Text

Testimony of Cd Jones on Behalf of Atty General Jm Shannon, Atty General for Commonwealth of Ma Re Ji 27A,61 & 62.* Supporting Documentation Encl.Related Correspondence
	ML20248G919
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/10/1989
From:	Clint Jones; MANAGEMENT SERVICES ASSOCIATES, INC., MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	;
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(ELATED CORftESPONDENCE a

I UNITED STATES OF: AMERICA' L Ltd H I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION N-ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 89 Am 11 P5 :58 Before the~ Administrative Judges: ernt :- :a .i-Ivan W. Smith, Chairman 00Chupo A i" N Dr.. Richard F. Cole '# Kenneth A. McCollom j l

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                  .In the Matter of                                )   Docket Nos. 50-443-OL l                                                             ,
                                                                   )                50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY                )               (Off-Site EP)

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, EI AL. )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) April 10, 1989 l ) TESTIMONY OF CHARLES D. JONES ON BEHALF OF I ATTORNEY GENERAL JAMES M. SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL. FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REGARDING f l JI 27A, 61 and 62 (- t Department of the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts One Ashburton Place , Boston, MA 02108

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-- s, , o UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. { NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before the Administrative Judges: Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole Kenneth A. McCollom i

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

                                                )                50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY.       )               (Off-Sit'e EP)

OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, EI AL. )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) April 10, 1989

TESTIMONY OF. CHARLES D. JONES ON BERALF OF ATTORNEY GENERAL ~ JAMES M. SHANNON, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, REGARDING 1 JI 27A, 61 and 62 i

SUMMARY

OF TESTIMONY TESTIMONY Q.l. Please state your name and current position. A.l. My_name is Charles Jones, and I am currently the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Management Services , Associates, Inc. ("MSA"), in Springfield, Illinois. Q.2 What contentions and issues does your testimony concern? _ .__ .________J

4 A.2. My testimony relates to a serier of issues surrounding the method'or manner in'which the utility plan generated for the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook EpZ will or might be implemented in the event of an actual radiological emergency at Seabrook Station. These issues are presented by the following contentions. JI 27/ Bases A, C, D, F and G present the issue of the effectiveness of the liaison position as it is defined and described in the SpMC in j facilitating the implementation of the utility plan-in those circumstances where no local plans exist and a mix of possible outcomes as to jurisdiction and function is contemplated by the. utility plan. JI 61 challenges the adequacy of the SpMC in Mode 1. This contention asserts that the utility plan provides no blueprint for the governemnts to follow at the time of an i emergency. Finally, JI 62 asserts that Mode 2-partial as it is described in the-plan is simply contrary to common sense and l l could not be implemented so as to provide any assurance that an effective response would result. Q.3. What experience have you had in preparing offsite emergency response plans for commercial nuclear power plants? A.3. From January 1985 to April 1988 I was the Director of 1 the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency ("IESDA"), i a Governor's Cabinet-level agency with an annual combined budget of $20 million. The IESDA was (and is) responsible for, inter alia, the development of offsite radiological emergency a i 4 response plans for all nuclear power plants located in Illinois,~i.e., seven sites with multiple reactors. The i Illinois Plan for Radiological Accidents ("IpRA") is the federally approved plan of record to respond to radiological incidents at commercial nuclear reactor sites, consisting ~of a j state general volume that addresses the state emergency i response organization. .The IpRA also includes site-specific state / local volumes of each'of the seven reactor sites , identifying the roles, responsibilities and resources of al" i 1 local governments located within the 10-mile emergency planning l zone for each site. Under my direction, the IESDA brought to I completion the development of the radiological emergency plan i for'all seven of these sites. Q.4. Can you describe for us in more detail what the difference is between a generic state plan and a site-specific plan for a particular nuclear plant? A.4. Yes. The State General Volume first and most importantly identifies at the State level the command and control, namely who has the authority, responsibility-and resources to carry out all aspects of a timely and coordinated state response to a radiological accident at a commercial nuclear power station. These capabilities and responsibilities are essentially generic, irrespective of the reactor site, and are therefore included in the State General Volume. l

