ML20064N830

Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention XIII Re SNM License.No Genuine Issue of Matl Fact Exists

ML20064N830
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	09/07/1982
From:	Hirsch D COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20064N821	List: ML20064N817 ML20064N830 ML20064N849
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8209130006
Download: ML20064N830 (139)

Text

__ _ __ - ____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ ____ _

1 UNITED STATES.0F AMERICA 00ggf NUCLEAR REGUIATORY CCMMISSICN BEFORE THE A'IDMIC SAFETY AND LICENSINEN .9 p2;14 us. ~

l In the Matter of Docket 40g THE RECENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY (ProposedRenM1D OF CALIFORNIA Facility License)

(UCIA Research Reactor) t CBG MarION FOR 9UMMARY DISPOSITION AS TO CONTENTION XIII (Special Nuclear Materials License)

I. THE MOTION Purnuant to 10 CFR 2.749 and the Board's Order of July 26, 1982, the Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) respectfully moves the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for summary disposition as to Contention XIII or, in the alternative, partial summary disposition thereof.

In support of its Motion, CBG submits numerous items of documentary evidence as well as the declaration of Dr. David Hafemeister, an expert in nuclear non-proliferation matters as they relate to the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) by research reactors. These materials attest to the incontrovertible material facts set forth herein, to wit: that the amount and enrichment of Special Nuclear Materials requested'by UCLA in its license application are excessive, that the proposed license activities can be performed with far lower amounts and enrichment, and that grant of the license in the amounts and enrichment requested would entail unnecessary risks to public health and safety and the common defense and security. In addition, it will be demonstrated that there is no genuine dispute about the failure of Applicant to include in its license application the information required 8209130006 820907 PDR ADOCK 05000142 C PDR bb)

r o

by 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) and (8) and 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1), (2) and (3),

particularly with It,gards criticality accident protection, mitigation, monitoring, and response.

On the basis of the material facts attested to herein, and the admissions of the other parties, included in their answers to interrogatories and related documents, CBG is entitled as a matter of law to a ruling in its favor on Contention XIII, as no genuine dispute exists which would necessitate a hearing. Should the Board determine that certain residual matters as to the overall Contention remain in dispute, CBG respectfully requests that the Board grant partial summary disposition as to those material facts not in dispute.

II. THE CONTENTION A. Background The Applicants in this proceeding, the Regents of the University of California, have applied for a license to operate their research reactor for an additional twenty year period. Included in that Part 50 application for a facility license was a Part 70 request for a license for Special Nuclear

&torial to be used in conjunction with the reactor. At page 5 of the application for renewal of the facility license, Applicant states:

"Other licenses applied for in connection with this facility:

Special Nuclear hterial: 4700gmsU-235(irradiated) 4700 gms U-235 (fresh)

Pu-239 as a 2 curie, Pu-Be neutron source" 1/SpecialNuclearMaterials,orSNM,aredefinedprimarilyasplutonium and as uranium enriched in either the isotope 233 or 235 'Ihese are the primary materials capable of a sustained fission chain reaction. See i 10 CPR 70.70.4(m) and Section ll.na. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,

! as amended.

l l

_3 The 9400 grams of Uranium-235 are to be in the form of metallic uranium of 93% enrichment. h 2 Curie Plutonium-Beryllium neutron source represents approximately 32 grams of Plutonium-239.

Among the matters to be decided by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board which has been established to rule on UCIA's application, in addition to whether to grant an operating license for the requested period, is whether the Applicant has adequately demonstrated that the requested license for nearly 10 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and over 30 grams of plutonium should be granted. Paramount in this decision is a determination whether the proposed license can be granted without undue risk to public health and safety and the common defense and security. For, as the Congress of the United States found in mandating that the Commission regulate these materials:

The processing ani utilization of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material must be regulated in the national interest and in order to provide for the common defense and security and to protect the health ani safety of the public.

Section 2.d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2012 This is especially essential with regards Special Nuclear Naterials, due to their unique hazards if misused.

i It is perhaps the chief irony of this age that the special materials which, when fissioned in a controlled fashion inside a nuclear reactor, can produce such useful power as well as research and thereapeutic application, can also be used to make a nuclear weapon. While the fuel generally used in nuclear power plants cannot, without considerable enrichment or reprocessing, be used directly in a nuclear weapon, that is not, as shall be discussed infra, the case for the kind of highly enriched SNM requested by UCIA. The threat to common defense and security, as well as public safety, consequent to such material falling into the wrong hands is obvious.

4 An additional hazard attendant to use of SNM is that, 1

in addition to being able to go " critical" (that is, sustain a chain reaction) in a controlled situation inside a nuclear reactor or explosively in a nuclear weapon, SNM can, if accidentally placed in the right configuration, go critical in unintended settings. Incidents such as these are called

" criticality accidents," involve small unintentional nuclear explosions resulting in intense localized radiation, ani require special procedures and care to prevent. Approximately thirty such " criticality accidents" have occurred in the United States, roughly one per year of the nuclear era, resulting in six deaths and numerous other radiation injuries, as will be discussed below. For this reason, the Commission's regulations require applicants who wish to possess more than a relatively small q(uantity of SNM/ greater than to provide detailed information as to how they intend to prevent and deal with criticality accidents.

Finally, the SNM itself poses a hazard due to its radioactive nature as opposed to its capability of fissioning. In particular, Plutonium-239 is one of the most toxic materials known (about 20,000 times more toxic by weight than cobra venom or potassium cyanid permissible levels are measured in billionths of billionths of Curies. Release of such material in the form of an aerosol of finely divided particles (as in a fire or through theft of the material for a radiological weapon) could have extremely serious public health consequences, consequences which would be environmentally of great longevity, given the 24,400 year half life of Pu-239. Therefore, the material is regulated carefully the Commission is not to permit its use unless an applicant can demonstrate that its use of the material will not be inimical to public health and safety.

2/ See, e.g., Theodore B. Taylor and Mson Willrich, Nuclear Theft:

Risks and Safeguards, a Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Foni Foundation, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, mes.,1974 J

g/See10CFR20,AppendixB 10 CFR 70.23(a)(3) and (4)

i In sum, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has before it, in addition to UCLA's request to be permitted to operate its 22-year-old reactor until the turn of the century, a related request to be permitted to possess and use approximately 10 kilograms or 22 pounds of weapons-i grade uranium (93% enriched) and approximately 32 grams of Plutonium-239, i

The ASLB must determine whether the Applicant has provided reasonable assurance that grant of the requested materials will not be inimical to common defense and security and public health and safety. CBG has

, placed h t matter at issue in this proceeding. Contention XIII, subject l of the instant motion, focuses directly on the SNM License Application, i

asserting that it fails to provide the information required by the regulations and, more importantly, h t the amount and enrichment of SNM requested pose unnecessary proliferation and health and safety risks. Other concerns raised in other CBG contentions (for example, that the security 4 plan to protect the requested material is inadequate) would be, at least in some

! measure, mooted by a Board determination that the amount and enrichment j of SNM requested by UCIA are in excess of that reasonably needed to i

perfora the proposed licensed activities. Contention XIII is described below.

I i

j B. Contention XIII

] The Contention as' admitted states as follows:

5

, The information which Applicant has provided regarding the special nuclear materials license is inadequate to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) and (a)(8) and 70.24(a)(1),(2), and (3). Furthermore, the enrichment level requested and the quantity requested of SNM are excessive

and thus pose an unnecessary threat to public health and safety.

M UCLA has actually requested slightly over 10,000 grams of 93% enriched uranium, of which 9400 grams is therefore to be U-235 I

l l

i The first part of the contention alleges that important information, required by the regulations and necessary for a favorable decision to grant l the requested license, is missing from the application, particularly with regards_ procedures and equipment to prevent, mitigate, monitor and respond to criticality accidents. Absent such information and, more importantly, absent adequate pr6cedures and equipment, reasonable assurance cannot be given that grant of the requested license would not be inimical to public ,

health and safety due to a criticality accident. i l

The second part of the contention alleges that,the U-235 and

Pu-239 requests are excessive, that UCM doesn't need the amounts and

] enrichments asked for, and that because of the unique hazards associated i  %

j with plutonium and weapons-grade uranium, the application should not be granted in the amounts and enrichment requested. 'Ihe threats to public health and safety from detonation of a clandestine fission explosive i

j produced with uranium that could be diverted or stolen from the UCM facility are extraordinarily graves the increased radiological dangers associated with increased criticality accident risks and hazard from accidental or intentional release of plutcmium are also of concern. These hazards

! would be substantially reduced or eliminated if UCLA were to perform i its desired activities with less potentially dangerous SNM levels.

t As UCM has reduced its SNM holdings to roughly half the quantity it requests in its application, and since UCM has for many years used a Radium-Beryllium neutron startup source for the reactor as opposed to i

! the requested Plutonium-Beryllium source identified in the application, i

grant of summary disposition on those portions of the contention would

, '6/ By " unnecessary threat to public health and safety" in Contention XIII,

CBC refers to the range of threats from harm from detonation of a clandestine

fission explosion to the lower order threats though still worrisome--

l from criticality accidents and dispersion of Plutonium by accident or intent.

For purposes of clarity in this motion, those separate threats to the public will be discussed separately.

l I

merely bring the application into conformance with the status quo at the facility.

The aspects of the Contention discussed in this Motion will be in the following eders (1)criticalityaccidentinformation, (2) the need for 32 grams of Plutonium, (3) the need for 9400 grams of U-235,and(4)theneedfor93%enricheduranium. By so doing, it should not be inferred that these natters are of equal importance. While real public health and safety concerns exist as to all four aspects, the nuclear weapons proliferation threat occasioned by unnecessarily h rge quantities of weapons-grade uranium by far predominates.

III. CRITICALITY. ACCIDENT PREVENTION INFORMATION A. What is Meant by the Term " Criticality Accident'!'

9pecial Nuclear Materials are unique in their ability to release enormously large quantities of energy in astonishingly small periods of time. This is due to the fact that the nuclear chain-reaction can increase in magnitude exponentially, all in an exceedingly small part of a second.

For example, in an atomic bomb, energy equivalent to hundreds of tons of high explosives can be released in'a period measured in millionths of a second if just a few kilograms of highly enriched uranium are rapidly brcught together or imploded and if one neutron is present at the start to begin the reaction.

The amount of 9NM necessary to just barely sustain a chain reaction is the criticil mass. If more than one critical mass is assembled under the right conditions, the reaction goes " super-critical",

i.e. power increases exponentially until something--intervention of control rods in a normally operating reactor or explosive disassembly of the device

in a bomb--makes the assembly go subcritical again. In the interval, lasting perhaps only milliseconds, considerable energy can be released.

It is thus obvious that unintended supercriticality is strongly to be avoided.

Unintended supercriticality is often called a " criticality accident." It occurs when two or more suberitical masses of SNM are accidentally brought together in the right configuration and with the right conditions (moderation, reflection, etc.) so that a chain reaction occurs where none was planned.

Rose accidents can be very dangerous because they are often associated with intense neutron and gamma radiation bursts and even on occasion small explosions. Bere have been at least six immediate deaths from such accidents and scores of serious radiation injuries.from doses in the hundreds of rads, causing the Hiroshima-type acute radiation syndrome.

Criticality accidents can occur inside a reactor or outside.

Because of the capability of nuclear reactions to increase in power exponentially in times considerably shorter than a person can respond, nuclear reactions must be carefully controlled if they are to be used safely in peaceful applications. In a reactor this is done by " reactivity" controls (reactivity is essentially that which makes a reactor react, something like how much horsepower one has "under the hood") such as neutron-absorbing control rods. R ose devices keep the nuclear reaction from getting out of control, something similar to brakes on a car except that the reactor "goes" by letting up on the brakes rather than stepping on the gas. Occasionally the brakes fail or someone makes a mistake and lets up on them at the wrong time and the fission process runs wild,

_9_

power goes from zero to millions of watts faster than you can blink your eye, and anyone unfortunate enough to be in the same room at the time gets a sizeable radiation dose capable of causing radiation sickness or death within a few hours or days. Such in-reactor criticality accidents occurred in 1952 at Argonne National Iabs,1961 at Idaho Falls, and 1958 at Vinca, Yugoslavia and resulted in some tragic deaths and injuries from the intense radiation fields generated.

Such accidents can also occur outside reactors, and have.

Whenever SNM of greater than a certain enrichment and quantity is handled, special procedures and equipment must be employed to avoid accidentally bringing enough SNM into a proper configuration that causes it to go super-critical. Two fatalities occurred at Los Alamos within a year of each other whens in one case the individual dropped a a reflector brick and in the other a screw driver used as a wedge to hold up part of an assembly slipped. In both cases a characteristic " blue glow" was observed and the victims died within a month from the intense radiation exposure.

Because of the dangers of criticality accidents attendant whenever more than a few hundred grams of SNM are handled, the Commission requires applicants for such materials to demonstrate that they can and will take the necessary precautions to prevent such accidents occurring and will be able to respond appropriately if they do occur.

B. The Legal Requirements 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) and (8) require an applicant for an SNM license to include in their applications " description of equipment and facilities which will be used by the applicant to protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as handling devices, working areas, shields...

criticalityaccidentalarmsystems,etc.)"and"[PJroposedproceduresto Y See, for more details about criticality accidents, WASH 1192, Operational Accidents and Radiation Exposure Experience Within the USAEC, portions of which are attached.

protect health and minimize danger to life or property (such as procedures to avoid accidental criticality. . . post-criticality accident emergency procedures,etc.)". And 10 CFR 70.24(a) requires all licensees authorized to possess more than 700 e; rams of U-235 of greater than 4% enrichment to have a criticality monitoring and alarm system meeting the specifications set out therein, as well'as emergency procedures for each area in which such SNM is handled or stored for response to a criticality accident.

These requirements are matters of laws they are especially important for the Applicant in this case to obey, given the fact that it has far more than 700 grams of U-235 and far higher enrichment than 4%, and given the existence of considerable quantities of moderating and reflecting materials in rooms where SNM is stored and used (e.g. heavy water and graphite). Yet the information is lacking from the application.

The Required Information is Iacking In interrogatories dated April 20, 1981, CBG asked the Applicant the following question (interrogatory 3 as to Contention XIII):

Precisely on what pages of the Application does Applicant provide the information required by 10 CFR 70.22(a)(7) and (a)(8) and 70.24(a)(1),

(2), and (3)?

l The Applicant responded on May 20,1981,(page135)asfollows:

l 10 Ch. ".22 (a)(7): A endices II and V, for examples pages III/5-15.

V/3-4 10 CFR 70.22(a) ): Appendix V, for examples, page V/3-8, j and Appendix IV. 10 CFR 70.24(a)(1), (2), and (3): None.

! Applicant thus admits than none of the information identified in 10 CFR 70.24 (a)(1), (2), and (3) is found in the application. Furthermore, the page cited by Applicant with regards the 70.22 information f III/5-15, merely says that fuel loading is directed by a reactor operator--not what procedures and equipment are employed to prevent accidental criticality, i

-11 Page V/3-4 deals with general reactor room monitors no mention is made of criticality monitors, nor of coverage of areas other than the reactor room. Information necessary to judge compliance of the monitors with 10 CFR 70.24 is not provided, as Applicant itself admits.

Page V/3-8 simply describes the fuel loading. Appendix IV formerly mentioned procedures for dealing with radiation accident cases, without specific mention of criticality cases, but after NRC Staff questioned tha assertion in the original Appendix IV (page C-1) that "the individual who has received whole or partial body radiation and may have received a lethal dose of radiation, but is no hazard to attendants, other patients or the environment," even that minimal reference to victims of direct radiation was removed. (The Staff rightly pointed out that a victim of neutron radiation, as in a criticality accident, would be radioactive himself, due to activation of sodium in the blood, gold fillings, ani the like, and could be a hazard to attendants, etc.) No reference whatsoever to means for coping with criticality accidents is found in the revised Emergency Plan, the new Appendix IV.

In response to CBG interrogatory number 5 of the set identified above, which asks "What specific means are employed by Applicant for i monitoring for accidental criticality of irradiated fuel?" the response l

was simply, "None."

l i

Given Applicant's admission in interrogatory responses that none of the information regarding 70.24 criticality monitoring and response is in the application, and the admission that no means are employed for monitoring for accidental criticality of irradiated fuel (of which the i

requested license is for 4700 grams, far in excess of the 70.24 threshhold I

of 700 grams), there appears no dispute as to the material facts and CBG is entitled as a matter of law to a favorable ruling on that part of the contention that the identified and required information is lacking.

i

i*

f

! 2at this result is warranted is further supported by Staff's l

answers to interrogatories 231-233 by CBG as to the Safety Evaluation 1 Report (found at page 14 of Mr. Bernard's affidavit answering the interrogatories). Rose three questions asked for various information

about the potential for and means of preventing accidental criticality l in the storage cabinet in which the fresh fuel is kept. Staff's i

one word answer in each case was: " Unknown."

Complete information about criticality protection at the UCLA facility is not in possession of Staff, it is not included in 1

the Application, and in absence of that information being fully provided in the SNM license request, reasonable assurance; that adequate protection, detection, and response measures will be taken is impossible, i

I IV. PLUTONIUM SOURCE UNNECESSARY l On October 3, 1960, the Atomic Energy Commission gaanted

UCLA's request for a license to possess 3 350 kilograms of U-235 and i

32 grams of Plutonium-239, the latter for use as a neutron startup source t

for the reactor. In early 1961, UCLA requested the Commission amend its i license to replace the Plutonium source with a far smaller (and less hazardous) l Radium source. As the AEC Hazards Analysis of June 28, 1961, described the proposed amendments l

l he applicant proposes to replace the 2 curie Pu-Be source with l a 10 millicurie Ra-Be source. The present Pu-Be source has j been determined to give a much stronger indication than required for safe startup. Both types of sources have been utilized successfully in research reactors; we anticipate that no additional hazarti will result from the replacement of Pu-Be source with the Ra-Be source.

Despite the fact that the amendment was granted, and UCLA has used Radium startup sources ever since, it has continued to carry on its license for the reactor the authority to possess up to 32 grams of Pu-239 as a neutron source.

1 Note that the same application which at page 5. requests 2 Curies of Plutonium as a startup source indicates at page III/6-5 that the facility now uses a 6.6 millicurie Radium source instead. Se Radium source in use currently is many, many orders of magnitude less hazardous than the requested Plutonium source which it appears the reactor does not needs in fact, the above-cited AEC analysis would appear to indicate that reactor operations themselves are safer without the very strong indication provided by the Pu-Be, which is why UCIA discontinued using such a source in the first place.

UCLA may have in mind use of a Plutonium source for some purpose other than use related to the reactor and the activities licensed under reactor licensc, R-71. In fact, UCLA has at various times had Special Nuclear Materials licenses that permitted use of Plutonium sources for uses other than the reactor. But these were granted on SNM licenses separate from the reactor's license. he SNM license for the reactor is for SNM for the reactor. A Plutonium source is no longer used for the reactor, hasn't been used for years, is not needed, and would be .an unnecessary public health and safety hazard. If the University is attempting to hold onto a Plutonium source, or at least license for such a source, when it is no longer used for the purpose for which the license l was granted and for which the renewal application has been made, then l

l the University is being less than frank with the Commission.

l

, In light of UCIA's own request to the Commission in 1961 to be able to use a radium source as 1-te reactor's neutron source, the Commission's concurrence at the time that the radium source was preferable, l

• i l and twenty years' operating history with the radium source, and in light l

l l

l

l 1

of the undisputable hazards associated with use of plutonium, and in absence of any compelling reason why the radium source should cease to be used in favor of a return to plutonium, CBG respectfully suggests ,

that there are no material facts in dispute about its contention that the requested license for 32 grams of Plutonium.is an unnecessary threat to public health and safety and should, as a matter of law, be denied.

V. AMOUlTP OF U-235 REQUESTED IS EXCESSIVE A. History On May 30, 1959, UCLA applied to the Atomic Energy Commission for a construction permit for a training reactor facility. That Application included a request for 4.0 kg of 90% U-235 and 2 Curies of Pu-239 as a startup source. UCLA indicated that 4 kg was 660 grams more than it needed and would return the excess after fuel fabrication on or about December 30, 1959. 'Ihe application, furthermore, provided an estimated schedule by years for subsequent receipts, consumption and transfer of SNM, consisting of needing no additional fuel until 1964, at which time it would need an additional 10 grams, and would not need an addition 10 grams againuntil1969.Y For the next decade UCLA operated with less than 3 5 kg of U-235 total on site. After the first year of operation it discovered it did not need the Plutonium source for startup, as mentioned above, and received Amendment 2 to its license permitting it to use a radium source instead.

After a decade of operation with 3 5 kg, UCIA requested 6/ Construction permit application, 5/30/59, attached hereto.

Z/i_d_.,atpage7 Y id.

"an additional 4.3 kg of Uranium-235 for the purpose of refueling."

'1his request, made June 3,1970, indicated that refueling was to be done l 1

during the summer of 1971, and that therefore they would briefly have 7.8 kg l on site, and "after refueling and shipment of the old fuel bundles approximately 4.3 kg." UCLA thus asked for permission to temporarily have on site 7.8 kg during refueling.

The AEC responded on June 24,1970,Yby reminding UCLA that its current possession limit was 4.0 kg, not 3 5 as UCLA thought (because for the previous decade that was all it had had on site), and thus asked UCLA whether it wanted the new license limit to be 7.8 or 8.3 kg.

The University responded on. July 9, saying "we would like the new limit to be 8.3 kilograms," and indicating that plans were for refueling in June of1971.b Two months later UCLA asked that the limit be altered further, this time to 10 kg, because the fuel manufacturer assertedly needed extra melt stock, scrap from which would be returned to UCIA.

On October 26, 1970, just six weeks thereafter, the AEC published notice that it ins acending UCLA's license from a limit of 4.0 kg to 10 kg, a 250% increase. The notice of issuance of facility license amendment 8 stated that the purpose for the amendment was that The additional material is required for the fabrication of fuel elements which will be used to replace those now in the reactor.

However, refueling never took place, the original fuel is still in the reactor, and the spare core loading and additional extra bundles and the scrap remained on site for a decade, unneeded and largely unprotected.

2 j Letter, 3 June 1970, from Thomas Hicks, NEL Director, to Dr. Peter Morris, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, attached, g Letter, 24 June 1970, from Donald J. Skovholt, Assistant Director for Reactor Operations, Division of Reactor Licensing, USAEC, c to Dr. Hicks, NEL 11/ Letter,9 July 1970,fromDr. Hicks,NEL,toDonaldSkovholt,USAEG 12/ Letter,10 September 1970,fromDr. Hicks,NEL,toDr. Morris,USAEC lg Notice of Issuance of #acility License Amendment, 26 October 1970 y ud towards protecting this

During the same period that UCLA was requesting amendment to its license to increase U-235 possession limits to 10 kg, it was writing technical specifications as part of a relicensing request.

Included in the latter request was a: request for a 15-fold increase in its plutonium holdings, to 500 grams, and receipt in addition of 250 grams of U-233, as well as increase in authorized power level to 500 kw, or 50 tines the level for which the reactor was initially designed.

(Neither the plutonium nor the U-233, obviously, were to be used in the power increase. UCLA had already increased power to 100 kw a few years earlier.)

On August 31, 1970, the AEC, following a preliminary review of the above application, asked for the following additional information to complete their evaluation:

1. A description of the physical form of the 250 grams of uranium-233 and the additional 467 grams of plutonium requested and a description of the proposed use of this material.

2 A supplemental safety analysis report, as described in Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50, in support of your request to increase the power level to 500 kwt.

The University responded on October 7, withdrawing the request for the 250 grams of U-233, the 467 grams of Plutonium, and the increased power level.

As will be indicated in CBC's brief on the issue of which set of security regulations (10 CFR 73.60 or 67) applies to this license request, having nearly 10 kg of highly enriched uranium on site during the 1970s became quite a compliance problem for UCLA and the Commission.

M/ Letter, February 20, 1970, from David saxon, UCLA Vice Chancellor, to Donald Skovholt, Assistant Director for Reactor Operations, USAEC Letter, Skovholt to H.V. Brown, UCLA August 31, 1970 Ig/

1_?

Letter,NELDirectorHickstoDr. Peter, Morris , USAEC, 7 October 1970

First, the AEC rejected UCLA's security plan because, even with the exemption for irradiated fuel, UCLA had a " formula" quantity of SNM on site with l

a security plan, then as now, not sufficient to protect that quantity.18ja UCIA promised to ship out just enough fuel to get it under the formula limit in order to avoid threatened enforcement action by the AEC. A few years later an NRC inspection discovered UCIA still had more than a formula quantity as NEL Director Catton put it, "We are presently in technical violation of our SNM possession limit, and further delay [in reducing inventory /

could invite a Notice of Violation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission."2_0/

The delay lasted an addition year and a half, with the shipment finally occurringinJuneof1980,withdisastrousresults.b CBG contested UCIA's license renewal request, in part contending the SNM amounts were still excessives an NRC site visit then confirmed this assertion, determining once again that UCIA had a formula quantity of SNM and had to take measures to better protect it or to reduce the inventory. And just six weeks ago, in the midst of the Board hearing argument on whether UCLA had a formula quantity and therefore had to meet a higher standard of security protection for the HEU, the University notified the Board that it had shipped off just enough fuel to get below the 5 0 limit (i.e., UCLA claims to now have 4.92,-

though it appears to have forgotten about the Plutonium source, which according to the SNM formula, brings it once again over the formula level). There has been no confirmation of the actual amount currently on sites available records appear to contradict the 4.92 assertion, indicating the actual amount i

l about half a kilogram higher. (Ictter of October 28, 1972, frca UCLA's Ashlaugh W a " formula" quantity of SNM is essentially that quantity defined by NRC as sufficient to make a bo.nb from without need of additional SNM. The formula. quantity, as in 10 CFR 73.60, is grams SNM enriched over 20% + 2 5 (grams U-233 + grams Plutonium) = 5000 grams or more.

18a/18 November 1974 letter AEC George Lear to UCLA's Hicks l 19/ 27 November 1974 letter, Charles Ashbaugh (UCIA) to AEC's Goller j 2_0/ 1 March 1979 letter, UCLA's Catton, to DOE's Berger 21 This was the shipment that took the wrong route, apparently so the driver could pick up his girlfriend and take her with him to Ias Vegas, where the truck was/

,, parked

,________ en overnight,in,a

,no _ii_

casino parkina unnemmI m lot, tma and later found to be highly contaminated.

to AEC's Coller, indicates that after shipping out the scrap UCIA was to have a total inventory of 9.047 kg. Records provided by UCLA's Neill Ostrander, transmitted by cover letter of William Cormier on August 26, 1982 indicate only two shipments took place thereafter, one of 730 grams and one of 2360 grams, which would leave the University still with about 5350 grams.)

In short, there are two periods in the history of the UCIA reactor's handling of HEU. For the reactor's first decade, the facility operated with less than 3 5 kg and was able to perform all its necessary functions. For the second decade, the University had on site nearly three times that amount, and was in constant violation of NRC security regulations because the amount on site was repeatedly found to be excessive. And further, the additional SNM never was used for the purpose requested, full core refueling, and the old core was thus never shipped off site, as promised, so what started out as a request to have 7.8 kg on site temporarily during refueling became an almost permanent period with nearly 10 kg, which was neither used nor needed. And now UCLA has shipped offsite some of the excess, but is refusing to amend its license or license application down to the level its security system can handle and the level it really has a need for.

l l

B. UCLA Does Not Need a License for 9400 grams of U-235 The reactor can only opera te on about 3 5 kg. Burnup is

! extremely small, approximately one gram per year. The maximum burnup

, that could take place in the requested license period is less than 40 grams t

total. Even taking into account potentially clumsy fuel handlers who might 2]/ in response to agreement between Applicant ani CBG, Applicant clarified its interrogatory responses through a submission on August 26, 1982 id, 2 see Hafemeister declarations also Ostrander memorandum, cited above

! Hafemeister declaration l

l l

j i

damage fuel during loading or unloading, a maximum of 700 grams, including burnup, can be expected to be needed during the next twenty years, based on the reactor's operating history. Given the current core arrangement and maximum burnup, the facility needs only 3600 grams through the year 2000, the requested license period. Counting in clumsy fuel handlers brings a total of 4300 grans-on the assumption that the full twenty years' spare supply should be kept on site all the time rather than shipped on when needed, as was the original arrangement with the AEC when UCLA first was licensed.

But the UCLA reactor can perform its intended function on even less than that. The Battelle study cites the minimum critical mass for the Argonaut as 1.9 kg.with one-slab geometry, and as 2.2 kg kg with slightly increased spacing of the fuel elements (the Argonaut is undermoderated, so increasing the spacing increases the volume of water between plates, ani hence the moderation.) These figures are lased on experience with different core configurations in the original Argonaut at Argonne National Iabs, which used 20% enriched fuel.

Thus it is indisputible that the UCIA Argonaut reactor can perfoIa its licensed functions with a far smaller inventory of SNM. It is indisputible because for a decade UCLA did precisely that, because UCIA asserts it curren ossesses about half of the amount of SNM it has requested l in its license application, and with some relatively minor modifications to

the geometry of the core, it can operate on roughly one fifth the requested l

amount. How far below 9400 grams UCIA should be required to go is perhaps disputable there can be no dispute that 9400 grams is too much. That is close i

l to enough for two atom bombs, if diverted or stolen. When the core _only holds 3550 and burnup is a gram a year, 9400 grams is excessive and an unnecessary l Environmental Impact Appraisal, page 5 I see A endix A to original Facility License l 23/ NURE R-2079, page 23, i 20/ Argonaut Reactor Databook by Sturm and Daavettila, A&6285, January 1961:

Summary Report on the Hazards of the Argonaut Reactor, Lennox and Kelber, l A L 5647, December 1956 i

risk to public health arri safety and the common defense and security.

VI. THE REQUESTED ENRICHMENT IS EXCESSIVE AND UNNECESSARY A. History In the 1950s and 1960s, low power research reactors were built in many countries, including the U.S., which utilized flat plate MTR-type fuel containing 20% or less enriched uranium, a value chosen because it was considered to be a limit for weapon usable material. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) came into demand for'high power research reactors, and eventually many low power reactors for which Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) would have sufficed were using HEU instead. In the 1970s, however, particularly after Irviia exploded a nuclear weapon using nuclear material obtained through a research reactor, concern grew once again about the use of HEU in research reactors (as well as very low enriched uranium in which Plutonium can be generated). This concern led to a national policy of attempting to reduce enrichments of research reactor fuels and reduce the amount of HEU in use.

The Argonaut reactor has a similar history. The original Argonaut at Argonne National Labs used 20% enriched fuel (infact, the uranium was in oxide form, which has other useful safety and. non-proliferation prop erties). 'Ihe first Argonaut used 20% fuel for many years, from the time it first went critical, in February of 1957, through the time of most recent reporting, October of 1961Y(theoriginalArgonautwas dismantled and no longer exists).

31/ See IAEA-TECDOC-233, "Research Reactor Core Conversion from the Use of Highly Enrichel lianium to the Use of Low Enriched Uranium Fuels Guidebook",

a Technical Document issues by the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1980, p. 1, attadted.

3.2/ ,i.d.

id Summary Report on the Hazanis of the Argonaut Reactor, ANL-5647, by Iennox and Kelber, December 1956 IAEA Directory of Nuclear Reactors, Volume V,1964r also, Argonaut Reactor

• - - - -, 7 M1

_ . . . i_ u u m i ._ _a m .._ i i n -

'Ihe first commercially-available Argonaut in the U.S., built by AMF for the University of Florida, likewise used 20% enriched fuel.

In fact, the University of Florida continued to use 20% fuel until 1970, when it replaced its original core. Now, because of the new policy of reduced enrichments for research reactors and the heightened concern about HEU, the University of Florida is involved with a program with DOE to use4.8%enrichedSPERTfuel.20! The policy of reducing both the quantity of HEU in use and the enrichment of research reactors has been official U.9. policy since 1977 the policy "has been fully supported by NRC since its inception. NRC itself has issued a formal statement of policy declaring that in exercising its licensing responsibility for domestic use and export abroad of SNM, the NRC is interested in reducing, "to the maximum extent possible," the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors.

One of the issues before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board is how to reconcile UCLA's request for 9400 grams of 93% enriched HEU with 'the Commission's policy of reducing, "to the maximum extent possible," the use of HEU in domestic and foreign research reactors. As we shall see, that reconciliation is relatively easy: UCLA doesn't need HEU in order to perform its intended activities.

B. UCLA Doesn't Need HEU Thcra le no dispute about the material facts: Argonaut reactors like UCLA's can ran on LEU. They can because they do. In addition to the original Argonaut and the University of Florida Argonaut, the following Argonaut-type reactors are listed in the IAEA Directory of Research Reactors 26/ University of Florida Training Reactor Hazards Summary Report, A Report to the USAEC from the Department of Nuclear Engineering at the University of Florida,1958 37/

7 NRC Staff Answer to Interrogatory 89 as to the safety Evaluation Report (3/17/82) 38/ Letter, October 10, 1978, to Robert Reid, USNRC, from N.J. Diaz, University of Florida 22/SeeHafemeisterdeclaration g USNRC Stabment of Policy: "Use of High-Enriched Uranium in Research Reactors" g id, 47 FR 37007, August 24, 1982

1 as having 20% enriched fuel: Siemens Argonaut Reactor No. 1 (Germany),

Siemens Argonaut Reactor Karlsruhe (Germany), AEG PrEfreaktor PR-10 (Germany),

Reattore Argonaut AGIP-NUCLEARE (Bologna), Siemens Argonaut Reactor Graz (Craz).

As indicated in the Hafemeister declaration and the Congressional testimony by DOE officials cited therein, LEU fuels are currently available, using available technologies and core designs, for low power research reactors such as UCLA's. It appears to be only the few, very high power research reactors who might need to await the commercialization of higher density fuels oven that seems available very shortly. DOE's annual reports give targets of 1982 and 1984 for demonstration of the fuels being completed.

, IAEA has published a detailed handbook on how to make the conversion, and I

other assistance is available. General Atomics, for example, currently has available TRIGA low-enriched zirconium hydride fuel for use in converting l and upgrading existing MTR plate-type reactors. In addition to significantly reducing proliferation concerns, the TRIGA fuel would immeasurably add to the safety of this particular reactor at UCIA because of its marked ability to prevent reactivity accidents because of the instantaneous negative temperature l coefficient.

I In response to CBG interrogatory XIII/11 of 4/20/81, UCLA stated that it knew of no reason why the reactor couldn't function if the enrichment level were reduced from 93% to 20%. In light of the overwhelming evidence that Argonauts can function on IEU, have and do function on it, and that LEU is available, and in the face of Applicant's knowing of no reason why the enrichment shouldn't be lowered to 20%, and given the NRC's policy in this regard, CBG is entitled as a matter of law to a favorable l determination on its contention that the requested enrichment is excessive.

