ML20199D484

From kanterella
Revision as of 05:06, 8 December 2021 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Documents Re Staff Aug 1985 - Feb 1986 Efforts to Review,From Generic Standpoint,Potential Lessons Derived from June Event at Davis-Besse.Documents Submitted to Aid in Efforts to Collect Ref Matls for Use in Deliberations
ML20199D484
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse, 05000000
Issue date: 02/19/1986
From: Stello V
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Gleason J
NRC - TEAM ON DAVIS-BESSE EVENT
Shared Package
ML20199D137 List:
References
FOIA-86-126, FOIA-86-127, FOIA-86-131, FOIA-86-80 NUDOCS 8603240136
Download: ML20199D484 (1)
v • d • e


Text

l o ur \

'o UNITED STATES g

U[ o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

% . . . . . ,o! February 19, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge James P. Gleason, Chairman Ad Hoc Review Group on the Davis-Besse Incident FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.

Acting Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

INFORMATION FOR THE AD H0C REVIEW GROUP In connection with the Review Group's efforts to collect applicable reference materials and background information for use in its deliberations, I thought it might be useful to provide the enclosed package of documents, some of which you may not have. These documents generally reflect the efforts of the staff over a period of about 6 months (extending from August 1985 to February 1986) to reflect upon and review from a generic standpoint the potential lessons which may be derived from the June event at Davis-Besse. You will note that the preliminary insights trom the December Rancho Seco event are starting to be reflected in the more recent staff activities.

If we can be of further assistance in support of the Review Group's efforts, please do not hesitate to call upon us.

A ctor tello, '.

Acting Executi e Director for Operations

Enclosure:

Documents t

4 0 3 9 Y DJ3

/

i "

L kEB 211986 f'o

/

Mr. Hal B. Tucker, Chairman B&W Owners Group Executive Comittee Suite 220 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Dear Mr. Tucker:

I am responding to your letter dated January 27,.1986 that provided comments by the Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group regarding the NRC's Incident Investigation Program (IIP). You provided comments and endorsed the equipment quarantining concerns expressed in a letter from the Westinghouse Owners Group dated January 9, 1986.

I appreciate the concerns raised by the Westinghouse Owners Group, and I have -

taken actions to ensure that the impact of quarantining equipment is minimized

' and the control of quarantined equipment does not interfere with the basic authority and responsibility of the licensee. My letter to the Westinghouse Owners Group is enclosed for your information. In this letter, I describe the concept of quarantining equipment that will be included in the IIP procedures.

Your letter provided additional comments concerning the determination of root causes of significant prcblems associated with the quarantined equipment. We certainly encourage your Group's initiatives to develop guidance addressing the key elerrents of an effective and practical root-cause determination process.

The results of your activity should be of real benefit to industry as an aid in determining the root causes of significant operating events in a systematic manner whether or not an IIT is involved.

I welcome support by the Owners Groups in assuring that the IIP procedures are practical, effective and clear. I also agree with your suggestion that further information exchange between our organizations is desirable. As noted in my letter to the Westinghouse Owners Group, we plan to conduct workshops in each Region this fall in order to solicit comments and suggestions on the IIP procedures. Further, we hope to obtain industry participation in the investiga-tive process, and we should discuss how best to achieve this goal. Thus, I have asked Jack Heltemes, who administers the IIP, to contact you and schedule a meeting at a mutually convenient time for further discussions.

I ynowoy:

,\7

i ;

e no 8

[s m%, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 y

h

  • 2,, ,

JAN 2 91986 .

Mr. D. Hunter, Vice President Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, MA 01701

Dear Mr. Hunter:

SUBJECT:

YOUR LETTER DATED JANUARY 9, 1986 PROVIDING COMMENTS BY THE WESTINGHOUSE OWNERS GROUP ON THE NRC'S INCIDENT INVESTIGATION -

PROGRAM We apprecidte very much the coments of the Westinghouse Owners Group on the NP.C's Incident Investigation Program (IIP). We appreciate your concern concerning the " quarantining" of equipment, and we share your objective to minimize the impact of the quarantined equipment on plant operations or restoration.

As Jack Heltemes discussed with you, our IIP concept limits the scope of quarantined equipment to that directly and significantly involved in the event.

