ML20214S083
| ML20214S083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1986 |
| From: | Baxter T CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO., NORTH CAROLINA MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCIES, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214S087 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#386-874 OL, NUDOCS 8609290390 | |
| Download: ML20214S083 (26) | |
Text
__
J Y
O DOLKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM7SSION 6FFICE 07 . . _ c t . ,,., y 00CXETiv,1. r;vic;'
Bi,sth. -
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant) )
APPLICANTS' ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO CASH MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
Wilbert Washington, II SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE Richard E. Jones Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Counsel for Applicants September 25, 1986 8609290390 860925 PDR ADOCK 05000400' G PDR DSo3
s o
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. Introduction.............................................. 1 II. Jurisdiction.............................................. 2 III. CASH is Not a Party and Its Motion is Unauthorized.................................... 2 IV. Overview of Applicable Standards.......................... 3 V. Application of the Standards.............................. 6 A. The Motion Fails to Demonstrate Good Cause for Its Untimely Submission.................... 6 B. The CASH Motion Does Not Advance an Acceptable Contention, Raise a Significant Safety Issue, or Demonstrate That a Materially Different Result Would be
, Likely.............................................. 11 C. Extent to Which Intervenors Can Contribute to the Development of a Sound Record................ 18 D. Extent to Which Admission Would Broaden the Issues and Delay the Proceeding................. 19 E. Other Lateness Factors.............................. 20 VI. Conclusion............................................... 21 i
Enclosure 1: Affidavit of Stephen A. Browne, May 6, 1986 Enclosure 2: Affidavit of Thomas W. Brombach, August 6, 1986 Enclosure 3: Affidavit of Stephen A. Browne, September 25, 1986 Enclosure 4: Affidavit of Thomas W. Brombach, September 25, 1986 Enclosure 5: CP&L letter NRC-469 (Aug. 14, 1986)
Enclosure 6: CP&L letter NRC-470 (Aug. 14, 1986)
-i-4 i
4 September 25, 1986 f
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
l )
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
i Plant) )
APPLICANTS' ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO CASH MOTION TO REOPEN THE RECORD I. Introduction l
! On September 15, 1986, Mr. Steven P. Katz of the Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (" CASH") filed a document en-titled " Motion to Reopen the Record Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.734 by Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris, Wells Eddleman and 1
Conservation Council of North Carolina" (hereafter the " CASH Mo-tion"). Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 5 2.730(c), Carolina Power & Light Company ("CP&L") and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agen-cy (collectively " Applicants") file this answer in opposition to the CASH motion.
i
s II. Jurisdiction The caption to the CASH Motion indicates that it is filed before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, while the text of the motion speaks to the Commission. Applicants' reading of the CASH Motion would place it before the Appeal Board.
The CASH Motion appears to attempt to raise a new contention which would be categorized in this proceeding as a safety issue (rather than an environmental or emergency planning issue).
- Since the Appeal Board has not completed its review of the Li-censing Board's decisions on safety issues,1# the Appeal Board has jurisdiction over a motion to reopen the record to raise a new safety issue.
III. CASH is Not a Party and Its Motion is Unauthorized Mr. Katz of CASH purports to have filed the CASH Motion on behalf of intervenors Conservation Council of North Carolina
("CCNC") and Wells Eddleman, and signed the motion on behalf of Mr. Eddleman and Mr. Runkle (counsel for CCNC). A document filed in an NRC adjudication must be signed "by the party or his i
1/ See LBP-85-28, 22 N.R.C. 232 (1985); LBP-86-11, 23 N.R.C.
294 (1986). In ALAB-843, 24 N.R.C. (Aug. 15, 1986), the Ap-peal Board affirmed the Licensing Board's decision on several safety issues.
2/ Mr. Runkle's name is misspelled where it appears in the CASH Motion.
authorized representative, or by an attorney h'aving authority
- with respect to it." 10 C.F.R. S 2.708(c). Mr. Katz has acknowledged to the undersigned that he is not an attorney.
Therefore, he cannot represent Mr. Eddleman or CCNC. See ALAB-843, 24 N.R.C. , slip op at 2 n.3 (Aug. 15, 1986); 10 C.F.R. 5 2.713(b).
CASH is not a party to this operating license proceeding.
- See Appeal Board unpublished Memorandum and Order (July 11, i
1986), review declined, Commission unpublished Order (Sept. 12, 1986). Only parties may propose contested issues for decision in an adjudication. See 10 C.F.R. SS 2.714, 2.715. Consequently, CASH is not authorized to file a motion to reopen the record to add new issues. Cf. Memorandum and Order, supra, at 3-4 (July 11, 1986).
j In order to avoid any delay in the disposition of the CASH j Motion, in the event that the Appeal Board views Mr. Katz to be authorized to sign pleadings on behalf of other parties, Appli-cants also address below the merits of the motion, as if it had i
been filed by CCNC and/or Mr. Eddleman ("intervenors").
IV. Overview of Applicable Standards The Commission's Rules of Practice, at 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714, i
require that a petitioner set forth the basis for each contention with reasonable specificity. This standard requires that a con-tention state a cognizable issue with particularity, Alabama J
, .---_.,_y--.._,7.__.-,,,_._r_,
Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-182, 7 A.E.C. 210, 216-17 (1974), and that a petitioner pro-vide a reason for its concern. Houston Lighting and Power Co.
(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 N.R.C. 542, 548 (1980).
In addition to the normal pleading requirements, 10 C.F.R. 5 2.714 sets out five factors that must be balanced in admitting a late-filed contention:
i) Good cause, if any, for failure to file on time.
ii) The availability of other means where-by the petitioner's interest will be protected.
iii) The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be ex-pected to assist in developing a sound record.
iv) The extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by exist-ing parties.
v) The extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding.
10 C.F.R. 5 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v).
The CASH Motion must clear yet further hurdles at this stage of the adjudication. The Licensing Board has decided all con-tested issues, and the record has been closed for some time.E#
3/ The record on safety issues (other than emergency planning) was closed on November 12, 1985, with the conclusion of hearings on CCNC Contention WB-3 (Drug Abuse During Construction). The (Continued next page)
Consequently, as the proponents acknowledge, the motion must meet 10 C.F.R. S_2.734(a), which provides that:
A motion to reopen a closed record to con-sider additional evidence will not be granted unless the following criteria are satisfied:
(1) The motion must be timely, except
]
' that an exceptionally grave issue may be considered in the discretion of the presid-ing officer even if untimely presented.
(2) The motion must address a signif-icant safety or environmental issue.
(3) The motion must demonstrate that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly prof-fered evidence been considered initially.
Applicants address criterion (1) below in conjunction with con-tention lateness factor (i) on good cause, if any, for failure to file on time. Criteria (2) and (3) are addressed in con-junction with the " basis with specificity" requirement for con-tentions.
(Continued) record on all contested issues was closed with the issuance of the Licensing Board's unpublished Order (Concerning Emergency Planning Exercise Contentions), dated March 19, 1986, which de-termined that no further evidentiary hearings would be held in this proceeding.
i
V. Application of the Standards A. The Motion Fails to Demonstrate Good Cause for Its Untimely Submission The CASH Motion relies upon, for its factual assertions:
- 1. A letter of January 1, 1986 from Patty Miriello to Licensing Board Chairman Kelley;
- 2. IE Report No. 50-400/85-48, dated July 15, 1986;
- 3. Affidavit of Patty S. Miriello, dated July 28, 1986, on radiation exposure records and radiation practices (hereafter "Miriello Rad. Exp. Affidavit"); and
- 4. Affidavit of Patty S. Miriello, dated July 28, 1986, on Quality Check interviews (hereafter "Miriello QA Affidavit").
The IE report documents the results of an unannounced inspection from December 2 to 6, 1985, of CP&L's pre-service inspection of safety-related piping welds at Harris. The NRC I&E inspectors had previously been provided with copies of the same data calibration sheets which were attached to Ms.
Miriello's letter to Judge Kelley,S! and which appear for the second time in the CASH Motion after the Miriello QA Affidavit.
Consequently, the IE report represents the results of NRC Staff inquiry into Ms. Miriello's allegations on pre-service inspec-tion of safety-related piping welds.
In short, the CASH Motion is grounded exclusively on in-formation originating with Ms. Miriello. Ms. Miriello's 4/ See Enclosure 2 (Affidavit of Thomas W. Brombach, August 6, 1986),1 8.
-.~-- - , = . . . - -
1 j' employment with CP&L terminated on August 30, 1985. LBP-86-ll, 23 N.R.C. 294, 325 (1986). The asserted facts in her letter and affidavits arise from her employment. Ms. Miriello has been in contact with counsel for CCNC since at least two days after her dismissal. Id. at 326. She testified in-this pro-1 ceeding in October, 1985. Yet factual allegations about her j work experience have continued to emerge over one year later.
If Ms. Miriello did not raise these issues with the intervenors
- a year ago, she certainly could have. If the'intervonors did j not inquire of Ms. Miriello as to whether she had additional I
concerns about the Harris plant, they certainly could have.
1 In any case, Mr. Eddleman and counsel for CCNC were l
4 alerted to many of her claims when they received in January i from the Licensing Board a copy of Ms. Miriello's ex parte let-ter to Judge Kelley. That letter addressed: pre-service inspection of welds at the Harris plant and the documentation of those inspections; radiation control practices at the i.
,1 Brunswick plant; and Ms. Miriello's radiation exposure records.
- j. While, as is her habit, Ms. Miriello continues to elaborate on j the same allegations with every new affidavit, the only new al-4 legation raised in the CASH Motion ir het assertion that Conam i personnel missed a row of steam generator tubes during ISI eddy current inspections in 1984. Miriello QA Affidavit at 2, 3.
l Yet, Ms. Miriello filed testimony in September, 1985 about al-leged drug use by these Conam inspectors, and the integrity of s
~ . . - -
their inspections was the subject of testimony' before the Li-censing Board.E Ms. Miriello made no mention of missing a row of tubes.
The Licensing Board was faced with the same timeliness issue five months ago when CCNC and Mr. Eddleman filed their Contention WB-4, supported by a Miriello affidavit, on ra-1
! diological exposure records. The Licensing Board even gave the j intervenors a second opportunity to explain and to justify tSe untimeliness of that proposed contention.5/ The Licensing i Board found that:
In the circumstances of this case, CCNC and Mr. Eddleman probably should have discov-ered the basis for Ms. Miriello's allega-tions about worker radiation exposure records -- and any other allecations about the Shearon Harris facility -- in the Fall
, of 1985.
4 Licensing Board Memorandum and Order (Rejecting Late Proposed Contention Concerning Alleged Falsification of Radiation Expo-sure Records), at 3 (June 13, 1986) (emphasis supplied). The i
Licensing Board went on to find that, in any event -- because of Ms. Miriello's letter of January 1, 1986 -- the intervenors
~
5/ See LBP-86-11, 23 N.R.C. at 319 n.10; Applicants' Testimony of Harold R. Banks, Roland M. Parsons, George L. Forehand and Thomas W. Brombach on Evaluation and Reinspection of Work Per-formed by Employees Implicated in Possible Drug Activity (CCNC Contention WB-3), ff. Tr. 10,077, at 15-21.
i 1/ Licensing Board Order (Concerning a Reply to Responses to Proposed Contention WB-4), May 14, 1986; Memorandum to the Par-ties, May 16, 1986.
i g- - - m , -.-e,-,-w - - +y- ----,,+,.-w,m -,rw--, y 1,+w-- p m ,w--
" definitely" should have filed that contention no later than February 1, 1986. Id. at 3-4. Neither CCNC nor Mr. Eddleman i appealed this ruling. As to the subjects covered in that Li-1 1
censing Board ruling -- Ms. Miriello's radiological exposure and records from her employment with CP&L -- the CASH Motion jl constitutes an untimely appeal of the Licensing Board's ruling, and it should not be entertained. See 10 C.F.R. 5 2.762(a)
(notice of appeal due within ten days after service of a deci-sion).
The Licensing Board's analysis is even more compelling today, as to a new issue raised even five months later. There can be no excuse for the intervenors to raise new Miriello con-tentions more than one year after she met with CCNC to begin
" blowing her whistle." Even as to smaller, but at this stage of the proceeding still significant delays, the CASH Motion offers no excuse. Ms. Miriello's allegations about the inservice inspection program for piping welds at Harris were raised in the CASH /Eddleman " Request for Institution of Pro-ceedings Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.206," filed with the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on July 2, 1986 -- 75 days before the instant motion to reopen was lodged. The two Miriello af-fidavits attached to the CASH Motion were executed on July 28, 1986 -- 7 weeks before the motion was filed. No attempt is made to explain these delays.1/
4 7/ There was, however, significant representation by the news media at Chairman Zech's tour of Shearon Harris on September 15, j (Continued next page)
- w. - - , , -m- we- ~
we-- - -
.--v-s-u-
The only justification advanced for the untimely filing of the CASH Motion is that Judge Kelley and the Office of Investi-gations have not yet provided the intervenors with contention support. CASH Motion at 7. This argument is specious. Judge Kelley had no reason to pursue Ms. Miriello's letter of January 1, 1986, and he promptly made it plain that he was not going to do so.8/ Neither is an OI report necessary to formulate the basis for a late-filed contention. CCNC and Mr. Eddleman have contested many issues in this case without the benefit of Li-censing Board or OI support. The effort to blame agency per-sonnel for the intervenors' own laxness and tardiness is pa-thetic.E The timeliness factor is a crucial element in the analysis of whether a late-filed contention should be admitted.
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units (Continued) 1986, during which CASH representatives presented the Chairman with the motion to reopen.
8/ See unpublished Order (Concerning Ex Parte Communication)
(Jan. 10, 1986). The Licensing Board is under no obligation to formulate contentions for intervenors, or to consider any matter beyond those actually put into controversy by the parties.
Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-226, 8 A.E.C. 381, 406-07 (1974).
9/ The IE report on in-service inspections, which Applicants filed with their August 15 answer to the 2.206 petition, was not necessary to raise the issue in the adjudication. Ms. Miriello ,
advised intervenors of her information via her January 1, 1986 letter to Judge Kelley.
l
1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 N.R.C. 241, 244 (1986). The CASH Motion j is one year late, completely fails to justify its untimeliness, and as shown below, there is no overriding " exceptionally grave issue." See 10 C.F.R. S 2.734(a)(1). Consequently, the inter-venors must make a " compelling" showing with respect to the other four factors governing late-filed contentions.
