05000259/FIN-2013011-10
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Finding | |
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Title | Requirements for Concurrent Verification, Independent Verification, and Peer Checks |
Description | The team identified a Green, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures. The team determined that BFNs Requirements for Concurrent Verification, Independent Verification, and Peer Checks were not consistently applied to plant procedures, instructions, and work documents as required by TVA Corporate Procedure NPG-SPP-10.3, Rev.1, Verification Program, and regulatory requirement ANSI N18.7-1976/ANS-3.2, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for Operational Phase Nuclear Power Plants. BFN documented the issue in SRs 722559, 726755, and PERs 707531, 722859, and 727405. This finding was more than minor because, if BFN site verification procedure requirement issues and adherence are left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, such as more severe plant transients, or engineered safeguard system actuations or malfunctions. Additionally, this issue is similar to Example 4.b in IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that the recent inadequate use of human performance error prevention tools (self-checking, peer checking, and missing IVs and CVs in the Procedure NPGSPP- 10.3, Appendix A, list of 35 BFN systems that are required to have verifications for procedures, instructions, and work documents) have resulted in a reactor scrams, unplanned safety and risk significant system inoperability and unavailability, or other transients. The Finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significant Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function or safety systems out of service for greater than the TS allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not ensure that procedures were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, accurate and up-to-date procedures, work packages, and correct labeling of components. |
Site: | Browns Ferry ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000259/2013011 Section 4OA4 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 95003 |
Inspectors (proximate) | C Even C Moore E Guthrie J Eargle J Heinly R Skokowski |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2013011 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)
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