IR 05000438/1986009
| ML20207U115 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1987 |
| From: | Bearden W, Ignatonis A, York J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207U074 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-438-86-09, 50-438-86-9, 50-439-86-09, 50-439-86-9, NUDOCS 8703240630 | |
| Download: ML20207U115 (11) | |
Text
- pm CNg UNITED STATES
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[ n REGION 11 g j 101 MARIETTA STREET, * * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323 s.,...../
Report Nos.: 50-438/86-09 and 50-439/86-09 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority 6N38 A Lookout 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Docket Nos.: 50-438 and 50-439 License Nos.: CPPR-122 and CPPR-123 Facility Name: Bellefonte 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted: December 1, 1986 - January 31, 1987 Inspectors: hb
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@g 6, 4[T7 Bate ' Signed J. W. Q&Yor p & J % 3/a/87 W. C. Bea n U U D8te Signed Approved by: [d wb?,
A. J. Ignatonis,'S(ction Chief 3!A/f7 Da'te Signed Division of TVA Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine announced inspection was performed in the areas of safety-related pipe supports and restraints, instrumentation, electrical, structural steel welding, welding, fire prevention / protection, and employee concern Results: One violation was identified in one area: Failure to control purchase ,
of instrument panels.
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8703240630 870306 PDR G ADOCK 05000438 PDR
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees l
- L. Cox, Construction Project Manager
- S. Johnson, Site Quality Manager
- Thomas, Site Quality Office
- Terrill, Site Licensing Manager
- J. Baxter, Site Licensing
- McCollum, IEB Supervisor
- E. Deason, DNE Principal Engineer
- L. Ford, Quality Improvement Evaluator
- K. Turner, Quality Improvement Evaluator
- T. West, Engineering Aid Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, techni-cians, and office personne * Attended exit interview Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 2,1987, with those persons indicated by an asterisk in paragraph one above. The licensee acknowledged the inspection findings with no dissenting comment The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. At no time during the inspection period did the inspectors provide written material to the license One violation was identified in one area: Failure to control purchase of instrument panels, paragraph 5 One Inspector Followup Item was iden-tified in one area: Tubing bending program, paragraph S ' Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
This subject was not addressed in the inspection. Safety Related Pipe Supports and Restraints - Units 1 and 2 (50090C)
The inspectors observed the following supports / restraints (hangers) in various stages of fabrication:
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Hanger No. 1RE-MPHG-0194F R5 Class of Hanger - SCAT 1 (Structural Category 1)
Welder - FCHL Detailed Welding Procedure - SM-P-1 Filler Metal Heat No. - 77061 (E 7018 electrode)
Also, observed hanger QC reinspecting hange _ _ _-_ __ __ -_-- -
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Hanger No. - 1CA-MPHG-0072 R8 Class of Hanger - ASME Sec. III, Subsec. NF, C Observed QC inspection of hanger. IRN 1-14-87TB-1 written to document bottom plate holes too large
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Hanger No. 2VH-MPHG-0009F,0010F,0011F Class of Hanger - SCAT 1 Welder - FCKJ Detailed Welding Procedure - SM-P-1 Filler Metal Heat No. - 77061 (7018 electrode)
Observed Welding and installation of hange Hanger Nos. - OVL-MPHG-0849F R1,0850F R1,0851F R1 Class of Hanger - SCAT 1 (Structural Category 1)
Welder - FCNT Detailed Welding Procedure - SM 11-B-3A Filler Metal Heat No. - 77061 (E7018)
Observed welding QC's visual inspection of the welds on all three hanger .
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Hanger No. - 0WD-MPHG-1333F R0 Class of Hanger - SCAT 1 Welder - FCJW ,
Detailed Welding Procedure - SM-P-1 .I Filler Metal Heat No. - 77061 (E 7018) !