Braidwood, supra, CLI-86-8, 23 N.R.C. at 244.
B. The CASH Motion Does Not Advance an Acceptable Contention, Raise a Significant Safety Issue, or Demonstrate That a Materially Different Result Would be Likely The CASH Motion purports to advance a new proposed conten-tion, but nowhere is it identified or set out. The motion hopelessly confuses a hodge podge of issues.
At the outset, the intervenors discuss legal standards ap-plicable to construction quality assurance. CASH Motion at 1.
Later, they acknowledge that pre-service base-line inspections
-- which occupy much of the motion -- are not relied upon to assure the quality of construction. Id. at 3. Next, the in-tervenors mix in Ms. Miriello's radiological exposure history in a most incomprehensible way. In reply, Applicants cannot improve upon the self-defeating language of the movant:
As a worker exposed to radiation of the Applicant's nuclear reactors, the facts which have been brought forward by Ms.
Miriello create serious close questions which would implicate the effectiveness of the Applicant's Preservice Inspection Pro-
- gram for its Harris reactor.
r
. , ~ - - -
Id. at 2.
It should not be necessary to speculate as to the meaning of a pleading which purports to raise issues for Applicants to address in a proceeding. Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-279, 1 N.R.C. 559, 576 (1975). The mere fact that one must guers as to the con-tention indicates that the CASH Motion fails to set forth an admissible contention which meets the basis with specificity requirements of 10 C.F.R. S 2.714. In the same vein, the mo-tion does not comply with 10 C.F.R. S 2.734(b) (where multiple allegations are involved, the movant must identify with partic-ularity each issue it seeks to litigate and specify the factual and/or technical bases which it believes support the claim that each issue meets the criteria of paragraph (a)).
Applicants proceed, however, assuming that the issue raised is the adequacy of the Inservice Inspection Program.1S 10/ The Miriello allegations about her radiological exposure records already have been found by the Licensing Board not to raise a serious safety concern. Memorandum and Order, supra, at 9 (June 13, 1986). The May 6, 1986 Affidavit of Stephen A.
Browne, on which the Licensing Board relied, is Enclosure 1 hereto. In an affidavit dated September 25, 1986 (Enclosure 3),
Mr. Browne refutes Ms. Miriello's latest elaboration on the same story, as well as her' companion charges about health physics practices at CP&L's Brunswick plant. Clearly no safety issue relevant to this proceeding has been raised. The assertion that Ms. Miriello cannot obtain her complete record, CASH Motion at 3, certainly does not raise a substantial safety issue. Nor do Applicants understand her claim to be true -- at least to the ex-tent that CP&L has provided Ms. Miriello with her final termina-tion report including the total dose she received during her (Continued next page) e--,, - e.-w- f. ~z - m p ,, n y-e.--
Inservice inspection ("ISI") is a programmed system of planned, repetitive tests, inspections and examinations carried out prior to initial operations and at regular intervals throughout the service life of an operating nuclear plant. Prior to plant operation, pre-service tests and examinations establish a baseline against which to compare the results of subsequent inspections. The ISI program is not designed to confirm the quality of construction. Enclosure 2, 1 6.
Before proceeding with a repetition of the ISI welding inspection allegations in the July 2, 1986 show cause petition, the CASH Motion raises two new variations on Ms. Miriello's theme. First, it is asserted that Ms. Miriello raised the issue of missed steam generator tubes during an eddy current inspection in November 1984. CASH Motion at 4. While it is true that the inspection contractor, Conam, initially failed to inspect a row of steam generator tubes, Conam identified and corrected the oversight pursuant to procedures CP&L imposed which required Conam to ensure that a record existed for every tube. If Conam had failed to identify the oversight, it would have been easily discovered and corrected upon CP&L's review of (Continued) employment with CP&L. See Attacament C to Enclosure 1. Appli-cants do not understand the reference to material false state-ments of fact or the disclosure of confidential information.
CASH Motion at 3. In addition, all of these Miriello radiation claims are before the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, who is considering the July 2, 1986 show cause petition.
the eddy current tapes.11# Enclosure 4 (Affidavit of Thomas W.
Brombach, September 25, 1986), 1 6. Thus, no safety issue ex-ists.
Second, it is asserted that in July-August, 1984, 10 to 20 welds were cut out and reworked, after ISI inspections were performed and without a subsequent reinspection. CASH Motion at 4. During the summer of 1984, with the initiation of the pre-service inspection program, it had become apparent that some welds were being re-worked after pre-service inspection.
Mr. Brombach therefore asked Ms. Miriello to investigate that possibility. It was then that Ms. Miriello identified, as an-ticipated, several welds that required reinspection. In order to correct this situation, CP&L and its contractors devised a new communications system to ensure that all welds were reinspected after they had been reworked. In any case, all weld changes are documented, and these records are routed to ISI personnel by controlled distribution -- so that ISI would have become aware of the need to reinspect the 10-20 welds.
Enclosure 4, 1 7. Again, no safety issue exists with respect to this assertion.
11/ Nonetheless, when Ms. Miriello raised the issue, CP&L insti-gated a review of the eddy current tapes of the steam generator inspection to ensure that every tube had been inspected. Each tube was properly inspected by Conam. Enclosure 4, 1 6. As part of a stipulation with CCNC during the Licensing Board hearings on the drug use contention, CP&L also contracted with EPRI to con-duct a 5% eddy current tape inspection review. EPRI verified the quality of Conam's inspection. Id.; LBP-86-11, supra, 23 N.R.C. ,
at 319 n.10; Brombach, ff. Tr. 10,077, at 15-21. {
l
' - ~~
. ._ - _ ~ - - - _ . - - _ - - . . - -
Intervenors then proceed to repeat the assertions on ISI inspections and documentation from Ms. Miriello's January 1, 1986 letter to Judge Kelley, and which are raised in the July 2, 1986 show cause petition. CASH Motion at 4-6. These asser-tions were fully refuted in " Applicants' Response to CASH's Show Cause Petition," dated August 15, 1986. See Enclosure 2.
In summary, Ms. Miriello identified a technical discrepancy in the way Nuclear Energy Services 1 ! corrected preliminary data in data sheets. The issue raises no more than an honest dif-ference in the interpretation of a procedural requirement. The information presented by Ms. Miriello does not support the as-sertion that any welds in the safety-related piping at the Harris plant are defective, or that there has been any inten-tional alteration of inspection records. Her allegations have been investigated by the NRC Staff, CP&L's Quality Check Pro-gram, and CP&L ISI personnel, and were found to be without basis. See id.
Intervenors attempt to make a great deal of the fact that I&E Region II inspectors found that the correction of data sheets did not technically follow procedure, and issued a Se-verity Level V notice of violation.12! CASH Motion at 5-10.
12/ NES was retained by CP&L to provide non-destructive examina-tion ("NDE") testing services for pre-service baseline inspec-tions and examinations of safety-related piping at the Harris plant. Enclosure 2, 1 4.
13/ The second Category V notice of violation is unrelated to l Ms. Miriello's allegations, and does not represent a significant j 1
(Continued next page) '
= - . - . _ _ . . . . . - . - _ .
e They fail to relate this violation, however, to the presence of a significant safety issue. IE Report No. 50-400/85-48 makes plain, however, that while the Staff found fault with the method used to correct errors on data sheets, independent inspections of the velds in question by Staff inspectors con-firmed in all cases the correctness of the data as revised.
Enclosure 2, 1 8. Consequently, there is no safety issue asso-ciated with the inspections or with the documentation.1S#
Neither does the mere pendency of an OI investigation es-tablish the existence of a significant safety issue, as the CASH Motion (at 2,3,6,7, 10) repeatedly suggests.
Oystershell Alliance v. NRC, No. 85-1182, slip op. at 12-13 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 9, 1986), affirming Louisiana Power & Licht Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 N.R.C. 1, 5 (1986).
The CASH Motion also fails to meet the requirement that it be accompanied by affidavits "given by competent individuals (Continued) safety issue. See Enclosure 5 (CP&L letter NRC-469, Aug. 14, 1986).
14/ The rewritten data, which was maintained in a separate file, has been reviewed against the final Weld Inspection Data Packages and incorporated with each file. The differences between these records were reviewed, and the final package reflects the baseline condition of the welds. The corrected data sheets have been reviewed and stand as the final QA document for record.
Personnel have been instructed on the proper use of the procedure for revising inspection data. Enclosure 6 (CP&L letter NRC-470, Aug. 14, 1986).
with knowledge of the facts alleged, or by experts in the dis-ciplines appropriate to the issues raised," and that evidence contained in the affidavits be admissible. 10 C.F.R.
S 2.734(b). Ms. Miriello was a Data Controller, whose role was purely administrative. She was not qualified to interpret test data. Enclosure 2, 1 4. The Licensing Board accorded Ms.
I Miriello's testimony on drug use "very little weight," among
- other reasons because at each stage of her involvement (summary disposition affidavit, pre-filed written testimony, oral testi-many) she added new facts and incidents (all historical) to her presentation, wichout a credible explanation for not having raised them previously.1E# LBP-86-ll, supra, 23 N.R.C. at 325-26. Ms. Miriello continues to dribble in allegations to the agency, arising from the same events of a year or more ago.
As one affidavit is rejected, a new one with a slight variation is prepared. Ms. Miriello's incremental presentations strain credulity. In short, her lack of credibility and expertise would render the evidence in support of the CASH Motion inad-4 missible.
Neither does the CASH Motion demonstrate that a materially different result would be reached if the newly proferred evi-dence had been considered initially. The NRC Staff has i
15/ The Licensing Board later found, in a ruling not appealed, that Ms. Miriello would not make a positive contribution to the record in another appearance in this case. Memorandum and Order, supra, at 6 (June 13, 1986).
?
t
, .- a-,,, , -w,--- - - - - - - - - - - , - , - , - - , - , - - - ,,.--a , , - - - , , , - , - - , - - - ,,w- ---<y------
4 .
inspected the Harris ISI program, with Ms. Mirlello's asser-tions in hand, and found only a technical, procedural violation which was corrected eight months ago. There is no basis upon
- which to speculate that the decisions of the Licensing Board or the Appeal Board (issued to date) would differ in any respect if the record were reopened.
3 C. Extent to Which Intervenors Can Contribute to the Development of a Second Record Our case law establishes both the im-portance of this third factor in the evalu-ation of late-filed contentions and the ne-cessity of the moving party to demonstrate that it has special expertise on the sub-jects which it seeks to raise.
Braidwood, supra, CLI-86-8, 23 N.R.C. at 246.
Intervenors attempt to make this showing by asserting that Mr. Eddleman and CCNC have been intervenors for four years, and that CASH has filed several papers with the NRC. CASH Motion at 11. This is irrelevant. To make this showing, a movant "should set out with as much particularity as possible the pre-l cise issues it plans to cover, identify its prospective wit-nesses, and summarize their proprosed testimony." Mississippi Power and Licht Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 N.R.C. 1725, 1730 (1982). This the interve-nors have not done.15/
16/ If Ms. Miriello implicitly is the prospective witness, her lack of credibility and expertise, discussed supra, leaves inter- ,
l venors far short of a capability to contribute to the record. 1 l
i
i D. Extent to Which Admission Would Broaden i
the Issues and Delay the Proceedinq __
All contested issues have been resolved by the Licensing l.
Board, and the proceeding is well into the appellate stage.
Applicants expect to load fuel at the Harris facility in j mid-October. Adjudication of a new contention at this stage would delay license issuance significantly.
Intervenors attempt to discount this factor, and argue in-stead that their untimeliness was caused by external forces.
- CASH Motion at 11-12. While this argument is beside the point, the Licensing Board's observation about a motion filed five months ago is instructive
. . . there remains, we repeat, an obliga-tion on the Intervenor to use his best ef-
! forts to obtain relevant information in a
) timely manner. Specifically, such best ef-forts should include an explanation to the whistleblower that information which might form the basis for a contention must be disclosed promptly or its consideration by the Board may be barred altogether. If that were not the rule, the door would be-open for the whistleblower (possibly with
! the Intervenor's collusion) to sabotage the
'i' licensing process by withholding some alle-gations until the eleventh hour -- an in-l terpretation of events to which the pending j motion is open.
Memorandum and Order, supra, at 4 (June 13, 1986).
I This factor clearly weighs against the intervenors.
i i
i
. ~.- . _ . . .
f' E. Other Lateness Factors i
I Lateness factors (ii) (availability of other means to pro-
- tect petitioners' interest) and (iv) (the extent to which other i
- parties will represent petitioners' interest) are accorded less weight, under established Commission precedent, than the three
- factors just discussed. Braidwood, supra, CLI-86-8, 23 N.R.C.
} at 245; South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer i
l Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 N.R.C. 881, 895 (1981),
3 aff'd sub nom. Fairchild United Action v. NRC, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Applicants would concede factor (iv) to the intervenors, except for the fact that its relevance is questionable in the context of a concluded proceeding.12/
As to factor (ii), other means have already been invoked to protect intervenors' interests. The July 2, 1986 show cause i
petition includes all but two of the Miriello assertions about i
i the ISI program. These matters are still before the Director i
- of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Principles of efficient admin-
- istrative decision-making dictate that the NRC need not launch
! two separate proceedings on the same issues at the same time.
Cf. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-4, 21 N.R.C. 561,
- 12/ As to the Miriello radiation claims, the intervenors have
, already had their " day in court." See Licensing Board Memorandum
! and Order . . . (June 13, 1986), supra.
4 I
l l
-, , - . _ . - - - . _ . - _ - , . _ - , _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ . . . _ - - - - - _ . _ , - _ , , _ . _ - - , . _ ~ . . . .
t 563-64 (1985), cuotino Rockford League of Women Voters v. NRC, 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982). Yet, this is what CASH and Mr. Eddleman have asked the agency to do. Such forum shopping should not be countenanced.
VI. Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, the CASH Motion to re-open the record should be denied.