29/ DOE /NE-001, Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program, USDOE, June 1980 IL/ IAEA Conversion Handbook, page B-2 lf/Becausethemoderatorispartofthefuel,fuelheat-upimmediatelyheatsup i

the moderator, causing power to drop and preventing destructive excursions

VII. M Arsrument In connection with its Part 50 Application to be licensed to operate its nuclear reactor, UCIA has requested a license for SNM.

In order to issue a license for the possession of SNM, the Licensing Board must determine that the application meets the requirements of the regulations and that such issuance would not be inimical to the common defense and would not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. 10 CFR 70.31.

! Risk is defined as probability times consequences. The consequences of theft of 9400 grams of 93% enriched uranium can be it while immense. As the Commission put / proposing stricter safeguards for SNM, the consequences of the successful detonation of a clandestine weapon would be " disastrous". Thus, anything which would tend to increase the probability of theft or diversion of HEU, eve by a small fraction, would vastly increase risk. For this reason, the Commission states in its recent Statement of Policy on the subject  :

In an effort to allay concerns of proliferation risks, efforts were made to reduce HEU inventories, on the assumption that any reduction in the potential for access to these inventories would constitute a reduction in the proliferation risk.

The Commission argues further:

The widespread ..e of HEU fuel, which involved a large number of domestic anc international fuel shipments, increases the risks of prolifuration through theft or diversion of this material.

In contrast to HEU, the use el with lower enrichments reduces proliferation risks The Statement of Policy makes clear that it is the Commission's policy to both redue the amount of HEU available through its licensing responsibility and the enrichment of SNM permitted.

4p6/ Proposed Rulemaking, Physical Protection of Plants and Vaterials, 43 FR 35323 47 Statement of Policy: Use of High-Enriched Uranium in Research Reactors; 47FR37007

,_j UCLA's HEU shipment parked overnight in a casino parking lot underscores this poin-

_24 10 CFR 70.31 prohibits a Licensing. Board from granting a requested license for SNM if the Board cannot determine that issuance of the license will not be inimical to common defense and security. In addition, the Board must determine that grant of the license would not result in unreasonable risk to public health and safety. As has been demonstrated above, the Commission is on recorti as recognizing that HEU increases the risks and LEU lowers risks and that reducing the amount of HEU available for its theft or diversion reduces the risks associated thereto.

The risks associated with a license request for HEU are not unreasonable, in 10 CFR 70.31 terms, if there are no alternatives to its uso'in the amounts and enrichments requested and if the benefits outweigh the risks.

The Applicant in this case clearly does not meet that standard, because the requestod license is in excess of need. Therefore the request poses an unreasonable risk and must, as a matter of law, be denied.

(1) The Request for 32 Grams of Plutonium Must be Denied. UCIA used the Plutonium-Beryllium start-up source for.its intended use for only a year before requesting the Commission amend its license to permit use of a less hazardous Radium source,and hasn't used the Pu-Be source for reactor operations in the twenty years since. Applicant thus doesn't need the requested Plutonium, and therefore grant of the license would pose an unreasonable risk and must be denied.

(2) The Request for 9400 grams of HEU Must be Denied. The core can only hold 3600 grams: the facility operated without difficulty for operated ten years with 3500 grams: thefacility/withdifficultyintermsofcompliance with Commission safeguartis regulations during the subsequent ten years

while it had nearly ten kilograms: the Applicant is unwilling--and due to the technical difficulties involved with keeping the fuel at self-protecting levels discussed in CBG's 73.60 brief,-incapable of safeguarding the amount of material requested: the reactor can run on about two kilograms; it burns up only 1 gram per years and simply has no need nor even use for 9400 grams.

(3) The Request for 93% Enriched Uranium Must be Denied.

The material requested is weapons grade and in excess of the quantity necessary for constructing a clandestine fission explosives it is NRC policy to reduce enrichments, including through its licensing authority; the reactor can (and other Argonauts have) run on LEUs the risks associated with grant of the requested license are greater if HEU is granted than if IEU is granted: the consequences are so disastrous that any small increase in risk is unroasonable unless no alternatives exist and benefits outweigh the risks; alternatives do exist and the benefits in no way outweigh the risks: therefore 93% HEU is not needed, poses an unreasonable risk, and mis t be denied.

There is another requirement that an applicast must meet -before a Board can be permitted to issue the requested licenses that is, the application must meet the regulatory requirements. In this case, UCLA has requested a license for nearly 10 kg of SNM but failed to provide the information required by the regulations (10 CFR 70.22 and .2) with regazds how Applicant will protect against criticality accidents. The law prohibits grant of the application if the application violates the provisions-of those regulations. The reason is simple: a licensing board cannot

possibly determine that grant of the proposed license will not pose an unreasonable risk to public health and safety if the Applicant refuses to provide the required information for Board review as to how Applicant interris to protect public health and safety should the license issue.

Criticality accidents are no trivial matter; ask the families of Louis Slotin, the Woods River Junction victim, and the scores of others who have been seriously injured in the thirty or so accidents to date. But the bottom line is that the law prohibits grant of the license without the rmuired information.

Instly, summary disposition should be granted as a matter of law because no genuine dispute exists as to the material facts and the facts are such as to require such a ruling.

The University, by its recent reduction in SNM inventory, l

l has admitted that the 9.4 kg it has requested is both excessive and unnecessary. By its' arguments against the applicability of 10 CFR 73.60 and its repeated violations of safeguards regulations applicable to the amounts possessed during the last decade, the Applicant has indicated it is both unable and unwilling to protect the quantity of material requested.

The licence therefore cannot issue.

The Staff, in formal submission to the Commissioners, has committed itself to amending UCLA's license to reduce possession authorization below a formula quantity. Memo, SECY-81-376, '" PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIRENENTS FOR NONPOWER REACIOR LICENSEES POSSESSING A FORMUIA QUANTITY OF SSNM", from William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations, to the Commissioners, ,

dated June 12, 1981 states as follows:

1 In SECr 79-187B, 22 nonpower-reactor licensees were listed as having licenses to possess a formula quantity or wre of SSNM.

Of these 22, seven have taken or are taking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession

~

authorization below a formula quantity.

UCIA is listed as one of the seven, confirming what CBG has allery all along, that UCLA is licensed to possess more than a formula quantity of SSNM and should reduce its holding. And the above memo commits the NRC to taking the action recommended by CBG's contentions reducing possession-authorization to at least below a formula quantity.

CBG believes the reduction should be below 4.92 kg, as UCLA claims, perhaps erroneously, it now possesses (but is unwilling to be licensed for). As the Commission stated in amending Part 73: "it can be preperly argued that a.4.9aformula~ kilogram quantity of SNM is about as important a quantity as 5 0 kilograms." 44 FR 43281, July 24, 1979.

And as Dr. Hafemois' tar points out in his declaration, 4.9 kilograms of 93%

enriched uranium is nearly three times more dangerous from a nuclear proliferation standpoint that 5 0 kilograms of 20% enriched, because the critical mass for the 93% is one third as much as for 20% (i.e., one needs only a third as much 93% uranium to make a bomb).

VII. CONCLUSION CBG has demonstrated through indisputible evidence that the amount and enrichment of SNM requested are excessive and thus pose an unreasonable risk as prohibited by 10 CFR 70 31. CBG has further demonstrated that there is no dispute that certain information required by the regulations to be provided in an application before approval can be granted is not in fact included. As a matter of law, CBG is entitled

o to a decision in its favor on Contention XIII. No more important matter will be before this Board than the prevention of an unnecessary increase in the probability that a clandestine fission explosive might be acquired and detonated. The consequences of such an occurrence would.indeed be, as the Commission has said, " disastrous." This Board can reduce those risks, and the law requires.that it do so.

Resp tf ly su tted, Daniel Hirsch -

President COMMITTEE 'ID BRIDGE THE GAP I

i s

I i

I

.g- _ . .

- - _ - . . - _ . - ___.___-__ _-. _- - - - - _- - ~ _ - _ - -

i' STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FAC'IS AS '!O VHICH NO GENUINE DISPUTE EXISTS l 1 'lhe full information as to equipment and procedures designed to prevent, i mitigate, detect, and respond to criticality accidents required by 10 CFR

'l 70.22(a)(7) and (a)(8) and 70.24(a)(1),(2), and (3) has not been provided in the Application.

2 The UCM reactor can operate with less than 9.4 kg U-235 on site.

3. The UCM reactor operated with approximately 3 5 kg of U-235 on site for ten years.

4 The UCM reactor did not use more than 4.3 kg of U-235 during its l entire lifetime to date.

5. The UCu reactor burns up on the average approximately 1 gram of U-235 per year.

6. Total fuel damaged or burnt-up in the last twenty-two years is less j than 750 grams.

i

7. 93% enriched uranium is weapons-grade uranium.

l 8 93% enriched uranium is Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).

i

9. Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that is not so low enriched as to produce 4

sizeable plutonium generation reduces prolieration risks.

10. It is official U.S. policy to reduce the enrichment of research reactor fuels.

kl. Reduced enrichment fuels are currently available on which the UCM reactor can run.

4

12. The original Argonaut reactor ran on 20% fuel.

13. The University of Florida reactor ran until 1970 on 20% fuel.

14. Other Argonaut reactors have operamad on 20% fuel.

15. Advanced reduced enrichment fuels of higher Uranium loading will soon be available.on which all but the highest power research reactors can run.

16. The UCM reactor does not use a Plutonium-Bary111um neutron startup source.

17. The UCM reactor us'es a Radium-Beryllium startup source.

18 Two curies of P1ntonium-239 are more hazardous if released to the environment than 6.6 millicuries of Radium.

, 19. UCM does not have a security plan and safeguards contingency plan that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.60 for formula quantities of SNM.

I 20 The amount of SNM requested in the license, if all were on site, would be a formuh quantity of SNM.

?>

j 21. UCLA has recently reduced its SNM inventory.

l 22 The NRC has committed itself to reducing UCLA's license authority t

to below a formuh quantity.- _ - _ . . - . _ - _ - _ - - ..-_. .-

l l Exhibit A DOLKETED UNITED STATES CF AMERICA

]

NUCLEAR REOULAKRY C0F2ISSION -

EEFORE THE ATOVIC SAFETY AND LICENSINC 2 CARD 0FflCE OF SEWtIAb,.

In the F.atter of DOCKET &jERVICt THE RECENTS OF THE UNIVER3ITY ) Docket No. 50-142 OL CF CALIFORNIA (Proposed Renewal of Facility (UCIA Research Reactor) License)

DECLARATION OF DAVID W. HAFEMEISTER

!, David W. Hafemeister, declare as follows:

1. I an presently Professor of Physics at the California Folytechnic Univorcity in San Luis Obispo, California. 17 professional qualifications are attached.

2. During the period 1975-1979, I was intimately involved with the development and administration of this nation's nuclear non-proliferation policy, both in the U.S. Senate and in the U.S. State Department.

This work included domestic and foreign policy matters related to the use of High Enriched Uranium (EEU) in research reactors and methods to reduce the associated proliferation risks.

3. The proliferation risk associated with HEU is that it can be used directly to make nuclear weapons, unlike the low enriched uranium used, for example,

! in power reactors. No further enrichment, generally very costly and difficult, would be necessary in order to utilize the material in a clandestine fission explosive, thus making it a potentially attractive target for theft or diversion. For this and related reasons, it has been the policy, both nationally and internationally, to attempt to minimize the amount of HEU in use.

4 935 enriched uranium in flat plate Aluminum-Uranium fuel would clearly fit within the category of Highly Enriched Uranium. In fact, 93% would be near the upper limit of HEU norna11y used in reactors, and is clearly

" weapons-grade." That is, it could be used directly to fashion a clandestine fission explosive. Furthermore, because the critical mass goes down as enrichment 6oes up, one would need significantly less U-235 if 93% enriched than, say, 205 for which the critical mass of U-235 is roughly three times as large. Thus, 93% enriched uranium poses significant proliferation risks and requires significant safe 6uards if its use is essential.

5. The prevention of nuclear proliferation is a matter which has lorg been recognized.as essential to U.S. interests and the common defense.

and security. 'Ihe solutions to nuclear nonproliferation are not simple: The office of Technology Assessment report on Nuclear Proliferation (1977) says that:

It is not too late to contain proliferation at a level which can be assimilated by the international political system.

However, there are no single or all-purpose solutions; no short-cuts. A viable nonproliferation policy will require the coordinated, planned use of a wide variety of measures...

6. In recognition of the threat to common defense and security osed by nuclear weapons proliferation, the Congress passed "fvirtually unanimously) the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

And, beginning in 1977, the United States Government established a policy designed to reduce the threat of proliferation by attempting to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of HEU, in part by attempting to reduce the amount of HEU in use throughout the world, particularly for research reactors. This policy of reducing the threat of theft or diversion by reducing the amount of HEU available for theft or diversion has had as a concommitant element the attempt to reduce the enrichment of research reactor fuels. This program, known as the Reduced-Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program (RERTR), represents the' official policy of the United States in attempting to reduce enrichments of research reactor fuels and thus the amount of HEU in use.

7. The sum ary report of the International Nuclear Fuel Oycle Evaluation (1980) has stated that it is feasible to rarkedly reduce the uranium enrichment of a great majority of research reactors; I:FCE endorned the conversion of HEU fueled research reactors to lower enrichment.

As C. Worthington 3ateman, Acting Under Secretary of Energy in 1980, testified to the Congress that with fuel fabrication technology presently available in the U.S. and Europe enrichment reduction is possible for'a great many reactors. And John M. Deutch, then-Director of Energy Research at DOE, told Congress in 1979 that fuel fabrication and core technology currently available in the U.3, and Europe permits enrichment reduction from 90-93 percent to below 20 percent in most reactors. Mr. ..Bateman indicated in his testimony that the eaciest rmeters to nake use of reduced enrichment fuels are low power reactore. The Department of Energy's NA3AF Fregram stated in 1980 that for those reactors where conversion using current technology mi C ht be difficult, substitution of higher u-anium density fuels with louer enrichment should'be possible. In this way the density (g/cc) of U-235 would remain essentially a constant, but the additional U-238 atoms would dilute the U-235 so that it would be less uneable as a mterial for nuclear weapons.

D. Given the official U.S. policy cf reducing the amount of HEU in use to that absolutely eccential, and the policy of reducing research reactor fuel enrichments, it ic my opinion that "C!a's request for a licence for 93"' enriched fuel should not be granted unless the applicant can shcu definitely that it cannot adequately operate the reactor without E of that enrichnent.

9. Likewise, UCIA's request for a license to possess, as I u*derstand it, 9400 grams of U-235 at 93% enrichment seems to me to necessitate a very substantial showing on the Applicant's part why such a very large amount of such cemitive raterial could ever be needed on site.

If it is true that the core loading is about 3600 grams, it seems to me an unnecessary risk for the facility to be permitted to have on site much more than a few hundred crans beyond that. Eurnup would appear to be minimal. The rule of thumb is that 1 gram of fissionable raterial is burned up per WD of heat produced; given a raximum pcuer level of 100 kuth ard a restriction to 5% of the year operating factor, which I am told the reactor is restricted to, in 20 years a raximum of about 36 !GD of thermal energy could be produced. If this is so, a raximum of less than 40 grarn of U-235 uill be consumed through burn-up, a far cry from the thousards of grams requested in the license.

10 I understand that the Environmental Impact Appraisal for this reactor indicates that a total of about 700 grams of U-235 have been "used" in the past twenty years. If this is true, ard assuming that part of that 700 grams constitutes damaged fuel as opposed to burnup, operating experience would indicate approxirately 700 grams spare fuel would be sufficient, and even then, there is no reason of which I am aware that a full twenty years' supply needs to be on site all the time or at any one time. In my opinion, more than 4300-4500 grara U-235 permitted on site and granted through a license would be excessive, absent a substantial showing of need, and would pose an unnecessary threat to common ddfense and security through risk of diversion or theft.

11. I have reviewed a July 1982 calculation by Neill C. cstrander of the Nuclear Energy Iaboratory entitled " Fuel Self Protection Calculation."

If he is correct that af ter seven days of shutdown the radiation dose at four feet from the core center without intervening shielding is 142 Rer/ hour, then each irdividual fuel' bundle (of which I understand there are twent be about 10 Ren/y-four, hour at t'enh reecontaining eleven fuel feet (unshielded). plates)

Thus wouldappear it would necessary to raise these radiation levels by more frequent (short-term) operation of the reactor to approach the 100 Rer/ hour level for each fuel bundle and would appear prudent to do so if the radiation level of the fuel is being relied upon as a deterrent to theft.

12 My conclusions are that the Applicant, in order to obtain a license, should: (a) reduce the total amount of U-235 permitted on site to about 4 kg. -

(b) louer the enrichment of U-235 significantly unless the Applicant can clear demonstrate that this is infeasible, and (c) institute an operation schedule which would raise the radiation level of the fuel burdles.

In addition, the security measures taken to protect what material is permitted on site need to be substantial, particularly if the above malcures are not taken. 9700 grams of 935 enriched uranium are by no means d_e minimus; nor for that ratter are 4900 grare. Theft or diversion of such raterial could have grave effects for our common defense and security, as well as public health ard safety.

13. The above suggestions uculd be censistent with U.S. policy and prudent in terms of protecting against the very worrisome prospect of an unnecessarily large quantity and unnecessarily high enrichment of uranium without adequate safeguards being stolen or diverted for use in a clandestine fission explosive. Furthermore, however, failure to take the above precautions, without substantial showing of good cause not to, would darage U.S. foreign policy interests by undercutting our government's attempts to reduce international commerce in IEU and convince other nations of the need to reduce their IEU holdings and the enrichment of their research reactor fuels.

I knew from personal experience in representing the State Department in such interactions with Chilean nuclear officials and~. representatives of Atomic Energy Commissions of other nations that it will be much more difficult for the U.S. to succeed in its policy of reduced enrichments and HEU holdings abroad if the policy is not vigorously pursued at home.

The inconsistency of the US, on the one hand, denying HEU to forei6 n research reactors uhile, at the same time, oversupplying research reactors at home with HEU that is not properly safeguarded, would'not 'bs lost on the nations we are trying to influence.

14 Instly, it should be stated that it is both national ani international policy that kilogram quantities of HEU must be safeguarded. While timely warning, after the fact, of theft or diversion is a key ~ element ~

in such safeguards, post-loss reportin6 is not sufficient protection and, in my opinion, fails to meet the standard of taking measures to minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of such material consistent with the consequences of such removal. The removal of 9400 grams of 93% enriched U-235 would have extraordimrily serious potential consequences; the removal of 4900 grams of such material would have potential consequences many, many times greater than removal of 1000 grams of 20% enriched uranium. But even 1000 grams of such material, given the world situation with regards pressures for nuclear weapons proliferation, is not de minimun.

I, David W. "afemeister, swear under penalty of perjury unier the laws of the U.S.

that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Executed on August 25, 1982, at Santa Cruz, California d) //).

/ David W. Hafemeister, Ph.D.

David W. hafemeister Professor of Physics California State Folytechnic University Professional cualifications

1. Education;

a. Eachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering from Northwestern University, 1957

b. M3. and Ph.D. in Physics, University of Illinois, 1959, 1964

c. Fest-Doctoral Fellowships:

Los Alamos 3cientific Inboratory (1964-66)

American Association for the Advancement of Science Congressional Fellowship (1975-1976)

2. Employment

a. MechanicalEngineer,ArgonneNationalLab(1957-58)

b. Physicist, Los Alames leientific Laboratory (1964-66)

c. Assistant Professor of Physics, Carnegie-Mellow University (1966-69)

d. Associate Professor of Physics (1969-72)

Frofessor of Physics (1972- )

California Folytechnic University, San Luis Otispo, CA 3

i

e. Visiting Professor of Physics University of Groningen, The Netherlands (1972,1980)

f. Legislative Assistant and Science Advisor to Senator John Glenn U.S. Senate (1975-77)

g. Special Assistant to Under 3ecretary of State Lucy Benson and j

Deputy-Under Secretary Joseph Nye, U.S. Department of State (1977-1979) l

3. Experience with Nuclear Non-ProI*feration Patters

a. U.3. Senates After the detonation by India of a nuclear device in 1974, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the U.S. Senate held extensive hearings on the " Export Reorganization Act of 1975

which dealt with nuclear nonproliferation. It was my job to be j the full-tine staffperson to the Ad-hoc Chairman of the Conmittee, j 3enator Glenn, on hearings and mark-up of the act. I was Senator Glenn's main advisor on nuclear non-proliferation matters.

b. Department of 3 tate

In 1977, I was appointed as one of two 3pecial Assistant on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation to Under Secretary 3enson and Deputy-Under 3ecretary Nye. Dr. Nye had the lead role for nuclear non-proliferation in the Executive Branch and at the London Nuclear Supplier Negotiations.

During this time I uas intimately involved with the draftin6 and passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, participating in the Departnent of Energy's Non-proliferation Alternative Systenn Assessment Frogram (NASAF), and dealing as a representative of the Under Secretary with officials of other nations' nuclear programs.

In addition, I was the lead State Department delegate to Workin6 Croup 8 (Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts) of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which was held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. Subgroup C of this Working Crcup had as its sole task the assessment of methods of reducin6 proliferation risks associated with research reactors.

4. Publications

a. Nuclear Non-Pro 11feration:

1. " Nonproliferation and Alternative Nuclear Technolo6 18s".

Technology Review 81, 58 (December 1978),

ii. " Science and Society Test 7: Nuclear Nonproliferation",

American Journal of Physics 48, 112 (1980) 111.primeauthor/editorofthePresidentialReporttotheCongress on the environmental impacts associated with nuclear exports abroad (1980) iv. co-author / editor of the supplement Nuclear Research and Development Export Activitien to ERDA 1542 (U.S. Nuclear Export Activities),

September 1979.

b. Solid State and Nuc1 ear Thysics 20 articles four book chaptersg one book

c. Energy Technology and Policy:

10 articles

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES Office of Technology Assessment UCl@ar Proliferation 42 and Safeguards M

,A s

i l

1 5

k 6

i I

i

.y P

P l

I The Praeger Special Studies program-utilizing the most modern and efficient book production techniques and a selective worldwide distrioution network-makes available to the academic, government,and j

business communities significant, timely research in U S. and international eco- prnoner Deshlicherc hinw Vnrle I nnrfnn

1_ - . . _ ._

m litical dissidents. A second position treats of rneasures: (a) political, economic, institu- . Aa Americin preeminence in the interna- same time, providmg for the colleoson a tional, technological; (b) unilateral, bilateral, tional market for nuclear fuel, facihties, and return of spent fuel.

acce able extension of exist-b "*'d'"

pig clearance programs and blackmaiI t.hreat multilateral, international; and (c) executive an yegis3,, ,.

technology has been allowed to erode, the abihty of the United States to unilaterally An effective effort to assert U S. influce responses in other fields of high security. A determine the ground rules of internationa'l wi!I c mbine the carrot and the stuk, we p.ird position believes safeguards could be in- , Components of a nonproliferation policy nuclear cooperation has diminished. With the principal reliance on the fermer for the long friled without doing serious damage to civil would include: (a) Steps designed to tip the entrance of other suppliers into the market' term. Such an effort will ako take into accou

11berties, but only if a least intrusive balan<e of political incentives and disincen* importers have the option to turn to non-U.S the wide variation in leverage available

. measures" approach is adopted and a zero- tives regarding the acquisition of weapons in sources. lf the United States were to removeit; Washington when dealmg with one N isk goal is rejected. favor of disincentives; (t) A comprehensive self from the global market entirely, other c untry r an ther. Thus U.S. influence wo Although a safeguards system that would safeguards regime to prevent the diversion of suppliers could quickly replace the withdrawn nahons perendent upon American mihtary nuclear material from civilian energy capacity. As a consequence American actions ec n mic assistance (e g , South Korealis se I extremely respectful of civilliberties can be programs to weapons use; (c) Controls over substantial but where such dependence desi8ned, three potential dangers exist: will tend to be most effective in a multilateral exports, particularly with regard to enrich- context-particularly in conjunction with lacking (e g., Argentina) U.S. influen

1. A gradual erosion of ivi c. .lliberties as the ment and reprocessing capabilities, in con

• other suppliers. The effectiveness of this ap- declines.

safeguards system is " strengthened, junction with arrangements for the reti -n of proach has been demonstrated in the negotia-2, A shunting aside of civilliberties during spent fuel to the supplier or any mternational tions which led to the NPT, and more recently Issue n a recovery operation if weapons material repository; (d) A broad range of domestic and in the Suppliers' Conference.

were diverted and a convincing threat f eign "C'I *' ; *"

,g po,cy epm s jgseuiy a sr to There remains, however, significant scope What Influence Can the United States pre ent theft of nuclear materials, expansion for the unilateral assertion of U.S. influence- Exert Upon Other Supplier States?

3. A public demand for Draconian of reactor-grade uranium production to obv . both in terms of positive inducements and safeguards in the future, even at the ex- ate the need for reprocessing, and arms con. negative sanctions. The recent successful U.S. Findings t effort inducing South Korea to abandon plans pense of civil liberties, if a diversion trol negotiations; and (c) Steps to assure that i followed by a convincing threat or an ac- other countries can meet their energy require. for purchasing a French reprocessing facility Efforts by the United States inducing othe f tual act of destruction occurred. ments without resorting to enrichment and/or is an instance of the effective use of unilateral suppher states to pursue policies supportivei me the ore obvious levers nonprohferation will generally be most effn Measures can be envisaged that would reprocessing national facilities. fuen ,

ive i ey are formulated m, a multilater,

• reduce the probability of the above three oc* Moreover, because each Nth country is to currences. Continued public monitoring of some degree unique, policy must be tailored to

• security guarantees; conte t and emphasire positive inducement-

safeguards systems for civil liberties infrac- f t particular national circumstances. This is assistance to civilian nuclear energy m e mosures include:

tions, new technologies or configurations especially true because of the potential for programs;

, , . political-diplomatic persuasion (e g., th

. (tg., coprecipitation or colocation), and serious conflict between nonproliferation and

• foreign economic aid (including U.S. in- Suppliers' Conference),

, response planning integrated at the local, other foreign policy objectives. The nature fluence in international lending institu- . tie-in agreements guaranteeing US St1te, regional, and Federal levels with and severity of that conflict will vary from one tions);

• military assistance programs; enrichment sersices at nondiscrimina f Luthority clearly delineated could reduce the Nth country to another, a fact which policy tory prices to reactor customers of othe probability of civil liberties infractions in a must take caref ully into account. (Chapters 111 political pressures and diplomatic per- suppliers, strong safeguards system. and IV.)

• joint-venture enrichment and/o mediation of international disputes reprocessing fachties, with proliferation implications; . market sharing agreements L

The Control Issue n . controls on the ciport of sensitive , multinational enrichm'ent and/o, Issue 15 nuclear technology; reprocessing fanhnes, What is the Outlook for Control of What Influence Can the United States gy urces; an nd

"' ' I '" 'i#'

Exert Upon Potential Weapons States? .

domestic policy initiatives (e g., con-Proliferation? . a multilateral study of alternatives tc cerning reprocessm, g) which might reprocessing.

' enhance the credibility of U.S. efforts to Findings Findin8s . persuade other countries to take similar The problem of reprocessing is estremely steps, d cu e rs th sur her is not too late to contain proliferation at a In the long run two general rules apply: )

level which can be assimilated by the interna. Solutions to the prohferation pro em The single most effective instrument of U.S have to be found prim , t ou no influence would be the capability to guarantee basic national decision in favor of rf ro

. tional political system, llowever, there are no ing and the breeder. They regard this hhcv single or all-purpose solutions; no short cuts. clusively, throug mu adequate low-enriched uranium esports to (b) The estent of U.S. influence will vary rom meet the needs of overseas users while, at the a vital element in their efforts to as 'd J

A viable nonproliferation policy will require quate energy in the future. Furopea r f

' the coordinated, planned use of a wide variety country to country, rg* 19 t

&a

' "' ~' ~~ ~7 77,Ci :. m hip .; ~ -h ,

'y 49, , . < . a .

+ y- .

e.- n . . . *;

Tj:

~-

nu .

4, .,m . a e .

,y , w .. , > " :v EXHIBIT C l

I INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION i

l I

l l

l 4 .

ADVANCED FUEL CYCLE ,

l AND REACTOR CONCEPTS l REPORT OF INFCE WORKING GROUP 8 i

l l

l l

i PUBLISilED BY THE j INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA,1980 i

.u

. E- 9 + - e*-

_' ,  ; p, , ]<& - -

-7?--w-T.i

6 Cil AI"TER 4 section 4.3 3, and their sunmaries as contributed to INFCE are included in Appendix 2. 'Ihese summaries are the responsibility

'*h**"d*'*d"***"*'*h"*"*"'***"'***d " * "***"*

RESEARCH REACTORS: SUBGROUP 8C consensus of Working Group 8. Section 4.4 briefly discusses the research and development requirements associated with enrichment

41. INTRODUCTION reduction. Section 4.5 presents the special needs of developing countries. .,

Subgroup C of Working Group 8 of INFCE is concerned with research reactors. The objective of this Subgroup is to review and report on the contributions' on this subject submitted by the various participating countries and organizations.

The term "research reactor' is used here for thermal-neutron 4.2. NON-PROLIFERATION CONSIDERATIONS reactors that are designed, built and used as neutron and gamma-ray sources for fundamental research material irradiations, To maximize neutron flux per unit power and/or to minimize isotope production, fuel element and reactor safety tests, capital and fuel cycle costs many research and test reactors training etc. (Appendix 1). Over 150 research reactors of .were designed or g verted to utilize uranium enriched up to On the other hand, a number of research significant power (between 10 kW and 250 MW) are in operation more than 90% in U.

with highly enriched uranium in more than 35 countries with,f reactors have also been designed for operation with very low total power in excess of 1700 MW. The overall annual g i enriched or natural uranium fuel.

requirement of these reactors is more than 1200 kg of U.

Concerns over the use of highly enriched uranium in research The number of operating research reactors in the world reactors arise from the fact that feedstock materials, fresh and does not appear to be increasing because the construction of spent fuels containing highly enriched uranium represent a new reactors is being offset by the decommissioning of older potential source of weapons-usable materials. A decrease to reactors. To satisfy cost-benefit considerations, new reactors below 20% enrichment is internationally recognized to be a fully are built only on well defined requirements and when excess adequate isotopic barrier to weapons usability (2]. Therefore, capacity of existing reactors cannot be used ef fectively. although it may not be technically possible in some research reactors, decreasing the enrichment from the 90% range as far as reasonable toward 20% would be a worthwhile improvement in The proliferation aspect of the widely distributed highly enriched uraniuti and of the production of fissile oaterials proliferation resistance of research reactor fuels.

in research reactors make these reactors of concern to INFCE.

Subgroup C has, on the basis of a limited number of contrib- The plutonium in spent fuels is also of concern, although uted studies, considered steps that might be taken to reduce attainment of weapons-usable material would require spent fuel proliferation risks without jeopardizing the function of reprocessing. Theannualplutoniumproductionisrougy proportional to the power level and to the amount of U in research reactors

• the reactor and therefore decreases with increasing enrichment.

In this report, the non-proliferation considerations are Decreasing the annual plutonium production would have non-discussed in general terms in section 4.2. In particular, proliferation benefits. However the use of research reactors studies of possible enrichment reduction in research reactors to for fissile 'sterials production is not prevented by changing improve proliferation resistance are presented in section 4 3, .

fuel enrichmonts and, therefore, appropriate safeguarding of which includes discussions on general criteria and considerations the reactor is still required.

(section 4 3 1). Since the enrichment reduction potential drpends on the fuel technology, this is also discussed (section In an overall assessment of the proliferation risks of a 4.3.2). A short review of individual case studies is given in particular research reactor, it is necessary to consider both the enriched uranium as well as the plutonium produced, and l

adequate safeguards must be provided. Note that fissile l

IReference numbers are shown in brackets and are listed at the materials are much less accessible in spent fuel because end of the chapter. of their high radiation levels.

L. _ _ _

EXHI3IT D DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FISCAL YEAR 1981 BUDGET:

/ NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS i

~%,,

AUG 281999 HEARING BEFORE TIIE .

Op 8 ,

l SUB00MMITI'EFM ON INTERNATIONAL SEU01tITY AND SCIENTIFIO AFFAIRS AND ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE OF TIIE

\

COMMITTEE ONgFOREIGN AFFAIRS IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES b NINETY-SIXTII pNGIlESS SECOND SESSION APIIIL 16,1980 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. OOYERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 64474 O W ABIIINGTON : 1980

\

l s

comurrEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS .

CONTENTS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairmes 1 II. FOUNTAIN,. North Carolina WILLI AM R BROOMFIELD, Mleblgan .

DANTE D. FABCISLL, Flertda EDWARD J. DERWINRKI, Illinole WITN ESSES CII ARLER C. DIOGR, Ja., Mtchtsan PAUL FINDLI:Y, Illinole IIENJAMIN R RENHNTIIAIS New York JOIIN 11. DUCH ANAN, Ja., Alaberna C. Worthington Batem an, Acting Umler Secretary, Department og Tage Energ I.EE H II AMILT9N, Indiana LA RRY WINN, Ja , Kaneae - ---- --

c------

LERTER !* WOLFP, New York Louis V.y-No.enzo,

--- --- Deputy Ann

• tant S.-- ecre tary for Nuclear E"ne"rgy an7g DENJ AMIN A. GILM AN. New York 20NATilAN D. BlNGIf AM, New York TENNYRON OUTER, Ohio Energy Technology AtTaire, Department of State. . .-------- ----rm ---

OUR YATRON, Pennsylvania ROilERT J. LAGOM ARRINO, California Charles Van Doren, A*gi*ta nt Director for Nonproliferation, CARDIRR COI LINR, Illinole WILIA AM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvanta t Cont rol and Disarmnment Agency- --------- ------- ----- -- -- g RTEPilEN J. ROLARZ, New York JOEL PRITCHARD Washtarton Edward A. Frieman, Director, Office of Energy llesearch, Depar men DON !!ONKER, Washington MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jereer Energy------------------------------"----"-""-"

OERRY 11 RTUDDR, Massachusetta DAN QUAYLE. Indiana ANDY IRELAND, Flortda M ATEltl AL FOlt TIIE ILECOllD 1 N MICA, Flo ! ! ' Uptlate on ptaffing levelg for Office of Nuclear Ali irs, Department _ ___-- 30

"" ~ ~

II

^

AM H. RAY !!, enne vanta Light w ter reactor impro"e[nent prok[atht--- -------- - -- -

TONY P. HALL, Ohio Fast mixed spectrum reactor program--- ----- -------- _ _ _

HOWARD WOLPE, Michtsan (IH)

DAVID R. DOWEN, Mlestantppt FLOYD J. FITIII AN, Indiana JOHN J. DaanT Jr., Chief of Alef DOM ALD R. Pbatten, stof Consultant Anert W. Rosmare, Jr., Stef A esociate ARLons M. ATw ATen, 'Bref Asedefeat SUBc0MMITTEE ON INTERN ATIONAL SEcCRITY AND SCIENTIFIO AFFAIRS .