Observed grouting under base plate and tightening of bolts to pull base plate down on concret Hanger No. - OWD-MPHG-1311F R0 Class of Hanger - SCAT 1 Welder - FCNT Detailed Welding Procedure - SM-P-1 Filler Metal Heat No. - 77061 Observed WQC visual inspection of weld The inspectors checked the fabrication and welding operations for compliance with documentation, welder qualification (when applicable), and nondestruc-tive inspection requirement Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Instrumentation - Components and Structures - Units 1 and 2 (52153C) Tube Bending The inspectors visited the site measurement and test equipment (M&TE)
issue room for the purpose of reviewing the licensee's program for qualification, certification, and control of instrumentation tubing bending equipmen _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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The inspector examined qualification records (Attachment E-16-3 of Quality Control Procedure (QCP) - 10.11, Rev.13, Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment) for tube bending equipment and noted that each bender lot was qualified by performance of a minimum of 3 sample bends on tubing of the same size and material specification as that used in the field, i.e. , separate qualification records must exist for two different lots of tubing of identical dimensions but of different material. The test bends are then checked for visual condition, ovality, hardness, wall thickness, and liquid penetrant or magnetic particle testing performed to check for surface cracks or defect The results are then compared to requirements which are based on sections NB3642.1 and NB4223.2 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 197 The inspector noted that no program presently exists for periodically checking the condition of benders in use in the field. The inspector determined from discussions with licensee employees that this item was
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previously identified under Corrective Acti.on Tracking Document (CATD)
10700-NPS-03 for developing a program for maintenance of equipment I qualification and had been referred to the Division of Nuclear Construction for resolutio This item is identified as Inspector Followup Item 438,439/86-09-02, Tube bending progra Instrument Panels As a result of an inspection trip to Watts Bar, the residents decided to inspect fabrication, inspection, and documentation of wall mounted local instrument panels fabricated at the Bellefonte site. The Watts Bar documentation, inspection, etc. , problems, including lack of full penetration welds where called for on the drawing, were documented on Nonconformance Report (NCR) No. 673 The licensee had evaluated the generic implications at Bellefonte for NCR No. 6738 and found that the site fabrication drawings did not call for any full penetration welds and no problems existed in this are The inspectors found that only one wall mounted local instrument panel, No. 0IX-IXPA-040, had been fabricated on site using welded joint Reinspection of this panel revealed that it met drawing requirement The licensee identified 73 other wall mounted local instrument panels that were fabricated on site using bolting instead of welding. The
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four following panels from this category were reinspected and found to meet drawing requirements:
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Panels fabricated on site by boltin Panel No. ORF-IXPA-028 Panel No. ORF-IXPA-003 Panel No. ORF-IXPA-023 Panel No. 2RF-IXPA-024
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All four of these local instrument panels conformed to drawing The inspectors decided to inspect York Electro-Panel Control Co. , In (Vendor) supplied wall mounted instrument panels, since the majority of the panels were vendor supplied. The welding on the following eleven panels was reinspected:
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Panels issued but returned to warehous Panel No. 21X-ILPR-060 Fanel No. 2IX-ILPA-147-D Panel No. 2IX-ILPA-148-F Panel No. 21X-ILPR-032
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New panels unissued in the varehous Panel No. 000-ILPG-035 Panel No. 000-ILPG-047
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Panels mounted in Reactor Building No. Panel No. lIX-ILPR-044-B Panel No. lIX-ILPR-042-B Panel No. lIX-ILPR-042-A
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Panels mounted in the Auxiliary Buildin Panel No. IIX-ILPA-186 Panel No. lIX-ILPA-198 TVA contract No. 86243-1 references vendor drawing No. D-8418 Rev. 6 as the weld information drawing. This drawing was used by the licensee welding QC inspector and the NRC inspector for reinspection of the welds on the 11 panels. The drawing calls for all of the fillet welds to be 1/4 inch in size. Using a sampling technique, i.e., not inspecting all the welds on each panel, the inspector found at least two undersized fillet welds on each of the 11 panels. Most undersized welds found would meet the 3/16 inch size fillet but some of the welds would only meet 1/8 inch fillet siz In addition, some of the weld joints were not per the drawin Nonconformance Report No. 5131 Rev. 0 was written as a result of this reinspectio The failure of the panels to meet the approved drawings is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion VII, and is identified as Violation 438,439/86-09-01, Failure to control purchase of instrument panels. Electrical (Components and Systems) - Unit 1 (51053C)
The inspectors reviewed the documentation associated with the containment airlock electrical penetrations. During a generic review inspection (438, 439/86-11) conducted at the licensee's Division of Nuclear Engineering offices in Knoxville on December 15-19, 1986, an inspector noted that no evidence of generic review of conditions at Bellefonte existed for Browns
