws in the plan. Had the Commission contem-plated case-by-case inquiry into exercise design, it surely would not have couched its discussion in the frame of reference of "exercise results" or whether an "exercise re-veals" problems with an emergency plan.

In admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16, the Licensing Board recognized this dis-tinction between exercise results and the scope of an exercise. December 11 Order, 24 NRC at 825-26. It dismissed the distinction on the grounds that 10 CFR Part 50, l

l App. E S IV, which is entitled "Content of Emergency Plans," contains provisions con-cerning the scope of full participation exercises. Ld. It thus reasoned that exercises are provisions of offsite emergency plans and, accordingly, that deficiencies in the scope of an exercise can reveal fundamental flaws in the offsite emergency plan.

The Board's reasoning does not withstand scrutiny. While it is true that S IV of Appendix E is entitled "Content of Emergency Plans" and that 1 IV.F.1 contains provi-sions for the scope of full participation exercises, those provisions do no more than re-quire that emergency slans include provisions for conducting periodic exercises that will be observed and graded by FEMA. The content of an actual exercise is independent of the provisions of an offsite emergency plane / and is set by FEMA, in consultation with NRC Staff and other federal agencies, based on FEMA's expertise from hundreds of offsite emergency preparedness exercises and on available agency resources. Thus, by accepting Contentions EX 15 and 16 for litigation, the Board was not admitting is-sues that could result in findings that the LILCO Plan was fundamentally flawed but rather allowing an unspecified inquiry into whether FEMA was conducting exercises in keeping with the NRC's regulations. The Commission's discussion of the issue in 4 CLI-86-11 does not contemplate this type of inquiry; nor is it sensible that it should, since it would permit scattered, uncoordinated inquiry into the working relationship of FEMA and the NRC which reflects the regulatory policies and requirements of two agencies coordinated by a formal Memorandum of Understanding.El 21 / Inclusion in offsite emergency plans of detailed descriptions of the specific ele-ments for each of the exercises required by 11V.F.1 would destroy much of the element of surprise sought in those exercises and would reduce their value as predictors of cmergency preparedness.

28/ In this sense, Contentions EX 15 and 16 represent a challenge to an ongoing reg-ulatory structure if not a specific regulation. They are thus inconsistent with the poll-cy imbedded in the Commission's prohibition against challenges to regulations in specific licensing cases,10 CFR S 2.758, which absolutely prohibits attack on any rule (footnote continued)

In the years since 1980, when the NRC and FEMA first formalized their working relationship in the Memorandum of Understar. ding, FEMA takes the lead with respect to the offsite aspects of emergency preparedness, including responsibility for scenarios and objectives for joint (onsite-offsite) exercises. Id. at 15,487 col. 3. Since 1980 liter-ally hurdreds of exercises have been conducted in which FEMA has functioned as an agency acting within its scope of lawful authority and professional expertise. In all them the exercise of that authority and expertise has been pursuant to a comprehen-sive compact with the NRC.

FEMA's functioning in the design and execution of the offsite aspects of the Shoreham exercise originated, as with other exercises, with a request from the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding. As such, its methodology and proce-dures for design of the exercise are entitled to substantial deference and a presumption of validity. See ALAB-861,25 NRC at 139 n.38. Contentions EX 15 and 16 contain no allegations that FEMA's methodology or procedures for the design and execution of the Shoreham exercise were any different than those it customarily uses at other exer-cises.N As a result, the contentions present no basis for believing that the designed scope of the exercise was so deficient as to preclude a "reasonable assurance" finding under 10 CFR S 50.47. Accordingly, the Board erred in admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16.

.(footnote continued) or regulation of the Commission, subject only to waiver en the "sole ground" that "spe-cial circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that application of the rule or regulation (or provision thereof) would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted." 10 CFR S 2.758(b).

2_9/ Indeed, the Board also conceded that the Shoreham exercise was as comprehen-sive as any conducted in FEMA Region II. PID at 51.

l

II. The Board Erred When It Adopted a "Reasonably Achievable" Test for Judging the Sufficiency of the Scope of the Shoreham Exercise As described above, the Licensing Board found that the "clear language" of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 required the initial exercise of offsite emergency plan to be signif-icantly more comprehensive than subsequent exercises and more specifically, that it needed to "test [] as much of the . . plans as is reasonably achievable without manda-tory public participation." PID at 18-19. The Board used this test to judge the merits of Contentions EX 15 and 16. In so doing, the Board committed reversible legal error.

First, the Board erred in interpreting Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 in isolation and ignoring the relationship of that provision to the ultimate "reasonable assurance" standard of

! S 50.47(a) - the very standard the Court of Appeals and the Commission used as the l

basis for defining the limits of litigation of emergency preparedness exercises. Second, even if one accepts that one can look solely to the language of Apper. b: E 1 IV.F.1 for resolution of Contentions EX 15 and 16, the Board's interpretation of that section vio-lates basic tenets of statutory construction. Third, the Board's unexplained conclusion that the Commission's 1984 amendment of Appendix E made substantive changes in the required scope of initial and biennial exercise is contrary to the regulatory history.

Fourth, to the extent the PID can be read to say that the Board declined to conduct a thorough review of the regulatory history of Appendix E because of the "clear" lan-guage of 1 IV.F.1, the Board erred. Finally, the Board incorrectly dismissed the signifi-cance of the basic joint guidance document, NUREG-0654, and of other FEMA guidance, in interpreting Appendix E. Accordingly, the Appeal Board should reverse tile Licens-ing Board's decision and find that the February 13, 1986 exercise was a "full participa-tion" exercise which provided an adequate basis for a "reasonable assurance" finding.

A. The Licensing Board Erred in Focusing Only on Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 in Defining the Legal Standard for Resolving Contentions EX 15 and 16 In discussing the legal standards for resolving Contentions EX 15 and 16, the Board begins by correctly noting that the contentions allege that the February 13,1986 cxercise was so limited that it did not yield meaningful results on implementation capa-bility as is required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a). PID at 10. Having summarized the language of the contentions, the Board then jumps to the conclusion that the regulation that bears on the contentions is 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. Id. at 10-11. In so doing, the Board does not explain how the ultimate "reasonable assurance" test of S 50.47(a)is re-lated those Appendix E requirements; nor does it consider how S 50.47(a) may affect the interpretation of Appendix E. This omitted inquiry is essential, however, since the Commission framed the scope of this litigation not in terms of compliance with Appendix E but in terms of "fundamental flaws in the plan," which the Commission in turn equated with defects of sufficient severity to preclude a S 50.47(a) reasonable assurance finding. See CLI-86-11,23 NRC at 581.

NRC regulations contain a numter of provisions which relate to emergency plan-ning for nuclear power plants and more specifically to exercises to assess the imple-mentability of those plans. Foremost among those provisions is 10 CFR S 50.47(a),

which containe the ultimate licensing standard - whether "there is reasonable assur-ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a ra-diological emergency." 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).0SI This "reasonable assurance" finding 3_Q/ "It is undisputed that the Commission must make an ultimate finding in a licens-ing proceeding that 'there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of (al radiological emergency.'" Union of Con-cerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,735 F.2d 1437,1445 (1984) (emphasis supplied). The Commission has defined S 50.47(a) as the "fundamental cmergency pianning licensing standard." S_ee Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nu-clear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13,24 NRC 22,29 (1986). Similarly, in the pream-ble to the recent amendment to S 50.47(c)(1), the Commission reiterated that "the eval-(footnote continued)

for emergency planning is different from other safety findings in the extent to which it is inherently predictive. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1103 (1983). The applicant is not required to prove, and Boards are not required to find, that the present state of emergency plan-ning at the time of a licensing proceeding is fully adequate. Id. Rather, Boards are re-quired only to find that there are no "insurmountable difficulties" to the sucessful com-pletion of planning, no "barrier . . . that cannot be feasibly be removed." Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756,764 (1982); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Sta-tion, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076,1104 (1983). The predictive nature of emergen-cy planning findings was reiterated by the Commission when it mandated hearings on the Shoreham exercise itself:

We disagree with the (Intervenors'] proposition that re-striction of an emergency planning exercise hearings re-quested by Intervenors to "fundamental flaws" requires rulemaking or is otherwise inappropriate. In the preamble to the rule reviewed by the UCS court, and in our rule change responding to the court's decision, we emphasized the predictive nature of emergency planning findings. See 47 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (July 13,1982); 50 Fed. Reg.19,343 (May 8,1985). The court never questioned this concept.

The court also observed that there was nothing to prevent the Commission from excluding from exercise litigation any issue which was not material to licensing decisions. See 735 F.2d at 1447-48. Under our regulation and practice, Staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergency planning, and is restricted to de-termining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, h, fundamental flaws in the plan. Since only fundamental flaws are material licens-ing issues the hearing may be restricted to those issues.

(footnote continued) uation of a utility plan takes place in the context of the overriding obligation that no license can be issued unless the emergency plan is found to provide reasonable assur-ance of adequate protective measures in an emergency." 52 Fed. Reg. at 42,080 col. 3 l (November 3,1987) (emphasis supplied).

CLI-86-11,23 NRC at 581.

Section 50.47 also contains 16 specific planning standards which an applicant is required to satisfy before a reasonable assurance finding can be made under S 50.47(a).

Section 50.47(b)(14) relates specifically to exercises and provides that:

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate maior portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

Finally,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E T IV.F contains provisions for exercises.

The section relating to pre-licensing exercises provides:

A full participation4 / exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued af ter July 13, 1982. This exercise shall be conducted within two years before the issuance of the first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5% of rated power) of the first reactor and shallinclude participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway EFZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ. If the full participation exercise is conducted more than one year prior to issuance of an operating license for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans shall be conducted within one year before issuance of an operating license for full power. This exer-cise need not have State or local government participation.

4/ "Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and 11-censee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to adequately access and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. "Full participation" includes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario.

The only discussion of the relationship between the provisions of S 50.47 and

l those of Appendix E that appears either in the text of those provisions or in the regula-tory history is in the introduction of Appendix E 1 IV.E That provision clearly indi-cates that while Appendix E contains requirements for the contents of emergency plans,N those plans will be evaluated against the standards of 5 50.47(b), and implic-itly the ultimate reasonable as;urance finding of 5 50.47(a). Thus, to ensure a consis-tent set of regulations, the language of Appendix E must be made to square with the provisions of S 50.47 and. in particular, with the reasonable assurance finding of S 50.47(a) and its acknowledged predictive nature and standards of materiality.

On its face, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 appears to recognize the predictive nature of the emergency planning provisions. The provision defines "full participation" exercises as including only "ma_jor observable portions" of the offsite plan and the mobilization of "sufficient numbers" of personnel to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario. It also provides that a full participation exercise should "test [ ] as much as of the . . . plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation." By 31/ The provision states:

The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not nec-essarily be limited to information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, i.e., organi-zation for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notification procedures, emergency f acilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery. In addi-tion, the emergency response plans submitted by an appli-cant for a nuclear power reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in S 50.47(b), and they will be evalu-ated against those standards, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV (emphasis supplied).

3_3/ As noted in the preceding section, the provisions of Appendix E 1 IV.F are some-what anomalous, since they talk about the content of plans relating to the scope of ex-Grcises, while as was the case with the Shoreham exercise, the exerciso scope is de-fined not by the applican. but by FEM A in consultation with the NRC Staf f.

singling out the "reasonably achievable" language of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 and placing on the applicant the burden to demonstrate that the testing of any element, regardless of its importance, was not reasonably achievable, s_ee, g, PID at 38-41, the Board has created an exercise requirement that goes far beyond that needed to serve as the basis for a reasonable assurance finding.EI Accordingly, the Board erred by interpreting Appendix E in isolation without regard to the pertinent licensing standards.

B. The Board's Interpretation of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 Reads Substantive Material Out of That Provision As a matter of statutory construction, the Board's interpretation of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 is incorrect. By giving the phrase "as much as reasonably achievable" para-mount importance, the Board has violated the basic tenet of statutory construction that if possible, all parts of a regulatory provision should be given meaning.UI Footnote 4 to 1 IV.F.1 states that '"full participation' includes testing the major observable por_tirm of onsite and offsite emergency plans. . . ." It also limits the mobilization of emergency response personnel and resourec3 to "sufficient numbers to verify the capa-bility to respond to the accident scenario." Footnote 4, including the defintion of "full l

3_3/ Section IV, infra, discusses how the Board's application of its "reasonably achievable" test ignores the materiality of certain omissions from the February 13 ex-ercise.

34/ See, eA, McCuin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 817 F.2d 161,168 (1st Cir.1987)("In interpreting statutes and regulations, courts must try to give them a harmonious, comprehensive meaning, giving effect, when possible' to all provisions.");

Campesinos Unidos v. United States Department of Labor,803 F.2d 1063,1069 (9th Cir.

1986)(The task of the court is "to interpret regulntions as a whole, in light of the over-all statutory scheme, and not to give force to one phrase in isolation."); Ln re Timbers of Inwood Forest,793 F.2d 1380,1384 (5th Cir.1986)("(E]ach part or section (of a stat-uta] should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to pro-duce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed" (quoting 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction S 46.05 at 90 (rev. 4th ed.1984 & Supp.1985)); Shepherd 011. Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 734 F.2d 23, 29-30 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.1984) ("(1)t is well-recognized that a court cannot concentrate on individual terms and ignore a consideration of the context in which the term appears" (quoting Citronelle-Mobile Gathering. Inc. v. Edwards, 669 F.2d 717, 719 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 877 (1982))).

participation," applies throughout 1 IV.F, to both initial and subsequent exercises. The effect of that provision -if it is to be given any meaning -is to confine the scope of exercises to "major observable portions" of emergency plans and participation in those exercises to that necessary "to verify the capability to respond to the accident t scenario."

The Board's interpretation of 1 N.F.1 is that "reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" is the only guiding principle of limitation. As a result, footnote 4 is reduced to mere surplusage. The Board's decision implicitly concedes this, since the Board found it unnecessary to resolve the parties' arguments concerning the proper interpretation of footnote 4. PID at 20-21. The Board's interpretation, which reads any limitation as to materiality out of the regulations as they apply to initial ex-crcises, cannot be squared with S 50.47 as interpreted in CLI-86-11 or with the restrie-tion of offsite exercises in Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 to "major observable portions" of offsite plans.

C. The Licensing Board Erred in Concluding that the 1984 Rule-making Erected Special. Additional Requirements for Initial Exercises An important factor in the Board's conclusion that initial exercises must be ex-tremely comprehensive is its finding that the Commission's 1984 revision of 1 IV.F.1 made substantive changes in the scope of initial and biennial exercises. PID at 19. A rcview of that section's history does not support the Board's conclusion.

To best understand the 1984 amendments, it is helpful to review briefly the evo-lution of 1 IV.F. As originally adopted in 1980, the requirements of initial and subse-quent "full participation" exercises were basically identical. Paragraph IV.F.1 contained a requirement that offsite exercises for a_Il plants - whether achieving their full power licenses for the first time or already licensed - must test "as much of 11-censee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation." 45 Fed. Reg. 55,402-13 (August 19, 1980).

l

1 1

In December 1981, the Commission proposed to clarify its emergency planning regulations to indicate that emergency preparedness exercises were not required for an initiallicensing decision. In the preamble to the proposed change, the Commission dis-cussed the relationship between initial and subsequent exercises, stating:

The nature of NRC's regulatory oversight should be more or less constant throughout the license term, and there should be no special significance attached to the actual state of implementation or preparedness at the time just prior to 11-cense issuance . . . . Of course, there should be reasonable assurance prior to license issuance that there are no barriers to emergency planning implementation or to a satisfactory state of emergency preparedness that cannot feasibly be re- '

moved.

46 Fed. Reg. 61,135 col.1 (December 15, 1981). From this it is clear that the Commis-sion did not intend to enact any higher standards for initial exercises than for subse-quent ones. E Nor did the 1984 amendment to S 50.47 and Appendix E change this parity be-twmn initial and subsequent exercises. The stated purpose of the 1984 rulemaking was to provide more flexibility in the timing and frequency of State and local government participation in exercises other than initial exercises, in response to complaints from i

States and an emergency management professional association that the then-annual extreise requirements were wastefully onerous and diverted attention from more 3_5/ This proposed revision to the Commission's regulations was adopted on July 8, 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 30,232 (July 13,1982). The rule change was vacated by the Court of Appeals in Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), but not in any way that requires or even implies that the Court would impose different standards for initial exercises than for subsequent ones. All the Court's opinion went to was the point that if the Commission believed exercises to reveal information material to a determination on the safety of a plant applying for a license, then the results of those exercises, whatever they might be, should be subject to licensing scrutiny like the rest of an application. Thus, the quoted language remains a useful indicator of the Commission's view of initial versus subsequent exercises for a given plant. See CLI-86-11,23 NRC at 581 (Court of Appeals did not question predictive nature of emer-gency planning findings; review of exercise results is consistent with predictive nature of ecergency planning and is restricted to determine if the exercise revealed deficiencies which preclude a reasonable assurance finding).

productive work. There is no reference, in either the notices presaging the rule change, 47 Fed. Reg. 29,252 (July 6,1982), 48 Fed. Reg. 33,307 (July 21,1983), or in the on3 actually promulgating the rule, 49 Fed. Reg. 27,733 (July 6,1984), to any intent that tho amendment affect anything other than timing requirements of exercises for op-cr ting plants and the frequency of State participation at "full participation" exercises for a particular site. There is no reference whatever to any intent to amend the defini-tion of a "full participation exercise" for initial (or other) exercises. Further, there is no reference whatever in any of the 70 sets of comments filed in the rulemaking record, nor in the NRC Staff's regulatory analysis of the proposed rulemaking, to any intent to change the requirements for initial (or other)"full participation" exercises.N Prior to the 1984 rulemaking, the requirements for initial and subsequent "full participation" exercises in 1 IV.F.1 were basically identical. The treatment of initial cxtrcises was not amended by the 1984 rule. Thus, even if the 1984 rulemaking is con-sidered to have relaxed the substantive requirements (as well as the required frequency) for post-1984 exercises at operating plants, it does not follow that the definition of a "full participation" exercise itself changed, much less that the requirements applicable to initial exercises were somehow increased.D As the PID acknowledges, the scope of 36/ These comments and regulatory analysis are not in the record of the proceeding before the Licensing Board. However, they are public documents within the Commis-sion's files, and pertinent to the issues the Commission and its staff thought they were addressing in the course of the rulemaking. One typical comment of particular interest filed by the State of New York, Department of Health (Attachment F hereto) shows a characteristic lack of concern with any distinction between initial and subsequent full participation exercises. The New York comment is especially interesting, in the con-t:xt of Intervenors' testimony about the need for exceptionally broad initial exercises (se_e PID at 17-18), since it includes specific consideration of Shoreham (Attachment F at 3), and since it shows a total absence of planned ingestion pathway exercises for f a-cilities located in New York State (Ld., Table).

3_7/ In the PID, the Board appears to premise its conclusion that the 1984 rulemaking increased the scope of initial exercises on the f act that the Cominission changed the language for initial full participation exercises from language that provided that the (footnote continued)

the Shoreham exercise was "as comprehensive as any conducted in FEMA Region II

[which includes New York] up to that time." PID at 51. The PID thus ignores the ob-vlous conclusion: that the requirements for the scope of initial exercises have not changed by the 1984 rulemaking and thus that an exercise which, like that for Shoreham, was consistent with pre-1984 exercises in Region II, is adequate as an initial exercise conducted since 1984.

D. The 1.icensing Board Erred in Refusing to Consider the Regulatory History of Appendix E 1 IV.F The PID appears to find that the language of Appendix E is clear on its f ace, and thus that it is unnecessary to examine the regulatory history of that provision.

(footnote continued) cxercise should be such that it "will enable" State and local governments in the plume and ingestion pathways to participate,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,1 IV.F.1.b, 45 Fed.

Reg. at 55,413 col.1 (August 19, 1980), to language that defined a full participation ex-crcise and then provided that the exercise "shall include" participation by States and local governments in the plume and ingestion pathways,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1, 49 Fed. Reg. at 27,736 col. 2 (July 6,1984). PID at 14 n.8 and 43 n.19. The Board's exclusive reliance on this language change is misplaced.

First and most importantly, a review of the notices involving the rule change re-veals that the Commission had interpreted the pre-1984 "will enable" language to man-date the participation of State and local governments in the plume and ingestion path-ways. S_e__ e e_.L, 45 Fed. Reg. at 55,408 col. 2 (August 19,1980) ("Each State and appropriate local government shall annually conduct an exercise jointly with a com-mercial nuclear power f acility"); 48 Fed. Reg, at 33,307 col. 3 (July 21,1983) ("It has become apparent that a disproportionate amount o! Federal, State, and local govern-ment and licensee resources are being expended in order to ennduct and evalute emer-gency preparedness exercises at the presently required frequency"); 49 Fed. Reg. at 27,734-35 cols. 3-1 (July 6,1984). Thus, the 1984 change was simply an editorial one with no substantive importance.

Second, as noted above, the "as much as reasonably achievable"language applied to initial exercises both before and af ter the 1984 changes. The Board has interpreted this phrase to mandate the inclusion of every aspect of an emergency plan and of most, if not all, offsite response personnel as well as other entities such as schools and special f acilities, that are not part of the offsite response organization, absent a demonstration by the applicant that such testing would not be reasonably achievable. It is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a factual situation where participation by a State in the in-gestion pathway EPZ would not be "reasonably achievable." Hence, the Board's reliance on the language change in 1984 is misplaced given its "reasonably achievable" test.

C rtainly, Intervenors invited just such a see-no-evil approach in their proposed find-ings.EI If this reading of the Board's vecision is accurate then the Board erred.

As is clear from discussions throughout this section,1 IV.F.1 of Appendix E does not have a simple, plain meaning. Instead, the provision includes general, undefined t:rms that are subject to alternative interpretations. Phrases like "the major observa-ble portions of a Plan,""as much of the plans as is reasonably achievable without man-datory public participation," and "sufficient number to verify the capability to respond" are sufficiently broad, both individually and collectively, to allow Boards considerable latitude in consulting other sources for guidance on their meaning. In such circum-stances, the Board is under an obligation to ensure that its interpretation of the provi-sions comports with the Commission's when it promulgated the rule.EI As described in Section II.C above, a thorough review of the regulatory history would have led the Board to conclude that its interpretation was in conflict with that history. Its failure to conduct that review constitutes reversible error.

3_8/ Intervenors argued that (1) the language of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 has a plain, non-controversial meaning and (2) the Court of Appeal's decision in GUARD v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir. (1985)), prevented the Board from looking beyond the language of Appendix E to resolve Contentions EX 15 and 16. I.F. 48. The statement in the GU ARD decision on which Intervenors premise their argument observes that the NRC cannot interpret the phrase "arrangements . . . made for mecical services" in 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(12)"as meaning something other than what those words, in the context of a nuclear power plant emergency planning standard, may rationally convey." GUARD, 753 F.2d at 1146; se_e I.F. 48. Intervenors then asked the Board to mechanically apply this phrase to the language of Appendix E in a manner that would require that language to be interpreted in a vacuum.

The GUARD decision does not stand for this sweeping proposition. The court in GUARD recognized that traditionally a high degree of judicial deference is afforded an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. GUARD,753 F.2d at 1148. Only where there is "violence to the plain meaning of the provision (s)" is deference not provided.

Id. at 1148-49 (emphasis supplied).

39/ See, eA, Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. United States, 648 F. Supp.

1017,1024 (D.C. Md.1986) ("When doubt exists about the clarity of the language of a statute, courts must look to the legislative history" citing United States v. Turkette,452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981)); United States v. New Castle County. 642 F. Supp.1258,1264 (D.C.

Del.1986) ("Where ambiguity exists in a statute, it is necessary to resolve doubts about interpretation through analysis of legislative history.").

n ..

E. The Board Erred in Dismissing Regulatory Guidance Issued by FEMA and NRC on the Scope and Conduct of Exercises Throughout the proceeding, LILCO, the NRC Staff and FEMA argued that NRC and FEMA guidance were helpful in interpreting the provisions of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 and accompanying footnote 4. S_ee supra pp.17-20. They argued that this guidance in-cludes a set of 35 standard exercise objectives that included all the major observable el-ements of offsite emergency plans; that these 35 objectives were required to be tested over a six-year period; that testing most of the 35 objectives provided evidence that "the major observable portions" of a plan had been tested; and that the guidance did not require an especially inclusive initial exercise. See supra pp.17-20.

The Board's conclusion about the necessary scope of initial exercises is irrecon-cilable with this FEMA and NRC regulatory guidance. The Board dealt with this con-flict by cursorily dismissing the guidance on the grounds either that it ignores the Board's own ill-premised distinction between initial and subsequent exercises or that it was intended to be limited to "subsequent" biennial exercises. PID at 19-20 n.11. The former ground ignores the obvious possibility that the expert regulators who wrote the guidance documents did not perceive any difference, for purposes of the definition of a full participation exercise, between initial and subsequent exercises. That view com-ports with the Commission's as evidenced by the Commission's comment in the preface of the December 1981 proposed rule change. See supra p. 34. The Board's rationale also ignores the f act that important parts of that body of guidance, particularly NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and the substantively equivalent predecessors of FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1, were issued prior to the Commission's 1984 rulemaking -

i.e., during the period when the phrase "as much as reasonably achievable" was found in the regulation applying to exercises for both NTOLs and operating plants. The latter ground is refuted by language in FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1, which plainly indi-cates that it was intended to discuss the scope of both initial and subsequent exercises.

LILCO EX Exh.12 at Att. E p. 2.

The Board's alternative distinction, s_e_e PID at 20 n.11 (cont.)- that guidance is only that - ignores the fact that official agency guidance still represents published thinking of agency experts, is not clearly contrary to the regulations, and is relied upon by agency staff as they frame the scope of emergency preparedness exerches. See FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 89-90.

Thus, the Board erred in dismissing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and other FEMA guidance.

III. The PID's Conclusion That the 1986 Exercise was Inadequate as a Full Participation Exercise for Licensing Falls to Give Due Deference to Agency FuertS' Views The PID's finding that the February 1986 exercise did not meet the Commission's requirements for an initi. Licensing exercise f alls to pay due deference to the views of expert witnesses, particularly those of FEMA and the NRC, concerning the design of that exercise.

The PID acknowledges and does not question the testimony of FEMA witnesses that the 1986 Shoreham exercise was as comprehensive as any that had been conducted in FEMA Region II - which includes New York, Connecticut and New Jersey - up to that time. PID at 51.S! Rather, its conclusion that the Shoreham exercise was not sufficient is premised on the conclusion, advanced by Intervenors but opposed by the expert staffs of FEMA and the NRC, that full participation exercises sufficient for ini-tial licensing purposes must meet higher requirements than subsequent full participa-tion exercises.

M/ The actual number of such exercises in Region II, though not a subject of dispute, ranks easily in the dozens since the exercise process became formalized in the early 1980s.

=

To reach this conclusion, the PID implicitly rejects the tcstimony of FEMA and NRC Staff witnesses that the 1986 Shoreham exercise was intended to constitute a full participation exercise and did constitute one in their judgment. See NRC EX Exh.1 at 7; FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 105. It also ignores the testimony of FEMA witnesses that they hrd never made any distinction between full participation exercises sufficient for ini-tial licensing purposes and subsequent full participation exercises. Tr. 7622 (Keller, Baldwin), 8513-14 (Baldwin, Keller, Kowieski). Its rejection of this testimony, without substantial explanation, fails to give due deference to the views, codifying years of ex-perience and practice, of experts not only from FEMA but from the NRC. It therefore should be reversed.

The role of FEMA in the federal government's structure for radiological emer-gency preparedness is clear. FEMA, established by Congressional Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41,943 (Sept.19,1978) and activated by Executive Order 12147 of March 31, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg.19,367, was invested with all of the President's delegable emergency planning and response authorities by Executive Order 12148 of July 20,1979 (44 Fed. Reg. 43,239). These functions include development of policies to I

l deal with "civil emergencies," defined so as to include radiological emergencies at nu-cl:ar power plants. Ld. SS 2-201, 2-203. Even more pointedly, a Presidential Directive of December 7,1979 ordered FEMA to "take the lead in offsite amergency planning and response," under the same directive, NRC was "asked to assist FEMA in these activi-ties."N!

M/ White House Fact Sheet, "The President's Response to the Recommendations of th3 President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island," December 7,1979, at 11.

Pursuant to this guidance, the NRC and FEMA entered into a Memorandum of Understanding, most recently revised in 1985. 50 Fed. Reg.15.485 (April 18,1985),

That Memorandum ,ceates a close and complex relationship of coordination and coo-peration between the agencies, in which FEMA reviews offsite emergency plans for all nuclear plants, operating and in licensing. FEMA provides findings on them and wit-nesses to support them in NRC proceedings. FEMA and NRC also bind themselves to extensive joint cooperation in exercise development and review:

Preparation for and Evaluation of Joint Exercises: FEMA and NRC will cooperate in determining exercise require-ments for licensees, state and local governme:.ts. They will also jointly observe and evaluate exercises. NRC and FEMA willinstitute procedures to enhance the review of the objec-tives and scenarios for joint exercises.

50 Fed. Reg.15,487 col.3.

This pattern of mingled responsibility is also mirrored in the two agencies' regu-lations: the speci. .e requirements for emergency preparedness, including those for ex-crcises, set forth in the NRC's regulations at 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(and especially (b)(14)),

are mirrored in FE!.1A's regulations in 44 CFR S 350.5(a) (and especially ta)(14)). The ag:ncies' most basic technical guidance on emergency preparedness is also a shared document: NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980). Similarly, the' de-tailed FEMA Guidance Memoranda, which set the working-level specifics of emergency preparedness policy implementation, are sent to the NRC for review before promulga-tion. In the review of emergency plans and preparation for exerciTs, FEMA works through Regional Assistance Committees consisting of representatives from affected ag:ncies; the NRC is represented on each RAC. 50 Fed. Reg.15,487 col.2. Finally, FEMA findings and conclusions on emergency preparedness are required by NRC regula-tions to be given a rebuttable presumption of validity in NRC proceedings. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2).

In sho*t, a detailed and interwoven pattern regulatory history establishes three basic facts: that FEMA is an expert agency invested with lead responsibility in the Federal government for offsite emergency preparedness; second, that that expertise is recognized in the NRC's regulatory structure; and third, that FEMA and the NRC have in fact so thoroughly meshed their operations and requirements for emergency pre-paredness policy and implementation as to approach regulatory symbiosis.

Thus, when the PID assertedly hinges a decision on an obligation to observe and interpret the provisions of the NRC's regulations, PID at 19-21, it merely states a tru-ism. Execution of that obligation also necessarily involves informing its understanding of those regulations by their interpretation in practice by the affected agencies - here, both NitC and FEMA. Indeed, in its prior, interlocutory consideration of the conten-tions now presented by this appeal, this Appeal Board concurred that "FEMA's profes-sional judgment as to what elements (of an offsite emergency plan] should be tested at the pre-license state is entitled to substantial deference." ALAB-861,25 NRC 129,139 n.38 (1986).

The witnesses who testified concerning the scope of the Shoreham exercise for

( FEMA (Messrs. Kowleski, Baldwin, Keller) and NRC (Messrs. Weiss, Schwartz) were le-gitimate experts with decades of experience and dozens of plant evaluations among them. The FEMA witnesses in particular had unassailable credentials: Mr. Kowleski had been chairman of the RAC for Region II of FEMA; Messrs. Baldwin and Keller were long-time consultants to the RAC who had participated in plan reviews and exercises for numerous plants including Shoreham. No serious attempt was even made by any pirty to impeach their credentials, and the Board acknowledged the FEMA witnesses' forthrightness in particular, see PID at 9 n.6.

L _ _ _ . _ _ _.

As noted above, these witnesses testified uniformly that the Shoreham exercise was designed according to standard practices for full participation exercises; that it was as comprehensive an exercise as had been held to that time in all of FEMA Region 11; that it constituted a full participation exercise in their view; and that they had never distinguished between pre-licensing and subsequent exercises. This testi-mony plainly supports the adequacy of the scopo of the Shoreham exercise, and is c'ne "substantial deference." It was never rebutted. It should have been accepted b';

Board as dispositive of the issue of the scope of the Shoreham exercise.

The PID does not deal comprehensively with this testimony. Indeed, the only as-pect of it addressed by the PID - that dealing with the exercise's comprehensiveness -

is acknowledged by the PID, apparently in concession of its indisputable accuracy. See PID at 51. The rest of the testimony, which was pointed out in post-hearing findings, see, eA, L.F. 33, 61,141,146; N.F.18, 30, 33, 8 4, was simply ignorect by the PID.

The Board's apparent reason for rejecting the effect of this testimony is appar-ently that the exercise failed to include some matters which, in its judgment, rea-sonably could have been included. PID at 51. That, however,is a legal conclusion rath-cr that a reasoned disuession. For reasons discussed elsewhere, the PID's "everything reasonably achievable" standard is incorrect. As the totally consistent and unrebutted FEMA and NRC testimony makes clear, that standard is also totally inconsistent with years of expert agency practice and in*erpretation. The PID's failure to give attention, much less appropriately deferential effect, to testimony concerning that practice in a highly technical area where complex regulations are given life by practice was clearly wrong. /.cmrdingly, its conclusion as to the adequacy of the scope of the Shoreham exercise should be reversed.

IV. Assuming the Licensing Board Was Correct in Its Interpretation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, the Board Incorrectly Concluded That the Four Items Should Have Been Included in the Exercise Even assuming that exercise design can reveal defects in an emergency plan suf-ficiently important to preclude a finding of "reasonable assurance" and thus constitute a "fundamental flaw," the Licensing Board's ruling concerning the four omissions from ths Shoreham exercise falls to analyze the materiality of those issues. It is impossible to determine from the PID whether the Licensing Board thought that omission of each of the four omitted elements was sufficiently material to constitute a "fundamental flaw," whether they constituted a "fundamental flaw" only in the aggregate, or whether taken together they constitute a "fundamental flaw" at all. Instead, the Boaro merely concludes that the exercise failed to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1.

PID at 61. In admitting Contentions EX 15 and 16, the Board noted that a failure to meet the requirements of Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 "may constitute" a fundamental flaw, December 11,1986 Order,24 NRC at 826, yet the Board never condJcts this necessary inquiry to relate its conclusions on 1 IV.F.1 to the ultimate inquiry of whether the scope of the exercise was so deficient as to preclude a reasonable assurance finding.

This failure to articulate and analyze the materiality of the omissions from the Shoreham exercise is con!rary to the UCS case and the Commission's implememing reg-ulations and decisions. The PID's failure to assess materiality is inherent in its errone-ous emphasis on the phrase "as much . . . as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" to such en extent that it excludes footnote 4 from 1 IV.F.1 in the context of initial exerciscs. As a result, the PID falls to assess whether elements ex-cluded from the exercise constitute "major observable portions" of emergency plans,S!

M/ In the PID, the Board admits that its interpretation of 1 IV.F.1 "makes it unnec-essary" for it to consider the application of footnote 4, with its "major observable por-tions"language, in considering the adequacy of the exercise design. PID at 20-21.

or alternatively, whether the omitted items, if tested and LERO's performance found to be inadequate, would have constituted a fundamental flaw in the plan. By failing to as- ,

I sess materiality, the PID leaves the determination of whether the exercise design pre-cluded a finding of "reasonable assurance" without rat:onal basis.

In addition, had the PID contained the proper inquiry, it would have found that testing of the four excluded items was either not "reasonably achievable," or not a nec-essary element of the basis for a "reasonable assurance" finding, or both.

A. EBS Station Participation The PID's conclusion that LERO should have communicated an EBS message to WALK Radio and have had WALK Radio authenticate the message, s_ee_ PID at 27-28,50, suffers from several defects. First, the PID recites no basis for concluding that WALK's participation in the exercise would have been "reasonably achievable." As noted above, Suffolk County enacted a criminal ordinance about 75 days before the exercise that made it a crime punishable by up to a year in jail and a fine of up to $1000 to partici-pate in the exercise (or potentially even in drills leading up to the exercise). See supra note 10. This chilling ordinance, which was in effect during the final exercise prepara-tion period, was enjoined only 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> before the exercise. LILCO witnesses testified l

that the only reason that the sirens were not sounded and the EBS system was not acti-vated during the exercise was because of the Suffolk County ordinance. The Board ac-cepted this testimony in concluding that the sounding of sirens and the broadcasting of an EBS message were not reasonably achievable. PID at 26. Given this conclusion, the Board does not explain how it was then reasonably achievable for WALK Radio to have received an EBS message and authenticated that message during the exercise while it was not reasonably achievable for WALK to have actually transmitted a test message to th3 general public. The appropriate conclusion is that the Suffolk County ordinance made any participation by WALK Radio not reasonably achievable. The Board never

l l

I focused on this apparent distinction, by inquiry to the parties or otherwise, in its hear-ings on this issue.

Second, the "omission" of WALK is not material to the ou*mme e' the exercise.

Th3 omission cited in the PID is extremely limited in eal world conseruence. It in-volves only the ability of WALK Radio personnel to answer a telephone chl! from LERO, verify an authentication code provided by the LERO chller, and record the EBS message read by the caller. It does not involve LERO's ability to decide that an EBS message

- should be broadcast to the general public, what that message should incluc'e, that WALK should be called to broadcast the message, or the LERO caller's ability 'a transmit the message tc WALK Radio along with the proper authentication code. 'those actions wre all demonstrated during the exercise: the LERO worker assigned to call the EBS station was given a telephone number on the day of the exercise that was purported to be WALK, he called that number and took all the actions he would take in an actual cm:rgency. See LILCO EX Exh.12 at Att. J and K. The only difference was that an exercise controllor, rather than personnel at WALK Radio answered the telephone call.