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4 Site-specific volumes do, however, delineate the k state's response capabilities and resources to the regional level to ensure that regional capabilities throughout the state l are noted and planned for. The site-specific volumes also include the emergency response capabilities, authority, resources and implementing procedures for all of the local governments located within the : 10-mile emergency planning zone. These site-specific volumes ara very detailed and identify exactly how each of these local ; i go/ernments will be notified of an incident and the detailed stops they will follow to ensure public health and safety foLlowing notification. l Q.5. Would you please summarize your background and ! qualifications in the field of state / local disaster l preparedness planning. l A.S. Certainly. prior to my becoming Director of IESDA, I served as the agency's peblic information officer, and was directly responsible for the formulation of all public information/ media components of the IpRA. I also played a key role in the development of most if not all other sections of the IpRA, because my assigned role during an actual emergency was to serve as spokesperson for the State of Illinois in the Joint Information Center. A thorough understanding of the planning philosophies and presumptions was essential for me to be able to clearly and quickly explain plan components to members of the media. l l

s As Director, my IpRA planning responsibilities changed somewhat to become more conceptual, overseeing the i planning activities of others, and being more directly involved with FEMA in matters dealing with the. plan approval and exercise evaluation response processes. It should also be mentioned that my nine years of employment at IESDA also provided much experience in emergency response planning for other hazards'that face Illinois, like hazardous materials, floods, tornados, earthquake and nuclear: l attack. Furthermore, my many experiences in actual: emergency response situations served as a solid foundation to revise existing plans and procedures, based on lessons learned and new technological innovations. My resume is included as Attachment "1". l l Q.6. How important is it for emergency responders to be familiar with the plans and to have drilled and exercised with 1 I them? i' A.6. It is extremely important. The plans are lengthy documents that need to be read and understood prior to an l emergency by those responsible f?r carrying'them out. In a fast-breaking accidsnt, there will not be time for emergency ; responders to sit around and read plans. That is why all emergency response organizations conduct training, drills, and exercises. There is another key reason to conduct drills and exercises, however. It is through participation in drills and 1

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      . exercises that working relationships get developed between responders both within a single response organization and,        ,

q perhaps more importantly, in different response organizations. .j These working relationships are what make the difference between a prompt and efficient response and a halting one. Through drills and exercises responders learn not only.what the

      'most efficient channels of' communication are; they learn how to convey just the right amount of information in the right way at the right time. Furthermore, it is only through drills and 1

exercises,'short of a real event, that lessons can be learned, leading to the improvement and enhancement of existing plans and procedures before.they are needed in a real emergency. Q.7. 'Are you familiar.with the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities ("SPMC"), a utility-sponsored plan for a response in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to a radiological emergency at the commercial nuclear plant in 1 Seabrook, New Hampshire? ! 1 A.7. Yes, I have reviewed it. Q.8. Are you familiar with the different " modes" of response it permits? A.8. Yes. These modes of response are described in Section 3, which is entitled "loncept of Operations". The two responst modes described there pertain to the utility-sponsored response organization, the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization ("NHY-ORO"). The SpMC describes these 1 i

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q two response. modes of operation as follows-

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The NHY Response Organization will function in one of ' three modes of operation during'an emergency at the { Seabrook Station (refer to Figure 3.1-1). These are i the Standby Mode; Mode 1 - to provide only resources -l (equipment, buses, ambulances, personnel, etc.) to the i State and/or local emergency response organizations; or Mode 2 - to assume ~ responsibility on behalf of the { State / locals (upon authorization by State) for 3 ' implementation of the entire response or integrating specific portions thereof. The initial action to determine.which mode of operation will be implemented is contacting the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to determine if they l have the capabilities to respond. 1 1 SPMC, S3.l'at 3.1-2. Figure 3.1-1 of the SPMC'further l describes these " modes". i l Q.9. What1are state and local governments doing under the j SpMC in each of these two response " modes"? , A.9. As I understand it,1 the SpMC is designed such that ! the state / local governments have essentially.two options at the

time of a radiological emergency, and these options correspond to the NHY-ORO modes. The first option is for the state / local } governments to assume full command and control ofsthe emergency il { response while requesting resources (buses, equipment, l personnel, etc.) from the NHY-ORO. In that circumstance, the 1 SPMC describes the NHY-ORO as being in Mode 1.. The second i, option is for the state / local governments to delegate authority to the NHY-ORO to implement the entire euergency response or, more likely, discrete portions of that response, e.g., monitoring and decontamination activities. In the' prior , l-l- i