Respectfully submitted, Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
Wilbert Washington, II j SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 (202) 663-8090 1
Richard E. Jones Dale E. Hollar CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 (919) 836-8161 Counsel for Applicants Dated: September 25, 1986 l
t
G COLKETED Septemb@PC25, 1986
'86 SB) 26 R2 :39 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO4FficE OF 2i m .wr DOCKET!Ng a u ?vir.l.
Si< MK.H BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Applicants' Answer in Oppo-sition to CASH Motion To Reopen the Record," with Enclosures 1 through 6, were served this 25th day of September, 1986, by de-posit in the U.S. mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the par-ties on the attached Service List.
Thomas A. Baxter, P.C.
i
e 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of )
)
- CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Plant) )
SERVICE LIST Thomas S. Moore, Esquire Dr. James H. Carpenter Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Appeal Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 .
Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Charles A. Barth, Esquire Janice E. Moore, Esquire Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy Office of the General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Appeal Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C. 20555 Commission j Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing and Service Section t
Office of the Secretary l Mr. Howard A. Wilber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Licensing Commission Appeal Board Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Daniel F. Read, President Washington, D.C. 20555 CHANGE P.O. Box 2151 James L. Kelley, Esquire Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board John D. Runkle, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conservation Council of Commission North Carolina Washington, D.C. 20555 307 Granville Road Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514 Mr. Glenn O. Bright i Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Richard D. Wilson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 729 Hunter Street
- Commission Apex, North Carolina 27502 j Washington, D.C. 20555 i
e M. Travis Payne, Esquire Edelstein and Payne P.O. Box 12607 Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Richard E. Jones, Esquire Vice President and Senior Counsel Carolina Power & Light Company P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Bradley W. Jones, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marrietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Robert P. Gruber Executive Director i Public Staff - NCUC l
P.O. Box 29520 Raleigh, North Carolina 27262-0520 H. A. Cole, Jr., Esquire Special Deputy Attorney General 200 New Bern Avenue Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 Dr. Linda W. Little Governor's Waste Management Board 513 Albemarle Building 325 North Salisbury Street Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 Mr. Wells Eddleman 812 Yancey Street Durham, North Carolina 27701 Coalition for Alternatives to Shearon Harris (CASH) 604 W. Chapel Hill Street Durham, North Carolina 27701
ENCLOSURE 1 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY )
and NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN ) Docket No. 50-400 OL MUNICIPAL POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power )
Flant) )
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN A. BROWNE County of Wake ) _
) SS.
State of North Carolina )
Stephen A. Browne, being duly sworn according to law, de-poses and says as follows:
- 1. I am employed by Carolina Power & Light Company
("CP&L") at the Shearon Harris Energy & Environmental Center as a Project. Specialist-Health Physics. In this position I am re-sponsible for the technical direction of the personnel dosimetry program for all CP&L nuclear. plants. I testified before the Li" censing Board on November 1, 1984. See "Appli-cants'-Testimony of Stephen A. Browne in Response to Joint Con-tention IV (Thermoluminescent Dosimeters)," ff. Tr. 6407. A description of my professional experience and qualifications is provided in that testimony. I also prepared an affidavit, dated January 4, 1984, which was filed in support of-c, .
WW ' ^ ) l } () c;A } h hPP
a a i 4 Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Interve-nors' Contention IV. R copy of that affidavit is " Attachment
- A",to this affidavit.
- 2. The purpose of this affidavit is to report the re-sults of my review of the Affidavit of Patty S. Miriello, dated April 3, 1986, which has been filed with the Licensing Board in support of " Request by CCNC and Wells Eddleman for Admission of New Contention WB-4 (Falsification of Exposure Records)," dated April 22, 1986. I will first review the fundamental exposure monitoring and record-keeping practices at CP&L. Second, I will present the actual facts concerning Ms. Miriello's expo-sure history. Finally, I will respond to specific statements in Ms. Miriello's affidavit.
- 3. At CP&L nuclear plants, routine personnel monitoring is performed using thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs). The 4
objective of routine monitoring is to assess the cumulative i dose to personnel for official exposure recordkeeping purposes and to ensure that total exposure for individuals is maintained i
1 below the. limits established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion. TLDs are rugged, reliable, and accurate for this purpose and are worn continuously by personnel while working in ra-diologically controlled areas. TLDs are normally processed at 4
a spectfied regular interval, but may be processed at other
' times if necessary, such as when an individual's self-reading
, pocket dosimeter (SRPD) reading is suspect. TLDs and the TLD reading system are subject to an extensive quality control t
F"' i program to ensure the accuracy of dosimetry readings. CP&L is accredited under the National Voluntary Laboratory Accred-itation Program to process personnel dosimeters. Attachment A at 11 3-5; Browne, ff. Tr. 6407, at 4-5.
- 4. SRPDs are used for operational monitoring at CP&L nuclear plants. The objective of operational monitoring is to provide the basis for controlling and minimizing individual ex-posure during the course of working in radiologically con-trolled areas. The SRPD is suited to this purpose primarily because, unlike the TLD, it can be read directly by the worker at any time. However, the inherent design of SRPDs results in a tendency for them to give readings which are higher than the true dose as a result of " drift" and as a result of being -
dropped or bumped. On the average SRPDs give higher readings than TLDs, but TLDs are more accurate. SRPDs are worn in con-junction with TLDs by all personnel working in radiologically controlled areas. SRPD and TLD readings for an individual are ccmpared and significant differences investigated whenever ei-ther device gives a reading above 100 mrem. However, unless there is evidenc'e that the TLD reading is invalid, the TLD reading is used as the official dose even if the SRPD reading is higher. Attachment A at 11 6-8.
S., .{g CP&L, exposure monitoring records are maintained in a computer data base. The data base contains detailed records of each SRPD reading, TLD reading, dose estimate, and whole body count for every individual who is monitored at any
F CP&L nuclear plant. The data base is maintained up-to-date and all official exposure entries are independently verified for completeness and accuracy by a second individual. In fact, at the time of Ms. Miriello's employment all official exposure en-tries were independently verified by two separate individuals from different departments within CP&L at different physical locations. The computer data base is used to generate various official exposure reports. In addition to the computer data base, CP&L maintains individual exposure history files for every individual monitored. These files contain all original source documents relevant to the individual's exposure history at CP&L. Attachment A at 1 9. .
- 6. The following is a summary of Ms. Miriello's short exposure history at CP&L, based on official records and docu- ,
ments. Each line of the table represents a different TLD badge.
Official Dose Summary TLD Dose (mrem)
Location Period Whole Body Skin Harris 6/13/85 - 6/28/85 0 0' 6/29/85 - 8/02/85 0 0 8/02/85 - 8/30/85 0 0 Brunswick 8/05/85 - 8/09/85 29 33 8/09/85 - 8/30/85 0 0 Total 29 33
- 7. Ms. Miriello's brief exposure history at CP&L is unremarkable except for one unusual SRPD reading on August 9 at Brunswick, which was investigated and documented. On that
I occasion her SRPD read higher than expected based on the dose rates in the work area and the amount of time spent in the area. Her TLD was promptly read to confirm whether or not the SRPD reading of 360 mrem was valid. The TLD reading was 29 mrem. The TLD reading was accepted as the official dose for the monitoring period for the following reasons:
A. SRPDs are prone to false high readings, espe-cially when bumped.
B. The TLD and SRPD were worn together at all times, as Ms. Miriello verified in her affidavit, there-fore, in the absence of any defect in the TLD or abnormal-ity during processing, the TLD should accurately reflect the true dose.
C. There was no defect in the TLD based on the re-sults of subsequent testing, and no abnormality during
, processing based on the consistency in the results of the four independent TLD element readings for her TLD badge and on the results of TLD reader checks performed on the day her TLD was read.
D. The exposure of one co-worker working in the same area was 5 mrem.
Two reports of exposure received were provided to Ms.
8.
MirielT6.' Only one of these reports is addressed in the Miriello Affidavit. A brief explanation of each report fol-lows.
- i
' j r
- 9. At Ms. Miriello's request, a summary of her CP&L dose was prepared and forwarded to her on August 20, 1985 (this is I
the report referred to in her affidavit). See Attachment B.
l The report only covered the period of time from February 25, 1985 through August 9, 1985, since at the time of her request her employment with CP&L had not terminated, and two TLDs which had been assigned to her (one at Brunswick and one at Harris) had not yet been processed. These last two TLDs were not pro-cessed until August 30, 1985, which was her official termina-tion date. The report contains the correct total dose, but .
through an inadvertent clerical error the doses for the second and third periods of time shown on the report were switched.
The report should show a dose of 0 mrem for the whole body and 0 mrem for the skin during the period from April 1, 1985 to June 30, 1985, and should show a dose of 29 mrem for the whole
! body and 33 mrem for the skin during the period from July 1, 1985 through August 9, 1985. The periods of time shown on this i
report are not intended to correspond to actual monitoring pe-riods, but rather represent each calendar quarter or portion
! thereof during which Ms. Miriello was empicyed by CP&L. The l
report is formated in this fashion so that the cumulative dose for each calendar quarter can be reported for purposes of de-monstrating-compliance with the quarterly dose standards estab-lished by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Other than the clerical error which resulted in the doses being corresponded with the wrong dates, this report was a complete and accurate
~- c representation of the total dose received at CP&L for TLD badges processed from February 25, 1985 through August 9, 1985.
- 10. On September 10, 1985, a final termination report was forwarded to Ms. Miriello (no reference was made to this report in her affidavit). See Attachment C. This report covered her entire period of employment from February 25, 1985 through August 30, 1985, and was generated directly by the computer system, so no clerical errors occurred. (The previous report was generated manually using data retrieved from the computer system.) In this report the total dose by location is shown for each of the following periods: (1) the entire period of euployment, (2) the latest calendar quarter, and (3) the latest s
calendar year. The dose for individual monitoring periods at
, each plant is not shown. This report includes the results of the last two TLDs which were not included in the previous report, although there is no difference in the total dose re-ported since both of the TLDs read 0 mrem. This report is a I
! complete and accurate representation of the total dose received I
by Ms. Miriello during her employment at CP&L. A copy of this
- report was forwarded to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as to Ms. Miriello, as required by regulation.
- 11. Ms. Miriello states: "The radiation exposure of 0 mrem or no-dose which CP&L provided as official is not only l
. false, it appears and I believe it to be the result of record tampering and destruction with malice by CP&L." Miriello Affi-davit, 1 2. This statement is incorrect, since.the report l
t .
i l
referred to by Ms. Miriello in her affidavit clearly indicates a total official dose of 29 mrem for the whole body, not 0 mrem. While Ms. Miriello may.not agree with the dose she was assigned during work at the Brunswick Plant, she was fully in-formed and aware of the dose assigned, and acknowledged such by signing the Personnel Exposure Investigation form for that in-cident. See Attachment D. No evidence of tampering with her records has been presented.
- 12. Ms. Miriello states: "I was fortunate enough to carry two survey meters and I was accompanied by another technician; therefore, I know what my exposure was, but many employees of CP&L will never know." Miriello Affidavit, 1 3. The fact that Ms. Miriello carried a survey meter does not mean she was abli to ascertain what exposure she actually received by her own measurements. A survey meter registers the instantaneous dose rate at a particular location and time, not the cumulative dose, like a TLD or SRPD. Since dose rates vary with both lo-cation and time in a nuclear plant, it would be very difficult for her to estimate her dose accurately. In any case, she ' pro-vides no specific information in her affidavit about any mea-surements she made with the instruments which would support a claim that the TLD reading was not accurate.
~
- 13. 'EIs. Miriello states: "I estimate the missing dose or actual dose to be from 400 to several thousand mrem which I had .
received while working for CP&L in the time period indicated."
Miriello Affidavit, 3 5. The " missing" dose for the period l
l l
July 1, 1985 to August 9, 1985 was inadvertently reported under the wrong time period on the first report provided to Ms.
Miriello, as explained previously. The subsequently provided official termination report was complete and accurate. The 400 f
mrem referred to represents the SRPD readings, including the high reading of 360 mrem, obtained during the period of August 5, 1985 through August 9, 1985 at Brunswick. The corre-spending TLD reading which was used as the official dose for this time period was 29 mrem. The dose that Ms. Miriello calls
" missing" is the unofficial dose from the SRPD readings; but SRPD dose is not used as official dose unless the TLD reading is unavailable or unreliable. In this case the TLD was avail-able and considered reliable. With regard to the possibility '
of several thousand mrem of dose being " missing" from her record, Ms. Miriello has presented no information which could pcssibly account for such a large exposure during any of her monitoring periods.
- 14. Ms. Miriello states: "The point is that: 61 mrem plus at least 400 mrem which I saw on the SRPD are missing f rom my dose records." Miriello Affidavit, T5 (p. 3). Again, this statement refers to unofficial SRPD dose which was not "miss-l ing", but which was superceded by the TLD reading which was used as'the official dose.
- 15. Ms. Miriello states: "The second TLD that I was given at BSEP must be read and that reading should have been added to my dose. It appears that this TLD reading is missing from my
F dose records." Miriello Affidavit, T5 (p. 3). As previously explained, the second TLD at Brunswick had not been read at the time the first report was issued to Ms. Miriello, but was read and the results (0 mrem) were included in the final termination report issued to Ms. Miriello on September 10, 1985.
- 16. Ms. Miriello states: "Even though the dose access card shows that no dose was accumulated on the second SRPD which I made an entry with on August 9, 1985 (the last entry on the card) the TLD is more sensitive than an SRPD and it would probably show some dose." Miriello Affidavit, 15 (p. 3). If a SRPD indicates a dose of 0 mrem, it is highly unlikely that the TLD would indicate any dose, since the SRPDs normally read ,
higher than TLDs as previously explained. Further, the TLD is not significantly more sensitive than the SRPD to gamma radia-tion, although it is more accurate.
- 17. Ms. Miriello states: "A third TLD reading also ap-pears to be missing from my dose records." Miriello Affidavit, 1 5 (p. 3). This refers to the last TLD issued at the Harris Plant. As previously explained, this TLD was not read until August 30, 1985 and was not included in the report issued to Ms. Miriello on August 20, 1985. The dose from this TLD (0 mrem) was included in the official termination report issued on Septemb r 10, 1985. Further, the zero readings at Harris are consistent with our experience with other workers involved in the areas in which Ms. Miriello worked.
1
- 18. In conclusion, the primary allegation of Ms.