Finally, as LILCO witnesses testified, the mechanical capabilities of the public i notification. ;ystem including the transmittal and broadcasting of an EBS message will be tested in a separate FEMA-REP-10 test, and LILCO has committed to perform such a test before exceeding 5% power. LILCO EX Exh.12, at 32-33. The FEMA witnesses agreed by testifying that of ten at exercises outside FEMA Region II sirens are sounded and the EBS message broadcast in a separate REP-10 test, Tr. 8525-26 (Keller), and that separate REP-10 testing would satisfy this part of the public notification objectives, Tr. 8378 (Baldwin). Iri concluding that "accurate communication of the text of EBS messages to the radio station which is to broadcast them. . . is not a mechanical activi-ty which appropriately can be covered in a FEMA-REP-10 test," PID at 27-28, the Board disregarded the record without reasoned basis and uid not afford FEMA's

testimony the rebuttable presumption it deserved.E/

Thus, the PID erred in finding that the participation of WALK Radio was "rea-sonably achievable" or that its exclusion precluded a reasonable assurance finding.

B. School Participation In finding that it was reasonady achievable for more school districts to have participated in the Shoreham exercise, the PID essentially f aults LILCO for not having secured more definitive refusals from school districts concerning their unwillingness to participate in the February 13 exercise. As the Board notes in passing, PID at 38, many Cf the school districts that did not participate in the exercise had enacted resolutions (which were attached to Intervenors' prefiled testimony) indicating their refusd to coo-perate in emergency planning generally for Shoreham.El Similarly, the consensus tes-timony, even from Intervenors, was that further efforts to obtain additional school dis-tricts' participation would have been fruitless. PID at 38-39. Thus, the PID would condemn the Shoreham exercise for the informality of the documentation of the con-cededly accurate evidence of the unwillingness of school districts, other than 4

Shoreham-Wading River, to cooperate in the exercise. This defect is the exercise's scope could apparently be cured by obtaining more explicit denials by the school dis-tricts since those letters would illustrate why broader school participation was not "reasonably achievable."E 13 / To the extent the Board sought to bolster its conclusion by general concerns about communication capabilities during the exercise to other areas, see PID at 28 and n.14, the Board has engaged in clasic improper reasoning by hindsight.

14/ While the resolutions do not expressly note the school districts' unwillingness to participate in exercises of the LILCO Plan, their general hostill'y to LILCO'r efforts to compensate for New York State's and Suffo;k County's refusal to plan for thc Shoreham plant leaves little room to doubt that the schools would have refused to partir!pate in the 1986 exercise.

15/ This portion of the PID graphically illustrates the fallacy of exercise design as an indicator of "fundamental flaws" in an emergency plan and the unreasonableness of using only a "reasonably achievable" test for judging the acceptability of an initial exer-cise.

J

t In additMn, FEMA grcded the failure of more school districts to participate in th3 Shoreham exercise as an Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). PID at 3*l-38.

FEMA defines an ARCA as "demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to ad-v:trsely impact public health and safety." FEMA EX Exh.11(Post Exercise Assessment) at 8. By contrast, FEMA defines the more serious category of "deficiency" as "demon-strated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate pro-tective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a 1adiological emergency." Ld.

Thu3, FEMA implicity found that the absence of participation by more school districts in the Shoreham exercise was not essential for niaking a reasonable assurance finding.

The PID improperly ignored this materiality testimony without so much as a mention of the rebuttable presumption owed FEMA's testimony.

o C. Inrestion Pathway To the extent the PID can be read to hold that ingestion pathway activities were "reasonably achievable" during the exercise, it is inconsistent with the manner in which the Board applied the term "reasonable assurance" in other parts of the PID and ignores th9 testimony in the record. The Board found that the testing of recovery / reentry ac-tivities was not reasonably achievable because EPA guidance on acceptable reentry doses has not been finalized. PID at 46. Thus, it recognized that a relevant aspect of its "reasonable assurance" test was that the exercising of a particular plan element needed to yield productive results. The uncontradicted testimony in the proceeding, acknowledged by the PID, was that ingestion pathway exercises are not uniformly per-formed, and that New York State has habitually not performed them because of the ab-sence of definitive guidance from FEMA. PID at 43-44.EI The PID does not explain M/ Such guidance as exists on this issue from FEMA - Guidance Memorandum IN was in draf t form at the time of the 1986 exercise and remains in draf t form today. _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l how, in light of. the absence of final FEMA guidance on ingestion pathway activities,

th iy wet 1"reasonably achievable." l 4 Alternatively, the PID could be read to hold that the last sentence of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 requires initial exercises to include a full ingestion path- 4 way exercise. See PID at 12 and 44. The last sentence of 1 N.F.1 provides, in part, that the "full participation" exercise which is conducted within two years of the ,

granting of a license to operate above 5% power "shall include participation by . . .

eich State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ." LILCO argued that this "par-ticipation" language requires States in the ingestion pathway to participate to the ex-t:nt required by the exercise scenario, Tr. 6850-52 (Daverio), and that during the exer-cise the State of Connecticut did just that Tr. 6851-52 (Daverlo). The Board rejected this argument. PID at 44 n.20.

The Board's conclusion is insupportable for a number of reasons. First, the PID reaches its definitive conclusion about the need for inge', tion pathway testing during initial exercises without attempting to parse the language of 1 W.F.1, which does not expressly require such testing, in addition, the Board does not explain how its interpre-I tation of 1 IV.F.1 squares with the remainder of 1 W.F. which only requires a State to 1

test its ingestion pathway plans once every five years, regardless of the number of sites whose ingestion pathway EPZs may include some part of that State,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 N.F. Second, the Board does not explain why it is essential for the Shoreham exercise to have included full ingestion pathway testing when at the time of th3 exercise it acknowledges, PID at 43, that such testing had never been conducted for a_ny nuclear power plant in New York State.EI Finally, the Board's interpretation E/ New York State witnesses attempted to argue that some, though not all, inges-tion pathway objectives had been tested in some early exercises in New York State.

Tr. 7232-33, 7240-41 (Baranski, Czech); see also I.F. at 63-64. In response, FEM A wit-nesses testified that early New York State exercises involved only limited ingestion pathway testing, using now outdated guidance, in which New York State's performance had been "absolutely unsatisf actory." Tr. 7527-28 (Keller).

. rejects without explanation the testimony of both the NRC Staff and FEMA that the Shoreham exercise was consistent in scope with other exercises and that, in practice, initial exercises have not been different than other subsequot "ft'.1 participation" ex-crcises.El D. Special Facilities The Board's finding that it was "reasonably achievable" for the exercise to have included actual communications between LERO and special facilities and additional testing of employees of ambulance and ambulette companies, other than drivers, PID at  ;

i 46-50, is in error as a matter of law because it f alls to consider the materiality of those it:;ms and rejects without explanation the testimony of the FEMA witnesses. As with j the earlier discussion of the actual participation of WALK Radio, the falle e of person-

,. nel at special facilities to answer telephone calls made by LERO workers has very little j real world consequence. In cases where the special facility has its own. vehicles to transport its residents out of the EPZ, the call serves only to inform personnel of the protective action recommendation - the special facility personnel should already have been aware of that recommendation because of sirens, EBS messages and the signal of a tone alert radio present in the facility. For special facilities needing transportation as-l

! sistance, the call would normally serve to inform the facility when to expect the arrival of LERO vehicles. Only if the transportation support data, which are updated annually under the LILCO Plan, are inaccurate would any meaningful information ex-change take place during the telephone call. Hence, the omission of actual calls to g/ During the litigation of Contentions EX 15 and 16, the Board did not inquire about the importance of States located only in the ingestion pathway EPZ participating in full ingestion pathway exercises for NTOLs. Public documents available in the NRC's public document room reveal that the Limerick, River Bend and Perry stations were 11-censed based on qualifying exercises that were conducted af ter the 1984 revisions to Appendix E 1 IV.F.1 and did not include participation by States located only in those stations' ingestion pathway EPZs.

i s.

3 51-special f acilities was not of such materiality as to preclude a reasonable assurance find-ing. ,

In addition, as the Board concedes, see PID at 49, FEMA witnesses testified that all special facilities did not need to be'actually contacted in the first Shoreham exer-cise. Instead, in FEMA's expert judgment it was appropriate to use a sampling ap-proach for these facilities such that all facilities would participate at least once over a six year period. Without explanation, the Board dismissed this testimony and applied blindly its "reasonably achievable" test.

The basis for the PID's conclusion that more ambulance companies should have been tested during the Shoreham exercise is not obvious. On page 48, it cites Interve-nors' testimony that "FEMA interviewed no ambulance company officia!S and thus did not evaluate whether ambulance company officials were knowledgeable about what was expected under the Plan." Then on the following page the Board recites that "we agree that an evaluation of the preparedness of the ambulance and ambulette companies should have been included." PID at 49. Since FEMA evaluated the performance of am-bulance drivers by observing them being briefed, receiving dosimetry and departing for th3 field, and then by accompanying them on their field assignments, it appears that th3 Board is holding that FEMA should also have evaluated officials at the ambulance companies. Under the LILCO Plan, the only function these officials would perform dur-ing an emergency is to dispatch ambulances to the Emergency Operations Center where th3 drivers would be briefed by LERO workers and dispatched into the fleid.EI This dispatching function is nothing more than these officials' everyday job. Accordingly, FEMA's failure to observe these officials cannot possibly preclude a reasonable assurance finding.

M/ Ambulance drivers from one contractor, Peconic Ambulance Service, are not briefed and dispatched from the EOC; instead, they receive their briefings at, and are dispatched from, the company yard in Jamespwt by a LERO Dosimetry Record Keeper from ths Riverhead Staging Area. See OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.6.1.

c i

CONCLUSION 3;

For the reasons stated in Section I above, the Appeal Board should reverse the Licensing Board's decision on the ground that Contentions EX 15 and 16 were improp-crly admitted. Alternatively, if the Appeal Board concludes that admission of Conten-ti:ns EX 15 and 16 was consistent with the "fundamental flaw" standard specified by th3 Commission in CLI-86-11, then it still must reverse the Licensing Board's decision of the reasons specified in Section II, III and IV above.

Reversal of the Licensing Board's decision on the basis of the arguments in Sec-tiens II, III and IV does not require the contentions to be remanded to the Licensing ,

Board for further consideration.

As.noted above, Contentions EX 15 and 16, as litigated, do not involve areas of substantial factual controversy. The FEMA witnesses testified without contradiction that they followed the typical FEMA practice in framing the scope of the Shoreham ex-crcise. As the Licensing Board found, the Shoreham exercise was as comprehensive as any conducted in Region II up to that time. It included the testing of the vast majority (29 of 35) of the standard FEMA objectives plus seven other objectives and involved the participation of the entire Local Emergency Response Organization as well as a number of other non-LERO entitles.

The remaining controversy centers on interpreting the Commission's regulations cod applying them in ke3 ping with the Commission's limitations, specified in CLI-86-11, on hearings concerning exercises - a matter certainly within the expertise of this Ap-peal Board. Once the Appeal Board has properly interpreted thme regulations, it is a straightforward matter to apply them to the facts of the Shoreham exercise to con-clude that the scope of the exercise was sufficient to provide the basis for a reasonable assurance finding under 10 CFR S 50.47(a).

i Finally, there remains a need for expedition in resolution of this appeal. Over 23 months have passed since the Shoreham exercise and it appears likely, absent a waiver or exemption, that LILCO will be forced to conduct another exercise before it can ob-tain a full power license.N Until a decision has been rendered on the principles gov-crning the scope of an initial exercise, LILCO and agency planners cannot know what is necessary to ensure that the exercise scope will be acceptable. On December 17,1987, LILCO requested tne NRC to conduct another exercise. Accordingly, it is essential to have a prompt, definitive ruling on these issues so that the planning process for this ex-crcise can proceed in an informed manner.

Accordingly, the Appeal Board should reverse the Partial Initial Decision and dis-miss Contentions EX 15 and 16 as without merit.

Respectfully submitted,

/ . '%

. Donald P. Irwin Lee B. Zeugin l Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 19,1988 50/ Commission regulations require that, in the absence of a waiver or exemption, an exercise for the first license to operate above 5% of rated power must be conducted not more than 24 months before the date of issuance of that license.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 1 IV.F.1.

LILCO, January 19,1988 00f.KETCO UWC CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 88 JM 20 P4 :14 FFiG c; q g t w ,,

00CXC m aa s!.avig' N""

In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 I hereby certify that copies of the APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 were served this date upon the following by Federal Express, as indicated by an asterisk, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.

Christine N. Kohl, Chairman

• Dr. Oscar H. Paris

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Fitth Floor (North Towers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway 4350 East-West Hwy.

Dethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Alan S. Rosenthal

• Mr. Frederick J. Shon

• Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Fif th Floor (North Tower) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers East-West Towers, Rm. 430 4350 East-West Highway 4350 East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 Dr. W. Reed Johnson

• Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W.

Fitth Floor (North Tower) Washington, DC 20555 East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts Bethesda, MD 20814 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street N.W.

John H. Frye, III. Chairman

• Washington, DC 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers 1717 H Street, N.W.

4350 East-West Hwy. Washington, DC 20555 Bethesda, MD 20814 Commissioner Kenneth M. Carr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555

1 i

i Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. *  !

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard J. Zahnleuter Esq. i 1717 H Street, N.W. Special Counsel to the Governor  !

L Washington, DC 20555 Executive Chamber Room 229  ;

~ James P. Gleason, Chairman

• State Capitol  :

. At:mic Safety and Licensing Board Albany, New York 12224

l. 513 Gilmoure Drive  !

l Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Alf red L. Nardelli, Esq.-

Assistant Attorney General l Dr. Jerry R. Kline

• 120 Broadway ' r Atomic Safety and Licensing Room 3-118 i

?

Board New York, New York 10271 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

East-West Towers, Rm. 427 Spence W. Perry, Esq.

• i 4350 East-West Hwy. William R. Cumming, Esq.  !

Bethesda, MD 20814 Federal Emergency Management [

Agency Secretary of the Commission 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Attention Docketing and Service Washington, D.C. 20472 l 4

Section i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Jay Dunkleberger i New York State Energy Office 1717 H Street, N.W.

i Washington, D.C. 20555 Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza p

Atomic Safety and Licensing Albany, New York 12223 l Appeal Board Panel ,

. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Stephen B. Latham, Esq. * ,

d Washington, D.C. 20555 Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West Second Street Atomic Safety and Licensing P.O. Box 298 l Board Panel Riverhead, New York 11901 i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

[ Mr. Philip McIntire  ;

l Washington, D.C. 20555 l Federal Emergency Management Agency l Edwin J. Reis. Esq.

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 26 Federal Plaza  !

11555 Rockville Pike New York, New York 10278 .

c'  !

One White Flint North Betherta, MD 20814 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq. i New York State Department of  !

H;rbert H. Brown, Esq.

• Public Service, Staff Counsel  !

Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. Three Rockefeller Plaza i

\Karla J. Letsche, Esq. Albany, New York 12223 l Kirkpatrick & Lockhart  ;

South Lobby - 9th Floor Ms. Nora Bredes  ;

1800 M Street, N.W. Executive Coordinator  !

Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Shoreham Opponents' Coalition  !

i 195 East Main Street Smithtown, New York 11787 f i

i t

Gerald C. Crotty, Esq. Dr. Monroe Schneider Counsel to the Governor North Shore Committee Executive Chamber P.O. Box 231 State Capitol Wading River, NY 11792 Albany, New York 12224 Martin Bradley Ashare Esq.

Eugene R. Kelly, Esq.

Suffolk County Attorney H. Lee Dennison Building Vct:rans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11787 L'eh B. Zeu$6 (/

Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 19,1988 J

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

ATTACIIMENTS TO APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 l

l Donald P. Irwin Lee B. Zeugin llunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 January 19,1988 i

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGIITING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-32':.'OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

ATTACIIMENTS TO APPEAL BRIEF OF LONG ISLAND

_ LIGHTING COMPANY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 1

Donald P. Irwin Lee B. Zeugin Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 i January 19,1988 i

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LIST OF ATTACliMENTS A. Contentions EX 15 and 16 B. LILCO EX Exh.12 (LILCO's Written Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16) with Attachment E (GM PR-1)

C. FEMA EX Exh. 5 at 89-140 (FEMA's Written Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16)

D. NRC EX Exh.1 (NRC Staff's Written Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16)

E. Cited Transcript Pages from February 13,1986 Exercise Proceedings F. Letter to Secretary of the Commission, NRC, from Donald B. Davidoff, State of New York Department of Health (September 6,1983) 2 I

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ATTACHMENT A i

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Contentions EX 15 and EX 16: (The matters set forth in subpart C of EX 18 are admitted as additional alleged deficiencies in the exercise; and the matters alleged in EX 20 are deemed covered by EX 15 and 16 3. The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful re-sults on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of major portions of the LILCO Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities telled upon to implement the LILCO Plan. The data set forth in subparts A-1, K and M of Contention EX 15 and A-L and N of Contention EX 16 individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in tne LILCO Plan. The exercise results do not dem-onstrate that the LILCO Plan could or would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.

Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Nei-ther the exercise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the exercise, nor an," FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the elements identified in EX 26 A-1, E ano M of emergency preparedness required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654.

The f ailure of each of the persons and entities identified in EX 16 A-L and N below to participate in the exercise both individually and collectively means that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR 55 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2).

Rather, the exercise results were so limited that they demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the scope of the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

l Other than LILCO and its personnel, the majority of the organizations, entities, l

and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for implementation of that Plan did not l participate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did not address the willingness, avall-ability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in EX 16 A-L and N below, each of which is necessary to imple-ment the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart. The f act that each of l

these entities and individuals did not participate in the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of reasonable assurance l that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham l emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.

EX 15.A. [ Subparts C and D of EX 16 subsumed in this subpart: and the f ailure to test sirens as alleged in EX 24 will be considered as an example of an additional omission ) . Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency information and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4. 3.S-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were ex-cluded f rom the exercist. in that sirens, the LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notifica-tion capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the notification capabilities

2-of LILCO's EBS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are re-quired by 10 CF" S 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR Part 50, App. E 5 IV.D: NUREG 0604 SS II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demonstrated in the exercise. Objectives EOC 14 and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable as-surance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a "prompt notification test" would cor-rect this deficiency (see letter dated June 20, 1986, from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demon-strate the ability of LILCO's offsite response organization to integrate that single por-tion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be implemented.

EX 16.C. [This subpart subsumed in basis A of EX 15). WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon for initial notification of the public of an emergency as well as for issuance to the public of protective action recommendations and other emergency information. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; OPIP 3.8.2.

EX 16.D. [This subpart subsumed in basis A of EX 15). No other radio stations participated in the exercise. Under the LILCO Plan, stations WBL1, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM, WLIX, WLNG, WRCN, WRHD, and WRIV are relied upon to constitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are relied upon for initial notification of, and com-munication of protective action recommendations and other emergency information to, the public. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B.

EX 24. [ Not separatelv admitted but f ailure to test sirens will be dealt with as an additional example of an omission under subpart A of EX 15). EOC ARCA 7 refers to the f act that there was no activation of the siren system during the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren system is the central feature of the prompt notification system in the LILCO Plan. See Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding that LILCO can and will provide early notifica-tion of an emergency to the public as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

EX 15.B. [Subpart B of EX 16 subsumed in this subpart). Procedures for notifi-cation of, and issuance of protective action recommendations to, the members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and i

at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, were ex-cluded from the exercise, in that the U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exer-cise (other than perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEMA never l

cvaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arcuendo there was any). Such capabill-ties are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR Part 50, App. E,5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F. Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. See, e.g., FEMA Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures f rom the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham

l emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is funda-mentally flawed.

l EX 15.H. (Subpart F> of EX 16 subsumed in this subpart). Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set iorth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J. and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in f act was no demonstration of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham acci-dent as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is f undamentally flawed.

EX 16.B. [This subpart subsumed in bases B and H of EX 15). The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exarcise beyond perhaps receiving phone calls, it is

alled upon for initial notification of, and communication and implementation of pro-tective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and commercial vessel traffic control and access restriction on the water portion of the EPZ. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OPIP 3.3.4. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ. FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any of these activities, including, if it occurred in fact, the dispatching of any Coast Guard vessels into the EPZ.

EX 15.C. Procedures for public education and the dissemination of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1, and at pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public education materials, were excluded from the exercise. Such pro-grams and materials are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D and NUREG 0654 5 II.G. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

EX 15.D. (Subparts H, I, and J of EX 16 subsumed in this subpart). Procedures relating to evacuation of EPZ hospital patients and patients in the Suffolk Infirmary, and a demonstration Of the capability of implementing such an evacuation, were ex-cluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850 patients in the Central Suffolk.

St. Charles, and John T. Mather Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2),

of which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric. Proce-dures to evacuate these persons and the capability and resources to implement them are required by 10 CFR 55 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.9 and 10.

Their exclusion from the exerche precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

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EX 16.H. (This subpart subsumed in basis D of EX 15). Officials from hospitals i located in the EPZ - Central Suffolk Hospital, St. Charles Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital- and the Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the exercise. Such cfficials are relied upon for determination and implementation of protective action recommen-dations for hospital patients. See App. A at IV-172: OPIP 3.6.5 5 2.0 (Note); OPIP 3.6.1 l 5 5.3.2.

EX 16.I. (This subpart subsumed in basis D of EX 15). Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ did not participate in tne ex- ,

ercise. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation of protective action recom- l mendations for the residents and patients in such homes. See App. A at 11-28 thru -29.

IV-173 thru -176: OPIP 3.6.5.

EX 16.J. [This subpart subsumed in basis D of EX 15). Officials from hospitals, I nursing homes, and similar f acilities outside the EPZ relied upon for relocation services and necessary health care for special f acility evacuees did not participate in the exer-cise. The LILCO Plan f ails to include agreements for such f acilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in violation of NUREG 0654 5 II.J.10; instead, the Plar, merely includes a list of such f acilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for relocation services and necessary health care for evacuees from hospi-tals, nursing and adult homes in the EPZ. See App. A at IV-166a thru -108, IV-172 thru

-178; OPIP 3.6.5.

EX 15.E. (Subpart F of EX 16 subsumed in this subpart). Procedures relating to i the sheltering of school children (Lee OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; App. A at U-19 thru -21) I were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10. Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of the protective action of sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed school shel-tering procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emer-gency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamen-tally flawed.

EX 15.F. (Subparts F and G of EX 16 and EX 26 subsumed in this subpart).

< FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability necessTry to ef- 1 feet an early dismissal of schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the ex- ,

ercise objectives. See objective EOC 18: FIELD 15; FEMA Report at 38. Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary protective actions for school chil-dren. LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A at 11-19 thru -21; OPIP 3.6.b. Thus, procedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and :he ability to implement them are required i by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J. Officials of most of the school dis- l t

tricts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of early dismissals have j l stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively I

implementing an early dismissal during a Shorcham accident. FEMA's iallure to observe l any demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early dismissal during the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be implemented in the event of a shoreham ae-cident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamen*

tally flawed.

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EX 15.G. (Subparts F and G of EX 16, EX 26. and EX 30 subsumed in this subpart). Procedures relating to the evacuation of school children, as set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 and in Appendix A at U-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobilize neces-sary personnel and equipment to implement an evacuation, were excluded from the ex-ercise. Such procedures and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS U.J.9 and 10. Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively implementing an evacuation of school children during a Shoreham accident. And, the one free play message in the exercise purportedly involving simu-lated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the resources or capabilities of officials of that school or of the Longwood School District to implement an evacuation, and thus f ailed to demonstrate the re-sources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacuation of school chudren set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures f rom ti.. exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective mea-sures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(aX1), and precludes any finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16 were met.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is f undamentauy flawed.

EX 16.F. [This subpart subsumed in bases E. F, and G of EX 15). Other than one or two persons f rom the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools,13 nursery schools, and 33 public schools located in the EPZ, as well as those from the seven school dis-tricts outside the EPZ but with children who reside within the EPZ, did not participate in the exercise. Personnel from such schools are relied upon for implementation of protective action recommendations for school children under the LILCO Plan. See App. A at U-19 thru -21, IV-169 thru -171; OPIP 3.6.5.

EX 26. [Not separatelv admitted but will be dealt with under subparts F and G of EX 15). EOC ARCA 9 refers to the f act that only Shoreham-Wading River Central School District participated in the exercise. FEMA Report at 41. According to the LILCO Plan, all protective actions for school children are to be implemented by school district and school personnel, not by LILCO. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at U-19 thru -21.

There are 33 public schools,15 private and nursery schools, and one BOCES supervisory district within the EPZ; in addition, there are seven school districts outside the EPZ with children who reside within the EPZ, plus three private schools and one BOCES su-pervisory district with buildings located just beyond the EPZ. App. A at U-19 thru -21 and IV-169 thru -171. The LILCO Plan relles upon these school officials and personnel, and their f ailure to participate in the exercise constitutes a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for school children in the event of a Shoreham accident.

EX 30. [Not separatelv admitted txt will be dealt with under subpart G of EX 15). Patchogue SA ARCA 5 ref ers to the f act that it took 40 minutes to dispatch a LILCO bus driver to pick up a bus to use to simulate the evacuation of 40 children from the Ridge Elementary School. FEMA Report at 67. Under the LILCO Plan, such proce-dures, involving the use of LILCO bus drivers for evacuation, are relied upon for evacu-ation of special f acilities and nursery schools (OPIP 3.6.5), although with respect to all other schools including Ridge, LILCO assumes that regular school bus drivers would per-form necessary driving duties. This defielewy demonstrates LILCO's inability to promptly communicate transportation needs of members of the public and to l

effectively implement procedures to effect evacuation of special f acilities. Thus, it precludes a finding that LILCO has adequate provisions for prompt communication among response personnel as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(6), or that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10).

It also precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

EX 16.G. (This subpart subsumed in bases F and G of EX 15). Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school bus drivers did not participate in the exercise. School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for implementation of the pro-tective actions for school children of early dismissal and evacuation. See LILCO Plan, App. A at 11-19 thru -20; OPIP 3.6.5.

EX 15 I. (Subpart A of EX 16 and EX 37 subsumed in this subpart). Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommendation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru 3.E-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement such procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located in the State of New York. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR 5 $0.47(b)(10),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E,5 IV.F. and NUREG 0654 5 II.J. and by objectives EOC 9,12. Their exclu-sion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that aequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as re-quired by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

EX 16.A. [This subpart subsumed in basis I of EX 15). The State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps receiving a phone call from a LILCO "player" at approximately 10:30. Connecticut is relied upon for issuance and imple-mentation of protective actions for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located within its borders. See LILCO Plan at 3.6-8; OPIP 3.6.6.

EX 37. (Not separatelv admitted but incorporated into subpart I of EX 15). The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the LERO players did not determine, recommend or implement the protective actions necessary to mitigate the et 4 sequences of a radiological release in the ingestion pathway, as required by OPIP 3.6.6,10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J 11. For the reasons set forth below, LILCO f ailed to satisfy objectives EOC 8 and 12 and the exercise results pre-clude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1).

Specifically, during the exercise the LERO personnel at the EOC f ailed to per-form any of the following actions:

EX 37.A. LERO personnel f ailed to extend protective action recommendations for the ingestion pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ and thus f ailed to mitigate the ra-diological consequences of the accident, as required by OPIP 3.6.6, 55 1, 2 and 5. Ac- >

l cording to OPIP 3.6.6, when a Site Area Emergency is declared, it is to be immediately recommended that milk producing animals in those zones within two miles of the plant be placed on stcred feed. OPIP 3.6.6,5 5.1.1.1.b. During the exercise, LERO made this recommendation for zones A-E at 8:19 when the Site Area Emergency was announced.

At that time, there had not yet been a significant release and no protective actions had

yet been recommended for people (except for the dismissal of school children). Pursu-ant to OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.c. at 10:24, when a General Emergency was declared, LERO expanded its earlier recommendation to include milk producing animals in the entire 10-mile EPZ. At that time, LERO was recommending evacuation of the public from only zones A-M, Q and R. However, when LERO's evacuation recommendation was ex-panded to cover the entire 10-mile zone, well af ter there had been a substantial re-lease, and there were projections of substantial doses out to the 10-mile boundary, there was no further expansion of the recommendation to shelter milk-producing animals out-side the EPZ boundary and place them on stored feed. Documents generated at the EOC f ail to indicate that such a recommendation was ever even considered. This f all-ure violates OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.1.1.1.a. which expressly provides:

In the early stages of an emergency, the milk pathway is the most significant. Thus, early protective actions for pre-venting contamination of milk in the affected area are ree-ommended prior to obtaining confirmatory data.

LILCO's f ailure even to consider whether to expand its recommended protective mea-sures to include the milk pathway beyond the 10-mile EPZ demonstrates LILCO's noncompliance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.11.

EX 37.B. LERO personnel never recommended any protective measures for other than dairy animals, such as, for example, pigs, lambs, commercially grown ducks, turkeys, and other poultry, either inside or outside the EPZ, and thus iailed to mitigate the radiological consequences of the accident as required by OPIP 3.6.6. In light of the releases projected during the exercise, such animals could have become contaminated.

There is no indication that LERO personnel even considered the need for protective measures to cover these elements of the food chain. The f ailure to consider and to make protective action recommendations for non-dairy animals constitutes noncompli-ance with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.11.

EX 37.C. LERO personnel iailed to make protective action recommendations concerning drinking water, fruits, vegetables and other food chain items, contrary to l

OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.4.3.1. That OPIP provides that if (1) a release is in progress and (2) o!! site dose projections have been completed, the public should be advised that such items may be contaminated. During the exercise, there was an early release (at ap-proximately 8:30), followed by a larger release when the core melt began (at approxi-mately 11:30). Dose projections were available by 11:49. However, LILCO never warned the public of possible food chain contamination, even though the LILCO players

! were told that approximately 18 percent of the public had not yet evacuated from the 10-mile EPZ by 2:40.

EX 37.D. During the exercise, LERO personnel apparently never completed the "Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for Particulate Radionuclide Releases," OPIP 3.5.2, Att. 3, although the necessary data were apparently available and completion of such a form is required by OPIP 3.5.2, S 5.3, and OPIP 3.6.6.

For the foregoing reasons, the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan complies with 10 CFR 55 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.11, and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

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EX 15.J. Not admitted.

EX 15.K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamina-tion of evacuees from special f aeliltles who, according to the LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special reception centers, were excluded from the exercise. Such proce-dures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR 55 50.47(b')(8), (b)(10): NUREG 0654 S II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21.

Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

EX iS.M. Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities tc imple-ment recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13),10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E 5 IV H, and NUREG 0654 S II.M.

Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that ade-quate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

EX 16.E. According to FEMA, Marketing Evaluations, Inc. did not participate in the exercise. FEMA Report at 111. It is relied upon for verification of siren operation and evacuation. See LILCO Plan at 2.2-4g, App. A at V-9, and App. B; OPIP 3.3.4.

EX 16.K. The following bus companics or yards did not participate in the exer-cise:

(1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - East Northport Yard (50)

(2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - Amityville Yard (74)

(3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100)

(4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29)

I (5) United Bus Corp. - Ronkonkoma Yard (46)

(6) Suffolk Transportation Servlee, Inc. - Lakeland Yard (40) l (7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. - Bayshore Yard (147)

(8) Coram Bus Service - Coram Yard (39)

(9) Coram Bus Service - Rocky Point Yard (27)

(10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines, Inc. (39)

(11) Starlite Bus Co., Inc. (60)

(12) Sesman Bus Co., Inc. (35)

l They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that l the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity would provide for LILCO's use the num-ber of buses indicated in parentheses above. See LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.4.

EX 16.L. The following ambulance companies did not participate in the exer-cise:

1 (1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (8)

(2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5)

(3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service (7)

(4) Nassau Ambulance Service (11)

(5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18)

(6) Orlando Arabulance and Ambulette Service, Inc. (6)

(7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. (10)

(8) Transportation With Care (9)

(9) Weir Metro AmbuService. Inc. (62)

They are relied upon for implementation of tao protective cetion of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company will provide the number of ambulance and arnbulette vehicles, manned with the necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list. See LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.5.

EX 16.M. Not aomitted.

EX 18.C. ( Admitted as further deficiencies in support of EX 15 and 16]. The exercise did not ensure that emergency organization personnel are iamiliar with their duties. As described below and in Contention EX 16, the organizations and personnel listed in Contention EX 16 did not participate in the exercise and the participation of certain other organizations was so limited that the exercise did not ensure that the per-

! sonnel of such organizations, relied upon for implementation of the LILCO Plan, are f a-miliar with their duties. Specifically:

(i) The "participation" of the following bus companies or yards in the exercise consisted merely of receiving a telephone call and a request that only four buses be prepared for LILCO's use (the LILCO Plan assumes each yard actually will pro-l vide the number of buses listed in parentheses):

(a) Bruno Bus Company (30)

(b) Educational Bus Transportation, Inc. (100)

(c) Suburbia Bus Corp. - Setanket Yard (80)

"- 4. (d) Suburbia Bus Corp. - Middle Island Yard (110)

(e) United Bus Corp. - Yaphank Yard (64)

(f) United Bus Corp. - Coram Yard (90)

(g) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - Westhampton Yard (5)

(h) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. - Bohem'ia Yard (90)

(ii) The "participation" of the Medibus, Inc. and Stat Equipment Corp.

ambulance companies consisted only of providing 12 vehicles (six ambulances and six ambulettes). Those companies are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, however, for 11 am-bulances and 45 ambublettes, all 51 of which are supposed to be properly manned by trained workers. LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 6.

(iii) The only "participation" by the Nassau County Red Cross in the ex-ercise was the presence of two individuals in the EOC and perhaps a small number at the Nassau Coliseum. The LILCO Plan assumes that the Nassau Red Cross will provide personnel at the reception center to identify congregate care centers, to assign evacuees to such centers, to open and operate as many congregate care centers as are necessary to handle the total number of evacuees, and to provide shelter management, food services, clothing, registration, information, nursing, medical services, and conseling. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2, 3.6-7, and 3.6-7a. .

(iv) . The only "participation" of the U.S. Coast Guard in the exercise was to engage in telephone conversations. N.o actions were taken by the Coast Guard to im-plement or to demonstrate the capability of implementing the LILCO Plan, despite the f act that the LILCO Plan relles upon the Coast Guard for notification of, and communi-cation of protective action recommendations to, the public on the waters of the EPZ as well as private and commercial vessel traffic control and access control on the water portion of the EPZ. LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a; App. A at IV-6.

t (v) The "participation" of the Shoreham-Wading River School District in the exercise was limited to one or two telephone calls to one school official (the Dis-trict Superintendent), and interviews with two school bus drivers located at one of the '

- district's schools. No early dismissal, sheltering or evacuation was performed; no chil-dren were moved or otherwise involved; no teachers, principals, or other school person-nel were involved; and, the two bus drivers did nothing but drive their buses to the high school when requested to do so by the Superintendent. The LILCO Plan, however, relies upon actions by school officials and school personnel from all the district's schools, and ,

substantially all the school bus drivers, and the cooperation of parents, to impicment an early dismissal, sheltering, or evacuation of school enildren. OPIP 3.6.5; App. A at 11-19 t tha -22.

(vi) The "part!91pation" of Nassau County in the exercise was limited to the receipt of phone calls. According to the LILCO Plan, however, Nassau County is .

expected to receive regular briefings (OPIP 3.1.1, Att. I at 10), and to provide police officers to perform traffic control on the public roads near the Nassau Coliseum, to perform traffic control and supervise parking at the Coliseum (OPIP 4.2.3 5 2.5), and to provide security at the Coliseum. Plan at 3.6-7, 4.7-1. In addition, during the exercis9, LERO personnel pretended to request that Nassau County provide social service assis-tance. In the exercise, Nassau County performed none of those functions.

, _ _ <y.

ATTACHMENT B I

1 L

- - . - . ,. .c- .-- , - ,, .

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street

! P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 April 6,1987

TABLE OF CONTENTS Ta ble of C on t en ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

1. Background ................................................3 II. The February 13,1986 Exercise Was a "Full

- Participation" Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 A. The February 13 Exercise Tested as Much of the Emergency Plan as Was "Reasonably A c hie v a ble" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 B. Licensee Personnel and Other Resources Were -

Mobilized "in Sufficient Numbers" to Verify Capability to Respond to an Accident ........................18 C. The February 13 Exercise Tested a "Major" '

Portion of Emergency Response Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 (1) The Exercise Tested a Vast Majority of the Standard FEMA Exercise O bjec t i v es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 (2) Among the Objectives Tested were the "Core" Objectives in FEMA Draf t Guidance Memorandum EX-3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 (3) The Exerche Tested Objectives Additional to the Standard FEM A Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 (4) The Exercise Objectives Deemed Most Important in a Report Ranking Various Aspects of Emergency Preparedness Were Tested in the Exercise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 III. The Alleged Omissions in the February 13,1986 Exercise Would Not Render the Exercise Less Than "Full Par ticipa tion" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 IV. Similar FEMA-Approved Exercises in Region II and Elsewhere Have Been Deemed Full Participation E x e r c ises b y N R C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

ee:LILCOtesKb LILCO, April 6,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 1 Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. [Daverio] My name is Charles A. Daverlo. My business address is Long Is-land Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, P.O. Box 628, Wading River, New York 11792.

(Behr] My name is Dennis M. Behr. My business address is The Behr Con-sulting Group, Inc.,360 Veterans Highway, Commack, New York 11725.

l

[Hockert) My name is John W. Hockert. My business address is Interna-l tional Energy Associates, Ltd.,1717 Louisiana N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110.

1 l

2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications relating to Contentions EX 15 and 16.

