05000259/FIN-2013010-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Compensatory Actions to Minimize the Effects of Impaired Fire Protection Equipment on Fire Safe Shutdown |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Technical Specification 5.4.1.d for the failure to establish procedural guidance to implement compensatory measures for the high pressure fire protection (HPFP) system in support of the Fire Protection Report (FPR) and Safe Shutdown Instructions (SSI). The licensee entered this condition in their corrective action program (CAP) as problem evaluation report (PER) 812090 and issued an operations Standing Order which supplemented existing fire watch patrol compensatory measures in Fire Area (FA) 25-1. The licensees failure to establish appropriate compensatory measures supporting the FPR and the SSI to ensure an adequate water supply remained available when the diesel driven fire pump was taken out of service was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than-minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and that it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process , dated June 2, 2011, Attachment 4 Initial Characterization of Findings . This screening determined that an IMC 0609, Appendix F Fire Protection Significance Determination Process was required because it affected fixed fire protection systems. Attachment 1, Step 1.4.2, Fixed Fire Protection Systems screened the finding to very low safety significance (Green) since the impact of a fire in FA 25-1 is limited to no more than one train/division important to safety and that the reactor would be able to reach and maintain safe shutdown condition. The inspectors determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency this finding because the operability requirements and compensatory actions in effect had been developed in the past (1988) and were not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
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| Report | IR 05000259/2013010 Section 1R05 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Jones D Terry Ward G Ottenberg G Wiseman J Dymek R Fanner S Shaeffer |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2013010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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