Miriello's affidavit is that records of her radiation exposure while employed by CP&L were falsified to reflect less dose than she actually received. The allegation is based on two beliefs:
first, that her SRPD reading was a more accurate reflection of her true dose than her TLD reading during one exposure period at the Brunswick Plant, and second, that several TLD readings were not entered into her records at the Brunswick Plant and the Harris Plant as evidenced by a written report she received from CP&L. Based upon the facts presented above, I conclude that both beliefs are false, and that there is no basis in fact for the Contention WB-4.
Und S'tephen A. Browne Subscribed and sworn to before me This Lei day of /Eg 1986.
( .
kA 0. Y N $ fry Public
-.. -- , j My Commission Expires 9/,9p/9/).
/ /
~
l l
l
\
l i
l ATGCIMCE A l
UNITED STATES OF AMER:0A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM:SSICN BEFORE ~~4E ATOMIC SAFETY AND *.! CENSING SCARD ;
In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA PCWER & L:CET COMPANY ) Cocket Nos. 50-400 CL AND NORTH CAROL:NA EASTERN MUNIC ?AL ) 50-401 CL PCWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN A. BROWNE County of Wake )
) SS:
State of North Carolina )
Stephen A. Browne, being duly sworn according to law, de-poses and says as follows:
- 1. I am employed by Carolina Power & Light Company
("CP&L") as a Project Specialist - Health Physics. In this po-sition I am. responsible for the technical direction of the per-sonnel dosimetry program for all CP&L nuclear plants. My business address is: Shearon Harris Energy & Environmental Center, Route 1, Box 327, New Hill, North Carolina 27562. A summary-of-my professional experience and qualifications is contained in Attachment A to this affidavit. For the last eight years I have been directly involved with the supervision and direction of dosimetry programs using themmoluminescent 9 4nti in l' 3 -
upp -
desi=eter (TLD) systems manufactured by Marshaw, Te'edyne and.
Panasonic, which are the major manufacturers of TLD systems used in the United States today. Recently I have been asked by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) to consult as a technical expert in assessing and evaluating personnel radia-tien dosimetry processors under the National Voluntary Labora-tory Accreditation Program. I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and I make this affidavit in support of Applicants' Motion for Summary Disposition of Joint Interve-nors' Contention IV.
- 2. In this affidavit I will discuss the issues of TLD accuracy and real-time monitoring capability. I will describe
~
the major elements of Applicants' exposure control and person nel dosimetry systems and show how together they provid,e accurate and timely information to assure worker safety and health. I will discuss certain fundamental dosimetry princi-pies and concepts and point out how they relate to the Joint Intervanors' contention and responses to interrogatories. I will relate Applicants' proposed programs to applicable regula-tory requirements, standards, the state-of-the-art, and accept-ed practice in the nuclear power industry. Finally, I will show why the Joint Intervenors' recommendation to use portable pressutized_lonization monitors to corroborate TLD readings is not practical.
- 3. When a worker is exposed to a radiation field there l
is a complex relationship between the source of radiation and l
the dose received by the individual at a specific point in the body. Some of the factors involved include the type and energy of the radiation, variation of the dose rate in the work area with location and time, and the orientation, movement, and time spent by the individual in the work area. Since it is not pos-sible directly to measure absorbed dose in tissue, dosimeters are placed on the surface of the body to estimate the dose received. Many different types of dosimeters are available for individual monitoring, including film, TLDs, and Self-Reading Focket Dosimeters (SRPDs). Many~ factors must be weighed in selecting the type of dosimeter for a particular application.
Each' type has certain advantages and is suitable for certain
~
types of monitoring.
- 4. At CP&L's nuclear plants, routine monitoring is performed using TLDs. The objective of routine monitoring is to assess the cumulative dose to individuals for official expo-sure recordkeeping purposes. TLDs are nearly ideal for routine monitoring because they are rugged, reliable, accurate, and sensitive. TLDs are capable of measuring the dose from the ,
types and energie's of radiation which represent significant
- external exposure hazards in nuclear power plants. For beta radiation, the_TLDs proposed for SENPP are capable of measuring dose over the energy range from about 0.1 to 2.3 MeV. Betas below 0.1 MeV are too weak to be a significant external hatard, while betas above 2.3 MeV are very rare. For gamma radiation, the TLDs have a usable energy range from about 40 kev to 7 Mev. l l
l 1
I Gammas above this range are rare and gammas below this range contribute relatively little to the total dose. The TLD also can be used for neutron monitoring with appropriate calibration. Other types of dosimeters have disadvantages which make them less well suited for routine monitoring. Film is more susceptible to temperature and humidity extremes which are prevalent conditions in nuclear power plants, thus increasing the risk of invalid results. Film is also vary en-ergy dependent in its response to radiation. SRPDs are knocked off-scale very easily by dropping or bumping them and are in-sensitive to beta radiation. Pressurized ionization chambers, suggested by the Join Intervenors as an appropriate monitoring device, cannot be used for individual monitoring, since it is impractical for them to be worn or carried by individuals.
Overall, TLDs are clearly superior and were therefore chosen for use as the dosimeters of record for the Shearon Harris Nu-J clear Power Plant (SENPP).
- 5. TLDs are worn continuously by individuals while working in the radiologically controlled areas of nuclear power plants and are processed to obtain official dose readings at regular intervals, normally monthly. More frequent processing is possible and sometimes performed under special circumstancas , such as when an SRPD is lost or goes off-scale.
Extensive quality control measures are applied to the processing of TLDs and recording of individual dose to ensure accuracy. Some of the major controls are: (1) semi-annual
_4
l l
calibration of TLDs and associated processing equipment to standards traceable to M3S; (2) daily calibration checks to as-sure constancy in the operation of equipment; (3) formal training and qualification of operating personnel; (4) formal review of all records and data; and (5) participation in periodic personnel dosimetry intercomparison studies. As part of the overall quality control effort, CP&L has applied for ac-creditation of its dosimetry laboratory under the recently announced Dosimetry Processor Laboratory Accreditation Program administered by the N35.
- 6. At CP&L's nuclear plants, operational monitoring is performed using SRPDs. The objective of operational monitoring is to provide the. basis for immediate actions and decisions by '
the worker in order to control and minimize personal exposure.
The SRPD is well-suited to this purpose because it is small, rugged, and easily read. The TLD is actually more accurate and reliable than the SRPD, but it cannot be read by the worker.
For operational monitoring, frequent reading of the dosimeter is necessary, therefore ease of reading by the worker himseld is more important than the accuracy of the dose measurement.
Because of their physical construction and principles of operation, SRPDs inherently tend to respond higher than the actual _ dose in normal use. This provides a built-in conserva-tism which is beneficial from an exposure control standpoint.
- 7. SRPDs are worn by individuals while performing certain tasks or while working in certain areas where J
significant radiation exposure is possible and are read at varying intervals by the worker. As discussed in Applicants' FSAR at 12.5.3.6.1.1; SRPDs will be used at SEMPP for specific job exposure evaluation and to indicate current individual ex-posure status. Although SRPDs are only useful for gamma radia-tion, they will provide workers with adequate real-time moni-toring, since the majority of individual dose comes from gamma exposure. In cases where significant beta exposure is possi-ble, beta-sensitive survey instruments are used to establish beta dose rates for exposure control purposes and TLDs are used to determine the dose of record. The quality control for SRPDs includes semi-annual calibration to ensure exposure response, charging operation, and charge leakage are within established specifications. The use of SRPDs assures that workers will have adequate real-time monitoring capability which will allow prompt decisions and actions to avoid unnecessary exposure.
- 8. Although TLDs and SRPDs are used primarily in sepa-rate and distinct roles for dose assessment and exposure control respectively, they are also used in auxiliary roles as backup for one another. For example, if a worker loses his TLD, his SRPD can be used to estimate his dose during the period for ofricial record purposes with only slightly less ac-curacy-- Orr if a worker's SRPD goes off-scale as a result of being dropped, the TLD can be processed immediately instead of l
~
at the end of the month, and used to update the individual's exposure control records. Also, the results of both SRPD and
- LD readings for individuals who receive significant dose are compared and differences above designated control levels are investigated. This check serves to detect gross problems with the monitoring devices, the methods of use, or the records of dose.
- 9. CPSL maintains a computer-based dosimetry record keeping system in which complete dose history data is maintained for every individual who is monitored. When a TLD is first issued to an individual a record is created on the computer. Initially, the individual's prior dose history is obtained from previous empicyers and is entered into the com-puter record. Based on the applicable administrative limits and prior dose history, the computer automatically calculates -
the dose, known as available dose, which the individual may receive without exceeding the limits. Each time the individual's SRPD is read, the dose is entered into the com-puter system and a new available dose is calcu.ated. At this point, the dose total is unofficial because it is based on SRFD readings. Normally, an individual's SRFD will be read several times and the computer record updated accordingly before the individual's TLD is read. The SRPD readings provide the interim dose status between TLD readings. When the TLD is read, which_is at least monthly, the dose is entered into the computer record replacing the SRPD readings for the exposure period and the new, official dose total is calculated. Because the computer system allows on-line, real-time updating of 1
l l
l records, the individual's current dose status is always
- = mediately available. The net effect is that the readings from the TLDs and the SRPDs are maintained in the record-keeping system both as separate readings and in combination such that at any point in time the total accumulated dose for an individual is known based on the latest TLD reading, plus any SRPD readings which have been made since the TLD was last {
read. Through this record-keeping system the needs for l accurate official dose totals and up-to-date exposure control l
status for each individual can be satisfied effectively.
- 10. The use of TLDs for personnel monitoring is generally accepted as the state-of-the-art technique. Over the past few years the use of TLD badges has steadily increased, while the use of film badges has decreased. CP&L has used TLDs success-fully for eight years to monitor personnel at its operating nu-clear plants. During this time the NRC has always accepted the ,
results of TLD badges as complying with the occupational expo-sure monitoring requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 20. Many nucle-ar power plants and other organizations use TLDs for personnel monitoring. During a two year study conducted by the Universi-ty of Michigan for the NRC, approximately two-thirds of the dosimeters submitted for testing by fifty-nine processing orga-nizations.ot-all types were TLD badges. Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-1063 (January 1980); Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Final Report of Two Year Pilot Study October 1977 -
i
Seetember 1979, NUREG/CR-1064 (January 1980); Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Su= elementary Recort of Two Year Pilot Study October 1977 - December 1979, NUREG/CR-1304 (January 1980); Performance Testing of Personnel Oosimetry Study - Alternative and Recommendation for Personnel Desimetry Testing Program, NUREG/CR-1593 (August 1980);
Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Study - Final Recort test 3, NUREG/CR-2891 (February 1983); Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Revised Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-2892 (February 1983).
- 11. At the present time Applicants intend to use TLDs f manufactured by Panasonic Company at SENPP as the official dosimeter of record. These TLDs have been tested and found to '
meet the performance specifications of ANSI N13.11-1983 for photons and betas. The testing was conducted at the University of Michigan by Dr. Phil Plato as part of a study sponsored by the NRC. During the study the dosimeters were irradiated to a variety of radiation sources whose calibrations were verified by NBS. The methods used during this study are documented by Performance Testing of Personnel Desimetry Services - Revised Procedures Manual, NUREG/CR-2892 (February 1983 ) and the I
results of testing are documented in Performance Testing of Personn=1 naaimetry Study - Final Recort Test 3, NUREG/CR-2891 (February 1983). In these reports CP&L is listed as processor number 187. This study demonstrates that the TLDs proposed for SHNPP meet the accuracy requirements which have been endorsed by the national consensus standard of ANSI and recommended by the international community of radiation p ctection and mea-surement authorities as appropriate to ensure the safety and health of workers.
- 12. In making their allegation that TLOs are Oco inaccu-rate to assure worker safety and health, the Joint Intervenors have been very vague, in light of the complexities in measuring radiation dose described above, about either the nature or mag-nitude of the inaccuracies about which they are concerned. In response to various interrogatories, the Joint Intervenors have cited inaccuracies for TLDs of 20, 30, and 50 percent without supplying specific technical references or specifying the conditions of exposure, such as radiation type, energy, dosimeter design, and irradiation geometry. Because,of the lack of any detailed information, it is difficult to understand or address the Joint Intervenors' concerns.
- 13. The International Commission on Radiation Units and
. Measurements (ICRU), the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), and the National Council for Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) have addressed the issue of accuracy for individual monitoring and published rec-
! cmmendations -in ICRU Report 20, ICRP Report 12 and NCRP Report I i
- 57. These_ organizations are considered to be authorities in the field of radiation protection and measurements and their recommendations are the basis for radiation protection practice and regulations in countries throughout the world. In general, l
they recommend greater accuracy at high (ace dent) dose levels than at levels below the maximum permissible levels. Disre-garding dose level, their recommendations f r accuracy range from within 20 to within 90 percent. Secause of the low risk at low dose levels these authorities recommend that individual monitoring is not needed at doses less than 25 to 30 percent of the msnimum permissible dose level. NRC regulations follow these recommendations and 10 C.F.R. $ 20.202 states that per-sonnel monitoring is not required for doses less than 25 percent of the quarterly dose' limit. According to ICRU Report 20, the maximum permissible dose levels have been set so con-servatively that great accuracy in dose measurement is not con-sidered necessary.
- 14. The current standard for testing the performance of dosimetry processes, ANSI N13.11-1983, specifies tolerance levels which are a compromise between the various recommenda-tions previously mentioned and the limitations of available measurement techniques determined through the series of tests conducted at the University of Michigan involving many .
~
dosimetry processors. In this standard, ANSI set the tolerance l level at 50 percent for doses from 0.03 to 10 rem and at 30 percent for doses from 10 to 500 rem. It should be noted that the ANSI.per.formance criteria specify that for a series of
]
dosimeter measurements the sum of the average absolute bias (accuracy) plus the standard deviation must be less than the specified tolerance level. The average absolute bias is a 1
~
l I
i measure of the deviation of the average measured dose from the l true dose, while the standard deviation is a measure of the variation or spread of the individual dosimeter measurements about the average measured dese. Since a series of dosimeter measurements normally contains a certain amount of statisti-cally random variability about the average value, the bias ac-tually must be better than 50 percent in the normal (non-accident) dose range to meet the standard. To illustrate, if the percent standard deviation for a series of measurements is 10 percent, then the bias or accuracy must be better than 40 percent to pass the combined criteria of 50 percent. Since all of the values for the accuracy of TLDs mentioned by the Joint
~
Intervenors fall within the tolerance levels established by ANSI N13.11-1983, it is not clear on what basis the Joint In-tervenors claim that TLDs are not accurate enough. The ANSI standard will be used as the basis for testing dosimetry pro-cessors under the recently announced dosimetry processor ac-creditation program'which will be administered by the NBS and
)
l as such it appears to be the best available standard for com.-
parison.