A. (Daverio) I am the Assistant Department Manager of the Nuclear Op-erations Support Department for the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO). My professional qualifications have been offered into evidence as part of the document entitled "Professional Qualifications of LILCO Wit-nesses on Exercise Contentions." My f amiliarity with the issues dealt with in Contentions EX 15 and 16 stems from my work in developing and

implementing the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Offdte Ra-diological Emergency Response Plan (the "LILCO Plan") for Shoreham, from my participation as Lead Controller for the Local Emergency Response Or-ganization (LERO) in the February 13, 1986 Exercise and from my in-volvement in the preparation of the Exercise scenario. In addition, through my work as an emergency planner, I am familiar with the applicable regu-lations and guidelines.

[Behr] I am a principal in The Behr Consulting Group, whlen provides consulting services for LILCO on emergency planning issues. My familiari-ty with the issues raised in Contentions EX 15 and 16 stems primarily from my work as a consultant on emergency planning matters with The Behr Consulting Group and with my previous employer. Impell Corporation, and from my involvement in the preparation of the Exercise scenario.

In addition, I have participated in a number of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) exercises for other power plants. This expe-rience provides me with a basis to compare the performanca of LERO against the performance of other cifsite orgnnizations in FEMA exercises.

My full proftssional qualifications have been offered into evidence as part of the document entitled "Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses l

on Exer'.ise Contentions."

l

( Hockert ] I am a Senior Consultant for International Energy Associates Ltd. liEAL). My full professional qualifications have been offered into evi-dence as part of the document entitled "Professional Qualifications of I

I LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions." My familiarity with the issues in Contentions EX 15 and 16 stems from my work in the emergency plan-ning area over the past four years. I have managed a project developing

and validating a method to quantify the relative importance of each of the 35 standard exercise objectives developed by FEMA to track NUREG-0654 l

planning standards (the IEAL Report); I have managed a project to develop an exercise evaluation modiale for the ingestion exposure pathway; I have reviewed the radiological emergency preparedness program for the Salem Nuclear Power Station and recommended corrective actions: I have partici-pated in a project to develop the FEMA-REP-10. "Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power PJants" (1985); and I have participated in a project to develop criteria for preparulon and eval-uation of radiological emergency response plans and preparedness in sup-port of nuclear fuel cycle facilities.

I. _ Background

3. Q. What is the regulatory framework applicable in this proceeding?

A. (Daverio, Behr) In order to ensure emergency preparedness, the Commis-sion's regulations require that a "full participation exercise" that "tests as much of the licensee, state and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation" shall be conducted for each nuclear power site within one year before the issuance of the first full power operating license.10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E,5 IV.F(1). At sites l with an OL, the regulations require biennial full participation exercises.

Appendix E, S IV.F(3). Full participation is defined as "testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobiliza-tion of state, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient l numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." Ap-pendix E,5 IV.F(1) n.4.

l l

4. Q. What issues have you been asked to address in your testimony?

A. (Daverio, Behr, Hockert) We have been asked to address the Intervenors' Emergency Planning Contentions EX 15 and 16. These contentions allege that the February 13, 1986 Exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited in scope that it did not yield meaningful results on implementation capability in that it did not include: (1) demonstrations or evaluations of major por-tions of the LILCO Plan or (2) the emergency response capabilities of many persons and entitles relied upon for Plan implementation. These latter al-legations regarding the lack of participation by various individuals and entities were "consolidated" or "subsumed" by the Board in its December 11, 1986 Order with the allegations concerning the lack of demonstration of various elements of the Plan. Memorandum and Order at 7. The admitted portions of Contentions EX 15 and 16 are set out in Attachment A to this testimony.

Specifically, Intervenors allege that the scope of the Exercise was too limited because it did not test the following Plan elements:

A. Procedures for public notification (EX 15.A) (subsuming EX 24 which alleges f ailurn to activate the sirens, and 16.C and D, which allege lack of participation on the part of WALK Radio and other radio stations):

B. Procedures for public notification in the water portion of the EPZ (EX 15.B) (subsuming EX 16.B. which alleges that the Coast Guard did not fully participate);

C. Procedures for implementing protective actions for transients and people on the water (EX 15.H) (subsuming EX.16 B and 18 C(iv), which allege that the Coast Guard did not fully partici-pate):

D. Proceduras for public educailon (EX 15.C);

E. Procedures for evacuating the three EPZ hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (EX 15.D) (subsuming EX 16 H, I, and J which allege that officials from these institutions, from the EPZ nursing homes and from such f acilities outside the FPZ, did not participate):

L__---____---__ .-

l

F. Procedures for sheltering school children, for implementing early dismissal of schools, and for evacuating school children (EX 15.E, F, G) (subsuming EX 16.F. G and EX 26,30 and 18 C(v),

which allege that school officials and school bus drivers, other than from Shoreham-Wading River, did not participate and such participation as did occur was limited and untimely);

G. Procedures concerning protective actions for the ingestion path-way EPZ (EX 15.1) (subsuming EX 37 (A-D), which deal with in-gestion pathway recommendations, and EX 16.A, which alleges that Connecticut did not participate);

H. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and deconta-mination of evacuees from special f acilities (EX 15.K):

I. Procedures concerning recovery and re-entry (EX 15.M);

J. Participation of Marketing Evaluations, Inc. (EX 16.E);

K. Participation of certain bus companies (EX 16.K, subsuming 18 C(i));

L. Participation of certain ambulance companies (EX 16.L.

subsuming 18 C(ii)); and M. Participation of Nassau County (EX 18 C(vi)) and Nassau County Red Cross (EX 18 C(iii)).

The Commission has directed that the proceeding in the instant case be limited to the exploration of alleged "fundamental flaws"in the LILCO Plan demonstrated by the Exercise. CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986). A c-cordingly, this Board in its December 11, 1986 Order framed the issue in this proceeding as follows: "If (the Exercise) is found not to comply with the Commission's regulations concerning the scope of a full participation exercise, it may constitute '. . . a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e2, a fundamental flaw in the plan.'" Memorandum and Order at 13, quoting 23 NRC at 581.

Thus, the one and only issue to De addressed in this testimony is whether the scope of the February 13, 1986 Exercise at Shoreham meets i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ - - __ w

the Commission's requirement for a "full participation" exercise. As FEMA witnesses have stressed, the issue here is not whether the Exercise objec-1 tives were met during the Shoreham Exercise, but rather whether the num-ber and types of objectives included in the Exercise and observed by FEMA make it a full participation exercise. See Deposition of Roger B. Kowleski, Thomas Baldwin and Joseph H. Keller, January 29,1987, at 237-40 (Attach-ment B); Direct Testimony .of Thomas E. Baldwin, Joseph H. Keller and Roger B. Kowieski Concerning Emergency Planning Exercise (March 20, 1987) at 94 (hereinaf ter "FEMA Testimony").

5. Q. Please summarize your testimony on these issues.

A. (Daverio, Behr, Hockert) Our testimony, in summary, is that the Shoreham Exercise equalled or surpassed what has been done at virtually any other exercise in terms of scope and sheer magnitude of emergency re-sources mobilized. Intervenors suggest that the Exercise was deficient be-cause not every element of the Plan was implemented and not every person or entity mentioned in the Plan participated. However, the Commission's l regulations do not require that every element of an emergency plan be 1

tested or that every person or entity relied on for plan implementation be included for an exercise to be a "full participation" exercise. Rather, they require only that the "major" observable portions of emergency plans be l

tested in a given full participation exercise and that emergency personnel l

l and resources be mobilized "in sufficient numbe.rs" to enable verification of response capability.

The Commission has never stipulated precisely which or how many elements of a plan must be tested for an exercise to be full participation, or the magnitude of resources required. However, FEMA has issued l

guidance as to which elements of an offsite emergency plan it considers es-sential to include in ' exercises. FEMA has published various Guidance Memoranda (GM), on the subject; two of these, GM PR-1 and draf t GM EX-3 are most pertinent. GM PR-1, in effect at the time of the Shoreham l

Exercise, sets out 35 standard exercise objectives keyed to NUREG-0654 planning standards. It does not require all, or indeed any specified nuniber, L of the objectives to be fulfilled in connection with any one full participa-tion exercise, but merely requires that all objectives must be satisfactorily tested over a six year period. Draf t GM EX-3, FEMA's current proposal on the issue, and soon to be finalized, contains a virtually identical statement of exercise objectives to GM PR-1, but creates a hierarchy among them:

"Group A" or "core" objectives that should be included in every full partici-pation exercise because they are deemed fundamental, and "Group B" ob-jectives that may be tested over the course of several years. Moreover, an independent study ranking the importance of the FEM A standard exercise objectives was also undertaken by International Energy Associates Limited (IEAL); that study ranked seven of the standard exercise objectives "very" important, nineteen of "moderate" importance and the remainder "rela-tively unimportant."

We conclude in the testimony to follow that the February 13 Exer-cise was a full participation exercise as that term is used in the Commis-sion's regulations since: (1) LILCO tested as much of the onsite and offsite emergency plans as was "reasonably achievable" without mandatory public participation (pp.16-18); (2) licensee personnel and other resources were i mobilized "in sufficient numbers" to verify capability to respond to an acci-l dent (pp.18-19); (3) LILCO tested a "major" portion of the emergency

response capabilities in that (a) the vast majority of the standard FEM A ex-ercise objectives, including all of the 13 "core" objectives, were tested (pp. -

20-26); (b) objectives additional to the standard FEMA objectives were test-ed (p. 26); (c) the seven exercise objectives ranked most important ac-cording to the IEAL' Report were also substantially tested (pp. 26-30); (4) even if demonstrated f actually, none of the alleged omissions from the Ex-ercise would render it less than full participation (pp. 30-43); and (5) exer-cise scenarios that were similar in scope and design have previously been accepted as full participation by the NRC (pp. 43-50).

II. The February 13,1986 Exercise Was a "Full Participation" Exercise

6. Q. What, in your view, does the term "full participation" mean?

4 A. (Daverio, Behr) According to our reading of NRC regulations, there is a three-prong test: first, testing "as much of the licensee, state and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public par-ticipation;" second, testing "the maior observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans;" and third, mobilization of emergency personnel and resources "in sufficient numbers to verify capability to respond to the accident scenario." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E S IV.F(1) and n.4 (em-phasis added). Nowhere is the term "full participation" defined as requiring that every element of an emergency plan be tested, see Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, slip op.

I at 26 n.7 (March 2,1987), or that every person / entity relied on for plan im-plementation be included in an exercise. NUREG-0654, which provides guidance as to the interpretation of these regulatory standards, says that a full participation exercise should test "a major portion of the basic i

9 elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations" and that all principal elements of any emergency plan must be tested "within a five year period." NUREG 0654 at 71 (Attachment C). Thus, the emergency planning scheme contemplates that, while all observable ele-ments c. a emergency plan must be exercised at some point, this is done over the course of several years, not in every full participation exercise.

In our view, a "full participation" exercise means first, testing as much of the Emergency Plan as is reasonably achievable given whatever practical, legal or other constraints exist; second, mobilizing a sufficient number of emergency resources; and third, testing the major portions of the Emergen-cy Plan. One would measure the scope and magnitude of an exercise against (1) FEMA guidance and whatever non-regulatory guidance exists and (2) exercises at other plants that FEMA and NRC have deemed to be full participation.

7. Q. Please describe the FEMA Guidance that exists on full participation exer-cises.

A. [Daverio, Behr) FEMA's position on what constitutes a full participation exercise has evolved over the past several years. FEMA's initial guidance, FEMA GM-17 (January 8,1981)(Attachment D) contained a general discus-l sion of full participation exercises without enumerating specific exercise l

objectives. As explained in FEMA's Testimony, Revision 1 to GM 17 (February 16, 1984), a document referenced to during the depositions of l

several witnesses, enumerated 36 exercise objectives to be selected from in structuring an exercise, but this Revision was merely a draf t version, and GM 17 Rev.1 and its list of objectives has never been officially accepted or finalized by FEM A. FEMA Testimony at 90 n.2. The guidance

L memorandum that was finalized, and in eff ect at the time of the Shoreham Exercise, GM PR-1 (October 4,1985) (Attachment E) specifies 35 exercise objectives that are to be selected from in designing a full participation ex-ercise. Specifically, GM PR-1 incorporates the 35 standard exercise objec-tives contained in an August 5,1983 FEMA Memorandum, "Procedural Poll-cy on Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan Reviews, Exercise Observations and Evaluations, and Interim Findings"(Attachment F). These 35 objectives correspond to the observable elements of emergency plans described in NUREG-0654/-FEMA-REP-1 and to the modules in the FEMA "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations."Il GM PR-1 does not require that all, or indeed any specified number, of the standard exercise objectives be fulfilled in connection with any one full participation exercise, but merely that they all be tested over a six year period. GM PR-1 at 2. Thus, exer-cise scenarios are to be prepared that meet desired individual exercise ob-jectives from the list of 35 objectives.

While GM PR-1 was effective at the time of the Shoreham Exercise, and remains effective at present, a subsequent draf t document intended to supersede previous Guidance Memoranda, GM EX-3 (8/15/86) (Attachment G), presents FEMA's latest thinking on this issue. In draf t GM EX-3, FEMA lists a slightly revised version of the 35 cbjectives to be incorporated into the design of emergency exercises. According to draf t GM EX-3, the basic objectives for a full participation exercise should be selected from this list 1/ The list of 36 objectives contained in GM 17 (Rev.1) was substantively the same as this list of 35 objectives with only one exception: GM 17 (Rev.1) Objective 10.

"Demonstrate appropriate lab operation functions for measuring and analyzing all types of samples,"is omitted from the list of objectives in GM PR-1.

of 35 objectives in order to test a "significant portion" of emergency re-sponse capebilities.-

In sum, FEMA's view regarding "full participation" exercises has evolved through numerous generations of guidance documents, but with fundamental consist ( 7cy of content in its enumeration of the universe of standard exercise objectives. In FEMA's most recent guidance memoran-dum, which we understand will be finalized within the next two months, FEMA imposes a hierachy on this list of standard exercise objectives.

8. Q. What precisely are the differences between GM PR-1 and draf t GM EX-3?

A. [Daverio, Behr) GM PR-1 and draf t GM EX-3 both contain a list of basic exercise objectives which correspond to the observable elements of NUREG-0654, as well as to the modules contained in the "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observa-tions and Evaluations." See GM PR-1 at 2; GM EX-3 at 3. Aside irom slight variations in the wording and numbering of the objectives, most of the ob-jectives are virtually identical. A side-by-side comparison is provided in Attachment H. The only substantive differences are that GM PR-1 contains two objectives that have no counterparts in GM EX-3: (1) demon-strate the ability to effect evacuation of onsite personnel and (2) demon-strate the ability to relocate to and operate the alternative EOF /EOC.

Moreover, GM EX-3 adds one objective that has no counterpart in GM PR-1: demonstrate appropriate lab operation functions for measuring and analyzing all types of samples. Also, GM EX-3 splits GM PR-1 Objective 21 dealing with the decision to administer KI, into two different provisions, Objectives 13 and 14 dealing, respectively, with issuing KI to emergency workers and to the general population.

In addition, in draf t GM EX-3, the 35 standard exercise objectives are prioritized into two groups. "Group 'A," numbers 1-13, are deemed "core" objectives that are to be demonstrated in each biennial full partici-pation exercise. "Group B," numbers 14-35, are to be included in at least one exercise during a six year period. According to draf t GM EX-3, the "core" objectives are deemed of a "fundamental nature" to emergency re-sponse. The others are regarded as being not so fundamental and may be tested over the course of six years. In this respect, draf t GM EX-3 formal-izes what has been long-standing FEMA practice. The proposed "Group A" objectives or their equivalent have tended to be tested at most or all exer-cises to date, w'hile the remaining objectives have been rolled into the six-year FEMA exercise cycle.

Unless the final version of GM EX-3 is materially different from the current draf t, FEMA's exercise regimen will continue to contemplate that only the various "core" elements or "fundamental" objectives of an emer-gency plan need be tested in each full participation exercise. The re-maining observable elements of an emergency plan must, in f act, be tested, but can be spaced over a period of several years. As FEMA's testimony states, "the testing of all major planning and preparedness elements incor-porated in the 35 exercise objectives is npqt required in every full scale ex-ercise. FEMA's policy permits that all exercise objectives be demonstrated within the six-year cycle." FEMA Testimony at 125.

9. Q. Does the NRC Staff agree with the interpretation of "full participation" es-poused by FEMA and LILCO?

A. (Daverio, Behr) Yes. LILCO requested the NRC Staff to provide for dep-osition staff witnesses who were f amiliar with the NRC Staff's

requirements for full participation exercises. The Staff complied. When asked by LILCO counsel whether a full participation exerclSe "required that every element of an emergency plan be exercised," NRC Staff witness Schwartz stated "there's no NRC requirement." Deposition of Sheldon A.

Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss (January 14,1987) at 18 (Attachment I).

When asked whether all 35 FEMA standard exercise objectives need be demonstrated in any given full participation exercise, witness Schwartz replied "It is not my understanding," and '.vitness Weiss concurred. M. at 18,

19. When asked whether the language regarding "core" objectives in draf t GM EX-3 was consistent with his understanding of NRC requirements as well as FEMA's requirements, witness Schwartz said yes. M. at 22. A nd, when asked whether there is any specific number of objectives from within the set of general objectives that must be observed for an exercise to be considered full participation, witnesses Schwartz and Weiss both said no.

M. at 30. Witness Schwartz added that the Staff can determine in a spe-cific case that an exercise design contains sufficient objectives to render the exercise full participation because the NRC relles on the evaluation of the Regional Assistance Committee as to whether an exercise meets the criteria for a full participation exercise. If the NRC repr.sentative on RAC is satisfied, "then the NRC is satisfied." Ld. at 23. Witness Schwartz further stated that th!S process was followed in the development and con-duct of the Shoreham Exercise. Ld. at 23.

10. Q. Is there any other document that attempts to identify which of the stan-dard FEMA exercise objectives are essential for a full participation exer-cise?

A. ( Daverio, Behr, Hockert } Yes. While not a regulatory document, an IEAL Report entitled "Importance Ranking of Various Aspects of Offsite f

Radiological Emergency Preparedness," which is discussed more fully in Section II. C.(4) below, ranks the various exercise objectives listed in GM PR-1 as either "very important," of "moderate importance" or "relatively unimportant."

11. Q. Was the February 13,1986 Exercise "full participation" in your opinion?

A. [Daverio, Behr] Yes. As will be explained more fully in our testimony to follow, the Exercise tested the vast majority of the standard FEMA exercise objectives. Moreover, we have compared the objectives designed for and tested in the Shoreham Exercise with those described as key in draf t GM EX-3 and in the IEAL Report and conclude that every element considered essential that related to LERO was tested. Finally, </c hcvc 00mpared the Shoreham Excrebc to cimilarly designed excreb0c h Reg!On-

-II :nd cbc.'hcrc th the h'RC hr 3000p Od = full partic!patier TW comparbon of the 0110ged 0=1210m f rom the Sh0=h = Excr0b0 '"!!h 'vh:4-vias Omitted frc= Other excrciscs furthe supports Our conclus!On that th0 Shoreham Exercise was full participation.

12. Q. Does FEMA agree with the conclusion that the February 13, 1986 Exercise was "full participation"?

A. (Daverio, Behr) Yes. In its testimony, FEMA states that it "made every attempt to ensure that preparation for and evaluation of the February 13, l

1986 exercise of the LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham was consistent with the parameters and process established for other full-scale Ra-i l

diological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercises evaluated by FEMA Re-l gion II." FEMA Testimony at 92. Moreover, FEMA also states that

. . . It is FEMA's position that the (exercise objec-tives tested at Shoreham] required mobilization of LILCO's Local Emergency Response Organization l

(LERO), its personnel and resources in sufficient l

l I

l number to verify the capability to respond to an ac-cident scenario. Furthermore, the February 13, 1986 exercise enabled FEMA to evaluate the inte-grated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within LILCO organization. The Shoreham exercise was eaual or greater in scope compared to any other full-scale exercise evaluated by FEM A Region 11 to date.

FEMA Testimony at 105 (emphasis added).

13. Q. Does the NRC Staff agree with your conclusion that the Shoreham Exercise was a full participation exercise?

A. ( Daverio, Behr] Yes. When asked wilether they considered the design of the Shoreham Exercise and the Exercise as actually conducted to be consis-tent with the requirements of a full participation exercise under 10 C.F.R.

Part 50, Appendix E. NRC Staff witnesses Schwartz and Weiss answered "yes." See Deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 36

. (Attachment I). Specifically, they answered affirmatively when asked (1) whether they would consider that the Shoreham Exercise included "as much of the licensee's state and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation;"(2) whether they would agree that the "integrated capability" to adequately assess and respond to an accident at a nuclear power plant was demonstrated; (3) whether the Shoreham Exercise tested the "major observable portions" of the on-site and off-site emergency plans for Shoreham; and (4) whether there was mo-bilization of licensee personnel and other resources "in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenarios." Ld. at 36-39.

Finally, NRC Staff witness Weiss said that, in his opinion, he thought the absence of state and local personnel participation was compensated for in design of the Exercise. Ld. at 39.

l A. The February 13 Exercise Tested as Much of the Emergency Plan as Was "Reasonably Achievable"

14. Q. Did the Exercise test as much of the Plan as was "reasonably achievable"?

A. [ Daverio, Behr] Yes. The Exercise was developed with the intent of de-monstrating the LILCO Plan and Procedures to the fullest extent possible.

Where any particular element was not demonstrated, it was due to one of the following reasons:

(1) Mandatory participation by members of the public or non-LERO or-ganizations would have been required.

(2) FEMA had identified the element as being non-essential for this Ex-ercise and was not going to instruct their personnel to observe the element.

'3) The political / legal situation on Long Island made the demonstration of an item inadvisable.

Thus, the Exercise tested as much of the LILCO Plan as was "reasonably achievable" given the practical and legal restraints.

15. Q. Specifically, why were the sirens and the Emergency Broadcast System not demonstrated on the day of the Exercise and the brochures not distributed prior to the Exercise?

A. (Daverio, Behr) Ever since February 1985, a legal cloud existed over i

those aspects of any exercise, to be performed by LERO, which would have l

involved contact with the public, as a result of the decision of the New York Supreme Court in Cuomo v. LILCO (Consol. Index 84-4615). That de-cision had held that "implementation" of the LILCO Plan by LERO would involve unlawful exercise by it of New York State's police powers. In plan-ning the exercise, LILCO had to avoid, wherever possible, even the appear-ance of conflict with that decision. Clearly the public-contact aspects of brochure distribution, sounding of sirens, and broadcasting of EBS signals posed the possibility of such conflict. Any uncertainty was removed in late

December 1985, some seven weeks prior to the Exercise, when a bill was introduced into the Suffolk County legislature which was passed in early January as Local Law 2-86. That local law imposed heavy civil and crimi-nal penalties (fine up to $1000, up to 1 year in jail) for participation in any exercise activity that could affect the general population, and was in ef-feet until the evening of February 10, 1986, when the U.S. District Court enjoined it as unconstitutional. LILCO v. County of Suffolk, 628 F. Supp.

654,666 (E.D.N.Y.1986). Issuing the brochures and sounding the sirens dur-ing the Exercise were activities clearly proscribed by the loeml law. Since the printing of the brochures required a several-week leadtime, it would not have been possible to print and distribute them in the two days between the enjoining of the local law and the date of the Exercise. Moreover, to have distributed the brochure prior to the Exercise would have been unnecessarily wasteful. The text of the draf t brochure contains a section on the legal authority to implement the emergency plan, an issue that had not yet been resolved, and that could necessitate the revision of the draf t brochure. Moreover, without the brochures having been distributed before-hand to inform people about the meaning of. the sirens, FEMA could not meaningfully sample the population to verify that they heard the sirens and understood that they should listen to an EBS radio station. Since without the FEMA population sample it would be necessary to repeat the public no-tification test, it was decided to postpone that portion of the Exercise.

16. Q. Why was the actual evacuation of school children, hospital patients and transients not demonstrated?

A. ( Daverio, Behr) Neither LERO nor any government can require mandato-ry participation by members of the public as part of an emergency response

f exercise. See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F(1). As such it would have been unreasonable to plan to test the actual movement of an'y mem-bers of the public, regardless of the political situation on Long Island.

17. Q. Do you know why ingestion pathway and recovery /re-entry procedures were not objectives of the Exercise?

A. [ Daverio, Behr) It was initially LILCO's intention to include both of these items as Exercise objectives and demonstrate theln. FEMA indicated to LILCO during early coordination meetings that it would not be observing those functions and that they would not be Exercise objectives.

B. Licensee Personnel and Other Resources Were Mobilized in Sufficient Numbers to Verify Capability to Response to an Accident

18. Q. Did the Shorehara Exercise mobilize license personnel and other resources "in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario"?

A. [Daverio, Behr] Absolutely. While Intervenors allege, for example, that not every bus company or ambulance mentioned in the plan participated, this allegation tells only part of the story. The Shoreham Exercise is unique in that it far surpassed what has been done at virtually any other exercise in terms of the magnitude of emergency resources mobilf sed. At all other nuclear power station emergency exercises with which we are f a-miliar, the samples of field personnel and equipment mobilized and evalu-ated by FEMA constitute only a fraction of those who are called upon by the plan being tested to respond in an actual emergency. By contrast, the February 13 Exercise involved the mobilization of all LERO field personnel, meaning that approxi.~:ately 150 percent of the number of workers actually mded in the event of a radiologica! emergency were called out. As a re-sult, over 1,000 emergency response personnel participated in the Exercise.

\

i l

l Thus, at 06:17 on the day of the Exercise an Alert was declared that caused the mobilization from the homes of 251 LERO personnel and 149 onsite personnel and the placing on standby of 41 additional LERO workers.

At 08:19 a Site Area Emergency was declared which required the mobiliza-tion of an additional 771 LERO workers.

During the day 333 general population bus drivers were dispatched.

of whom eight drove their routes in buses, and the remaining 325 drove their routes in cars. One hundred-thirty traffic control points were manned by 165 traffic guides. An additional 30 vehicles were dispatched to perform route spotting, to respond to road impediments and to dispense fuel. Thirty-nine buses (two were real, the rest being simulated using cars),

were dispatched to assist in the evacuation of special populations. Three route alert routes were run in response to three simulated siren f ailures and sixteen actual deaf notification routes were run. Six actual ambulances and six actual ambulettes were run for the pickup of homebound handi-capped and special f acilities.

To observe all these events FEMA used for the offsite portion 38 federal evaluators,11 controllers and 11 simulators (simulators were feder-al employees simulating the activities of county and state personnel).

I j 19. Q. Are you familiar with any FEMA or NRC Guidance regarding the magnitude

! of resources required to be deployed at an exercite in order to satisfy the regulations pertaining to full participation exercises?

A. [Daverio, Behr] We are not aware of any. When asked that same ques-l tion, NRC Staff member Schwartz replied that there were, in his belief, no regulations or guidance regarding the magnitude of resources necessary to fulfill the requirements for a full participation exercise. See Deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 27 (Attachment I).

C. The February 13 Exercise Tested A "Major" Portion of Emergency Response Capability

20. Q. Why do you conclude that the Exercise tested a "major" portion of the LILCO Plan, and thus that demonstration of the emergency response capa-bilities to the extent "reasonably achievable" was in fact adequate to fulfill the requirements of a full participation exercise?

A. (Daverio, Behr) Our view that this was a full participation exercise that tested a "major" portion of the emergency response capabilities is based on comparing the Exercise to three benchmarks:

(1)The FEMA Guidance and draf t Guidance Memoranda on this issue indicating that there is a universe of 35 standard exercise objec-tives and that there are certain "core" objectives among them (see_ Subsections II.C.(1) and (2) infra);

(2) A Report published by IEAL ranking the importance of various as-pects of emergency preparedness (see Subsection II.C.(4) inf ra);

and (3) A comparison of the Shorcham Excrcisc ic cther excreic0c FE"A h= designed and NI1O he decmed ic bc full p;rticipation by the iruancs or rcisuanc; cf an cpcr;;ing licence since the p0ct-T.'!!

+mergency planning ruics came into p:::: M Sectica P.* inf rc).

(1) The Exercise Tested a Vast Majority of the Standard FEMA Exercise Objectives

21. Q. How many exercise objectives were tested during the February 13,1986 Ex-ercise?

A. [ Daverio, Behr] As we will discuss more fully below,29 out of an appilca-l ble universe of 34 standard FEMA objectives contained in both GM PR-1 and GM EX-3 were tested at the Exercise -in short, a vast majority of the l objectives that can possibly be tested. The more significant actions taken 1

1 to test these objectives are detailed in Attachment J, with references to i both the Post Exercise Assessment (PEA) and to player logs, which are l

compiled in Attachment K. Moreover, as also shown in Attachment J.

among the objectives tested were all of the 13 "core" objectives identified

in GM EX-3. What is more, not only were most of the standard FEMA ob-jectives tested, six objectives not even on the list of standard FEMA objec-tives were also tested.

22. Q. Which of the standard exercise objectives delineated in GM PR-1 were n_ot tested or not fully observed by FEM A?

A. ( Daverio, Behr] Out of the 35 objectives contained in GM PR-1, one is in-applicable to Shoreham at the outset. Relocating and operating an alterna-tive EOF /EOC (Objective 33) is inapplicable to Shoreham since both the Shoreham EOF and EOC are outside the 10-mile EPZ. This is a FEMA ob-jective only because some EOF's and EOC's are within the 10-mile EPZ, with the result that these facilities might conceivably have to be evacu-ated. Moreover, the part of Objective 21 that deals with issuing KI to the general population is also inapplicable. Since KI is not ordinarily issued to the general population under New York State Health Department policy, l

this was never part of the LILCO Plan. With regard to the 34 GM PR-1 ob-t

jectives that are applicable to Shoreham, 26 of these exercise objectives l

l were tested and fully observed by FEMA. See Attachment J; FEMA Testi-l l many at 94-104.

l Moreover, three other standard FEMA objectives were in f act tested l

even though they were not among the group of Exercise objectives formally observed or graded by FEMA or NRC. Objective 23, relating to de-monstrating the ability to evacuate onsite personnel, while not an objective of the Exercise or observed by FEMA, was nonetheless tested on the day of the Exercise and graded by NRC. See Attachment J. And, Objective 32, pertaining to demonstrating the ability to request federal assistance, also not an Exercise objective, was nonetheless tested because LERO contacted

DOE, the Coast Guard, FAA and FEMA. See Attachment J. See also FEMA Testimony at 103. Also tested was the part of Objective 21 that deals with issuing K! to emergency workers, even though this was not an Exercise ob-jective. LERO recommended K1 ingestion based on an assessment of the accident presented in the scenario. The appropriateness of that recom-mendation was observed by Federal evaluators at the LERO EOC on the day of the Exercise. See Attachment J; FEMA Testimony at 100.

Finally, the five remaining objectives - three relating to ingestion pathway (Objectives 9,11,12) and two relating to recovery /re-entry (Ob-jectives 34 and 35)- were tested in part even though they were not graded Exercise objectives, see Attachment J, and they would have been tully test-ed had the drill not ended when it did.

In sum, of the universe of 34 applicable standard FEMA objectives listed in GM PR-1, 29 were in fact tested, including the part of Objective 21 that deals with issuing KI to emergency workers. And, the remaining objectives were tested in part.

23. Q. Which of the standard objectives delineated in GM EX-3 were not tested or fully observed by FEMA?

A. (Daverio, Behr) GM EX-3 also contains 35 objectives. One of these re-lates to demonstrating the ability to decide to administer K1 to the general public (Objective 14) and is inapplicable to Shoreham from the outset for l the reasons explained above. Out of the remaining universe of 34 applica-t ble objectives, LERO fully tested, and FEMA observed,26. See Attachment l

l J; FEMA Testimony at 94-104. Three other objectives were tested and evaluated by FEMA even though they may not have been Exercise objec-tives (Objective 33, relating to requesting federal assistance, and l

l -

i i

Objectives 13 and 15, dealing with issuing KI to emergency workers). See Attachment J.

In addition, there are four ingestion pathway objectives listed in GM EX-3 (Objectives 21, 22, 23, and 24) and one recovery /re-entry objective (Objective 35). Again, actions were started to test these objectives, s_ee Attachment J, and wculd have been completed had the Exercise lasted longer.

In sum, of the universe of 34 applicable GM EX-3 objectivess the Ex-ercise tested 29 of them, including the part of Objective 15 relating to issuing KI to emergency workers. And, the remaining objectives were test-ed in part. See Attachment J.

24. Q. How significant are these omissions or partial omissions from the scope of the Exercise?

A. (Daverio, Behr) These omissions do not mean that the Exercise was less than a full participation exercise.

Regarding the partial testing of ingestion pathway objectives: First, ingestion pathway objectives have nothing to do with the immediate pro-tection of the public in an emergency. The first priority is to prote.;t those within the 10-mile EPZ. Second, as FEMA witnesses have pointed out, until now there has never been a single full-scale ingestion pathway exercise in l New York State, yet offsite emergency preparedness programs at plants l such as Nine Mile Point and Ginna have received 44 C.F.R. Part 350 certifi-l cations and these plants are licensed by NRC, S_ee Deposition of Roger B.

Howieski, Thomas Baldwin and Joseph H. Keller at 215-16 (Attachment B).

NRC Staff witnesses also said that most of the exercises they were f amiliar with and viewed as full participation excluded testing of ingestion pathway r

response. See Deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 45-46 (Attachment I). Third, while ingestion pathway Objective 11 was deemed one of the seven "very important" objNtives by the IEAL Report (the objecthe numbers in the IEAL Report tracg those of GM PR-1), this is not one of the 13 "core" objectives according to FEMA GM EX-3. And in any event, this ingestion pathway objective was one that the Exercise did start to test. Sf' Attachment J.

Regarding the partial testing of recovery /re-entry objectives: Re-covery/re-entry activities are not even conten4p.ated until evacuation and all other applicable short-term protective action measures have been take.n. This is not a "core" objective according to FEMA. Indeed, the abill-t', to determine and in:plement recovery and re-entry measures was ranked as least important in the group of objectives that was as a whole considered "relatively unimportant" in the IEAL Report. What is more, recov-ery/re-entry activities were in f act conducted to a degree at the Shoreham Exercise. See Attachment J.

In sum, the Excrcise tested 29 of the standard FEMA objectives, a vast majority of the objectives that could have been tested. Moreover, the others would have been completely tested if the Exercise had continued longer than it did. And, as discussed below, all of the objectives identified in GM EX-3 as the "core" objectives were among those tested.

l (2) Among the Objectives Tested Were tho "Core" l O@ctive in FEMA Draf t Guidance Memorandum EX-3 l

25. Q. What are the "Group A" or "core" objectives listed in draf t FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-37 A. [Dawrio, Behr] The "core" objectives delineated in GM EX-3 include the following:

Ob_lective

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and activate fa-cilities promptly.

2. Demonstrate ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

3. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

4. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

5. Demonstra!e ability to project field data and to determine appiopriate protective measures, 1 based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates and al) other appropriate fac-tors.

6. Demonstrate ability to implement protective actions for plume pathway hazards.

7. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-taile EFZ and disseminate an initial instructional message with 15 minutes.

8. Demonstrate ability to formulate and d3 tribute appropriate instructions to the public in a time-ly f ashion.

9. Demonstrate the organizational ability and re-l sources necessary to deal with impediments to avacuation, including weather or traffic ob-struction.

10. Demonstrate ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. ,

l l 11. Demonstrate ability to brief the media '.n a I

clear, accurate and timely manner.

l 12. Demonstrate ability to provide advance coordi-  ;

! nation of information released.

I

13. Demonstrate ability to make the decision, based j on predetermined criteria, 60 supply and admin- i ister KI to emergency workers, i

26. Q. Did the February 13, 1986 Exercise at Shoreham test these "core" objec-tives?

l l

l

A. [ Daverlo. Behr) Yes. The Shoreham Exercise tested all of FEMA's "core" objectives. The more significant actions taken to test the "core" objectives are detailed in Attachment J.

(3) The Exercise Tested Objectives Additional to the Standard FEM A Objectives

27. Q. Did the Exercise test objectives other than the standard FEMA exercise ob-jectives?

A. (Daverio, Behr) Yes. The following objectives were tested even though they do not f all within any of the standard FEMA exercise objectives delin-eated in GM PR-1 or GM EX-3:

1. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the emergen-cy response with County and State officials. The role of the State and/or County officials was simu-lated by FEMA designated personnel. (EOC 9) (PEA at 31).

2 Demonstrate the ability of the designated officials to determine the need to obtain state assistance.

(EOC 10)(PEA at 31,32).

3. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch to and direct emergency workers in the field. (SA 9) PEA at 56, 62,72.

4. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to  ;

effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. (EOC 18)(PEA at 38).

5. Demnnstrate the adequacy of evacuation bus trans-fer points including access and parking / transfer areas. (Fleld 12)(PEA at 58,65,75),

i 6. Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to ef-feet an early dismissal of schools whin the 10-mile l EPZ. (Field 15).

(4) The Exercise Objectives Deemed Most Important in a Report Ranking Various Aspects of Emergency Preparedness Were Tested in the Exercise 1

28. Q. Can you describe the IEAL Report attempting to order objectively the rela-tive importance among the standard FEMA emergency preparedness ,

objectives? -

A. [ Hockert ] Yes. A "eport that I helped author was prepared by Interna-tional Energy Associates Limited. Its purpose was to rank, in an objective fashion, the standard FEMA emergency preparedness objectives according l to categories of relative importance. The Report, entitled "Importance Ranking of Various Aspects of Offsite Radiological Emergency Prepared-l ness" (November 15, 1985), was sponsored by Edison Electric Institute, and prepared with extensive participation from FEMA. Tnis Report is ap-pended to this testimony as Attachment L.

