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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24032A4762024-02-0101 February 2024 Final Report of a Part 21 Evaluation Associated with Starter Contactors for the BFN Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection Suppression Pool Inboard Suction Valve ML24023A2802024-01-23023 January 2024 Final Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with a Relay in the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Condensate Pump CNL-24-017, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions2024-01-17017 January 2024 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure and Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revisions ML24016A3042024-01-16016 January 2024 Final Report of a Part 21 Evaluation Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump CNL-23-071, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Inservice Inspection and Augmented Program Interval Revised Request for Alternative 0-ISI-472024-01-11011 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3, Inservice Inspection and Augmented Program Interval Revised Request for Alternative 0-ISI-47 ML24022A1732024-01-0303 January 2024 Receipt and Availability of the Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23319A1992024-01-0303 January 2024 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 333, 356, and 316 Regarding the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 3.4.3.2 and 3.5.1.11 Regarding Safety Relief Valves ML23355A2062023-12-21021 December 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23348A3942023-12-14014 December 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Potential Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Starter Contactors for the High Pressure Coolant Injection Suppression Pool Inboard Suction Valve IR 05000259/20230102023-12-11011 December 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000259/2023010 and 05000260/2023010 and 05000296/2023010 ML23335A0722023-12-0101 December 2023 Interim Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with a Relay in the Unit 2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Condensate Pump ML23334A2492023-11-30030 November 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision CNL-23-070, Submittal of Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program Plan2023-11-29029 November 2023 Submittal of Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program Plan ML23331A2532023-11-27027 November 2023 Summary Report for 10 CFR 50.9 Evaluations, Technical Specifications Bases Changes, Technical Requirement Manual Changes, and NRC Commitment Revisions CNL-23-067, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions2023-11-27027 November 2023 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions ML23325A1102023-11-21021 November 2023 Anchor Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Commitment Revision ML23320A2542023-11-16016 November 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump IR 05000259/20230032023-11-13013 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2023003, 05000260/2023003 and 05000296/2023003 IR 05000259/20230402023-11-0202 November 2023 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000259 2023040 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter ML23292A2532023-10-18018 October 2023 BFN 2024-301, Corporate Notification Letter (210-day Ltr) ML23282A0022023-10-0606 October 2023 Interim Part 21 Report of a Deviation or Failure to Comply Associated with Check Valve 0-CKV-023-0565 for D1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump ML23278A0122023-10-0505 October 2023 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 30 ML23271A1702023-09-28028 September 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23270A0702023-09-26026 September 2023 SLRA Pre-Application Meeting Summary 09-13-2023 ML23257A1232023-09-22022 September 2023 Administrative Changes to Technical Specification Pages Issued for License Amendment Nos. 332, 355, and 315 CNL-23-061, Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision2023-09-20020 September 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23263B1042023-09-20020 September 2023 Special Report 260/2023-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ML23205A2132023-09-0808 September 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 332, 355, and 315 Regarding the Revision of Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-566-A and TSTF-580-A, Rev. 1 CNL-23-057, Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions. Includes CECC-EPIP-1, Revision 76 and CECC-EPIP-9, Revision 642023-09-0505 September 2023 Central Emergency Control Center Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revisions. Includes CECC-EPIP-1, Revision 76 and CECC-EPIP-9, Revision 64 IR 05000259/20230052023-08-29029 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 - Report 05000259/2023005, 05000260/2023005 and 05000296/2023005 ML23233A0432023-08-18018 August 2023 Enforcement Action EA-22-122 Inspection Readiness Notification ML23219A1542023-08-17017 August 2023 Request to Use Later Edition of ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance and Alternative Requests BFN-IST-01 Through 05 for the Fifth 10-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML23228A1642023-08-16016 August 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision ML23228A0202023-08-15015 August 2023 (BFN) Unit 1 - Special Report 259/2023-001 for Inoperable Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation IR 05000259/20230022023-08-10010 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000259/2023002, 05000260/2023002, 05000296/2023002 and 07200052/2023001 ML23192A4472023-07-31031 July 2023 Staff Assessment of Updated Seismic Hazards at TVA Sites Following the NRC Process for the Ongoing Assessment of Natural Hazards Information CNL-23-055, Tennessee Valley Authority - Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revision. Includes EPDP-3, Revision 3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills2023-07-25025 