  -                                                                         1 circumstance, the NHY-ORO would be in " Mode 2-full"; in the latter it would be in " Mode 2-partial", that means that the l
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state / local governments are carrying out the emergency response ' functions not delegated to the NHY-ORO. It appears from'IP q l 2.14 Attachment 8 (attached as Attachment 2) that " Mode l 2-partial" is conceived along two different parameters: first, different local jurisdictions could retain control over all or part of the emergency response. Thus, one of the Massachusetts 4 communities -- Amesbury, for example -- might retain command 1 and control over the entire set of emergency response I l acti,vities-within its jurisdiction while at the same time a neighboring town has delegated a portion (or all) of the response to the utility organization. _Second, any one l jurisdiction (as well as the entire Massachusetts EpZ) could delegate certain functions to the ORO while retaining I l responsibility (i.e. command and control) over the other 1 functions. Finally it appears to be the intent of the authors of the SpMC to permit any combination of these two parameters. i Therefore, there is literally a matrix of possibilities combining different functions with different jurisdictions. The level of complexity is frankly astounding as a review of Attachment 8 to Ip 2.14 reveals. I Q.10. Are you familiar with the FEMA review of both the SpMC as a plan and the June 1988 exercise as to the various modes of implementation set forth in the utility plan? a - _ -- i l A.10. Yes, I have reviewed the FEMA review of the SPMC as a plan and the FEMA report on the performance of the utility during the 1988 exercise as to those parts of the FEMA review

and evaluation connected to the various modes of implementation set forth in the plan. I have also reviewed portions of the deposition of Joseph Keller who functioned as team leader for the review and evaluation of the SPMC exercise. ' Q.11. How would'you characterize that review with respect ; to the issues surrounding the various modes of implementation? d i A.11. Basically, I believe that FEMA approached the SPMC assuming that Mode 2 full would be implemented at the time of. l an emergency. Thus, FEMA assumed for purposes of both its review of the planning documents as well as its conduct of the .! i s exercise that Massachusetts officials would delegate the I requisite legal authority to permit the SPMC'to be implemented as a stand-alone plan. Having viewed it from this perspective, i FEMA actually did not seriously examine the issues surrounding the implementability of the SPMC in its other modes:' Mode 1 or Mode 2-partial. Q.12. What is your basis for this statement? l A.12. The exercise assumed that full legal authority would be granted to the ORO to perform all required emergency response functions. As a result, the only mode of implementation that was actually being tested and evaluated was ! Mode 2 full.

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Q.13. What is your assessment of the implementability of the SPMC in Mode 1 as that Mode is described in the planning l documents? 1 1 A.13. First, I would note that Mode 1 is itself

ambiguous. On the 9 hand, it appears from the planning documents that the Antent of the authors was that in this Mode the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would actually follow a plan of its own. This is clear for example, from a sample news ] release set out at IP 2.12 at page 34: j The NHY ORO is operating under Mode 1. Under this Mode, Massachusetts has responded to the emergency with their own response plan.... Moreover, Mode 1 is described as a situation in which the state responds to the emergency and the utility organization stands I ready to supply whatever resources may be needed. In light of this description which omits any express reference to the actual activities of the state it is reasonable to assume that the authors intended by Mode 1 to refer to a situation in which the state is implementing its own plan. It is my understanding that although state-wide or generic planning documents do exist for Massachusetts, there is no site-specific plan presently in place for the Seabrook site. On the other hand, it is at least possible to interpret the SPMC in Mode 1 as positing a situation in which at the time of an emergency the state's response organizations actually attempt to implement or follow