29. Q. How was this assessment carried out?

A. (Hockert) Expert opinions were solicited by sending detailed question-naires to FEMA and NRC headquarters and regional staff, RAC members, other federal, state and local emergency planners, and members of various concerned interest groups. Based on the responses, the 35 exercise objec-tives delineated in GM PR-1 were ranked using the following methodology:

(1) The goals that each objective supports were identified, leading to the construction of a hierarchy.

(2) The hierarchy was derived by identifying the three capabilities

• necessary to protect public health and safety: (a) the capability to obtain information necessary to determina actions to be taken

to protect public health and safety; (b) the capability to main-tain the command and control necessary to support effective decision-making and independent management; and (c) the capa-l bility to implement appropriate protective actions when the de-cision is made to do so. These three capi.bilities were then ana-lyzed into subordinate capabilities until, e 'entually, all 35 ci the '

objectives were linked with capabilities that they .,upport. ,

(3) The next stage of the method involved the estimation of the re-l spondents' underlying estim3tes of the importance of each goal or objactive through the use of ratio judgments, which were in the form of pairwise comparisons.

(4) This was accomplished by having the respondents answer a se-ries of questions regarding the relative importance of each pair of objectives.

i

l l'

l (5) The responses were then quantified and a quantitative impor-tance rating was derived for each of the 35 objectives using the methodology described in Appendix A of the IEAL _ Report.

Rankings were derived based on each individual's responses and L

an overall composite ranking was developed based upon each re-  !

l spondent's area of expertise. The responses were, in addition,-  ;

analyzed for internal consistency and to determine the degree to  !

which responses from individuals in the various group differed.  !

1

30. Q. Did the individual rankings of the 35 exercise objectives vary?

A. (Hockert] While the detailed rankings varied - not surprising in a com-plex situation like emergency planning where the importance of specific capabilities vaties with site conditions and the accident scenario - there was a general cor.sensus on a group of exercise objectives that were consid-ered very important by the vast majority of respondents.

31. Q. What were the objectives deemed "very important" by the respondents?

A. (Hockert ] Seven objectives were considered very important by the vast majority of the respondents. These are, in order of decreasing importance: ,

(1) Ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure (Ob-jective 10);

(2) Ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organiza-tions and field personnel (Objective 5);

(3) Ability to make decisions and coordinate activities (Objective 3);

(4) Ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly (Objec-tive 1);

! (5) Ability to project dosage to the public via ingestion exposure j (Objective 11);

(6) Ability to monitor and control emergency worker exposure (Ob- ,

jective 20); ar.d (7) Ability to evacuate onsite personnel (Objective 23).

32. Q. What do you mean when you say these objectives are the moet important?

A. ( Hockert ] These exercise objectives represent those capabilities that,

l

according to the Report, would be necessary for effective offsite response '

to virtually the entire range of radiological emergencies at nuclear power I

plants. The Report anticipates that these exercise objectives would be i- demonstrated most frequently, evaluated most thoroughly, and_if not dem-  ;

onstrated satisf actorily, could be the basis of a deficiency or negative find-ing.

33. Q. In your opinion, can an exercise be considered full participation if not every "very important" objective is f ully tested? ,

A. (Hockert] Yes. The "very important" category only contemplates that these objectives would be demonstrated most freauently - not necessarily  ;

in every full participation exercise. Testing additional "lesser" objectives ,

could offset an omission of one or more of these objectives in my opinion.

34. Q. Did the February 13, 1986 Exercise test the seven exercise objectives deemed very important by the IEAL report?

A. ( Davario, Behr] As Attachment J shows, all of these objectives were test-ed, with the qualification that Objective 11, relating to ingestion pathway, 4

was partially tested.

I

35. Q. How were other FEMA standard exercise objectives ranked?

A. (Hockert] Nineteen objectives were consloered to be of moderate impor-tance by the majority of respondents. These are Objectives 2,4,6,7,8,9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22,2/ 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33. See IEAL Report at I

i 2/ The Report breaks Objective 22 ("Demonstrate the ability to supply and adminis-ter KI, once the decision has been made to do so") into two separate capabilities. The part of Objective 22 pertaining to administering KI to emergency workers is the part l that the Report ranked of moderate importance. The part of Objective 22 dealing with  ;

l administering KI to the general public is the part ranked among the least important.

See the answer to Question 36. t l \

1-3 (Attachment L). These objectives represent capabilities that may or may not make important co.itributions to public health and safety, depend-ir.g on site-specific conditions cnd the details of the radiokgical emergen-cy. These exercise objectives would, on an average, receive moderate em-phasis according to the IEAL respondents. Ig. at 1-5.

36. Q. Hrv were the remaining FEMA standard exercise objectives ranked in im-portir.ce by IEAL Report?

A. [HoA'rt] There were ten exercise objectives, labeled as "less important,"

that were considered "relatively unimportant." These a.e Objectives 16, 17, 22, 24, 26, 26, 27, 28, 34, and 35. See IEAL Repe

• at 1-3 (A ttachment L). Based upon the importance weightings derived from the analysis, the total importance of all ten of these objectivet combiped is comparable to the importanca of any single one of the suen objectives considered to be very important. !_g. at 1-;.

[Daverio, Behr, Hockert) In sum, whatever the benchmark - whether one looks at the 34 applicable FEM A ;ojectives, the 13 "core" oDjectives, or the seven "very important" IEAL Objectives - the objectives tested during the February 13, 1986 Exercise at Shoreham far exceed the minimum required for a full participation exercise.

III. The Alleged Omissions in the February 13,1986 Exercise Would Not Rendqthe Exere!'e_,Less Than "Full Participation"

37. Q. Are ar.y of the alleged omissions from the Exercise vital to Plan imple-memation?

f,. [Daverlo, Behr) No. Reviewing each of the alleged omissions from the February 13 Exercise item-by-item shows that - even if the!r exclusion is factually demonstrated - none was so vital to Plan implementation as to

have been required to be part of the Exercise. Thb ;;adcion !; Erne Out by the readts of ; survcy c;mp;rini th: Chrich;r. Ex;r;i;; :: Other excr=

ci;;; similar-in scopc--that-RRC h;; decmed t0 be full participa4!0n. q E0;;

Section "' !nf ra. Indeed, several of the alleged omissions, e.L. notification of transients, procedures for public education, and monitoring aE decontamination of evacuees from special f acilities - are not even stan-dard FEMA exercise objectives.

38 Q. Were any of the omissions that allegedly render the Exercise less than "full participation" deemed to be deficiencies by FEMA?

A. (Daverio, Behr) None of the alleged omissions was considered by FEMA to be a deficiency. Moreover, only two of these alleged omissions - relating to schools and the public notification :.fstem - were even considered by FEMA to be ARCAs. However, FEMA's evaluation of LERO's responses to these two ARCAs as indicated in the RAC Report recently issued found that LILCO's commitment to activate the siren system prior to commercial operation and its commitment to include school districts other than Shorehem-Wading River in future exercises are adequate responses to these exerie issues. See LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham-Revision 8, Key to Consolidated RAC Review Dated December 15,1986, Table 3.1 at 9,11. ,

39. Q. Intervenors auege that the existence, operability and adequacy of the

! prompt notification system, which consists of sirens, tore alert radios and i the EBS system, was not tested during the Exercise and that the Exercise was therefore W._, than full participation. Intervenors also ulege that the LILCO P'.n is flawed since neither WALK Radio nor other radio stations partic! pated in the Exercise. Do you agree with these conclusions?

l A. (Daverio, Behr) The fact that the sirens were not actually sounded, aM l that LILCO's EBS system did not broadcast durint the Exercise does not in-dicato less than a full participation exercise. The demonstration of any  !

F

I:

public notifichtion system consists of establishing both the administrative and physical means for notification of the public. FEM A-REP-10, "Guide For the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants" (1985) at E-1 (Attachment M). The administrative elements include the decisions to inform the public of an emergency, to prepare an EBS mes-sage, to approve the message, and to begin to transmit it to the EBS sta-tions and take the steps necessary to activate the sirens all within the 15 minute time period specified in NUREG-0654. The mechanical aspects consist of testing the telephone lines dedicated to the EBS station, the si-rens, and the electronic equipment needed for siren activation. During the Exercise, LERO personnel demonstrated their ability to implement all the administrative elements of an EBS system, and took all steps necessary to activate the prompt nctification system short of actually physically sound-ing the sirens and broadcasting an EBS message. What has been done to date is sufficient under FEMA Guidance: the pertinent document, FEMA REP-10, states that "[a] satisf actory exercise of an alert decision imple-menting chain can occur up to the point of actually activating the alert and not.ification syst3m . . . " FEMA REP-10 at N-2. in any event, LILCO has committed that, before operating above 5% power, it will test the re-malmng mechanical capabilities of the system in a full test of the prompt notification system that will be monitored by the NRC Staff and FEMA.

See Letter from John D. Leonard, Jr. to Harold R. Denton, SNRC-1269, En-closure 1 at 4 (June 20,1986)(Attachment N),

FEMA recognizes in REP-10 that it is not always advisable or possi-ble to sound the siren on the day of the Exercise. See FEMA-REP-10 at N-3. Very of ten this is done as a separate e!! ort. Indeed, NRC 5taff j

~ __ -__ ____-_ __

members have stated that "many" exercises they consider to be full partici-pation did not haile the strens tested during the exercise, (See Deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 47 (Attachment I). Moreover, the normal physical means for informing the'public about emergencies -

the EBS radio test - is tested on a weekly basis in any event. Finally, the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Report of December 15,1986 finds s

that LILCO's commitment that the siren system will be activated as part of a prompt notification test prior to commercial operation "Is an adequate response to this exercise issue." See LILCO Transition Plan for Shoreham-Revision 8. Key to Consolidated RAC Review, Table 3.1 at 9.

40. Q. Intervenors allege that the LILCO Plan is flawed because procedures for notification and issuance of protective action recommendations to persons in the water portion of the EPZ were not implemented during the Exercise.

Intervenors further allege that the Coast Guard did not participate in the Exercise beyond receiving a phone call. Is this correct?

A. (Daverio, Behr) No. The fact that not every aspect of LILCO's plan to 4

notify persons in the water portion of the EPZ was implemented on the day

. of the Exercise does not render the Exercise less than full participation.

Although the Coast Guard did not broadcast a message on marine band radio it did receive notification from and communicate with LERO on both the primary and backup communications modes throughout the Exercise.

See FEM A Testimony at 108-09. The Coast Guard communicated with l LERO trom the Eaton's Neck Coast Guard Station by Marine radio and by telephone. Moreover, the Coast Guard simulated establishing a Maritime i

Safety Zone for the water part of the EPZ and simulated making emergency I radio broadcasts to all ships on the distress frequencies. Id. at 109. The Coast Guard also dispatched a patrol boat to the water part of the EPZ for access control at 10:20. Id. The boat was on the scene at 11:27, reported t

the area clear at 11:51 and returned to New Haven at 17:36. Id. The Exer-cise established that LERO has the organizational ability to manage an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. The fact that the Coast Guard

- did not actually broadcast a message on the marine-band radio does not in- 1 dicate a flaw in the Plan, since the Coast Guard during the normal course of its duties has ample experience in the use of the marine-band radio and broadcasting emergency messages over that system. Also, sending non-emergency messages on distress frequencies is prohibited. Finally, LILCO has a letter of agreement with the Coast Guard that confirms the Coast Guard's willingness and intent to provide notification and implement pro-tective action recommendations in the water portion of the EPZ. See LILCO Plan, Appendix B at B-8.

41. Q. Intervenors allege that during the Exercise LILCO did not demonstrate ca-pability in implementing protective action recommendations for people on the waters of the plume exposure EPZ or for transients on beaches or in parks. Do you agree?

A. (Daverio, Behr) If Intervenors mean that there was no demonstration of the ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ, the facts of the Exercise show the contrary. As indicated in the previous Ques-tion and Answer, the Coast Guard, which is responsible for notification of waterborne traffic, was contacted by LERO on both the primary and back-up modes of commur.! cation, sent a patrol boat out, and was kept informed of the progress of the hypothetical accident. With regard to notification of "transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ," those per-sons would be notified in the event of an emergency in exactly the same j way as permanent residents, via the prompt notification system, which in-cludes the siren system and the Emergency Broadcast System. See LILCO Plan, Chapter 3 at pp. 3.3-4 to 3.3-6.

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42. Q. Intervenors &llege-that the Exercise was deficient becattse it did not in- i elude a demor.stration of "[p]rocedures for public education and dissemina-tion of information to the public." Presumably, Intervenors intended this contention to apply to the distribution of the public information brochure.

Do you agree with this conclusion? -

A. ( Daverlo, Behr] No, this was not an objective in the Exercise, nor was it required to be. LILCO is not required to disseminate a brochure before SNPS operations exceed 5% of rated power. Moreover, to have distributed the brochure prior to the Exercise would have been unnecessarily costly, i since the text of the draf t brochure contains a paragraph on the legal au-thority to implement the LILCO Plan, an issue'that had not yet been re-  ;

solved, and that could necessitate the revision of the draf t brochure. In i i any event, as explained in the answer to Question 15, there would have i been insufficient time to get the brochure out in the two days prior to the h Exercise af ter the Suffolk County Ordinance was enjoined as unconstitu-tional. Also, the brochure review is part of the FEM.A REP-10 test that i will be conducted.  :

43. Q. Intervenors allege a flaw in the Plan because procedures for evacuating the hospitals in the EPZ were not exercised and because officials from these hospitals did not participate in the Exercise. Do you agree?

l A. [Daverio, Behr] Evacuating the EPZ hospitals was not an objective of the Exercise. Evacuating the "institutionalized mobility-impaired" from the 10-mile EPZ was. LILCO did, in fact, demonstrate ample resources to ef- r feet an evacuation of this population. FEMA used free play messages, and  ;

I chose two f acilities where a simulated evacuation was demonstrated suc-cessfully - Our Lady of Perpetual Health Convent and the United Cerebral  !

Palsy Institution. Precisely which type of institution was part of the Exer- l cise is not relevant to the demonstration of planning elements or resources [

to evacuate the institutionalized mobility-impaired population, j i

l I - . _ - , _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ . - -

i Moreover, even if the Exercise objective was broad enough to'in-clude hospitals, emergency planning for hospitals has already been litigated extensively. In its Partial Initial Decision (PID), the Board found this as-pect of the Plan acceptable, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear

Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 844-46 (1985), stating "we

. . . regard LILCO's conclusion that in the vast majority of cases sheltering would be the protective action of choice to be a realistic one which is con-sistent with NRC's design basis for the EPZ." Although the Appeal Board reversed and remanded on this issue,23 NRC at 135, the Appeal Board or-dered the remand held in abeyance pending further Commission direction.

4~

Id. at 163. The Commission has accepted review of this issue and thus the issue remains in its hands.

3 As LILCO has previously testified, evacuation is only a backup pro-1 j tective action for hospitals, to be recommended only if the primary pro-tective action - sheltering - is determined to result in an excessive dose in a particular emergency. This feature of the Plan appropriately weighs j the facts that the hospitals are located at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ, that

, their masonry construction and the slow infiltration of outside air provides a high degree of radiation dose reduction, and that evacuation might have j detrimental effects on patients. In most scenarios, the hospitals would pg be evacuated, and ad hoc evacuation is appropriate. PID, 21 NRC at 844-46.

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44. Q. Intervenors allege that there was insufficient demonstration of procedures relating to the sheltering, early dismissal and evacuation of school children.

Intervenors also allege that LILCO was unable to provide supplemental transportation needs for school evacuation in a timely manner. Do you agree?

A. ( Daverio, Behr] No. Each of these activities - sheltering, early dismissal

and evacuation - are activities frequently performed by schools in emergencies and therefore need not be exercised in order to assess whether they can be carried out in an actual emergency. Schools do not rely on LERO resources for these activities. In fact, the Board found in its Partial Initial Decision that it was not f atal-to the LILCO Plan that schools are not participating in planning because New York State-required emergency plans, designed for all sorts of emergencies, coupled with LILCO's planning efforts, provide adequate assurance that school children will be protected in a Shoreham emergency. PID,21 NRC at 858.

Sheltering involves simply making a telephone call to the School Su-perintendent, bringing the children inside, and closing doors and windows.

Sheltering is in effect merely "staying put," subject to some simple rules.

Schools in:New York are required to have a "Stay Where You Are Plan."

_Ste "Minimum Requirements for Schools in New York State" (1980) at 19 (Attachment O).

i Similarly, no demonstration of special resources is required for early dismissal, which is simply a precautionary measure taken to facilitate

'vacuation should it become necessary. Early dismissal is routinely em-played on snow days and other emergencies. The children merely have to

) report to the bus drivers and are driven home. Schools in New York are, i moreover, required to have early dismissal ("Go Home") plans. See "Mini-

[ mum Requirements for Schools in New York State" (1980) at 19 (Attach-I ment O).

Evacuation is also not so complicated that it requires special demon-stration or resources. In f act, the only difference between early dismissal and evacuation is the destination of the buses. During an evacuation,

(

instead of the bus drivers driving the chlidren home, they would be given maps to locations outside the EPZ. Schools rely on LERO resources for evacuating children only if unforeseen additional assistance is needed.

Moreover LERO did in fact demonstrate the physical means to dis-miss schools early. FEMA injected a free play message and LERO commu-nicated with the District School Superintendent, and the appropriate num-ber of buses were dispatched to the Shorehsm-Wading River School, in addition LERO demonstrated the ability to assist an evacuation. FEMA sent a free play message that resources were needed for the evacuation of 40 children. A bus was sent to Ridge Elementary School to assist. That it took some 40 minutes to dispatch a LERO Bus Driver to pick up a bus to use to simulate this evacuation does not identify a flaw in the LILCO Plan, See LILCO's Testimony on Contention EX 50 at 46-48, Att. B. The Ridge free play message was designed to test the backup capability of LERO, not the primary method of evacuation using the buses contracted for by schools.

Even if the response to the Ridge free play message were somehow inade-quate, an inadequacy in a backup capability does not denote a flaw in the Plan. The primary capability to evacuate schools was shown to be ade-quate. In any event, even assuming that the 3-hour delay cited by Interve-nors is accurate, there was still ample time (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) for the bus to reach the edge of the EPZ within the time estimates in the Plan, ample time for the children to have been evacuated.

Finally, the RAC Report issued on December 15,1986 concludes that LILCO's commitment that schools other than Shoreham-Wading River will participate in future exercises is an adequate response to this Exercise issue, which FEMA did not even consider to be a deficiency. Table 3.1 at 11.

45. Q. Intervenors allege that the absence of measures in the February 13 Exer-cise specifically intended for the ingestion pathway beyond 10 miles ren-ders the Exercise invalid, and demonstrates a fisw in the LILCO Plan. Do you agree?

A. [Daverlo, Behr) No. Despite LILCO's willingness to include ingestion pathway activities in the Exercise, FEMA decided not to include them. In-gestion pathway protective action recommendations were not an Exercise objective, nor were they required to be in order to constitute a full partici-pation exercise. Ingestion pathway protective action recommendations such as interdiction of the food chain have nothing to do with the first pri-ority in an emergency, the immediate protection of the public within the 10-mile EPZ. In f act, there has been no full-scale test of ingestion pathway activities to date in New York State. See Deposition of Roger B. Kowieski, Thomas Baldwin and Joseph H. Keller at 215-16 (Attachment B); Deposition of James Conrad Baranski, Jr.mes bominic Papile and Lawrence Bruno Czech (February 3,1987) at 78 (Attachment P). The exclusion of ingestion pathway activities is, moreover, consistent with FEMA regulations, which do not require states occupying the ingestion pathway (50 miles) EPZ around a nuclear plant, but not its plume exposure pathway (10 miles) EPZ, to participate in every exercise for such plants. In f act, the regulations re-quire state participation only every 6 years in ingestion pathway activities.

44 C.F.R. S 350.9(c)(4). NRC regulations echo this FEMA policy. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50 Appendix E, S IV.F(3)(e). NRC Staff witnesses have stated that "most" of the full participation exercises they are f amiliar with ex-cluded testing ingestion pathway response. S_e_e Deposition of Sheldon A.

Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss at 54 (Attachment I).

In any event, player logs from the Exercise indicate that attention was given by LERO to the risk of ingestion pathway exposure. See Attachment J.

1

46. Q. Intervenors allege that FEMA failed to test, and LERO f ailed to demon-strate, adequate procedures for monitoring and decontaminating evacuees from special f acilities who would be sent to special reception / relocation ,

centers. Do you agree?

A. [ Daverlo, Behr] This issue is duplicative of issues covered by Contention EX 47. As LILCO has testified on that contention, the Exercise objective was to demonstrate adequate procedures for monitoring and decontamina-tion methods used in general, not evacuees from special f acilities. The monitoring and decontamination function was in nt. t tested. The moni-toring and decontamination methods used are the same regardless of whether the person being monitored is an emergency worker or a general population evacuee. The major difference is the location at which moni- i toring and decontamination takes place. According to the Plan (OPIP 3.9.2), LERO monitoring personnel are dispatched to the special f acility re-ception centers.E Once there, they use the same methods that monitoring and decontamination personnel follow everywhere. Monitoring and decon-tamination procedures were thoroughly exercised and reviewed at the Coll-seum and at the EWDF. This function, which is not even a standard FEMA objective, was therefore adequately tested.

47. Q. Intervenors allege that the exclusion of recovery and re-entry activities from the February 13 Exercise demonstrates a flaw in the LILCO Plan. Is this correct?

A. (Daverio, Behr] No. Recovery and re-entry activities were deliberately excluded from the scope of this one-day Exercise by FEMA, although LILCO was willing to make these part of the Exercise. Recovery /re-entry is a relatively noncompelling protective action. Recovery and re-entry 3/ This procedure, but not the technique, has been altered slightly in that the loca-tion at which monitoring and decontamination will take place has been changed.

activities are not even contemplated until evacuation and all other applica-ble short-term protective action measures have been completed and the af-fected population is safe. Thus, the time constraints affecting short-term protective measures do not apply to recovery and re-entry activities. Fur-ther, the governmental actors involved, particularly state and federal agencies, are no strangers to nuclear safety. See Deposition of James Conrad Baranski, James Dominic Papile and Lawrence Bruno Czech at

' 81-87 (Attachment P).

In any event, recovery and re-entry activities were in fact con-ducted to a degree at the Exercise. See Attachment J.

48. Q. Intervenors allege a flaw in the LILCO Plan because of the lack of partici-pation in the Exercise of Marketing Evaluations, Inc., which is relied upon for verification of stren operation and evacuation. Do you agree?

A. [ Daverio, Behr) First and -foremost, there was no reason to have Market-ing Evaluations, Inc. participate in the Exercise since the sirens were not physically sounded. The function at issue here is to conduct a post-activation telephone survey to verify that the sirens worked properly. This function cannot readily be performed without siren activation. This fune-tion will be part of the FEMA-REP-10 test that will be conducted. In any event, backup notification for the siren system is not required by N U REG-0654. Consequently, provisions for backup notification methods are not essential elements of an emergency plan. See PID,21 NRC at 759; Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1).

LBP-84-26,20 NRC 53,67 (1984).

49. Q. Intervenors allege a flaw in the LILCO Plan by virtue of the f act that not every bus company mentioned in the Plan participated in the Exercise. Do you agree?

Y

.n.

A. ( Daverlo, Behr) No. Valid contracts are in force with the bus compan16.

There is no reason to think they will fail to live up to them. Buses will be i used on an as-needed basis during emergencies. The only function of the bus companies, moreover, is to supply the buses, not even the drivers (who come from LERO). This is a simple function that need not be tested. In any event, some bus companies did participate in the Exercise and made actual equipment available.

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50. Q. Intervenors allege a flaw in the LILCO Plan by virtue of the fact that not all ambulance companies mentioned in the Plan participated in the Exer-cise. Do you agree?

A. ( Daverlo, Behr) No. Valid contracts are also in force with the ambulance companies. Tnere need not be a test of their abilities to drive ambulances, a function they perform routinely, in any event, some ambulances did par-ticipate in the Exercise, it would not have been possible to mobilize hun-dreds of ambulances and ambulettes without affecting their ability to re-spond to actual emergencier, and contradicting the prohibition in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E of requiring mandatory partielpation of the public.

51. Q. Intervenors allege that the LILCO Plan was flawed because of the lack of

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participation of Nassau County and of the Nassau County Red Cross. Do you concur?

A. (Daverio, Behr] No. First, there is no regulatory requirement for partici-  !

pation of an adjoining county, unless that county f alls within the 10-mile ,

EPZ. Nassau County did participate by virtue of supplying the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum (a county owned f acility) for use as the evacuation Reception Center (PEA at 79). Second, the Nassau County l Chapter of the American Red Cross participated by mobilizing staff for the l

activation of two Congregate Care Centers in Nassau County. They also i

1 r I

f

provided the American Red Cross Coordinator who was located at the LERO EOC (PEA at 82-83).

IV. Similar FEM A-Approved Exercises in Region Il and Elsewhere Have Been Deemed Full Participation Exercises by NRC

52. . Aside from your own expertise in emergency planning, and from the 11 shed on this issue by FEMA Guidance Memoranda and the IEAL Report o you base your opinion that the Exercise at Shoreham was a "full part pa-tion" exercise on any other foundation?

A. averio, Behr) Yes. Many full participation exercises have aen per-for at other plants. These were the initial licensing exer es required after t. emergency planning regulations came into pl as a result of Three Mile -land. Those regulations required that a 1 participation ex-ercise be con ted in order for an already opera g plant to continue to operate, and that 'TOL's conduct such an exer e before exceeding 5 per-cent of rated power. As this Board ruled i ts December 19,1986 Memo-randum and Order, "info ation regardi the scope of other full participa-tion exercises is necessary' order resolve intelligently the issue in this proceeding. S_ee Memorandum 7 rder at 5. Thus, we reviewed a sizable sample of these exercises in eg II, and in other Regions where plants had similar surrounding alation de tites, and, based on a comparison of these exercises to the .noreham Exere we conclude that the Shoreham exercise was indee 'f ull participation."

Some of e exercises reviewed were licitly identified as being full partici tion in the FEMA Post-Exercise Re rt. With some of the other e ' cises, this was not clear from the f ace of ' P.oport. However, sine any of these exercises served as the initial licert g exerclSes that

. owed a plant to operate or to continue to operate, we M that the

e. reise was full participation even where the Report did not explicit stat this. Any other Reports that did not specify "Licensee only" or " ar-tial" w e also assumed to be full participation.

53. Q. Please ide fy exercises at other plants that were reviewed.

A. ( Daverio, Be ] The following exercises were reviewed:

Facility Exercise Date FITZPATRICK Aug.11,1982 GINNA Jan.21,1982 GINNA June 22,1903 GINNA Sept.26,198 HOPE CREEK Oct. 29,19 INDIAN POINT-2 June 4,19 INDIAN POINT-3 Mar. 3, 82 INDIAN POINT-3 Aug.2 5,1983 INDIAN POINT-3 Nov. ,1984 JINE MILE POINT Sep" 15,1981 NINE MILE POINT Se 28,1983 NINE MILE POINT v.13,1985 OYSTER CREEK ar.16,1982 OYSTER CREEK J 5,1985 SALEM O 23, 1984 BEAVER VALLEY Feb 7,1982 BRAIDWOOD Nov. 1985 BYRON Nov. 1983 CALLAWAY Mar. 21 1984 CALVERT CLIFFS Nov.17, 81 DIABLO CANYO ' Aug.19,1 1 l FERMI - 2 Feb.1-2,1 l HADDAM NEC May 12,1984 l

LIMERICK July 25,1984 M AINE YAl' EE Dec.11,1982 i

MILLSTO ' Mar.19,1982 l PERRY Nov.28,1984 l PILGRL i Mar. 3,1982 l PILG ..M Sept. 5,1985 l

POI BEACH Mar. 9,1982 S ARON HARRIS May 17,18,1985 RMONT YANKEE Feb.18,1982

'OLF CREEK Nov.7,1984 ZION July 29,1981

54. Q. What was the purpose of the exercise survey?

A. (Daverio, Behr] ,We reviewed the exercises at other plants that have n a epted by NRC as full participation exercises, in order to det mine whe er the alleged omissions contained in Contentions EX 15 an 16 were also o 'ted at those exerches and to compare the number of ose omis-sions with ose omitted at Shoreham.

55. Q. Specifically, w t did your survey of exercises reveal o the inclusion or exclusion of th lements alleged by the Intervenors be missing in the Shoreham Exerc  ?

A. [Daverio, Behr) Ou esearch revealed the follow' g:

a. Public Notificati Procedures Of the 34 full parti ation exercises ich we reviewed:

1. Ten did not include iren test:

2. Eight did not include E Sys m tests:

3. Nineteen did not include a ual broadcast of EBS messages;

4. The SNPS Exercise did ot i lude siren or EBS System tests nor did it include an actu croade 't of EBS messages.

b. Notification of Publ in Water Portio of EPZ Of the 34 full par cipation exercises wh h we reviewed:

1. Twenty-thr did not demonstrate noti ation of the population in the wa portion of the EPZ;

2. Thirty d not include participation by the C t Guard;

3. The NPS Exercise included a demonstration of tification of the po lation in the water portion of the EPZ in hich the Coast ard did participate.

c. AR for Transients on Water Portion of EPZ and on Beaches Parks Of the 34 full participation exercises which we reviewed:

1. Twenty-three did not demonstrate protective action recom -

dations for the transient population on the water portion o' the EPZ or on beaches and parks;

2. hirty did not include participation by the Coast Guard;

3. T SNPS Exercise included Protective Action Reco endations w 5 included the transient population on the water which the Co Guard participated.

d. Procedure Public Education (Brochure)

Of the 34 full rticipation exercises which we viewed:

1. Sixteen did n evaluate public informatio rochures;

2. The SNPS publi niormation brochure 'as not evaluated during the Exercise.

e. Procedures for Evacuatl ' EPZ Hoso 1s Of the 34 full participation xerc which we reviewed:

1. Thirty-one did not demons or simulate evacuation of hospital patients:

2. The SNPS Exercise did n de nstrate or simulate evacuation of l hospital patients.

f. Procedures for Shelter' g, Early i Dismissal, Evacuatlo of School Childre

! Of the 34 full par ipation exercises whic we reviewed:

l

1. Thirty-two not demonstrate or simul e sheltering of school children;

2. Thirty d' not demonstrate or simulate early i missal of schools childre .

l 3.Twe y-one did not demonstrate or simulate eva ation of school chi ren;

4. venty had no mention of the participation of school 'ficials; Twenty-four did not activate school bus drivers;

6. The SNPS Exercise did not demonstrate or simulate the sh tering of school children but did include demonstrations of early d iss-al and evacuation of school children which involved the participation of school officials and school bus drivers.

s

g. Procedures Concerning Protection Actions for Incestion Pathway EPZ the 34 full participation exercises that we reviewed:

1. venteen exercises had no ingestion pathway imple ntation in t home state;

2. Thi -three exercises had no participation of any rder state:

3. Twenty our exercises did not implement shelt / stored feed and for dairy attle:

4. Thirty exe i es did not include PAR's for n dairy animals;

5. Twenty-six e cises did not include PAR' for drinking water and food chain;

6. Thirty-two exere had no mention performing ground deposi-tion calculations;

7. The SNPS Exercise in uded no d onstrations of ingestion path-way activities by eithe ome or rder states. Ingestion pathway Protective Action Rec men tions were made for both dairy and non-dairy animals bu of r drinking water. A ground depo-sition calculation was perf ed.

h. Procedures Relating to the adiol ical Monitoring and Decontami ation of Evacuees from Special/ acilities Of the 34 full particip lon exercises ch we reviewed:

l 1. Virtually no exer .se demonstrated s al procedures relating to t

radiological m toring and decontami tion of evacuees from special f aciliti ;

2. The SNPS reise did not include demonst tion of special pro-cedures r ting to the radiological monito 'ig and decontam-l ination o vacuees f rom special f acilities.

l 1. Recover , Re-entry Procedures Of th 4 full participation exercises we reviewed:

1. .ghteen exercises did not simulate recovery and re-en ' activi-

.ies;

. The SNPS Exercise did not simulate recovery and re-entry tivi-ties.

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j. Participation of Certain Bus Companies Of the 34 full participation exercises we reviewed:

Twenty-eight exercises did not specify that bus operat!' were emonstrated;

2. the exercises that did specify this information:

at I lan Point-2 (June 4,1986), 8 bus companies re telephoned and1 buses were requested; at India cint-3 (August 24-25,1983), 5 bus e panies were tele-phoned a 10 buses were requested; at Indian Po t-3 (November 28,1984), 9 b companies were tele-phoned and it *as not specified how man uses were requested; at Nine Mile P t (September 28,19 ) 2 bus companies were telephoned and 2 ' es were request ,

at Nine Mile Point 'ovember 13 985), it is not specified how many bus compani were spe led, but two buses were re-quested; at Salem (October 23,19 , bus company was telephoned and 2 buses were requested.

3. Eighteen exercises did n s ify the number of buses that par-ticipated:

4. The SNPS Exercise luded the rticipation of 9 yards which provide 10 buses,

k. Verification of Sir Operation by Marketine Evalua ons, Inc.

Of the 34 full rticipation exercises reviewe

1. No exere report mentioned a contract orga 'ation:

, 2. Twent three exercises verified by field obsert ion that sirens sound , of which two had personnel stationed t rovide verifi-cati (M. interview of EPZ resident / transients observations m e for purposes of the exercise);

3. ne exercise verified by verification signal;

. The SNPS Exercise did not include a siren test and t efore l LERO did not utilize its contract organization, Marketing atua-tions, Inc., to verif y siren operations.

1

1. Participation of Certain Ambulance Companies Of the 34 full participation exercises we reviewed:

1. Sixteen exercises did not specify that ambulance oper ons were demonstrated;

. Where ambulance company operations were dem trated: as compared to the six ambulances and six ambul es run at the horeham Exercise, 2 ambulances participated 7 exercises: I bulance participated in 9 exercises; and e than 2 ambu-la es participated in 2 exercises.

In summary, the 34 full participation exercises r iewed, 28 exercises had more of the - ged omissions than the Shoreh Exercise.

56. Q. What do you conclu f rom the data genera d from the exercises re-viewed?

A. [Daver10, Behr) We ca onclude two t gs from our review of these data:

1. Each of the non-demons ted ements, alleged by the Intervences to be a fundamental flaw I he LILCO Plan, was also not demon-strated at other full pa ci tion exercises at licensed nuclear power plants.

2. The total number o egedly non emonstrated elements at the Shoreham Exercis .s comparable with he number of elements not demonstrated at ese other full scale exe ises. See Attachment Q.

For example, appears from the Exercise zrt of the November 28,1984 e. cise at the Perry Nuclear Plant, w h the NRC clearly found w a full participation exercise, that all b two of the ele-ments . tervenors allege were omitted at Shoreham 'ere, in f act, not ested during the Perry exercise. See Cleveland 'etric Illu-ating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), 22.

lp op, at 4 (November 7,1986).

Specifically, the sirens were not tested at Perry: EBS messages w not bro cast; no PARS were issued for persons in the water portion the EPZ or to ransients in beaches or parks; the Coast Guard did n partici-pate: FEMA not evaluate public education materials dur the exer-cise; hospital ev uation was not simulated; school childre were not shel-tered; the early issal of schools was not demonst ted; there was no demonstration of the cuation of school children chool officials did not participate; school bus d ers did not participa ; no border state partici-pated in ingestion pathway 'ivities; shelte tored feed recommendations for dairy cattle were not imple ented; t te were no PAR's for non-dairy animals; there were no PAR's to r' King water and food chain; ground deposition calculations were not n recovery / reentry procedures were not demonstrated; neither the mber o mbulance companies telephoned nor the number of ambul es requested specified, and only 2 ambu-lances - compared wit at Shoreham part pated; siren operation was not verified by a e ract organization (a silent en test was done); and neither the num . of bus companies telephoned n the number of buses requested no e number of buses that participated specified in the Exercise port. See Attachment R. Thus, the Shoreha Exercise is al-most ntical to an exercise that NRC has clearly found to ull partici-pa n.

57. Q. Does this conclude your Testimony on Contentions EX 15 and 16?

A. (Daverio, Behr, Hockert) Yes. We conclude that the February 13 l Shoreham Exercise was itideed a full participation exercise.

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Attachment E AV .,

40M Fede.a] Emerz.ency Management Agency

• yI w

Washington. D.C. 00C0 Q }. Y

@CFKtud. P:R: Te;iv.a1 Direct:rs A:.irq Pur;;,endE. Sinc:::

/

T108.: Sarue1 A. ,

As asc at er . e<:t.;st Sute a. oef:qrams ard Sg;:cr Guidan rard.:m iR-1, Pelirf on N'JF.0-0654<T&A-?5-1 S*JELTO:* :

and 44 OTR 250 Periedi: Paga.rwnents Guidance Me crard:: (2) PR-1, Poli;y n %MG-0654/?DA-FD-1 :.rd 44 :TR 350 Peri: die 3egaire.wnts, is herwith trans.itted for your it:plemntati n.

2is 2 bec==s : perative en Oct:eer 1,19 85. ~he ;clicy, ;rWares ard regaire. enu conuined in :nis 2 =ere deve'.oped := sync .r:ni:e tam . v tr.

the tiennial exer:ise freq.ene/, highli;ht perisii: requirumnts ird f:= ally 2:icn,"

set forth .w n;cr: irs regaireranu in :ne ' Art.ual :.atter of Car.if1:

wi=n i.s due by Jaruarf 31 f:r :ne ;re:edi.q year's activities. I 1:cr. :

the Regi:ns := u ke snis 2 availa:1e t: State ard local 9:ver==n organizations tr.a Cd := i.welwd in tu deple entation.