- 15. The Joint Intervenors also contend that TLDs lack j real-time monstoring capability. The pertinence of real-time
- monitoting capability for the dosimeter of record is not clear.
It appears that the Joint Intervenors do not understand the re-lationship between the different types of monitoring performed, routine and operational, and the types of dosimeters used, TLDs l
l l I e
j 1
and SRPDs. As discussed above, the purpose of routine l monitoring is the assessment of individual dose for official exposure records, while the purpose of operational monitoring is the control of exposure to the individual. The two functions are closely related, yet distinct. Separate dosimeters are normally used for each purpose. The TLD is used for routine monitoring and the SRPD is used for operational
=enitoring. For exposure control purposes, real-time moni-toring capability is important because it provides the basis for immediate decisions and actions to minimize individual ex-posure. For official record purposes, accuracy and reliability are more important than timeliness. This is manifest in the fact that TLDs are normally only read monthly. Real-time moni-toring capability is not needed in TLDs, but SRPDs do provide this capability more than adequately to ensure the safety and health of the workers.
- 16. Finally, the Joint Intervenors recommend that porta-ble pressurized ionization monitors be used to corroborate TLD readings. In response to interrogatories served by Applicants and the Staff, the Joint Intervenors amplified upon this recem-mandation to include real-time recording equipment as part of the proposed monitoring equipment configuration. " Joint Inter-venors LResponse to Applicants' Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to Joint Intervenors (First Set),"
dated March 29, 1983, at 6; " Joint Intervenors' Response to i
Staff Interrogatories," dated August 31, 1983, at 5-6. The
Join Intervenors stated that such equipment should be located near work stations and that accumulated dose could be obtained through computation f cm the output of the real-time recording equipment with greater accuracy than TLDs worn on the body by workers. Id. at 5-6.
- 17. What the Joint Intervenors actually have proposed is a work area monitoring system, rather than a personnel moni-toring system. The equipment proposed by the Joint Interve-nors, although technically portable, is designed to be used in a stationary position. The equipment cannot be carried or worn by the worker and the results it provides will not represent or correspond to the dose of any individual. The results from any off-the-body instrument, regardless of its inherent accuracy, are subject to many variables and inaccuracies which can only be reasonably accounted.for by an on-the-body device. These i
variables are discussed below:
A. Soatial variations in the excesure rate within the work area: Order of magnitude variations are common between various points in a single work area at a nuclear -
. plant. In fact the radiation fields are often so non-uniform that the dose to one part of the individual's body may dif fer significantly from the dose to another part (e.g. head compared to chest). Such dif-forences are of ten unpredictable and neces-sitate the wearing of multiple dosimeters on various parts of the body. The highes
-- desimeter reading is selected as the dose
-of record. An off-the-body monitoring de-vice would not be able to assess the dose to different parts of the body simulta- .
neously, nor would a stationary monitor be able to assess the dose rate at multiple locations within the work area where different individuals might be working simultaneously.
1
- 3. The movement of the worker within the work area: Such movement will cause the worker to be exposed to varying dose rates during i the time he is working in an area because I
of the non-uniformity of radiation fields. '
Even the difference between standing or kneeling may be significant to the dose l received by the individual. A stationary, off-the-body monitoring device cannot l account for the movement or position of the ;
individual.
C. The variation of the radiation field as a function of time: In a nuclear plant the radiation fields are constantly changing and fluctuating as a function of the operating conditions. Often the work being performed affects the radiation field as shielding is installed or removed and as contaminated equipment, parts, or waste are moved about. Even the most accurate surveys of an area with portable monitoring equipment are of only transitory value be-cause of changing radiation fields. A sta-tionary monitor with a real-time recorder would o'nly monitor the changes at one point in an area.
D. The variable time scent by workers in radiation fields: A worker spends a certain amount of time in one work area and then proceeds to other areas. The amount of dose received is a function of the expo-sure time in each area. Different workers will spend different amounts of time in the same or different areas. With a stationary monitoring system a worker's exposure would .
be extremely difficult to assess since it would require a precise knowledge of each area entered and the time spent in each ;
area and a complex series of computations for the dose received in each area. Such an approach would still fall far short of l individual monitoring by TLDs in terms of l
.overall accuracy.
- 18. As a result of these variables the dose to a worker will be a complex function of his position, orientation, move-ment, and time in the radiation field, as well as a function of
any changes in the field itself during the period of exposure to the worker. Each individual worker will be subject to a unique combination of these variables, so that the final doses received under apparently similar conditions may be signifi-cantly different. It would be impossible for the system pro-posed by the Joint Intervenors to account for these variables and corroborate the accuracy of the dose measured by TLDs worn by the worker.
- 19. In addition, the "real-time" monitoring aspect of the Joint Intervenors' proposed system for corroborating TfD mea-surement is unrealistic. Since the output of the pressurized ionization monitors will be a dose rate, computations will be required to assess individual integrated doses. The time period for integration will be different for each individual who enters a given area and will require separate computation.
Likewise, the dose rate in each area which an individual may enter will be different and will require separate computation.
To calculate the total dose for an individual will require an exact knowledge of each area entered, the time of entry, the' time of exit and the integrated dose in each area over the specific time intervals spent in each area. In fact, the com-putations required would be so complex and time-consuming that they coEld' Hot be accomplished by any feasible means on a "real-time" basis.
- 20. .Although pressurized ionization monitors are not suitable for the use proposed by the Joint Inte rvenors, CP&L
(
1 does use such equipment for other more appropriate purposes.
For example, in environmental monitoring the pressurized ion-ization monitors are used effectively because of their accuracy and sensitivity at very low dose levels. In addition, the dose rates in the environment are relatively uniform and constant compared to the dose rates in work areas; therefore, a station-ary monitor is acceptable.
- 21. In summary, with respect to accuracy, the TLDs proposed by Applicants for use at SENPP are adequate and meet applicable standards. The standards themselves are reasonable, considering the state of current measurement technology and the conservatism of radiation dose limits. With respect to real-time monitoring capability, SRPD's which can be read by the individual will be' used for this purpose. The primary purpose of TLDs is to assess the cumulative dose of individuals for official records, not for real-time monitoring. Finally, with respect to the Joint Inter-venors' proposal for corroborating TLD measurements, the use I
e l
l l
--- -- l
i I
of portable pressurized ionizacion monitors with real-time recording equip::ent is completely impractical.
~
Stephen A. Browne Subscribed and sworn to before me this Vb day of . . - -- 1984
/ ('
A4 cary LA J.Public My Commission Expires 9!Jf!1T
/ /
G 0
9 m
68 *h 18 -
4 ATTACHMENT A Stephen A. Browne Harris Energy & Environmental Center Carolina Power & Light Company 27562 New Hill, North Carolina Education and Training S.S. degree in Physics, Union College (1971)
M.S. degree in Environmental Health Engineering, Northwestern University (1974)
Professional Societies Health Physics Society Experience A. 1972 to 1974 - Radiation Safety Officer, Packard Instrument Company, Downers Grove, Ill.
B. 1974 to September 1978 - Health Physicist, General Electric Company, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Windsor, Conn.
September 1978 to April 1979 - Lead Engineer, General Electric Company, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, Windsor, Conn.
C. April 1979 to October 1981 - Senior Specialist - Desimetry, CaroI1na Power & Light Company, New Hill, N.C.
~' October 1981 to present - Project Specialist - Health Physics, Carolina Power & Light Company, New Hill, N.C.
i
ATUGEE 3 Carolina Power & Light Company Shearon Harris Energy & Envtronmental Center Route 1, Box 327 New Hill, Nceth Carolina 27562 August 20, 1985 Ms. Patty S. Miriello P.O. Box 20071 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611
Dear Sir:
The following exposure information is provided for your records:
Names Miriello, Patty S. Social Security No. 228-46-0985 Period of Employment at CP&L: from 02/25/85 to 08/09/85 I. Radiation Exposure Information in REMS Extremity ERClGd Wh9lt E9dX EhiQ WEERC QC LEMRC 02/25/85 to 03/31/95 0.000 0.000 N/M-04/01/95 to 06/30/85 0.029 0.033 N/M 97/01/85 to 08/09/85 0.000 0.000 N/M Total: 0.029 0.033 N/M II. Whole Body Counting and/or Bioassay Information A. No whole body count or bicassay was perf ormed.
B. X Whole body count and/or bicassay was performed and the results indicated no significant activity.
III. This report is furnished to you under the provisions'of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation 10CFR, Part 19.
You should preserve this report for further reference.
N/M - not monitored
___ ____ I'3_ _
- - - - - S. W. Cros11n Technical Specialist Health Physics Form ERC-032 2/85 l
ANc2T.T C Carolina 7:ver I !.ight d epast SIEtC loute 1, lor 327 Ionlill,porthCarolina27562 85/09/10 :
Social Seculty to inff!$III!!LLS 20446-0145 F.O.40118471 InLLIII IC27611
$nJttf: Radiation tiposere forsination Aegert Dest II. IllitLL0t nis is to infore ros of the results of radiatics esposere sesitorig durin roer N9 1 s!sett/ Visit at Carolina Enter I $ilht U SDaar free 85/02/25to15/08/10.
EIftI845 IIM$IN Onft Period CP&L Ones (ree)
Free to Location Ibele W Y Skin Isais feet tapleteest/ visit 15/02/1515/01/10IrusEctPlant 1.021 0.033 Barrist6tCentar RobiasesPlant larrisPlant 0.000 0.000 CF&Lfatals 0.019 0.033 __
Latest harter 15/06/19 15/08/34 lesassick Plant 0.0!! 0.033 Istrist&tCenter totissesflast Istrisflast 0.000 0.000 CF6Lfatals 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.033 tatsstIsar 15/01/01 85/08/10 Irsassict Plant Barrist6tCenter Robissesflaat ,
larrisPlant 0.000 0.000 CFnLfetals 0.021 0.033 IIftBILLEDOSOtt0&ft .
folloeingistheeastressetbedtenestdata,takesos85/08/0508:45:
leslide Orged Insecuries % of Int loclide organ lasecuties % of IFBB fatal %IFil .0 nis report is funished to roe seder the provision of the inclear legelatory Coseission regulation 10CFt 19. Ice shoeld preserve this report for farther reference. Future esplayers est require this inforestice.
forftrulyroers, Copies to ( ) Individul
()ItC a/7 {.))(ji%/b A.Sc')',t.,)I
()iIEIC $.I.Croslia fechnicalSpecialist lesittFtsics Y
AT&C.TTI D
- v i:m _
~ ~~
q
.,, 4,;* -
g P ERSONNEL E)6'OStJt E I WWE S TIG TION L
w 26 --
f 1 PER50MnEL (MTA SAW M MO iiN dO[--@p- b J5i -ea5T wi 3EO. 3 C GE b d 0 $ $ : P..CYE4 b h I" EG. 3i:i:0a [IddM_
m, ;a
" hIs c.6
< ;a i1 DESQttPTION OF GCCURftEM:E 4EASCN: '.cS T t i c4waGEg i i -ic,. y A.NCaunt ECN t c: SCALE i C Ev ICE: TLJ i i S@ 0 I TLOR EAIAL NO. (/4 /7 9 CiATE/wE OF CCC#iaCEP!9/26 '
C P"' 3 d i r i soi v i Cuat a A S 4)RK I NG LNOEA AN M . Uvf M NO. h (CD // ! NA 1 '
- st.:;; LATED OCSE: (a0AK *EEA OCSE 4 ATE: x (riwE iw aaEA) =- usEu/wA) xf -R : . e4 i s, A R EM Aiu t: /). %A u % dmnd V V V
./ //
lli. A551(MD 005188ETRY RESULTS IV. ODGt PER$000sEL ( Ag Ag3 Igggtg)
FOR ASSIGNED TLD CR Smo OEVICES, SCA OB ERS 4RKING IN SAuf AAE A, Sm0w OOSE INFORMAfl0N:
5-Os DOSE iP#Cas ATICN:
OCSE(wA EM ) OCSE (wAEM)
TL') d 3*08 TLD S@ 0 ' 57 0 " ?LC 55 0 C 416.3 G 3W77 ZLJ 4'. D D C %
M U G S 9
'JAL UAL
.AR UAa LL LL RL at uEL ML utM da LEL LEL LER Lia V. 00$leIETRY DEVICES YES N0 TLD mEMOVED FRod SE*v lCE t if t T NEW TLD ASSIGNED IA I I iF YES, SEQi AL NO.: O d 963 )
TL3 TO BE TESTED I i 1
$50 REMOVED FA04 SEAVICE I i 1
$@ 0 TO SE TESTED .
II I i 11 F1 ACTIOt I Yi NO DOSE ASSIGMsENT. NCR*AL TL3 AEAOINGS ACCP TED 1 1 COSE ASSIGNED BASED ON THIS INVESTIGil0N ANO ENTERED IN AluS:
d*0LE BOOY Gae8A/ BETA WREM wHCLE 800Y NEUTRON wAEM (PoEA Ex~REMiTiES wA EM SKIN W EM t.OsER EX 2Eul fl ES
OISCUSSION: [ @- YNNY b h .
F.
IN01v10UAL'S SIGNATtRE: Abbb.# CATE: 8' " [d .
N U 4 ca0VED BY: OATE: U/dffT--
INvESTISTED SY: e[ l A,-- :
REVIEWED 9Y: b !_- '
- M/6/b-'- aEvitaED SY: CATE: b
%c5 caswtrav /
Q G 5.rtMviscR , [
'(lNCIDENT1
- (PRIOR 70 l*C10ENT)
ENCLOSURE 2 4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION In the Matter of )
)
CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-400 AND NORTH CAROLINA EASTERN MUNICIPAL ) (10 C.F.R. 5 2.206)
POWER AGENCY )
)
(Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant) )
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS W. BROMBACH County of Wake )
) ss.