Further, a*. all times the licensee can take any action involving quarantined i equipment deemed necessary to: achieve or maintain safe plant conditions, prevent further equipment degradation, or conduct testing or inspection activities required by the plant's technical specifications. The period of quarantining is to the point where the NRC agrees that the probable root cause of failure has been identified. The actual preparation of the troubleshooting l

procedure and the conduct of inspection, troubleshooting and corrective main-tenance activities is, of course, under the control of the licensee.

l As noted previously, it is our objective that the IIT procedures minimize any i schedular impact and disruption to the licensee's activities. We recognize that some impact may result, but we certainly do not wish to interfere with the basic authority and responsibility of the utility management.

I have directed AE00 to proceed with the development of procedures governing the conduct of NRC Incident Investigation Teams and to issue these procedures initially for trial use and comment. We would welcome the review and comment on these procedures by the Westinghouse Owners Group and other organizations.

Toward this end, I have asked that regional workshops be conducted to discuss the program and implementing procedures and to receive the reaction and comments from those involved with the process. We now estimate that these 4

workshops will be held this fall.

y(pOhDWhN ~

096 '

i ,

d Mr. D. Hunter '

Again, we appreciate your concerns. We look forward to receiving your comments on the interim procedures, but in the meantime, if a meeting would be l helpful, we would be pleased to get together with you. Please contact either myself or Jack Heltemes to arrange for a mutual convenient time.

Sincerely.

Original signed by 71ctor St ello ,.

Victor Stello, Jr. I Acting Executive Director for Operations e

1 @

5 l

Mr. Hal B. Tucker As you know, comments by the Owners Groups on NRC programs are cordially invited and I appreciate your interest and comments. If you should have additional comments, please feel free to contact me or Jack Heltemes (301/

492-4484).

Sincerely, Origina. s ,a*d by yiotot Stello Victor Stello, Jr.

Acting Ex'ecutive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated

- DISTRIBUTION PDR AE0D CF AE0D SF V. Stello J. Roe T. Rehm J. Sniezek J. Taylor

, H. Denton

  • ED0'.R/F73 M. Bridgers (ED0-1383)

C. J. Heltemes F. Hebdon W. Lanning K. Seyfrit K. Black IIS RF IIS SF FC :AEOD: IS :AE00: :EDO  :  :  :  :

JAME :WLan 1 g:cs :CJH temes :VStello  :  :  :  :  ;

____:____________:____________:____________.____________.____________.____________.___________ j iATE :02//7/86

02/18f86 :02/ /86  :  :  :  : i 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY

(

i. J

FEB 211986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Commissioner Bernthal Commissioner Zech FROM: Victor Stello, Jr.

Acting Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

STAFF REQUIREMENTS - MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY DATED JANUARY 23, 1986 RE: SEQUOYAH FUELS CORPORATION By memorandum dated January 23, 1986, from the Secretary, the Commission requested that the staff provide a plan for addressing the January 4,1986, event at the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (SFC) facility at Gore, Oklahoma. The enclosure to this memorandum provides the plan. It describes the scope of tasks undertaken as a result of the event and includes projected completion dates, where available. For a few tasks, completion dates depend on the nature of findings in other tasks or on actions by others outside the NRC and cannot yet be projected with precision.

In addition to the plan, the January 23, 1986, memorandum from the Secretary requested answers to the following:

1. When the report of the site investigation team will be available and what the scope of the report will be.

Answer: See Item 1 of the plan.

2. Staff priorities and schedule for resolving issues at the site, including how and when will restart of the facility be decided.

Answer: The enclosed plan answers the question of priorities and schedules.

Item 6 of the plan treats the question of restart based on current information.

3. When staff believes they will be prepared to provide a follow-on briefing 1 for the Commission including lessons learned.

Answer: The staff believes an appropriate time to provide a status p briefing to the Commission would be in early March 1986 after

',Dy the Augmented Investigation Team completes its report, which is g

h[ projected for February 28, 1986. A subsequent briefing including lessons learned will be scheduled, if the Commission wishes, g D , ((f after the Lessons Learned Group completes its report, wh projected for late April 1986.