CLEMENT J. ZADLOCKI, Wlaconste, Chefrmen I. H. FOUNTAIN, North Caroline WILLI AM 8. BROOMFIELD, Mtchtgen LED II. H AMILTON, Indiana LARRY WINN, Ja, Kanese LESTER I WOLFF, New York DAN QUAYLE, Ind1ana JONATilAN D. BINGHAM, New York Ivo J. BrALATIN, Subcommittee sfef Dirrefer WILLI AM H. FITS, Minordry step Coneuffent Tont J. GaAnt,8mbrommtffee Bref Associete Stf sc0M MITTTE ON I NTTRN ATION AI. ECONOMIC POWCY AND TRADE JONATHAN D. BINGH AM, New York, chefrmos DON HONKER, Washington ROBERT J. LA00MARSINO, California DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio PAUL FINDLEY, Illinote MICH AEL D. B ARNES, Maryland DENJAMIN A. GILMAN New York IIOWARD WOLPE, Michtaan R. Roora M AJ AI, Subcommiff er 8f4f Director TAnos E. DONM AN,Jr., Minorify afef Consulfenf Victon C. JoHNeoN, SubcommIf fee Stef Associoff PAULA Dutun Ac, Su8 committee Stef Associate (TU i

a

5 4

source consumption by backfitting existing reactors. We are commit .

The Office of Nonproliferation under the Director of Energy Re-search pinys nn important policy and technical coordinating rola ted to carrying through this program. There is tremendous interest on across a wule range of nonproliferation programs and issues. the part of utilities and fuel vendors in cooperating with us in moving The Office of Defenso programs administers the safeguards and this forward.

We are proposing a budget of about $21 million in this area for lis-security program and export controls. cal year 1981.

These oflices have all given crucial support to DOE's involvement The international energy development program was initiated in in our nonproliferation efforts.Their continued support will obviously 1977 by President Carter. Two assessments have been completed in be necessary for DOE to achieve its nonproliferation objectives. Egypt and Peru. The reception these studies have received is encour.

You asked what changes have been made since Under Secretary agmg. We currently have studies underway in three other countries; Deutch left the Government. Basically the assignment of responci- Argentina, South korea, and Portugal. We have high expectations bilities that I have just described continues with tho strangement that for a similar response in t hose arens.

prevailed during Dr. Deutch's tenum. In the safeguards and security program, we are pro In addition we have assigned to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear year 1981 budget of $50A million.3fost of this is for money ,i domestic Energy responsibility for coordinating the flow of p, aper and depart- ssfeguants and security but a significant part of tfic pmgram does mental positions, responses, and renetions on specific issuca. That work su > port internationni safeguard activities.

is coordinated through my office and more generally through the Office Ve are supporting R. & D. for physical protection hardwaie under of the Secretary. bilateral agreements. Systems are being developed for possible appli.

This arrangement reflects more realistically the ability of the dif- cation of safeguards for facilities such as enrichment plants and spent ferent staffs to carry out responsibilitics in this area. /

Dr. Deutch assumed a leadership role in this ama through many fuel storage. International training courses are given as required hv the NNPA. Additional direct technical support to the I AEA is lein'g ditTerent jobs that he held in the Department of Energy. He himseif provided through pmgrams funded by the Department of State under recognized, prior to his departure, that his direct and continmng m- the Foreign Assistance Act but msnageit by the DOE Office of Safe-volvement was to some extent out of sync with his responsibilities as Under Secretary. Dr. Deutch moved immediately prior to his depar- guards and Security.

The NURE program, which is administered by the Assistant Secre-ture, to change that arrangement in a way which I think is a workable tary for Resource Applications is continuing. The data collection.

one and which he felt more accuratelv reflecte1 the degree that the

~ evaluation and assessment of U.S. uranium resources effort is being Under Secretary could be involved in these matters. reduced in light of lower projections of nuclear capacity and nuclear I think it is efear that them is no intent to diminish the coordination demand.

process, and certainly it is not intended to reflect any diminution of We expect to complete the NURE proFram werk by 1990. In fiscal the role of the Under Secretary in these matters. year 1981 we propose a budget of approxunatelv Sao isillion, It simply reflects the range of activities that the Under Secretary Af r. Chairman, that summarizes some of the liighi mints of my testi-is responsible for and the need to have day to day staff suptwrt as- mony. I wdl not try to describe each program m the satne let a d.

signed and delegated c1 Sew 5cre. I would be happy to try to answer any questions you may have.

With that let me say a few words about, the specific programs which Alr. Brwana. Thank you, Dr. Bateman.

the Department of Energy is responsible for that support U.S. non- [3tr. Bateman's prepared statement follows:]

pmliferation efforts.

First, I wouhl like to mention the reduced enrichment research and I'REPARFD STATRMENT OF C. WORTH mOToM HATEM AN. AcrIMo UMpeR sF n eTAnT tout reactor program. Tim objective of this progrnm is to develop and """"""

• demonstrate technology that can use low enriched uranium fuels in re- I am pleased to appent before you today to discunn the Department of Energy search reactots now using HEU fuel. This is a move which has been N P'""r"m" and neurluen in support of U.s. nonpronferniinn sency. The suppor.ted b.y INFCE and NASAP. Foreign accc itance of this pm- I" *I""' '"#F'*" " "" h th' D'P"*'"'

• f 8'" *08 8 ""d ' h*

FRG1 n D'P"**"l Armn Contro nud Diantmament Agency ( AODA 1. han played a major rule In l' 8 cram is also wu' lespread. Jap nonprollferation errorta, and continues to attach a htsh priority to the eterclap-R. & D. pmgrams m this area. 'I,an, France am1 t iehis is somethmg itted to. we are comm,11 have I ment of nuclear fuel cycle appronchen. both domestically and internationnuy. that The current hudget proposal is for $3 million which is somewhat I min mlze the rinka that civillan nuclear power nintemn and repenrch reactorg might contribute to the aprend of nuclear weaponn.

lowe.r ihnn we ma}* have liked but in the straints and cutbacks we think this is a programfact of ver} se wh.ver.e ich is Vinble, It fis. cal con- We are at an important juncture in the nonprollferation efforts initiated 19 the Carter Administration three yearn ago. The extenstre studice performed f T emphasizes short-term and near-term results and bamcally puts us m a INFCE and NASAP have been completed, although the full Impucationn of their stretch-oul mode with respect to some of the more advanced fuel de.

velopment activities.

The LWR impmvement, program is also a very important one to us. It is clear we can realize very significant,cconomies m umnium re-

6 7 find!nga muxt still be assenmed. In the months ahead, we will be working intin- Chitrm2n, these inneen are all innues which you ralred in your letter to Secretary Elvely with our allien and other cooperating partners on meanures to strengthen Duncan. There are arcan where the I)epartment of Energy han healthy, ongoint the international nonprollferation regime and to renolve a number of lanues held programa, and it in with pleasure that I have this opportunity to discuan thew in abeyance during INFUE. programs with you.

As world events have reminded us repeatedly during the last three yearn, First. In addrenning your general requent for a review of those parta of the nuclear proliferation remalng an urgent problem of International necurity. It I)OE budget which have relevance to UA nonproliferation efforts. I nould point reems untlkely that the problem will diminish In the years immediately ahead. out that proliferation rentammlbilitten in l>OE are spread acrwn a numter of l'rollferation in, an we all know, a complex and dimcult lanue. It requiren a whole omces. Programn concerned with II. & D, on prollferation-realatant fuel cycle range of political, atrategic, and technical approachen, no one of which, by itself, technologien are primarily conducted by the O!nce of Nuclear Energy. The NUltE can be expected to offer a "0x." prognm is in the Omce of Itenourn Applications, which in also rengennitile for The present Administration, while not neglectful of the other dimensions of uranium enrichment servicen. Technical safeguards issues, physical security, the problem, han sought to draw attention to the potential prollferation rinks export controls, and nonproliferation intelligence are centered in our Office of poned by widespread movement toward reprocensing, commerce in plutonium Defense Programa. The Omce of Nuclear Affairs, in International Atralrs, cmp-fuels, and the apread of senaltive nuclear facilltten. It was the perception of these crates clonely wit.h 8 tate and ACl>A on nonprollferation policy mattern and han riska, among other reasonn, that prompted the United Staten to revine its domestic important delegated responalbilitten in implementing the Nuclear Nonprvlifern-nuclear strategy and to urge other nations to exercine rentraint in premature tion Act (NN1*A).Thme responalhilliten include tanks much as negotiating nuclent moves toward plutonium fuel cycles and the export of sennitive technologlew. The agreements for cooleration and proceaning **nnhneiluent arrangernents."The Office United Staten aino took the initiative in proponing the INFCE study to explore of Nuclear Nonprollferation, under the 1)lrector of Energy Ite=earch, playa an the economic, technical, and institutional aspectn of fuel cycle strategies in the important loticy and technical coordinating role acrona a utde range of non-light of nonproliferntion and nudear energy objectiven. Domentically, the DOE's prollferution programs and lanues, n id administers neveral programn dealtng NARAP ntudien examined almits.r questions with particular reference to U.S. - with nonproliferation.

nuclear program choicen. Due to the fundamental importano of the DOli programmntic aint !=dicy nut

• The renulta of these mis &n, as well an recent world aventa, have confirmed port for the Adminiatration's non, coliferation efforts, theme omeen are not only that nuclear fuel cycle FevelopmW can afrad prollferation risks and that this necennary but crucial tu order for un to properly fulfill our algnificant obligation

• f act munt be given adegante weight in national and international nuclear energy in this mont important area. I found their support to I e invaluable in the rnte I planning. The INFCE results are indeterminate on many important issues. They have played in coordinating DOE *n nonproliferation efforts.

were arrived at through a proccan of techn! cal connennun and are not fully sup-portive of any one atrategy or national ponttlon Still, it is a algn of growing arnecm snanci Ment aEnEAaCIE AND T7aT ar.Ac' roan enoGaA M j international reallam, to whleh INFCM made a key contribution, that although An I previously noted, INITE studien recognized and endorsed the conversion the civillan nuclear fuel cycle in not the only path to nuclear weapons develop. of IIEU fueled research reacturn to lower enrichments. The In)E tiscal yenr 1%I

• ment, its relevance to proliferation in more widely recognir,ed. Therefore, though budget requent for the Advanced Henctor System program in sa million in tendget there are many questions that remain to be nettled in the pont-INITE world, a authority, directed to support Italuced Enrichruent Itevnrrh nml Tc*t itenctor return to "huninean an usual" without due consideration t9 nonproliferation OMTIO prograin acHvlun. The objecHve of Hie itMM program b to de Innuen ta ntmply not an option. velop and demonstrate technology for reducing uranium enrichment in resenrrh An I mentioned, we are still annenning the INFCE and NASAL' results in terms amt test reactor fueln, and to facilitate International use of such rnluccelen. [

of their specific implications for DOE program cholces. Ilowever, before pro- richment fneln. The attainmetit of thesa objectisen would, therefore, reilure the ceeding to a discunnion of the program you have asked about, I would like to annociated rinka of weaponn unable materinta for research reactorn by affecting a mention briefly some of the key results which we believe are encouraging the reduction in related ilEU luventurien at home and nbrond.

U.S. hopen for rentraint and caution in moren toward w!despread une of plu. The plecmc neardnm oNecum of He program b to acMne the lonnt fnd tonium and ot her mennitive nuclear activitten. ble fuel enrichment for research renctor fuel uning current technotory. Fuel fab 3 INFCE*n generally positive findings with regard to the fant breeder reactor ricadon technology presently avnllable in the 11.8. and,In Europe would termit en.

have received conalderable attention. The report of the breeder working group dcInnent rnlucHon fnun N to Et lent to N to la tercent in many renrtors exprennen enthuntanm about the breeder's long-term potential to realize algnio- and to N Incent or below in odwrn, widiout signincant relucHon in dWnNe cent urantum antings over current once through systems. This has never been in t orma criterin.

dispute. Ilowever, it in inaccu, rate to any that INFCE endorned rapid deployment reaforI of the t>reeder or legitimized reproceHRing. Rology whlch would termlt enrichment rnluellonn to below $ { rrent In INFOE was connervativo in Itm overall annennment of the breeder. It acknowl- nlmont nit repenrch and tcat renetors. An ndditional and niuntly impattant b.or edged that breedern require a tuajor economte inventment, that they may make term objective in to provide the techntent support necennary to mnke the high nenne only in muntrien with heavy deployment of nuclear power, and that their urn,ulum-deralty fuela commerrtntly ninflalde.

timing and need are highly dependent on the speciflen of uranium supply and g renently, the numeroup offern from renctnr clerntorn amt fuel fabrient..r*

nuclear power demand in individual muntrien. Rimllarly, although INFCE e to participate in the ItEltTit progrnm actitillen and the creation of similnr ognized the Interent of some countrien in reproceaning, it also renched a number ItD&D progrnmn in Jnpun, France, und Went Germnny, indiente much internt of nignificant ntatements about the benefits, mata, and rinks of this nennitive and foreign ncreptance of the redm ed enrictuuent fuel concept. Commetrint fuel technology, Although some countrien see reproceaning an a positive contrlhuflon I fabricatorn have alrendy demonstrated that significant lucreasen in the urantmu.

to fuel supply, it was concluded that plutonium recycle in extating reactors le density of AITit-type fuela can be nchieved by mlulmal modifications to current not likely to bare targe economic advantagen, fabrication proceduren. Thun, most low power dennity research reactorn could f INFCE also fmmd that ante management of nuclear wasten doen not regulre succennfully convert to low-enrichment uranium (LEU) fuel, once such olern L the reprocenning of spent fuel. The long-term storage and terminal dinponal of '

tionn have been reticensed.

r. pent fuel as such, without the separation of plutonium, in technically feantble In flacal year 19RI, DOE la continuing: (1) the development of advance I fuelg and wouhl only re<plire the adoption of erinting technology. \ with increnned uranium content, thereby facilitating further reduction of urn.

Finally, it should lie noted that, inter alla, INFCE explicitly remgnized and I nium enrichment requirements; (2) implementatlog of irrndlation demountra-endorsed the conversion of IIEU fueled rencorch renctorn to lower enrichmentn, tion of reduced enrichment fueln in selected renenrch and tent reacturn; aml 43) the potential for considerable improvements in LWit fuel utillsation efficiencien. applatance to reactor operatorn involvel in ceniversion of their reactorn to reduce the need for improved International safeguanin, the evolution to new forms of j enrichment fuels.

Institutional moperation, and a need for increased uranium exploration. Bir, i

e w _ _ _____m__

g 8 -

would reduce the amount of spent fuel discharged by about 40 Ivrcent, na im-Through DOE nupported research, development and demonstration, commer- provement program. particularly the advanced LWR program, has the potential clat fuel fabricatorn should Ie in ponttlon by 1983 to establish commercial avail. to reduce LWR neparative work requirements in the long term.

ability of reduced entlebment fuels which can replace the HEU fuels now being Substantial interent in improving uranium utillration in light water reactora le need in almost all of the low. power research and test reactors which depend on being shown in a number of other countries an well.This interent la evidenced by the United States for fuela. SpeelDe activities to be carried out in fiscal year 1961 a willingnenn to participate in multilateral conparative projects. One such project M in the high burnup effects program being organtred t>y Itatteliefacitte Northwest include:

1. Characterization of related neutron flux epectra and operation at design Laboratorien. This project will evaluate the effect of finnlon gan released in high poner levels sultable for full performance vertDestion of a fuel core of plate. burnup fuel. Both the Japanene nuclear industry and the European nuclear Indun.

tyle LEU fuel in the Ford Nuclear Reactor (at the University of Michigan), try are participants. The Eurnrean countries include Britain, Germany. Sweden.

2. Installation of a full core of TRIGA type LEU-fuel in the Rhode Island Denmark, Finland, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, France, and Switzerlan<l.

l Nuclear Science renetor and operation at power levela suitable for fuel perform. Several other international research and development projects are currently in ence verification. the formulative atagen.

3. Continuation of advanced fuels technology development including trradla. The funding requented for the LWR urautum uttilzation program for 6. cal year tions of aluminide, oxide, and silicide reduced enrichment fuel materlata and 1981 le $21 million. This is an increase of $3 million over the flachl year ifW inttlate lent trmdlation examination and evaluation studien. budget.

4. Continuation of technical ansistanM in response to request from ree.ctor operators who are evaluating the convertibility of their reactors to redismf rao!.mta,ATIoM aESISTANcE or rarar.NT A!ED FUTras NUcutAn SYpTr.Wa Enrichment fuels. hir Chaltman, you requested that we discusa prollferation renintance of leth

5. Continuntion of analysis of HEU procurement requents and of potential convertibility of reactors, as generic or speelfte examplen. present and future nuclear systema. For current nysterna, the Department's Non-Pledsen made at the 1978 Special Bennion on Diantinament (8809) in support ; proliferation Alternative Systems Annenament l'rogram ( N At4 A P-addreased of the conversion of forelgr. research and tent r'actorn to LEU are expected to later la thin tentimony) han twncluded that the LWIt olerated on theonce through be funded out of the Department of State's budget. An specifle requents for aantet, fuel cycle le a relatively proliferation resistant commeretal power technology in an& from foreign operators are jdentlfled by State, DOE will provide technical that directly weapoon unable material does not occur fr* lta fuel cycle. The DOE support for thene conversions. han programs under way to further improve the LWR and enhance its long-term Conaldering future systema, the mont algninennt improvepents w h!ch we bellere PaANItN UTILIEATIoM tN 1. font wAfra aF.ACToas could be implemented at an early date are improved luternational anfcguards The light water renaMr (LWR) will produce the bulk of the world power from and the continued development of institutional arrangementa among bree ter nuclear energy well into the next century. Since its commercial introduction developing nations. Improved safeguards for L3!FHit systems are currently 3 almont 20 years ago, the LWR has been making steady progress in improving being develol+d in the United Staten to identify menna for increasing the security nefety, reliability, and fuel et!!clency. Conaldering its prominence in nuclear of all aspects of the fuel cycle luctuding handling of f!sselle material, fabrication lower generation and Itn prollferation rentstance when operated on the once- of fresh fuel, transportation of fuel hand!!ng and mntrol of fue! In the reactor through cycle. DOM han instituted a long-range program to aantat industry in plant, handling and storage of spent fuel, and reprocessing. We are coordinating our efforts in this area with other breeder developing nations and our ultimate upgrading its capability, objective in to develop a set of international safeguards which could be uniformly Alr. Chairman, you have asked that the Department speelfically addrena the funding levels and object!res for the program to improve uranium utilization in implemented through the I AEA.

LWR'n. This important program han the following milestonen for improvement Technically, the llepartment in also exploring breeder improrcruents that could of the LWit through the remainder of this century. be mon proliferation replatant through a decrease in the frequency of fuel The Department will concentrate its efforts through the 1980'n on backfittable reprocessing and reduction in the amount of plutonium that may extat outalde Irnprovements that can have a algntocant near term impact on all existing and the renetor core at any gtren time. These improvements are anunciated with the currently planned LWR's. The present high priority program concentrates on extended burnup that may become ponalble with high brwding ratio FDR cores.

development nf high burnup fuel. Succennful completion of this program should With respect to the L51Fillt. prollteration ren! stance can be enhanced by reduc-provide the technology with the potential for increaalng LWR fuel efficiency by ing the requirements or frequency for reprocessing. Thin can be accompilmhed about 15 percent before the end of the decade. Other backettable improvements by extending the burnup capabilltten and hence lifetime of oxide or carbide fuel could te expected to add further to the increamed fuel ef!!clency, systerns. Such a program in under way and ludications are that lifetimm. nignif-Advanced denigns that could have commercial potential are also being consid. leantly beyond the current 80.000-100,0n0 blWd/t range, can tie achternj.

ered by DOE. These concepts concentrate on rnore fundamental Irnprovements in Another approach that han been conablered Invoirca a concept referred to as the once-through LWR that could be incorporated in a new reactor denign.The.., the Fast Allzed Spectrum Henctor (F51 Sit). This concept anno addrennen the concepts could lead to total urantum narings in new light water reactora of about , absence of or upe of infrequent reprocessing by extending the burnup capahtlity.

80 percent by the end of the century, It also proponen the une of metallle type fueln utilizing large quantitlen of lan i

The Department *n program for developing and demonstrating urantum utiliza- enriched uranium, a varying neutron spectrum, either podlum or helium as a l

tion improvements han four major parta : coolant, and fuel rentdence timen on the ortler of 15 to 20 years. De feanthility ef l

1. Development and demonstration of higher burnup fuel-this in the most th!n approach han, however, rot teen proven and the performann requirementa l

' Important near term method for substantially improving uranium uttitration ; are beyond the known or projected capability of materials being develoted or

2. Development of other backfittable improvements (those whleb can te examined to date.

readily utillred in existing planta) ; Spect!!c efforts on Advanced Nonprollferation Herrocessing Technoingy have

3. 8upporting research and development to prorlde the technical basin for been considered in flacal year 3DNo. Work in thin subprogram will. tie directed i high burnup tuel design ; nnd, toward reprocenalng plant design concepin which would virtuntly ellmlunte direct  !

4. Examination of nonbackfittable reactor design featuren (those which accens,in the fuel reprocenning operations, to materinta unable in nuclear weap-loroire major plant changen and are, therefore, practical only in new plants), onn. Theme concepta involve zero accean to procena cella throu ch the use of mmplete The high burnup fuel program han a number of important olde benefits. Firnt, remote operation and maintenance of reprocensing operations an well ao remote.

the continued evolution of t,WR fuel efficiency will reduce the demands on ura- in-cell analytical na mpling procedurea. Proceneentrol systema could be es;.ude I nium renourcen and production capabl!!tles to a altntficant degree. Second, the to incorporate the surrelliance of diversion attempt Information and pnotre increased burnup from current levels to the DOE target of fio.000 mwd /51Til une-dental actions by the une of a command, control, and rommunication nettrerk.

N- --_-___ -

36 '

37 a wide range between the low demand estimites and tha high d: mand ctmnv ctrr retimates and the same thing is true worldwide.

What you ultimately decide is going to be the figures that you hang Mr. Wmic. I unqcatand the adm. . mis trat. ion's S5 m. h.d on neal yer-your hat on is a matter of judgment. I think people come to difTerent 1951 mquest for this program has been mluced to $'l milhon. Cmou conclusions on that. INFCE is a case where you have a lotof difTerent any p y u gentlnnen imlicate how it is possible to justify a cut of thm ideas about what the world is going to look like in the long rim. I sort in a small but vitally important security-orientnd research etTort think thewor wald wouldlooklifmthat subgrou i proceeded reflected a consensusin wabout hen there are so many hundreds of millions of dollam left untouchen what that . broader fuel cycle research!

I think it is difTerent than our own projections. This is a consensus Mr. ban 3 FAN. Thn intent throughout m, terms of the bmiget cuttm:-

process of technical repmsentatives. I think it is not unlikely that you amim was not to make any long-range programmatic cuts m thes o

arefr.ing to find significant budgets. M e are talking about cuts which afTmt only 1981, in nn A Noseszo. I might adddifferences to that, thatinthese thoseestimates outlooks. were 1968 1 auen3pt to balance the budget in that year.

estimates and as you know the key contributors to those estimates were  ;

. It is not correct to read the $5 nulhon to $3 m,llion i cut as a, chang the IEA countries, the OECD-1EA countries. ne estimates that wem ' * "' I""R'. range pmgranunatic goals. We behere ,the $3 mdhon s used in INFCE were in fact the IEA estimates. c nsistent with meetmg our near-term objectives with an acceptahk I do not know if you know how these estimates are formulated. IEA schedule shppage in the years beyond 1981; we th, ink t,hnt it will per-countries fill out questionnaires giving their nuclear projections and imt n3cetmg our long-range programmatic objectives In terms of de-nubmit them to the IEA secretariat. They then go through a very vel ping these advanced fuel types.

careful scrubbing. The IEA secretariat reviews each one and asks van- I just want to stress that tlie budget cutback is not intended i,n th,p ous questions of each country to get the best possible estimate, recog- program or the others to icileet changes in long-range pn granunatic nizing that country's projections really represent their goals rather s[f[e administration. M e am committed to this program as we than what they wdl reahze.

• If you were to make these est.imates right now based on the current Mr. Wotre. In the short range could you indicate specifically what IEA proj,ections, you would get, a much lower value. To characterize will be the impact of the proposed cut on DOE efTorts to develo'p safer it as a U.S. rojection compared to an INFCE projection isn't really research reactor fuelst accurate. I t unk it is more charactenst,c i of what the global prolection 3fr. ban 3rax. In the long run I think the impact will be an exten-would be today versus what it was m 1978. . sion of the program hv about i vear. In the short run it will ivtani fuel development activities and w'ill delay work on the development of aga.rn rnomust g' .

advanced fuel types for 1 year or so.

3fr. Wof.rz. IAt me switch to a discussion on the reduced enrich- Mr. Wotrc. Thank ou.

ment resenith and test mactor program. I undentand Iraq is import- Mr. Umon A>r. Mr. dilman.

31r. Giur AN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ing a large scale research reactor as well as the highly enriched ura-nium which is necessary to fuel it. This is obviously a worrisome devel- I wouhl like to pursue this issue a little further on mdueni enrich-opment for the security of that region. ment research. If additional funding were made available, how coul..

Conkl you tell um whether thn fuel being developed under the it lie utilized to make this program more etTective t RERTR program would eventually help to reduce concerns such as Mr. Han3rAN. Basically on work having to do with advanced fud thosn posed by a caso like Iraq where highly enriched fuel must be technology development for these larger research reacton and on es-sent because no alternative fuel form is availablef pediting the stretched out R. & D. activities currently planned.

9 Mr. GiurAN. Do von have some specific programs that you wouhl 3fr. B An3f AN. That certainly is the intent. The question is over what period you can accomplish this. It is clear that the types of LEU fuel which am nearest to deployment are for low power reactors and the ability to develop that fuel and to make it commetrially available

,'k ld utilize it within that' broad rangei Mr. BAms AN. Yes, sir.

Mr. GiurAx. When it was reduced from $5 million to $3 million, did you take part in that reduction recommendation I probably will take place over the next 3 years, say sometime in 1983J" 3fr. Ban 3 AN. No, sir.

or at least in that range.

For iow per reactom I think the picture is fairly clear and I / Mr..GiurAN. How would the additional $2 million have been uti.

think optimistic. For the higher power mactors and the more advanced lizedi fuel technologies you am really talking about a longer range picture Mr. B An3 FAN. On advanced fuel technology development activitis.

perhaps a 10-year period at the outside. Mr. GiurAx. Are there some projects right now that are underway I think it depends on what kind of reactors you am talkm, g about with regard to advanced technologies t and what kind of near term or advanced fuel development technology Mr. BAMfAN. Yes and those would be stmtchal out for at least a is involved. year along with stretchout of near-term fuels development activitic.s under this revised budget.

Mr. Wnr.rz. Nevertheless the Iraqi example would fit the goal of the program t M r. ban 3 FAN. Yes.

L

EXHIBIT E PROGRESS IN U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL

/

NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS _-

~ ..;=::~,-

el AUG 201979 HEARING gg { ^1{ E DE lhIER AT10N2G MM AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS AND ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY \

AND TRADE OF TIIB COMMITTEE ON E0 REIGN AFFAIRS x1xtry.stk7irg>xonsss , , g ea e FIRST SESSION MA5tCII 12,1979 s

Printed for the use of th[ Committee on Fore!gn Acairs j

k s

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 46-381 WASIIINGTON : 1979 s

- ,,-m .

~>- *

=

I.

CO3l&!!TTEE ON FOItEIGN AFFAIRS CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wiecene's, CAafrmen I. II. FOUNTAIN. North Carolina WILLI AM S. ItHOOMFIELD. Mtchtgen DAN 1F. D FARCELL. Florida EDWAHD J. DI;HWINSKI, Illinole CII AltLEM C. DIGON, Ja., Michigan pal?L FINDLEY. Illinole gQ rp { rp g DENJAMIN N ItOSENTII AI. New York JOlIN II. Itt?CII ANA Nl Ja , Alabagna 3 LEE II. II AMILTON Indiana LAHHY WINN.'Jn21(ahmes LEMTI'.lt I. WOI,FF. New York DENJA MIN A. GILM AN, New York JON ATIIAN D. IIINGIIAM, New York Ot!M YA*ritON. l'ennsylvanta TENNYNON GilYEIL. Ohte ROHERT J. I.AGWptSINO, dal'libzhla WITNESSES CAttDIHM COLLINS. Illinois WILLI AM I". GOU!) LING. Pennsylvania Fase MTEpilEN J. NOIAHZ, New York JOEL PHITCII AHD, Washington ] Ion. .lohn 31. Deutch, Director, OfDee of Energy Research, Department of DON HONKEh, Washington Energy ..... ............-

MILLICENT FENWICK, New deracy ' _ .._---

2 GEHHY E. STUDDR. Massachusetts DAN QUAYLE ,Itgliana % vi linn. Thornas R. Pickering, Assistant Secretary, linre.au of oceans and ANDY 1RELAND, Florida '

• • • ]nternational Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Department of DONALD J. PEASE Oblo State . _ ... ..- --- -_ .

hi DAN MICA, Florida .

(,.,M9',', Charles N. Van Doren, Assistant Directcr, Bureau of Non-l*roliferation f

MICII AEL D. IIARNES, Maryland .

Arrus Control and Disarmament Agency ..=

WILLIAM II. GnAY III, Penneyhenta 1 TONY P. II AI,I. Ohio

• IlOWARD WOLpE. Michigan 3f ATE!!IAL SUll311TTED FOR TIIE IIEColtD DAVID ft. HOWEN, Missiselppt * '"_

Some ACDA initiatives relating to nonproliferation alternative assess-FLOYD J. FITIII AN, Indiana ,

ments ..._. _ _ -

Joan J. Baany, Jr., Chief of Stef a 6.i Enrichment reductions supplied by the Department of 1:nergy... ..... M Donato it. Foarisa. #fer Comeultant Jnformation on naval nuclear reactor program supplied by ACDA........  ::'D AaLans M. ATwarts, stag desferens Information on naral nuclear pivpulsion program supplied by the Degert-Inent of Energy............ _

.___....... ...... 9 Statement ott nonproliferation related technical priorities supplied by the Department of Energy............. - _ _ - _ _ _ _ M Suacou utrTrE ON IN1EaN ATIONAI, SEcUnirT AND Sc1ERTI{IC*dFFplag lillaterni technical exchange arrangements with developing countries suis..

+

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKi, Wisconsin, Chairmes

. 6 - ' plied by t he Depa rtinen t of !!nergy..... ............................. M World Ilanic tending programs in developing countries supplied by the De-T. II. FOUNTAIN, North CaroHan partment of Energy .

IEE II. !! AMILTON, Indiana , WILLIAM 8 IIROgkrFIELD, M1thissa ._

..._. 43 LARRY WINN. Ja , Kanese Application of the itecover systena to anonitoring the transport of special LI: STER L. WOLFF. New York DAN QUAYLE Indiana nuclear materials supplied by the ACDA _ - . ____ 4 ~n JON ATIIAN II. DINGIIAM, New York U.S. participation in INFCE supplied by the Department of Energy . _ Tel Ito J. SraLar:N. embcommif tee Sieg Direcree WILLlau IL Fire, Minority Step consultant Founaar It. Fnant. Subcommif tee '# rep Associate Tons J. Gaany. Subcommittes Stef desociate

..,, , . : , . .a ,, .n .: .. ) t l/I Beacou ulrTEE oN INTanNATsoMAI. EcoNoulC PoWCT AND TaADE JONATIIAN B. BINGIIAM. New York. Chairmen DON DONKElt. Washington RollERT J. LA00MARSINO, California DON ALD J. PEASE. Oblo PAUL FINDLET, Illinole MICIIAEL D. HARNES Maryland 110 WARD WOLPE, Michigna HENJAMIN A. GILMAN New York R. Rooma MasaE, subcommittee Stel Directee Tason E. Domman, Jr., Miserify afef Cenestfeat Vacna C. Jounson, se6eesemities stas desociere PaULA Bs!.ENar, Sabecmedifee Sieg dee@Ciefe (II[ e a

, a *1 ta f 8

PROGRESS IN U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL

! NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS l XONDAY, MARCH 12, 1979 -

. }IotNE oF REPRESENTATIVES, CoMunTEF. oN 1*'OaEloN AFFAIRS, SonConurrrEEs oN INTERNATioNAI. SECURrrY AND SCIENTIFlo AFFAIRS AND oN INTERNATIONAL ECoNonic I*or2cr ANo TnAnE,

. . TVasMngton, D.C.

The subcommittees met at 3 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn llouse Office Building, Iron. Clement J. Zablocki (chainnan of the com-

. ,, mittee) presidmg.

.  ;, Chairman ZABMCEI. The subcommittees will please come to enter.

-i -

We meet today to consider technologies and prograrns that can help

• *' make the nuclear fuel cycle and the U.S. nuclear exports moro

+

l, safeguardable and secure. As Dr. Van Down kindly notes in

,, - this committee has been in the forefaunt of i e r his prepared those trying to statement,imely assure t warning of any diversion of nuclear materials well in advance of the time it would take to transfonn such

'" ;# " material into nuclear explosive devices.

., ".. I wish to commend the representatives of the Departments of State

. . < and Energy and ACDA for their work in pursuit of this goal anil for the etTorts they have alread i and development along more,y taken to restructure nuclear rese much initial skepticism, these labors have already begim to Ivar iniit as demonstrated by our success today in reducing the enrichment of research reactor fuels. As for future alternatives, we are of come  !

uncertain. But the technologies you are promoting today are cleanly important in that they help to hy time, time in which safeguants econornic and re-and source research can continue; uncertainties new designs further narrowed; and most- explored;importantir. tim during which the international community can pnpare to deal willi secunty problems for which no inunediate answers exist.

At least now, for the first time, the question of how to reduce proliferation da.wers is beina considered, before, not after, nuclear technologies are unJartaken. Ehis is an important step. ',

This is a joint cominittee inceting of the Subcommittee on Inter-national Security and Scientific Affairs and the Subcommittee on In-ternational Economic l'olicy and Trade. I call upon the chairman of the latter subconunittee to welcome you, gentlemen.