St.ates s. bald propre and f:r-ard an ' Ar.nual *e::er of Cenifi stien* ty Janu-arf 31, 1986, :: :v;cn en t.wir mee:1.T tr.ese ;er.cii: :weairemenu app' i:2.:le fer calendar year 1985. '+.ile inese priedi: ,qairements are -et nw and have been ge rative si..ce the ;cli ati:n d N'J5-3654<TP.A 85-1 in 19 80, .,

tr.is is the firs: :L e == have asW. Sutes := f:rmally n;cr: :n ne:.

Yo:: reviw ard. :r cent on :.w final draf :::py sen: April 26, 1985 =as helpful in devel:pirq :ne final versien. We appreciate tr.is assis.a .ce l

j ard cecgeration. Any q.estions eenevrnirq the i.nierenutien d :r.is CM s.bdd be direc.ed : Bill McNutt at (.m ) 646-2857 I

Atu run:

l As Stated

>= % Federal Emer ency Mar.agement Azency B \.a e9: 9 - -

5 2 Washington, D.C. 2047 2

'k SG5

' OCT I 3UIDANCE WEMOR ANCC" DR ~1 DOL!CY ON NUREG-0654/r!N -RE:-1 AND 44 0?R 350 PERICOIC R'0U:REMENTS Purcose This Saicance demorancum (GM) cro ices interpretation anc :larifica:ica Of in One "ece*al Emergency "anagement agency '"E*AI :l ane n; recu1rement s :entained rule, 44 0FR 350, anc NUREG-0654/~E"A-RE?-1, rela:ec :o exer:ise frecuency anc c:ner RE: program empnases.

Ba x;Pounc

) CFR 350, on Se::em:ec 23,  :

3 Witn :ne publication of :ne final FEMA rule, 44anc :ne 9e recui :ne Nuclear R ements on July 6, 1984, it nas become necessary to elsrify s me of k containec in :nese rules anc our ::mmon guidance criteria im:le9entati:e cocument, NUREG-Of Also, as we are a;;r:dening One fif tn y9ar of :ne

/ FEMA-REP-1.

f of our joint (NRC/ FEMA) radiological emergency precarecness (RE ) 3rogram, it is accropriate to nignlign; anc clarify recuirements relatec to :eri:c.:5 x n year of a assessments, es;ecially : nose maue in the fif tn and RE? program.

Guicance ianning stancar:s The changes anc program emonases rela:ec to ne referenced anc 4:e evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/

and local gover-ments FEMA-REP-1 anc to Federal reviewers of plans ancanc 14 CFR 350

re:are:-

to 5: Section A ::ntains ness. This quicance is civided into three se :1ons.

planning stancarcs , evaluation criteria and c:ner RE7 program recuirreats Secti: !

Ona nave Deer revisec anc/cr clarified to f acilitate ::m:liance.

incluces : nose =ni:n remain vnchanged but are af galign:ec nere to ensure comcie: ion and em:liance. Section C ces:ribes ne Annual Letter ofOi e:::-

Certifica:ica wnien is submittec ey :he State to :ne TEMA Regional 3.

docunenting actions :asen on :ne recuirements resentec in secti:ns A an:

SECTION A: TH: :L'. v: NG Eval'IAT 04 R:TER!A NC'.UO! OMANGI' : nw Et:5': 43 RE;uiRE."ENTS

?LANN: NG STANDARDS AND EVALUA!!ON CRITER!ON N. Exer:ises anc 's 81anning 5:arcarc evalua e major ;ortt:es Per.s:i: exer:1ses are '=i :e) :encustedcrills  :: are l=111 :e) ::newetec ::

emergency res:ense :a:a:ities , :ericcicevelee and :.7*.'. maintain re exer:ises anc ceilis are (=ill ce) correctac.

2 N . *. . c . Evaluation C' ;*f on An exer:ise snal' incluce moeili:ation of State and local :ersonnel and resources acecuate to verify :Se Oa:Acility to res:cncrovice to an 4::icent for a criti ue The organi:a: ion 53411 l scenario recuiring res;onse. exer:f se ey Feceral and Sta:e oesoevers/ evaluators.

o' :ne ti ennal cc ..** ..

..fm su n The scenario snould ce variec fr0m exercise to exea:ise . ..

! :na :ne major elements of :ne ;;ans :r anc pre:areoness eriod.

segani:ations Each organi:ation snould maarece i

tested wi:nin a si x-year "  : .

00 a.m. -: : ,

provisions to start an exer:ise ot: ween 5:00 e.m.

and 4: once every stx

-c ': '; :, . c reet :- ::: ::- seasons of :ne feta years. Exteci ses should be condu:*ed durino dif ferent 4*

wi*nin 9 six-year oeriod for exercising uncer v.arlous wea:Ser conc 1:1ons. ,

: ::;'; :00 should be least one exercise Over a cerloc of six years un announc eo.

Areas of Review Evaluation criterion, N.1.b., addresses several periccic The mos: exercise important requiaemeats.

nange is to :e-m?:

All of :nese recuirements are moci fied.

t l :ne :esting of major planning and pre:4reuness elements w1:nin a six

Man five-year period. All of :

witnin :nis six-year period.

Attencan: Criteria In accition 'n meeting s:ecific exercise recuirements, State and local governments snould meet :ne following requirements:

for 1.

For tnose recuiaenents relatec to the six-year :cmoliance :eriod ne 51x-year selected exercise activities delineated in N.1.3. jota:aeove, (uttitty anc Sta e period commences with :ne ca econcucted of ne firstaf ter Novemoer 3,1980, : e l

' and . local governments) exer:it 1c75 effective ca:e of :ne Nuclear Regulatory "ommission Final Regula:

on Emergency Dianning,10 CFR 8ar: 50 (accencix !) (45 Ft 554'.0, August 19; '.980). For :ne examole, if :ne da:e of :Se first join: exe-:d se end of :ne six-year ;eriod is Mar:n 23, '.98*.

was war:n 23, 19' All of ne maj oa elements are to be :es:sc witnin :ne six-year :ea'c:

on a site-spect fic basi s exce:: for inges: ion-rela:ec elemen:s as :te testing of suca elements is not tied to a particular site for State governments. (See Attendant Criteria 3 below.)

2. Scanscios for :eaiedic exer:ises should be suf fi:tently varief so

nat all of :Se major elemen:s of :ne plans anc =ce:arteness The ma'j or elofeaea*

f's te5 organi:aticas of plans and are testic witata a six-year' Procedural :ericc.;rePolicy arednesson are contained in :ne Augus: 5,1983, memorandum:

Radiological mergency Preparedness Plan keviews, Exercise Ceserva:icas and Ev aluations , and Interim Findings.'

ne requirement for ea:P

3. :molici: in ev a: aa: ion :st :erien , N.1.3. , i s its wi:nin sorcers is f ully State tien nas a mue! ear cower clan:

' To nigni1gn :nanges :o :riteria in NUR(G-0634/FE.MA-427-1, :ne new langua;e uncerlined and ne old language is lined :ncougn.

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1 exer *i se its :l ans and are:are ness "eIate? :: ingesti:n ex: sure i

athway measures at leas: Once every 5 x years in :en;un t:n =1:3 a 4

lune ex: sure :ateway exer:: se ':e s:me site ':-  :: . r: . Hs  ;

recut r ement is refle::e in :ne 35 exer::se : ;e:::ves anc

• s

resentec in 44 0FR 350.9(:)(4). Eaca Sta:e.wi:n ingest'09 ex::sare

athway es:ensi:ilities f:e two Or more sites locate =1:v - *:s ter:ers will 'ully artici: ate a: some si:e on a ::a:::na, :as:s an:

ar:1aily :artici: ate at tne ::ner sites once every six years. A 5:a:e ni:n 9as inges:icn rela:e: es:ensitili:ies f:a a st:eis) locatec =1:nin 1:s torcers anc wnien is also wi:nin :ne 50-m:'e inges f on ex:csure :a:nway of a site (sl loca:ec in a ::rtea* ;

State's1, small : art: ally : art::::a:e in ali f tne imles:::n reia:e exer:i ses f e :nese Oor:ering 5:a:e site (s). 7 e :nese States na: co act nave a c-er :lant loca:ec in its r:eas, :u:

are loca:ec wi*nin :ne 50-mile *mergency :lanning ::ne O f a . r:ea' g State's :c=er :lant, :ney snould fully :artic1: ate in a: 'eas: :ne exer:ise ever a six-year :ertec dec artially :arti:f:a:e 'n III c:ners. "Lese inges:10n rel ate: recutaenents Pe:resen: ev'1':n of :r:vi s1:ns ::n:ainec in Octa YUREG-0654/FE.MA-45.:-l anc la "Ei 350.9( )(4).

4 The :efi9t:icn Of full sar:ici:a:'on in inges:icn as:e::s :' e'xta:'ses is guicec :y 44 0FR 350.2(f). Since 1c:a1 ;0ver mea:s are a:: asual'y aecui ec :: ceve10: and tes inges:1:n :lans anc Ore:ar: ness, State officials woulc te :ne: emergency cescnnel primarily inv:l <ed in :e inges*iCo :Cetion of exer *1ses, mowever, in some 5:a*es,

• cal gCver9ments nave res:cosi ilities :na recuire :neir 'ar*i**:a:'** '"

suca exec ~ises. The aum:ee ancung ':n of :ersonnel 9eece s ?:'J : :e suffi *en* for car *ying *ut all :."Ose ingestion measures *na* a~e necessitatec Dy a : articular ac:icent scenario. Als0, Organ':a**:*s fully :ar !:i:a:Ing in :ne ingestion ::etion of an exer:ise snou :t ce: ley #iel: teams

• secure an analy:e mecia sam:I es as *e:; *e: :;

ne ac: ice 9: scenar' .

5. The e.efint:10n of :artial :artici:ati:n in inges: ice as:e::s :' et e :'st i s guic es :y 44 0?R 350.2( cl . As s.:a:ec in i:em a a: ve , 5:at e :: a'

-c ul .: :e Ine emergency :ersonnel :rimarily involvec in :ne 19;es:t:n

ortion Of exer:fses. The num er anc function of Sta:e :ersencet eec e:

snoul 9 Se ceterninec on :ne tas. s of veri'ying ca:acil1:t es f:e :ar y' :

ou: :ne f:ll wing resconst:11ittes: Dire :icn anc ::nts:I aa: *etate:

c:mmunica:1:ns ':e :c::e ::ve ac: ten cetisiermaxing ane :: sse-t a:':n l

l of e9ergen:y inf:r9ation : acce: ria:e incivi:ual 5, ;rcu:s in: :e

! general u:It:. Organi:ati:ns :artially :artici:ating in :ne I inges:f on :ertion of an exer:ise will not have := ce:IOy 'ield teams to secure anc analy:e mecia sam:les as s!ch sections :an De simul a:es.

6. Of f si:e organi:::f ons shoulc make Or: vision to start an exer::se Deteten 5:00 :.m. arc 4: 00 a.m. Once every six years.

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7 Of' site organi:at: Ors snoul: 5:necu:e exer:'ses at iteaea; seas:rs ver a six-year :ertec :: increase ne I'ce 1.occ ' e exea:'ste; . : ea This 3r vision :J.4 :e f ul fi ' ec 19 :s;- :e vart:us -ea:9ea ::nct:::ns.

regular seneculing of exea:15es anc in : n; unction w1:n items 2 an: 2 acove.

3. Offsite organi:1: tens sacui: mate prev i sion :: :artici:ata ia unanneur.ces exea:i ses at least once ev'ery sir years. An unanneur:e exer:ise is a regularly 5:9eculec exer:ise in =nlen :ne cn0= es;e :'

ne ex ac; ca:e of :ne exer:ise is restri:tec to only nose ce-s:-s witn a neec to ' anew. Altncugn :ne knowlec;e of Ne exac: : ate 's restricted, a time frame of 7 days witnin =nien :ne unannouncec exercise is to se ::ncuc ec will se estaelt sned anc known :c a';

parties involvec.

9. Items 2,3.6,7 anc 3 may te :omeinec in :ne same exe :ise or ac:resse:

in separate exercises =1:nin a six-year pericc.

SECTION S: OTHER DER!CO: REOU:REMENTS HIGHLIGHTED 70 CAL'. a7 EN7: N :

_NEIO FOR COM:'.:ANCE '

PLANNING STANDAR05 AND EVALUAT 0N OR!?!R:A F. Emergencv 00mmuni:st' Ors .

31anning Stancarc Drovisions exist f:r': rome: :ommunications among principal res:ense :r;a": :': s

c emergency

er'sennel anc :: :ne suelic. (NURE3-0654/FE"A-RE.3-1, :.4" Evaluati:n Criteria r.3. Each Organi:a:icn snall :encuct ceriodi: tes:4mg of :9e en:i e eme ;ea:f emnnunica:1:ns system ' See evaluation cet teria N.2.4., N.2.c. anc a::eac x 2.

3. Duelic Educa:'en anc :nf:rma: 1:n l

Dianning Stancarc Information is made availacle to ne cuelic on a ce-iocic basis en 9c=

• tty will se notified anc wna: :neir initial actions snoul: a in an eme ;ea:y (e.g., listening to a local Dreaccast statier, anc re9aining incoe's!, : e principal points Of contact v1:n :ne news media f:P cisseminatice. Of in':r-at*:-

curing an eneagency (inclucing :ne anysical loca:1cn or locatiens) a*e esta: ' sre:l in advance anc pr:cedu.*es for :ccr:1na*ec dissemination of inf:rma:::n :: :.9 e public are estaelisnee. (NURE3-0654/ FEMA REP-1, p.49)

Evaluation Criteria 1 a-~.4y'  !

G.I. Each cegani:3:':n snail :revice a ::orcinated :ericci: (at least i 01ssemina:!cn of inf:rmation :: :9e Duel;c regarcing 90w :ney will :e a::' ' ' ec anc wna: :neir AC 10ns sn0ul :e in an F9ergency. Th i s i n f 0 r34 :10 n s e a ' '

incluce, $U; n0t necess ari'f De limitec IC:

a. ecucational inf:r9a en en raciation;

b. cQntact f or accitional inf:r9ation; Iari'y i-:ta:

• Language for scre of :ne evaiwation criteria nas been Onangec to but :ne re:Viremeats a.e* no* 05angec.

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c. protective measures, e.g., ev acuation routes and relocation centers, snet tering, respiretary protection, r adioprotective drugs ; arus

d. Special needs Jf the handicapped.

f mans for accwolishing this dissemination may include, but no limited to:

bills and publications distributed on an annust basis.

3.2. De public information prograss saall provide the per9anent and transient '

soult peculation within the slee esposure CPZ :n adequate opportunity toTh ,

bec:ene aware of the information annually.is likely to be availacle in a residence for writni materi al thatUpdated infor nation shall be disseminated at least annually.

emerg e ncy.

Signs or other measures (e.g., decals, posted notices or etner means, pt to aced in hotels, motels, gasoline stations and phone booths) shall also be use:

disseminate to any transient population within the plume esposure pat"way !:!

l accropriate infor'"ation that would be helpful if an emergency or accident occurs. Such notices should refer the transient to the telephone direct 0ry or other sources of local energency information and guide the visitor to a:propriate racio and televison frequencies.

3.5. Each ceganization shall conduct coordinated programs at least annually to acquaint news media with emergency t 'ans, information concerning radi ation and points of contact for release of public information.

H. Crer;ency facilities and Couto-ent Planning 5tandard_

Agequate emergency facilitief and equi; ment t0 su Cort the 89ergency res; osse are proviced and maintained. (MuRIG-0654/TEMA A!7-1, p.52) tvaluation Criterion M. Eath organization operationally caect small make provisions to las;ect, inventory quarter and after each use, Dere shall be suf ficient reserves of fe w energeacy ttts instreents/ equi; ment to replace those which are removed l

for calibration or repair. Calibration of equi;nent shall be at inteav al s rec: mended by tMe sugglier of the equi; ment.

M. (2ercise ard 3 rills, planning Standard Periodic esercises are (will be) conducted to evaluat6 najor porticas of emergency response capacilites, periodic drills see (vill be) conducted to develop and Saf ntata tey stills, and deficiencies identified as a result of esercise and drills are (vill ce) Corrected. (MUR!iI-0654/fl.MA-I!) 1, p.71)

.4.

Orill Recui remer:s (Evaluation C-i t ea* a)

N.2. De fi ni ti on: A drill is a secervisec instrue:1on :eriod aimec at

esting, ceve ooing anc maintaining still s in a par:1cular coerati:n.

A drill is often a comoonent of an ex0 cise. A Each celll snall se suceavisec organization enall and evaluatec ey a cualified crill insero:::r.

conduct cr111s, in accition to the :lediial annual exercise at : Me freq0encies indica:ec selow:

N.2.a. Communication Orill s: Three types of connunication crills are 1" a; 'ommunications with Sta:e anc :ucal goverement: 1:ntn :ne accressea: s plume exposure sa:nway enargency planning :ene snall se tes:ec 'Jon:aly; (b) Communications vita f ederal energency resconse organi:stians anc State (sl within the ingestion pathway shall se testec at least once quarterly in

• conjunction with :ne testing of plume excesure pathway measures of :ne State plan anc (c) cannunications be: ween :ne nuclear f acility, State anc local government emergency operations centers anc field essessment teams snall be testec at least once every year. Communication ceill s snall al so include ne aspec of uncerstancing :ne content of messages.

N.2.0. we dical imer;ency Orills: A medical emergency crill involving a simulatec contaminated incividual 134: contains provisions for particica:1cm ey local succor: service agencies (i .e. , amoul ance and of fsit'e mecical treatment f acility) snall be conducted annually.

N.2.d. Raciological wenitoring Orills: Requi aements are set for:n for :~e types of ract oi ogical monitoring cr11i s: (a) Raciological monitortng ceills relatec to :na clume ex:osure patnway emergency planning zone snall se conducted at leds: annually and snall include provisions for c>nnunications and recorckeecine. (2) Raciological monitoring crills relatec to :ne ingestion excesure cataway emergency planning :ene shall be concuctec at least annually anc snall include ;rosisions f or communications anc rec:rc ketoing.

N.2.e. we al n Dnysi:s Orills: Heal n 8hysics crills shall De concuctec semi-annually oy 5:a:e governme.nts with licensees to test resconse to anc analysis of simulated elevated aircorne and liquid samples anc direct raciation measurements in :ne environment. The State drills can se concuctec at any site.

O. Radiological ime ;ency tescense

• raining planning Stancarc Radioleytcal emergency response trainir- is provided '.9 ?Sose uno may te called on to assisc in an emergency. (

47(G-0! ^; 4-4EP.1, p.75)

Evaluation Criter'a 0 .1. acn organt:at'on snall assure tratning of accroccia:e incividuals.

I

.7 articica:e in anc receive 0.1.3. Eacn off site res:ense organi:a: ton snall betwten local agencies sucn as 'i e, tr aining . Where mutual alc agreenents exts polics and amoulance/ rescue, tse training shall also se of ferec to :ne a:ner depar tments uno are memoers of :ne mutual sid district.

0 . 4_ .

Eacn organi:a: 1on snall ei aolisa aradiological tra'ining program for instructing anc emergency resconse ::ans.

cualifying personnel uno will implemenThe speciali:ed initial trainin frequenc/ and snould me proviced in defined with respect to their scope and

ne following categories:

a. Directors or coordinators of resconse orgrani:ations; assessment;

3. Personnel respons1 Die for accioen:

- c. Radiological monitoring teams anc raciological anal ysis ;ersonnel;

d. Police, security and fire fignting personnel; f.

Fi rst aid and rescue personnel;

g. Local support services personnel including Civil Defense / Emergency Sersice personnel;

h. Medical succor: personnel; and

j. Ptesonnel responsible for transmission of emergency information anc instructions.

0.5. Each eagani:stion saali provide for :ne jni.tial and annual retraining of personnel with emergency response responsibilities.

c. Resoonsibility for the planning Effort: Develeeve-t. Dericcic Review

~

rne 015 r::utton of Eme ;ency D i a n s_

planning Standard Respontibflities for plan ' development and revisv and for distributf:n of e9ea;e-g (NUR!3-0654/CEwA.: E:.;

plans i.ra estaclisned, anc planners are properly trained.

p.78)

Evaluation Criteria P.4 EJcn organi:ation shall update its clan aad agreementi The upcate as neecec, snall tace ev*ew IEc certify it to se current on a annual ba.'t.6. '"1545.

into accoun: cnanges iden:4 fied by dril's and The emergency ris: Onte placs and approve; cnanges to :ne slans sn411 P.S.

5E'forwar:ed to all organi:4: ions enc asoccortate incivicuals st n es:ensi:' *:

for implem:nta: ion of :ne t ans. i Revisto pages srall be cated and marrec to show weare changes nravt seen made.

F.10. Eaca organization 19all provide for updating teleonone nume, r!, call-cc.e ll'slIS and maps in e9ergency procedures at least quarterly.

Acpe9 dix 3: 8eAns f?r D'ovidi9q 3*en?! Alert ar.d Not1'i ation of itsOOnse Or*ani:Attons 19c 'nr 10 uia:*19 Periodic recu' Dee7:s rel ated to alert and notification will se itscustec anc celineated in a f sethc:rnt ng GM.

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1 SECTION : ANNUAL LETTER OF O!RT**:CA~!ON 1 I

In order to f acilitate :ne monitoring of 4"5 planning and pr eca r edne s s I recutrements as prescribed in NURIG 4065a/' tMA-REP-1 anc 44 CFR 350 as I delineated in :nis memorandum, an Annual Letter of Certification snall se Th e l submitted from eacn State tc :ne <anropriate FEMA Regional St rector. l

( State submission of :ne Annual Lat <r of Certification :o :ne FEMA Regienal ]

Oirector should te made by January 31 of each year and snould accress Thi s letter comol'ance witn periodic recuirements for tne preceding year.  ;

ne requi site acti~ities nave L*en under aren '

shall include assurances :na ~

41 organi:atic > for :ne or concleted, as appropriate, ty ne State am.

following functions:

1. Public Education and Information (Gl: Means of dissemination of information, ca:es, ;articipants , sponsoring organi:ations and cescrip;'in of any programs conducted to increase puolic and

• media radiological energency planning and response awareness.

Emer ency Facilities and Ecui: ment (H): Type of equi pmen:/ ins

• rument ,

2.

cuantity anc cates of cnect/ test.

1ses unce*

3. Exerci ses (N1: Testing of all major elenents, conducting exer:

various :Ime ane seasonal conditions, unannounced exercises anc tes*ing of State (and local, as appropriate) plans for implementing ingestion pataway measures. .

4 Orills (MI: Types, dates held and participating organf:ations.

Radiological Emergency Resoonse Training /01: Scope and purpose of trai9 t eg, 5.

dates neic, numoer of participants, agencies represented and sponsors of training:

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Verifica:ica that plans arc

6. UDdate of plans and Letters of Agreement (pl:

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Uccates letters of agreement nave seen reviewec ano accropria:e :nanges made.

of plans snould include teleonone numoers, call-down lists and maps.

Type of tests conducted in ac:orcan:e

7. Al er and No:ification (Ao:endix 21:

wl:n estacilsnec scnecule, ca:e13eic, and operacility per:entage acnt eved :a sec l

on periodic testing.

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i A TT A C H M E N T___C_

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IIMA, March 20, 1987 s

)

e SDCES OF AMCA NCC:ZAR REGU*N C2ir.d5SICN 3afere te Atede Safeav and *lcansim Sca_M In the Mattar of )

IC G ISIAND LIGHT 2G GAEY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

)- ) (IP EXE" M )

J' (Sh=eham Nuclear Power )

Station, Crd.t 1) )

DIFICT T!TIDON OF U!CEAS E. BAIDfIN, Jwun 3. EIIZR AND PCER 3. .N

.NQG DERGDICY F_ANICG EXERCISE d

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89 CCITrD7FION EX 15 AND 16 l

ISSUE: 'Ihe exercise did not include descr=L.ations or evaluationc of Inajor portions of the I2IID Plan and the amenJency response capabilities of Inany persons, organizations and entities Iulled upon to implement the IIICD Plan.

ANSWER: With the publication of the final FDR rule, 44 CFR 350, en Sep*=har 28, 1983, and the Nuclear

. Regulatory h4==ian (NRC) final regulation,10 CFR 50, on July 6,1984, it has h mean to clarify sana of the requiar.-=As centained in these rules and FDE/NRC m guidance critaria document, NCRB3-0654/FDR-REP-1. On Oc*h 4,1985 FDR 4==nM Guidance Mancran:tum 5 ., Policy on NOFS-0654/FDR-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 Periodic Requiar.-uds which prtr.ridad intesp.etation and clarification m periodic planning ard exercise l activities and other requit.-=As affected by the f biennial exercise frequency. Guidance Memorandum PR-1 states:

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I 90 CDNIDTI'ICH EX 15 AND 16 (continued) i scenarios for pariedic exercises should be sufficiently varied so that all of the major elements of the plans and preparedness of offsite organizations are tasted within a six-year period. 'Iha major elements of plans and preparedness are ir m -- in the 35 exercise objectives antained in the August 5, 1983, hddum: "P W M Policy on Radiological Edmu.vs c1 Preparedness Plan Reviews, Exarcise Observations and Evaluations, ard Interim Findings."

With regard to the Shoreham exercise, on June 20, 1985, NRC requested FEMA to ss_*1e as full an exercise of the LIILO I.ocal Emergency Ersg=e organizaticn (LERO) plan as feasible, to test offsite a w cyv preparedness at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Statien.

However, NRC suggested that ITMA emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of s.aywcy preparedness related to the demonstration of response m =_b414 ties within the plume exposure (10-mile) Eme.M Planning Zona (EPZ) .

2 It should be noted that durirs the deposition of the ITNA witness panel, a tabulation showing 36 FENA stardard objectives was p. 5.ntad for witness emmants. This tabulaticn was marked kr.?* L.- d.1 (M 17. 'Ihis revision, ircluding the mcdified objectives, was a draft version circulated for e m mant caly. 'Iha modified objec*dves have not been accepted at this time. 'Iharefore, there are only 35 standard FINA objecadves which nnst be considered over the six-year cycle.

91 j COTrD7FION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

In its October 29, 1985 respmse to NRC, N r6 two (2) options for exarcisig the Iccal E m p .y Response Organization (lERO), which relies upon utility employees, w h actors, private organizations and the U.S. napar 6 d. of Energy (DOE). 'Ihase two options were as follows:

o Option 1 re,-:M that N set aside

. all functions and exercise objectives related to issues of legal authority and Stata and local participation.

o Opticn 2 re,-:M an exercise of all functions and m 1 exercise objectives.

' Ibis optim would exercise the current versim of the IERO Plan. Exarcise centrollers would sitm21ata the roles of key Stata and local'offim4=1= unable or unwillig to participata.

N T a=ized in its October 29, 1985 letter to NRC that "the reluctance of county and State officials to participata in such an exercise ...

would place v 4=1 parameters en its conduct."

N stipulated that "(a)ny exarcise without participation by Stata and local ge w A J would not allow ... sufficient demonstratien (for N) to' reach a findig of reasonable assurance" that der # atei protective maae m can be taken offsite l in the event of a radiolcgical emergercy. N added that "(o)bviously, the value of such an exercise in the licensig 3 m is a determination i

l which can only be :nada by NRC." On November 12, 1985, NRC requested that N conduct the exercise in accordance with parameters described in Option 2.

On November 21, 1985, N suknitad the svg rarcine objectives to NRC for use by LII4D exercise planners.

92 CDNIHTI'ICN EX 15 MD 16 (continued) l As stated in the nummary of the Post Exercise 1

l A==a==mant (PEA) Report, the February 13, 1986 l

exercise was evaluated in acxxani with the general l

provisions of the second option s w.csed for the exercise to NRC by N. 'Ihis option g% ;ari an l

exercise of the current version (i.e., Rev: 6) of the IERO Plan which would exercise all functions ard nor:nal exercise objectives. Exercise controllers were to simulate the roles of key state and local officials if they were unable or unwilling to participate in the exercise.

N made every attanpt to ensure that preparation for ard evaluation of the February 13, 1986 exercise of the LIIro Transition Plan for Shoreham was consistent with the parameters and g e estab14 =hari for other full-scale Radiological Eme.M Preparedness (REP) exercises evaluated by N Region II. 'Ihe Reficri designed the exercise objectives to ensure that the exercise would be of sufficient scope for m to evaluate the following:

o All functions - 1.e., M would l

l be able to evaluate LIILO's and IERO's integrated capability to adequately ===a= and respond to an amiriant at Shoreham, l

o Normal exercise objectivec -

i.e., m would be able to evaluate major obsem.rable l portiens of the IERO Plan.

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i 93 CDNI"DTI' ION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

This initial set of pwgsad exercise objectives included most of FDR's starxiard objectives (3) l that had been keyed to the various locations (i.e.,

IDC, Field Activities, Brookhaven Area office, Staging Areas, Emergency Worker Decantamination Facility, DiC, and IDF) where they would be evaluated. The first meeting was held with utility imp osentatives an November 25, 1985 to d4 e3== the exercise k m . Subsequent to that first meeting the gu,-M exercise objectives were revised prior to the exELD pursuant to Orgoing plannirq d4 er==ians with LU.co &=sasentatives.

3 The followirq standard objectives were not i

included in the initial set of objectives gW for the exercise:

o Evaluation and implementation of irgestian pathway protective actions (3 objectives);

1 l

o Ability to make the d e kian whether to issue KI to emergeng workers; o Evacuation of cnsite pe. h ;

o Ability to identify and request Federal assistance; o Ability to relocate and operate an alternate Irc an:l/cr IDF; ani o Evaluation and impleme. v ation of recovery and any (2 objectives) ;

94 CONTENTION EX 15 AND 16 (ceneJnued)

'Ihe followirg list correlates FEMA's standard exercise objectives with vific objectives that were evaluated durirg the February 13, 1986 Shoreham exercise. Objectives evaluated durity that exercise are listed under the statement of each standard objective. Nbers a standard objective was not evaluated, this is so irriicated. Exercise objectives affected by the legal authority issue are marked with an asterisk (*).

1. Demonstrate ability to ucbilize staff ard activate feilities s w Lly.

IDC 2 BIO 2 ENC 1 SA 2 EWDF 1 FIEID 17,18

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities ard mairedt sr.affirg around tha clock. ,

t IDC 3 BIO 3 INC 2 EWDF 2 SA 3 N 19, 20 l

t

- ~., ._ . . . , _ _ _ _ _ ,__ _ . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .

95 CONTD7FION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

3. D =5= Lata ability to make decisions

and to coordinata siL=.v=cy activities.

]!DC 8*

SA 8

4. Demonstrata adequacy of facilities and displays to s W -um.v= cf operaticos.

EDC 4, 6*, 7 EDF 1, 2 5D 4, 6, 7 INC 6, 7*

SA 4, 6*, 7 l

5. Demonstrata ability to ocenmunicate with all w e inta locations, organizations, and field personnel.

EOC 1, 5*, 7, 11*

BHO 1, 5, 7, 9 SA 1, 5, 7, 10

6. Demxstrata ability *w schiliza and deploy field mani*aring

• m in a l timely fashion.

1 FIZID 2 l

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_CONIDTTICN 15 AND 16 (continued) 1

7. Denonstrate omvriate equipnent and l pc- e+m for de mmhirg e ambient radiatien levels.

FIIID 3

8. Cearadate omvgiate equipnent and g1 et m for maa % -:a4t of ai h m radiciodine w cmikations as low as 10-7 uci/cc in the presence of noble gases.

FIEID 4

9. Demonstrate a m vr iate equipnent and st-T t m for collection, trar. ru.t and analysis of samples of soil, f

( vegetation, snow, water, and milk.

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Note: Ingestien pid1way objectives we m not evaluated durirs the 2/13/86 1

e:2rcise.

10. DeErmaate ability to project dosage to tM p.iblic via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and to detamine wvgiate protective measures, based on PMs, available shelter, evacuation tima es* h tes, and all othar Eq.rgcgiate fac*m.

IOC 8*, 12 EOF 3*

BHO 10

97 02TfDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

11. Descimkate ability to project dosage to the public via ingestian pathway exposure, ha d an field data, and to determine s p e late protective measures, based on PAGs and other relevant fac*wrs.

Note: Ingestion pathway objectives were not evaluatai durity the 2/13/86 exercise.

12. M . Late ability to implement protective actions for ingestion pathway hicartis.

Note: Ingestian pathway objecdves were ret evaluated during the 2/13/86 exercise.

13. De cr= Late ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ, and l

M ==am % te an initial instructional i m aage, within 15 minutes.

Eoc 13*, 14*, 15*, 21*

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l 14. De:renstrate ability to fcmilate and distribute a m # atei instructions to the public, in a timely fashian.

By: 15*, 21*

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98 CDNITTrION EX 15 AND 16 (cen*hed

15. Dr.- r= Late the organizational ability and rescurces e aa q to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

IDC 16*

FIEI.D 9

16. C aw.r aata the organizational ability and resources & ==_7 to deal with 4 W 4 % to evacuation, such as inclement whether or traffic obst:n? dons.

IDC 17*

FIELD 10*

17. Denanstrate

• Jut organizational ability and resources maa_7 to h kul access to an evacuated area.

EOC 19*

FIEI.D 6*, 11*

99

/

CONTDTrION EX 15 AND 16 (continued

18. Cars L ate the organizational ability ard resources ma"f to effect an orderly evacuation of scbility-4=r=4M indiv4A mla within the plume EPZ.

FIEI.D 13,14

19. Demonscate the organizational ability and resources &ary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the pluma EPZ.

IDC 20*

FIEID 16

20. Cemcnstrate ability to continacusly nenitor and wavl emergency worker expcere.

FIEID 1 FIZI.D 8 1

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100 CDNIETI' ION EX 15 AND 16 (continued l

21. DeEcr=Leate the ability to make the decision, ha=ad on preder amhed criteria, whether to issue KI to amengency workers and/or the general population.

Note: Descr=Lcation of the ability to make the decision regardirxJ the use of KI was not included in objectives to be evaluated because FDA deval W the initial set of exercise objectives before the technical parameters of the scenario had been presented by LIIID for FDWs review and approval. It is New York State policy that KI will not be t rded for use by the general pepslation. With respect to emergency workers, IERO r - W KI ingestion based on ' M cal a= = =marrt of the accident presen*M in the scenario. The awtylateness of that u--g - rdation was observed l

by Federal evaluators at the IIRO EOC on the day of the exercise.

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101 CCITIDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continuedi

22. C=.rar. L ate the ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

FIELD 7

23. Derairahate ability to effect an orderly evacuation of ansite personnel.

4 Note: evacuation of ansite personnel  ;

was not evaluated at the 2/13/86 exercise.

1

24. Denonstrate ability to briaf the n=Ha in a clear, accurata and timely manner.

Dic 3 l

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25. Den:r: strate ability to provide advance coordination of informatien released.

EDc 13*, 21*

DiC 4*

. _ _ . _ - ___ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ~ ,__ ___ - ---

102 (UTfDTfION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

26. E.Es = Late ability to establish and operate rumor h Lul in a coordinated fashion.

Dic 5

27. Demonstrate adequacy of p ur t m for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees.

FIELD 21

28. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care of evam m .

FIEID 22

29. EeEs a k ate adequate equirmant a M g E twis for decontamination of GE=u vm y h7, equipment and vehicles.

D4DF 3*

1

30. Demonstrate adequaLv of ==h'1_ance facilities and pOzet"vs for haniling contaminated indivh1a.

FIELD 23 l

103 00tTfD7FICN EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

31. DEscrabate adequacy of hospital facilities and g.MMims for hardling contaminated indivMmis.

FIEI.D 24

32. hakate ability *w iden*i#y need for, request, ard obtain federal assistance.

Note: 'Ihis was not specifically listed as an objective to be evaluated during the exercise. It was however an aspect of the deilcrokations because IERO requested and received radiological monitoring assistance frczn ECE RAP Team at Brookhaven Naticnal laboratory.

33. Demonstrate abilicy to relocate to ard operate alternate EOF /DDC.

l Note: 'Ihis cbjective is D9t atalicable since both tra B3F and the BDC prirary facilities are outside the 10-mile EPZ..

34. Dwakate ability to estirate total population exposure.

Note: Recovery and reentry ccnsideraticns were not evaluated during the 2/13/86 exercise.

104 CCNID7FION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

35. Demonstrate ability to deramine and implement am e iate measures for m iavlled recovery and reentry.

Note: Reo:nery and re=cuy considerations were not evaluated during the 2/13/86 exercise.

In addition to FDR's standard objectives, the following objectives were also evaluated at the February 13, 1986 Shoreham exercise:

IDC 9* E==g= M ate the ability to coordinate the a y= cy response with county and State officials. G 1: of State and/or county offiMala simulated by FDR designated pe h ).

EDC 10* Deicr= Late the ability of the designated official to detexmine the need to obtain State assistance.

EOC 18* D w = L ate the organizaticnal ability maq to effect an early d4 =m4 ==_1 of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.

SA 9* Dee ' strate the ability to dispatch to and direct emergency workers in the field.

FIEI.D 5* De::cnstrate the ability to provide backup public alerting, if m=7, in the event of partial siren failure.

/.

105 C:NrDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

FIEID 12* Demonstrate tha ad91=cy of evacuation bus transfer points including access and parking / transfer areas.

FIEID 15 Demonstrata a sanple of resources maa7 to effect an early d4 =m4===1 - of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (to be-sin 11ated out of sequarca, if w e iate).