Ajt . .- .

y.

l 1

1 The Comissioners 2 l l

4. The staff recommendation on asking Kerr-McGee officials to brief the Comission.

Answer: The staff suggests that Kerr-McGee officials be available when the staff briefs the Comission in early March to provide information to the Comission as appropriate.

5. Information from the staff on whether there are any other federal or state agencies responsible for regulating the chemical hazard at the Sequoyah facility, and if so, what the responsibilities are.

Answer: See Item 5 of the plan.

In addition to the request for information from the Comission, the January 23, 1986, memorandum from the Secretary contained the following questions from Commissioners Asselstine and Bernthal.

Comissioner Asselstine requested:

1. Information on whether the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act provisions apply to the Sequoyah facility.

Answer: Wastes generated, treated, stored, or disposed of by SFC at its Gore, Oklahoma, facility that are not source, byproduct, or special nuclear material, are subject to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the regulations of the State of Oklahoma since they are authorized by the Environmental Protection Agency to issue RCRA permits.

2. That the staff inform him as to whether the public and state and local officials were informed of the pending application for renewal of the Sequoyah facility's operatinn license prior to its September 1985 renewal.

Ar.swer: All informatice relating to SFC's application for license renet.al was made uailable to the public in the Local Public Document Room tt the Sa!Msaw City Library in Sallisaw, Oklahoma. Also, during the preparation of the Environmental Assessment (EA), relating to the renewal review, the staff and its contractor, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, met with appro-priate State officials to discuss environmental issues. Prior

.0 the issuance of the t enmcd lieme, a Finding of No Significant Impact er.d n,tice of availability of the EA was published in thc Federal Regist_er.

Comissioner Bernthal requested:

1. Information on the normal free velame for the type of cylinder that ruptured during the event at the Sequoyah facility.

Answer: The normal free volume for a loadeo Model No. 48Y UF 6 cylinder is 7.1 ft3 TM s is bssed on a fill limit of 27,560 lbs. UF at 6

maximum 250 F (liquid density 203.3 lb/ft3) and a minimum certified internal volume of 142.7 ft8

The Commissioners 3

2. Information on whether the prohibition on heating the overfilled cylinder to remove excess uranium hexafluoride was in response to DOE's 1978 circular.

Answer: The 1978 circular to which Commissioner Bernthal refers is a revision of an earlier document titled, " Uranium Hexafluoride, Handling Procedures, and Container Criteria" (OR0 651), issued by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1966. This earlier document also contained the prohibition against heating to remove excess weight from cylinders and was widely distributed throughout the industry, including Kerr-McGee. SFC also has in its possession the 1978 revision. It seems likely that the prohibition in the licensee's operating procedures against heating to remove excess weight in the cylinders has its origins in the 1966 AEC circular or its subsequent revisions.

Original Signed by

, Victor Stelig ,

Victor Stello, Jr.

Acting Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure:

As stated cc: OPE OGC SECY DISTRIBUTION NMSS 860087 BDalrymple JPartlow, IE RWilde JSniezek FC Central Files DBangart, RIV EHeumann DBMausshardt NMSS R/F RFonner, ELD CCudd WTCrow FCUF R/F JRoe HDenton, NRR VLTharpe TRehm, ELD JTaylor, IE RMinogue, RES Docket File 40-8027 BClausser GCunningham, ELD JGDavis PDR RMartin, RIV RECunningham LPDR Ncgg 3

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE _ Revised per A0/ED0 2/19/86 1

0FC: *FC  :*FC  :*FCUF  :* ELD  :*RIV  :*IE  :*FC l NAME : B Da l rympl e/a s : RWi l de : WTCrow :RFonner :RBangart :JPartlow :DRChapell DATE:2/ /86 :2/ /86:2/ /86 :2/ /86 :2/ /86 :2/ /86 :2/ /86 0FC: *FC  :*NMSS  :*NMSS :E00  :  :  :

NAME:RECunningham:DBMausshardt:JGDavis:VStel)#:  :  :

______________.____________________________V_________ _____________..._____.

DATE:2/ /86 :2/ /86 :2/ /86:?/l//86:  :  : l l

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Staff Plans for Follow-on Tasks Resulting from the Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (SFC) Facility Accident on January 4, 1986

1. Report of Augmented Investigation Team (AIT) (Region IV)

The AIT is preparing a report which documents and describes the incident.