Mr. Bingham.

3fr. DiNonAn. Thnnk you, Afr. Chainnan. I would simply note that just about a year has passed since the l' resident, with the strong sup-(1)

. e t'

port of Congress, set in motion the Nuclear Non-Prolifen;ntion Act of 1978. Duiing that time the United States has raised mternatumal It has been my observation that ext.crts come to the problem with nwnreness of the inherent security risks posed by the, commereml different points of view. Lawyers and diplomats look for techme.d nucicar fuci cycle. Concrete steps have been taken to mitigate solutions, while technologists look for instuutional solutiom.. I thms rie. including decisions by M est Germany and France to jom,these the we all recognize that there is not going to be a single moment wueie linited States in suspemling further ex]mrts of nuclear reprocessmg there will be a magic set of arrangements, whether they are teennical vipupment. Over 50 nutmns are participalmg m the mternational or institutional, that will lend to an nltimate resolution of tlas pnib-nuclear fuel cycle evaluation, INFCE, and we are particularly lem. It is something we will have to work at with gnat incemiity nnd perserverance usin anxious to hear about that today. .Together we are reviewmg all to make progr,ess. g both tecimicai nnd institutional meadn es in'onler nspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, with specific focus on tecimological and institutional means of reducing prohferation. ru ono w in rmx This is the first of a number of planned hearings this year on lo>rogress in interuntionni and ILS. nonpniliferation edorts, and we I wonhl like to describe briefly for you the organization of the De-ok forwanl to henring the three agenies represented here today. partment of Energy in support. of the international nnelcar fuel Thank you, 3f r. Chairmn n. cycle evaluation. As was mentioned by Chairman Bingham thesu Chairman 24nincur. Ambassador Pickering, 3rr. Deutch, and are 53 nations and 4 international organizations inwived in the Air. Van Doren, we welcon e you back to the committee. We are international fuel cycle evninntion. The lendership for our Nntion's pleased. once again, to have the benefit of your judgment on these im- participation in this important netivity comes under the Depne tment portant matters. We have prepared statements that you have filed with of State through Ambassador Gernrd ' Smith and Assistant decretary tho sehcommittees. You may either rend the entire statement or sum- Pickering. Thero is a management conunittee which is comimsed of mnrize it ns you wish. Your entire statement will be made part of representatives of the diderent concerned ngencies, incluitine two the recon]. ' members of the Depnrtment of Energy, who work together to forimi-Ambassador Pickering would you begint late a joint U.S. position.

Mr. PicxEntna. Mr. Chairman, since the basic focus is tecimical We are nhout at the midpoint of the international nnelear (nel measures and some institutional measures, I wonder if we could begin evelo evaluation. Dv the end of this fiscal vent the Technical Co.

wit h 3Ir. Deutch. 'o'nlinating Commitice, which is charged with integrating nwntts of Chairman Zantocar. I understand further that yoit have a tinne the international nuclear fuel evela evaluation, will he taking re-problem. '

' ports of eight diderent working groups and bringing them together

- for consideration by the plenary body.

STATEMENT OF HO'N. JOHN M. DEUTCH, DIRECTOR OF ENERGY The Department of Energv's support to the international nuclear

' RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT 0F ENER0Y fuel cycle evninntion comes in a variety of forms. We have nn in-ternational nuclear inel cycle coonlinnt'ing ouice at the Department Mr. Detrrcir. Mr. Chairman, very much. '

I am pleased to be here.,Thank you of Energv. That of1 ice is responsihie to the Director of Energe lle-search-that is me-nnd it is hended hv Mr. Eric Beckion1. He is the With your permission. sir. I will present my prepared sintement for principal point of contact between tlin Department. of Energy and the record, including answers to specific questions raised in the, letter' the Department'of State on these matters.

sent to the Depn 1 ment invitine us to appear7 and just summanze my We have over 10 professionals in the Department of Energy, tech-remnrks, if thnt in ngreenble with you, s,r.i nical experts of one type or nuother, that nre participating in the Chnirman Zantocur. Withont objection, your prepared statement- preparation of pnpen or in the deliberations of tho cicht different of tho anawcra to the qucWimin that were nnpplied wdl be made part working groupe thnt are ongoing in the internnfionni nucienr fuel of the reconi. evele evnlontion study. Onr support, our finnncial support for the Mr. Dceren. Thnnk von. T nm very pleased to nppent here th.is U.S. participation in this tecimical work and in the work of n flernoon to disen Second, we have recognized that there have been in international f' commetre ment of Energy has underway which eveIstrongly beh,rograms that support our the i'  ;

a large number of research reactors which have been fueled nonproliferation policy. It should come as no surprise that the core of f by highly enriched uranium. Indeed, there are approximately 5 metric theso pro-rams has to do with improving and extending the lifetime tons of this fuel in the cores of research reactors in the free world,in. of our hght water reactor system in the United States.This, we believe,

.cluding the United States. The general conclusion emerging from is extremely important. to our nonproliferation objectives, as well as INFCE after initial questioning is the desirability of developmg alter. to the questions of energy supply in this Nation.

native fuels which will permit the same physics to be done in these There are a variety of progmms that I would liko to touch on that

! research reactors,in as safe as possible a way, while reducing enrich. bear on this effort. Iairst is our new program this year for light water

ment to, hopefully,20 percent but at least 45 percent. At the end of a reactor improvements. In tlas piogram we have four ditierent e Torts, program of conversion we believe there would be no more than'five or all of which are aimed at makmg light water reactors a stronger and so reactors in the worhl which would be required to still.use highly more extended option for the United States. We have etTorts going on i

g enriched uranium. in reactor safety;.in the reliability of reactors, that is, keepmg their Finally, speaking of the preliminary results coming out of INFCE, capacity factor Ingh; and in reducing the radiation which peopio we do recognize, and it was broadly recognized in other participating v ho work armmd reactors are exposed to .t countries, the importance of at least examining alternate fuel cycles and alternate breeder concepts. While I would not wish to give you , '

IMrnov1No UMNiUM EFFICIENCY the impression that all nations are immediately agreeing that there are better fuel cycles than the plutonium purex reprocessing system, or I,m. ally, the. fourth major effort .in our light water reactor improve-that there are breedern which might be more proliferntion resistant '"'"l. pr gram is an aggressive effort to nuprove the elliciency of nac-than liquid metal fast breeders, we do believe there was general agree- tors m their consumption of uranium. We beheve that improved fuel ment on the need to examine alternate fuel cycles and alternate breeder inanagernent and higher burnup can lead to a 15 pement mewa.+ m the concepts. Furthermore, we need to examine certain measures that'would econ my of reactor uranium. usage of the existing generat,mn of mitigate the proliferation risk of the present or alternate fuel cycle's reactors. ,

that are under cumination. 1n mhlition, we beh, eve that there is a 10-peirent to 15-percent addi-Your let ter, Mr. Chairman, requested in formation on precise, quanti- i t,ional improvement that, may be possible, and I wouhl like in einpha-l tative proliferation criterin. I might note that within INFCE, five S ' 2" I

' cmmtrier-the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, 8.echm.'ero cal prograi that good intentmas are not enough. On France, and India-have provided papers on proliferation-nsistance is possible.somet,n to assure unes ret rofittable that m an exist ma tlus additional generat amom um ot reactors criteria. I think that you must all recognize that there will not. he and sometimes not.1 hit there will be an additional 10 percent to 15 simple quantitative criteria available, agreed to by all, by which to percent for uranigun efheiency for our light water reactors.

judge prolifecation resistance. ' L Of coniw, tlus is of paramount importance because if we can reduco

' e e me urani i TitaEE cATrooniEs or cn: ten:A 9 amount of power,, uni m)uistinents of a reactor to produce l tune of a reactor inventory, or more reactors operating for a given However, there has been general nereement that there are at least period of time without the need to enter a plutonium economy.

three entegories of criteria that require examination. The first is re. 46-35 -r9-a

]

6 a lt is not only important for the United States, but it is important for fw perat.ing reactors. In some parts of the world the water requin-other nations of the world who wish to take advantage of nuclear inents for reactors are of considerable importance, power, but whom we do not wish to encourage to make a premature commitment to reprocessing for thermal re-vcle. Ai.NAME WE1. CYCi.Es This program of improving uranium efficiency, which is one part We are also continuin to examine alternative fuel cycles and re-of our hght water reactor program,is slated for $18 million in fisent 1980 m contrast to $14 milhon m fiscal 1970. Perhaps th,e greatest ad- actor types. We have mokest programs underway for matters such as vaninge that all of these programs taken together to unprove light using partially decontaminated fuel after reprocessing, water reactor performance in the United States is that it, will provide coprocessing,larly and a particu important. effort underway to examine what engs-not only for reliable power which does not hear great, proliferation neering features can be nibled to conventional purex reprocessing to risks, but also for less expensive power to the American consumer.

make that rather vulnerable technology more proliferation wsi9 ant.

P Isomrz sErARrr ON FROGRAM i members of the committee have specific questions. Let me FnV tb' at om II "I'l metal fast breeder program is not only looking at plutonimn/

4 .

There are many other programs that hear on our nonproliferation uran, nun systems, but also at thor,iam/uramum-2.Tl systems. M e are poliev. We next turn to our advanced isotope separation program for continually lo kmg at all breeder technologies such as gas-cooled re-which we are requesting $55 million in fiscal 1979.The advanced iso. utes, inotten salt. reactors, accelerator , breeders, and even ,h3 brids.  ;

tope separation program, particularly laser isotope separation,has two I" "II.of these cases, we have not determmed at the present Ome that advantages associated with it. First of all, it is an economic way of there is an alternate breeder concept to the LMFillt that otfers quah,-

stripping tails; that is, removing the last amoimts of uranium-235 tative proliferation advantages.

from the depleted tails that are presently being stockpiled after lear- - ..

ing enrichment plants for use in reactor fuels. This is something that RESEARCH REACWR PROoRAM will also extend the lifetime of the light water reactor system in this ussion of wuh like

)n' rescan to conclude, wacte pmgrani nMr. hayeChairman, nquys edwith in thisa brief year disc,s budget.

Eq ily important, our advanced isotope separation tech- miumn in 6 scal ,vear W fu our nology etTorts will continue to place the United States in a position of f ep w am mine @

a re- e6m s m n ne ng enne unent required for research nactors. M e heing a reliable supplier of enrichment services, rice, so in that particular' our allies arn m the piocess of changing that request to $5 milhon. ,

liabin supplier of enrichment services at a low will be nhin to look to us for the provision of re fiable enrichment serv-. ""hl like to make a remark about our efforts on th,s very im- i ices at a price which is competitive. ,- e i ,. . portant .research reactor conversion program. 'I here are two stepa which are' required.The first is a near-term step that will take hetween l

[ now and about 1982. which will require that we develop allemate fuel

• MBE PROGRAM i  : r f I wer enricliiiient und demonstrnto that high-density focis can le The third program thnt hears very henvily on our nonproliferation

~ ,

uwd,in' research reactors with ndequate safety, and yet pmvide the policy cliorts i9 the NITRE progrnm. the nntional uranium resource physics for which those research renetors were bitilt.

evnhintion program We are rc<piesting $80 million for' fiscal 1980. In the development of thesn fuels, they are tested, and then their This program is directed toward assessing the amounts and the costs demonstration m the reactor is n part of the program under which of domestic uranium ore supplies. As our knowledge of the supply w are currently embarked nnd for which my Ollice of Energy Tech- l curve for uranium improves and our knowledge of the resource base nol gy is responsible. We believe that it will take up to the end of 1984 improves, there will be greater confidence in staying with the light before these fuels have been demonstrated and there are radiation water reactor system for a longer period of time.

tests which supply completely compelling information for renctor 1 would next like to mention our etTorts with alternative fuel cycles operators. For safety and for physics con <iderations it will enke until nnd with niternative reactor systems. I would. first of all, meiition thy cnd of 1982. The total cost of that. program'will be nhout M that we are continuing this year at a reduced hudget IcVel our research miH,mn. ,

and development into the high tempernture gar reactor IITGil; Subecquen l

particulnrly in the use of low- nnd medium-enriched fuel for the charg- #"""

I" 'I",t "to""'.that humweor will have to undertake 1me.cnriched fuel in our rencton. a deployment This de- pro-mg of such' reactors. We are not proceeding at this stage in reprocess- / '

I pl yment program will consist of two parts. In the first ninee it_will ine of IITGR fuel. We nre proceeding with a longer look at direct cycle applientions of the IITGR. This is a particularly'important pro. Lltivohereasons necessary for this.toFirst, convert to showonrthatITA it is possible domoctic recentch to convert n. renctom I gram with our allics. particularly with the Germans, who have a great scarch reactors and to set an example for other nations of the wor 11.

interect in develnnine alternatives to the licht water reactor system ~

Segnd. to establish the reqmred experience- which will le m e, led to Ihnt hns some ndvantages, particularly in the reduced use of wnter

- i gmde our further ciTorts. . -

g 0 Telopment. At the same time, him ever,it is luy.ortant to slew these techn.dogical

. ," ,' * . D01IESTIC !(ESEA!!CII REACTORS efforts in a larger context of nonproliferation policy generally and to reg. die that there are no " technological 111ef' that in thetuselves cara guarantee us a There are two t ws 'of domestic lescarch reactors in this country: ric. free nucicar future.

,I.hete nre doniestic research reactors tyint are 9asically run hy g }ge 317 observation is that the experts come to the proldem with different peints

])e[ntrtment of Energy or by universities niider Department of Encrgy of h hwyers and diplomats look for technical solutions, uhlte techn dogist*

look ror institutional aolutions. In fact. U.s. nonproliferation i-lh y is as it contract. The Oflice of. Energy llesearch, of which I am the Director, must be, a blend of dirrerent approaches. inciuding any la day <tiplomatic as neu

,e is in the hnsincSs of hu 'inE uels f for suels. lenctors. The pace and the as songer term, institutional economic, amt technical elements. Aloreover, we cost nt w hich we convert theFe reactor?, III p,ullicular ilIOse renctors have recognized that many of the basic lucentives towards developing nucle.ar f weapons tweessarHy an be dealt with only at a pontical level whether a nathm which contniti unore than lor D hilogranes of highly enriched tiranittin, takes the final step is heavily dependent on its sense of politieni and tullitary l

is one ilutt will hnVc to be decided on in the fut tire. security, and its technical and emnomic capabilitics.

We will he' durinE scal fi 197D. layin. g out, a specific rogram for the IIaving said this. however. ne have recognized that there is a strong techni-deployinent of the technology that WIll 1se fiIna11y aval able at ille end can c moonent to um pmt ens. The rids of prouteration could be serious!/ ag.

gravated by the uncontrailed spresd of sensitive tuaterials and facilities or by of fiscal 1982. a situation in which our institutioual safeguards and controls are not judent The second class of domestic reactors concerns those which are .in to be funy adequate to <ical witti the quantities of weapons.usabic inateriais that ruay be readily accessitae in the fuel c3cle. Factors such as these Itate prompte i the.

their hands conversionof.l)tiv. ate indtis.trJ.

IS Something we wiThe.ll alSo hnYepaymg toinethods that we use .to encoura.ge agtention the United States, in the past. to push vigorously for the widespread acceptaure of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the strugthening of IAEA safeguard <. l'a to dnring fiscal 1970. . nddition, however. these considerations prompted the Carter Administration to

, take a substantially harder look at the proliferation issue from the technican CoNvr.HSloN or rostr.loN Itr.sr.AltCII RF.ACTottS o t.

staf{ la t eve that the technological innovallons can broaden our choices. not only Finally we have the quest. ion of our ciicourngmg conversion of for-technically hut also poiltically and inntitutionally,in a may that strengthen $ the protireration-resistance of nucient energy development. This is not only true t..r eign reNa,rch reactogg We will be working closely With the Depart- the long-term as we develop follow-on syktems to our current generation of nu.

lu.ent of Si.nte nnd the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to de. clear power. The improvements ne can snake in the near- amt mid-terne in esist.

ing reactor systems can extend the resource habe and hence the lifetime of the gUCetg enrIC]1meng ride fuels. what I wantis the hesttostrategy to say you thatfor employing I ain iglese estreinenly op re(timistic and have rdaunty prWikratimmbtant Ihht M*ater IWor W W om he@

cycle. This in turn can Inty un time before any irrevocable commitments to more fouild a grent. deal of interest in other countries. Both Germany and siensuite fuel cycles are necessur,v Improving the chances for developing nenh d Frnnce* for. ex. nin.I>1c. a.re not only fa.bricating such fuels themselves, diplomatic ana institutionni frameworks in the interim. In this way. technolonieni but also assisting in their deplo ment nr. t le wor i tot a). .

improvements lend crucial support to the evolutionary approach to nutlent de.

telopment that we have advocated.

We in the Department of nergy strongly favor the ob).cct.ives of In recognition that tite United States could not embark on major new min.

this program, it is our responsibility to undertake the technology de- proliferation initiatives alone, we caued for the inauguration of a anajor new velo 1iment and demonstration in a timely and eficctive way, and we are International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCEL The purene wu* fo 60 proceeding. enable the nations of the world to pause and systematienlly conshler the prinri.

pal options that snight be most supportive of nonproliferation objectives. The Mr. Chairman, that is a brief overview of the major programs under- united states entered use annirsis wohout nxca preconcepuona but with a deler.

way among our nticlear programs to support nonproliferation objec- mination to explore approaches that might ndnimize the presence of weapms.

tives, nnd the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle efforts in particular. whie materiais whue assuring the orderly growth of nuricar emer.

With that I wouhl like to close and apologize for perhaps having ,3,c, gone o,n too long.Thank you v,ery much, Mr., Chairman.

Chairman Z.uuocut. No; it is a very technical su nect, an you can tries rum a4 m un. purpm of mFCE un m womu mmu do it in just a few paragraphs or a 'few pages. I think you did very rhe g,n,.ipanta in she organizine conrerenn. or the Internaunual such.ar well, not only in your prepared transcript. I must say,you did ren.nrk-

- ruel Cyci, Evuinnoon are consaoua of the uraent need to incer u.e worbri. ener:y aldV we .  ; requirernents amt that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should I e made nide-e

.' ly availaide to that enil. They are alm continent that effective mepures can sued Nr. DF.UTCit. l,hanN f ou, St r.

,,houbt be taken at the nanonni level and through international agreement to

[Mr. Deutch's prepared statement follows:] minimize the danger of the prourerauon of nuclear weapons wohout jeopirdir.

Inc energy supplien or flui development of nucient energy for peaceful purpose's/*

Parrrarn StaTotEMT or IloN. JoitM M. DEt'Tcu DiarcTom or ENEner REsEAncIT. INFCE's work in lisent year 197M was focusal on scoping efforte. and on wh DrrAaTMENT or ENEaGY lectlug. Organizing ami annlyzimg data and information nerded for the es uhnation.

Men $rm. Chairmen and members of the subcommittee: I am very pleased to ap- To date. over ::Ou international papern have been produced. Seseral of the richt pent before you thin afternoon to discuss the status of the International Fuel working groups are now well advanced tu drafting sections of the final working group reports.

Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) study and the Department of Energy's technical lly the ernt of fiscal Jear 1970, it in expected that each of Ile crmtps will haie programs in support of U.S. nonproliferation policy. As you know. an important c.nnpleted reports for conshleration by the final Technical Croribuntine Cummit.

part of that policy la the effort to develop nuclear fuel cycle approachen that are tee iTCC) and Pienary meetings. In addition. the TCC is preparane a munimarv ne proliferation <ealutant an possible. This goal in and muat remain a central con- document on the working group studies and providing an overslew of the INFtt.

elderation ne we plan our own imclear energy strategy and na we work with other nsuono to develop a conaensus for a safer global regime for nuclear energy de- -

. - - . --- - - _- - - - ._ . - -. -----.--~-_~---.-_--n_- -- ~ . - - ~ _.~ ~ . .-

10 11 work. The overnll work of INFCE is proceeding on schedule totrardo completion sourie utilizatinn and eafety and environme ntal impacta. Iloweter, research q

in Vehruary 11N. und des elopn6cnt la necessary to prot e out Ihep vahdity.

- The l'ulted States contributions to and participation in INFCE are coordinated When the IN FCE report is comph te, azul F ASAP stm!!cs are 11nishnl, the DOE namng the concrrned agencies in the Executive Itranch by the Ollice of Am- will be prepared to make speci!!c progrn ru rerr minendatious.

f b:nondor Gerard Smith, Specini (LS. Itepresentative for Non-l*roliferation Mat- In regard to tetablishment of aneamngfat and u tdely accepted criteria for l ters. There are three principal agencies supporting our involvement: the proliferation re*ietance, progress has beca made in INFCE in sensitizing the i

Incpnrtment of State, the Department of Energy and the Artns C<mtrol and Dis- International community to the urgency of this problem. Five countries (t;nited armament Agency. Several other agencies contribute expertise as appropriate in- hintes. United Kingdom, the Federal Itepublic of Germany, France and Indial I

ctuding the Nurieur llegulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection have submitted patern on either protheration risk assessment or criteria to J

Agency, nud Cotmcil on Environmental Quality. Itepresentattres of the United INFCC, largely as a result of 11X initiatises. Although it is tem soon tn say that '

States are attis ely involved in all INFCE meetings. a con >ensus has emerged, the TCC han n,anested that the working groups perform j

The Department of Energy provides suost of the technical data used in the au n.esesament of proliferation risk for each element of the umlear fuel cycle.

U.S. contributions to INFCE drawing upon resources available, ruainly from its The results will be included in the working groups' reports and uscrtiew.

i Ollice of Energy Technology and also from Internations! Affairs,Ilesource Appil- The U.S. Initiatives which stimulated this respemme suggested three criteria for  !

1 cations, Energy Ilesearch, Environment, Defense Programs. Energy Information prnliferation risk assessment of a fuct cycle actisity.These are :

l Agency, and Polley and Craluation. More than 40 professinnnis from these orga- (11 the resources respdred to extract fissile material from the fuel cycle uhtch ulzntions have been worklug on a part time basis as active participants in eight conhl be used for the purpose of making weapons,i.e., manpaner, technology and 1 11.8. support groups and several crons<ut groups. Three full time DOE pro- int est ment ;

(2) the time necdad to complete the job. from commencement of the activity fessionals mnke up the INFCE Coordinator's Office. Two DOE people serve on sin INFCE Mnnagement Committee. until the production of sufIicient material for one or more weapona, and in addition to those professionals providing direct support to INPCE activities, t31 the detectability of the activity, that is la say, the means and degree of shout 7 professionnis support the Nnn Proliferation Alternative Systems Assesa- ditticulty by which the international community muld become aware of the Juent 1*rocram (NASAP) which is I

• nona e of most technical data amt analysis specitic activity.

macd by the United States in INFcn 96tles. The overall goal of N ASAP is to Much discussion has taken place on this general subject, and also on epecific recommend strategy options for implementing civilian nuclear systems which, fuel cycle activities. One melhe=I that ham tec.n con =idered in to take n einin-t hen deploynt in the United States and internationally. offer increase! resistance titatite approach, determinine siccific mensures for the various parts of the to prnliferatinnt sthlle ninintaining the benefits of nuctent energy over the long-activitv. and conclu ling a value for the risk. Another rnethod is to esamine term. This includes the screening of all candi< tate nuclear power mystems and the activities on a carie-by-case basis to render a epinlitative conclusion on prallfer-urtection for detailed analysis of the most promising options, that is, those that ation risk. The prnlominant view in that a qualitative approach is repairni. atul offer hlch proliferation resistance, are techulently and economically feasible.have that spinntitatire assepaquents are misicuding and likely to become outdatet as blch proml=e far commerclal introduction, have high expectation for etticient techunlogy and skills improve and benmae more widely dl=persed in the fmure.

rei.ource utilization, and bare acceptable pub!!c health and enfety and environ-I would now like to turn to a resiew of nur 1. Wit. ndranted sperms and research reactor conversion program =. In doing so. I will attempt to hichlicht "

mental characteristics. fur 3 0u the relevance of each progrant to our smuproliferation objwtites 4 INFCH nn auch han no line item in the bud:et, but rather drnwm upon varinus Don hudgets, including N AS AP. Fiscal year 1979 hudget authority for the NASAP 1.wa FUEI UTTu2ATION AND Furl CTC12 E M H A NcE M EN TS l pre gram. which is expected to be conipleted in December 1979. Is $6.9 million.

' The total estimated cost of the program is $28.2 rnillion. I,lght water reactors (LWits) operating on a omwthrauch fuel cycle alTent In addittnn to the NASAP program, other nngoing U.R. nuclear program actirl- to be the best renetor system for meeting projectel nent-term nuclear er.mtli i ties have been providing applienble data and analyses for INFCE.These include with neceptable pro.iferation characteristica. If 1.Witm are to sday the sleniti-programm for development of thermal reactorn, breeder reactors. ndranced re-fuel cycle technology, enrichment, and waste management. cant role exlected of them. It is essentiel that aderlunte uraninni bs' nsnibibh*

I to fuel thent To help assure this. DOM has two technolney efforts and one infor-

! actors'e Sine INFCM and N ASAP are not yet complate, research and <tarelopment pro- ruition efDrt underway: the Uranium I'tihzation 1*rocram which nill improve  ;

grnm recommendations based on their conclusions would be premature. Ilowever. efficiency of uranium use in once-through I.Wlts the Advanced Isotope Sepa-some preliminary findings are emerging which are helping to shape our view of ration Technology ( AIST) l'rogram to estrnet more tissionable uranium frnm uranium mined; and the National Uranium llesearch Ernination (N14tC) pro-f ut ure l'rnerama. Ilrletly, t hece include :A= inentinned at the outset, there is no puregram technical or institutionni to determine ,, extend and poothly fit,, the uranium resource base.

I which npplied alone, will eliminate the risk of prollferation. Taken together, the Urnnium 1*tilization and AIST programs rould reten-

' The once through fuel cycle is the most proliferation resistant of system 9 tintly result in a safe. reliable nuctenr energy supply u=Inc from IM to en ler-cent of the amount of uranium currently consumed by pre =ent erstems per

) gl e I Wlbn the once-through cycle with improved fuel utilization le the inegawatt of power genernted. If our program resultg in te.hnolocice that are preferred conte er rencinr. edgned to use hieldy enriched nrnnium (IIEll) economically attractive, the impact of the crolution of a fuel ~etlicient I. Wit omw l through fnel cycle will he substantint. not only on the preactrallon or a vlat b*

i f e re l g ed to use medium have or Inw enriched uranium (MEU or I.EUL led to the program emphasis on improving nuclear enercy option, but also on proliferation concerns. l'Irst, it enu lewn i These ireliminary findingg the perceived need for thermnl rec 3cle of plutonium nnd delay or arnbt the licht water reactor fuel utilization and the development of low nnd malium rc=ultine "pintonium econnmy." Second, it will reduce demand for uranium w .

lehed ceacerch reactor fuel. In addition niternate fast breedee reactar inet plieg more relievine the prem=ure on escalating uranium pricca Third. It will pr.m t time for the orderly est1blishment nf breeder reactar programs toofL.mdb.

"#1" *ideh Iirnduce excess denatured fucis for use in thermal renetorgthe nre partch lone-range fueland development supply program.

problems and minimimi Menne attendant proliferntlan making rl*Ls. r vuinern e iirnllferntion, much ng coprocemmlne. have become part of the U.S. It should niso be noted ihnt I.Wite can namnme a larger share of mir encrey i

1 are im=ible camlidateg for INFCE recommendatlana. productinn be further incrensine their reliabiltty and enhnneine lheir public i

I

'N I t I nical alternatleen being ndenneed by the United Staten in acceptance. Therefore. In addition to improvine the uranium utiltration reli-INF E nel de foci utt11 ration improvements in light water reactnrn. Inwer ciency of I.Wita. we are propngine a complementary ohjertire of IMit olernfine ,

I

"" # t el t facinThe forDepartment re*enrch bellerca reactors. thatnmtthese alternate alternatiresfast nre1.rceder all tech

• renetor fnels terformance and safety improvement. Successful completbeu af them proe rnm

! 1 will assure that I.Wil plants will deliver their full potentint of energ.rgeneration.

I all fra tid and rotentially attractive from the standpoint of economics, re-f 4

i

-r o m , -

- , --m- -m,m---- w- -- , --% , - --

nse e .tt )s -

n " edac- er ' lae t m)f St 4to te *. t y rahhl e e ri e. ih ss - ent -

mlii re i

oah e ir t.

aegr ni = a hn oo N' cg aUo uH i

et co 'I.teTGp0c l eer rThe r i nH e e t

c t t f nnt s iht t

h eltait taifes t t n t

/ e.hi tt=n e edu grEe c t innki m mfu6nTt l

f rr flig aso ei t not ina beti ee n i rl7ts i ta 'l o nl le' c rtt eiimpoe u n l

.u i

eu o nF "

hb

.n oHn r( a eH e f

t.nr otiic ra r ao r ei a e P oiou*ul e n rwul p a rdr a st cm e aoin e a idh ph toi r ir Ii t yRat c

s p rts y

iue r

opt en e n l hdv # smde mls t

ar f u upc ah na t

i gupv oi c=p t mwi oTpt o rh=

t e tr eiPrnt ro e s rFt tnds ee it p o

) ie ne a o/r vl-htdha a nint r t e e*

n o.n et nre Hnr I

draf r e p s, e e

lwil chyrea wCet atp u ar ngo t t l p

d8 n3Ss c edo n nt ed . ry

• n o Ta-n a1 ArIdnmmE e

.uoy p . noyc ymh admsa ,u asrnss o e l

l r t tt i y t a nid t ua ortpt h wirup n uio ounr a or si rN t n E t t nn initihc r) r t ct eo my enf " nee kcc cT mn e n.nfomhe . e t e t

n a Rn ra nt o lnf =Et i nit cne"il e e

ki el ce ee ti tiuc s ad r ra cc e . # pah r e et t y p e. n d ir t t e i o 'n b c n t e,og n n noi rn nshant s o ( e e.

nI mi il eiel r c mnt l t epet =i*aaC tib l

ht tbicm eiae a nt p oa otp t eoI e T mf eTcfi p vmpr raaorh v ign C ewrse e

v nnie t a e ce Hu r ti ' rhll omaihl ri l

bTaai t

tut t g h t

irut l inele t

t o e o adut dc(

i sr r pt int i

s r rr c os nr a

u oc ndm# "" lnum.s Uihennh rec dedaaeS n lt e isi c d nde e r A

a terp ocir o dIl ed s o sH wi p ce onl t

pt a  :

u s n .hns ev l nn l e got , rv i r t - e t r ioenue ft I.ei r aheeiaGt thrtch tne i rnt ura e co rWn""a p merst ena ner "

a Ru d I I eee vrint e nase n Wtca rifd ain nini=HI t c nolu Tnea i a"k ' dmt rr u ebvtel t

taHl c Hhd t e tnnli ehi t r e i r a l c n e a al nf nicg .a t hti hdenr t v

l nt u - Mtn I" rUo vnt odia n e n A t ce ir 5 I ehit I t

inm glepuhnie r rl r

h erci

,iW u t t

nw ryet a pIlr H e = s.

i s ) l s uilutupeme*"gg fms n hnoc n ail eWi r r esu s v tne m i c p o r, b vI tdhmt ewai nI l

5i rys su e wr e ofemeynf n t R. rr e r 1 a( y. p n iaHo ll 1 n a g d "" 3" m wtl n nre S .ba nTi o

. s r

a Ter do rp a r4d.ua h'dmi T s e . ce ei c ur rat chriev h s e r v. m A olo r tirl liuhc c m dem o) ogtS L uilii i iet n( o isun t

wrGert N m

t nct i t r a l it hor n ,t re en c urih r no uro dml o p U "" we rnminnu e n todt r o c n o r a a nti 3 etI grs e li.

u viae sD rWI e amtet e ec ab t c e""e e nth f naw t hs tro ai Mfnn t I luh s 1 s : e :

dcwu mo c o*

l r pl a f erhwi rl so postuc iryn % i nn fi eerh h yc b' I" a iSdoi n f r n I

x cn ,

t me t l i weu nl wiU't nl e r eic " u n s.

g"d md.aut ra

-rI gNt r n cfg o ptade u t o oI na e re . n, A tn ne e ae h F otf net s

au ui e ro s r t

clys nro

.i<a wsd s n u r eCnti Aehd hn shl . t ms c ie3 ire el an ht ettn tnhos al n .lrlta no etae 'tlpm pnt s

s amo c

nl t of ol e n w et u( tehns mr rwpme r f li i s etc u r s r of n u elru m L la aso i oc t vt doteti n r pi s v usdth at e N emft e e i

n rI'PI e

" em w e u uu=e s detkke n menr h lan orica ' cated n idea a nsfhsiahtiz e nosWiu e " I" nwl t

v n ig g f" n r f

u shoi o c ewlio n" rf l

ce rt 4 nl s e p rd ts t .r eirw p o hdt t t

kNnWe mc ef ii sohdd ee bo,p i n v dr gnp t t u n0 e tn e pW uo nt r nie n voiWnm a e

na i g U" " uc wn nl e E

o epe n at s

a ll.n e eni0 ne nhed1 t

0 i nil c eI i tttia t

iiy t r h eaGs u alt titI Turahhdne n t mom

.tr sn a

A teoie ipuin n

rd n

nh"ne"UWnH n"" I" ae MnA.n ho eg i nic*

t nc uy r mlot cn hevd c o"" din ntAo nmn t

tehnims oVI rt eoet aoaff o i .t f rl r tl ro ul c n ae a t >= n$

f e n3 i

nt u o l

e;rAie griV s eAehc ndmpr g et dleDsmPamn iuSet em f

e fu " a n u ird a r

r g ,etaisot u eI ev e c hIh t d re o ).

o er os rI as In&

x uMad""e3m e"Utn An"inag tl n e= hd ch h a p0 f' n n t e nhf a e e n

AeMH o nt ua I]o t; Nt e e . o '* E.tohc 9 rc=di pruhc nthme$pf r5 ohmhi ar eitt o ot orhdlfep&a b h o he eHHAot e hte""W rp anu I

ye' tu j

t ddr e e ae7 M=h o iwa f o t wt ot dc h ten p t ,osa i t s t

es nnf o poia iett

'i uf r t. m t

lcN gyded n P n m "# a def r r ao lyn e e' Nne t

s cbs u m -1 I

I ece ,r4e g e r nfu mi Gynn oos s r inc ng nn ufo t

inC 1 sl eh c die el r 3 3

'I r ih h m o *$ n g

a ao ot Treog ct epn g omsu tnn b o" m Han6 l -

is loi Nmw pnInropf ra t

e)rWci tavignsf u n nl i or ne t di p I n ve l

n u .is eo"fc 1

I i I 8 i nse a ti s 4 e u ,oaMt e rR e

e 't it .sta nt eiioa e e cr ta)e cse dp lfDe loM d n . c p #" r

'" nmH l rn n r e f" ,T P g t oo o he es n "c r

i i h e. h anirdrt s etbG hWl PIn &e . r %n-l r lrt p se Taor i uhn g r uu s" a o p