It is FDR's position that the above exercise objectives required =+414mtion of LILCO's Incal Emm.v.44ry Respcmse Organization (IERO), its personnel and resources in sufficient number to verify the capability to re.perd to an acx:ident scenario. Furth '- n o, the February 13, 1986 exercise enabled FDR to evaluata the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within LII.CD Transitica Plan and IERO organization. 'Ibe shereham ecercise was equal or greater in reope W M to any other full-scale exercise evaluated by FDR Region II to data. While FDR desires the fullest possible ccznpliance with the critaria of NCRB",-0654/FDR-REP, Rev.1, our objective is to festar the develwit and enhar =-it of radiological ame w plannire and preparedness as fully ani rapidly as possible within the constraints of Federal, State, and local m pabilities and resources, tw objec*J.ve of exercises that involve stata and local participatien is for ma to be able to make de*amirations on the adequacy of offsita p W. on the basis of (

reasonable assurance, not abcoluta certad.nty.

106 CDN197? ION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CNITNTICH EX 15.A ISSUE: Public rx#49fmtion capabilities of LIILO including sirens, the LIIID EBS sys*m, and NAIX Radio, were not testad, used, deurstrated, or involved in the exercise. Dia 4==== identified in the si em=1 h and additional subparts of this contention are as follows:

16.C Walk radio did not participate in the exarcise; 16.D No other radio stations participated in the exercise; 24 3m siren system was not actually activated during the exercise.

ANSWER: Actual tasting of p_iblic alerting and notification systems was limitad since most activities including activation of sirens and tons alerts, airing '!35 messages, and other public information initiatives were either simlated or not d.Ers L.hted. Prior to the exercise, Inco % 2. made the decision that the siren systen would not be sounded as part of this exercise. Activation of the siren system needs to be acusally tasted in the future (fran FEMA PEA Lisra.:., p. 34).

.- - . . - -. - - . =_

107 cmIERION EX 15 AND 16 (continumi)

CWITNIICH EX 15.A (continued) _

'OJK radio did not participata in the February 13, 1986 exercise. Based cm activities observed duritxJ i

the exercise it was detarmined that all EBS massages j were prepared and coordinated in s h with the I Plan. OPIP 3.3.4, Sectim 3.1, req 1 ires that activaticn of th9 mw notificatice system m.1st take place within fifteen (15) minutes of a decision cm the syific protective acticn r-%tions that are to be br * =t to the public via EBS masscges. In C cases the sin 21ated siren sounding W W wi+hin fifteen (15) minutes of th'.'

decision by the Director of Iccal Respmse (frcza  :

i FDR PEA iwi, Table 1. 2, p. 26) .

l As stated in FDR's amended atMwars to Suffolk County's Firse Request fer Admissions filad January 27, 1987, other radio staticne _alled upon as part of the EB3 System did not par +-ir*4Nta in the exercise. FD R evaluated ceerdinacicn of EBS mammarjes with IcJ.K Radio as the primary insert  ;

station. FDR Regicn II does not as a matter of practice require the participation of nor does jt s'raluate the performance of the hda:y stations ,

in an EBS network for other nuclear power 9 snts in New York and New Jersey. 7his is consistenw with j the practicx of other FDR Regicns throughcm.It tM country. It should bn noted that the use of 1&IE ludio as the primary EBS insert station was revaiwod ani q: proved by the RAC in its review of tM plan that .ias in affect cn the day cf the examise. [

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-~ v - - m -.--- -..- -~..-,--.,,.,.,,-e ,n, c- .., --- - . , , , .--- -.-.~ ,,._ m - y,- , ---- , , ,,

108 CDT1DTTION EX '.5 AND 16 (continuedl C:2EENTICH .'!:X IE.B ISSUE: Pr-invas for ncA4f4c-ation of the public in the water porticn of the GZ were excluded frtan the exercisa in that the U.S. Coast Guard did not par +4cipata in the exercise (other than p=*= the receipt of cza or acre talephens calls) . 2a abeerra of U.S. Coast Guard participaticn in the i . exercise is CDEENTICE EX 16.B subsumed ha4 31n.

ANSWER: PrMm fer nct.ificaticn of the ptlie- in the water partim of the EPZ were inglenanted durhg the exercias by the U.S. Coast Gotrd. 7Eia's evaluation

- of thema activities en the day of the exercise was limitad to the cbee.Wation of IERO's oczem2nicaticrn with the U..!. Coast Guard frtza the IDC and talepbcna intarviews of the Coast C. nard officials in New Haven by the Feder,d evaluator. HMA's decisim to limit the cbearvatim to those cczantnicaticas was based on rammandation of the DCfr RAC mamhav who stated:

wdsr Lyon plans to participata with ana boat ffuMirxr md other comrati.:nal ,

-4% allovim) in tha exercisa.

Mditicav.lly, of ecurse, ha plans to rarticipata in the mmand and contrcl and l cessamicatiuns part of the exercisa.

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<e,- = -

, , --ep- -- . ----- ,-,- ,-v.,, - - - - ,., ,. -w- , -

109 C2TIDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (coatinued)

CONIDEICH EX 13.B (continued) I I believe these arrarywd.s should be more than adequata for tM exe r.ising of the plan with .v to actions regardjrg the water part of the EPZ. The important thing is to exair.ise i:he ccumunications link to the Coast Guard and to cocciinata operatians with them. It is not imocr* g to have the Coast Guard move one of its boats, which they do continually in normal operatiuns.

Since actual dispatct1 of the U.S. Coast Guard's patrol boat was conditional, ccup'.ed with the Der RAC wombar'd advi::e, FDR deidM not *a evaluate the nce4*i m tion of the public 21 the water portion of the EFl.

Durire the exew.ise, the FDR evaluator direct.ly I observed mnmtW. cations frca the ECC between IED i

and the U.S. Coast Guard boto by telephone and by radio. Ailitionally, 62 rig t% exe :ise, 9 the FDR observer verified, with the Coast Guard that the Coast Guard took or similated protac.tive actions for the public notification in the water pcrt of ths l

EPZ. The Coast Guard similated the establisdrg of a Maritime Safety Sane for t% water part of the EPZ ard sim11ated mWim emrgency radio broade.!tsts to ,

all shippig en the distress frequercios. The coast Guard also dispatched a patrol boat to the water part of the EPZ for access wvl at 1020, The boat was or, scene 1127, repor*M *Ju2 srea r. dear at l 1151 and returned to New Haven at 17'16.

110 CNIDTrICH EX 15 AND 16 (centinued)

CDNIENTICH EX 15.H ISSUE: The capability for inplementirg protective action t- g -----dations for the ptlie on waters and transients an beaches and in parks was excluded frcm the exe::cise. There was no MA-Laation of the ability to evacuate the water portiT1 of the EPZ.

The absence of U.S. Coast Gumi participation in the exercisa is CENIENTICH EX 16.B shw.d herein.

ANSWER: Objs:tive IDC 16 required demonstration of the orcanizational abilitv (emphasis added) to inanage an orderly evacuatice of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ incluiing'the water partion. This involved evaluaticn of IHC's ability to coordinata notification of the public and amm nul in the water portion of the EPZ with the U.S. Coast Guard which was satisfactorily demonstrated (see Pasponse to C22IlfrICH EX 15.B) . ocrjective IDC 16 also would reqaire the coordination of at::tivities to notify arri irplement protective actions for trarcients in parks axd en beaches within ths. lo-mils MG which is Inc j specifically inentioraxi in FDR's MA report.

However, it is Fa'a's understarxiing, based en j

inspectice ? the siren cxwcragt up, that the siren system is capable of prcviding auiibic ale.rt signal

':cughout the 10Mle E including beaches and parks.

i o

- - - -- . , - . - - ~ - --- .-. - - , ,

111 CmmrrION EX 15 AND 16 (cx:ntirmed)

CNTENTICE EX 15.H (continued)

- objective Field 9 required dentmstratica of a sanple ,

of .- necessary to implanant an orderly evacuatica of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ. As described in Sectica 1.7.3 of FEMA's PEA report (see pp. W23) this did not involve an evaluation of the inplementatim of protective actions for transients on beaches and in parks or demonstratica of the ability to evacuata the water portice of the EPZ.

McMrver, FEG notas that the exercise scenario was for a wintar weekday (i.e., February 13) idan verv few transients would be expec*A en the beaches, in parks or cm the water pcztian of the 10-mile EPZ.

Therefore, in light cf the circumstances sunnarized above, the implementation of protecticm acticos en beac: bas, in parks and cm the water was not evaluated during the exercise. 2m implementation of these activities would have to be evaluated at an exercise i

that would involve different weather ocniitions as required by NURB3-0654, II, N.l.b (Exarcises should be conducted under various weather ccmditicos) . -

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- - - - , -- m- __ _,._.._.,,.. ,.. .- - - - - - . , . _ _ _-, , _ - , _ , - .

112 CD?frDTrICN H 15 AND 16 (contirggi),

CCHISTICH E 15.C ISSUE: @m exer &- did not include the evaluation of periodic d4--ination of infomatim to the public.

4 ANSWER: Rw R*C in its N/iew of Rr/ision 5 of the LIICL Trar.1ation Plan foursi the NUREG-0654, evaluation crd'. Eia G.la-4, related to a cLhted ,

dis mination of informatim to the public to be daquata. In additim, in 1984 the FINA panel reviw the public infonnatim brechure and the spring 19c4 issue of IIIID's newsletter, "Kasping Current" and tastified m this isma before the ASIB (CENITNTICNS E 16 and 18) .

It is FEMA's understanding that at the time of the

. February 13, 1986 exatcise, LIIID had not distributad the infonnational material called for in the plan to the 9w = id public . Since the public informatim brochures had not baan distributed, it l would have been % ,iata to evaluata distdlution of that material or to sample pt.blic awareness. It should be rated however, that it is FINA's position that the pukic informatim material nast be distributed prior to full power operation of the plant.

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CCt 6 qi EX 15 AND 16 (conq @ y1 i

i CCNlr.RrlCN EX 15.0 l 1

l l l ISSUE: The pec $.2es for evacuation of hosrpitals within. ,

the 10-mile EPZ was not evaluated 6: ring t%. I exarcise. 'Ihn issues identified in the suh%nad subparts of this contert:. ion are as follows:

16.H 2 e hospitals in the 10 mile EPZ did l not participate in the exsreise; 16.I 2e rursing and ath11t broen in the 10-sile EPZ did not participata in  ;

the exwrcise; 16.J S-4=1 facility r%iien certars ,

outside the 10-sile EPZ tl' l not i participata in the exercise.

MG7ER: F WA testified on this issue before the AST.B in l

l 1984. In reirgwe to the planni45) CCNTENTICU 72.D, FDR statad:

2a plan dcas not intend t%t evacuation '

l would be r* = dad for thmoe hospitals.

As stated in Pr MM OPIP 3,6.5, page 1, I

shaltaring will be the primary protarcive action r;-< a-ded for Jchn T. Mather, St.

i l Cieles, ard central Suffolk Hospitals.

l Se following secticri is tibm fr:xn the above refedrel page.

i I

t e

)

- 114 F ,

CENTDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CDtEDTTION EX 15.D (continued)

NCHE SHELTERING WIIL BE THE PRIMARY PRDIECTIVE ACTICH RECO!MD{DATION FtR MATHER, ST. CHARI.ES, AND CENIRAL SUF701K ICSPITAL UJE TO

?"EIR DISIANCE FRCH SNPS AND THE S!EELDING AF70RDED BY THEIR SIEUCIURE3. IF AN EVACUATICH IS DESIRED BY 'IHEIR AININISTRATORS FOR AIL OR PhRF OF THEIR PATIENI POWIATICH, ARRANGDENIS WIIL BE MADE USDG AVAIIABLE RESOURCES."

Also, based on the RAC rwiew of t% plan, NURD3-0654 element J.10.d was found to be adeq ate. This was due to the fact that the hospitals in questian are near the beurdary of the l 10-mile EP2. @.e ASIB in its decision concluded (p.

291, XI.B.5):

1 The Board agrees with I2Im and FEMA that nursery schools, adult h mes, nursi.rg hmes and other s-4a1 facilities within the EP2 are not support organizations within the meaning of NCRID-0654,Section II.A.3. These facilities have no assigned role to sw. t%, cvarall ama.w

. w effort. The only actions expected of these organizations is to act

in their own interest to protect themselves from */adiation by either l sheltering er macuation.

119 CCITIDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (contirraed)

CCNIETIICH EX 15.D (continued) i Furtha m , the Board also stated (page 307):

We ccnclude that T.CO's Plan for protective actions for hospitals is a reasonable ans. The planned ac*dans are not in violation of NRC's regulations or guidance on sau.yscf planning.

For the reasons stated above, the demonstration of w_-#N for evaccation of EPZ hospitals and nursire or adult bcznas with relocation to similar v 4=1 facilities outside the 10-mile EPZ was not an objective of the exarcise. Sinos hospitals and other special facilities inva re assigned role to l

l 9 W the overall swu.vs cy responsa effort, FDG l does not, as a matter of policy, evaluata their evacuatica plans as part of the REP program. The adequacy of these sub-level plans .'d their t-=Pbility for impleWatic" arc reviewed by stata agencies that are directly responsible for the certification ard/or licensirq of them facilities, i

FDA Region II does not as a art *ar of practice require hospitals to participate in REP ecercises, except as responders *w medict1 drills as reqaired by NUREG-0654, II, element N.2.C. This is consistant with FDR's practice in c2er regicns throughout the country.

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116 CONrD7rION EX 15 AND 16 (continued) o CCNIENIICH EX 15.E h

ISSUE: WN for the sheltering of school children

[ were not evaluated durdag the exercise.

f ANSWER: In 1984, FDR testified before the ASIB t%t school officials would be expected to take preter?ive actions for students under t%ir supervision similar to those h w ded for the general p v lation.

Assisting and supervisirs school eMMm is part of the W in' n-1 funccion, although specific actions differ with the type of emergency.

The Board agreed with FDR's position and stated:

h The Board finds that LHCD need not ottain writtan a# cs with schools, and that the written emergency plans required by New York Stata are adequate to provide J

reasonable assttance that adaquate prota:?ive measures can and will be implemented in the avant of an eme. w y at the Shcrenham plant.

For .-ha reasons stated above, the her.Lation of pr - h m for the sheltering of cnildren at school was not an ot:rjective of the exercise. FDR, Region n did not as a mattar of policy, evaluata school emergency plans as part of the REP r w - .

Adequata school eme.ngency plans are reqaired by t.%

stata Board of Education as part of tM xtool certif.ication sm, i

117 c2TrafrIcN EX 15 AND 16 (contiEmat'),

CCtCDEICH EC 15.F ISSUE: FDR did not observe any desenstration of the ortjanizaticmal ability mea 7 to effect an early d4 =4===_1 of schcols within the 10-mile EPZ nor was the inplementatim of early d4=4mmal g-:MN observed during tha taarcise.

ANSWER: As stated in FDR's PEA R' port (see p. 38), a demonstratice of the err mizational ability necessary to effect ar,aarly di mismal of schools ,

within the lo-mile EPZ (objective BX: 18) could not be cheerved at the IERO BX:. Siis was huma officia1= of both public and private acteols were

simulated to have been contacted by the respcosible l- IERO school ocerdinatcrs fra their hcnes prior to c aing to the }rc. In these ccritacts the officials were advised not to open their schools due to the ,

emergency situation.

l On we used during the exercise is ocmsistant with com of the provisicos of the I2Ico Transition Plan. Appendix A provides as follows for early d4=i---I or 6 of Wla in the event of a radiological amargency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Statim :

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118 CCNrDTTIN EX 15 AND 16 (centinugi),

CENITNTICH EX 15.F (continted) i If school is not in sessicri and an Alert  !

or higher amargency classificaticr) is declared, schcol officials will be advised to cancel classes for all schools in the EPZ until the emergency is emminated.

FDR's evaluaticris in the PEA et (see pages 43 and 66) regarding observation of the At-:++N to

. inplement an early d4==imaal or an ordarly evacuaticn of sdicols (objectives FIEED 15 and 16),

were based on intarviews with school officials and bus ocupany Wh.el respcmsible for the ShorehanHeading River W1 District and actual observatico of com schd route empleted for the l

l Ridge Elementary School (Isrigview School District)

using IZRO resources. As notai in the PEA 1%i.

I only the ShccehanH4adirg River W1 District participated in the February 13, 1986 exercise.

Prior to the exercise, Inco mara, at made the decision that other schccl districts were not to be ircluded in the exercise. FDR rocca ended that in ,

the future all adic.als mast be includd in all Federally evaluated exercises arri drills.

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119 C2mNTIN EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CrtMNTICH EX 15.F (continued) l i

ansed = intavi - with shoret +ading atver p.s .el and actual observation of IERO resources dispatched to the Ridge elementary schccl. 'Ihm PFA

+ t, states the following:

o ShorehanH4ading High School - seventeen buses wars dispatched (sblatmi) for tragsgt.aticn of students back to their bases. h ri4==4==al acticns were inplemented by the Superint At of the school district. 'Iha bus ocupany, which .

. is under ocntract to the school district i

and av=41=hle at any tima, was notified and dispatched two buses to the high school. Drivers were given detailed maps

! cf routes to follow and instructions to l

i w t. back to the bus depot up m ocupletien of their routes (see PEA, p.

43).

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120 I

c2rrmricN n 15 AND 16 (centirn. lad)

! CWITNTICH EX 15.F (contirued) o Ridge Elementary School - since schools would already have baan cleami, an actual dancmstratice of the organizational ability rarmana7 to affect an orderly evacuatice of acteols within the 10-mile ,

EPZ could ncrt be aboarved at the IZRO EOC (B3C 20). niis exercise objective was met as dancmstrated in respmse to a free play message insertad to dammstrate this activity. A free play massage requesting school bus resourons to assist in  :

Larydng forty +41*an frta Ridge Elenantary School was given to the Evacuaticri Cocedinator by the Exercise

! G.uauller at the IZRO IDC at

w A taly 1030. In a 1041 massage the partinent informatica was ocumuniated to j the F 4=1 Populatica Bus Dispatdier at i

I that a bus be picked up at the thlitad Bus l Ccapany. Ceardinatien was affected with  ;

the Superintendant of the Imgwocd Central l Sctical District, in whicts Ridge Elementary i i

School is located, to ocmfirm arrival of  ;

the bus. Arrival as ocmfirmed at about 1323 but it was ncrtmi that the bus had nct yet arrived at the Receptica Cantar. Sie  ;

Reception Cantar was ocatac*Jd and [

requestad to inform the Public School I Cecrdinator at the IZRO IDC when the bus [

arrived. .

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i rv-a ti w--w- -- e. - - - - - . - -,. . - ---.___-,.w-.m _ .- e . . . , y y-m ,. ,y y--_ . -,, - -- , - = y , -

g-- .-ww-

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121 l l

l CNmTfICH EX 15 AND 16 (ccmtinuadi l

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CI2fITNTICE EX 15.F (ocatinued) l i 'Iha Bus Dispatcher at the staging area arranged for cna bus to sinn.11ata the .

avacuatice of forty +41+en to the

• Receptice Cantar, based cm a IERO IDC TWquest. 'Iha driver was f=414e with his functicm and folloWed his directicms very well. 'Iha objective of dancmstrating a ,

sangle of rescurons necessary to affect an .

ordarly evacuatice of schools within the 10-mila EPZ was partly met at the l

l Patchogue Staging Area (FIZID 16) (See PIA, p. 66) . 'Ihis was h=1 the staging i area tock forty minutes to di endi the driver. 71!2R r6 that the Bus Dispatdwr be providad with trained staff l suppcet so that Bas Drivers can be dispatched in a acre timely manner. [

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122 CONIETTICN LN 15 AND 16 (contimed)

(INIENTICH EX 15.G ISSUE: PWN for the evacuaticri of schools were not evaluated by FDR during the exercise. 2a 99'-

identified in the subsumed and not separately admitted subparts of this contantion are as follows:

16.F only a limited @ .r of Shoreham-Wading River Sdrol District personnel participated in the exercise; 26 Other school districts R h inside and outside the lO-mile EPZ did not participate in the exercise;

30. LIIID was unable to prtwide sugplemental trar.p.u.i.aticri needs for a adrul evacuaticn in a timely manner.

16.G Cnly two bus drivers frta the Shoreham-Wadirs River School District participatai in the exercise, l

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123 CDNID7PICH LN 15 AND 16 (continued) 02TIDTI' ICE EX 15.G (o:xttinued)

ANSWER: As stated in FDR's response to contention 15.F, since schools would have already been closed when an evacuation Protective $ction R+3----rdation (PAR) was taken, IERO's organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools could not be obemW.

at the IDC based on exercise events. Also, only the Shoreham-Wading River School Dist:rict participated in the February 13, 1986 exercise and FDR r+> - - =ded that in the future all schools mast be included in a.11 Federally evacuated exerd=== and drills. FD%

Region II did not, as a mattar of policy, evaluate school (i.e. , sub-level) hve cy plans as part of the REP r + am. Neverthalass,' school participation is roccznarded so that FDR can evaluate IEPO's ,

coordination of PAR inplomarttation with the r wrisible school officials.

As stated in response to CINIDTI'ICH EX 15.F, FDR's evaluation of the ability to denenstrate a sample of resources m ==n to affect an orderly evacuation of schools (FIEI.D 16), was based an IERO's response to a free play = = age. Nhan the general p::pulation evacuation PAR was L- H , this free play = = age was inserted which required IERO resources to assist in the cvacuation of a W 1.

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124 CCNID EION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CCNIHCICH EX 15.I ISSUE: PW"w for deemmking, ism:ing and inplementing Protective Action P-rdaticos in the ingestion pathway were not evaluated during the exercise. 'Ihe i== identified in the subsumed and not separately admitted subparts of this contantion are as follows:

16.A Cuae-ticut did not participate in the exst h.;

37 IERO failed to implement ingestion pathway protmetive acticris as follows:

37.A No rWtions were made bayerd 10-miles; 37.B No rWticris were made for animals ottar than dairy anim as;

-l 37.C No 6 2 -- rdatiens were made fruits, vegetables, drinking water, etc.; and 37.D tie Ground Deposition aledation Worksheet was not ccupleted, i

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l 125 1

CORTENTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CCNIENTICH EX 15.I (continued)

ANSWER: As stated in FDR's respcose abeve, the tasting of all major planning and prophredness elements ir wm. tad in the 35 exercise objectives is Darr "

M in every full scale exercise. FDR's policy permits that all exercise objectives be dammstrated within the six-year cycle. It should

be noted that when NRC requec".ed FDR to schedule an exercise they suggestad that FDR emphasize evaluatim of the functicmal areas of emergency ,

preparedness related to the desenstration of respcmse espabilities within the plume expeane ,

('.0-mile) Eimu.psy Planning Zms. Ccorequently, FDR and LIICD hp.4 that ingestion pathway objectives would not be a part of this exercise.

211s is entirely in accord with past FDR practica.

i As of this data, the Stata of New York has not participated in e full-scale exercise of ingestien exposure pathway for any of the three operating sitas located within its borders. Du scenario whidt was devale.W. kry I.E.00, and approved by FDR, was ena which did not require the inplementation of ingestian pathway PAR's. If ingestien patWay objectives had been selected as part of the exercise devel w 4., an entirely different scenario would have been m 7 i.

126 CENTDTTICH EX 15 AfD 16 (continued) c COTIERIICH EX 15.I (ocritinued)

In the scenario used, t% release pathway selected was an indirect path to the envia. m at h by the released radl e M vity passed through both HEPA filters and a charcoal adsorber bad. 'Ihase affluent treatment systans essentially alim bated any par +1mlate radioactivity and ademhi essentially all of the depositing h 4 ml forms of radiciodine. It is thans "r=-ima which entar into j f

the i W.cri pathway to any w ,4=hle extant.

censidering that there were no ingesticri pathway objectives and that the somnario was developed and approved cri that basis, the participatim by the state of cm.h:ticut which was limitad to ocasunicaticrm was reasenable and w#iata.  ;

1

'Iha IZRO participants did not, so far as FDR  :

I ascertained, extend PAR's boycrid the 10-mile EPZ.

Nor did IZRO rW PA's for animals other than i dairy cattle (either within or boycrid the :.0-mile ,

EPZ), rW PA's for water or other foods, or ocupleta the "Cround Depositiert calculation Worksheet for Particulata Radicruelida Releases". I i

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127 C2CDCICH EX 15 AND 16 (omtirwi)

CCNIDEIC21 EX 15.K.

ISSUE: Precedures for nanitorirq and daccmtamination of v4 al facility ev e - were not evaluated during the exercise.

ANSWER: 'Iha demonstratim of pWw for nonitoring and de.us.aminaticm of special facility evacumes was not an objective of this exarcise. 'Iha process of monitoring and decentaminaticm, if needed, is the sama regardless of the locatice of the acrdtoring sita. As stated in the RAC review of the LIIID plan, the locaticm of the r .pdem cantars for many of the v 4=1 facilities has not been damignated in the plan.

It has been a standard operating rMm of FDR Regico II, negotiated with and agremi to by the Stata and affected counties, not to activata All facilities (this applies to rwiicm centers as well) identified in the plan during an exercise.

Instead, FDR has evaluated a sanple of facilities at each exercise, cm a rctating basis, to assure that all facilities identified in the plan (including rwtice omnters) are evaluated within a six-year period. 'Iha process used during the shoreham exercise is ex:msistant with the cme that FDR Regicm II has been using in all full scale exercises held up to this data. As stated in Sectice 1.7.3 of the exercise report, the only r% don contar evaluated ddng the exercise was the Nassau Ceum:y CcU _=_ .

128 crNTDTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CINIINIICH EX 15.M.

ISSUE: Procedures for, and activities related to, the inplementatim of recovery and reentry wars not evaluated during the exercise.

ANSWER: As stated above, recovery and w h y activities were not objectives of this exarcise. h FINA evaluatim of preparedness around nuclear power sitas involves the evaluation of the 35 standard FDR objectives over a six year cycle. h re is no

>. requiu d that all 35 cbjectives be evaluated in any one exercise. Per NRC suggestion, FINA .

emphasized evaluation of the functional areas of emergency preparedness related to the demonstratim of resp mse ~ =h414 ties within the plume exposure

! (10 mile) Eiumspsf Planning Zma. Further, the Envis-Aal Protectim Agency guidance m recovery l and muf activities is in draft form and has not ,

been adopted for inplementatim. 'Iha missim of

, recovery and may objectives is omsistant with i

ether FDR full-scale exerclses in Regim II.

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129 CINIDTfICN E 15 AND 16 (centd.rned) 0:NIDiTICH EX 16.E.

ISSUE: 2e partimimtion of Marketirq Evaluations, Inc. was not evaluated durirq the exercisa.

ANSWER: LU.CD made the decision prior to the exercisa not to activate the p.wi. notificaticri system (sirens were not to be sounded) at any tima during the exercisa.

Acoceding to the plan, ans of the two functions assigned to Marketing Evaluations, Inc. is to em duct a survey of residents to establish if a partim1ar siren e sirens failed to sound when activatad. Since thars was to be no siren .

activatim, there was no reasm to evaluate the parfamance of Marketing Evaluations, Inc. ,

i In additicri, Marketing Evaluations, Inc. is assigned the responsibility of making randca tal@g:re enlis to assess the pregress of any evacuatiert that has  !

! baan r 6 . Since the public did not actually evacuata during the exercisa, the evaluation of this activity was also 1% , late.

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130 CINMTTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CINITNTICH EX 16.K.

ISSUE: Sane bus ocupanies listed in the Plan did not pa1+1eiptm in the exercise. I ANSWER: IDE does not recp. tire that all trar-Wation resource suppliers listad in the plan be involved in any com Federally evaluated exercise. As stated in NUREG-0654, II, N.1.a, an exercise is an event that tests the integrated capacility and a major portion of the basic elements existing withi.n energency preparedness plans and organizations. It has been a standard operating st-:--W of FDR Region II to evaluata a sangle of bus wdes listed in the plan at any full-ecale exercise. However, st :7hn. exercises should test a sanple of the remaining bus empanies in an effort to evaluata all resources identified in the plan within a six-year cycle.

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l 131 F CCNITNTTCN EX 15 AND 16 (continued) l CINIDfTICH EX 16.K (continued)  ;

In ordar to evaluate IERO's integrated %=_k414ty to provide bus resources in the event of an amargency, FDR indeF=abd.ly selected a 4hdative number of bus reutas to be run on the day of the exercise.

Eight of forty-three transit d-F-.b .i. general platim bus routes were selected for demonstraticri. Ras drivers to drive those routes were picked at ran$m by a FDR evaluator frt:an the I

large number of bus duivers at m:21 of th6 Staging Areas. Da routes to be demonstrated were selected m the basis of two key critaria; (a) the assumptian, based cri FDR's review and analysis cf the scenario that at least emergency planning zonas A - J would be affected by an evacuatim rerwunendation, ani (b) dammstratim of the rtxtas would require the activaticri of four of the eleven ,

Transfer Points listad in the plan. (4) i i

4 It should be noted that zonas A - J involve twenty bus routes that would ,

require activation of up *w four Transfer l Points (see OPIP 3.6.4, at'achment 5, Rev.

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132 CotTm TTION EX 15 AND 16 (continued) l CarmfrION EX 16.K (continued) l Bus route La play === ages were inserted at the l

Transfer Poir?.s. It is important to note, that the free play message wwL used by FDR Region H was

)

reviewed and endorsed by GAO in their Report to the '

Ca g a entitled "Further Actions Needed to Improve Ermu.pcf Preparedness Around Nuclear Power Plants" dated Aix3ust 1, 1984. On page 31 of that report, under "Dcercises Are Not Unannounced" the GAO stated:

'Ihe federal 6Edu.pcf preparedness criteria statas that s m a exercises should be unannounced; however, this has not m W because of difficulties in obtaining participaticri fra the responsible states, local goveu w a , and volunteer ge:x2ps. h nam state and local governments prepara scenarios, scue federal exercise observers have gaestioned the effectiveness of exercises in testirg response m m b414 t ies. 'Ibey object to those being tes+M designirg the scenarios and believe that at a minimmn exe.h shculd include surprise events. Scme Regional Assistarx:e Casnittee ==hm believe that FDR's introduc* don of j su.W events in exercises would be an acceptable substitute to unannounced exe. h and would allow for a response more closely resemblirg that of an actual accident. Um Director, FDR Pagion H, agreed. He said that the region began I introducing seM in exercises more I than a year ago (late 1982).

133 cntrnfrION U 15 AND 16 (contirnied)

CCNmfrICH H 16.K (continued) 4  ;

, surprim have been related to bus ,

evacuat;21 and traffic control ard have helped assure that s ta and local goved 4s more fully test t%ir capability to respond to an accident.

nzrther, en page 40 of the i.eust., GAO endorsed tim ,

wwi. of introducing free play messages at t%

exercises b/ statirxJ:

We believe that if state and 1ccal  !

govw As are permitted to certtinus [

preparing scenarios, FDR and NRC should be jntroducirx; surprises into exercises to ensure that stata and local ge % /J l l are able to respond to wmud  !

events. Surprise elements would not '

maavily add more time to the exercise, as Pennsylvannia suggests, h uma they l could rel- other su.-@&M activit4es.

Also, we do not believe surprise ex m .ses would disrupt stata and local ge % d.

operations. Although the conra:f:s of <

1 l exercises would be a surprise, t% datas l would be announced. Steta and local  !

gem ss that are prepared for the exercise should do well and improve not only . w capability but public l confida.u as well.

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.. g 134

, g27m7rICN EX 15 AND 16 (continued) 1 CONIDTI'ICH EX 16.K (contirnaad)

Ras resources that are available to I.ERO are d^"= anted in the letters of agreement that LII.CD has with various suppliers. Based cri PDR's following ur n . A of the plan, a

.Wative n2mber of bus routes was selected and LILCD red to insure that sufficient buses would actually be deployed to run these routes on t% day of the exercise:

o Bus av=41*h414ty is ascertained by the has Coordinator at the IDC who is respmsible for calling bus Wdes (with which LIICD has an,r.g . a n. to supply vehicles), requesting vehicles, and

}

allocating them to the w e iate Transfer Points; i

o 'Iha bus cx:mpanies will provide vehicles *w LERO drivers who are resp msible for picN,ing them up at the bus oczpany yard (s) and driving them to the Transfer Point where they have been instructed to go by i

LM Staging Area Bus Dispatdar(s);

i o Evacuaticri route maps are supplied to Bus l

Drivers at the Transfer Paints by t%

l Transfer Point Coordinators who dispatch l buses to the various routes in accordance with the bus W 'le for the zone (s) *w l

be evacuated. With the use of maps l

supplied to them, tM Bus Drivers are l responsible for driving any route that :nay  ;

l be assigned *w t%m.

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135  ;

CDNITNTICH EX 15 AND 16 (cc.h)

CDNI'E21TICH EX 16.K (continued)

In addition to the eight general populatim bus rcutes that were evaluated, two other bus routes were evaluated that required the use of two additional IZRO buses. One bus was dispatched to i h.:. ate the evacuaticn of curb-side pick up of non-instituticnalized mobility i-hwi persons fra the Patchogue Staging Area. Anct%r bus was used *w demonstrata the evacuatice of a school (i.e., Ridge Elementary School) requesting (simulated) IIRO assista c.4. It is FDR's unda.% that IIIID wdad with the bus ccupanies for more than tne tan bus vehicles required on the day of the exercise and that these additicnal vehicles were also used by IIRO during the exercisa although they were not avaluated by IT2R.

As notad in FDR's PEA twi (see p. 35), the Bus Coordinators began milirig bus crupanies to datamirm the potential number of buses available as early P.: 0805, before the recedet of the utility rect umJndation for declaration of the Site Area Emmayw.rcy ECL.

136 cmrDTTICN EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CWIERIICH EX 16.L. I ISSUE: See ambulance ccupanies did not participate in the exarcise.

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ANSWER: As stated in the respcmse to CWIENTICH EX 16.K,

- does noe require that au tm+tatim  !

resource suppliers listad in the plan be involved in f i

each Federally evaluated exarcire. l 1

In order to evaluata IERO's integrated espability to provide ambulance and ambuletta macurces to Wal Health Care Facilities (i.e. , Handi ";-;-d .

Facilities, Nursing / Adult H aas, and Hospitals),

m selected two of the eight Health Care Facilities identified in OPIP 3.6.5 using a free play wm, as requiring IERO trar@tatiicm resources. See also N's response to CINTENTICE EX 16.K regarding the GAO positicn cm introdued.ng surprises (free play messages into exarcises).

Base facilities were selected based en m 's review an:1 analysis of the scanario that at least emargency planning zcmas A - J would be affected by an evacuaticm roccanandaticm.

137 c2rrnrrICH E 15 AND 16 (continued) l CX2TITNTICH EX 16.L (continued)

Based cm FINA's WA.'W of the plan and analysis of the scenario to be used in the exercise, two L a play messages were int W M re W ng tha actual deployment of vehicles to each of the i facilities listed as requiring t%se resourced in the plan.(5) When thesa La play ==arjes were injected, they were handled aWitiously by the I230 IDC staff. Both massages went frt:st the Wial l Facilities Evacuaticra Coordinator to the Health Facilities Coordinater to the Ambulance Coordinator l a mording to r e tres defined in the Plan (see PEA 4 t, p. 36). It is FDR's WA.'anding that l

l III4D hk.cted with the =*1mvice ocupanies for l

l more than the two health care vehicles required for denenstratice m the day of the axarcise. As stated in the PEA *+t (see p. 43), FDR evaluators l

observed that six ambulances and six ambulat*as were l activated and all were dispatched to pick up i mobility 4-=4M indiv44=1=.

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5 only two Health Care Facilities of the six listed for amargency planning zonas A - J are identified as rW.J1g I230 Larhaticri resources in Attadmant 2 l

of OPIP 3.6.5. These were the two I facilities selec*Jd for dancmstre* don *w whic one ambulance and one ambuletta were to be dispat 2nd on the day of tM exercisa.

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l 138 1 1

l CONIDCION L'X 15 AND 16 (centinued)

CDNIDEICH E 18.C.

ISSUE: Many of the organizations and personnel listed in the plan did not participate in the exercise.

Fur +# r-rw, the participation of other a

organizations was so limited that the exe.h did not d.Ecr Late the pez h usil of those participating organizations are familiar with their duties.

ANSWER: FDR's evaluation of IERO's in*Jgrated capabilities to 12nplement the LIIfD Transi* don Plan using non-IERO o.W ations and personnel have been Me_=M in the answers to previous cc:tantions as follows:

o Bus w nies - see the answer to

CDRIDCICH E 16.K o Ambulance wnies - see the answer to CCNIDEICH E 16.L o U.S. Coast Guard - see answers to CDNIDEICNS E 15.B and 15.H o Shoreham-Wading River School District -

see the answer to CCNIDEICES E 15.F and 15.G l

139 CDNTDTfICN EX 15 AND 16 (continued)

CQTIDirICH EX 18.C (ccritinued)

With respect to the participaticri of American Red Cross (ARC) representatives, FDR observed that at least one regreentative of the Nassau County Chaptar of the ARC participated at the IDC throughout the exercise to coortiinata ARC activities with IERO. 'Iha ARC Cecrtiinator maintained contact with the Recepticr1 Cantar and Nassau County ARC Chaptar M=% in Minsola (see PEA Report, p.,

i 32). FD R also observal that several ARC representatives participated at the Nassau Coliseum to direct persons to Cs.g+ta care Cantars as set l

forth in the Plan. Regarding ARC participation at the two Cs.v.+ta care centers activated for the i 1 exercise, the following results are dev'n =1ted in l

FDR's PEA WT.:

1 o U.S. Marine Corps Brigada, Garden City, NY (see p. 82)

- 'Iha ability to maintain 24-hour staffing was demonstrated by the ARC.