1 the procedures set forth in the SpMC. Although the SpMC 1 planning documents do not so state, it is certainly possible to 4 l make this assumption. 1 In my opinion in its present form the SpMC simply can not l be meaningfully or effectively implemented in a timely fashion in Mode 1 no matter which way that Mode is interpreted. Fi r s t ,-

if it simply means that the state will implement its own plan i then basically, in this Mode the SpMC is no planning vehicle at j all. Obviously, if in this Mode the utility is simply standing t i by with additional resources the situation is actually no l different from, for example, the federal governemnt standing by ! with additional resources available to assist a particular i j i 1 l state's emergency response effort. The fact of the i i availability of those federal resources is not itself the same as a plan for a particular state. If it were then no state i l_ would have to prepare, develop and exercise its own emergency { l plan. To assess the effectiveness of Mode 1 understood in this way would be the same as attempting to assess the effectiveness .l of the Commonwealth's response in light of the present posture of the Commonwealth's planning efforts. Although I have not reviewed and evaluated the present state of the Commonwealth's emergency response capability, I can state categorically that no matter how professional, well-equipped, and competent the state's overall emergency capabilities and response organizations may be, in the absence of a site-specific ;

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v , Seabrook' plan which includes plans and procedures radiating. from the' local levels to the regional and. state-wide levels which has been recently exercised there is no assurance that the Commonwealth's response will be adequate. I Second, if Mode 1 is understood as a mode of implementation 'l pursuant to which the state's response organizations are understood to follow the EPMC itself in the sense that the. i actual procedures are followed by state responders, the 1 planning documents are very inadequate as presently drafted. 1 I The SPMC is a lengthy and unwieldy planning document if it was designed to be quickly read and absorbed by emergency ~ ; responders at the time of an emergency. Assuming that these responders are not familiar with the planning document, it would take a fairly lengthy time first.for the state's 1 personnel to obtain copies of the relevant portions of the i SpMC, second to orient themselves in the structure of the documents themselves, third to identify the correlations i 1 l tetween the activities mapped out in the SpMC for various ORO I organizational components and the parallel state activities and l responsible organizations, and fourth, actually read, understand and then implement the procedures set out in the SPMC. Tn a slow moving radiological emergency, a competent state response organization like Massachusetts could probably perform these " translation" activities over the course of 6-8 a hours at the same time mobilizing the appropriate personnel to 1 i l 1

une tasks 4 rribed in the SpMC. But obviously the planning , basis for which radit logical emergency planning is necessary (if not most necessary) includes fast breaking accidents that demand timely and effective preparedness and response. For this reason, Mode 1 understood as a mode of implementation pursuant to which the state follows.the map written for the utility organization is not an adequate mode of ! implementation. The blueprint was written obviously for the ORO organization to follow and was not intended to be followed at the time of an emergency by those unfamiliar with it. It should also be noted that the SpMC does not appear to include any planning documentation for the local Massachusetts communities to even try to understand and follow in the event they were to choose a Mode 1 response. Q.14. What is your assessment of the implementability of the SpMC in Mode 2-partial as that Mode is described in the planning documents? A.14. This Mode of implementation is r etently unworkable primarily because it contemplates and w,uld permit a fantastically complicated patchwork of functions and jurisdictions at the same time providing no mechanism for:

1) communicating to the various response organizations their respective responsibilities and the responsibilities of the other organizations; 2) permitting any meaningful command and control over the entire response; 3) permitting a tilnely and

effective response; and 4) assuring that each of the organizations are able to communicate one with the other during. 1 the emergency.