Tau hmt r s s f ef utimt T HuMAo mTett r sea p Vt lpaaocc ienuI ti f o'I t

e I,-

t iia t u i o t # c y

s o

I a

a n m wf uedoNai ( sII sO 3 f

6s or.yg

- t3se o n*el

- rt . et - - ey e rs.y.piery a c c v laca n ic eg e e r vu0 9 achb st y hd -

dt f rs.he .dedrdc na rol ult sel h oo eOhr a et cn i

re pc soz a o- oiatl fhrob ar nhe e ei eatta wt l

eds ao1 r t t r r r a egl o uATu i o m oh Nan uh n u gi yd e qS ses,pophfd oenn t

tdr o iha n y Tuba frlon n ns ,o nmt u or u mhbadxmr t o re ni79. ome f

uu lamiit l o t i

soe t nb u s eev o l wM dtcgh e p e ui d . n gi nd Uoc tTi obh t

l e i ihnieehing n ,o gc oc nl est . c hIh a tu79inf oit e itnn n nefm cwyou 9 H t i t

e e n oabs t

sn t 9 tik d e u yt ot cio ue se e gI r nyc rt pi re ag nah oi a ain uv rl u gm1 r e a ih o ent mt S 1 oa ecpe l

e .t n i siv r s arel bt t if i pi ad riatn ro l r pts0r t

0a ssage da rohstiet td ero&n nevatca e i

us rn u ie sin .nrmp-elb n ha y ri r

rTt e lob db n n t a oo ntt pra rr1 ae i

uoh uraf bge a

cmdu cn

.g n ht es inonRa amos t e em v e o T.f ynlbatni a t nt 1ihs , e odr eru jes fi l hn nAmter lafi ac espwgllaot, eo eiat i oyy r uen 1 .la vn s 0r l

bihr t al e r e, i c ti t c u et eyo,n sn riu n gm h c yanm echu i i a em 8 pl a gab ee daDl a rpid e enwmol l e eR e pWto t noo psp

!uh 8al ehc a 1) at cl sTl e o olTsed9cre nr t tb 9 re n a gmil eil r eca t c r

l li tai a rh u ign s hg z n ur l

e ni e ep wawt e sdi l r cmWa ai o

t r(u gnct q0 dinr t a.l nl r c 1 setd e rEl r br ta nio! si th auu el e e s o ).n e r s e r E, n ietf mscaahee

s. senr et t et el nHe f

is I' n

o r t5 yp~ h v a ut o

t c

eL t n c if q r r airr e itat r simed f t$9l .ed e n tnmAgny s

eeovetbr n at yUi yli ti1 i mel rt nnbhn t

l v et rd , n a mG gk pd n e 7a eio n u t t

rgi l n oy v upnmei a ge u dea ae nt n esf e rwurgiel n e uone t gn9cnt pnl e e r hcrdy oa t opaldot hla lNnn o fmeuH empog e us a te t o n se n di1 ol r a foom fl o mb icl es t

ae a i mt dneiom a rp f oh o nhfite v I u byt l yis p e c ne n repd u ck e i eo r eca unt mhe e v c(ilta s l s e n0 nh11 de n oin.nint dt ip t nyoleuni pndt aeatt thole r t

nane nrlaya I g kr cae erM o n npd a O en gn e

t nfDhdil t e anis ohel f a

e ut e i nii f omm rei av eid e ff4ls.

l I f e ef o f hi ni yith c fb ei h tn4 A t

o e$ c1 nnn c e vWl Tnnlny e d s. uot ldb f o nelts sll o cgodsD nhI rn v bisLpib et t nn0t ua eReiind mel e s.det i

wo a r nt f dal ha e iTsi7 ta 9.ae2 pi i

tov re .bc fid Vde uo eott e

r y a Hi ne a jh c

ee .ha cc ont i s '0 o c ai u ul a Tatrhfdiuki c u1E z r i oO11 ou nfit egh t

r in eA Ab m a er nat ehonp uol ubr csf t

gcnP yesg cl e

,t v .p ons e ni n w T.n v a$OlG ll tcM1le qe I i

e enr hlhoT t crpr . pTilaeIm uun f a t edt ns nn e hl el r T ioEo!

c h i t gaiain a nl xnd e pT e adms deeFne a I a o eif r 2 e yd l a r xh e e maeh t e 1

l' nI rv e ae mIt rayed hsb re e egs tjihr nn eie wmdue n c acdw.e r hnei hcnI t

i tNimelip i I ah dninf t

o oGthmut ni ntc .e pceet pmn a

mt tin wioM t I a edh u rr rrt u e ounu m t eo o ovbhevw bae dri nt e al lb te o p. tde y o sr rs ht cao eRcnt eucde los rp lyd tA eoI agr nen l mnpo u nf n n f

l lua3ttl n n uge iqmg ns eplih drliche t io Rnroi f ga or r v t a m sordelter ul e ad e erip Tal l awla as fs a er n ei n nle . t def vpnI vgset f o s gchn Eemn nml ei

• r ea! r acm! mui r

rinemww t We tm e nf p u n ronvin e pio emrL e enrli n ngteti rr ywI e rc ali a s Ll glit yn diogSnitltl rm8 p n d ho in n n rk r crcHoo rt ef d ed oewnk ci r red ryr he n d yfcehl e att ni r

I t au 2 etr pi t ny .oi heTri hlf nriatinia nmn oi o e be e cas ss nh aractn t auba t rnh if a e ehn e e er u nyc o gV gd en o r pR h t t

enge i r s dd=hu uk t e ueri t ueogmd d omir e nn omcof iain snm l

ut vt vl u njeiprn e nm enod n ea ! potoSt ocnor orl olou ua ae oey a nnut o c otl musi siri me s e roi r orn T*f *t noAbu nyipI n r f emredciza gt cv o s.rul pf teit ly ,i t i d ihepufehD r ort s

e nf enn c er s.h i e es T l a h .t R ah e he'boaHthr l olu lzFhtflel t m rt

'r- oth t tu a lep egmsadiWn t

tts r pn netl mh e eucDg n0td h l

f ouv ii ce6 aW.a e t

c s a s t s e a e

ar e mUuh yvhin Nlaa ea iede a h "U eh"U i c n nbb dob r

t r I n del asen dhm ahi u ni t qrI e ,1 ed, e

rn en fi operyl nt T t

n oo r o e m. tnf s nd r il t Htit4.

n ir c f de in n a ua ae nw ih gf e do hneor fT eel l n ae e irva oreprva e r gt tnlgmor s.

goitrmn ne o cuodaal d ha o repuil. arg netihhs lo caglnin npo y gco e no . apdnn a nrl u

i c s,i$vly3eih a

4 1 e 0ne g dl ri l

n p niniolbore ea o t veTrermr a.tiwl ol r et e mnTi u .d un it umlon nriyi e s e

c ereblonp rs* ne o ro a

rodm Uinn ab=n a t

. ~tfh f o 3 cn awimaet s rbatarhc gt n- a ra hrt sopeo aihdmyr e ne d d chet on i eta cl np ooa1 r pb n nie ilatl niw ii ul! tnh vnth l e trt ot cipa prkm t pai t kAbe eiv eA , csarIlrat ek pn .i ann!la iet v e cnec t

. mh oIjnus et r l!zt l n e c s nd vt e a nleS r u c c et be y! ! a o ct t a r tyea beWpc ei o ee ,r, noe in mtn efhWoro rho edi!

a nb di r tk cdniel ec a nolct t

n o pt ev wuat emenf e nohmod e ih. p l

li iutf Not o efsuc e n oi stl s ih ne n ft r a oniepbeye ol v t g oy

. er Anrpd m a h n nl t r rbn e r yegse r

erergnint adnd-hl n a nl o a ef ol rm e o 0h 4hc o e nt enla l mnnn t ri a c!! eila eoe ufaremuc Nrl c ta tiorl gtp r t ueush ha e M. tTr u e2 pol l

oiorp t r ge n ehli l

lhidi auWoe t

7' rqmTr6 a r an mtihpTopunt ee et ot cr tug Tnssn se ho i a nwTa roh uuel ot re t r Du oe.ol l aerent nt f mpA r eo i

prc cp sn ntostiot isnt( it sfj sNm o pb w a pI net tI 2 a pl 0l f

V r

i e i. m o. fi ntr e nndee.ir.r 1

- re . n o * -

rr -n

r. io fie.!1 ror.et o r.oi n r. *rao d4 o.mf f

t r

e - h .

< nd h

iinwkhst e e o on pe eili enu n 1hhti el u beWt e

mt emht n cr n taIlwa p i n ur tati . i s wf sie s uotcylir t

.:iin e .hwrf n pcn. n v peo c l? trb i s pmae c et t n ot. (

lor ecnmt t

r en

u. takt i oeh r esl r T ga .mc i

pl wslini

.e t i dnldil . i p i T. a p tlcs aneu nt o a h tene inu iler et oi o n ne rh .eh n ka *r. wleea r . seaon. r

c. r in e rmms de l.

s sI e tnpie e ulemh t

nm mb e a na an !. . ut dnr part i enwpi sI n t e

tr1 nmie ni ih io d g eetm "a r n n eioe nm,ucp hrli oaaTi n s a he e nt t p t d*h sen nig ases ro eun nm(l at ho! m 3 ot e nniin no eTm s u pt ed t e t .

ehwf e t e n winhlld c rurh th r el psn .e t

r r dnsi oet tah t t o e e. tegt a egs seoio g n i p u =.

ri s t rnt apmil o ahteCr ci t =r inh h 4mnp ec coppio nt nl ipeeeot u ea n l n1: a n ncms or e wr t yn c

a p u e

em ve me esot r uanlbr r pn u e

hert sihu nti i ini n lehem r e s priit spl tnie nn mt f ro e e e rha st e( cicf e t c od r w h o

pl o

e nrItle oc at et e to #etean entueantost pt r rGo o v cpwnls we D gct i edyr eoti d n s acyee r r r rn et rr t r yf ryn d si t el u a n rh nf es o pt aItt t t einshh ed)eiTpbcnee reot mv l e pG e m e icyh ut ps si t eol e rT e

< t n ehwvl el o mc ri - e1I e S tahal nhme n t e po nf h e bs s

sdon segmc nl e et ru ofhly e'.

i t e

cr i euet n

sifs e niot a ehil o mel toGedlciF e i I t l eihsiet rl l

d tI Idh h nrgaTpeTv  ! a eh hegwll trt goo s Arlue t

ei

,er asgs rul s nGetot t

s n hn ogil .td a h oc she rere e i slcwetoniit s a eor imat tcupimnigmt tf gweymfs cfhc eu o f a ee e upn rnighLwIhomhtt r p I ac d

usin ibe uu cf n o t

u s t li r o dt o?smur hduel srma ngr ntiigdi e aTndo d ea ni s eos og et tehisa7zn c

rt ethm woi ctd ioThd l t r ed moewot on ,n me no t

epi s.

x sa ohislta re se nh idt .uuwt n n. porit pi a n tTae 7i , re ll fi e eht scem nm e v rt gl e9 sieOnrme v ah er ous tl dt ne ae an mosyv s ut s e ar et t edcenh eitda f amsmshr e s setiotnflc enelctI a e S. or l

e yh i oif n1 arMeaiPu ho tf ee q o p

lil ef m ,i e c yS i e n y s, anmn niee cds aieyerhh U ph r esp rfVo n npe ra h oI nrt s rp dAiur ef as synr smgeo u l ptt ei .r t

rgr n .nf erl t cs t fd sl s

t f n ue o _

aielsams ekorE edohteywI nptl ec.nteom rrpomt n oelo e r s t

a ygUngnff oul tsa u a nrn plphoe tVs r ne rss u Ad o ug d of 'n s eet nrinrt v ne e co n teypgrye t

y w en ha r gn s to re a v nl r o ssa vht i ihnn se itt eo esu t ennrh edMhig k e n i

. .l t

nloiMiiese rnl eie r pr ert h r n pli y rn. t umm teht i pl snper t t t eaytibr s edt veo f aia ee ge r sert p ua b a eol i seu ea eoolia x mnl ocy c toic nnuna al tld adn t ps s yhn ii odst wt can l w e thh o o amoi u r e

s e sinpo siemo a ,t at s ner mGyrdsim seTdge ei .t vn4luwm en 5 ph ee est ul i c a o te o t ain r fi rs ca nr!l payhAlt enu es da ecyahTn tl swt ar t rmlivt n at f e oce veun s a n/m! o1 y i r j

sr 1 ndeds o a rerdl i

nyei o e dshi c, uii xtr a  : inel l u ns . ed r % g apd r

t ai trt nt c ei n cnra rpiGl ol l a letd o ii s es di teeActl c eel mt crwsiqe l ewsAnchmt nIit oet t

a ne op1 r )c aGuc nl s e n nGeo riieg p ef e i

rdco$cso ic aeo a ic ro t Ihoh u co ai ntbdrtivJ v t ee o ftit ru uee ern napct n ouiarenue ua .dme r o r r ch io sndnn ang nTut t sttshin e dcne ncca Gef gmnape a nt oI s eet dt p ceem ul Tdurl il eltai cl t pnfi ct ,mt n ue s l/ a yt .toI a "g vd iot t s ale tali ge geml s e ual gi e o f y 5 llft ) e n o enlewi sdi<t dh go f, . af rt onlh et on a enn nso et v e rl e t.

v n aais re apmrl t

e oa ufit feri rt cu sunst pani gr est o h edia rtihelilaol nsa pGt,clet y -

ngcppaitt epl ts eoblpmh m u ll l o l.

on hiG

• i mromn eo an rsanf r o .di r ofe rhSips sn t ao n ri o oisinhtcy ni rleT0 c ot ymn t yg e r r r ne i l

ti n cn iT ininCe .grda meep pI t raw dlet o t.irtr!no ni l

s ie ut pndcsdogat s sodxAi t

.x i o scm et sx iewe b p t. rshmet ne am ull5my e(9aCnautt t nm! -

hi y o oil gout aiwnlin t o nl n o e e vpirAeEhmf reeEcAl t u ueie a mraneel o o t

ewrpihr s s rn l

1 e t t rnnchiht n

n e el eyn s e ceiAe ol!

e poiit l

egnt t eD a t

ctbrt rt l rs c e i eo tef tep odt r oa anio ri edawe t r pu leso feio a ii pt tnymn rv s a eF g d I h coIteAonuionfth rir i pt aF p ec sI n sle tst o a eptt r

mnnihohi ri cg s r n el t sr t. h C a linesdn t oi n re et h

s dect na s vn r

t so tl ep .n eys I. ntsslomde1 e r e nnt mbcc iiet eoD i oise da c t sSrd4hi pna f hr ialaro sf sn en eu no rvis e lo axt lamsNicphs nihbe nvpn nmI s

i eionyGDteic si e c e yh e r t wFbmaaGdnahnlTo o f st tlTe hl il n ht qeu d r ),

el Jhe06t tb4 s f e I ns r t s sr e e aot s iiTnmhn e o r sai ges pmvI al eot s rt. e oet emsl igshe namt o iacn o e "s a 'tn epht td t

n n o r x .it rs oi t opnf v oa sehsdv c md s lh guntinet )I :dnnl i n ni i a anrl e ici nGy nr t

e s pI lc el Nps d sr t

nrt su ,ul n G s. e antdon e or a I 'e e ehgeaf ev egt ne ubi oCsaepoti r o s ro s e I inrd met s

imoucf eit i

sidt e .eh tT m T i u yd nc i

n toient nc nimidi de o nt a iaawc o resssohdet rtsh dulI.nlel i ho o I nt t ro efI n targ nUeoit o et hmn ere nl oTc e ohvidn c s et nde ohni t eo reihc o aanythot ue c 1:

b ewahns(Ft oht os cyt r ah r uhrl r rni cf ednmc rio t epldnitl s r4tn r. ta%r r enircn l i o adcil t c t mes c ou ctir shnfo a c.osr Com) .me nf aba e t e

cpnt ur f u nt o ue oho n nee O n enoyAneadeat l

a m weAsi a s ro sDSnttase i bputiwdteha newteet nisgt sesi ndmtaGwf

, nt o reiae r pi t tot tnhit enirgce ecyrd sr on Sn o r

eyo nCtae th r anlayad ,mmeti s sd m e l nic s n apaL bt rc

.h c id eieflue dtd a tepeeuCn .l obc ele ne e gsesnl nt ott e r et t u er nyl oTedet s

et rmoohe mT I tedcWt pe e!i n ntla yh toor e r t gt mf ae a eo r rQeAeNyoe Ac o te s nr mnhmedl a e a hhs sinciQuAa vi nti epcr rI eI cn l t eimegvfoIlole ro cs h hhn sr l

o ht h t(btdt ieo rix e cynyrouh weVepmhxuuestGVaUahnif nwscrnqtcoeiuhmf sit inii sTihuJvfemcI t t spcst t s nd( t c

stI ge o epI r ne nf i '

~ -

cidtt - - o-o ol -

5 pac l el see a g r. d nu nnUnd dsl et sn d .

yt e -

e m heieinri ihnf ul eo f

ty-nwtosle ieo rt pn nnn . oaefTdi eeihv ruh n a

S. n n s u i d pt brh o te n e e m1ratnn t a abeeEoec c

t t p r tl ev a

U3oit inel n v tr f

rct ninen ct e rcs sslisu ns eey f eo rh givi miellt 0 e s d e exn e wqn ly 3

iu n esllflt)I il ns inde l gu n i n na o

vd . u s Sl oe t

r rli e- ngb eai pem d rey eo a 7 f

o ne idEi h

, seeia un esndr oo is de oie r o - rovt l e,n ndrf

.id f othucl 9 1

nu.

i qy E

r m v .d de euhr i?

g se f igt rlcei n pi s si e

cypnb0hp r c l3 r mfotii u ct s a cn hsn rn ar e uicf se r tt r

oe ios c n T d o) e rG uc tf ,e h mot rhg ndshp a e r ce ph ee s e r icl ee e

orm c itf eej w o h n pb nordrh T n pt inUgl yh n aeriett t

nedy re ihv d fu dhef?a ul eghtlt a a o ec nnsbd aei -

dt c ce a aehcg e ott a

e y

puf pqcim u

I M

s n

iFo id UEnl i

r no egefUcode2 shn 0(

ll t n o ee om lrat t i rct sypsei w r et inw t m da n t c

dntu tni cr aei n f rih t se v0s oe t n n(p if r or s irh l

ch u- ra o I e smiu wrgn eben n h n , nt nse o iee.ni tco nmni l

f a9eer rt a l r! nhe n t

e t e h ow n hp c r c n nlt C o3' t trptl cewp rc , e et coan eh isn cd neell hi v oyrn ocn ed g i0d e rn

- t er a nst re.einail s le f

il n a e r et p)a s ve i t

en f s im n ray iem E

e r

o teemu inact sn gt ea t l

hi o a

n tepetr pm nlee xde tepeft l o i

vt p e .h e

lpt iet nfrnu h2i vgu tnhi ug s o n mf v H f nKi e in s rsdu e u a r dap s u it sw f

opct he r a pwro n- ca rt xe fi sn0edc t al eh T b

e riaa .leid s ey -

or n smcfl r eMih n r s r nmid i

u jee nh h 2l n re gs si t

Y ?tNr uif c uenn ncd w d ed e r es oro l o n pI ig e ogdtt or n f n o vnw e dt s w veal ecpeio edt noiv dnl u se pt o rf n eu t (h o o tr c ae bnhu inep l

u .bv uiov ee n E ve at r ed ndn i

o ut 1.uhl d s ot r nS i oe ctf c r a vhoth e n t se nihnds ched cy i r ni pied c ipdne i v t rncfe0cych nt c s e,r a

e o do tdtha e t l ll Umhyu eiUirtt et ri t m r r N nt ueranh2ig t rwa , ly g Jue a aeo ns i

l n c n hol t ndn ens c r n e lp . ict pec n nl ebi r. mlipr ewe r cgdpt r eiwenihe e a

e ao erhl n a no rt t nwere c A e a )e ci c ni r a nl zennn nd,l v e r v in Mq ett o n dpee V .

o iint - oo l

ge i n npe nu c l xvr ei e1 a s r n r r ohcn rnaw o wt c rn etbi rli t id er rt e en e s c dn e n t a el udFt.e er t tan eyh e rt nti u a nhf = nsma

!it o k

as en ua op rsh1 r ot$ ind a uh A ef b c d n r e - e n n ega n i ot n ha cc ot cp an c lan u ho ct s c n o ngcemed mut c rim y hernefl c

l c c i. o p r us r pna r tt N o ew eFerdtdi e s c inm wue nr c et .o c r

et e nr re f a umrdt e '4 f t n ec( htfhi oen r o n nc edWte ac ee ve I

ri o r ht ne 4 tet c el o t

hmeh ndnl cl o t f cncopeIbnThl n e efi D c n hea letn lnr

. y ape c3 1lb9 co c r e e a hcyn itEtl m % 'n yih I Eped o tf r eevc r Afiir n c oia s9 nr crrTi i u o a e 1

nuh n r eiSi gr r uy ai i T une tnor6na0a1hl r 9t idTh on .nr qr en e0 iga nts n0 r i nl nCn le n a rh eprl s dt rh e e r.c ceg r o

pn s t

t en rtd2ro nl c eI o rI r1O pnt e nut t 1 M he el rr us e c

msoe wr1e wet ev0eybl st hl eli et t y l

a de t r e eens e s

giw ni e ze o . v nge dg o rDh a i

nn l 9t - rMl Enfd ynt 4 or neizd8 hgnI n cd n i aa t

otdso t t t .

nmemtAc nadit hnWninc o r

e= u U l

mn5. oCpeeml i o xh ce egg hh e 1 fprnl l n n sd n

ob c de

.e imlrin cA c t

itbe l

rn nic nmn erhhd t l

! eiuPefyotlnl 8 f uet i guhti n ee n rl y e t h. b r n cdd u

• N is0 l

a ee c c arrnerer ece- f lt a r ae rt t e nsn ro o tuct eTw ned8empeITcenl r 0ieerilnrnet at rl lds e 5 oe eic e ri oni yt bfiv o 9 0 n ihih cr u n og n n h r t inl c a b na f T g uapt pron otr p 0 g rlef n t

a o tn snmcog rn e m ecl a t o . nape ehTlalhn v s nn ol put ot h n e (r pee dt eW19 nU

. ge et i e

v e ueh to yo elrf oct e o5ee a ehco ctbmd l

rt nl rI Uy e t ch cap r ep 1 eri c 5niao yE fnr eIhie T e f c n r irII inn n nurSEl st inveer nt nr h dbt spm4nvtimnru o et i

.1 4 ot wys4ame cdllIi t v sb R la eTr u , abEl e yn n g n e r o nti nn h n rhbe n a ) o y. I. re i

nener r nh r e t ejeerswtsel y pnt a l

r fT hn d e. r* f fIhnn at ngi nr eeWI It nt en fhrevn e a, o n ti n resbnni mcmeOt e niet o l

xda aied o e eleea Q nhndogcii e nign ddif bl f e c *f s el evunEi0 nhpren th f nle e .hn e tI e f

dn3io t

e e tog n nelllar a tnor et e

r cl e gl uwl et shlime. n ot o pt t e T

t ct n n rf neidit hhoine i et r ne nd s n ahrgo . scrdoinr wn a x reiapt rh p e s udf.

,t c he? v t e lvo fu lcdi)ht t c n e c r cm rn o h r vtif c au1 u') nsn s arh r rW c u runiol at rp i thh o pf o o w enl=it 4 r

i. = n e cr n ento me riI r

tApDmrdh n< Isl gn id

. 9 of r si ct teiinl Wctla an rin r R eneh 3 nl e pniohm r a

.nr. T n y rjolleWE .n n eU l I n p:i e nEtFg ee p ua egs l te ly c 3tDnUe s ewih nl t F s s

.uh e5nine.l lhli t

a c at m wF c!

qmt ni e s>l et el .llen2iTs e . er e(ht .

I ix eO1ly ng e er a a da ue n .nc r l

rn o aN n rtnt2if t

.t0e rrgoe nel . cie l

n n nr nmi.I g t ri t n e nficn a . et t

eaI n r t o nn a s rnyont eerbhnu ful e(la r lohlld ti c fha aME e r n pf n e. d n ee C o r r,u nt nn r ff uuaI trIf ee n fumonneSwl e ee e a n fItat r e II aeeehe m cmrantl shli niof l cl e a ab vy A idef a Sr ettl ir o i u 'repagi r oel n i r ebnt ac e%u! awah i

ca mdst r in l omne t

d rg r l

ts ewn c l f r r a E oe t.lv rhetlliv i

p e r ,

tte iumhd hd aishet rt n nt coemirhd eha e=df e re e n,t u he mn c lan n ec tel ndii r b yi n eTe lycimhioie nmTnTo t n

t rpndn h

a T 0. T no nnm hp y e ucnl QrAr i eiMenvnruene.

e nt ng ioOhAda rnnhr t.

hmf r ehh rdd eerplOenAit cc rroht oeli bg r w ol c n e r n n t et ng ri c iwtoe c n ne pil v irirft s e n r oneUt o mh uinro e s M r5 men n n nI ue cr '$ n lg cpp l

riut t ft epc p3 i ni; e fIU r i

t n 6

,* t

.1r -

, 17

" " " nH dmt. The techniod cil uk, can have a' major i;npnet on son e-anNnUc"ff $15Ntrraciar en , ' of pohtical and institutionnl measures. I will give sc.ine emnple, at answer. we linte a. >nity sttianinted a high' degree of international interest thi, sort of relationship.

in ..ur prognon to liapeo<e the wantuni cinciency of light wi.ter reactorm. This l i fuelrveIc hn= f.ects it ine throngfs pretentaties of (eur J.rNr.ini in international foruins jKpCE Wu qiiesglons. , is y no.S proposed asnoan. o[Wu us evnluation suegi will gseof var o (the 10 nation, horueginn-11aseil lleiden project group, INI CIs M orking Group a negotiation, ning agreements

.% internationally attended Arncrlenn Nuclear Society technical meetings) ane l ienched. It is hea.(.ily deimmlent on techmeal nna analvtic mpui. In in numerosas ili.*ru.klong with foreign if>ttor9 la the U.H. We have been ap. launching 1NFCE, we were nsking the internatinnal coimnunitv to prmwhesi by F(t eral foreign and domestic groups seeknig to establish inultilateral pp , pen nnd reeXnniine modes of fuel cyt,lc develoIunent, and n9sn't9p-intervatiount emperntite research anil development pro,jects in teclusologies .

uid"h utD contrainite in inqirove<l uranluin eithiency la LH Hm. The !!rst of these tions as to factiial bacIjgroulid.

1.r..jects, to investo:ste ns ton han retense. troiti Ngh burnup fuel, lii just getting 3f r. Deutch has reviewed Some of the spec,ific Department of Energy start ~l at llattebe. Northwest ' Laboratories in Richland. M~cshington. Three plugrams of interest. These include woik on improved light water c'her multilateral Tvojects are known to be under consideration, under Jiritish, Swedish anil Danlih leadership. Very pretiniinary disetmaicut for information reactors, advanced fast Worg {m nigince(g enric and.reagiment .ctors, In re8earcgi the NASAP reactois. ) eve opmelit p 'ogram, o an

,sciinnge azul/ur bilateral cooperative research projects have taken place with key inilisittual* of four nation 9. The Dim intentls to pursue vigorously each of Ein'nt luel Storage capacity and waste management are also relevant.

the<e lenils azul to continue to stlinulate foreign intercat in innproved uraniuin The Ad lloc Interagency Group on Non Pmliferation has con-utilization through presentations and giersonal contacta. ducted detailed reviews, and has determined with DOE that its over-Chairman ZAnmcitr. 31r. Pickering. all R. & D. strategy to pmmoto unprovements m the light water reactor,I,. Wit, for the near and medium tenn and to develop breeder STATEMENT OF HON THOMAS R. PICKERING, ASSISTANT SECRE. possibly other advanced technology with the most prohferatimy-nm}

resis tant characteristics possible as msurance for the long term is TARY' BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON. technically and economically sound. We believe it is the appropriate MENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE strategy, which takes into account both energy security nud nonpm-T Pacitauxo. Thank you, 31r. Chairman, and Chairman liferation concerns and objectives.

U.mgham.

ir.

Cl.ainnan Z.mmcia. Air. Pickering is the Assistant Secretary for mcz the Bureau of Oceans and International Enviromnental and Scientific The DOE, as Dr. Deutch has pointed out, is the major source of Atinirs. Depa,rtment of State. M. Deutch, but, he needs no introduc- U.S. technical participation in IN FCE. The State Departnwn ethut

, I failed to utentify 31r. .lh on on INFCE is led by Ambassador Gerard Smith, who is the overall tion. Ile is the Director of the Oflice of 1.nergy Research at tl,ic De.

j policy leader for UlS. participation. The operational direction of the partynent of Energy. And 31r. Van Doren is spe Assistnnt Director li.S. INFCE effort is carned out hv a nuumgement conunittee of honproliferntmn at the Bureau of Arms ( ontml and Disarma- chaired by Ambassador Smith's deput'v, and which includes Dol ['

ment Agency. 50 we have the Department of Energy, the Department State, and ACDA members. 3fy Buredu for the State Department of Stn,te, and the Ayms, Control and Disarmnment Agency. I am sure provides the major statt involvement. Approximately five Depart-l there is close coonhnution between all of you, the three agencies. ment ofhcials devote a large fraction of their efforts t'o INFCE and

.Tir. Pickcring, closel related nonproliferation matters. In addition. fumling for 3Ir. Picarnswo. I,et me begin by reemphasizin your remarks.There attem ance of some key If.S. participants at INFCE meetings is pin-is indeed very close coonlinnt, m, n between the t iree of us. lou have vided by the International Orgamzations Bureau.

uf rendy received a great deal,of informalmn from Dr.Deutch,and the Of central importance in 1NFCE is to detailed nature of the techmcal pn,mnuns related to proliferntmn re- product which can be useful to national birovide ecisionmakers as ther a con-balanced sistance of nuclear fuel cycles. I will try to make my comments bnef sider the future role of nuclear power and plan fuel cvele actiiiiic and to address mamtv the reintions of these programs to our mterna- In doing this, we hope to convey the point that natidual situationE tional fuel cycle evaluatmn and nonproliferation etTorts. The non- ditTer, and that it need not he ass'umed that all countries shouhl moro proliferntmn eliort is a cornerstone of our foreign pokey chmate.

international and of our immediately into reprocessinn and hweder development, pnerams overall hopes to estal, dish a stable and peaceful,de array of, imlitical, Our nonprolifernamn etTort consists of, a wi We also h, ope to provide a hainneed indiention of the economic. non institutional, and technical measures. It meludes as a basic element proliferatmn, and recource implications of thennal reevefe. We feel these unplications will lend to the conclusion that thersmi reevele is support for the NPT, and y,s related to our etTorts to reduce regumal not. ndvantageous. cither imm an economic or nonproliferation' point tensions and increase secunty of states. loday I understand the dis- of view. In providing II.S. contributions to such an annittir and enssion will focus pnmanly on the tecluucal programs related to the factual base wveral If.S. pronrnms are of particular imibiance 4

nuclear fuel cycle, but we should keep m mmd that sigmficance of These melude work on, international uranium usource evnination, de:

these technient nrens can extend into imich broader arens of the over- velopment of means to unprove uranium ntilization in pnsent thernal

10 18 In your letter, you specifically mentioned the question of timele reactors and development and implementation of geologj.e disposal detection. A closely related factor has been one major component of our own assessment of fuel cycles. We have pivposed in the INFCE of spent fuel, should that be judged desirable. All o,f these mputs con- Technical Coordinating Conunittee general assessment factors to be t ribute to a realistic understanding of fuel cycle options,available,over uced by the working groups. These factors, in their simplest descrip-time, to countries now in the early stages of utihzation of nuclear tmn, are resources reepaired, time required, and detectnhilit v of < liver-power. sion activities based on the fuel cycle or facility in quest' ion. These basis ron coorERAnoN inctors are increasingly used in cont ributions p f other states to 1 N FCE.

I should also mention U.S. programs on breeder teclynology and on We will undoubtedly not agree on specific nund> cts,lmt we are gaining IITGIt's which Dr. Deutch discussed in some detail. 'lhese programs neceptance on the basis of such factors of the need to minimize presence of material which is readilv conveitible to weapons use or to provide provide the United States, internationally, with a basis for cooperat mn with similar programs in other countries. Such cooperation is both some additional institution'ai measures to decrenso risks of diversion.

a schicle for mutually advantageous exchanges, and a menns for the I would like to conclude my statement here and thank von again for United States to convey our woric and views on proliferation resistance the opportunity to appear on behalf of the Department df State.

l' the fuel cycle of presence Chairman Lnincxi. Ambassador Pickering, your lurpared state-considerations; of HEU or pure plutonium.for example, It also avoidance provi in, des a jomt involvement in ment will be made a part of this record.