State of North Carolina )
Thomas W. Brombach, being duly sworn according to law, de-poses and says as follows:
- 1. I am employed by Carolina Power & Light Company
("CP&L") at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant as a Project Specialist / Inservice Inspection. In this capacity I am responsi-ble for non-destructive examination ("NDE") of Class 1, 2 and 3 components, piping and their supports to ensure applicable requirements of ASME Code Section XI and 10 C.F.R. S 50.55(a) are met. My business address is Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Route 1, Box 101, New Hill, North Carolina 27562.
- 2. I have been actively engaged.in NDE and inservice inspection programs at nuclear power plants since 1976. I have M oNCU@
1 3t pp
O received extensive NDE training, including ultrasonic testing, visual inspection and eddy current testing / examination. While employed by Virginia Electric and Power Company from 1976 until 1982, I was certified as an NDE examiner. From 1978 to the present I have been employed in supervisory positions, overseeing NDE and inservice inspection activities. Beginning with my early training and experience in the United States Navy, I have seven-teen years of hands-on experience in power plant operations, maintenance and testing. A complete statement of my professional qualifications and experience is appended hereto as Attachment A.
I have personal knowledge of the matters stated herein and be-lieve them to be true and correct.
- 3. The purpose of this affidavit is to address certain .
issues raised in a " Request for Institution of Proceedings Pur-suant to 10 CFR 2.206" dated July 2, 1986 (" Request"), specifi-cally those allegations regarding inservice inspection of Harris safety-related piping welds. Request at 9-10. Those allegations I
are based entirely on " problems" described in a January 1, 1986 letter to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Chairman James L.
i Kelley from Ms. Patty S. Miriello ("Miriello Letter") attached to I will show that the allegations, which have previ- !
the Request.
ously been investigated by CP&L's Quality Check Program and the i NRC I&E, Region II, are without any foundation whatsoever.
- 4. Before addressing Ms. Miriello's allegations I note, r for the record, the extent of her qualifications and experience i
l
to form an opinion regarding NDE of piping welds. During the period beginning in April 1984 through February 1985, Ms.
Miriello was employed by Nuclear Energy Services (NES) as a Data Controller. NES was retained by CP&L to provide NDE testing ser-vices for preservice baseline inspections and examinations of safety-related piping at the Harris Plant. I was responsible for overseeing NES activities. As a Data Controller, Ms. Miriello wa,s responsible for assigning each data sheet with a unique num-ber and reviewing the data for completeness, legibility and accu-racy of certain information. Ms. Miriello coordinated the re-quired reviews by the NES Technical Reviewer, CP&L reviewers and
{ the Authorized Nuclear Inspector ("ANI"). Her role was purely administrative. While she has an engineering degree and was com- -
1 pensated at an Engineer I level by NES, her role and assigned responsibilities were those of a technician. Ms. Miriello was not qualified by training or experience to perform NDE examina-tions or to interpret data from such examinations.
- 5. The Request alleges "approximately 10% of the welds in the inservice program at the Shearon Harris plant are defective and improperly documented." Referring to an instance where data on a calibration data sheet were revised, it is alleged: "These j
inservice inspection records were altered and changed without following the proper NRC procedure for record revisions on pipe welds." Request at 9-10. The sole basis for these assertions of defects in welds and tampering with records is Ms. Miriello's 4
letter. Yet, Ms. Miriello never actually points to a defect in welds but rather raises her " concern" that "this sort of thing" (referring either to two NDE examiners disagreeing about " indica-tions" in welds or unauthorized revisions to data sheets) "oc-curred to the best of [her] knowledge in at least 10% of the welds in the inservice inspection program." Miriello Letter at 4.
- 6. In fact, the inservice inspection ("ISI") program is not designed to confirm the quality of construction. Each weld on safety-related piping systems has been inspected by radio-graphy and/or surface examination and the results reviewed for quality and documentation by QA personnel. ISI, rather, is a programmed system of planned, repetitive tests, inspections and _
examinations carried out prior to initial operations and at regu-lar intervals throughout the service life of an operating nuclear plant. Prior to plant operation, preservice tests and examina-tions establish a baseline against which to compare the results of subsequent inspections. Pipe welds are examined by ultrasonic NDE testing to establish baseline data. ISI during plant life can help identify conditions in safety-related systems and compo-nents which could lead to failures, can serve as the basis of ex-tending the design life of plant systems and components, and can enhance reliability. CP&L does not, however, rely on the preser-vice baseline inspection to assure the quality of construction.
l l
I
- 7. Ms. Miriello's only specific allegation refers to cali-bration data sheets attached to her letter. Ms. Miriello states:
" Inspection Sheet A [ Attachment 1 to the Miriello Letter] was turned into me and was an official document which could only be revised through a revision process according to plant proce-dures." Ms. Miriello describes how NES Level III lead Technical Reviewer, Mr. Ron Saunders, "took the sheet back" and after argu-ing with the NES inspector, Mr. Mel Perry, about the results on the data sheet, returned it to Miriello with new pages as indi-cated by reference to Sheet B (Attachment 2 to the Miriello Let-ter). Miriello Letter at 2. Ms. Miriello finds this procedure
" questionable." She notes "that the mention of a weld or repair weld was eliminated from page 4 of the original Mel Perry turned i in." She claims, "[allso removed was the listings of indications _
in this weld, referring specifically to indications #9 and #12."
Id. at 2-3.
- 8. In an unannounced inspection by the NRC I&E, Region II, l
held December 2-6, 1985, CP&L's preservice inspection of safety-related piping welds at Harris was reviewed in detail. The NRC I&E inspectors had previously been provided with copies of the same data calibration sheets attached to Ms. Miriello's letter.
The Inspection Report of the results of the inspection (Report No. 50-400/85-48 dated July 15, 1986) is appended hereto as Attachment B. The NRC inspectors' review of Preservice and In-service Data Control Procedure, IST-101 Rev. 1 and the manner in
l I
. l which revisions were made to NES data sheets, led to a notice of l violation (Severity Level V) for failing to correct data sheets as prescribed in Paragraph 5.2.e of IST-101 -- which requires corrections to be completed by a single line drawn through the incorrect entry, initialed and dated by the responsible individ-ual, and the corrections made. While the NRC found fault with the method used to correct errors on data sheets, independent inspections of the welds in question by NRC inspectors confirmed in all cases the correctness of data as revised. In fact, the NRC inspectors themselves noted a problem in defining the bound-ary of the weld metal in the welds in question which " caused many of the data corrections made by the NDE lead examiner and could be identified in many cases as ultrasonic beam redirection to the
~
ID [inside diameter]." Attachment B at 7-8. The' mention of "a weld or repair weld" that "was eliminated from page 4" referred to by Ms. Miriello was a proper correction as the reference to the repair weld was not applicable to the entire weld circum-ference. This notation, however, was not removed from page 3 j of 5 on Sheet B and was in the same location on indication #1 as indication #2 on page 2 of 5. Indication #9 and #12, claimed to have been removed from the data sheet, were not removed. Only the classifications of these indications were clarified. On Sheet A they were noted as " geometric reflectors or small indica-tions," on Sheet B they were specifically noted, correctly, as
" geometric reflectors."
4
- 9. NES and CP&L had interpreted Procedure IST-101 as requiring changes pursuant to Paragraph 5.2.e only after the NES review process was complete. NES had viewed Sheet A as an inprocess document, as it had not been reviewed or accepted by the lead Technical Reviewer, Mr. Saunders. Thus, rewriting a data sheet with incorrect entries was not viewed as inconsistent with the procedures as long as the lead Technical Reviewer had not accepted the data. This issue raises no more than an honest - s difference in interpretation of a procedural requirement.
- 10. Ms. Miriello quotes selectively from the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes,Section XI, and asserts that CP&L's practices are in violation of the ASME Code. Miriello Letter at 3. In fact, CP&L's Ultrasonic Testing Procedure IST-501 re-quires recording all indications that exceed 20 percent of the reference level. The ASME Code Section XI, Article IWA-2232 (b)(1), states that "for examination of welds reflectors that produce a response greater than 50% of the reference level shall be recorded." Note that the indications that Ms. Miriello brings to the Director's attention -- all with a response less than 50% -- need not be recorded, based on the requirements of the ASME Code as adopted in 10 C.F.R. S 50.55a. CP&L has adopted a standard for recording indications that is 50 percent more strin-gent than required by Code to acquire a very conservative base-line data, providing useful information if recording criteria i
ever change with new Code additions and subsequent years of plant life.
I
~7-
- 11. For the record, Ms. Miriello never brought the data sheets attached to her letter to my attention nor did she bring any similar concerns to my attention while she was employed by NES. When Ms. Miriello was terminated from employment at Harris and was interviewed by QA personnel as part of the Quality Check Program, she never brought to Quality Check personnel any allega-tions with respect to quality of the welds at the Harris Plant.
Instead, she took unauthorized copies of weld data sheets for her later use.
- 12. Ms. Miriello makes something of a file kept by Mr. Ron Saunders of ISI records that were " changed on the side without a revision as required by procedure." Miriello Letter at 5. This file kept by Mr. Saunders was reviewed by me, by the ANI and by
~
the NRC. This review showed that the NDE data was not being incorrectly changed or revised. All parties accepted Mr.
Saunders explanation that he had viewed the revision procedure not applicable to inprocess documents that had not been finalized by the lead NES Technical Reviewer.
- 13. It is untrue that I cautioned Mr. Stark, the ANI, or Ms. Miriello to keep discussions to themselves when the NRC was around. See Miriello Letter at 7.
- 14. For the record, I never received phone calls from I&E, Region II, or anyone else alerting me in advance of inspections.
When NRC inspectors arrive at the Harris Plant they hold an en-trance interview with applicable plant personnel and discuss the l
l
These meetings are often held early in the areas of interest.
morning and might account for my informing Plant personnel of a pending inspection. See Miriello Letter at 7.
- 15. In summary, Ms. Miriello may have identified a techni-cal discrepancy in the way NES corrected preliminary data in data sheets. The information presented in Ms. Miriello's letter does not support the assertion that any welds in the safety-related piping at the Harris Plant are defective or that there has been any intentional alteration of inspection records.
Her allegations have been investigated by NRC I&E, Region II, the CP&L Quality Check Program and by me and were found without basis.
~
CA lu n_
Thomas W. Brdgbach (
Subscribed and sworn to before me this LN day of August, 1986.
a4 W My Commission Expires: 3[2R!87 i
ATTACHMENT A Resume THOMAS W. BROMBACH EDUCATION MILITARY Basic Propulsion and Engineering School
- Machinist Mate "A" School Water Treatment School Power Plant Maintenance School Damage Control School Fire Fighting School '
Submarine School Nuclear Power School (25 weeks)
Hydraulic and Pneumatic School AC & R School Magnetic and Licuid Penetrant School 3M Records Manacement School Radiological Control School -
CIVILIAN High School Graduate 5 Semesters of Collece Continuing Education Units Awarded for:
-Magnetic Particle Inscection
-Liquid Penettant Inspection
-Ultrasonic Weld Inscection
-ASME Section XI Short Courses Formal 5 1/2 Year Journeyman Power Plant Mechanic Apprenticeship Company Sponsored Schools: ,
~
-Dresser Valve School
-Radiation and Radiological Control School
-Grinnel Valve School .
-Milton Roy Pump School !
I
-Non-destructive Testing Schools for MT, PT, VT and Eddy Current Tube Insoection
-Multifrecuency Eddy Current Examination
-'" ~ ~ -
-Personnel Manacement
-Aberrant Behavior PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Society of Mechanical Encineers
I l
o EMPLOYMENT September 1982 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CCMPANY to SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Present Project Scecialist/ Inservice Insoecticn Scoce of Responsibility Responsible for developing and maintaining the Harris Plant's inservice insoection ("ISI") program in accordance with, and as required by, ASME Code Section XI to assist in meeting NRC, plant Technical Specification, operating license, and other related plant and regulatory recuirements. The ISI program is developed based on the latest reaulatory require-ments. The ISI program provides direction and support of inservice inscection related tests such as hydrostatic testing, weld inspections, and eddy current testing.
Major Functions
- 1. Developing and maintainina an inservice inscection program for welds by working with Operations and Mainte-nance. -
- 2. Coordinating inservice inspection activities and schedules.
- 3. Developing, updating, and maintainine ASME Code Sec-tion XI inspection programs.
- 4. Maintaining interface responsibilities amonc the Plant's organizations to ensure the ISI program is imple-mented effectively.
- 5. Analyzing and providing resolution to Plant problems resulting from ISI.
- 6. Preparing and monitoring budcet items certaining to ISI.
1
- 7. Staying updated on chances to, and latest recuire-ments of, the ASME Code.
- 8. Responsible for ensuring the proper maintenance of inservice inspection records, deficiencies and resolu- ,
tions.
l
l
- l O
March 1976 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY to SURRY NUCLEAR PCNER STATION August 1982 Engineerine Sucervisor of Ncn-destructive Testine and Evaluation Sccce of Resconsibility Performed unit and component testine in the field of non-destructive examination and orovided evaluation of test re-sults to insure component and vessel intecrity.
3 Maior Functions
- 1. Conduct inservice and preservice inspections to assure compliance with ASME Code Section XI and plant technical specifications.
- 2. Provide non-destructive testing services for the station, i.e.: PT, MT, RT, VT, UT and ET, in accordance with ASME Code Sections III, IV, IX and XI and other designated applicable codes as required.
- 3. Coordinate inspection services with the desig- -
nated ANSI to ssure full compliance with the ASME Code in effect.
- 4. Provide eddy current examination services to meet the recuirements of USNRC Reculatory Guide 1.83 and ASME Code Section XI for steam cenera-tors.
- 5. Provide eddy current examination services in ex-amination of condenser and other various heat exchanger tubing.
- 6. Prepare and submit inservice, creservice and eddy current reports.
- 7. Assist Engineering in identifyinc ceneric prob-lems and working toward solutions.
- 8. Support and implement additional training pro-grams for NDT technicians to keep personnel abreast and trained in new field developments.
- 9. Establish and maintain accropriate records man-q acement of all work conducted.