July 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Emergency Preparedness Department Procedure Revision. Includes EPDP-3, Revision 3, Emergency Plan Exercises and Preparedness Drills ML23171A8862023-07-24024 July 2023 Issuance of Amend. Nos. 331, 354, and 314; 365 and 359 Regarding Adoption of TSTF-541-A, Add Exceptions to Surveillance Requirements for Valves and Dampers Locked in the Actuated Position ML23201A2182023-07-20020 July 2023 Registration of Use of Cask to Store Spent Fuel (MPC-298 and -299) ML23159A2552023-07-20020 July 2023 Proposed Alternative to the Requirements of the ASME Code Regarding Volumetric Inspection of Standby Liquid Control Nozzles ML23199A3072023-07-18018 July 2023 Site Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Revision CNL-23-053, Tennessee Valley Authority - Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions2023-07-18018 July 2023 Tennessee Valley Authority - Radiological Emergency Plan Revisions IR 05000259/20233012023-07-18018 July 2023 NRC Operator License Examination Report Nos. 05000259/2023301, 05000260/2023301, and 05000296/2023301 2024-02-01
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UNITED STATES June 11, 2013
SUBJECT:
NRC REPORT 05000260/2013012; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
Dear Mr. Shea:
This letter discusses a finding that has preliminarily been determined to be White, a finding with low to moderate safety significance that may require additional NRC inspections. This finding involved the failure to properly implement procedure 2-OI-99, Reactor Protection System, and was a performance deficiency. Specifically, during restoration of 2B Reactor Protection System (RPS) 480 volt power, the RPS motor generator set tie to battery BD 2 Breaker on the 2A RPS bus motor generator set was opened inappropriately, causing a Unit 2 reactor scram and closure of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV).
This finding was assessed based on the best available information using the applicable Significance Determination Process (SDP) and was calculated to have a preliminary increase in conditional core damage probability (CCDP) of 4.1E-6. This CCDP and additional risk insights were determined by evaluation of the increase in risk caused by the additional scram that resulted from the performance deficiency. Based on the risk evaluation, the preliminary significance determination is White or low to moderate safety significance. The final resolution of this finding will be conveyed in separate correspondence.
This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of the human performance area and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during at-power operations. Specifically, the failure to properly implement procedure 2-OI-99, Reactor Protection System, caused a Unit 2 reactor scram and MSIV closure. The NRC determined that this finding does not represent an immediate safety concern, because the licensee has taken actions to prevent recurrence of the associated human performance error that caused the event.
The finding is also an apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification 5.4.1, Procedures, and was documented as AV 05000260/2013002-02, Failure to Follow Operating Procedure Guidance Resulted in Unit 2 Reactor Scram, in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 05000259, 260, 296/2013002, dated May 14 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13134A237). This AV is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which can be found on the NRCs Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, we intend to complete our evaluation using the best available information and issue our final determination of safety significance within 90 days of the date of the referenced report. The significance determination process encourages an open dialogue between the NRC staff and the licensee; however, the dialogue should not impact the timeliness of the staffs final determination.
Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you with an opportunity: (1) to attend a Regulatory Conference where you can present to the NRC your perspective on the facts and assumptions the NRC used to arrive at the finding and assess its significance, or (2)
submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of your receipt of this letter. If you decline to request a Regulatory Conference or submit a written response, you relinquish your right to appeal the final SDP determination, in that by not doing either, you fail to meet the appeal requirements stated in the Prerequisite and Limitation sections of Attachment 2 of IMC 0609.
Please contact Craig Kontz at 404-997-4715 or in writing within 10 days from the issue date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision. The final resolution of this matter will be conveyed in separate correspondence.
Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being issued for these inspection findings at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violation described in the referenced inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
Sincerely,
/RA/
Richard P. Croteau, Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 05000260 License No.: DPR-52 Enclosure: Phase 3 Risk Significance Determination cc w/encl: (See page 3) _________________________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:EICS RII:DRP HQ:OE HQ:NRR RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE DXW /RA/ CRK /RA/ CFE /RA/ RHB /RA/ Via -Email Via-Email WBJ /RA/ RPC /RA/
NAME DJackson CKontz CEvans RBernhard LCasey SWeerakkody WJones RCroteau DATE 06/04/2013 06/04/2013 06/04/2013 06/10/2013 06/07/2013 06/10/2013 06/10/2013 06/11/2013 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO cc: Distribution via Listserv 3 Letter to Joseph from Richard P. Croteau dated June 11, 2013 SUBJECT: NRC REPORT 05000260/2013012; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT Distribution w/encl:
C. Evans, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC RidsNrrPMBrownsFerry Resource