As a-result, local elected officials could easily announce uncoordinated and conflicting protective action information to the affected populace through the broadcast media. Evacuees from town A could be directed in the wrong j 1 direction and run into the evacuees from town B. Or, a

shelter-in-place recommended protective action for people located within two miles of the plant in New Hampshire could I I ) become' useless if evacuation were recommended out to five miles l . l in selected sectors in Massachusetts. Governmental authority and credibility, weak in my opinion to begin with.in the eyes of the public, would likely l completely break down under this mode. Q.15. Have you reviewed the various governmental liaison i positions and their implementing procedures? A.15. Yes I have. Q.16. What is the regulatory basis for this requirement in a utility-only plan? A.16. As I understand the development'of the regulations, the NRC has adopted a new rule that sets forth a procedure for-reviewing the adequacy of a utility-only plan in those circumstances in which the relevant governments are not participating in the planning process. Further, FEMA and the l l

h 1 NRC have promulgated a supplement to NUREG-0654 which sets forth a new requirement.that: l The offsite response organization shall identify ' liaison personnel to. advise and assist State and local officals during an actual emergency in implementing those portions of the offsite plan where State or local response is identified. l C.S. In addition FEMA has added an Exercise Objective (No. 37) , which requires that a utility:- 3 l Demonstrate the capability of utility offsite i response organization personnel to interface with non-participating State and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice )' and assistance. 1 In this case the SpMC provides for 9 liaison personnel to be assigned to the function of government " interface". Because of i the stand-alone assumptions it made about the implementation of the SpMC FEMA did not evaluate the liaison function as it is-l described in the SpMC if that plan were to be implemented in either Mode 1 or Mode 2-partial. In fact, the role and function of the liaison if those modes were to be implemented is not well-defined and I do not believe that as presently i configured the liaison function as set forth in the SpMC is adequate to ensure that the plan could be implemented in those alternative modes. Q.17. What do you believe are the major problems with the liaison function as described in the SpMC? A.17. There are several fundamental issues here:

1. First, the actual role and function of the liaison personnel would differ according to which mode of

e : implementation is being followed. (By liaison personnel I am referring specifically to those 9 individuals assigned as I either Local EOC Liaisons or as State Liaisons. FEMA ' identified the Public Information Coordinator / Advisor as also performing a liaison function pursuant to NUREG-0654 Supplement 1, C.5. See the FEMA Review and Evaluation of the SPMC (December 1988) at 18. I have reviewed the procedures set forth at IP 2.12 for these two positions and I do not think that they are actually performing any meaningful liaison function. Indeed, the only reference in IP 2.12 in this regard i is an instruction to the Public Information Coordinator to

        "[i]dentify yourself to the     ... State and Federal Public Information Representatives."       IP 2.12 at Attachment 7, page 54.)

Under Mode 1 the ORO is standing by ready to provide j resources to the Commonwealth to whatever extent they might be required. As discussed above the actual procedures followed by the state's response organizations are not detailed in the SPMC. If the state is assumed to be following the procedures that were written in the SPMC for the ORO then the liaison function in this Mode would be extremely important. The liaison personnel would have to advise and assist all the critical state response organizations as to the actions and procedures that the state whould follow. The procedures and guidelines for these liaison personnel do not even begin to o 4 l 1 provide any basis for believing that the liaison personnel are familiar enough with both the details of the SPMC and the details of the corresponding state agencies to effectively j function as " interpreters" of the SPMC to the corresponding t state officals and organizations. 1

2. Second, there should be at.least two liaison personnel' assigned to each location. One should be expert in explaining !

plant conditions, how the accident occurred in layman's terms, and in providing easily understood examples of how given levels of radiation for given durations of time.could affect given members of the general public at given distances from the plant, etc. The other should be expert in the plans and ! procedures of the SPMC, the existing planning modes used by the ; Commonwealth, and have extensive communications skills to ens're u a quick interpretation between the SpMC and the Commonwealth's existing operational response structure and capabilities. These two individuals together might be able.to ; accomplish the kind of ad hac integrative function apparently contemplated by the SPMC in either Mode 1 or Mode 2-partial.