- a
- 10. Prepare and submit budcets for crocurement of equipment, supplies and arrange for contractor and vendor services.
- 11. Provide schedules and ccmmitment dates durina plant outages for inspection services.
- 12. Review and implement non-destructive examination procedures.
- 13. Certified in accordance to ASNT-TC-1A as a LEVEL II in Visual, Liquid Penetrant, Magnetic Parti-cle and Eddy Current examinations and LEVEL I in Ultrasonic Testina.
- Also prior to being promoted to a supervisory position, I was a journeyman mechanic providing round-the-clock maintenance and repair to all. station ecuipment, i.e.: oumps, valves, hy-draulic and pneumatic systems, HVAC, steam turbines and auxil-iary systems on both the primary and secondary sides of the plant. A collateral duty was to travel to various fossil fuel plants within the VEPCO system and conduct maintenance and re-pair on high pressure power boilers, coal systems and other plant systems.
September 1975 NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRYDOCK, CO.
to ,
Newport News, VA March 1976 Power Plant Ooerator, Utilities Decartment
~
Assigned to the operation of the main power plant and all
- substations -- maintaining and operatina 600 lb. boilers, air compressors and related equipment supplying power steam and
- compressed air to the shipyard.
September 1974 COLLEGE OF DUPAGE to Glen Ellyn, Illinois September 1975 Assistant Chief of Plant Ocerations i
Responsible for the operation of the steam generating and air conditioning plant, in addition to which, performed all re-pairs as necessary to its plumbing, hydraulic, oneumatic and electrical systems. Collaterally responsible for the mainte-nance of the buildings and all service support systems.
April 1974 FACTORY MUTUAL ENGINEERING CO.
to Chicaco, Illinois September 1974 Boiler & Machinerv Insoector Conducted on-site physical inspections of steam generatinq
! power plants and machinery for compliance with ASME, state and l local codes.
January 1969 UNITED STATES NAVY l to E-4 Machinist Mate December 1973 i
i
, , , . 3-. - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - , - - - - . ~ , . , , - - - - -
' ATTACHMENT 3 go sCic UNITED STATES RECENEr "." ! 2 ess .
f '
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7 REGION 11
$ ,, 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W.
O
\pov[/
"E ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323 JUL 151986 Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Gentlemen:
1 i
SUBJECT:
REPORT NO. 50-400/85-48 l
l On Cecember 2-6, 1985, NRC inspected activities authorized by NRC Construction l Permit No. CPPR-158 for your Harris facility. At the conclusion of the inspec-tion, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report. -
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these -
areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations of activities in progress. The inspectors also conducted independent measurements, utilizing -
Region II ultrasonic equipment at your site, to verify your capability for performing ultrasonic examinations and analyzing examination results.
The inspection findings indicate that certain activities violated NRC require-ments. The violations, references to pertinent requirements, and elements to be included in your response are presented in the enclosed Notice of Violation.
Your attention is invited to unresolved items identified in the inspection l report. These matters will be pursued during future inspections.
The responses directed by this letter and the enclosures are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget issued under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
I Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
, Sincerely, i > W -
D id M. V relli, Chief R actor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosures:
(See page 2)
- JULi:655 Carolina Pcwer and Light Company 2 i
Enclosures:
- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. Report No. 50-400/85-48 cc w/encis:
R. A. Watson, Vice President Harris Nuclear Project D. L. Tibbetts Director of Regulatory Compliance J. L. Willis, Plant General Manager 4
f e
i A
l d
ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Carolina Power and Light Company Docket No. 50-400 Harris License No. CPPR-158 The following violations were identified during an inspection conducted on December 2-6, 1985 and a subsequent in-office review on December 12, 1985. The Severity Levels were assigned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR Part 2 Appendix C).
- 1. 10 CFR 50.55a paragraph (g) subparagraph (2) allows the licensee to use the American Society of Mechanical Engineer (ASME) Code Section XI,1980 Edition with addenda through the winter 1981. Carolina Power and Light Company's Inservice Inspection Program delineated in Procedure Number ISI-201 Revision 1, the ASME Code, 1980 Edition, with addendas through winter 1981. -
Contrary to the above, Nuclear Energy Service, Inc. (NES) Inservice Inspection Procedures IST-501 (Rev.1) and IST-401 (Rev.1) were written to the ASME Code,1980 Edition with addendas through winter 1982. ~
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement II).
2.
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be acccm-plished in accordance with these instructions procedures or drawings. NES Preservice and Inservice Data Control Procedure IST-101 Rev.1, Para-graph 5.2.E. requires that corrections to data reports are to be completed by a single line drawn through the incorrect entry, initialled, and dated by the responsible individual when the correction is made.
Contrary to the above, on December 2-6, 1985, examination data sheets were observed where the NES Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Lead Examiner, had written " rewrite" on initial examination data sheets that had been signed by an NDE examiner and given a control number. In some instances technical entries of evaluations were changed on the rewritten data sheets.
This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I;).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violations; (2) the reasons for the violations if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the. results achieved; (4) corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
. ~ . . . . ._
Carolina Pcwer and Light Company 2 Docket No. 50-400 Harris License No. CPPR-153
. Security or safeguards information should be submitted as an enclosure to facilitate withholding it from public disclosure as required by 10 CFR 2.790(d) or 10 CFR 73.21.
oate: JUL 151986 .
l .
o i
l 4
, , , _ . - - - _ . . . . , - , - . - - - , , - -.--a --m--' . ,.
,,,.,,,g.,,..~ . , _n.. _ _ . ,_,_. -,_.-___.-,___,_ . _ _, _,_. _- ,,- ..~. --n -n--- _
UNITED STATES
[p 4:q\ 1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f;EGION ll f S 101 MARIETTA STREET. Nw. %'
"a s e f ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
\..~...f ,
Report No.: 50-400/85-48 Licensee: Carolina Power and light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Occket No.: 50-400 License No.: CPPR-158 Facility Name: Harris 1 Inspection Conducted: December 2-6, 1985 Inspectors: iv } /- 6-8 s R. W. Newsome Date Signed J.
bd. Etriey n e_..,
y O, /-/t.f4 Date Signea Approved by: -
/ /!/3 f.
J. . 81are, Section Chief O&te Signed En ineering Branch .
O vision of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 65 inspector-hours at the site in the areas of preservice inspection (PSI) of safety-related piping welds including review of procedures, observation of work, data review and evaluation, and independent ultrasonic verification examinations; also, general observation of car. truction activities, construction progress and material storage.
Results: Two violations were identified - Preservice examination procedures incorrectly reference subsequent code addendas - paragraph 6.a.(5): Failure to follow procedure for correction of examination data, paragraph 6.a.(6).
i
REPORT DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- J. Harness, Assistant Plant Manager
- N. J. Chiangi, Manager, Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC)
- C. R. Gibson, Assistant to Plant Manager
- R. 8. Van Metre, Manager, Technical Support
- C. L. t'. Aenzie, Director, QA/QC, Operations
- C. R. Osman, Principal QA/QC Specialist
- T. W.'8rombach, Project Engineer, Inservice Inspectio'n (ISI)
- P. W. Howard, Regulatory Compliance
- M. G. Wallace, Regulatory Compliance Other licensee employees contacted included construction cra ftsmen , -
engineers, technicians, security force members, and office personnel.
Other Organization ~
- R. Saunders, Level III Examiner, Nuclear Energy Service, Inc. -
NRC Resident Inspector
- G. Maxwell, Senior Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview '
- Attended exit interview and contacted by telephone on December 12, 1985
- Contacted by telephone on December 12, 1985 i i
- 2. Exit Interview I
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on December 6,1985, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above; on December 12, 1985, Region II held a conference telephone call with the persons indicated in paragraph 1. The purpose of the call was to inform the licensee that after further review of the PSI data and procedural requirements, and in-office discussions between the inspectors and regional management it was concluded i that one item reported on December 6, as an unresolved item - (Preservice j examination procedures incorrectly reference subsequent code addendas) would be upgraded to a violation. Two new additional items (one violation and one i unresolved item) were also reported to the licensee. The inspectors described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
, No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The following new
- items were identified during the inspection and subsequent in-office review.
1 4
.,..r- , _ _ _ , _ - , _ _ . - . , . . .,
2 (0 pen) Violation '50-400/85-48-01, Preservice Examination Procedures Incorrectly Reference Subsequent Code Addendas - paragraph 6.a.(5).
(0 pen) violation 50 a00/85-48-03, Failure to Follow Procedure for Correction of Examination Data - paragraph 6.a.(6).
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-400/85-48-02, Power Wire Brushing Prior to Surface Examinations - paragraph 6.a.(3).
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 50-400/85-48-04, Independent Technical Review of Examination Data - paragraph 6.a.(7).
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any'of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
- 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection. -
- 4. Unresolved Items ,
Unresolved Items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve a violation or -
deviation. Two new unresolved items identified during this inspection are i
discussed in paragraphs 6.a.(3) and 6.a.(7).
- 5. Independent Inspection Effort (92706)
The inspectors conducted a general inspection of the containment, auxiliary building, and material storage areas to observe construction progress and construction activities such as welding, material handling, housekeeping an'd storage. The inspectors did not observe any questionable workmanship. The inspectors also observed that material protection, handling, and storage appeared adequate.
Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were identified.
- 6. Preservice Inspection (PSI)
The inspectors examined documents, activities, and records, as indicated below, to determine whether PSI was being conducted in accordance with applicable procedures, regulatory requirements, and licensee commitments.
The applicable code for PSI is the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel (ASME 8&PV) Code,Section XI, 1980 edition with addenda through winter 1981. Nuclear Energy Services (NES) has responsibi-l lity as the PSI contractor. However, nondestructive eddy current examinations had been conducted by Conam Inspection and Technical Services Laboratory (TSL) . NES Level III examiners are performing the ultrasonic examination evaluations.
l . __
4 3
- a. Review of Procedures (730529)
(1) The following procedures were reviewed in the areas of procedure approval and qualification of NDE personnel:
Procedure No. Title IST-501 (RI) Chg. 1/1 Procedure for Ultrasonic Examination of Piping Systems (NES) 80A5051 (RO) Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Reactor Vessel Welds From the 00 Surface 80A5036 (RO) Procedure for the Operation of the RPV 10 Examination Positioning Device for the Inside Surface Ultrasonic Examination of the -
Reactor Pressure Vessel for Shearon Harris Nuclear Power -
Plant Unit 1 80A5037 (RI) Automated UT Examination Procedure -
for Reactor Vessel Shell Welds (Plus Field Changes FC-1 through FC-7) 80A5040 (R1) Automated Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Shell Welds 80A5050 (RO) Manual Ultrasonic Examination Procedure for Vessel Nozzle Safe End Welds (Plus Field Change FC-1)
IST-401 (R1) Chg. 1/1 Liquid Penetrant Examination (Color Contrast, Solvent Removable) NES IST-604 (RO) Multifrequency Eddy Current Procedure for Westinghouse 04 Steam i
Generator Tubing Using The MIZ-13 Digital Eddy Current System (Canam Inspection) 157-101 (RI) Preservice and Inservice Data Control Procedure (NES)
} 6
)
I i
_ _ . - , . _ __ , , . _ _ , . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . - _ . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ . _ , . . - _ _ _ _ _ , _ . . . ~ . _ _ _ , _
A w
(2) The inspectors also reviewed the above listed ultrasonic examina-tion procedures to ascertain whether they had been reviewed and approved procedures.in accordance with the licensee's established QA The above procedures were reviewed for technical adequacy and conformance with ASME,Section V Article 5 and other license commitments / requirements in the below listed areas: type of apparatus used, extent of coverage of weldment, calibration requirements, search units, beam angles, DAC curves, reference level for monitoring discontinuities, method of demonstration of pene tra tion , limits for evaluating and recording indica tions ,
recording significant indications, and acceptance limits.
(3) The inspectors also reviewed the Ifquid penetrant procedure, I IST-401, to ascertain whether it had been reviewed and approved in accordance with the licensee's established QA procedures. The above procedure was reviewad for technical adequacy and conformance with ASME,Section V, Article 6, and other licensee commitments / requirements in the following listed areas: specified' me thod , penetrant materials identified, penetrant materials analyzed for sul fur, penetrant materials analyzed for total halogens, acceptable pre-examination surface, drying time, method-of penetrant appitcation, surface temperature, solvent removal, dry surface prior to developing, time and method for applying '
developer, examination technique, and evaluation technique.
While reviewing the liquid penetrant examination procedure, the inspectors noted that power wire brushing of surfaces prior to liquid penetrant examination was allowed by the procedure. This practice may close surface openings and be detrimental to the penetrant examinations. This concern was discussed with the . ,
licensee who has agreed to address the power wire brushing issue and make appropriate changes to resolve the issue. Pending NRC review of the actions taken regarding this concern the matter will i be identified as Unresolved Item 50-400/85-48-02, Power Wire Brushing Prior to Surface Examinations.
1 (4) The inspectors reviewed Eddy Current Procedure, IST-604, for
- technical content relative to: multichannel examination unit, multichannel examination equipment is specified, examination sensitivity, material permeability, method of examination, method of calibration and calibration sequence, acceptance criteria, qualification of NDE personnel, and procedure approval.
(5) During the review of procedures 157-501 (RI), Ultrasonic Examina-tion and IST-401 (RI), Liquid Penetrant Examination, the inspectors noted that these procedures were written to satisfy the requirements of ASME Section XI 1980 edition with addenda through winter 1982. Since the " Code of Record" committed to by the licensee is the ASME Section XI 1980 edition with addenda through t
, ., ,. _ ~- _ - _ . - - - -.
5 l
l winter'1981, as stated in their Preservice Inspection Program (R1) submitted to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), the inspectors discussed this discrepancy with the licensee. The licensee indicated that he had discussed this point with NRR but l was unable to produce documentation supporting this discussion and there did not appear to be a formal request to NRR which would allow the licensee to use the winter 1982 addenda. The licensee i
is in violation of Title 10 code of Federal Regulations Part
( 50.55a paragraph (9) subparagraph (2) which requires the licensee to use ASME Section XI 1980 Edition with addenda through winter 1981 if authorization from the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has not been obtained. This item is identified as Violation 50-400/85-48-01, Preservice Examination Procedures Incorrectly Reference Subsequent Code Addendas.