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Ferry NCR BFNTDP810 This NCR identified lack of documented evidence of containment airlock electrical. penetrations being qualified to maintain containment integrity during possible accident environment. The electrical penetration installations were of mineral insulation (MI) type and were evaluated as not being suitable for primary containment service. The subject MI penetrations were to be replaced at Browns Ferry and had been previously replaced at the Sequoyah and Watts Bar sites but no information could be provided by DNE personnel as to the conditions at Bellefonte. This item was identified as part of URI 438,439/86-11-0 The inspector determined that the containment airlock electrical penetrations at Bellefonte were not of the MI type but rather a Conax type solid metallic penetration with a Kapton type insulation material which the licensee has evaluated as being suitable for service. The electrical penetrations were provided under Wooley contracts 77K61-820979 and 75C61-85617-2 with the primary and secondary containment air locks. The Conax electrical penetra-tions are shown on Wooley drawings 35365 and 3253 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
7. Structural Steel Welding - Unit 1 (55053C)
The inspectors observed the craft training session for training Module No. TM-051, Welder, Welding Operator and Peening Operator Qualificatio Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8. Welding - Units 1 and 2 (Modules 50090C, 55053C, 55063C 55073C'and 55083C)
The inspectors reviewed two areas of welding which affected all current welding areas being inspected. These areas were (a) report (Phase I) of Bechtel QA audit of Bellefonte welding programs and (b) review of materials certifications for current site welding filler meta Results of Bechtel Quality Assurance Audit of Bellefonte Welding Programs Because of welding problems identified at Watts Bar, TVA initiated an audit of the welding programs at Brown's Ferry, Bellefonte, and Sequoyah. Each audit is performed in two phases. Phase I is more of a programmatic audit and Phase II is a hardware audi The inspectors reviewed the licensee's report for Phase I evaluation of the Bellefonte welding program. The audit team from Bechtel Power Corporation independently conducted a formal quality assurance audit of the sites welding programs between March 28, 1986, and April 4, 198 The audit addressed the welding programs as implemented during construction of Bellefonte and verified programs to be used by Nuclear Operation Since little or no quality related welding has been performed under the Nuclear Operations Program, the audit in this area l was very limite )
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The audit covered the following areas: l Drawings-Welding procedures Supporting records Welder qualification records .
Welder continuity records Welding QC personnel qualifications Use and control of welding filler metals Evaluation of employee concerns regarding welding Examination of six hardware weld There were no audit findings identified. Five observations (sugges-tions or recommendations) were identified. The report stated that the general consensus of the audit team was that quality activities relating to welding at Bellefonte are in compliance with the TVA programs and procedures and the applicable codes and standard The report also stated that there were no findings relating to any of the employee concern The Phase II' of the welding program involving reinspection of some of the hardware is tentatively scheduled for April 198 b. Review of Weld Filler Metal Material Certifications The inspectors recorded the following heat or lot numbers for the welding filler metal currently being issued by the site:
Shielded Metal Arc (SMAW)
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For Carbon Steel Welding E 7018 - Heat No. 9109 E 7018 - Heat No. 8215 E 7018 - Heat No. 77061 E 7018 - Heat No. A60991
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For Low Alloy Steel Welding E 8018 B2 - Heat No. 0158 AL 43143 E 8018 C3 - Heat No. SN3C E 8018 C3 - Heat No. 411H 3192 E 9018 B3 - Heat No. 1267C1 47143 E 9018 B3 - Heat No. 2034A1 47144
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For Stainless Steel Welding E 308 - Heat No. 1J26E26 E 308 - Heat No. G32E32
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For Stainless Steel Welding (Continued)
E 309 - Heat No. 9D9C E 309 - Heat No. 9C16B E 309L - Heat No. 004C E 309L - Heat No. OB3B Gas Tungstan Arc (GTAW)
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For Carbon Steel Welding ER 70S3 - Heat No. 422T 7432
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For Stainless Steel Welding ER 308 - Heat No. 35838 ER 308 - Heat No. 463730 ER 308L - Heat No. A4340T308L ER 308L - Heat No. C4611R308L ER 309 - Heat No. 463701 ER 309 - Heat No. 463699 ER 309 - Heat No. A3465T309 ER 316 - Heat No. J4002 ER 316 - Heat No. E7636
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For Inconel Welding ER NICR3 - Heat No. C3371N382 ER NICR3 - Heat No. D3142N382 Gas Metal Arc (GMAW)
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For Carbon Steel Welding E 70S6 - Heat No. 658C253 Flux Core (FCAW)
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For Carbon Steel Welding E 70T1 - Heat No. 1013A
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The certified material test reports for the weld filler material were examined to determine if the material complied with ASME Code Section II, Part C, Welding Rods, Electrodes, and Filler Metals, and Section III, where applicable. Control of this weld filler material is i
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specified in ASME Section III, NB-4122 which requires traceability of the material but gives two methods from which to choose. One method requires traceability to each component, and the second method requires a control procedure to ensure that the specified material is use Bellefonte's program uses both methods, i.e., traceability to the component for ASME fabrication and use of qualified or specified material for AWS, B 31.1, et Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Fire Prevention / Protection - Units 1 and 2 (42051C)