[Mr. Pickering's prepared statement follows:]

energy programs and some conse,quent measure of mfluence on fuel cycle ihrections in other countries through this involvement. For

~ ra>:ranco starrumar or uox. Tnouta n. Picar.aisc.' Assasvut Srcamar, example, we see the IITGR program with Germany as an example of rmam . Emnos urarat. no Scusrinc imitual interest to the United States and several other ndvanced coun-Ij,",j^{ yFj'fg8, ,^5, ,

tries, and we see cooperation as one means of conveying our interest Mr. chairman, i apprecinte the opportunity in naares. the in.parannt matt rs in avoidance of IIEU fuel. INFCE has been,in addition to a vehicle j mind in your letier. Inu have received information from Isr. Deutch on the for making otir Views Id. eletnited n:tture of technical progrnrns related to prntiferntion resistance of standing of the perceptm, ns and DSsessments lown, aofmeans for usWeto increase our other countries. ulnfueler-nuclear cycles. Therefore. I wH1 make my comments brief nnd uill ad tress mainly the reintinn of these programa to nur INrcE and unn-rrorireration efrorts.

have now a clearer underst nnding of the major role some of these coun- As the committees are aware, the non-pronfonoon errort . n key element of tries n.oIse fast reac. tors will play in their energy future. A continuin.g U.S. foreign poller and of our nrerall hopes in establish a staide and penceful U.S. mvolvement in this nren, as provided by our own programs, is internanonni cuante. our non-prouferation errore consists of a niae array of political institutionni nua technient inensures. It inchulon na a hnsic element clently desirable. support for the NpT. nnd is related in our errotta to reduce regionni tendone and Establishing a satisfactory factual and analytic basis for nuclear increase suurity of stnica. Toaar we wm discuas primarity the techntent pro.

proarnm decisions in various countries niso implies a proper peispec. " * " "' " d ' " " ""*1 ? " ' '""I '7 " h"' "" " h""' d k '"P 3 " " 3 "4 ' h" ' "' ""' h -

tive on ihe role of nuelcar Imwer itself in r. elation to of her options. In cance of these techulent arens can extend into much broadcr arens of the oserall errort. The technical errotta enn have a mnjar impact on succes< of ponnent and that connection, our program of cooperative bilateral assessments of Institnunnal measures. I wm cire some esnmples of tht= sort of reindonship.

cuergy program options for developina countriesis ext remely valunble. INFcE was prapnmed as an open erninntion of varinne fnet cyrle questions. It We plan to engnge in several bil.aternfnssessme.nts in the coming year. """"'""""""*""d""""""**"'"""""#h"*'"""h*d3'I"h""'"7 Ilot,h, our partners am) we, gam umyerstatujing fr! m such (1einiled dependent on technieni and annlytic input. In launching INPCE. ne were neking the international enmmunity in reopen nnd re-etnmine modes of fuct cycle d.-

reviews. s cionment, nna n=snmpoon. n. to fnetuni hack:round. Tia= In never an en=r Lind You have raised some specille questions, many of which have been of thinc to do. We were nbm accepting an a hnsic appronch that wn.rm nmet t.e fuhlrrf+ed in Dr. Dentrhh teHlimony. Some others will he nddreSSed in found hr which I.cnenta of uncienr pnuer nre widely arnunhle, without unnmptn-mine. hte prollferation riska. Thle appremch Inu*t lie credible in anure the continned With regard to crderm. specific. nmnerical cr.ter.ia i for quantit.ies of vinhility of the NpT. The United States benrn the primary hurden of proof that l thia propasition nna the reinted technicni quesnona nre h gitimate and an urrntd.

material, times. or dilliculties may be neither desirable nor neceptable from an operational perspective. Thus, our reinted procram and anepart work to the intei nationni communitv. Such criteria might either be so tight "'" *f """"'d""Id* D3*'"""""'""I"""'"'""dd'"'""""""

concern I")fr"."Deutch has reviewed t he spectn"e DOE pro-

"'""I""""".

~

ns to eII'ectivelv rule out some fuel cycle activities even in those case.s the seriousness of our where they mby be ciently advantageous on resource nnd economic grama nf interest ; these lnclude work on improved light water reactorm. adranced and fa t reactor . the NasAP pracrnm. and the work on reduced enrichment in ground 9, or alteruntively, to be so loose as to be metTective. However, resenrch reactors. Development of spent fuel storage capacity and wn=le manece-I i i t.beliere we are ional neceptance in fact of some achieving fimdamentn,l major pomis progress related to criteria.in gain ng nterna.mentTheare Adalun Iloc relevant'gency Intern Group on Non Prnliferatinn has conducted dernited First and most generally,it is now walely accepted that proliferat.ion reviewa nna has determim,d with DOE that its necrnit it. a n =tratere to pro-mote imprnrementa in the 1.ight wnter nencent (Iavn) for the near nna enedinm inyplientions must be a substantial consideration in making fuel cycle term and to develop breeacr nna r*=snar other advanced technoiner with the decisions. Secoml. it is commonly accepted that presence of wenpons. mno pmufemunn-re 1= tant chamcred nc vonnae na in=umnc. for the inne nenble material. either seIinr.ated plutonium or highly enriched urn, term is technicallr and economically sound. We f ellere it is the apnrnpriate

~

nium. IIEU. Shoubt be nu.nnmzed or avoided to the' greatest extent, strategy. which enkes into necount both energy pecurity n 41 non proliferation concerns and objecures.

practiruble. This is not a quantitative result, but it is clear and demon-ttrable progress.

20 21 The 1)Ol! is the major sourse of l'.S. technical pirticipation in INFCE. Their not only desiralde, but achievnide without major negative imImet on the u<c< of effort hun been unjor and of high quality. The state llepartment efrort on INFCl? I nuclear energy. In particular, our specific technical program on re%Iuent enricid 14 led by Anshawador Gerard Sunth, who in the oserall policy leader for U.S. suent in research reactors provides creillbility that we enn in (net avoid use of participation. The operational direction of the U.S. INFCE effort is carried out III00. This program involves direct luvolvement with foreign fuel manufacturers by a Stunngement Couunittee, chaired by Atubansudor Smith's Ileputy,and includ. nml reactor operators to prodna hh:h nensity, louered enriclunent fuel, and to luc IH)lh Shite, and ACI)A enembers. The ell:S Iturenti, for the State Depart- do operational tests on that fneh Without this program we would hate little Inent, provbles the major staff involvement. Approximately tive Department chance to gain international acceptance of the need to avohl the use of IWt*.

ot!!cials ilevote a large frnetion of their efforts to INFC10 and closely related mat-tern. In addition. funding for attendnnte of some key IM participants at INFC10 In your letter, you steelhently mentioned the e,uestion of timely detection. A Inertings is provided by the International Organizn tions llureau. closely related factor has been mm major component of our own asscument of Of central imp >rtance in INFCil is to provide a balanced analylle product fuel cycles. We hate proposed, in the INFCE TCC, general nasessment factors which can be naaful to national decision makers as they consider the future role to be used by the Working Grouge. These factors, in their simplest descriptian.

of nuclear power und plan fuel cycle activitlen. In doing this, we hope to convey are: llenources required, tin.e ristuirt%I, and detertability of eliversion artisities the point that national situatipun differ, atul that it need not be assumed (but based on the fuel cycle or facility in question. These factors are increasingly nll count rie9 should move immediately luto reprocessing and breeder development uses! in contritmtions of other e.tntes to INFCli. We will undoubtedly not agree ou specific numbern, but we are gaining neceptance. ou the basse of much factors, programn. We ulwa hole to proside a hahinced isnlication of the economic, non- of the need to minimize presence of material which is rendily cousertible to proliferation, and remontce implicationn of thermal rerycie. We feel these impli- weapons use or to provide som additional institutional measures to decrease entions lend to the conclusion that thermal recycle is not advantageous. In pro-tiding U.S. contributionn to much unnlytic and furtual base, several U.S. programs risks of diversion.

nre of particular luyiortance. The e include work on international uranium ggg. g . 7 gJ . 7 g-resource evaluation, development of means to improve uraulum utilization in Mr. l,an Doren, present thermal reactors and development and implementation of geologic dis.

posal of plent fuel, should that be judged desirable. All of these inputs contribute to a renuntle understunding of fuel cycle options avallntde, over time, to coun- STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES N. VAN DOREN, ASSISTANT DI-tries now in the early singen of utilization of nuclear power. RECTOR, BUREAU OF KON. PROLIFERATION, U.S. ARMY CONTROL I should niso mention U.S. programs on breeder technology and on IITGIts.

These progrnma proside the 1:nited States, internationally, with a basis for co- AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY operation with similar procrams in other countries. Such cooperation is both a ve-hicle for mutuntly udvantagrous exchanges, and a means for the United Staten to 39. VAN DonrN. 3Ir. Chairman it is an honor f.or me to nIiItent convey our unrk and views on proliferation resistance considerations (for exaus- gdog this comtnittee to discuss th'e role of nlternative stuclear tech-ple, avoidance in the fuel cycle of presence of IIICU or pure plutonium). It also provides a joint involvement in energy programs and some consequent measure of nologies In mmumZmg the proliferation dangers of the nuclear fuel in'luence on (nel cycle directions through this involvement. For example, we cycle, and it is of palticular pleasure to note that one of the greatest see the IITGit program as an option of mutualinterest to the United States aml gntiNfactions of working on this huh'ect 3 in this current mhninistration several other advanced countries, amt we see cooperation an one means of con. as thH the three departments represented hele are work.m g m such

' veying our intercut in avoidance of 1I10U fuel. INPC10 has been,in addition to n vehicle for making our views known. a means for us to increase our understand- clo%s coordinntion, nl.1 in the Sante ditrction.That is a very construc-ing of the perceptions and unmensruents of other countries. We have now a clearer live development.

underntanding of the major role nome of these countrien hope fast reactors will . Chairman MnioCKI. You don't, have' nnJ obstruction from O.\lll play in their energy future. A continuing U.S. Involvement in this area, as pro- In the proceS% do you I vided by our own prograins,is ciently desirnble.

10stabtlwhing am good as possible factual and analytic basis for nuclear program Mr. VAN DoltrN. Each of us has our own responsibilities. One of decisiona in vnriong countries also implies a proper perspective on the role of theirs is to keeIi the Intd.get do.wn, nuclent power lh.cif in reintion to other optione. la that connection, our program .\CDA consniers the mvestignt.mn of such n}ternni.lves to be nu .un-of cooperntise llanteral nuemments of energy program options far developing

• portant aspect of U.S. domestic and international poliev. In that te-countries is extremely vnlunide. We plan to engage in several bilateral asse8s-ruents in the coming year. Iloth our partners and we gain understanding from gard the linited Sintes hns heen successful in Inunchink the intertut-

" "" "" "" ""I" ""

a1 r i [me specific questions about the program to promote the use

" " Y e60d by the international cosmimnity to intrestigate the tuirleur fuel '

of lower enrichuwnta in re=enrch reactorn. You have also raised the question of progrens on criterin to I e used tu evaluating proliferation resistance. I would like cycle and its proliferation implications. Domestically, a major effort to to relate these two points. investigate alternative fuel cycles is currently being' undertaken by the With regard to criterin. specific, numerlent criterin for qunntitles of material. Department of Enem7, umln the nonInofifnntion alWnative sve times, or ditticultien may le neither desirable nor neceptable to the international tems assessment program j.N ASAPl. Because of our strong int'er-community. Such criteria might either be so tight as to eifectively rule out some fuel cycle activities even in those casen where they may be clearly advantageous est, ACDA has also undertaken a modest but productive research pro-on resource nud economic grogmds, or he no loose as to be Ineffective. Ilouever, grain in this field.

" # " "*" "8 8" ""8 8 8 "ce'P Uut first,let ine ti,y to put this effort in perspective.The nuclear pro-N NoNc"fNiu edta $iUtir l$tYlIo*c'rNc"r'ijj" nr t und mmt genernily, it is now u blely arrepted that proliferation im. liferntmn problem 1s nn enormously complex one, to which no single pilentions must oc a substantial consiaeration in fuci cycle decisions. / upproach is adequate. Local, politieni, and institutional approaches second it is cononnniy accepted that presence of wennon . usable material . are of enormons importance, und every case has unique features.Thus

'" '" """'"" U 'h " ' "i" wy are umler no, illusion that any technical fix can solve the prolifern-

$."5.Nv$i!!7)l to I1$Y"",t$t This is not quantitative i' demonstrnide ut it la cIrar and NtiNt O. progress. These points lion problem by liself.

had not hern univermully fnetored into fuel cycle ih riminne in the pent in order We are also aware that there are routes to weapons capabilif v that to muatain Iwdula much un Ibin, we mn=t make a credible case that these points are do not involve the counnercial fuel cycle. But we are continec[I that 40.n ,1-To-a

23 22 reactors thninch its u e-without reproce sing-in CANDU U c. hensy ub r.

minimizing the proliferation risks and the sulmational threat involved reneterm Furthn examinntion of this fuel cycle was later inciudea in the 1*-

parunent of i:nergy NASAP procrnm. While the prognosis for adoptian of thi<

in such cycles is essential to efIective management of the overall problem, Ifhr o 1j ns b'v7n"g ?H r g "fs"""

Your committecs have been in the forefront of those calling for {

a secon.) nren in which an AcDA initiative was subsequeuur pursuea by the cfforts to insure that the United States will have timely warning of f Department of Energy was the derclopment of densi6cd tower enrichea But Sti-l any diversion of nuclear materials well in advance of the time at which .

'"'"* f ' ' h" "*" P"""

8'"d* "'""i" m cu rrenor belne used in many re carch I

'"8* W" nlao instituted work on the e nrersion of research reactors u-ine a State could transform the diverted material into a nuclear exP losive I natural uranituu to the use of fuels of medimu enrichment, to reduce the amount d" *CE ' ' j# of plutonium produced.

IMPnovINo BAFEoUAnDfi 3Iore recenny, ne have luttintra a number of studies of improtea once-throuch systemswhich conserve uranium rnources (nna enrichment) without reproe-We have approached this problem from two angles: Improvement of nMug. One nami de is n Mntran Mudy being done on a modiGcanon of the hght and examination of ways of increasin, m water breeder reactor to permit eununced fuel savings in a once-through maie.

safe unrd.s agains.t diversion.le st.dl meeting nuclear energy needs.' .This modulcation would entnH neHher the use of highly enriched urnulum nor prol feration resistance whi the separation of plutonium. simunrir, we have sponsorea projects on the use While the latter approach is the focus of these hearings,I would like of urunium fnet of inwer enrichments in high temperature gas cnotea reacrer<.

3 to note the relevance of some current ACDA research to the first ap_ on which the Unitea states plans to do cooperative stuales with the F.,leral proach: Our largest sa.feguards research project is the des.ign, develop- Itepubiic of Germany.

ACDA has also iniunted studies on the use of thortuni as fuel in light unter Inent, and demonstration of a sysicIn to provide nearly instantaneous reactors-nna na hinnket muterini in fast breeder reactors, with a view to reduc-information to the Internat,on1 Atomic Energy Agency on the status i ing the unantlues of plutonium producea and fostering the use of denatured fuel of sensors at Safeguard facilities. For example, it should enable the ( t h"t * "' d "* ' "* " *'d '* ' * *" """' " " h *"' ' *"' P * ** P" ' ' " I *AC I AEA to check at any time o.n the status of sea.ls E aced l I ent on e3ni im.

or on stocks of nuclear material and thus materially help provide time- prouteration reaiarance cruerin for use tu INrci: and in subsequent fnei ey.le decisions; sumulated stuiues on by-product and low grade uranhuu rewure co

}y warning of any diversion. promotea mmparative econorde nnairsis of alternante fuet cycres: and bezun Otir etTorts on the other approach have been focused on support for Inmugauon of inmum neded to pnunpt tuaustry to adnt munnnan met the international fuel cycle evaluation and the search for prolifera.. ' inh respect to fuel cycles involving heavy water renetors, ACDA initiated a tion resistant fuel cycles. study of how to safeguara heavy water proauction faciuties.

Let me first describe briefly the resources that ACDA is devoting to A" ached 18 m"re specine information on AcDA a externai research#""'

(""*' pra=rnm this aspect of the problem, which is one of the major responsibilities "" """"""" *I""* ""ist a"oes **"*"'""""#*"""'

devotes - projects 1s. 3s and Cs) this l not include our retenrch on international 7 safeguards technwues.Justrumentation nua implementuunn, which is adare-ea o.f ACDallA's Virtually Non of us timeir.oliferation to this Sublect,B.and ureau.. M deEu.

is a member of t t3*' Dr. Rochlin'he U.S.

In other questions.

INFCE Management Committee. The eight professionals in our Nu .

clear Energy Division, headed by Dr. Sheaks, are also engaged full. *"' *" " "" #'" # " # "" #" # " # emrm

~~d time itg s,up1 5 ort of this efTort, through in-house research and analysis, 1.' Ernination of methods of improving fuel. 2 A. Urinzation for once- m mu supervision of relevant external research projects, and active partici- "' rougii f uei cy cles _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ __ _

pation both in the eight INFCE working groups and in preparation . '

2 ^ *M 't iei Ey'lYU_I.'."..'.'"" I_"'_"_'.b_" '". nium of U.S. input to those groups. Our external research on this aspect of

,i

3. N A S A P-INFCE summer study group.....____.___.__ .'_$."_'_".__"_.. "_"_$'GJ suoi h "I the problem, which complements that of the Department of Energy,is - n. Stuay on unproltrernoon features of slTan. and cerit s_..____

at a level of about $1 million per year, and we have also been able to . "h""'"*--------------------

6 "~'

call on outstanding consultants to aid in these studies.

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request permission to insert in the E ^""""""

[ $,r","i

.D*'$an ""*'*

'c[", '$fe7a""""En'riT"'cTEr'oitic'r'ali.~n-r' nt u soaa' technoingies . . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ W ""

record at this pomt a paper describmg some ACDA mitiatives related R Nonprouferation vertnention of Inser Isotope separution__...___ **

to nonproliferation assessments and providing more specific details - 1 * """ ' T A"*1 ""4" """""*""""'""d'""'"d"""-----

as to the relevant portion of our external research proEram for fiscal' 12. A characterization of the interuntionni reactor deployauent 10 'm scheduie ____ _______ _....._____._ ____. _ _ -_. ....___.

yea rs 19N,10.9, n ud 1980 . 24. Depletion benchmark and irradiation performance esnination for 40.000 Mr. ZAnmcni.Without ob.iect. ion,it is so ordered. P wit t horin u ra nia fuels _-__ __.__ ___..__ __.. ......_ -_-. . no.i m

15. Low-g ra de u ra nium resonrces__ _ ..._ _.._ _ ___.._ _. .__..__- _ To. t *

[The material referred to follows:] IL Cost analysis of niternative breeder fuel cycles ___.......__....

Sour ACDA Intit ATIVr8 Hr.I.ATING To NoNrRourrRATION At.TratrATire 1s. An evaliintion of the internatiorial safeguards for niternatise ~

1.att I"hl Anscssurst n uclea r f uel cycles. - ._. . - _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . . . . . _ _ - _ _ _

3s. Impact of proliferation reslutant fuel forans on internauonal

[Suppiled by the Anna Control eni: lunarmament Agencyl "

'"""'"""'"""""'"~""""'~'#

"# " "# "I

• I",

At DA uns among the Hrst to identify the need to take due account of prollf- #

plication of international a.nfeguards.._____.'"."....... _.__ II erntion resistance in snaking nuclear fuel cycle decisions and the need for inten.

elec enatoinnlinn of alternative furi cycles, ,pogag " " " " " " " " ' """""--"'""'~~",, ...

Jts firMt infuntive wn= suggestion of the so-callea "tande.n" fuel cycle, de.

signed to recover the residuni fuel value from the spent fuel from light water

21 23 riscar ucar m3 International Atomic Energy Agency on improved safeguarde for Jgga,,"; j such reactors.

TIroniUM-nasi:n rUEt, cvrixs T luiprovement s in once-th rough fuel cycles._ _____________ _ _ .... $210. t a al l

6. I'tility/ fuel tentinr luceuthes for alenatureil fuel cores phase II . ca.0in)

7. Timrium.t,ase<i f u el c y c ie s _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ . no. om

' ,l'he second of the three fuel evele alternatives that I wonhl like to 8.1:conouile anil evalitative analysis for nonproliferation _______... 3tI2. Ot a) address brictly is the thorium-liased inel cycle. Tlu sub-titution of D. Quick response analy61s tlaat relate to breetler anti once-tlirough thoriuin for fertile isotopo urniiium-238 iii nuclear reacto 5 hot h

" ~

n I is"o'f'inteItn'a't'i $[a'lIu~ clear [t$el c'ycie'[a'c'lIity"n$ater'l'a'l's m ad b r mado lo. .\

lin ent orien _..____.__________..__________..__..___.________ 80. 0n0 tages if combinetl@with new instit ,iWon,M lum nonpnMm utional arrangements, ation such ns aM an-scenie

11. Quick responac st mlies on alternate nuclear fuel cycle __________. 10.Ono niultinational energy centers and enlinneed I AEA categnands. The

32. International nuclear f uel c3 cle data anti analysis.___.____.__.__ 10.000 l primary advantage stems from the fact that the fissile inaterial luo-i duced in Toini _____________________________________________________ 3,o2o,000 tured-m,t ixed he rea,ctor is the isotope with li"-and uranimn-233 thus rendered u hich can unusahic be dena-for nuclear Fiscal year 1930 program weapons without isotopic sepaintion. Such enriclunent technoloric4 hyaj are likely to remain beyond the capacity of terrorist and snhnational

.\. I mprovemen t s in once-t hrough f uel cycles ___ __.___.___. _ _____ __ $38 NL ooo groups forever. atid beyonid the capacity of titany untions for sleradtv.

I t . Tim rl u m f u el cycles _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . .. . 120.Ono Wo consider this advantage significant even though it is not n com-c.1:conomica n nel prolifera ti<m resistance ns.sessnent__.. -_....___.

D. Nucien t fuel cycle <!at a a nil in tentories... _ ___ ___ ________.____

Soo.0*H' 80,000 I' pleto teclumlogical k lu the wcomi Nm the pohetion of U b always associated with another urnninin isotopp, li"2. a coninininant Total _____________________________________________________. 800.Oro whoso decav involves very sirong gnnuun rndint mn. which cmnplicates 3f r. Vu Done.v. Let me now briefly describe three lines of research thp sepnrat' ion and handling of the li-site materini. This is an indus-in t his field t hat we consider especially promising.

yial d,uahantane of de diorinni l but a valuable noninuH Fir t, improved once-through cycles. The principal arguinent used

"*' ."O,""I f *"D' "N." ugh ,cyc umlintmn e,

^#"'.locs not ehnunate the productmn of denatmed uram{cieum-

""" I"^8 of plutonium,it does for the reevele of reprocesed fuel in light-water reactors was that it would result in saving uranium and enricionent services. If similar E"".dy 7duce it.

D h"I."" d'"S".denatund fuel cycles may he of part,cular i , ter-m foci savings can he achieved without essing and the incremental costxed,oxale of nn.te1iroce.ssing, fuel gg>rication couj'g the co.st o.f reproc- national interest with respect to the development of symbohe irla-t onships between breeder and fin rmal converter reaciors. And ur he < aved. And ,we wonhl reap tl,ie sigmficant nonproliferation ad- Imve hem prmotiu dds in n FCF (Wt bw w Nm wi4 yed vantage of avoidmg the separntmn and wnlespread circulatiory of endorsement from the world conununity on this iden,lmt ne haie not I dntonnim. Sforcover, the longer ,we can rely on sufhcient uranmm, given up hope of doin- so.)

the longer we have to find the optunum solutmn to choosmg the next 7t ;s wep go.vn thai thermal reactors usinn lim ns a fuel bas e generation of nuclear rcactors. significandy improved convn-ion mtins approEching unitv for some

, Dr. Deutch has descryhed the Department of Energy programs on advanced converter types. Those national programs which inelnde unproved nrnnium utihzation, which we strongly support. I he DOh, phms for dinmM red hirs conbl. at least for the balanco of this cen.

research has develol?cd near-term fuel unprovements which can lead tury,henefit from reduced nrnnium fuel requirements, to urninum savmgs in, the neighborhood of 15 percent. M e have been 'l'he DOE is developing technical information on IMirs.11Tiiln.

investigating along with DOE possible longer term unprovements ut and llWlfs operating on the t horium fuel cycle und has a subsiam'd I.M lt fuel n e that nught, result m an additmnal 25-percent savmg. p, gram of fad mndm dmium milind%. MDA mma in 6 (I note that 1)r. Deutch cites the figure 10 to 15 percent additmnal area includes examination of incentives for the develotonent of ad-sarmgs; I flu,nk we need a lot more work before we can hx per- vanced converters operating mi the denatured thorinni cycle and for ceninges.) M e are ,also examining modification of the light water the implenyentation of thorima blanketed inceden.

breeder reactor design that could result in even more dramatic re-somye savings operating in a once-through mode, nrocren nxmenursrs M hile we re.pect the reasons why DOE has not concentrated its e: Torts on heavy water renetors,it naist he recognized that a number of The third nnd last development I wouhl like to touch on tmiar ns a other countries have purchased such reactors. We have seen utility hichtight is the use of reduced enrichments ii. rescairh reacto'rs' of in esploring the possibilities of improvements in such reactors from which Dr. Dentch has alrendv spoken.

proliferation-resistance nml resource points of view. One such possi- l There has already been maior lirogress in the investiention. devel.

bility would he the use of 1 percent enriched uraninm in such renc- opment, and comm'ercialization of fuels of lower enrichmem for re-tors, which wonhl creatly decrease their uranium requirements and I search and test reactors. There are many such reactors oper.uing mnke reprocess,mg for recycle m such reactors even less attractive than worblwide which now operate on weapons grade uraninm. Such Lich-it now is. We have also donc considerable work with Canada and the ( ly enriched uranium-D EU-poses potential nonp,iuliferation and nn ,

t i

2G y l 27

<! car terrori<t dangers at least ns great, or greater, than those posed ) Finally, Mr. Chairman, while it is still too early to judge how hv plutonium. Although this problem can le mitigated by safeguards these developments may be reflected in the tinal outcome of INFCE, aint enhanced physical security, with substantial quantities of HEU i we beheve they are making an important contribution to that study, moving in international commerce, drastic measures were needed,in ' I and helping to focus the attention of other nations on more pro-cluding a search for alternatives to HEU. l liferation-resistant alternatives to the fuel cycles that were long assumed to be the inevitable next etep in nuclear power development.

In April of 1977 the President announced plans to minimize HEU nces hv requiring, among other things, a careful economic and tech. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

nical justihcation for its use, by minimizing HEU inventories, and +

hy seeking to convert existmg research reactors to the use of lower LOCATION or nEAcTonS enrichments as quickly as possible.  ! Chairman ZAB >oCar.'l, hank you, gent}emen, i

One question, Dr. Deutch. I nhnost wanteil to interrupt you when coxvonTixo To inwr.n exnicnu.cxTs you were givmg your statement. You mentwned that a number of The Department of Energy has an excellent program, which Dr. countries have research reactors and that there are five such reactors 1)eutch described, underwa that are likely to be particularly hard to convert to nuclear fuel of develop and test newdensity highyfuels at the Argonno which National will permit a signifi-Laboratory to i 20 percent, or less enrichment of uranimu-235. Where are these 5 reac-cant reduction of enrichment level in both new and existing reactors. tors located ?

This program is receiving considerable international interest and co- Mr. Detrren. The five reactors include the BR-2 reactor in Bel-operntion at the IAEA, at INFCE, and at a special meeting hosted gium, the HFR reactor in Grenoble, France, and tim ndvanced test lato last vent by the United States at Argonne National Laboratory. reactor, the high flux irrtuliation reactor and the General Electric We are o'htaining the active cooperation of foreign governments and test reactorin thc United States.

fuel fabrientors. Chairman ZAnthCKI. What are t he problems In addition, the General Atomic Co., working in conjunction l Mr. Detrren. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. There is a reactor at Oak with the Department of Energy, has already developed and be-  ; Ridge. There is a reactor at Idaho which we currently fuel with gun marketing alternative low-enriched-20. percent enrichment- highly enriched uranium which wouhl not bo posihte to convert.

fuels [ LEU for its line of TIMG A reactors, and has nnnounced that Chairmnn ZAmncar. Why wouhl it be impossible? What would it is discont]muing HEU fuel fabrication for research reactors. Wo make t he conversion so diflicu'It ?

nico expect that European fuel fabricators will begin making LEU Mr. Dztrreu. My understanding is that the uses of this reactor are und reduced-enrichment fuels-15 percent-commercially available for particularly high neutron fluxes for particular experiments. The within thn next 2 years. Even further reductions may be possible one m Idaho is used for the Naval icactor program, and we need to through the research program that Dr. Deutch described. get those neutron fluxes. Let me present it for the record, Mr.

As a result of these etTorts, we are confident a substantial number Chairman.

[ of the world's research renctors can be converted to lower enrich- Chairman ZAnrocar. Are these in the area of research ?

ments within the next few years. We consider this to be very bene- M r. Detrren. Yes.

ficial from a nonproliferation perspective, and a highly cost-c'ficctive i Chairman ZAnmcar. Is this research worth the risk if they are so and timely payofi of investigntmg alternative tecimologies. I dillicult of course, encouraging countries to actually convert their reactors I Mr. Detrrcn. That judgment can nbvays be considered at a later will require suitable incentives. The executive tyranch,has proposed to !i date if they are, but it is mv instinct that with proper sa feguards we the Congress that the United States provide mcentiv,es to countries could quite happily live with that number of renetors. We woubt have which wish to convert research reactors to lower enrichments. Such  ! lowered the amount of highly enriched uranium in general com-countries will necessarily face additional costs, which could pose a i merce significantly by just limiting ourselves to 5 in contrast to problem, particularly for developmg countries. To olTset these costs, ,

the present 141. It woubt be quite nn nchievement, nnd I think it the executive branch has pmposed,a program that wouhl provide could be done. Perhaps we could make those five operate down to 1:i uranium enriched to 20 percent primarily to deyelopmg countries, I percent enrichment which would be a step forward, maybe not "-t with preference given to NPT parties. A compmnon program would t hem nll the way down to 20 percent-otiset incremental costs of fuel fabrication and would be oiTered t.o Chairman ZABMCKr. You can amplify that, for the record, if you countries using HEU fuel m research reactors with special emphasis w;)L on developing countries. Hy making these otters, we would be com- Mr. Drtrren. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to do so.

plementing our techmcal progrn [The following was subsequently provided :]

-rnms that wouhl juwide mcentives real ,m toofcountries yeduced enrichments which possess with pro-IIEU fuel and research renetors using HEU to return such fuel and  ; Esincuur.sr uroucunne to convert the rearlors to lower enrichments. , i is,,,n,, ,,i,, n,,,,i ,,, ,,ico,,,,,

A('DA has been involved in all aspects of this etTort to reduce the  : These renetors are very blah performnnee renetors which have pusheil exist.

]IEU problem, ing fuel technology to the limit. The urantum densities currently nrproach what

su;+ 1 DOE /S-0010R1 I U.S. Department of Energy

( #a t@)

......p*,,. . . . . .

4 Second Annual Report on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Supplement to Secretary's Annual Report to Congress 1980 1

Pacific Basin Spent Fuel Storage The results of the Non-Proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program were published in During 1979, DOE participated in discussions with June 1980.2 Japan concerning the concept of an interim spent nuclear fuel storage capacity for the Pacific Basin Reduction of Enrichment in Fuel for area and made some preliminary conceptual studies Research Reactors of the possibilities for establishing such a facility.

No decision to build one is anticipated in the near In April 1977, the Administration decided to future. A primary consideration m determu, ung work toward minimizing the use and distribution whether to proceed with the effort will be the of high-enriched uranium fuel. One element in results of thorough study and evaluation of health, the policy, a program known as the Reduced-safety, environmental, political, social, and cul-Enrichment Research and Test Reactor Program tural factors. The relevant committees of Congress (RERTR), is aimed at developing and encouraging were informed during the year of the status of the discussions with Japan and the nature and extent the use of reduced-enrichment fuel in research reactors on a worldwide basis when such changes of the preliminary studies. Those committees will do not diminish reactor performance and do not be kept informed of further developments.

affect safety standards.

With respect to cooperation with India, DOE pro- Progress was made in several areas of the RERTR vided technical advice toward the reracking of the Program during 1979. Foreign and domestic manu-spent fuel storage pools of the Tarapur reactors.

The Department of State arranged for the loan of a turers were encouraged to develop and apply equipment and the provision of consultant services the technology mquimd to produce reduced-for pool cleanout. enrichment fuels. General Atomic (United States NUKEM (Federal Republic of Germany), CERCI)

(France), CNEA (Argentina), and possibly others Views and Recommendations are participating in fuel fabrication and in the development of the required technology. France is The United States should continue actions to pro. also conducting a reduced-enrichment fuel program mote international cooperation in the storage of for research reactors. During INFCE, Germany spent power reactor fuel. The Nation should also announced the start of a similar program. Exten-establish, as soon as feasible, a domestic program sive cooperation exists between the United States of away-from-reactor spent fuel storage with pro- and various country programs, and international vision to accept limited quantities of foreign spent meetings are held periodically to discuss the prog-power reactor fuel when such action advances U.S. ress in the development of research reactor fuel rion-proliferation interests. This was proposed by utilizing uranium of lower enrichments. Coopera-the President in October 1977 and reaffirmed in tion between domestic and foreign programs is February 1980. being discussed. As a result of a U.S. initiative, beginning in 1980 international technical expert teams and fellowships for personnel are offered ,

Development of through the IAEA. They are structurad to provide the stan and technical msouxes to the wwamh Proliferation- reactor operators who lack sufficient capabilities.

Resistant Fuel Cycle to undertake independent conversion programs. )

Technologies it is expected that prototype assemblies containing low-enriched uranium fuel (enriched to less than Introduction 20 percent U-235) for TRIGA re.ictors will be t

As part of its non-proliferation responsibilities, U.S. Department of Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and G&an Nudear P u>en Report of Me l DOE has been examining a variety of fuel cycles Alternative Systems Assessment Program,gnhoWemdon t.xecutive Sum-and nuclear systems to determine if the prolifera- mary plus nine volumes, Washington. D.C., June 1980:

tion risks of existing technologies might be reduced. DOE /HE-0001/19.

I l

9

Introduced into the 14. megawatt electric TRIGA fuel cycle. The reports of these eight groups, research reactor in Romania under thelow-enriched together with a summary and overview prepared uranium fuel procurement assistance program an- by the Technical Coordinating Committee, were nounced by the United States at the 1978 U.N. referred to governments for use in planning and General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament executing their respective nuclear programs. The and discussed on page 3 of this report.The United conference communique stated that the findings States was the host of an information meeting on of INFCE have strengthened the view that:

reduced-enrichr:ent fuel for research reactors in November 1980. 1. Nuclear energy is expected to increase its role in meeting world energy needs and Views and Recommendations should be widely available for that purpose.

General international acceptance of the use of low. 2. Effective measures can and should be taken enriched fuels in research reactors in place of high. to meet the specific needs of developing enriched fuels would represent a highly valuable countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear contribution to reducing the risk of proliferation energy.

associated with nuclear research and development activities. INFCE has er_dorsed the use of such 3. Effective measures can and should be taken fuels. As indicated above a number of nations are to minimize the danger of proliferation of taking steps to develop and to use such fuels in nuclear weapons withoutjeopardizingenergy their research reactors. In the light of these facts, supplies or the development of nuclear the United States should continue programs de- energy for peaceful purposes.

signed to encourage the wider use of reduced-enrichment research reactor fuels.