(6) On December 4, 1985, the NRC inspectors conducted verification examinations on a selected sample of welds that included examples of welds where technical changes to the examination data had been-made as a result of data rewrites. The NES NOE lead examiner was invited to accompany the inspectors during these verification .
examinations and it quickly became apparent that the NDE lead examiner was very familiar with the examination of the specific welds involved although in some cases there was no documented -
evidence that he had ever examined the weld. The lead extiiner knew specific locations of welds even when they were not visually j discernible due to surface contouring for PSI and in one case i because of cladding on the pipe base material. He was also able to tell the inspectors how to manipulate their transducer to see ;
specific indications and how and where to dampen specific signals l when it appeared that the signal could not be dampened. The NRC, l inspectors verification examina tions were performed using Region II's ultrasonic equipment and the examinations ccmpared favorably with the final examination data and evaluations made by NES (see paragraph 6.b.2 of this report for sample selection and conclusions by the inspectors).
On December 5,1985 the NES NDE lead examiner was requested to perform a liquid penetrant examination on a weld where the initial examination data indicated that the rewrite had altered the reported results. The re-examination confirmed the results reported in the final report with some small differences noted in the reported indication size. The inspectors did not detect any problems with the final examination data when compared to the components involved. ,
Ouring the inspectors in-office review on December 12, 1985, of the Preservice and Inservice Data Control Procedure, IST-101 Rev.1 and NES inspection data reports obtained by Region II, changes were observed to technical entries on data sheets prior to the completion of the NES review process that were not in
- 6 i
~
l accordance with paragraph 5.2.E. of the data control procedure.
Paragraph 5.2.E requires that corrections to data reports are to j be completed by a single line drawn through the incorrect entry, initialled and dated by the responsible individual when the correction is made. Examination data sheets were observed in scme instances where the NDE lead examiner had written " rewrite" on the initial examination data sheet that had been signed by the i examiner and given a control number. In most cases a new data i sheet would be submitted on the same day as the initial data
, sheet, however in some instances technical entries or evaluations
- would change with no explanation or evidence of additional
. investigation. The method used to correct examination data sheets was not in accordance with paragraph 5.2.E. of the data control procedure IST-101, and is in violation of 10 CFR-50 Criterion V.
This item was reported as Violation 50-400/85-48-03, Failure to
. Follow Procedure for Correction of Examination Data.
(7) In addition to the item reported above, the inspectors review of '
NES Procedure IST-101, R1, revealed that the diagram for data l flow, illustrated in Attachment 1 of the procedure, delineated the -
4 NES NDE lead examiner to review the examination data for technical and administrative accuracy and then in a subsequent step allowed the same individual to sign-off the data as the technical reviewer. This method of controlling data is inappropriate when
- it results in the individual signing off data that he previously had input to. The licensee was notified of this conflict in data i
review / flow on December 12, 1985, when the iten was reported to the licensee as Unresolved Item 50-400/85-48-04, Independent
. Technical Review of Examination Data.
! b. Observation of Work and Work Activities (730538)
The inspectors observed a limited amount of work activities due to the limited number of examinations being performed and the time required for independent ultrasonic verification examinations utilizing Region II equipment and personnel. The inspectors reviewed certifica-tion records of equipment, materials, and NDE personnel which had been and will be utilized during the required PSI examinations. The reviews conducted by the inspectors are documented below.
(1) Examiner Qualification The inspectors reviewed the qualification documentation for the
- below listed NES, CONAM and TSL examiners in the following areas
employer's name, person certified, activity qualified to perform, effective period of certification, signature of employer's designated representatives, basis used for certification, and annual visual acuity, color vision examination and periodic recertification.
]
7 Method - Level Examiner (CONAM) UI PT MT RT EC JEC - - - -
II A GRT - - - -
II Itd REM - - - -
III Method - Level Examiner (NES) UT PT MT RT EC MOA I II I - -
CAA II II II -
RSB II II - - -
! PMG I II I - -
GG II II II - -
JTH II - - - - -
SM -
II II - -
MS -
II II - - .
RTS III III III - -
Method - Level -
Examiner (TSL) UT PT MT RT EC RMB - - - -
III SDG - - - -
II CMC .
I (2) The inspectors conducted verification ultrasonic examinations '
using Region II's equipment on portions of the below listed welds.
The examinations were performed in order to evaluate the technical adequacy of the ultrasonic examination procedures being used to perform preservice ultrasonic examinations and to assess the validity of the information being reported by the ultrasonic examiners. The ultrasonic examination procedure used to perform the verification examinations was IST-501 (RI) Chg.1/1.
Weld 10 ISO No. Size 1-SW-FT-601 1-ISI-51-29 3" S1-13-1-SW-4 1-ISI-CS-7 4" 1-CT-SW-E4 1-ISI-CT-1 8" 1-RC-SW-A3 1-ISI-RC-23 6" RC-2-FW-7 1-ISI-FW-MS-RC-2 31" 1-AF-SW-84 1-ISI-AF-7 4"
O 8
The verification ultrasonic examinations conducted by the inspectors indicated that the procedures being used to conduct the
]
preservice examinations are adequate and tha t the information i being reported by the ultrasonic examiners ccmpares favorably with the verification examinations. The verification examinations also i
indicated that a conservative examination was being performed.
The only problem encountered by the inspectors was in defining the boundary of the weld metal in pipe joints due to the quality of surface grinding and in one specific instance, due to clad welding i
on the pipe base metal. The inspectors were able to over come this problem by using.an additional instrument and a compressional wave transducer to continuously monitor the inside diameter (IO) surface configuration. These problems caused many of the data i
corrections made by the NDE lead examiner and could be identified in many cases as ultrasonic beam redirection to the 10.
(3) The following listed ultrasonic equipment and materials certifi- -
cattun records were reviewed:
l Ultrasonic Instruments Manufacturer / Model Serial No. -
Sonic MKI 781306 XX USL-48 212200 AI S-80
- 10244-9 Minature Angle Beam Calibration Blocks
' Serial No. 783913
- Serial No. 785363 Ultrasonic Couplant Batch Numbers Ultragel II 8336 & 8443 Ultrasonic Transducers Size Frequency Serial No.
a
.5" 2.25MHz E20000 1.0" 1.0MHz J22462
! 1.0" 1.0MHz J22463 l 1"x1" 1.0MHz F30199
.5" 2.25MHz L-19108
.5"x1.0" 2.25MHz B 338d
. . .312"x.625" 2.25MHz A 3342 i
?
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , - . ~ . _ . - - - - - . _ - . . - , - . _ - - , _ -______. , _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _
9 (4) Magnetic particle yoke serial number 6853 was used for the performance of PSI examinations. The inspectors reviewed the lift test qualification documentation to verify controlling document requirements were met.
(5) The inspectors observed the liquid penetrant examination of weld 1-RH-SW-0198 on ISO 1-ISI-RH-2. The observation was compared with I
the applicable procedure and the Code in the following areas:
specified method, penetrant ma terials identified; penetrant materials analyzed for halogens and sulfur; acceptable pre-examination surface; drying time; method of penetrant application; penetration time; surface temperature; solvent removal; dry surface prior to developing; type of developer; examination technique; evaluation technique; and r'eporting of examination results.
The above examination resulted in the enhancement of two linear indications, one indication was above the other and both measuring.
3/32" in length. Both indications were acceptable to Section XI of the ASME Code and compared favorably to the licensee's final liquid penetrant examination data sheet. ~
(6) The inspector reviewed the below listed penetrant material .
certification records to ascertain if the sulfur and halogen content of the material was within acceptable content limits.
Materials Batch Number Liquid Penetrant 828058, 83K052, 83M015 Cleaner / Remover 82K080, 84J040, 84M021 Developer 82J062, 84J002, 83LO94
- 1
' (7) The inspectors reviewed the qualification documentation for the below listed TSL & CONAM eddy current equipment to verify controlled documents were met.
TSL MIZ-18's Serial Numbers 052 & 075 CONAM MIZ-18 Serial Number 007 l (8) The inspectors reviewed certification documentation for the eddy current calibration standard identified as Z1292, Heat No. 2185.
- c. PSI Data Review and Evaluation (73055)
Records of completed nondestructive examinations were selected and
- reviewed to ascertain whether: the method (s), technique and extent of the examination complied with the ISI plan and applicable NDE procedures; findings were properly recorded and evaluated by qualified personnel; programatic deviations were recorded as required; personnel, instruments, calibration blocks and NDE materials j (penetrants, couplants) were designated.
$ l i
_ , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ .. - - . - - - --- -- - - --- - -~ - - ~ ~ ~
10 (1) Records selected for this review are listed below:
Iso. No./ Item Weld I.D. NDE Method 1-ISI-FW-MS-RC-1 1-MS-SW-86 UT 1-MS-SW-83 UT 1-RC-SW-N5 UT 1-RC-SW-06 UT 1-RC-SW-P6 UT 1-ISI-RH-2 1-RH-FW-17(A) UT 1-ISI-SI-29 1-SW-FW-601 UT 1-ISI-CS-7 S1-13-1-SW-4' UT 1-151-51-10 SI-SW-C8 UT 1-ISI-CT-1 1-CT-SW-E4 UT I 1-ISI-CT-14 1-CT-FW-185 UT 1-ISI-RC-23 1-RC-SW-A3 UT 1-ISI-FW-MS-RC-2 RC-2-FW-7 UT 1-ISI-AF-7 1-AF-SW-84 UT -
1-ISI-FW-MS-RC-2 1-FW-FW-486 UT 1-FW-SW-E3 UT ,
Reactor Vessel Shell 1-SH-RV-010 UT Weld 1-SH-RV-004 UT -
Reactor Vessel Inlet Nozzle to Shell Weld UT Nozzle at 335' Reactor Vessel Inlet Nozzle to Shell Weld UT Nozzle at 95*
Reactor Vessel Safe Nozzle to Safe End UT End at 335' Reactor Vessel Safe Nozzle to Safe End UT End at 145*
1-ISI-FW-MS-RC-3 1-MS-FW-255 MT 1-MS-SW-A3 MT 1-MS-SW-A3A MT 1-MS-SW-A38 MT
- 1-RC-SW-03 PT 1-RC-SW-P8 PT 1-RC-SW-N6 PT 1-RC-FW-5 PT 1-RC-SW-02 PT Reactor Vessel Safe 1-SH-SR-01 PT End
=
11 1-ISI-RH-2 1-RH-SW-0198 PT RH-2 RH-FW-17 RT CT-15 *CT-FW-185 RT CS-7 *SI-13-1-SW-4 RT SI-10 SI-SW-C8 RT RC-23 *RC-SW-A3 RT
- Construction radiographs were reviewed to confirn ultrasonic signal reflector locations.
(2) The inspectors reviewed records of the Steam Generator (SG) tubing eddy current examinations. The reviews were compared with the applicable procedures and the Code in the following areas: the multi-channel eddy current examination equipment has been -
identified including indicator, meter, tube, strip recorder, and tape; method for maximum sensitivity ,is < applied; method for ,
determining material permeability recorded; material permeability has been recorded; method of examination has been recorded; examination equipment has been calibrated in accordance with the -
applicable performance reference; amplitude and phase has been 1
calibrated with the proper applicable calibration reference and is recalibrated at predetermined frequency; 100% coverage of steam generator tubes occurs during the examination; and acceptance criteria is specified or referenced and is consistent with the procedure or the ASME 8&PV Code.
The tubes selected for review by the NRC inspectors were
- originally examined by CONAM and sometime later independently examined again by TSL. The objective of the examination by TSL was to assure the validity of the examinations conducted by CONAM.
The data comparisons made by the NRC inspectors indicated that i
with the exception of a few minor deviations due to probe speed and independent calibration curves the data generated by the two t
independent examinations compared favorably. Examination data for the tubes listed below was used by the NRC inspectors to make this comparison.
1 1
_ - , _ _____;__,__ _ _ . , - , _ _ - - - - , - . . - . . _ . _ _ . , . _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . m._... _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ - . - . . - , . . _ ._
12 TUBE 10 Row - Column SG-A 12 - 6 15 - 74 15 - 86 41 - 74 10 - 8 29 - 14 i SG-8 5- 1 20 - 45 33 - 46 15 - 50 22 - 33 41 - 29 SG-C 14 - 77 29 - 29 5- 23 .
21 - 21 22 - 33 -
31 - 34 Within the areas examined, no violations or deviations were -
identified, except as reported in paragraphs 6.a(5) and 6.a(6) '
above. l
Forn 80248 ATTAC1 DENT 3 I
5/84 QC7 Case Number (Assigned by QCP Coordinator)
] OfPI.0YII EXIT QUESTIONNAIRE
- 1. Were you provided o encation on the Harris Nuclear Project Quality Check program? Yes. No[
- 2. Have you reported any concerns or allegations in regard to the design, fabrication, construction, test, start- or inspection of the Harris -
Nuclear Project? Yes] No
- j 3. If you reported concerns or allegati*ons, were he results satisfactory?
Yes No] Not applicable 4.
l Doyouhaveany]rersainingconcernsorallegationswhichyouhavenotreported?
Yes] No If answer is YES, complete QCR form.
i 5. What is yourreason / for leaving the Harris Nuclear Projjet?
be m .AES s4.xe M ~ GAcL.
The attached Q icy Chaelr. Reporc form may be used at some later time for reporting 1 concerns or allegations which you'may have reported previously without satisfactory results or ich you have not r port / .
30bW Y osta k-l Y ~
Signaturei / . l4 ' . Nc r P oj W71 MN Data Commenced Work .
Name ATM M /77 //'R /6/ 4.0 (Print) at Harris Project #
Y Address NM,3dk .;zce7/ 1,1,,3,,, 3 , 4 gy Og,y
- AHL E / GN, N. d. 2 76 // ,
! The QCP Coordinator or one of his representatives will assist if needed in filling out this form or the attachment.
! Date Odh" Notest $fb JA 'ft m V) & h(/ W-j m j O
WLb 4
%el.nc%
ffCP Coordinator os/Regirese ive
Attachment:
Quality Check Report form (To be provided to employee) l
- - - _ . . - - - - - - - - - . - . - - - - . - . - - - - - - . . - . - . . - - - . - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - . - - - ~ .