An inspector toured the Unit 1 Auxiliary, Reactor, and Diesel Generator Buildings, the Control Building and the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building to observe fire prevention and protection activities. The following conditions were verified to be in effect:
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equipment protective coverings were treated for fire retardancy
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wood scaffolding was treated with flame retardant
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there was no unnecessary accumulation of combustible forms, form lumber, shoring, or scaffolding
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fire extinguishers and fire hoses were located at designated places at each elevation
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access to suppression devices was not restricted by construction materials
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suppression devices indicated current inspection Additionally, an inspector reviewed the licensee's program for inspection of fire extinguishers. Records held by the licensee public safety department were- reviewed and selected fire extinguishers located in the plant were inspected to verify routine checks were being performed in accordance with the requirements as stated in Bellefonte Joint Fire Protection Plan. The inspector noted one fire extinguisher, number 464, located on the 649'
elevation of the Unit 1 Reactor Building that had not received monthly checks for at least 7 months. However, this appeared to be an isolated case due to the remote location and the removal of temporary scaffolding which had provided access to the associated area. Public safety personnel were informed and determined that the fire extinguisher was no longer required and it was removed from servic Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
1 Employee Concerns The inspectors had several discussions with the Bellefonte site employee concerns representatives, in regards to the program at this site. Following are some of the site statistics as of January 21, 1987:
Concerns received 3_9 Investigations completed 22_
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Concerns closed 18 Concerns referred to the Inspector General or to Watts Bar Employee Concern Task Group 4 Safety-related concerns (out of 39 total) 12, Concerns with confidentiality 3 Concerns substantiated (out of 18) 5 Following is a breakdown of the concerns by category:
Quality Assurance / Quality Control 3 Material Control 2 Management and Personnel 16,
Welding 3_
Construction 4 Industrial Safety 5 Engineering 5_
Intimidation, Harassment, and Wrongdoing 1 The one case of harassment, which has been investigated, did not involve a safety matter but an administrative area.
11. Followup of IE Bulletion (92703)
(Closed) 438;429/86-BU-03, Potential Failure of Multiple ECCS Pumps Due to Single Failure of Air Operated Valve in Minimum Flow Recirculation Lin The licensee responded to IEB 86-03 in a letter dated November 14, 198 The licensee stated that the facility was not vulnerable to single-failure of the ECCS pumps minimum flow recirculation lines due to the following: The DHR, RBS, and AFW systems are redundant (i.e., dual-trained) safety systems with separate miniflow lines for each system pump. There are no powered or air-operated valves in the miniflow line Manually-operated valves are installed in some miniflow lines; however, they are normally open and administratively-contolled. Therefore, these systems do not represent a concern in this are . The MuP/HPI has two train Train A which is used for normal makeup and seal injection as well as emergency high pressure injection (HPI);
has a motor-operated isolation valve in its minimum flow recirculation line which leads back to the makeup tank. Train B line, which is used
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for HPI or to provide redundant RCP seal injection, has cross-trained motor operated isolation valves in its recirculation line which leads to the borated water storage tank (BWST). These valves serve an automatic isolation function when an engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) signal is generated. These valves can also be remote-manually operated from the main control room (MCR). On an ESFAS ,
signal, these normally open valves will close. At this time, HPI must !
be maintained by the operator until he decides that he should override )
the isolation function and throttle or stop HPI flo . Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Plant Limits and Precautions document specifies that (1) the recirculation flowpath for each makeup pump should be open at all times except when operating in the HPI mode of operation, and (2) the minimum allowable makeup pump is 100 gallons per minute per pump. Each makeup pump's circulation line is equipped with a pressure switch located upstream of the recirculation isolation '
valve. This pressure switch is provided so that if recirculation flow is restricted within 60 seconds of pump start, and the stagnation pressure in the line increases, an alarm will be acuated in the MCR and the operating pump will shut off. However, in the event of an ESFAS signal, the high pressure trip will be overridden and the pump will run until it is manually shut of This does not represent a challenge to the MuP/HPI pumps since the pump discharge pressure exceeds that l required to open the RCS safety valve In summary, the single failure vulnerability discussed in the subject j bulletin does not exist at BLN. This item is closed.
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