3. Third, the liaisons should also be attempting to harmonize the response of the Commonwealth with that of the State of New Hampshire pursuant to its state plan. l

4. Fourth, FEMA appears to be assuming that each ORO field responder will or might have to function at least in part in a liaison capacity in Mode 2-partial. For this reason, FEMA 1

conducted some field interviews during the exercise of ORO ) l 1 tr'affic guides to inquire concerning what actions.they would or 1 might take in the event that during an-emergency state 1 responders'actually appeared at their' respective sites and they j had to integrate the state activities into the ORO response. Not only is nuch~a method of testing the capacity of the ORO

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                                          . personnel to function in!this Mode inadequate (FEMA itself did l

not consider it part of the actual exercise) but what is

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    '                                                                                                          4 envisioned here would'be extremely difficult to implement.       : :j Because of.the complex set of possible permutations discussed above and referenced at Ip 2,.14 Attachment 8,   the actual         '

planning problem is.quite difficult. .At'any' point in time any

one ORO responder what'have to know which. organization has command and control over what' portions of the emergency. ' response. Q.18. .Does this conclude.your testimony? 5 A.18. Yes it does.

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ATTACHMENT 1 PERSONAL RESUME Charles D. Jones 4030 Brookfield Drive Springfield,IL 62703 Home: 217/529-8312 Work: 217/544-0270 CURRENT EMPLOYMENT: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Management Services Associates,Inc. (MSA), 630 South Pasfield Street, Springfield, Illinois,62704. MSA is a marketing and manage j ment consulting firm that specializes in government and public relations for businesses ' dependent upon or regulated by government. MSA was formed in April,1988, and currently has clients in Chicago and Springfield, Illinois, and Miami, Florida. One major MSA client that may be relevant to your needs is Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO); governmental relations services relative to CECO's nuclear program are provided by MSA under contract. PREVIOUS POSITION HELD:

January,1985 to April,1988 - Director of the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency is a Gove(IESDA),110 E. Adams Street, Springfield, Illinois,62706,217/782-2700. IESDA!j mor's Cabinet-level agency with an annual combined budget of S20 million, i and is responsible for all emergency services programs and disaster operations. l i MajorIESDA Accomplishments: Brought to completion the development of disaster preparedness plans for all nuclear power plants located in Illinois,i.e. seven sites, with multiple reactors. The Illinois ! l Plan for Radiological Accidents has been tested more than 25 times and evaluated successfully each time by federal officials. Administered the E (SARA Title III), and hols Chemical Safety Act - federal and state laws d i signed to bring the chemical industry and government into closer working relation-ships through shared information and preparedness plaitning.

ing Secured two majornearl flood $75 million in federal disaster assistance for the State of Illinois disasters.

I

s PERSONAL RESUME Charles D. Jones MajorIESDA Accomplishments (Cont.): i Helped develop an earthquake education and preparedness program -Illinois lies along the New Madrid seismie zone where the most destructive US earthquake oc-curred in 1811-12. i

Participated in classified federal exercises.

PastIESDA Memberships: State Emergency Response Commission for SARA Title III. Served as Chairman April, 1987 thru March,1988. National Emergency Management Association.1985-88. Past Regional Vice President, q Central United States Earthquake Consortium.1985-88. Past Secretary / Treasurer. l Illinois Hazardous Materials Advisory Board. 1985-88. Past Committee Chairman. Covernor's Chemical Safety Task Force. 1985-86. Secretary of State's Truck Safety Task Force. 1987-88. I National Coordinating Council of Emergency Management. 1980-88. Illinois Emergency Services Management Association. 1980-88. PREVIOUS POSITIONS: August,1979 to January,1985 - Held the following positions at 'ESDA: Acting Direc- 1 tor, Assistant Director, Legislative Liaison, Public Information Cfficer and Traming Pro-grams Supervisor. March,1977 to August,1979 - Public Information Officer. Iuinois Department of Trans-portation. i EDUCA M B.A., Eastern Ennis University, May 1975, Business Administration.

Post-Graduatestudies, University of Illinois, August thru December,1975, Advertising. ! OTHER CAPABILITIES: Registered Professional Lobbyist, State of Illinois. ' i Writing, logistics, graphic design and public speaking. l J ' REFERENCES AVAILABLEON REQUEST l

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SUMMARY

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