From the U.S. perspective, INFCE was successful

. in many respects. All participants now more widely The International Nuclear share the view that substantial risks are associated Fuel Cycle Evaluation with the use of weapons usable materials in the fuel cycle and the technology required to produce them. The collective acceptance of this premise At an organizing conference in Washington, D.C., should now help to steer nuc! car power in safer in October 1977, the United States joined more directions.

than 50 nations and 4 international organizations in one of the most comprehensive examinations of DOE will be involved in the continuing efforts of the nuclear fuel cycle yet undertaken. This Interna. the U.S. Government to implement new protective tional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation continued for measures associated with the next steps in the nu-more than 2 years, concluding its work at its clear fuel cycle, including technical changes, insti-second and final plenary session, held in Vienna, tutional arrangements, and improved safeguards.

February 25 28,1980.

A final evaluation of INFCE will not be possible Views and Recommendations for some time. This is because much of its value will depend on the degree to which participating Now that INFCE has concluded, the United States states consider INFCE's findings in relation to their should be prepared to pursue areas of agreement respective nuclear programs and the degree to through appropriate post-INFCE fora leading to which pending issues become the subject of techni- new institutional arrangements and technical deci-cal studies and negotiations leading to new arrange- sions regarding the fuel cycle. DOE should also be ments for the fuel cycle. prepared to support these efforts with an appro-priate capability to undertake studies, provide for

. As reported in 1978, INFCE functioned through technical exchange, and implement such steps as eight working groups covering all aspects of the spent fuel storage cooperation.

10 iN FL c - W % F J M p.a.u tm

/

p . _ _ .

b DOE /PE-0014/R1 l

fig First Annual i%g/3 Report on Auclear Xon-Proliferation Supplement to Annual Report to Congress 4 - ,

. .4 l

U.S. Department ofEnergy j

Office ofPolicy and Evaluation

' Washington, D.C. 20585 l

4 l

a fast, once-through, breeder reactor, it offers a reactors of power greater than a few megawatts, number of proliferation resistant features that fuel technology does not currently exist that include no recovery or use of plutonium except would permit enrichment reductions to below 20 on an in situ basis. The reactor concept offers an percent without severe reactor performance increase in uranium fuel utilization by approx- reductions (flux per unit power), expensive reac-imately a factor of 15 over the conventional tor modifications, and/or fuel cycle cost in-LWR without reprocessing and recycle. Disad- creases relative to highly enriched designs us-vantages are very long fuel residence times and ing 90 to 93 percent enriched uranium. The pro-the need for reactor materials to withstand very gram now beginning in the United States is high burnups-materials not yet available to- designed to develop the necessary fuel day. The FMRS concept, which would basically technology. Several years of work will be need-draw upon existing LMFBR or GCFR ed.

technology,is currently being studied by DOE. Currently proven fuel technology is capable of This discussion has identified some of the alter- accommodating enrichment reductions to the 45 native systems being considered in NASAP and percent range (from 90 to 93 percent) without other parts of DOE, and has tentatively in- significant performance degradation or fuel cy-dicated some of the features that may affect pro- cle cost increase for many reactors in the 1 to 50 liferation resistance. Further understanding of megawatt range (some reactors can be converted the effects of these features and identification of to less than 20 percent enrichment). According-others will be an important function of the ly, as an immediate interim step, the United studies being conducted in NASAP. States is proposing to convert existing research and test reactors (and new designs) from the use of highly enriched fuel to the use of either 45 Research Reactors percent enriched fuel or 20 percent enriched fuel wherever this can be done without unacceptable Numerous research and test reactors now in reactor performance degradation. It appears this can be achieved without sigmficant cost in-operation or planned were designed to utilize 90 crease.

to 93 percent enriched uranium to maximize flux performance per unit power and/or to minimize fuel cycle costs. Fabrication, Proliferation Resistance tmnsport, and storage of fuel for these reactors, particularly in the un-irradiated form, are of HEU Research Reactors: The removal of HEU concern from a proliferation point of view. The from a research reactor to obtain sufficient larger fuel inventories associated with high- material to build a nuclear explosive would re-power test reactors increase the potential con =" quire removal on a scale comparable to the an-quences of diversion. Elimination or substanbal nual fuel element requirement for a typicallarge reduction of the trade in highly enriched fuel research reactor. For instance, a 20 megawatt elements for research and test reactors by (thermal) research reactor may have about 200 l

substitution of reduced enrichment fuel grams of HEU in each fuel element. About sixty elements would lower the potential for using fuel elements are needed as replacements each research and test reactor fuel as a source of

, , year. For this example, more than an annual material for nuclear explosives. supply of fuel elements would have to be A program is underway in the United States to diverted to build a nuclear explosive. However, make feasible the fueling of most research and the fabrication of fuel elements for a given test reactors with uranium of less than 20 per- research reactor is normally performed on a cent enrichment while maintaining the reactor special order basis and may involve con-performance. A small number of high power, siderable leadtimes. Thus, in the absence of high performance reactors needed for important measures to minimize HEU inventories, typical l

work that cannot be reasonably accomplished in procurements of fresh fuel elements would i reactors with lower performance might have to otherwise be available and stored at the reactor continue to use high-enriched uranium. It is site. Significantly large quantities of HEU are recognized, however, that for research and test also present at the fuel fabrication facilities.

l l 28

{

o Moreover, large quantities of irradiated HEU enrichment reduction should not cause signifi-can build up at research reactors, even ones of cant flux performance (flux per unit power) or substantially lower power (e.g. I to 5 megawatts burnup performance degradation relative to the (thermal)). unmodified reactor design. To first order, this LEU or Natural Uranium Reactors: Natural implies the requirement that the U-235 density uranium fueled research reactors produce in the reduced, enrichment case be the same as plutonium at the approximate rate of I gram per the U-235 density in the 90 to 93 percent enrich-megawatt (thermal) per day of operation. A ed case. This can be accomplished by substitu-typical naturat uranium fueled 20 MWt research tion of higher uranium density fuel technology reactor would therefore produce about 5 I '".rently used fuel technology. Enrichment kilograms of plutonium per year. The amount of reduction potential is set in proportion to the plutonium produced is reduced as the enrich- available uranium density increase. It is ment level is increased. A 20 MWt research reac- recognized that, for research and test reactors of tor using 10 to 20 percent enriched uranium Power greater than a few megawatts, fuel would generate about 0.5 kilograms of technology does not currently exist that would plutonium per year. Permit enrichment reductions to below 20 per-cent. As already indicated, a program is now The proliferation resistance of spent fuel from beginning in the United States to develop the research reactors would be similar to that from necessary fuel technology. The program is ex-nuclear powerplants with the following excep- pected to last for several years.

tions:

1. The amount of radioactivity from Improved international safeguards and a more research reactor spent fuel can be as universal commitment to full scope safeguards i small as one fiftieth that of fuel from a would also be important for increasing the pro-commercial power reactor, so shielding liferation resistance of research reactors.

problems may be less difficult to deal Safeguards procedures need to accommodate with, the necessary flexibility of research reactor

2. There are several different chemical Perations.

forms that are typical:y used for research A long-term goal would be the achievement of a reactor fuel elements, so that the steps in-level of enrichment of between 3 and 20 percent.

volved in the chemical reprocessing would be altered.

Enrichments in this range would maximize research reactor proliferation resistance. In-creasing the enrichment of natural uranium Efforts to Improve the Proliferation research reactors to about 3 percent would Resistance of Research Reactors substantially reduce their plutonium produc-tion and hence the availability of weapons-The U.S. development program for enrichment usable material in the spent fuel. Efforts to reduction in research and test reactor designs make existing technologies available on a com-currently using 90 to 93 percent enriched mercial basis could make a significant contribu-uranium is based on the practical criterion that tion toward meeting this goal.

J 29 ,

l

Q;G+ H-DOE /NE-0001 Nuclear Proliferation and Civilian Nuclear Power Report of the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program Executive Summary

/pras% ~

? ~.71.- 4

'%w]f U.S. Department of Energy June 1980 Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 .

i t

TABLE 1. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS l

[ PROGRAM TARGET i'

f Light-Water Reactor Fuel-Utilization Improvements:

• High burnup,andoperationalandfuel-management Commercialimplementation by 1990

[

[ changes

• Addi:icnal high bumup and other fuel-design Commercialimplementation by 2000

{ chan;es

• Ionger-term nonretrofittable improvements Identify initial attractive candidates by mid-1980; commercial capability after 2000 f

Reduced Enrichment of Research Reactor Fuel Demonstrate 20-45% enriched fuel by 1982; demon-i strate <20% enriched fuel by 1984 l

) Liquid-Me:al Fast Breeder Reactor Continue development so that it could be commercially l available if and when needed (possibly 2010-2020) 3 Advanced Isotope Separation Demonstrate technical and economic performance of a

process by 1990-1995 i Light Water Breeder Reactor Continue development and complete proof of breeding demonstration in Shippingport Atomic Power Station by 1985 or 1986 Proliferation-Resistance Engineering of Reprocessing Demonstrate in breeder program pilot fuel-cycle facil-ities l High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor Assess unique markets, such as those for process heat E and usability at water-poor sites Fast Mixed-Spectrum Reactor Investigate high-burnup fuel technology National Uranium Resource Evaluation Complete program by 1985. Continue research and development in discovery and extraction methods Technology Support for IAEA Safeguards on

Continued 2:nprovement in surveillance, containment,

• Enrichment plants and material accountancy

• Interim spent fuel storage l

• Spent fueldisposal repository

• Reprocessing plants

• Plutonium storage

• Mixed-oxide fabrication plants

• Transportation 24

. O

l

~ L MhT ---~~~

Federal Register' / Vol. 47. No.164 / Tuesday, August 24, 1982 / Notices 37007 N i FEormAc Reoasten (ExpomT/luponT)-Consnued l Meewud ei tsayuus O"'""' W8 'I'""""

Ne aw aan

.T.ee.s T

a.o.. sus.

Wits.mers enr1 Com. My rt.1981 s2s ses evuead wween[/ ca.7W ads massed tse tur See -

Just )

A4 s.1ss2. rsuuoisso.

Gene a' fects Co. Aug s. 190L :sepd armsfusspeese - *a7:4 'M Dureman eserely of metwuf our Caorse peerer, ensuf M. .

Ag. s. Its2. ESNmn.amoek . ause, and euermomets eyegenswas sur casem Toud tasSas asas .*

' Aa***ast .

i la Da 88-** rues e-swa mes =1 being exploited to produce nuclear NRC has issued several export licenses siwmo come tsam weapons. Particular concerns were for reduced-enrichment uranium to be expressed with respect to the fabricated into test elements for foreign proliferation risks associated with and domestic research reactors.

Use of High-Enriched Uranium (HEU)In inventories of HEU for research and test I-Research Reactora; Policy Statement reactors abroad.De widespread use of Assuming RERM program success.

most of the performance testing of LEU e ActNcy:U.S. Nuclear Regulatory HEU fuel, which involved a large aluminide and oxide fuels with high Commission. , number of domestic and international , wanium densities for use in plaW-type Action: Statement of pollCy. fueI shipments, increases the riska of reactors will be Completed by the end of proliferation through theft or diversion 19R The irradiati n of Pin. type

- syvuAnv:The Nuclear Regulatory of this material.In contrast to HEU, the CommissionTNTC) has licensina use of fuel with lower enrichments l

responsibility for domestic use and for reduces proliferation riska.

" ' " " " "* D I" "** *D*

export abroad of Special Nuclear In an effort to alley concerns of' an po88 plate % m actw o d b completed in 1983. Assuming licensing j- Material, including High-Ennched prohferation risks, efforts were made to approvals, these fuels could then enter, Uranium {HEU], and is interested in reduce HEU inventories, on the t into full scale use in appropriate i reducing, to the reaximum extent assumption that any reduction in the reactors. Silicide fuels with very high

, possible, the use of HEU in domestic potential for access to these inventories uranium &nsM am also Wng

- t and foreign research reactors.The NRC would constitute a reduction in the developed and tested by the RER11L j 1 is pleased to note that the current U.S. proliferation risk.These concerns Administration continues to support the Program.These fuels may be needed for eventually led to the establishment of convasion of high pown macws.

4 Reduced Enrichment for Research and the reduced enrichrnent for research and Test Reacters program and that to date test reactors (RERTR) program.This As part of the overall RERTR

>l ,

the U.S. Congress has approved

program was established to develop and program, Argonne conducta for DOE a

adequate funding for this program. In demonstrate the technology that will technical and economic evaluation of

' this connection, the NRC has prepared facilitate the use of reduced. enrichment each significent HEU export license the fo!!owing policy statement. uranium fuels in research and test application including the potential of the o FoR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: reactors. If successful, this could lead to reactor for conversion to reduced-James V. Zimmerman, Assistant a significant reduction of HEU enrichment fuel within the planned

,. l availabilities of appropriate reduced.

i i" Director. Office of International inventories abroad, and thereby enrichment fuels. Nearly all potential

'! Programs. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555.

increase the proliferation resistance of related fuel cycles. conversion candidates have been 6

' [ evaluated. Technical conversion

!! (301) 492-7868. The objective of the RERTR program L la to develop research and test reactor schedules are being planned by reactor

& SUPPLEMENT ARY INFORM ATIOIC fuels which will allow substitution of operators based on demonstration and f.

In the 1950's the U.S. entered into licensability of the fuel. Based on the ll5 l

'g .' )I several short. term agreements for uranium oflow enrichment (LEU less cooperation (5-10 years) allowing for the than 20%) for HEU and which will not technical and economic evaluation by export of research reactors and fuel significantly affect reactor performance ANI. a coordinated Executive Branch l, ,

under the " Atoms for Peace" program. characteristics or fuel cycle costs. On an recommendation on the license p application is developed by the In subsequent years the U.S.has been a interim basis, some reactors may utilize Department of State and is submitted to I major supplier of high enriched uranium intermediate enrichment fuels (455),

the NRC.

while the LEU fuel development i 1 l

(HEU) for use abroad. primarily in research and test reactors. Such reactors program is in progress. It should be The objectives of the RERTR program

. produce radioisotopes for use in such noted. however, that no U.S. effort will have been rully supported by NRC since areas as medicine, agriculture. 'be made to develop fuels with its inception.The Commission has also

,i l g desalination, research in biological enrichment significantly below 20% utilized Argonne's analyses in support effects of radiation, etc. Materials test because of the increasing magnitude of ofits reviews of proposed interim lj) g e reactors are also used to train future plutonium production in fuels with very low or no enrichment.

exports of HEU, particularly with respect to determining the dates when ig i operators of commercial power reactors To date, DOE has initiated a conversion to lower. enriched fuels can

,h [e and to test new materials and fuela.

In the mid 1970's, particularly development and test program managed be anticipated.The Commission is 1

4 C. followingIndia's detonation of a nuclear by the Argonne National Laboratory pleased to note that the current f.

fd y

.l. exphsive device in 1974, nuclear (ANL) to prove the feasibility of the new Administration continues to support the proliferation concerns began to increase. lower enrichment fuels. Many foreign RERTR program and that Congress haa Expanded efforts were undertaken to countries are cooperating with the U.S. approved adequate funding for the ly ,, i in this effort, and, within the past year. program.

1- i prevent nuclear power programs from 4 b $,

!I  !! -

u. t 5 0 -

'i fI

--. - ..__.... ... - -..-.-- a

[ 37008 Federal Register / Vol. 47. No.164 / Tuesday August 24, 1982 / Notices

\

The Commission also notes that reduction in the degree of protection power levels not in excess of106 I several types of LEU fuel are currently against radioactive properties of source, megawatts thermal (5 percent power)la ,

being tested in DOE's RERTR program. special nuclear, and byproduct materials accordance with the provisions of the As soon as all the necessary tests are are abnormal occurrences. . IIcense, the Technical Specifications and completed, the Commission is prepared This report to Congress is for the first the Environmental Protection Plan.

, to act expeditiously to review the use of calcodar quarter of1982. The report De Commission has now issued

, the new fuelin domestic research and identifies the occurrences or events that Amendment No. 4 to Facility Operating  ;

, test reactors licensed by NRC. the Commission determined to be License No. NPF-11, which authorines '

, With respect to future export license significant and reportable; the remedial operation of the La Salle County Station.

6 applications for HEU bearing in mind actions that were undertaken are also- Unit 1. at reactor core power levels not t

the Commission's responsibility to rnake described. The report states that there in excess of 3323 megawatts thermal

{ an overall finding that each export were four abnormal occurrences at the (100 percent power)in accordance with

would not be inimical to the common nuclear power plants licensed to the provisions of the amended licanas.

defense and security of the U.S., the operate.The first involved diesel In addition, the Amendment makes Commission intends to continue its generator engine cooling system failures. administrative modifications dealing p current practice of careful scrutiny to %e second involved pressure transients with omissions, an addition and changes -

p venfy that additionalinterim HEU during shutdown.The third involved in the areas of exemption, reporting to g exports are justified. ne Commission major deficiencies in management the Commissfor:. and completion date of n plans to continue to monitor,the controla. De fourth involved a steam b progress of the RERTR program so that generator tube rupture. Rare were no equipment qualification: requirea Y confinnation of vacuum breakers to it can understand what would be abnormal occurrences for the other NRC withstand pool swell forces: and a h appropriate conversion schedules, and licensees during the report period. De to encourage that action license condition regarding HVAC eliminate U.S.. supplied m,s be yentories of takenAgreement to States reported no abnormal systems with respect to operation above occurrences to the NRC. 5% and 50% power.

IIEU to the maximum degree possible. The report to Congress also contains

.j %e Commission notes that U.S. la Salle County Station. Unit t is a Information updating some previously boiling ws ter nuclear reactor located in j research reactor operators have shown reported abnormal occurrences.

y little Interest in converting to lower Brookfield Township. la Salle County. -

Interested persons may review the Illinois.ne amendment is effective as r enrichment fuel. As part of a policy to report at the NRC's Public Document a strongly encourage conversion by of the date ofisguanca.

Room.1717 H Street NW, Washington

[q foreign operators, the Commission will take steps 8 to encourage sumlar action De application for the amendment D.C. or at any of the nuclear power plant complies with the standards and Ihcal Public Document Rooms requirements of the Atomic Energy Act J by U.S. research reactor operators. throughout the country. Single copies of j of1954, as amended (the Act), and the Dated at Washington. Dr this 17th day of the report, designated NUREG 0000 Commission's regulations.De August. tes2.

For the Ce"--

Vol. 5. No. l. may be purchased from the Commission has made appropriate

-l. Na tional Technical Information Service. findings as required by the Act and tho' Samuel 1. Chilk. Springfield. Virginia 22161. Commission's regulations in 10 CFR If Secretaryofde Commission A year's subscription to the NUREC- Chapter I, which are set forth in the f

,, m e. m 4 0090 series publication, which consista amended license. Prior public notice of

,,w,,, coa - of fourissues,la available from the N the overall action involving the NRC.CPO Sales Program. Division of proposed issuance of an operating y TechnicalInformation and Document license was published in the Federal g Abnorma! Occurrence Report; Section Control. U.S. Nuclear RegulatoeY

( q Register on June 9.1977 (42 FR 29576-203 Report Submitted To the Congress Commission. Wa shington, D.C. 20555. 29577). De increase in powerlevel h Notice is hereby g'ven that pursuant McroBche of single copiesof the authorized by this Amendmentis q to the requirements of Section 208 of the Publication are also available from thia encompassed by that prior public notics.

[. Energy Reorganization Act of1974.as source. Prior public notice of the administrative Q amended, the Nuclear Regulatory Dated at Wastungton, D.C. this teth day of changes authorized by this Amendment N Commission (NRC) has published and August 1982. _ was not required since these changes do d issued the periodic report to Congress for the Nuclear Regulatory f*nmminaios. not involve a significant hazards u

' on abnormal occurrences (NUREG-0090 Samuel J. ChGk. consideration.

Vol. 5. No.1). geef,fo77ofr3,commf,,f De Commission hae determined that H Under the Energy Reorganization Act y g,w the issuance of this amendment will not of 1974. which created the NRC. an - coog e result in any significant environmental n abnormal occurrence is defined as "an '

impacts other than those evaluated in

? unscheduled incident or event which the the Final Environmental Statement. its

[i Commission (NRC) determines is significant from the standpoint of public (Dd'cket No. 50-3731 Addendum, and assessment of the effect 40 yearlicense from inuance of this O health or safety." The NRC has made a Commonwealth Edison Co; Issuance -

amendment since the activity authorized d<iermination. based on criteria . of Amendment to Fac!!!ty Operating by the license is encompassed by the h published in the Federal Register (42 FR Ucense overall action evaluated in the Final 6 10930) on February 24.1977, that events On April 17.1982. the U.S Noclear Environmental Statement. Its

• q involving an actualloss or significant Regulatory Commission (the Addendum, and assessment oflicense t

1

"; Commission) issued Facility Operating duration. Further, with respect to the

'sem tveiep. nrund io in the ebea k sentence haie not beca der:Jed oc discus L License No. NPF-11. to Commonwealth administrative changes in the Edison Company (licensee) authorizing - Amendment, the Commission has inn.Ync" Nth *p$eI., .Ericobat operation of the la Salle County Station, determined that the issuance of this f' ect on mu be tonowed by the mtc. Unit 1 (the facility). at reactor care ti Amendment will not result in any b

h .

4  ;

P i h

.=p:::;7 z p: . =

- 1g. , p q :g~y 9=. . -~. ,z .RM~,3;

.~ y,. -my.on.T.W;KLy.7,i.Wr

. A;-;. . a J -- Tww-?nm un:.

~

a 1 ~2~7a.2.=

i M r.' 9 _'

=

r kNYah

. p, ,, g

6. , .s -

~ - -

, E

.....i RULEMAKING ISSUE '

June 12, 1981 (Affirmation)

SECY-81-376 For: The Commissioners From: William J. Dircks Executive Of rector for Operations

Subject:

PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NONPOWER REACTOR LICENSEES POSSESSING A FORMULA QUANTITY OF SSNM Purcose:

To provide the Commissioners with (1) a status report on the 22 nonpower reactor licensees listed in SECY 79-1878; (2) a reso-lution of the issues listed in SECY 79-187C; (3) a discussion of alternative physical security requirements for nonpower reactors possessing a formula quantity or greater of SSNM; and (4) a recom-mendation on the preferred alternative.

Discussion: Backorcund On July 24, 1979, the Commission approved a recommendation that nonpower reactor (NPR) licensees be deferred from implementing the requirements of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule, and that in the

~ interim new Category II (573.67) physical protection requirements as well as previous existing requirements (573.60) be applied to nonpower reactor licensees who possess formula quantities of SSNM.

The interim requirements were to continue in force until certain nonpower reactor issues were resolved and a determination was made on what physical protection requirements are actually needed at these particular nonpower reactor facilities, given the unique type, form, and enrichment levels of the reactor fuel. The Commission asked the staff for an interim status report in 120 days which would give a more definitive explanation of the nonpower

Contact:

C. K. Nulsen, SGRI 42-74181 Ip Mo 1 cf 1 i ~,

The Commissioners 2 reactor problem and actions being taken to determine the appropriate physical protection requirements for these facilities. The interim status report was published on December 19, 1979, as SECY 79-187C.

The four issues identified in SECY 79-187C and addressed in this paper are the determination of:

1. What radiation dose rate levels are needed for exemption purposes, (review the l'00 rem /hr at 3 feet standard),

2. What safeguards credit should be given for fuel type and reactor design,

3. What constitutes " contiguous site" based on reasonable applica-tion of 10 CFR 73.60,

4. What safeguards credit should be given for intermediate enrichments of fuel.

/' Nonoower Reactor Status Report '

In SECY 79-1878, 22 nonpower reactor licensees were listed as having'li_ censes fa possess a formula quantity or more of SSNM. Of those 22, seven have taken or are tiking action to reduce their holdings to less than a formula quantity of SSNM and the NRC will take action to amend their licenses to reduce possession authoriza-

. tion _below a formula quantity. These seven licensees are:

o Babcock and Wilcox, Lynchburg, Virginia o Pennsylvania State University o University of Missouri (Rolla) ~

o University of Washington o Rensselear Polytechnical Institute o Westinghouse, Zion, Illinois ,

yo University of California (Los Angeles)

The remaining fifteen nonpower reactor licensees will continue to possess 5 kgs or more of highly enriched uranium (HEU) onsite and the determination of the appropriate safeguards category for each of these reactors is contingent upon the resolution of the issues addressed in this paper. These fifteen nonpower reactors are:

o General Electric, Vallecitos, California o Georgia Tech a Massachusetts Institute of Technology o Union Carbide, Tuxedo, New York o Rhode Island AEC .

o University of Michigan o University of Virginia

nEnu, To COLLEGE T UNIVERSITY OF FLORlDA

> OEpamr=ENT OF NUCLEAR ENGINEE*ING SCIENCE 3 ah, 56 202 wuCLEaR $CIENCES CENrER ENGINEERING omi= EswutE. rLeason satt A R EA CO C E 904 *~CN E 39 2.i 401 1

• CEmaar=Eur or wuCLEAa E=oi=EEmiac sciEwCEs 33 October 10, 1978 Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 14 Division of Operating Reactors Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 RE: Renewal of Facility Operating License No. R-56 Cear Sir:

We are in the process of compiling all necessary and required infor-mation associated with the license renewal of the UFTR. A significant part of a new Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications has been done.

Presently, a parallel effort is bei;ng made, with Departant of Energy support (Contract No. EY-76-5-05-4014), to change the UFTR fuel to 4.8".'

enriched in U235, UO2 pellets in stainless steel cladding. This change will directly affect portions of the SAR. We respectfully request that only one license renewal with the new fuel be submitted and considered for re-licensing, rather than two consecutive and different applications.

Portions of the required additional infomation not affected by the change of fuel will be submitted earlier for review.

We expect that our studies on the new core perfarnance and the safety evaluation be finished by the end of March,1979 with final submission to the NRC by June, 1979.

.The UFTR is an operating reactor, w ti h almost 20 years pf safe operating record. The studies and changes will further improve the operational capa-bilities and safety of the reactor. _ ,

digem 9po f p2-FLORICA'$ CENrER FoR ENGINEERING EDUCArloM AND RESEARCH p

79

==u.c - uavv ~r.....ru~ ,ve... -.rivc.crio~ -.uevia i

Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Page 2 October 10, 1978 e .

Please let us knew if further information is required.

Sincerely yours, l- )},fw

. . . .z &

Associat~e Profes Director of Nuclear Facilities NJD/jcb .

APPROVED:

M.J. Chanian, Chairman cc: L. Akers (00E)

G.R. Dalton (UFTR Subcommittee)

C.E. Roessler (Rad. Control Committee, UF)

Steve Ramos (NRC) i l

1 c . m_,_ _

Yk's Nb 1

i r APPLICATION FOR A CLASS 104 LICENSE FOR A RESEARCH REACTOR FACILITY Based on Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i

(~-

t 1

R. R. O'Neill, Dean School of Engineering and Applied Science University of California Los Angeles February 1980 AMENDED: April 1982 i

1 Title Page 30-82 l

5 l l

(iii) Foreign Relationships: The applicant is in no way owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or foreign government.

(4) Agent: The applicant is not acting as the agent or representative of another in filing this application.

The applicant is the principal party.

e. Class of license applied for:

Class 104 License.

Use to which the facility will be put: -

The reactor and its supporting laboratories will be used for the education of senior undergraduate and graduate students in nuclear engineering and related sciences. In addition to formal courses and demonstrations, the reactor will be used to support research at the M.S. and Ph.D. levels.

Period of time for which license is requested:

Twenty (20) years, or until March 30, 2000.

Other licenses applied for in connection with this facility:

Special Nuclear Material: (1) 4700 gms U-235 (irradiated),

(2)4700gmsU-235(fresh),

(" (3) Pu-239 as a 2 Curie, Pu-Be neutron source. J

f. Financial qualifications of the applicant:

This item is treated in Appendix I " Financial Qualifications".

g. Deleted

h. Not applicable

i. Not applicable J. No restricted data or defense iaformation is contained in this application or in any material offered in support of this application.

TABLE 111/6-2 TRAINING REACTOR CHARACTERISTICS mn m m m m e xx mous,Tm = L -

' Poca 10 nr 1:D m ru.m ttwL (AT 10 m) 1 x 10lln/cx2sse 1.5 x ID12gc ,2,ge DGss AEACTIVITY (Tt04 SPEC UMIT) 0.5E o AT I'uF 2.3% o AT noon fue Detss EACTIVITY ImTAL12D 1.E o AT RxM TDP 1.E o AT 2xM 199 c1.EAN CIxD OliT!c4L mss m et U-3

• EntcTivt reff uum0N UFETim 1.4 x F % c 2 x Ifr4sse t#t!FGM MAfDt WID CoEnlCIENT =0.1E 8/I WID -0.1614 o WID TeetmM cDEFICIENT -0.88 x F2 I e/ CF .481 x 10' I o y U235 mss canicterf 4).31% oA U-25 mss +.3Z e/: U-235 '

j-sTAnt-w souu:t mFtscTons 2 cimit Pu BE 6.6 m C RABE 4^- j eurn:Tt (1.57 ovcc) nxxmTon AfC GMPHIM

• IEtAe surn0N RUCTION Ef)EB 0.G .GE5 m PtAtts FEL E DRIDED, (ML AttDr

• nat tonorm 3,445.2 es U-25 3,556 si U-25 ptAn TNicoass 0.(P3 in.

• mitn owse. 0.137IN.

• AumM To em mito (WL.) 0.51

• 4AT cDfostTION 13.4wrzIHL

• cooveri

• n))

FtoM 3D crm .

IE sw Teetutu o in IIBur 20fF Teetnam, cui 1100F 142uF co m at m a s cD, mermim vu, emvity rau.

• NLPGEn

• 3 sartrr: 1 mauTim twenTia. Tim

( eUVAL tim 0.324 sec (cAulum) 0.5sec(mAsue) 93 sEC (MINIMM) IQ) sEC axt eTH, satTY 3naos1.5%o-4.SZo 3 as

• 1.E o = 4.E m m e TH, m a u Tim 1 = 0.6%o=0.6Zo I e s 11 o TUrAL=5.1%o TorAL s5.2 o EAcTav TY m: Tim uTE, mx. 0.02: o/sEC .IEE e/gt s<rtto (cacetti stoEs, aNTrn E n. 0 IN. cast, macTin

• sim s, switLD T w o o E n. 8 IN. cast, ano Ner

• sims, T*ww. causes so G n. 8 rN. cast, marrin

• lh:xu cast cuorTE macxs

• Amow cne 5 n.10 IN. mecTin mocxs

• pus F or name PAmwsN tms

• 3 n. 4 IN. mecTin m.ocxs DPDt!PedTAL FACILITits TMML COUP 9t, FCRf 2DNTAL 5 n. x 5 n. x 4 n.11 IN. tac (DIN.x52N. x 43 IN. LDIG eUVAsLE DEhL Cx.1Mt. wRTicAL P4Dvis!Gd Fun INsTAU.ATIDs +

switto u si T m 5 n. x 5 n. x 14 n. 6 IN. w!CH

• oetnineers aus 2 - tentzoNr o 6 IN. D! w TER

• 5 - ar2ptro 4 in, etwTrn 4 - arz:wro 4 IN. c APetra i

3 wnfic o lh N. D:Arcita 3 - eficat,1-7/8 in. D Astra l ortniswrAL , oles, nom. czx.. 15 eovan aurwin sfn:Naas

• Post suns

• 11 - >ca 2mtro 1/8 tN. x 1/2 IN.

16 - warico M in. x 1 IN.

111/6-5 vm l

l 1

l

hikt - b

- ANL-6285 ,

Reactor Technology (TID-4500,16th Ed.)

AEC Research and Development Report ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY 9700 South Cass Avenue Argonne, Illinois em ARGONAUT REACTOR DATABOOK A compilation of experimental and theoretical results of work done with, or related to, the Argonaut Reactor to July 1960 3

by

,, W. J. Sturm and D. A. Daavettila 1

i January 1961 Operated by The University of Chicago under Contract W-31 -109-eng-38 s

_ _ _ , , _ _ _ _ _ . . - . _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . . _ , _ _ , . , _ . . _ _ . . , , _ . _ _ _ . . _ . , _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . ~ , _ _ . - - , _ . . . _ .

11 Section A CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARGONAUT The Argonaut Reactor was designed for training in both nuclear engineering and research, and the experience of nearly four years of opera-tion has proved the design to be practical. The reactor, because it is simple to operate and extremely safe, is well suited for training people without previous reactor experience. Safety is a primary design feature. As a re-search tool, the usefulness of the reactor is enhanced by the fact that the core is readily accessible and that the core geometry is flexible. A graph-ite thermal column and a large water tank are integral parts of the reactor, and numerous types of experiments can be done in these media. -

The 10-kw maximum operating power of the reactor prohibits certain types of experiments, but this disadvantage is far outweighed by the fact that fuel does not become a serious radiation hazard. For all the experiments whose results are presented in this compilation, the operating power was less than 100 watts and for most less than 10 watts.

This section lists some general nuclear and engineering data of the Argonaut Reactor in order to present the basic design. The data cover only the main points of a broad area, but this will be expanded in later sec-T tions. The nuclear data given in this section are the result of the first theoretical calculations and preliminary critical studies.

~

t i

12 .

A.I. Genera'l (Ref. I-7)

Type: Training reactor Design power: 10 kw Normal operating power: ~ 100 watts Normal operating schedule: 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> a day, 5 days a week Principal uses of reactor: Education and training A.2. Fuel Nominal fresh loading: 1 slab: 2.0 kg U 2 35 2 slabs: 3.6 kg U 2 35 -

235 3-in. annular: 4.0 kg U Total fuel inventory: 6 kg U 235 Fuel element shape: 24 x 2.84 x 0.098-in. plates Fuel mixture: 39 w/o A1, 7.8 w/o U$350s, 31.2 w/o U$3sOe; Al matrix.

Fuel dimensions: 24 x 2.84 x 0.094 in.

Cladding thickness: 0.002 in. (avg)

Cladding material: Aluminum Type of subassembly: Stacked parallel plates No. of elements per subas s embly: 17 Subassembly dimensions: 6 x.3 x 24 in.

Normal number of subassemblies in core: 1 slab: 6-9 subassemblies 2 slabs: 12 subassemblies 3-in. annular: 24 subassemblies Normal arrangements of subass enablies: 1 slab, 2 slabs, or full circle in cylindrical annulus.

j Normal lifetime of standard

, subas semblies: Indefinite A.3. Reactor i

! Annular s ector - 30 in. OD, Overall active core dimensions: 1 slab:

24 in. ID, 24 in high, sub- -

tending a 90 an gle.

2 slabs: 2 of above, diametrically opposed.

I ,

l UNIVEl?SI'lT OF CALIFOllNIA, LOS ANGELES UCLA 7

% %% Dli d.4 %W e h4%t IM.U j

,- WNN 54NT.% B 4MB 4R4

• g g%14 (.prZ htHk t i.i t D 4% I% (ht l% E

• 1.04 4 %t.t t E%

• Bl% FH%IDt j

OFFICE OF Tile CilANCELLOR LOS ANGELES, CAUFORNIA 900M August 26, 1982 Mr. John H. Bay, Esq.

