05000259/FIN-2013004-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Reactor Vessel Water Level 1 Initiation Logic Including the Common Accident Logic Not Evaluated for Appendix R Fire Event |
| Description | TS 5.4.1.a. requires that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Revision 2. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 6.v, requires procedures for combating emergencies such as plant fires. Embodied within these requirements is the requirement that the procedures are adequate. Contrary to the above, procedural guidance given in SSIs 1-1, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 3-1, 3- 2, 3-3, 9, 12, and 13 was inadequate. Specifically, on October 20, 2009, the licensee identified, for a postulated fire that requires a plant shutdown with 20 minute depressurization, the licensees SSD procedures did not include steps to reestablish required Appendix R system alignments in the event that reactor vessel water level falls below the Reactor Vessel Water Level 1 setpoint. This condition has existed since the BFN Safe Shutdown analysis established the sites SSD methodology in January 1986. Upon discovery, the licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program (PER 177130) and implemented compensatory measures to inhibit the accident logic after SSI entry. The licensee also implemented fire watches as additional compensatory measures. Because the licensee committed to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC is exercising enforcement and reactor oversight process (ROP) discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and Inspection Manual Chapter 0305, Operating Reactor Assessment Program, Section 11.05.b. Specifically, this issue was identified and will be addressed during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, it was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, it was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance. |
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000259/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher D Jones J Hamman J Montgomery L Pressley M Riches S Shaeffer T Stephen |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.48 Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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