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- 'Iha shultar Manager was aware of how to get any required assistance or support; these would be acquired through the ARC Coortiinatcr in tha -

IZRO IDC. i l

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140 CCNITTI'ICN EX 15 AND 16 (centiraled)

CCNIDfrICH EX 18.C. (continued) o Luro office R111 ding, Minsola, NY (see

p. 32 and pp. 82-83)

D ars was limitad participation by ARC volunteers during the exercise due to perscrial work-related ex:nflicts. On capability to staff the facility cm a 24-hour basis was descristrated through the presentation of duty resters.

- D a Sheltar Manager knsW to request rescurces and supplies through the I.ERO B3C (i.e. , A%. : c:ordilstor) and the Eastern Pagicn&l Office of the .

ABC. l With respect to specific cantacts beemen IIRO and Nassau County, IDR understocd that actual telephone contacts were to have taken place en the day of the exercise. Accertiing to ritm's detailed timeline, the Director of local Response first contacted Nassau County at 08:20 following notification of the Site Area Eumy.cf ECL at 08:19. (6) y.e11 4 the decisicn to activate the Reception Cantar subsequent to ncrtificaticm of the General Emergency ECL at 09:39, the Nassau County Police Depaa. M t was notified by the Decantaminaticr Coortiinator at 09:50 that the Reception Cantar had been activated. ,

This is in keeping with OPIP 3.1.1, Section C.8 of 4 the Plan.

I I

6 .N notas that CPIP 3.1.1, Secticm D.3 l iniicatas that the Direc*a of local  !

Response will brief organizatices, includirq Nassau coef, an the status of IDO emargency respensa operaticas as appropriata.

l l

I

ATTACHMENT D l

O UNITED STATES OF A?. ERICA

. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE TIIE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

LONC ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-332-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF SIIELDON SCI 1MARTZ AND BERNARD II. WEISS OF THE NRC STAFF ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND EX 16 l

June 5,1987 1

l t

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- NITCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE T!!E _A_TOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-323-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

l DIRECT TESTrMot4T OF SMELDON SCHWAP.TZ AND BERNARD H. WEISS OF THE NRC STAFF ON CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND EX 16 Q. Would you please state your name, business address, and position?

A. My name is Sheldon Schwartz. Since April 12, 1987, I have held the position of Deputy Director, State, Local and Indian Tribe Programs, ,,

Office of Governmental and Public Affairs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.

My name is Bernard H. Weiss. I am the Federal Response Coordt-nator in the Incident Response Branch. Division of Engineering Response, Office of Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington , D.C. 20555. I have been employed in this position since March 1982 Q. Do you sponsor this testiray jointly?

A. Unless otherwise noted herein, we sponsor the following testimony jointly.

Q. Would you please give a brief summary of your educational and pnofessional background?

A. (Schwattz) T received a Bachelor's Degree in Mechanical Engineering in 1960 from Widener University in Chester, Pennsylvania. I have taken various courses in engineering and management at Drexel Institute of Technology in Philadelphia and Sacramento State College in California. Additionally, I have taken technical courses on boiling water reactors and pressurized water reactors at the NRC Training Center in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

I joined the Commission Staff in 1972 and have since held various assignments in technical and management positions. From 1983 to April 1987 I was Deputy Director, Division of Emergency Prspared-ness and Engineering Response. From 1980 to 1982, I was Deputy Director , Division of Emergency Preparedness and in 1980 I was detailed to the Federal Ernergency Management Agency. From 1972 to 1979, I held various positions in the NRC (AEC) cooperative ,

programs with State and local governments.

Prior to Joining the Commission Staff, I worked in the California Legislature sa a Senior Consultant and in the private sector as a l designer, project manager and senior engineer on various aerospace 1

and nuclear technical projects.

l (Weiss) I received a Bachelor's Degree in Chemical Engineering in 1958 from City College of New York, and in 1962 a Master's Degree in Public Health, with a co. :entration in Environmental Health from l

l . - . . ______

the Univert.ity of Michigan. I have more than 25 years of experience w6rking on public health issues involving radiation safety, with

~

nearly 20 years of thct experienea at the NRC and its predecessor, the AEC.

Q. What have your responsibilities been at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relating to offsite emergency planning?

A. (Schwartz) In 1980 I was detailed to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, along with some other NRC employees to develop the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness program.

This effort involved a number of activities relating to rulemaking, technical analysis of the current posture of State and local governments to respond to an emergency at a nuclear power plant, development of initial guidance to the FEMA regions, and projects designed to upgrade offsite radiological emergency preparedness.

1 As Deputy Director of two divisions at NRC, my principal involve-ment in offsite planning was as a member of the NRC/ FEMA Steering Committee. Since FEMA has the responsibility for offsite prepared-ness and NRC has the responsibility and licensing authority for nuclear power plants. NRC and FEMA coordinate various policy, i

technical and administrative matters through this committee.

(Weiss) As the NRC Federal Response Coordinator. I am the primary coordinator of all Federal response to emergencies involving licensed facilities. I develop and maintain emergency operating ,

i i procedures for coordination between NRC headquarters and regional j l l i

- . . -= - - .= .- .. ..

I 4

offices and other agencies involved in a offsite emergency planning and response; plan and develop the National Emergency Preparedness program; and perform various emergency response duties at the NRC >

Operations Center such as aneuring that Federal agencies, the news media, and the Congress understand the course of any accident, and insuring that appropriate Federal ageneiss are notifled of significant accidents and have sufttcient information to perform their duties in re6ponding to such accidents. In that position . I have been l responsible for doing some of the scenario planning and control for  !

many tests of the NRC incident responae program. Additionally, in j this position I have been Chairman of the Scenario Development, Control and Evaluation Work Group for both the 1984 and 1987 Federal Field Exercises which involved the largest participation of Federal responders in a nuclear power plant exercias.

From 1979 to 1982, I was Chief of the NRC Incident Response Branch. In this position, among other things. I developed guidance for NRC regional offices on procedures to be used in emergencies; planned , monitored and evaluated exercises of emergency response l plans for NRC licensed facilities; developed agreements with organizations supporting NRC emergency responses; and assured the operational readiness of the NRC Operations Center.

From 1977 to 1979, I was an NRC Senior Technical Operations Specialist. responalble for developing, exercising and coordinating the NRC incident response program. I also participated in the

development and implementation of emergency response agreements

~

between NRC and other Federal as well as State agencies.

Q. Did you participate in any way at the February 13, 1986 exercise of the LERO plan for the Shoreham facility?

A. (Weiss) I participated as the controller in charge of the FEMA Control Cell. This control cell was responsible for simulating a number of Gtate and county officials who would not have been expecteo to be sent to the LILCO EOF or the LILCO EOC, Their inquirics and requests for information were simulated by use of commercial telephono. All the comments and exercise materials developed by these simulators were given to the FEMA evaluators immediately after the exercise. I never reviewed the material nor was ! provided with a copy of the simulator comments.

(Schwartz) During the February 13, 1986 exercise, I did not participate in any manner in that exercise. After the exercise. I had only informal conversations with a few of the NRC participants.

Q. Has the NRC established spec!Sc criteria or guidance for determining '

whether the exercise of sn offsite response plan constitutes a "full participation" exercise?

A. There are no criteria or guidance published by the Nuclear l

l Regulatory Commisalon with respect to the scope and depth of a "full participation" exercise. FEMA has published guidance which includes a number of elements which need to be exercised periodically but not at each exercise. Each exercise scenario is reviewed by a Regional Assistance Committee to assure that the exercise objectives are met l

and will cover appropriate FEMA guidance objectives to constitute a

"[ull participation" exercise, if such an exercise is required.

4 Q. How does what constitutes a "full purttulpation" execuive depend on the emergency response plan that is being evaluated?

A. While all offsite plans are required to meet the 16 planning etandards in the regulstions in order to gain FEMA approval, each plan la different because of unique State and local governmental infrastructures. Therefore, it is our view that a determination as to whether an excrcise is "full participation" is dependent on the particular details in the plan that is being evaluated.

Q. Is there a relationship between the number of objectives identined in FEMA Guidance Memorandum 17 Rev.1, which are to be evaluated, or which are actually evaluated, and whether an exercise is a "full J

participation" exercisef A. Not directly.' The number of FEMA objectives exercised is not the j determining factor as to whether an exercise la "full participation."

The FEMA guidance and NRC regulations require that the exercise test the integrated capability to assess adequately and respond to an accident at a nuclear power plant. See 10 CFR Part 50, App. E, i i  ;

l IV., F., fn.4. Since each plant is unique, the specific number of f i  !

FEMA objectives exercised in a "full participation" exercise wil! (

1 vary. l l

l What is t sign 1Scance the lack Suffolk unty a New Y k  !

tate parti tion in off emergen plannin for the oreh  !

fa ty with re et to what u conside to be a ull particip n" l l

exer e of the Sh ham offsite mergency sponse lan? )

l  !

l $

l

A. The plan exercised includes compensating features for lack of State and County participation. Consequently e exercise was designe test these compensating featu and the lack of Suffolk County and New ' rk State par .pation is not relevant to the determination of whether as a "full participation" exarcise; however, because t exercised plan vides for accommodating State and loc authorities in an kctual emergenc , hose features were e. rcised by simulating the participation of State local oJReials.

Q. la it your opinion that the exercise conducted on February 13, 1986 at the Shoreham f tcility was a "full participation" exercise?

A. The February 13, 1986, exercise attempted to test the integrated capability of the LERO plan to adequately assess and respond to an

accident at the Shoreham facility. This exercise was designed to test the major observable portions of the LERO plans and the mobilization of those resources which were designed to compensate for the non-participation of State and local authorities, plus accommodating State and local officials should they respond to an emergency. We believe that this was a "full participation" exercise.

6 4

0 ATTACHMENT E i

f f

8 P

6

'O 04 04 6100 bwalch 1 speak more closely into the microphone.

2 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 0 Do you know whether the adequacy of a public 4 information brochure for Shoreham was evaluated by FEMA in 5 the Shoreham exercise? .

6 A No, sir I do not.

7 0 You don't know whether --

8 A I do not have personal knowledge. Based on the 9 testimony that Mr. Daverio and Mr. Behr have presented, I 10 gather that it was not.

11 0 Okay. So, let's assume that you are correct, 12 that Objective 14 is the objective under which that would be 13 tested, if it were, okay?

14 '

A Okay.

15 0 Then, it's fair to say at least that portion of 16 Objective 14 was not tested at Shoreham, correct?

17 A Yes, sir.

18 0 Okay. Just so it's clear, Mr. Hockert, then 19 ,

it's your understanding that the 35 standard objectives 20 cover all the possible observable elements of an emergency 21 l plan?

1 22 '

A They cover all of those that FEMA felt important 23 enough to provide guidance to its regions.

i That doesn't answer my question precisely. Is 24 0 i

25 it your understanding that the 35 PR-1 standard objectives ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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i 10 06 06 6121 Cwolch I he said that he was capable of doing it.

2 MR. ZEUGIN: He said he was capable of answering 3 somethinns must be exercised. He did not say --

4 JUDGE FRYE Let's ask the witness so we 5 understand your position clearly.

6 WITNESS HOCKERT: I do not feel that I can draw 7 a legal judgment. I can draw some ideas out of my analysis

8 as to what would appear to be a reasonable basis for a set 9 of objectives that must be exercised every time, or a total 10 amount -- I should actually say a total amount of this 11 importance, weighting that should go into a full 12 participation exercise.

13 JUDGE FRYE: In order for an exercise, in your 14 opinion, to qualify as a full participation exercise.

15 WITNESS HOCKERT: Yes, sir.

16 JUDGE FRYE Now, then I guess the question is 17 Should the ingestion pathway --

i 18 MR. LANPHER: This is only an example.

19 JUDGE FRYE An example. Should that be 20 included in order for you to draw the conclusion that a full 21 participation exercise had taken place?

22 WITNESS HOCKERT: My judgment in that, as 23 expressed in one of the answers also in the testimony here, 1

24 is that there is probably no single objective that is an l

l 25 absolute must.

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0 06 06 6122 Cwalch 1 JUDGE FRYE I see.

2 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 0 Well, is it your testimony then -- are you 4 through, Judge?

5 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, go ahead.

6 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 7 Q Is it your testimony, Mr. Hockert, that you 8 could have an exercise in which no communications 9 capabilities whatsoever were demonstrated. In other words, 10 Objective 5 was not -- I am referring to Page 28, Objective 11 5 of PR-1, the ability to communicate with all appropriate 12 locations, organizations and field personnel, no telephone

13 calls were done, not even simulated, you don't have any 14 communication whatsoever, it is still a full participation 15 exercise. Is that your testimony?

i 16 A (Witness Hockert) I would imagine that would 17 could hypothetically do that. I doubt that it would be 18 possible to demonstrate many of the other objectives without 19 communication, however.

20 Q But it is your -- is it your testimony that in 21 theory you could eliminate that objective, and still have a

22 , full participation exercise?

23 A In theory, 24 JUDGE FRYE But not as a practical matter.

25 l WITNESS HOCKERT: Not as a practical matter, no, l

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D 06 06 6123 Dwolch 1 sir.

2 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 0 And this all goes back to your weighting system,- l 4 is that correct?

5 A Yes, sir, i 6 JUDGE PARIS: When you say,. *in theory,' what do-7 you mean?

i 8 WITNESS HOCKERT: Well, it goes back'again to 9 the idea that these objectives realistically are not 10 exercised in isolation. -

11 They come together in scenarios, and therefore, i t

12 there are certain linkages that are in existance. For l 13 instance, it is hard to bel'ieve that without communications, j 14 Objective 5, you would have a situation in which you could s

15 coordinate activities, Objective 3.

i 16 JUDGE PARISt I agree.

17 MR. LANPHER

Judge Paris, can I follow up on j 18 that?

19 JUDGE PARIS: Sure. Go' ahead. ,

i 20 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) .

4 21 0 Let's not take this hypothetical to the absurd, l l i 22 Mr. Hockert. You certainly could have communications in an [

i j 23 exercise and still not have that something that is an 24 objective of the exercise. People telephoning, and that 25 kind of thing.

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lo 06 06 6130 Twnish 1 0 Answer my question please. If you can't answer 2 my question, just say so.

3 A I can't answer your question, then.

4 0 What is the difficulty you are having, sir?

5 A The difficulty that I am having is tnat there 6 seems to be a paradigm on your part that there are certain 7 objectives which get the title, ' major observable portion' 8 attached beside them.

9 0 Well --

10 A And the view that I have, based on the analysis 11 in the Report, is that one can take a set of objectives, sum 12 up the importance of them, find out how much of the total 13 importance of all the off-site preparedness objectives they 14 subsume, and thereby based upon that sum, say a major 15 observable portion of the emergency preparedness was 16 f exercised.

i 17 0 You said, 'a major portion,' cor r ect?

18  ! A Yes.

I i

19 O But doesn't the regu'.ation -- do you have a copy 20 '

of Appendix E there, sir?

21 A I think I have one.

22 l (Witness Hockert obtains document.)

i 23 i O I direct your attention to Part 4.F, if you have 24 l it. Do you have that, Mr. Hockert?

25 A Yes, sir.

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0 06 06 6132 swalch 1 O It is an interpretation of what Appendix E 2 means?

3 A I can't give a legal interpretation on Appendix 4 E.

5 O So this is your separate definition of what a 6 full participation exercist means, is that correct?

7 A This is my judgment of what a reasonable 8 definition for a full participation exercise would be, and 9 in that sense it is a separate definition.

10 i O So, your use of full participation exercise here 11 does not relate to Appendix E?

12 A Certainly it relates to Appendix E.

13 0 Okay. Let's get back to it. You can't have it 14 both ways, Mr. Hockert. You say you don't n'eed all of the 15 very important in every full participation exercise.

16 A Tnat is my judgm9nt, yes, sir.

17 0 okay. Then, do you draw the judgment that 18 ingestion pathway testing is not a major observable portion 19 of the emergency plan?

20 ,

A No, sir.

i 21 0 Do you draw any judgment on that?

l 22 I A The judgment that I draw in this area is best I

! l 23 i think expressed by my answer to Question 33, and that is 24 that one cannot take these individual objectives and put l 25 major observable portion on one piece; and not major l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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ewalch 1- observable portion on another piece.

2 That that the exercise has to be looked at in 3 toto, and determine whether or not the major observable j 4 portions of the plan are exercised.

5 0 So, this Board has to meke a decision whether 6 the major observable portions were exercised, correct?

7 A That is correct. i 8 0 Can you help us decide whether ingestion pathway 9 testing is a major observable portion?

i 10 A Not in isolation from the rest of the exercise.

11 0 But doesn't the Hockert report at least 12 implicitly support the view that ingestion pathway testing ,

13 is very important?

14 A It is very important, and it should be done most 15 frequently, but it does not necessarily support the view 16 that its omission constitutes a f ailure to test the major i 17 ebservable portion.

i 18 JUDGE SHON: Mr. Lanpher, it seems to me that we l 1

19 are hanging up here on something that looks fairly clear. I 20 think Dr. Hockert is telling us that he thinks he has I

21 developed a group of weighting factors such that if you add j

)

22 up all the weighting factors of the objectives that were i

23 tested, you can tell whether the exercise as a whole tested  :

24 the major observable portions of the Plan. Is that correct? -

t 25 NITNESS HOCKERT: Exactly, sir. l l

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0 06 06 6134 Owalsh 1 JUDGE SHON: But he can't tell you about any one 2 objective, because there is none of them, not any one of 3 l chem, that sums up to a major observable portion of the 4 Plan.

5 Is this not correct?

6 WITNESS HOCKERT: Exactly, sir.

7 JUDGE SHON: And there just is no answer to your 8 question, is Number'15 a major obs'ervable portion. The only 9 thing that is a major observable portion is a sum of 10 weighting factors that exceeds a given amount, is that 11 right.

12 WITNESS HOCKERT: Precisely.

13 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 14 0 Well, Mr. Hockert, I thought you testified 15 earlier that the objactives represent the observable 16 portions?

17 A Yes, sir.

18 19 20 21 j 22 i 23 24 t

25 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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6148 140 00 00 2arysimons 1 somewhat reluctant to split hairs in terms of partial credit 2 unless there is a ne 6 to, and even when you get to the 3 stage where it's a bv derline case where you need to, you're 4 probably best to really look back in the details of what 5 went on and think perhaps a little bit more deeply, but 6 certainly it could be addressed in a follow-up report.

7 0 That's not something that you've been able to do 8 yourself for Shoreham?

9 A No. For Shoreham, in my judgement, there was no 10 neod to.

11 0 Well, Mr. Hockert, you testified before that you isn';'

12 had not reviewed the Shoreham exercise documents; 13 that correct?

14 A That is correct.

15 0 And you haven't reviewed the Shoreham emergency 16 plan?

17 A That is correct.

18 0 So how do you know that there was no need to?

19 A All right, may I explain what I did do to get 20 this testimony?

21 0 I would like you to answer my question.

22 A Okay. I did a sensitivity analysis to get the 23 testimony. I started out and I took what Mr. Behr and Mr.

24 Daverio indicated were the objectives that were fully l 25 tested. I analyzed those, summed up the weights for those, 1

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$2rysimons 1 and came to the conclusion that over the whole universe of l

2 weights that about 87 percent of the total importance of 3 objectives had been' tested. This, in my judgment, was 4 major.

5 However, I recognizeo that there were 6 contentions as to what was or was act tested. So I went 7 through and looked at the intervenor's contentions, assuming 8 that they had been diligent in identifying those which were 9 either not tested in toto or not tested in part. I assumed 10 conservatively that they were not tested at all and removed 11 those weights from the overall analysis and came to the 12 conclusion that approximately 79 percent of the total 13 importance weighting was tested under those circumstances.

14 My judgment in that case was that it was also full 15 participation.

16 0 Do you have a copy of that sensitivity analysis?

17 A I have some notes in my briefcase, but it's 18 certainly something that anybody can do adding up the 19 numbers.

20 0 Well, you performed this analysis. Is it an 21 analysis? Is it a piece of paper or several sheets of paper 22 or what?

23 '

A It's several sheets of paper that I did in the 24 motel room in the last couple of nights.

25 MR, LANPHER: I would like to see a copy of this ace FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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l 1 e40 14 14 6233 crygimons 1 and my understanding of how FEMA does business in drawing 2 its rindings, which then is an input into NRC's 1 3 determination of continued operation of a reactor or 4 operation of an initial reactor.

5 0 This is not based on personal knowledge though 6 in terms of talking with FEHA people. Why did you put this 7 paragraph in?

8 A No, it's again ny opinion that that's what they 9 meant by doing it based on my expertise in emergency 10 planning.

11 0 Well what expertise in emergency planning allows 12 you to draw that conclusion? Is it just your general 13 expertisc or something specific?

14 A Just my general expertise of having been 15 involved in emergency planning since 1980. I've lived 16 through most of this process and seen exercises over the 17 years and have talked to many other people about exercises

18 and how FEMA does their business and draws findings and how l

19 NRC issues 120-day letters or they get a finding that's 20 good and they' issue the license. I mean those are all 21 historical facts that occur.

22 0 It says here that the taajor elements of plans 23 and preparedness are incorporated in those 35 standard 24 objectives, right?

25 A You've read that correctly, yes.

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<40 14 14 6234 scrysimons 1 O Do you agree with that, that statement that I 2 just read to you?

3 A I have no reason to dispute that FEMA wrote 4 that, and I have no problem that the major elements of 5 plans and procedures are incorporated.

6 0 And isn't it true that that under FEMA's 7 guidance they plan to test all of the 35 objectives for any 8 particular plant over a six-year cycle? Isn't that their 9 sort of rule as you understand it?

10 A As they applied to that site. There may be a 11 site like we talked earlier where an EOC doesn't have to 12 have a backup EOC because it's not located there, but as 13 they apply that's my understanding.

14 0 Unless there is some special reason that an 1

15 objective doesn't apply, FEMA interprets its objectives as 16 requiring that they all be tested, maybe not in one j 17 exercise, but over a period. of six years, correct?

18 Isn't that in fact what this says?

19 A Yes, I agree.

20 0 Doesn't that indicate to you that FEMA considers 21 those 35 objectives to constitute the major elements of the 22 plans?

23 A I think I stated that already, that I agreed 24 with FEMA's statement.

25 O Now looking at page 3 of that guidance ace. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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,140 14 14 6235 I8arycimons1 memorandum, gentlemen, 1 guess, Mr. Behr, you were the one 2 that drew our attention to paragraphs 4 and 5. Isn't it 3 true that each of those paragraphs expressly references 4 full participation under 44 CFR 350?

5 A (Witness Behr) Yes, that's true.

6 0 So how does this constitute guidance or 7 interpretation of what is required under Appendix E to Part 8 50?

9 I would like to have Mr. Behr answer this 10 question if he can. If you can't, say so, and then 11 certainly consult with Mr. Daverio.

12 A Well, I go back to the background paragraph on 13 the first page, or actually the second page of the 14 attachment that says that "The purpose of the memo is to 15 add clarification. With the publication of the final FEMA 16 rule and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC final 17 regulation, 10 CFR 50 on July 6th, 1984 it has become 18 necessary to clarify some of the requirements."

19 Q But paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 on page 3 are 20 very express in their reference to 44 CFR, the FEMA rulo 21 and not any NRC rule; isn't that correct?

22 A That's what the paragraphs say, yes.

23 0 You have no reason to disagree with them, do 24 you?

25 A No, I don't.

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01700101 6806 suswalsh .

I "portions."

2 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 0 What distinction do you draw between the words "portions" and "elements?"

l l 5

A Portions , in my mind, relate more to I

6 organization and maybe combining elements to make a portion 7

of the plan. I would have a hard time reading the elements 8

as outlined in the guidance memorandum as being considered portions of a plan.

10 0 So, when references are made to elements of a

'I plan in any kind of document, that "guidance" -- and I put 12 that in quotes -- relating to elements does not relate to 13 Appendix E to Part 50 in your opinion?

Id A No. I don't think I said that. I said it's not is directly linked.

16 0 okay.

37 A I don't draw the link between an element and a 18 portion.

19 0 When a guidance memorandum relates to elements l 20 of a plan or an exercise of certain elements of an emergency 21 plan, do you consider that to be guidance related c:

22 Appendix E even though Appendix E does not use the word 23 "elements?"

24 A If you will let me explain, I think the Yes.

25 way I -- in my opinion, the way FEMA does it is that the

i 01700101 6807 i cuswalsh  !

I elements are combined to make up the major portions that .

I 2 they think needs to be observed to meet Appendix E. They 3

pick and choose from the objectives to design an exercise d

that, in their mind, is in compliance with what they have to ;

5 do, that being draw a finding on the health and safety of 6 the public, FEMA.

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 l

20 l 21 22

{

23 .

24 25 I

I

! 01700202 6808 matyOimons 1 Q Have you had any conversations with anyone from 2 FEMA relating to this distinction between elements and 3 portions?

4 A (Witness Daverio) Only to the extent that in my 5 experience I've seen exercises where they pick and choose 6 from the guidance memorandum elements to make up the 7 exercise, but I have not directly asked them the question a that you've posed to me.

9 0 Well, looking at PR-1 on that same page, which 10 is page 3 of Attachment E, page 2 of PR-1 under paragraph 11 No. 2, the second line, well, the first two lines say 12 "Scenarios for a periodic exercise should sufficiently 13 varied so that all the major elements of the plans and l 14 preparedness of offsite organizations are tested within a 1

is six-year period." Do you see that statement?

16 A Yes, I do, and that's how I draw the conclusion l 17 that there is a difference between elements and portions.

18 They are saying there that you could do them over a six-year 19 period.

20 Q So you can do the elements over a six-year 21 period, but can you do the portions over a six-year period?

22 A As I read Appendix E, NRC must make a 23 determination that in combining those elements that a major 24 observable portion of the plan has been exercised, and then 25 they make the decision.

9

01700202  ;

6812 marysimons 1 portions. Did you mean to say elements versus portions, 2 because I think Mr. Daverio has explained the difference in 3 his own view between those two terms.

4 MR. LANPHER: Let me rephrase the question so we 5 are absolutely clear and come at it a slightly different 6 lay .

7 BY MR. LANPHER:

8 Q I want you to assume that there are portions, 9 major portions of the plan that it's reasonably achievable 10 to exercise them without mandatory public participation.

11 And you've got a plant such as Shoreham that has never gone 12 above five percent power. Do all such portions of the plan 13 need to be exercised as part of that initial full-14 participation exercise or, on the other hand, is it is acceptable to do some of those portions in that first 16 exercise and others over a six-year period?

17 A (Witness Daverio) I believe you used the word 18 "portions." As long as you draw the distinction between 19 portion and elements, as I have, and you take my definition 20 of reasonably achievable, which means political problems i

21 could make it unreasonable, FEMA deciding not to do an j 22 exercise objective could make it unreasonable for whatever, I 23 budget constraints or whatever reason they decide, then I 24 l would agree with you that all major portions have to be 25 exercised before exceediny five percent power.

l 01700202 681; .I maryeimons 1 Q Well, then you're disagreeing with PR-1, are you 2 not, which says that you can do major portions over a six-3 year period; is that correct?

4 A I thought they used the word "elements."

5 Q Okay, they use the wo rd "elements ," and you ' re 6 making a distinction. So all major portions have to be done 7 if it's reasonably achievable, and I hear you definition, 8 and we'll get back to that definition, sir ---

9 A I figured we would.

10 Q But they have to be done in an initial full-11 participation exercise, correct?

12 A Given all my caveats; that's correct.

13 MR. LANPHER: Just one moment, Judge Frye.

14 (Pause.)

15 BY MR. LANPHER:

16 Q Mr. Daverio, I would like you to look at page 9 17 of your testimony. I guess I'm confused because you've is drawn a distinction between elements and portions, but in 19 your testimony on page 9, lines 4 and 5, you 're talking 20 about observable elements. Now the regulations talk about i

21 observable portions, right? Do you see where I am on page 22 9, lines 4 and 57 23 A (Witness Daverio) Yes, I do.

24 Q Do you want to cnange that sentence, or is that 25 sentence accurate the way it's written?

I  !

01700202 6814 mary;;imons 1 The sentence, so the record is clear, "Thus, the 2 emergency planning scheme contemplates that, while all 3 observable elements of an emergency plan must be exercised 4 at some point, this is done over the course of several years 5 an? not in every full-participation exercise."

i l

6 A I used the word "elements" there. I think 7 that's consistent with what I've said before. I'm not using 8 the word "portions."

9 10 11 12 a

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4

a

Y 6837 el s ons M A I agree, yes.

2 0 And isn't that at least part of the reason why 3 ingestion pathway testing was not in us that we brought to

, meet with FEMA did include a two-day exercise which would 3 have had ingestien pathway in it, and FEMA subjectives did 3 not include ingestion pathway and wanted to do a one-day 7

exercise.

l 3 I think that may be the confusion. We never ,

requested to do it after that day. So I just wanted to e point out there is that one little inconsistency in our two n testimonies that you asked about last week if I ever found

[ u one.

, g Q Over the weekend or at some point you went back 1

) a and re-r us that we brought to meet witn FEMA did include a l t

u two-day exercise which would have had ingestion pathway in

6 it, and FEMA subjectives did not include ingestion pathway e; and wanted to do a one-day exercise.

! I think that may be the confusion. We never I

,; requested to do it after that day. So I just wanted to

. . , point out there is that one little inconsistency in our two l a

i

testimonies that you asked about last week if I ever found  !

one.

Q Over the weekend or at some point you went back $

a and re-reviewed, so to speak, FEMA's testimony? .

!! ' )

A I looked through it. The only other thing that  !

may be -- I'm not sure there is a dif ference of opinion in t

{

l -

01700505 6850 maryaimons 1 question?

2 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, why don't you ask the question ,

3 again.

4 BY MR. LANPHER:

l l 5 Q Gentlemen, is it your testimony that for an NTOL 1

l 6 plant like Shoreham it is acceptable under Appendix E to 7 Part 50 not to include testing and evaluation of ingestion 8 pathway preparedness?

9 A (Witness Daverio) Some ingestion pathway 10 testing, whether it be just a participation by the -- I 11 think it says the boarder State, if I recall correctly.

12 Q Well, why don't your refer to the regulation if 13 you need to, Mr. Daverio.

14 A Okay.

15 (Pause while the witness reviews his documents.)

16 17 18 19 20 21 I

22 23 24 25 i .

I

b 01700606 6851 l joswalsh .

i i O Why don't you refer to the regulation if you 2 need to, Mr. Daverio?

3 A (Witness Daverio) Okay. l 4 MR. CUMMING: JudgeFrye,Ihaveextracopiesofl 5 that regulation I passed out yesterday which is, in fact, 6 the --

7 JUDGE FRYE: They have it.

8 MR. CUMMING: -- effective regulation.

9 WITNESS DAVERIO: The words state that "and io shall include participation with each state within the 11 ingestion exposure pathway EPZ."

12 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 13 Q Bow do you interpret the word "participation,"

14 Mr. Daverio or Mr. Behr?

15 A (Witness Daverio) In the context of the 16 Shoreham exercise, a phone call to Connecticut occurred, 17 Connecticut having four operating units. I think that was is enough. They have ingestion pathway concerns of their own 19 for their own units.

2o O So, a mere telephone call to a state with i

21 operating nuclear plants constitutes participation 22 sufficient to satisfy this regulation?

23 That's your testimony?

24 A I thought that this regulation was trying to go 25 to states who did not have plants, who were border states.

01700606 6852

~jo3walsh 1 Q Does it say that anywhere in this regulation?

2 A No. It's not specifically there.

3 Q You are referring I believe to Section 4.F.1, 4 Paragraph 1, correct?

5 A That's correct.

- 6 JUDGE FRYE: Are you moving to a new topic, Mr.

7 Lanpher?

8 MR. LANPHER: Yes, I am.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Maybe this would be a good time for 10 our 15 minute break.

11 MR. LANPHER: Frankly, there will be a more 12 logical place. I've got another topic that isn't going to la take too long.

14 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

15 MR. LANPHER: And I think it will break up the 16 morning a little more evenly.

17 JUDGE FRYE: Fine.

18 MR. LANPHER: Unless you want to --

19 WITNESS DAVERIv: I have no place to go.

A (Laughter.) -

21 MR. CUtiMING: Judge Frye, before we go off the 22 record -- l 23 JUDGE FRYE: We are not going off the record.  ;

I 24 MR. CUMMING: Okay.

25 MR. LANPHER: Thank you, Judge.

-- _.1- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ - - . . - ~

01700606 6853

- jo;;walsh j i BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 2 Q Gentlemen, briefly I want to go back to Page 9. I 3 We were talking about your testimony ct the top of th'at page 4 that the emergency planning scheme contemplates that, while 5 all observable elements of an emergency plan must be 6 exercised at some point, this is done over the course of 7 several years, not in every full participation exercise.

8 I just want it to be clear that it is your 9 testimony that either the five year or six year cycle that 10 is referred to in several of the FEMA guidance documents 11 that we have spent time talking about, that five or six year 12 cycle for biennial exercises, that does not apply in an NTOL i3 situation, does it?

14 A (Witt.ess Daverio) I thought that one paragraph is we pointed to before when I talked about the first joint 16 exercise, so that 's in PR-1, Page -- it 's Attachment, Page

17 3, Page 2 of the document. It talks about the date for l

l 18 starting that six year compliance is the first joint 19 exercise.

20 0 But, it 's you r testimony, is it not, that with 21 the caveats you've made about -- we have some differences '

22 about what is reasonably achievable, all the major j 23 observable portions of an emergency plan for which it's 2: , reasonably achievable to test without mandatory public i

23 participation, they must be tested in an NTOL full l

I;

01700606 1 6855 jo walsh j i to give you an example.

2 Q Okay, i 3 A If you look at the FEMA objectives, and you 4 could use either PR-1 or EX-3 --

5 0 You choose, Mr. Daverio.

6 A Let's -- yeah, for consistency, let's go to PR-7 1.

8 Q Okay.

9 A They've got --

10 JUDGE PARIS: Thac's Appendix E?

11 WITNESS DAVERIO: It's actually Appendix F is 12 what we are talking about. And, it's the page following 13 Page 3 is the one I will be referencing.

ia If you look at cne elements that are listed here 15 -- and that 's FEMA's words -- I can show you -- take Example

! 8, Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for 16 17 measurement of noble gases down to the 10 to the minus 7. I is don't see that as a major portion of a plan. It may be a 19 major element within a plan but not a major portion of the 20 plan.  !

i 21 So, that's the types of things I'm talking about ;

22 when I draw the distinction between an element and a  !

t 23 portion. I 24 JUDGE PARIS: Do portions consist of one or more ,

25 elements?

i

l- l' t

01700000 6875 l

marynimons j

i A Well you used the word "participate" there, 2 because that's been used in very broad context and narrow 3 context.

4 Q WALK did nothing during the exercise, Mr.

5 Daverio.

6 A If you tie it specifically to exercise, that's 7 correct, FEMA could not evaluate what WALK did.

8 Q Thank you.

9 Now you testified earlier in response to my 10 question that -- well, to some questions, that you thought 11 it was not very important that WALK Radio was not contacted 12 during the exercise, and you refer in your testimony to FEMA-REP-10, and I believe that 's Attachment M to your testimony  !

13 ,

la or at least an excerpt from it.

15 A That's correct.

16 Q First, as a matter of clarification, REP-10 17 talks about alert and notification systems, correct? e la A That's the title of it; that's correct.

19 Q Am I correct that when they talk about alert, 20 they are really referring to the siren portion, and when i

21 they talk about notification, they are talking about the EBS 22 broadcast portion. Is that your understanding of alert and 23 notification?

24 (Witnesses conferring.)

25 A Sitting here now and quickly reading through REP i

0 07 01 7122 1UE/cw 1 MR. LANPHER: I object to the question. It calls 2 for these witnesses to speculate about FEMA policies. This 3 is again a question that ought to go to FEMA.

4 JUDGE FRYE: I agree. I think it does have to go 5 to FEMA. But, I think it would be appropriate to ask them 6 whether they think they have any basis to disagree with 7 that.

8 MR. IRWIN: Yes. That's how I was going to 9 phrase the question.

10 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 11 0 Do you gentlemen have cny basis to disagree with 12 this statement which appears to be a statement of FEMA 13 policy as to the nature of observable elements?

14 (The witnesses are conferring.)

15 A (Witness Baranski) Mr. Irwin, what I would say 16 about this list of objectives is that it's not completo.

17 0 From whose standpoint?

18 A From our standpoint and our experience in the 19 last number of federally graded exercises and that this list 20 leaves out some rather important objectives that you need to 21 test for a comprehensive integrated emergency management 22 system.

23 0 In other words, what you arc saying is that 24 FEMA's statement of its own objectives is incomplete from 25 New York State's standpoint?

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l l

l 07 06 7127

$E/cw 1 0 Now, gentlemen, as I understand your testimony, 2 particularly on Page 35, you state the view that initial 3 exercises for nuclear plants which have not yet received l 4 their operating licenses must include all' major observable 1

5 elements of the plan which are reasonably achievable without 6 mandatory public participation; is that correct?

7 A (Witness Baranski) That's correct.

8 0 Okay. Now, is that intended to distinguish them 9 from exercises for plants which have already received their 10 operating licenses in terms of the scope of the -- the 11 required scope of the exercise?

12 A I believe, Mr. Irwin, our testimony reflects the 13 fact that we -believe that the first exercise should be 14 tested as comprehensively as possible and subsequent 15 exercises may, based on a track record, shift the focus and 16 emphasis of that exercise.

17 But, the first exercise should be as 18 comprehensive and complete as possible. And, from a common 19 sense perspective it tells us that, as emergency planning 20 people, we would like to know where the weak areas are in 21 the plan. Therefore, we attempt to test as much as we can.