The report will present factual information and chronologies of events to describe the incident together with a qualitative description of the near-term response actions taken by Region IV and other agencies. The report is scheduled for February 28, 1986.

2. Report of Physical Cause of Cylinder Rupture (Region IV)

The staff with the assistance of experts from DOE contractors have preliminarily concluded, based on visual appearance, that the cause of the

, cylinder rupture was stress failure due to hydraulic pressure. SFC agreed to conduct the metallurgical analyses on the UF 6 cylinder at a private facility, that would be approved by NRC, in order to firmly establish the cause of cylinder failure. SFC submitted a plan for conducting the analyses on the cylinder, and this plan received final approval from Region IV on January 29, 1986. Battelle Laboratory has been selected to perform the analyses. Region IV, with an expert observer frota Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, will oversee the analysis conducted on the cylinder.

The preliminary metallurgical analysis results will be incorporated into the AIT Report to be completed February 28, 1986. The final report on the metallurgical analysis will be issued as a supplement to the AIT report or as a separate report.

3. Report on Assessment of Public Health Impacts (NMSS)

The initial meeting to establish the Ad Hoc Interagency task group for public health impacts was held on January 14, 1S86. In addition to NRC staff, membership in the task group includes representatives from the Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Energy, Center for Disease Control, University of Rochester, Oklahoma State Department of Health, EG&G, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The data collection was completed on January 31, 1986. A second meeting of the group took place on February 6 and 7,1986, to begin preparation of the assessment report. The first draft of the assessment is scheduled for February 14, 1986. The final report is scheduled for the week of March 3, 1986.

4. Coordination with the Department of Transportation (DOT) on the Adequacy of UF Cylinder as in a Low Specific Activity (LSA) container for transhort(NMSS)

The initial letter to DOT from NMSS was sent on January 14, 1986, on this subject. The letter provided a brief description of the UFg cylinder rupture and posed several questions as to the adequacy of L5A container requirements for safe transportation of UF . Requirements for LSA containers arebasedonradiologicalcharacteristics$fcontainercontent. The risk

2 l .

from UF6 is dominated by its chemical characteristics. DOT was requested to analyse the issue since UF is shipped from SFC under DOT regulations.

AverbalreplywasreceivedobJanuary 24, 1986, indicating that DOT had established a task group to examine the issues in the staff's January 14, 1986 letter. DOT staff has not yet indicated when they expect to complete their analysis, but it will probably not be until they review the report described in item 2.

5. Report on the Role of other Federal / State Agencies in Regulatory, Radiological, Chemical, and Industrial Safety at Nuclear Fuel Processing Facilities (IE)

Meetings with representatives from EPA, OSHA, and FEMA were held on i January 22, and 31, 1986. Points of contact were established to define '

understanding of present regulatory roles with respect to nuclear fuel processing facilities. IE plans to complete a report in April 1986 which describes agency roles, identifies problems, and outlines plans for resolution of problems should they exist.

6. Plan for Permitting Restart of the Sequoyah Fuels Facility (NMSS/IE/ Region IV)

The staff defines restart of the facility as resumption of UF production. The Sequoyah Fuels Corporation plan for restart ks expected in the latter part of February 1986. The date of restart, however, cannot be established at this time since it will depend not only on the licensee plan but also on findings contained in studies listed above as well as some possible requirements not yet established which the licensee will need to meet before startup. These requirements might include equip-ment modification, changes in operating procedures, operator training, etc.

7. Report on Lessons Learned (Region I - Chair, NMSS - Staff Administrative Support)

The draft memorandum directing the formation of a Lessons Learned group was sent to Office Directors and Regional Administrators requesting comments and concurrence on January 22, 1986. Members of the Lessons Learned Group have been identified. They consist of staff drawn from NRC organizations not directly involved with the SFC license. A final memorandum establishing the Lessons Learned Group will be issued shortly. The Group is expected '

to begin its work in mid-March as some of the reports listed above become l available and complete its analysis near the end of April when all the appropriate reports are available.

1

_ _ .

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20199D484&oldid=3336548"