22 0 Does this require, in your view, testing all 35 23 of the objectives stated in Mr. McLoughlin's memo and 24 referred to in PR-l?

25 A Sir, if you would care to go through the list of ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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07 07 7128

!UE/cw 1 PR-1, there are some objectives there that can't be 2 demonstrated.

3 0 But, assuming that as many as can be 4 demonstrated, is it your opinion that all of them must be 5 demonstrated prior to issuance of an operating license?

6 A The answer is yes. -

7 0 Okay. If you -- now, gentlemen, isn't it true 8 that Guidance Memorandum PR-1 requires only -- and, here I 9 would refer you to Paragraph 2 on Page 2, and to Page 34 of 10 your testimony, doesn't PR-1 require only that these major 11 elements, the 35 objectives, of plans be tested within a six 12 year period?

13 MR. LANPHER: I object to the form of the 14 question. He says doesn't PR-1 require something. That's a 15 mischaracterization. PR-1 doesn't require anything. It's 16 not a regulation.

I 17 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) j 18 O Doesn't it provide? I will substitute the word l 19 "provide."

20 A (Witness Baranski) Please ask the question 21 again.

22 O Isn't it true that Guidance Memorandum PR-1 23 provides only that the 35 exercise objectives which cover 24 the major elements of off-site plans be tested over a six 25 year span, not in any one specific exercise?

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

m.m.m3 NnnanwW Conrp FMt%6M6

7219 f1501 UE/aw 1 O Let me dome back to a light motif of this 2 testimony, gentlemen. There has been much discussion in the 3 testimony, and today, about the concept of major observable 4 portions of an off-site plan.

5 Can -- is the term "major observable portion" 6 different from the term "observable portion?" Are there 7 such things ':s observable portions of a plan which, in your 8 view, are not major observable portions?

9 (The witnesses are conferring.)

10 MR. LANPHER: I object. The question is overly a

11 broad.

12 JUDGE FRYE: Do you think you can answer that 13 question or not?

14 WITNESS PAPILE: I would like to, speaking from 15 my viewpoint, sir. Everything is a major as far as we are 16 concerned. We have never considered an exercise or 4

17 objectives as saying this is major, this is minor, this is 18 in between. We have taken them as -- and I will use the 19 statement again, as' portions of the plan that should be --

20 and I will use the wording of Appendix E, should be tested.

21 But, to say major versus non-major, we may 22 consider that in our mind when we are thinking it over but 23 never when we write the objectives.

24 JUDGE FRYE Okay.

25 M R. IRWIN: I have no further questions.

4 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coserage 800 336 6M6 If

{0 16 01 7231 GW/gw 1 JUDGE FRYE: Shall we go back on the record, 2 please? Mr. Lanpher, or Mr. Zahnleuter?

3 REDIRECT EXAltINATION 4 BY MR. ZAllNLEUTER: ll 5 0 Gentlemen, you just fielded some questions by 6 Mr. Irwin regarding recovery and re-entry. Is recovery and 7 re-entry a PR-1 objective?

8 A (Witness Baranski) Yes, sir.

9 0 Could you identify specifically where it appears 10 in PR-1 as an objective? , ,

I 11 A Objective No. 35, demonstrate ability to 12 determine and implement appropriate measures for control, 13 recovery, and re-entry.

14 0 Co you believe that the PR-1 objectives 15 correspond to major observable portions?

16 A Yes, sir.

17 0 And do recovery and re-entry objectives 18 constitute major observable portions under Appendix E?

19 A By definition.

20 0 Is your answer, yes?

21 A Yes.

22 0 Also, in response to questions from Mr. Irwin, 23 you stated that you understand ingestion pathway testing is 24 an NTOL Appendix E requirement, is that correct? L 25 A Yes, sir.

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l0 16 02 7232 GW/gw 1 Q Have there been any NTOLs issued in New York 2 State?

3 A NTOLs have been issued, but none that we have 4 done the emergency planning for.

5 Q Since the --

6 A Since the implementation of the regulation for 7 emergency planning exercises, the answer is, no. All of our 8 exercises have been with operating units.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Do you know, by chance, when the 10 last operating license was issued?

11 WITNESS BARANSKI: Approximately mid '75, Indian 12 Point 3.

. 13 ,

3Y MR. ZAHULEUTER: (Continuing) -

14 Q How do you reconcile your position that recovery 15 and re-entry and ingestion pathway activities should be 16 included in an exercise prior to the issuance of an NTOL, 17 but those same activities should not have been included in 18 other full participation exercises in New York State?

19 A (Uitness Baranski) Well, for one looking at 20 Appendix -- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, there is a 21 regulatory requirement under F, Training, 1, that for a full 22 participation exercise for an NTOL, and I am paraphrasing a 23 little bit, shall include participation by each state and 24 local government within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and 25 each state within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

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I (O1603-J 7233 GW/gw 1 So, for an NTOL, I view this as a regulatory 2 requirement. How do we reconcile our stand regarding 3_ _ ingestion pathway for current exercises? We actually have

4. -demonstrated' ingestion pathway activities during many of our 1 5 early exercises.

6 Our problem is not one so much of should we, or 7 should we not, include ingestion exposure pathway, but it is 8 primarily from our end, it is a state activity. If you look 9 at our exercise schedule, which we had gone through l l

10 yesterday and today, you will notice that at times we were I i

11 doing three exercises; whether you want to call them full 4 12 scale, at least they were major workload.

13 . You were involving the same state agencies, the 14 same state personnel several times a year for ingestion 15 pathway. We didn't get credit, if you will, for having 16 satisfied a full ingestion pathway exposure. There was no 17 particular guidance as to what FEMA was looking for for 18 that, or what sort of evaluation yardstick.

19 So, we said we have done a bunch of these, we are 20 waiting for you to provide further guidance, FEMA.

21 0 Now, Mr. Irwin asked you questions about the NRC 22 regulations that were in effect on January 1, 1984, and 23 those regulations are LILCO's Exhibit 19.

24 Did that regulation define either full 25 participation or full scale exercises?

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') 16 05 7235

$W/gw 1 take this as more permissive than the one that followed. fI 2 -

Q With respect to PR-1, on Page 2, Item 2, 3 Mr. Irwin asked you questions about whether this represented 4 FEMA's practice. In your experience, did FEMA's practice (

5 always' conform to this particular section of PR-l?

6 A Would you restate the question, please?

7 0 Okay. I am on Page 2 of PR-1, Item 2 under f i

8 Attendant Criteria. Are you with me? There is a reference l 9 there to the 35 exercise objectives. Do you see where I am? j 10 A (Witness Baranski) Yes, sir. -

11 O Mr. Irwin asked you questions about whether this 12 represented FEHA's practice. My question is: In your 13 experience, did FEMA's practice always conform to PR-l?

14 A No. We have had additional requirements thqt 15 have been placed on us, in addition to the objectives that 16 are outlined in PR -; .oe our exercises that we have 17 conducted in New

• c:< Stat l 18 JUDGE : .RI : . F w7ed on you by FEMA?

19 WITNESS BA AN3KI: That is affirmative, sir.

20 WITNESS PAPILE: I would like to be more specific 21 now. FEMA Region II.

22 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Continuing) 23 0 What are those additional requirements?

24 A (Nitness Papile) The additional requirement was 25 on public education and public information.

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

) 16 10 7240 3W/gw 1 Therefore, I Feel it was something much more than 2 just communications that was implied. Because if you look 3 at other r,egulations or other parts of 10 CFR 50, in

/ Appendix E, that in the past we have used words like, 5 "communications."

6 O But you are not aware of anything more specific 7 than your inference, are you sir /

8 A No, I am not, sir.

9 0 Okay. When you -- I guess it was either you, 10 Mr. Czech, or you, General Papile, indicated that the State 11 of New York had participated in various ingestion pathway 12 elements of exercises, but you quit after a while. Can you 13 describe in general terms what the state typically did in 14 that ingestion pathway participation?

15 A If you reviewed some of the post exercise 16 assements from FEHA -- one comes to mind from Ginna of about 17 '83, and some other ones, you will find some wording in 18 there where you got credit for a partial, but typically it 19 would involve things such as looking at the source term, 20 doing calculations of potential deposition, potential impact 21 through the food chain, sending out someone to collect 22 samples or perhaps milk, vegetation, fruits or vegetables, 23 collecting those samples. We have actually even had the 24 samples rushed back to Albany by Civil Air Patrol and or by 25 State Police courier service; everything up to, but short ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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) 16 11 7241 ,4 l

EW/gw 1 of actual laboratory analysis.

2 O And that involved a cadre of state employees, 3 primarily from Albany, sir /

4 A That is true.

5 Q The same employees.from exercise to exercise 6 --the same organization?

7 A At the state emergency operating center, the 8 decision makers, command people, will be somewhat the same, 9 although we have more than coverage than for one shift, but 10 that group would be the same. The people who would actually 11 go out and collect samples would be different. Typically, 12 they would come from state employees who work in that 13 particular region. So, for example, if you are running an 14 exercise at Nine Mile, the people would probably come from 15 the Oswego - Syracuse area. If we are talking about the 16 Ginna area, they would be someone who is probably working 17 out of an office near the Rochester area.

18 Q But with respect to the people in Albany, the 19 same cadre were involved from exercise to exercise, as I 20 understand it, in the ingestion pathway?

21 A A large pool of the same people are used, yes.

22 Q And as I understand it, the ingestion pathway 23 functions for those people do not vary significantly from 24 exercise to exercise, do they, for the ingestion pathway?

25 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: I object. This is beyond the ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

l 24700707 7483 sucwalsh 1 objectives. And --

2 Q Well -- excuse me, Mr. Fowieski.

3 A And, you have a timeline, the exercise -- pre-4 exercise activicies, activities on day of exercise, post-5 exercise activities.

t 6 Q Mr. Kowieski, maybe you misunderstood my --

7 well, first, let me rephrase it.

8 What oo you mean by standards in your 9 testimony? You say at the bottom of Page 2 the standards -

10 used in reviewing the exercise are included in various 11 documents , including GM-17.

12 A Right.

13 Q What do you mean by standards?

14 A You have to, understand that 35 exercise 15 objectives are interrelated to NUREG 0654.

16 Q Mr. Kowieski, what I would like is your 17 definition of the word "standards" as used in your 18 testimony. At the bottom of Page 2, the second line in the 19 last paragraph on that page, you use the word "standards."

20 You say standards used in reviewing the 21 exercise. I want to know what you mean by standard.

22 A All right. First of all, I think we ought to 23 define the purpose. We mention the purpose of NUREG 0654 --

24 Q No, no. Mr. Kowieski, I want to know what you 25 mean by the word "standards" in your testimony.

24700707 7492 sucw31sh a 1 JUDGE FRYE I think it should be here.

2 MR. PIRFO: I better .ake that phone call.

3 JUDGE FRYE All right.

d MR. PIRFO: Well, it 's close enough to the lunch 5 b re ak . I think I can wait.

6 JUDGE FRYE: Fine. Let's continue then with the 7 cross-examination.

8 MR. LANPHIR: Okay.

BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 10 Gentlemen, at Pages 2 and 7 of your testimony, Q

il you talk about the documents which you lave relied upon in >

12 the evaluation of the February 13, 1986 exercise. You 13 identify two specifically, 065 4 and GM-17.

14 And, you reference other FEHA guidance memoranda 15 that were effective at the time of the exercise. Now, can-16 you identify which particular FEHA guidance memoranda you 17 relied upon besides GM-177 18 A (Witness Keller) PR-1, for one.

19 Q Are there any others, Mr. Keller?

20 A I think in general you woald have to say that 21 al of uc here on the panel are reasonably conversant with 22 the material that's in the guidance memoranda; and, as 23 background knowledge and information we used. that because it <

24 was in the guidance memoranda, because FEMA Headquarters had 25 promulgated this material to help amplify how to use 0654.

I

l

.24700909 7516 I joew31sh 1 A (Witness Baldwin) Can I jump in?

a  !

2 Q Well, can you identify FEMA guidance which would 3 specify tP , type of objective that must be included to 4 ensure that something is a full participation even? That 5 was my question.

6 A The regulation, 44 CFR 350, refers to the 7 demonstration of the participants in sufficient number to a demonstrate their ability, their capabilities to protect 9 the health and safety of the public.

Io Q ifell, Mr. Baldwin, my question to Mr. Keller was it whether he knew of any FEMA guidance documents or other 12 documents which were in effect which identified the types of i3 objectives that must be included in order for something to 14 be a full participation event.

15 A Well, Mr. Keller I believe answered you, and 16 that is in PR-1 there is reference in CM PR-1, which states 17 that major elements of plans and preparedness are is incorporated in the 35 exercise objectives contctned in the 19 August 5, 1983 memorandum which goes back, I believe, you ,

20 are referring to it as Exhibit F. ,

21 Q Attachment F to LILCO's 15, 16 testimony.

22 A Those 35 objectives are again referred to in PR-23 1, that over a six year cycle all 35 objectives must be 24 tested within that six year cycle.

25 We would want to see a sufficient number of

24700909 7517 joew31sh 1 those tested. Obviously, if it was a small number, you l 1 would have to test a larger number in the second exercise, 3 the second and third exercise. <

4 There is no delineation of what defines a full 5 participation exercise in the guidance memorandum that are 6 issued by FDiA.

7 Q Is it your testimony, Mr. Baldwin, and I guess 8 it is really with reference to both PR-1 and what we call 9 Attachment F; it is that August ' 83 memorandum, and also 10 with reference to the FEMA regulation that you were 11 referencing, that regulation talks about how a full 12 participation even should test the implementation of the is observable portions of state and or local plan. You are 14 familiar with that statement in the regulation /

15 A That is correct.

16 Q Is it your testimony that the 35 standard 17 objectives correspond to the observable portions of the 18 Plans?

19 A Yes, it is.

20 Q So, over a six year, three exercise cycle, you 21 have to do all 35 objectives in order to test the [

22 implementation of all the observable portions?

23 A That is correct.

24 A (Witness Keller) met me add one thing.

25 Everybody knows, I hope, that the FEMA regulations and the

I i

24700909 l. 7518 jcowalsh .

I 1i NRC regulations say state and local participation in the ene '

l you just read to us. It says state and 1ccal plans.

I si i Clearly, state and local plans were not exercised in the 4 February exercise. This was a utility only plan. That 5i caveat has to be added to this whole discussion.

l i This was not a state and local plan that was 6l 7 exercis ed . It was a utility plan. 44 CFR 350 says state -

j' s and Jocal plan.

9 Q You are substituting utility plan in the FEMA r to regulation for state? -

11 A That is right. We attempted to use the 12 regulation as well as we can. There is a difficulty here.

33 In 44 CFR 350, there is a preclusion, and I think it is Part 14 IV or Part 11 I don't remember which right now, that says 15 FEMA will not use any of the rest of this rule for a utility 16 plan, so FEMA's own rule says we can't do what we did.

17 But the MOU says he had to do something. ,

i i

is We, therefore, used more than anything else past i, experience, what we had done previously in other exercises .

o li Q Gentlemen, .ill you look at Page 2 of PR-1. Do 1

l

i you have PR-1 handy? Tcr the record, PR-1 is Attachment I to LILCO's prefiled testi. mony on Contention 15 and 16, and I

2 l

l am looking Gentlemen at ? age 2 of PR-1, which starts at the i

b time with evaluation criterion.

J

s - Down at the bottce of page, Item !!o. 2, they l l l 1i

~

l 24700909 7519  !

joewnish I talk about major elements cf plans and preparedness. I take 2 it, Mr. Baldwin, from your earlier answer, when you talk 3 about major elements in this context, you are talking the 4 came thing as major portions of the plan?

5 A (Witness Baldwin) The way we use the two terms, 6 elements and portions, NUREG 0654 is broken down into 16 7 planning standards. Those 16 planning standards are broken 8 down into various numbers cc ('ements, which we refer to, 9 for instance, A is the assignrent of responsibility.

10 There is a sWbsection A-1. That is an element 11 in our nomenclature. A portion is a portion of the plan.

12 OPIP 361, for instanc e, would be an example of a portion of 13 the plan, or paragraph from the plan itself.

14 When we refer to standards and elements, it is refers to planning standards identified both in 44 CFR 350 16 and then spelled out in NUREG 0654, portion or portions of 17 plans.

I 18 Q But you testified before that the 35 standard 19 objectives are designed to insure that all the major

portions of emergency plans are tested ovar a six year 21 cycle, correct?

22 A You need to be very specific here. The 35 22 standard objectives are keyed to NUREG 0654 elements, and 24 those elements are the elements against which FEMA and the 25 RAC evaluate the plans.

24700909 7520 joewalsh i In order to have an exercise which evaluates 2 those planning standards and elements, we go back to the a plan and the people responsible for putting together an 4 exercise and identifying the objectives, determine which 5 objectives they really want to exercise during that 6 exercise.

7 Those are keyed to the NUREG 0654 elements, and a in that context we are looking at the elements of 0654 that 9 are being tested.

10 Those encompass broad portions of a plan, and 11 they are interrelated in such a way that you can 't -- I 12 guess you could - but it would be a real exercise, an 13 academic one at that, I think, to cross tabulate all of the 14 portions of the plan that core under any specific element 15 that is being examined.

16 Q The way you, at FEMA, have confidence that you 17 are able to test the observable portions of a state and or 18 a local plan, or utility plan if you substituted, is by l

19 testing all of the standard objectives over a period of l

20 time.

21 A (Witness Kowisski) That is correct.

22 Q And by doing that, it is your opinion that you 23 test all the portions of a plan?

24 A That is correc t. However, can I add, in this 25 case we took an exception. We added an additional to the

)

-24701010 7537 sucw31sh-1 you?

2 A (Witness Keller) That's correct.

3 (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

4 Q And, so when you say it's not -- it would not be 5 inconsistent with other exercises in New York State or 6 Region II to have included ingestion pathway objectives, 7 would it?

8 A (Witness Keller) It would have not been 9 inconsistent, however, all --

10 Q Wait a --

11 A I thought I was allowed to amplify after I 12 answered the question. If I'm not, just tel3 me not.

13 l JUDGE FRYE Yes, go ahead. You said it would 14 not be incensistent, so go ahead.

15 WITNESS KELLER: It would not be inconsistent, 16 however, all of the exercises which had ingestion pathway 11 objectives were done very early on prior to the current la system that we have in place.

l 19 And, had we had the deficiency system in place l  !

20 at that time, we would have had remedici exercises, because 21 the performance of the people in those ingestion pathway 22 exercis es , the early ones, was absolutely unsatisfactory.

23 And, they are still being carried as open items, many of 24 them.

25 The State has refused to reschedule until this N ,

k

24701010 7528 su;w31sh

^

Fall other inges tion pathway exercises until guidance has 2 been promulgated, which clearly is late in coming. Now, 3 they have agreed to schedule a full-scale ingestion pathway 4 exercise for this Fall, the first full-scale ingestion 5 pathway exercise in New York State.

6 It is true that there were a few ingestion 7 pathway exercise objectives in previous exercises but the a people couldn't find the qgrms, they didn't have the maps, 9 they didn't know where to go. I know that for a fact, 10 because I was the evaluator.

11 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 12 Q But, the fact is that at other New York State 13 exercises there have been ingestion pathway objectives; 14 isn't that so?

15 A I said it would not be inconsistent, however, 16 there are some mitigating circumstances in my belief.

17 Q But, is it fair to state that the primary -- is 18 it fair to state that given the NRC's determination or 19 soggestion, to use the word in your testimony, that the 20 exercise focus on the 10-mile zone, that eliminated any 21 consideration by you gentlemen in designing the exercise, or 22 I guess maybe you, Mr. Kowieski, primarily in designing the 23 exercise, it eliminated any consideration including 24 ingcstion pathway objectives?

25 A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

__J

24701717 7620 mary 3imons 1 A (Witness Keller) No.

2 A (Witness Kowieski) I provided comments on PR-1, 3 on draft PR-1.

4 Q Did you provide any comments pertaining to --

5 and to the best of your recollection, and I realize it was 6 probably a while ago, Mr. Kowieski -- did you provide any 7 comments about clarification of the NRC rules?

a A I did not, to the best of my recollection.

9 Q And do any of you know how PR-1 clarifies any to NRC rule?

11 A Well, as far as ---

12 Q Let me modify this question for a second.

13 Based upon your personal knowledge without 14 reviewing any documents, but just given your testimony here, 13 how does PR-1 clarify any NRC regulation?

16 A (Witness Keller' , And I am not a lawyer so I 17 cannot tell you whether it's a regulation or not, but I is would like to explain if possible.

19 Q Well, I want to understand your testimony, 1 20 that's all.

21 A At one time NUREG 0654 was a part of 10 CFR 50 22 and it was quoted in 10 CFR 50. That was taken out and it 23 is no longer quoted in 10 CFR 50. However, in the Federal 24 Register notice in the rule change the statement was made 25 that the Commission intended that NUREG 0654 would still be

24701717 7631 marysimons 1 used as the basis for the evaluation of plans both on and 2 offsite.

3 Now, I don ' t know whether that 's an NRC 4 regulation or not, but to the extent that NUREG 0654 is a 5 regulation, clearly PR-1 does clarify NRC regulations.

6 Q And is that the only extent to which you believe 7 PR-1 may clarify NRC regulations?

8 A I think that's correct, yes.

9 Q Do you have any different understanding, Mr.

10 Kowieski?

11 A (Witness Kowieski) I don't.

12 Q Did you even have that understanding?

13 A Yes, I did, and I would like to paraphraks what 14 Mr. Keller said. The NUREG is based on 10 CFR 350. en ,

is planning standards were derived from 10 CFR and in thi.

16 context, yes, i t clarifies the planning standards of 10 17 CFR. If ym. equate the planning standards of 10 CFR with 18 the NUREG it clarifies 10 CFR. 19 Q And that's the degree of clarification you 20 believe that PR-1 provides about NRC regulations?

4 21 A That's correct.

22 A (Witness Keller) Yes, sir.

23 Q And despite that clarification, you've never 24 made an atteept in your design of exercises or preparation ,

25 for exercises or the evaluation to determine whether your PR-

24800505 7690 naryJimons 1

ambulances identified in the plan, (See Proc edure OPIP 3.6.5 2 Health Care Facilities Listing) -- let me start over.

3 That was all a parenthetical.

4 (Laught er . )

5 "An assessment of whether the number of 6 ambulances identified in the plan are actually available 7 will be determined during an exercise."

s Do you recall that testimony?

9 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, we do.

10 Q You didn't do that in the Shoreham exercise, did 11 you?

12 A (Witness Keller) That is correct.

13 Q And the ambulance portion of the plan is again a 14 major observable portion of the plan, isn't it?

15 A (Witness Baldwin) Well, it 's an observdale 16 portion.

17 A (Witness Kowieski) I don't know. Could you 18 restruc ture your question. I don't know if I follow you.

19 Q You stated in 1984 that an assessment of the I

20 number of ambulances is something that has to be looked at 21 during an exercise.

22 A (Witness Keller) I disagree. I dcn't think we 23 said it has to be looked at. We said we would look at it I 24 believe. There may be a dif f erence between has to look at 25 and would look at, i

97500505 8378 '

@cew31sh I I should also point out on Page 20 of the Post i

2 Exercise Assessment, which lays the ground rules under which 3 all of the various aspects of the exercise were to be f d l c onduc ted , under Public Notification it says: During the i 5

exercise, public alerting systems and the emergency 6

broadcast system were to be demonstrated.

7 So, those were the ground rules under which we a were evaluating --

9 Q Mr. Baldwin, you referenced then objective --

10 I believe it is EOC-14, not 18.

A 11 Q Would a FEMA REP-10 test satisfy the exercise 12 objectives for demonstrating the ability to alert the public 13 in a timely manner, whether they be EOC-14 or 15?

Id A Yes, I believe they would.

15 Q Do you agree with that Mr. Keller, and Mr.

16 Kowieski?

17 A (Witness Keller) Not in a vacuum.

18 A (Witness Kowieski) Which objectives?

l l'

A (Witness Keller) 14 or 15. As Mr. Kowieski 20 said to you this morning, and we said last week, what was i 21 done in the exercise was everything up to pushing the 22 button, okay? l 23 The FEMA REP-10 process is the pushing of the l 2' button and the actual testing of the acoustical output of 25 the sirens, and the survey of a statistical sample of the

37501515 8525 Cu;walsh I (The witnesses are conferring.

2 A (Witness Keller) I think you are aware, as we 3

testified previously, that not all the regions sound the Mr. Kowieski, when he was  !

sirens in every exercise, okay.

5 the RAC Chairman felt that it was important that these 6

exercise (sic) be sounded in the exercises.

7 JUDGE PARIS: Sirens.

8

• WITNESS KELLER: Sirens, I'm sorry. I'm losing

' He felt it was important to sound the sirens it. Sorry.

10 All right.

during the exercise. ,

33 We see no. reason to change that evaluation at 12 this point in time, okay. But, if we were going to do it 13 again we would like to see the sirens sounded as an Id integrated thing in an exercise to be consistent with what 15 we have done in the past in this region. That's not what's 16 done nationwide, but to be consistent with what has been 17 done in the past in this region we would like to see it done 18 consistently.

19 BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Continuing) 20 Q Mr. Keller, ycu have evaluated exercises outside 21 this region, haven ' t you?

22 A (Witness Keller) That's correct.

23 Q And, at those exercises the button pushing, 24 siren sounding and EBS test message don't' all take place on 25 the same day, do they?

l.

37501515 8526 sucwalch 1 A' Quite often, they do not.

2 Q You do the butten pushing or the simulated j 3 button pushing as we did at the Shoreham exercise, and then I

d you do the test message and the siren sounding separately at  ;

5 a REP-10 test, right?

6 A That is correct.

7 Q Now, when -- Mr. Kowieski, in Region II when you 8 do the three activities on the same day, does FEHA send 9 anyone to the radio station to observe what goes on there? l 10 A (Witness Kowieski) I already testify to this M Only on one occasion we sent an evaluatnr to a effect.

12 radio station. I believe back in 19 82 or ' 83. It was at 13 the Ginna site or Nine Mile Point site.

14 Q And, Mr. Keller, the scheduled nature of the 15 test and the siren testing is the same for an exercise or 16 for a REP-10 test, isn't it?

/

17 A (Witness Keller) Well, not exactly. I mean, 18 sometimes we are told that we cannot sound the siren in a 19 certain window, okay. I'm sorry.

20 As we testified last week, we think it's 21 critical that when the sirens are sounded that the EBS test 22 message come on in the time frane that you 've told the 23 public in your educational brochure that they will come on.

24 And, we are not in favor of sounding the sirens unless we 25 have a commitment to air this test message, I think for i

00606 8835 u walch 1 A (Witness Schwart:) In one or two, I was part of 2 an evaluation team for NRC where I would provide written 3 comments as an evaluator. But, in the past it has been more d of a management observer observing the exercise for the NRC 5 as to the licensee's performance and also the performance of 6 the NRC evaluation team.

7 Q Mr. Weiss, in what capacity have you --

8 A (Witness Weiss) Primarily as an observer.

9 rrimarily as an doserver?

Q ,

10 A Rig ht .

11 f

0 Gentlemen, in your experience, has the scope of j 12 l

a full participation exercise been different for operating  ;

13 plants and NTOLs?

Id A (Witness Schwartz) May I have one second for a 15 conference?

16 Q Yes.

37 (The witnesses are conferring.)

i 19 20 21 1 22 23 24 25

700707 8836 1w21sh I

A (Witness Schwart:) I don't see any difference.

Q Gentlemen, did you have an opportunity this 3

morning over the break to review Attachment I to LILCO's testimony on Contentions 15 and 167 '

5 A Is -- would you --

6 Q Attachment I is the deposition excerpts that were in --

8 A Is that the one that is marked 109?

Q No, sir. Suf folk County Exercise Exhibit 109 is 10 excerpts from the testimony itself. Attachment I was your 11 deposition excerpts that are cited in 109.

12 Did you review Attachment I?

'3 A Yes. 1 14 (Witness Weiss) I'm not sure. I have a

'3 document here --

Q Let me show you Attachment I, and you tell me if 17 ycu looked at it this morning.

18 A (Witness Schwart:) Thank you.

19 (The witnesses are furnished a document.)

20 Now, your question was?

O My question was, have you reviewed Attachment I?

A Yes.

'3 Q Do you disagree with anything in Attachment I?

24 A (Witness Weiss) This morning, we reviewed portions of Appendix I.

97700808 8851 goewalch 1 f eas ible , and I think the word "legal" was in there as well 2 in that context.

3 So, I -- the issue of whether or not it 4 qualified under the regulations as a full participation 5 exercise was never asked of me, and I don't remember any 6 discussions leading to a conclusion or even the hint that it 7 didn't satisfy the regulation.

8 BY MR. JOHNSON: (Continuing) 9 Q But since that time, and based on review of the 10 post exercise assessment, did you form an opinion about 11 whether the major observable portions of the plan were 12 tested?

13 A (Witness Schwart:) I formed an opinion that it 14 did satisfy, in reading it, it did satisfy within the limits 15 of the scope of the exercise with respect to the report 16 Where it was discussed in the report that there was no State 17 and Local participation, and that was a given in the Report, 18 that there was no indication that it was not as the 19 Commission expected, and that was all the elements that 20 could have been exercised from that plan were exercised and -

21 observed, i 22 Q Mr. Weiss, did you, based on your evaluation of l

23 the post exe ise assessment report, or otherwise come to l

24 the conc lusion that major observable portions of the plan l

l 25 had been tested?

I i

30808 8852 kalCh 1

MR. LANPHER: I object to the question. That is 2 outside the scope of the cross. Mr. Weiss wasn't asked any 3 questions on that, d

MR. JOHNSON: It seems to me that the question 5

was asked concerning whether the maj or observable portions 6

were tested, and this is joint testimony, and it went to the 7

last question and answer, and Mr. Weiss has something to say 8 abou t that, and it seems to me it is pertinent.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Do you disagree with Mr. Schwart='s 10 testimony?

11 WITNESS WEISS: No. But I do have something to 12 add with regard to my participation in that.

13 JUDGE FRYE All right.

Id MR. LANPHER: Judge, are you denying my 15 obj ec tion?

16 JUDGE FRYE: Yes.

17 WITNESS WEISS: The point was that I was 18 involved in the design of the exercise, and in that was 19 concerned about the making of the exercise as full as 20 pos s ible , working with the FEMA people, Mr. Kowieski in 21 particular, during that portion of the time.

22 It was my -- we never had a discussion on the 23 question of full participation, but he on many occasions 24 said that he was trying to design this exercise to be the 25 equivalent of all the other exercises that he has ever run

00808 8853

{walsh s

I in his region, and so there was no basis to think that it 2 wasn't as equivalent.

3 JUDGE FRYE: That would be the source of your d knowledge.

5 WITNESS WEISSt That is the source of my 6 knowledge.

7 MR. JOHNSON: The Staff has no further 8 questions. Thank you.

• JUDGE FRYE Re-cross??

10 RE-CROSS C< AMINATION 11 BY MR. LANPHER:

12 Q Mr. Schwartz, you stated in response to some 13 questions that you were brief ed by a Staf f member about the ld LERO plan. Do you recall that?

15 A (Witness Schwart:) Yes, sir.

16 Q When was that briefing.

17 A I honestly cannot remember as to --

18 Approximately.

Q

{ M A I would say it was some time in early '85. I 20 can't remember which version of the LERO p.Lan was being 21 briefed, buc every time a new revision to tne LERO plan was

, s' - -

22 submi t t ed , I was given a briefing as to the substance of 23 what was in that plan.

24 Q Who gave you this briefing? The one in early 25 '85?

4 0

6 ATTACHMENTJ

. 5TlTE OF NEW YORK ve s. .wme . r e me-eo co:~ .

h DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

c<t,w.ea emae ir4t: aa:4 . k a ae. my,,up . . .

,w, i m .co. . .

• • ~""

sep:emhe 6, na) '83 SEF -9 P3 :36

- Cimi c; m; . .-

" CCCAEim3 s sih.?..

3 RANCH Secretary of the Cer. mission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C r. mission W WIR 3 Attnt Docketing and Service Branch P8070$(0 ng( Yd, Washington, D.C. 20555 {gg g

' Gentlemen The Nucles: Regulate:y Cor. mission has proposed revisions to 10 CTR Part 50 dealing with frequency and porticipa:ien in exercises. The pr:pesed rules were published in Vol. 43, No. 141 of the Federal Register, Thursday, July 21, 1993. 4 The stated intent of the ruler.aking is to provide greater flexibil:.ty in implementing regulations determining tho frequency of emergency preparedness exercises. The NRC recognizes that a disp Opertionate amount of resources are being expended in ceder :: conduct and evaluate exercises to the' det:Iment of day-to-day upgraded state of emergency preparedness and =ctrecting any deficiencies une vered in previous exercises.

It appears that the pr:p sed revisions do not ::: mplish the stated intent and if anything potentially exa:erbate the problem thcy seek to solve.

The rule .:revides fer full participatien and partial participation in exercises. L :a. goverr.r.ents in the 10 mile IPZ as well as licensees retain requirements f:: annual full scale exercises. The rule allows the sta:e :: participate ,

partially in the annual exercise with full parti::pation by the State at least nce every 7 years. There is a fallacy in assuming that the "partial participati n" requiremer w:uld p : vide relief for many states, rull participation by local governr.ents in an exercise gencrally requires f airly extensive participat:.:n by the state to exercise the response system. Since exercises vill of necessity include dose and accident assessment, protective action decision making, radiolegical exposure :ent:01, ingestien pathway determina-ticas and recovery / reentry, m:s: states will have a maje: role in all exercises.  :: appears that the regula:icns were n:t drafted by persons familiar with inte; sted radielegi:a1 response by licensec staff and 10:a1 and State agencies.

The Nattenal Emergency . Management Association petitioned the NRC :: require exer::ses en a b:.er.nial f requency unless TEM.A and NRC determined that a greater f:cquen:y is req 2 red. Unf 0rtuna te!.y, the NRC proposed rule requires a del:. berate a :icn for a schedule less frequent than annual'y. ;s wri::en, unless FIF.A .akes a re:Or.?.endatien and NRC eakes a finding sna al'. Ta:c: elements were performed D* aid // N, p LJ N .A. .i ~" '.c r~}u -. . ,1 ?. - 5S 2:c W :r;t: y :n :..

a ---

p~as e.1 usaTfsfactorily during the previous exerciso and that another le'x'ereise f

is not needed f or up to 2 years, the t.nnual f ull partici-sn..of.at least local government agencies is rec.! ired.

w .

,; [.Regardlessofintentorpresent'ractice,the p

. propose 1 rule specifically calls for an annual exercise for each F1Ti-ssen_.at each site. Thus, Oswego and the four Indian Point The

'councles will be Tegtiired to participate fully twice a year.

phffsi'te plans, emergency communications sytem, etc. are the same  !

".if6ry.TP.;2 and Ip 3 as well as for Nine Mile Point and Tit: Patrick.

?!T6 i/Offsite planning and response, it does not matter Vhich elicenses at a site is assumed to have the potential problem.

. W The proposed rule requires full participation by the

= .

i to at least once in 7 years in eadh ingestion pathway EP3.

' T'u'rther clari!!catien is needed en the extent of state participation, since etc. does not

'.l' appear.f ull activation o f the S ta te and Dis trict ECCs , warranted for exer

ise

on'the ingestion pathway EP3.

w.

The proposed rule for an;pxercise ! each licensee at s.a ,

s'ach' site requires the State to participate fully at each site at i least twice each 7. years instead of the stated intent of at least

once'in 7 years. Apparently, NRC staff failed to consider the S nique situation of dual licensees at the Nine Mile Point and-ridian Point sites.

l *;. " .

l t The p;cp: sed rulemaking appears to require that licensees provide for particaation by Tedersi emergency response agencies in s

at least one exercia; every 7 years. Although raderal participation

[e;is desirable, tnis prevision is an a;. parent mandate on the licensee l over events in which they have no control. If this provision were in

effect, we should have had Federal participati

n in at least two of F ,our exercises to date. With the exception of limited MRC participa- .

~lon, active participation by Federal agencies has been lacking. There should be a different vehicle to require Federal participation than hrough 10 CTR regulations.

h The proposed ru'.e calls for formal :ritiques fer all training

'and exercises. This should be clarified so that :he training one of zequirement is for licensees and not for offsite agencies,

,the quickest ways to minimize participation by volunteer response

, organizations is to require formal critiques after receiving training.

ditionally, the requirement for formal critiques f:: all exercises is unnecessary and too restrictive. Formal critiques should be required as part of the annual exercise. Many drills and exercises are for. training rather than evaluative purposes and provide for instant feedback and evaluation without necessity for formal critiques.

~

N Attached are charts of exercise frequancies for three

n all three, fer planning purposes, Shor'eham gdifferentsituations.

.Was censidered as requiring an exercise for an cperating license sfollowed by Indian Point as the next most pressing site, In each case, an attempt was made to even cut the work 1:ad. :n all three

, cases, . partial participation by the State is indicated according to

., proposed rules, even th: ugh it is doubtful that a meaningfulThe exercise third an,be. completed withcut substantial state part:.:!pation.

I,;!; case;representsapreferredsituation,i.e.,bionnialexercises Even under this

.fr at. ear;h site alternated between licensees.

least

@r. three situation, theper (3) exercises state year.would potentially be involved in at

- ~ .'

.t Y.,. ,

Your attention and review of our co.?:. ants will be cppreciated.

Sincerely yours, D

r1 /

yonald .

avidoff

- Director /

' Radio logical/ E:.orgency preparedness creup

' Atts.

t 1

5 l

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