1. Embarcadero Center Twenty-Third Floor San Francisco, California 94111

Dear Mr. Bay:

In response to our agreement reached over the telephone on August 18, 1982 and recorded in your letter to me of the same date, I have enclosed the following information:

- a table representing the fuel inventory by various category at the UCLA facility since 1970 contained in memo, Ostrander to Cormier; and

- answers to the written questions on the

" Fuel Self-Protection Calculations" which you had hand-delivered to my office on August 23rd; these questions were essentially follow-up questions to our interrogatory responses of August 9th.

I trust that you will find our responses to your discovery requests both complete and timely.

Very truly yours, a Ga ;v /~ N' William H. Cormier UCLA Representative Enclosure cc: Service List

[

LOS ANGELES: SCllJUL OF ENGINEERING Anis APPLIED SCIENCE I

< r ,e

[

MEMORANDUM , "'.' 5 25 August ~1982 T0: W. Cormier' 2241 tiurphy , ,

FROM: N. Ostrander 2567 Boelter Hall ,

SUBJ: NEL Fuel Inventory Since 1970  ;

I have constructed the attached inventory record for your response to Mr. Bay's request of August 18, 1982. Inventorial practices have changed over the several AEC-ERDA-NRC administrations and even within the lifetime '

of the NRC. The general trend has been to' add detail by distributin9 inventory into an increasing number of categories. Descriptive words have been replaced by a three symbol code. There have been seyeral generations of such codes, and no assurance that they are one-for-one translatable.

For example, one can translate " encapsulated, enriched, unirradiated,'

uranium-alloy scrap" into the category " uranium" but the inverse -

transfonnation is not possible.

All of this goes to say that I have made a best effort to provide a complete record, but I have had to make some interpretations based upon .

continuity of category by continuity of number s. I cannot attest to the .

absolute accuracy of the record. I think it is a reasonable, but not ,

necessarily unique interpretation of the available records.

J l

INVENTORY OF U-235 IS0 TOPE IN FUEL,'kg v Irradiated Fuel Fresh fuel

• TOTAL s DATE A In-Core In Pits Useful Scrap 3-31-70 3.50 - .- 0.02 3.52 6-30-71 3.50 -

2.53 0.02 6.05 12-31-71 3.56 0.73 3.74 0.94 ~8.97 12-21-74 3.55 0.73 3.74 0.60 8.6?

9-30-80 3.53 - 3.74 0.60 7 37 9-30-81 3.53 - 3.75 -

'7:28 8-25-82 3.53 - 1.39 -

4.92 Except for the Ismall burn-up (~ l om per year)l, the inventories are constant over any interval between adjacent dates. E.g., from"12.-31-74 to9-30-80,thetotalinventorywasapproximately8.62kilogr6ms.j-The 4 dates are inventorial record dates and not the actual dates A of the'

~

material transfer. -

~

~ , , ,

~

L UNIVF.RSITY OF CALIFOILNI A-M etterhead for inte departmental use) s i

.T ,

~~

E+J . u i u "O" kdd['/ D([

October 28, 1974

^--

.\ '

Karl R. Coller Assistant Director for '

Operating Reactoro ,"

Directorate of Licensing 4 USAEC Washington, D. C. 90545

Dear Sir:

Due to the .ccasitive nature of the contents of this letter, we request L"

that this document be withheld from public disclosure purcuant to Section 2.790 of'10 CPR Part 2.

Upon redoing our calculations on the Special Nuclear Material inventory, we found that our scrap quoted to you vas the total uranium content, not the U-235 content. Therefore, we have at our facility a total SiH inventory of 9.J87 kg. Of thia, 4.293 kg. are except and 5.094 kg. are non-exempt.

ln order to coeply with the 5 kg. limit and approval of our security ayatem,

~

we requcet pef 61snion to ship 340 grams of U-235 to Oak Ridge - Y-12 facility. This vould bring our non-exempt SMM inventory down to 4.754 kg.

and our total SNM inventory down to 9.047 kg.

Forns OR-653C and Forms OR-653A have been sent to:

Joe !!ahler Product Division USAEC Oak Ridge Operations Office P. O. Box "L" Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831 i

Sincerely, Charica u, i. - sugh III

, Reactor Supsp;.aor r-y , -

l l

j -  :

_ . - . .. g

Jht%C4 44~' -

omiweaEr:m::ac sh*mmiscsTE:L*.*. *> ---' ! W K^":* E 91.5 5 $ 1 e

Exhibit f Page 1 of 2 UNIVER$1TY OF FLORIDA TRAINING REACTOR HAZARDS

SUMMARY

REFORT Prepared by J. M. Duncan n

$5. 00 per copy A Report to The United States Atomic Energy Commission Division of Civilian Application l

From the Depanment of Nuclear Engineering College of Engineering University of Florida Gainesville. Florida October,1958

. . - - . . . - - + _ . . . . . . _ . . . . . m

I IIIT i

. Exhibit I  ; I' ,

Paga 2 cf 2 f  ;

4 .

The biological shield is made of cast. In order to adjust the fuel loading to achieve ll in. place conc rete with sections o f barytes the specific excess k desired for operation l concrete carefully located to reduce the of the reactor, aluminum dumraies may be substituted for fuel plates in assembling the i t

ove rall shield thickness. Access to the ends and top of the reactor is provided by removal fuel bundle s. An estimate of the worth of a ,i of ordinary concrete blocks cast to fit the single plate lies between 0.I and 0.2 per i cent k, which should allow sufficient flexi- l ope ning s, '

These blocks, weighing up to 4500 lb. , bility s o that no special or partial plates  !

each, have pick-up plugs so that they may will be required initially for adjusting re-  : i j f be handled by means of the overhead crane. activity. ,

The concrete is thick enough to reduce the Since heat-transfer considerations are 1 i

radiation leaking f r o m the reactor to 0.7 o f mi no r importance for this reactor, a mr/hr at the full operating power of 10 kw. number of different fuel elements could be conside red. It i s desirable, however, to  ;'

The nuclear characteristics of this re- use a structure w hi c h closely resembles actor, given in Table 4.5A, are similar to {' ,

those used in the Borax reactors, since the those o f o t he r water-moderated reactors behavior of B o r ax reactors during power using similar fuel plates such as the LITR, Ki T R, BSTF. Borax I, II, and III, and excursions has been experimentally demon- ,

strated. The use of metallic fuel plates of A rgonaut.

• high the r m a1 conductivity minimizes the q extrapolation of these data so that there is g a greater degree of confidence in the calcu-lations of the results in the unlikely event of l 4.5.1 Reactor Core 1 an excursion.

The reactor core consists of 24 bundles Plate s of 20 per cent enriched uranium- f of fuel plates and 12 single fuel plates con- aluminum alloy jacketed in aluminum have l been selected for the initial loading because 'j tained in s ix water-filled aluminum boxes surroundedby reactor.-grade graphite. Four ' (1) Iess stringent security requirements are associated with this enrichment, (2) nu- I cadmium control blades, protected by mag- '

nesium shrouds, move between the fuelboxes. clear characteristics a r e satisfactory for The fuel plates are in the form of the the purpose, and (3) proven fuel plates of" 1 AITR type (Figure 4.5F). A sheet of 0.040- this enrichment are available.

in. - thick 20 p e r c e n t enriched uranium- The six type- 1100 aluminum fuel plate ,

aluminum alloy is c o m pl e t e ly clad with boxes have inside dimensions of S in by 6 '

O 015-in, thickne s s a f aluminum. Thele in, by 48 in, high ( F i. 3 u r e .4. 5G ). The 'l plates are 25 5/8 in, long, 2 7/d in, wide, plates re st on a supporting raember,1.'% ir..

above the bottom of the box, which centers and have a total thickness of 0.070 in. Each plate contains approximately 14. 5 grams of the fuel vertically in the reactor and pro-  !

uranium-235. These plates are bolted into vides for a water reflector above and below i bundle s o f eleven plates e a c h, spaced on the plates. The aluminum boxe.s are con-0.207-in, cente rs, leaving 0.137-in. channels nected at the bottom by means of an aluminum ~

i between plates, in each fuel box there is header through which the cooling water is .

space for four fuel bundles and two single supplied. The tops of the boxes are con- ,

t plate s. When fully loaded in this manne r the nected by aluminum overflow and vent pipe s.

f six fuel boxe s contain 276 plates with a total Each box rests in a rectangular hole in the of approximately four kilograms of uranium- g r a p h i t e prism and, if desired, can be g 235. removed by first unloading the fuel plates - -

the n, disengaging four nuts from studs on !r The calculated cold clean critical mass I of the reactor is 3. 5 kilog rams of U-235. the bottom flange with a long-handled wrench.

The top of each box is closed by a plug j

" Summary Report on the liazards of which extends upward through ihe graphite i i

which forms the base for the vertical ther- ;l i the Argonaut Reactor," D. II. Lennox and C. N. Kelbe r, ANL-5647. mal column. The upper part of the plug t

Il er.:phasis added 1

e

Q L,'{-] Q ANL-5 647 l SPECIAL I- I i

4 I ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY I P. O. Box 299 Lemont, Illinois

SUMMARY

REPORT ON THE HAZARDS OF THE ARGONAUT REACTOR by D. H. Lennox and C. N. Kelber Including work done by: R. H. Armstrong W. L. Kolb Andrew Selep B. I. Spinrad t

l Reactor Engineering Division I'

B':l;;[31::S & L!AT!:5i2.Ii"Al SE:CESLE.l.I!

0;;',VE.10iY OF Cf.E.;5I.:A I

December, 195o, tts A;;SELES 24, Cfh.. .

.l Operated by The University of Chicago a

under Contract W-31-10 9-eng-38 l

'e

^

^

~ ^

^ '

^~ ^ '

. . . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - . . T '~~-- ~

r RE-6-I7775-A W.l(OLO:P.D.,12-3-56

= - - -

5'- 0" -

CONTROL POSITIONS 3

~~

A I

[__ / l l l -

/

h__) y. .e FUEL ASSEMBLIES

-r== /

'N ./ SAMPLE THIMBLES

% /

/' '

- - GR APHITE-INT ERN AL

/

7 ' THERMAL COLUMN

_ _ N _

c>

i / _I

_3 i i . , _ .. r .

t q

t_ _.

• GRAPHITE MODERATOR

\[ \ ~

_,[ x 24" O.D. INNER TANK

\ s ss=

• 6" ANNULUS

- x N-N 2,# .

- 36" 1.D. INNERTANK

__ )( b GRAPHITE REFLECTOR l l .. . _ . _ _ _ .

l l Fig. 2 l'l.AN SECTION OF CORE LATTICE AND REFLECTOR

if 19 b l-

[

.L

5. Graphite Core Pieces [

p The core contains 24 graphite wedges, each liin. at the [

base, 6 in. thick, 24 in. high, tapering to a blunt point. It also contains h twelve graphite dummy blocks (3 x 6 x 24 in.) . (

d

.i When water is admitted to the fuel region the graphite filler i-pieces become submerged and hence must be waterproofed. As an inexpen- I sive substitute for aluminum cladding, an aluminum-Krylon plastic spray-coat is used. Irradiation in CP-5 comparable to several years of operation  !

of Argonaut caused no degradation of the coating. $

6. Fuel Elements  ;.

Each complete fuel assembly box contains 17 aluminum- i; clad plates (Fig. 7). The ove r-all dimensions are 6 in. x 3 in. x 24 in. long. h The plates are assembled with aluminum bolts at top and bottom. Dummy I aluminum plates or graphite slabs can be substituted for fuel plates to vary I the quantity of fuel per box. Spacing between plates is maintained by two ]

Teflon washers (1/4 in. thick) attached to each end of the individual plates. ,

This separation gives a metal to H 2O volume ratio of 0.4. ,

An inexpensive fabrication technique for making fuel plates  ;>

containing 35 wt-% of 20% enriched U 30s was developed by the Argonne f Metallurgy Division. A hot extrusion of a mixture of U 0s 3and 2S aluminum l powder gives plates with negligible void volume and over-all dimensions of 0.098 in. thick by 24 in. long and 2.84 in. wide.

l Aluminum powder and U 0s 3 in the proper ratio were placed in a 3!-in. diameter vented aluminum can, heated to 483C, sealed and then extruded in a 400-ton horizontal press. The resulting fuel sheet, approxi-mately 17 ft long, was cut into sections 2 ft long. A clad ave raging 2 mils thick covered the plate except on the ends at the point of cutoff and at some sc ratch points along the surface. Exposed portions of the fuel matrix pre-sent no corrosion problems; however, a plast:c spray is applied to stop

ission recoils. ,

a The uranium oxide content of each plate varies; those cut  !'

from the ends of the extrusion contain somewhat less U 0s than the average.

3 The composition of each plate is.  ;

1 v.

U 235 19.6 gm _+ 10% P U3 0s 114 gm Al 248 gm

\

s

IF t

-' LL u .-

I l

l i_

~

f sq \ T (I' "M/A/f/////(ps s 'g. x 's N

mw e= z ,:

jgg

(

\\/[i/^g = u u. 4 g x>

i

/\ \ \ 18~

1

'k]l/fn vf, i i i d alll b 5 z

/, s

/(J ,l /,/ u==8g:

ss' /"'T ce 34 w,,u. ./

s a

's s/k' O/ b ele -7=w'i g/ y i

' z

/

,x' 1

iY >

s//,,x g,y 3, s., ,.

g, o

g

=

x/ \/ / \'

m e '

I ,

\/

i f 3 (

/ '/

,8 j', / '\,%. p,, j I , N .

\'s /s 7

c.

~ .

oai,iy -

\ /f; - ,

'I'

\, , ,

\, 4

, +. , i -

/

!1 n as 89

/. t ,L p 18 j/ - x ,- all i Q. Ii }

u e.:

L!7

\

• As as

/.' /

'f  ;-

s

, /*

"QQ  ;

// . r;f i.

4

"- N NN"

T L

I 24 r

.?

11. Start-up Source ,

An antimony-beryllium-photoneutron source is used to pro- .

~1 vide neutrons for start-up and multiplication measurements. The source l

is motor driven from a loading port outside the concrete shield in a trench i

unde r the reactor tank.

1 4  : The antimony in the source is removable from the beryl-lium to permit rejuvenation in CP-5. An activity of ~5 x 10s neutrons /

fi second is obtained from a solid cylinder of antimony 1 in. OD x l{ in. long.

- The antimony is clad with aluminum, irradiated for 5 days in CP-5, and inserted in a 3-inch cube of beryllium.

D .,

1 12. Handling Equipment

A jib-type crane is installed in the floor within the reactor i shield so that the jib arc reaches all blocks. The rated capacity is 1/2 ton at the end of the boom and 4700 pounds at a point 6 ft from the mast, cor-responding to a position directly over the top shield plug. A portable lead coffin is used for transferring either fuel elements or antimony from the l start-up source.

- I' a. Top Shield Plug A steel-clad, barytes concrete-filled slab (61{ in. x lj l.' 61{ in. x 1 ft thick) shields the top of the active region (see illustration).

. ;I

\ 1l 7

LEGEND

/ '

b IUdCX KO'[

&g j t

/

,/ \:- 3 :ndex Slot l

a - / /

C Access to Fuel and Four Radial

'Q/

, l l Experimental Holes l

I

- .C / l

', l A \

x l

i D Central e xpe rimental Port i  !

i 1

< l l j i i

i i

i l

27 ,

i D. Exne rimental Facilitie s i i

Space and structural strength is provided for exponential ex-periments laid on top of the core region. Removal of the upper shield plug i leaves a five-foot square distributed neutron source, which may be shaped by addition of a graphite pedestal. Performance of such expe riments tem- {

pararily precludes any access to the core. I I

A tunnel (4 x 5 ft) penetrates one side of the shield and is served  !

with a movable cart. Initially, a water-filled tank will be mounted on the i cart, plugging the tunnel. The tank may be used for (1) shielding studies; I (2) water-moderated exponential measurements; or (3) solid materials i may be located on the cart for migration measurements. Inte rlocks re-quiring both that the cart be completely forward and that the biological shielding be adequate before start-up can proceed ensure that cart motions cannot add reactivity to the system and that loss of water in the tank cannot lead to ove r-exposure of personnel.

f The inte rnal reflector has five removable ve rtical stringers at varying radii. Access to the stringers is through ports in the top shield i plug. When these stringers are removed, samples or experimental line*rs must be in place before operation is permitted. Electrical interlocks en-sure this condition. L I-Two holes (4 x 4 in.), provided by removal of concrete-graphite plugs, penetrate the shield and reflector at the active lattice midplane. The holes extend to the outer reactor tank at points 90 degrees from the external ,

the rmal column and the irradiation cart. i i

The external the rmal column has fifteen removable stringers.

I Complete removal of the internal tank is possible when the fuel 1 annulus is inloaded. This leaves a three-foot diamete r, graphite-reflected tank in which multiplication expe riments may be pe rfo rmed; or c ritical ex-pe riments may be pe rfo rmed the rein afte r an additional hazarris re .lew.

Such re.lew is also required for pe'rformance of inte rnal exconential ex-periments, which require removal of the inner tank before replacement of the inne r the rmal column. The inne r thermal column cannot, by its design, ,

be unloaded while the inne r tank is in the reactor.

E. Fuel Storage ,

The total inventory of U* in the reacto r building is 5.3 kg con-tained in fuel plates. Approximately 3.75 kg are normally contained in the reactor; the remainder are locked in a four-drawer, cadmium-lined, ,

combination-locked file. All storage criteria have been checked to ensure against achieving criticality by flooding or other accident. i

r .- . _ _ . . _ . . _ _

t g 7d %g% y gp ff4 (USA) ARGONAUT l

i uGL M- N ARGONNE NUCLEAR ASSEMBLY FOR UNIVERSITY TRAINING l

PURPOSE: Research and Training DATE OF INFORMATION: October 1962 GENERAL

5. Owner sad Owned and operated by Argonne National

1. Reactor type innched (20%) uranium. lecht water rnodevoted operator Laboratory and cooled graphete renected

2. Nominal reactor Design 10 kW thermal 6. Designer and Arge Monal Laboratory 1 power Normal opwating power 1-100 W thermal busider Neutron beam source, esponenteel expenments. 7. Present status in operation 8tud'es magestion measurements fuel 4 construction Start of construction 1956

3. Purpose Shd's",O Feb.1957 I studie stradiation studies, reactor kmetics studies, schedule Reactor cratacal

)

general seactor penperties

4. Location Argonne National Laboratory.

Lemont. Illmois. USA l RE ACTOR PHYSICS

8. Neutron energy 10. Neutron flum At 10 kW:

Thermal Thermal av. 1.47 x10 a n/cm2 sec and lifetime Lifetime about 1.8 x10 4 see Thermal max.1.69 x1058 n/cm2 sec i

Fast maa. 1.35 xIOnen/cm a sec S. Core parameters One slab core:

vj = 2 05 s = 1.0 f = 0 80 p = 0.98 k ,,, = 1.60 k,gg = 1.005

11. Reactivity Mat built in (cold, clean): 0.!E used for esperi. #

La = 3 929 cma e = 61.3 cm2 BI = 0 008 cm-s balance ments Thermal leakage factor 0 97 Fast leakage factor 0 65 CORE

12. Shape end 18. Average power Cyhndncal annutus. 36 in. ed 24 in. id 24 in, high Normal 14 W/ liter dimensions vanous core configurations possible, cons stmg of density in core Design mas.1.4 kW/ litre(one slabcore.1 (one slab core.100 W) 0 kW) 6 to 24 subassemblies.

In each case the remaining annular region is filled with graphite faller blocks. 19. But nup ggg

13. No. of channels Room for 24 subassemblies in annulus 20. Fuel loadin9 Under normat conditions fuelis menually transferred

& subassembless One slab core- 6 svoessembhos in a 90'section and unloading without need of sheeldmg. For outreme cases a of aanutus ,ib. type crane and lead coffms wrth means for Two slet core-owo evce 90* sectione diametri- . g end grapphng may be used, cally opposed Annular core -every posmon loaded. but only the mner 3 in, with fuel Cylmdncal holes. 8 in. diam, and 4 ft deep in 24 positions spaced equally on a circle of a radius 21* 1rradiated fuel cadmium hned concrete.

14. Lattice storage Normalloading of 6 subassemblies, but it is possible of 15 in. to stoes up to t 8 subassemblies.

15. Critical mass 22. Moderator 200 gal. light water, cooled for operation above e, s,Iab

, co 1 W to roorn tenperature Annular core 4.1 kg Ull8

16. Core loadmg at One slab core 1.95 kg U385 rated power Two slab core 35 kg Uass Annular core 4 2 kg U 8s

17. Average specific Normal 50 W/kg UIss (one slab core.100 W) 23. Blanket gas power in fuel None Design man. 5 kW/kg Uiss (one slab core.10 kW)

FU EL ELEMENT Alumimum bonded to meat by sintermg.

24. Form and f 25. Cladding Final cladding thickness as 0 002 in encept at end composition p afe* O pomts of cutoff which are epony resan coated eralf' . 8 = 2 84 w 24 in.

Enrichment 20% 35 wt. % U30s in alummeum 17 paralle6 plates, spaced 0 25 in. apart form a fuel powder matrix. hot entruded subassembly. 6 m 3 x 24 in. overall.

26. Subassembhes Dummy alummium plates or graphite slabs may be

l used to very fuel load per subassemNy

' 115 1AEA.Research R. - ARGONAUT

7, . D w.

(GERM ANY) SAR .1 I

l i

SIEM EN S ARGO N AUT REACTOR No.1 PURPOSE: Research and Training DATE OF INFORM ATf 0N: August 1962 l

I GENERAL l

g g ,, gyp, Asoonaut type. h.on6v ear.cned (19 8%) ureneurrt 5. O. ner and , g,,,,,,, Sen,cg,,5=e.= e AG, E<tengen leget watee modeseted and coo.ed groonne renec1.c operstor  ;

a 2 Noenenal reactor 1 kW theemel. continuous 6. Des.gner and S mern-Schuceertweeme AG. Ersenpeet po rer 10 kW thermes. mes. bue& der in coeretTon

""1 8 M N lieutron phys.cs. lensee esperiments. sn.eedeng '

&C***""'*" l 5'm of Wrucson Jan. 1959

a. Purpose ,,,,ngs, po.,, ,eecia, o,,,e.opment I Sta'1 of essamo6, scheavia i hoactor entecei June 1959

4. Lecesson G echsag 00em honn W Germany WW 6am ,f y

Thes reactos is swm.e no iner AMGOreAUT eeectru es Aagann, hevone! Leooretort USA. se ses me n parts wretn tne tocomag most. cations: ,

Neartroe tiva; Thermal men. 14 . t0H niem; sec Feni men. 2 4 a 108 8 nrcm'sec

Av. soectf.c power m f use

0 5 kW/kg U:8' at 10 kW tor annuw loso.ng trvedessed fuel storege: 18 sneed clad hnees en conceeee ficar Coe6eert mees f 60w rate: Mes.11 lesers< rmn -

Centrol roos: 3 ornm.setery tp.oes 178 r 177 w 0.76 mm 1 coarse eeousating beece 178 m 177,0.76 r.w-i 1 fine teoussieng niece f A) 178 n 102 = 0 76 mm

. 1 fine roovienng twooe (B) 178= 51, aa0.76 mm e

Wostn of snem svery bemoes 4 to 81 p oeoenoeng on core conhpretson rk Worth of coeroe secuesteng twooe 3% p rk Worth of A fine reouvetenp eseoe 2%

' rk Worm of B fone eeousanaq twede 1% p

-m Speed of h.aoes 025 causec = 15 s 10-8 % pisec tear co w e ouset.ng beeoe)

Cons einment : No actues conte.nment the ee ctor a 6ocated en a nom.-eene9m concreie her.16 = 12 ert F m h cti Surroundengs : Spa co.y pooviesers forerwand on tne ese< rever. eoout 10 am anrte of Murvien Botnieegrepny: 1 Atornwenseneft 11 47e f how 1959a 2 S.emens Jensen *t ho 12 o 745 titr59) l (

R ES E AR C H F ACILITIE S

, Usef ul dimens6ons Neutron flux Remarks Dessynation 'No. Posttion l (nicm;sec)

(cm) e I l l

t e t l

I I tsorwarnet no.it.on tmems 2 l (1) 7t. 79 j ,

i 1

(2; i Monsomel thermen coiumn i 1 126=156 l l 15e .ong 4 l

Raerwwenie sonnemes of horaontel l j i enormes co.ww 1 15 (31 , 10.5 1C5 .

t  ! l bertieel therme co.umn 1 44; Ei o.em Famoveo.e st eno es of verticei 1 f54 it i o e .

tharme' Co6um'n 4 86. E.2 = 1 Mno e . :en,  ? <7. 125 , i C7

• 2'5 sew;,

I t

i r i 1

1 3  ; u e . i -. , c. .%

i

3 f

(GERMANY) SAR 2 .

1  ;

s e

SIEM ENS ARGON AUT REACTOR i t

K ARLS RU H E  !

t PURPOSE: Research and Training DATE Of INFORM ArtoN: August 1962 l GENERAL __ .

,_ __- -- - q .

, 5. Owner end Geseenscas't lur Keentorschung mD+4.

1. E ectortype Aeoonaut twee. heonav ene.v.ed (19 e%) ve. mum. , operegor

!I.9nt watee mooevai d ono coa o. g.,pn.ie ,,,,,ci,e

6. Desegner and Consortium of A. G. l

2. Nomenal reactor S.emens Schuc*e'.1*e'*e 10 W tae mal. conunwous besider  ; Luegi G ei. O H Penisch-bam*9 A v.

7. Present status

' I" **'*D"  !

! t Man of cons nuction Oct M i g Neus,on on.s.cs e .,ch en receo-chem,stry and g con,i,veg,an 3' ' * *'* * "

i educat.nnes putava*** scheoule 6 ftenciar enucai Jan 1963 f

'1  !

n, ,

4. tocateon te on.os,...,n n.ee, . .s,u,.e Ge.

f Thes ee.ciae se um..at to tr+e AHGON AUT *eractw at Ansonne Natsunse tacosetoew. USA eri its ma.n parts math the Orplomino moo.f.cet.ons-boutron fous : Theems mea 14 10* n/cm2 sec f est mas 2 4

• 10' n/c'* see Av. specif ee powee en f uel: 0 t Wise UD* foe annu ae a so.oeng erredested fuel storeae: 30 siee. cied stoeace n< pes en conceese seau Cooient enees f enw rete: u ns 2 ag sec Contros roos. 3 srsee saiety twooes 175 . t 77 0 76 r*.m 1 coe 17e v 177 = 0 76 mm i s.n,'se 'euu.ating e,ou.atino tdooe tone i A r 178 = 102 = 0 7t. mm 1 fine seguestang ts oe (6) 178= 51 > 0 76 mm e 4 W orth of coarse eeouest.ng osace e.

, .3 % r -

• k Wortn et A hae seousehng space 2%p k

Wo'th rd 8 fene eeoulevino ruede 1 % :.-

k

-h Speed of tie.oet 0 25 cmisec - IS = 10*l % -/sec a eso. coarse re tu.ae no hs.oe)

Cent eenment : Gas.i.gnt anhances heen ..tt. tiat nom? mas o.am 17 m. he.q%t 10 m Surrounosno s : > <westre 13 km emetn of Konvuna en M nine W ade v eso.us hem ves-i,= c ent.. popwae.on 4 a.m 0 a em 10 0'YJ 8 sm AS Or 0 20 em 530000 Sittisogroon,: 1 Atna .ris:nmet 11 479 qNaw 1859' 2 S.****eng iedse n se'1 NO I2 g 745 (19$9)

R ES E A R C H F ACILITIE S i

Usef ul riimensions Neutron flux 1

! Hemar>s D orseu nation No. Posetion ,

(nrem sec)

(cm) , i 1

{

. . _ _ .w

+.a..,om me net.,,nn f.e.-.o 2 .i 79 79 r j verminete' thee: coee *i 1 0 1M. % e l-1 s; u.no ,

a '

berTWHPSD. sitectoet% tt* nrte.Pn.*t a ,

• 1 10ts1C5 j ,

theems. c.on.enn g i

ven.c.,. .e.c.,,- c. e c.em i

• t C 3 e em 8**** wren e s+ ince 10 a n.cm2 e ,

l*"me 14 e 10

• sec t oes.oc t - 3 10 -

• m 1C. heut on flua 21 r 10'2 necm2 sec and intenime 6, to..caemium man.

(meesurec)

, c.re p.r. ,e,s 20. se,0 ,

1 l- 0 793 p=0940 k .,, = 1.b4 5 e Fast see& ace tactor 0 6P1 i l Therme6 easce f actrw 0950 11. Reectivitv I Mas cu.n-.n (coad, c ee) 0f% i basence  ! To compensate for ,

' temosestuee C20%  ;

periments 01i% i Aeaon 0 20s.  !

Du'nup 0205 CORE _

I u sh.oe .n. ... A eer. e po-er h.ema,o. ..sm. oe e. ._s u . 20 .r,. 2 ..,

8 1 d ' C'"e o.menssoas ing3 oensrty en core 1 l i

19. Burnup \ 0t a s o* tes.nneone ras'e .al n i

13. No. ni chsaaeis 20. Fuet soso.n9 '

7.o 9,,n og 3 pu,. m, ..,n w,,,,,,,o p,17 ,,

Fue. tomo.nc and va r e+9 e

& s ut,essemoi.es i o, son,., ano up.oedeng . eo.s'e -cr ne'ete teenste.9 svatoms casa,, pos.tsome.o piet.c.cona '

s's n'

& ue. t.u.es e.e each 5 , C , 4e - h.or . .as.o. . ove a*eo cesae. mmo's one war.ous naaesano 100 6 o ~ en .,,..si w

• two svoorri pese 11 S .c tv Dottom e' bos a f ,,i s aassemn6.=a o.us 2 s.r o.e toe. o eves er

.er n e,r,,

l 204 en. fuee e,.s a est er. .'7 situ one tes== m conc'e'e y Distanc e tiet. n f ue tenem p e beam es . e 21 arreo.eted f uel , ,,no. ,,;, omec d m c.en.

.st ev e t,e.=een .name s es . . sine ese 93 ..,. ,,,,. s steereo en e pnemei st** se** e.%e

( eme so cemer o fue o.aies 0 . . . .n yL gy,,rg,31, ,,, , g y,, , 3,, y ,g,,,y it, Cretical mass i 3

• e c U2 m case o' ?O4 eae.c w,: f ue. 22 Mooerever  : Laget weiae en the to 8 homes 3 *. o g 0 ; ci c ose n' 9's s ea >c w f ue beennite soeastry i b t r='***n tne f. bneet 3 i e

16. Care lomo.nc. at l 3 y , , g ; , . ,,, y, g ,,,,,,,g , , , ,

toted peu.er  ; 7 , ; g ; i . ,n, p ,,,,, ,,

17 la cereost sr ectisc 22 6.eneet pas f.ovve' n f uel ADoros . 'B e W 'aq U; ,

,,p FU E L E LE M E NT

=- =.-:-_. ==- -== .. _-__-- -.- --

- ~

= ^ = = ' ^ - - --^^ :^^=~~~~

x ,..... . . . ., e , .,. e. o. . .e, x,,..e-.~,,.m.

c om news.r.r. s . . .,..., r ( 7 ;y4 ;t (;t ,

,, c ,,,, o ,,, n. . . _ , _

[ u.--..e- J's e, .- s c .- $ e.. w

~~ ~ ~ - - - ~~ - - - ~ ~

v., .~ . . . . - . . e.,. m. se~. *. n e .

M . 3. g[s&*' *O b '

. . k.

(* ea.%4.*- . '*-'49S., [18 ' *

,,,,,.4 b u Ple s s***' Dl'e' ' [em* , -. F -ef ' r.fw e a',*l'.a c.a%.- e 0, *

• s e** t . g

, j 4 s ,. ...m v n.- .c. m.

l *2. 1 & l 6 . .g me e ger *' r.t I I I *.

sr.' Q Q._.

(GERM ANY) A EG.PR.10

.. l AEG PRU FREAKTO R PR-10 -

I e

I PURPOSE: Research DATE OF INFORM ATION: junc 1962 GENERAL Aegonaut i.pe en,eneo #2o u u.a,w - cm 5. 0-aer aad  ; Ai m.ene t t,.cnat..co.eeeschatt seanatort am '

, ,,,,,,,,,,, .a.e, noe,s .d ano coo.ea. ,..pnne ,%ee one aior . uen  !

6

' i

2. Nomened reactor **"*# "" '"'" ***"'Ch' '**"'""'"

10 W the mal bu.eoer ' M#a*en****** j p, ,

7. Present status j

. 3. Purpose hector pnysics for pri.ee eesctor season & constructeon l '" e

"#"**"I' . keector cret. cal Jan.1961 I 6uss pn ee opeestion Foi 1961 l se., c.,, .. - am os, u.e....a ~ e, ,

..m,,,,, cmman, 6 .a.

f R E ACTO R PH YSICS I i

s. womron energy i Aop,o. o o2e ev i te e,ma: av eso a. i.75 ,1o. ,emasse g 3, ,,,,,,,,,,,,,

and titetsme Liteveme 19 10** sec . av. en.al 20 ,10* n/c,nasac

• mau 2$ s 10* niemasec lr Fast av. esosa: 2.75 e 10e necm- sec '

v = 2 021 e = 101 8' **'ai 19 v 10= niemJ sec

9. Core pesameters **- 415 " 10* n<cm2 sec i f = 0 812 o = 0 97 *

• =161 **60cm3 LF = 6 7 cm3 .

11. Reec1.vetf

• Mas bumet en 0 6% foe eenanments  !

beeance I

CORE Annuda' cose ses setepe of an Octogon' 18. dewef age po-er

12. Shere end ' Not evadacee demens ons art *'nahveiv oenoty an co,,

80 cm (315 en ) h.c h. 618 cm (24 2 en , ec., 6 79 2 cm (31.2 en 3 od.

ne >

3 80 cm (31 S en ) heon. 916 cm DE 2 es J ed. 19. Buenup i g o. ,,,,,34, 108 8 cm (42 6 n l od t i

13. No. et channels Oute. annu.us consists of 24. .nna- anno ut c' 20. f uel loso*ng . Manoa.i ans#ee nsinc eenvemesa ctdian anc ovengaa

& subestembl*es 16 atomen um hnees eocator' en ve tica n, wet e3 anc un6oadino e c'ene graprute One fuet sun.neseerse, pe* teos l

l ,

71. tremoisted fuel

14. tJttece N o, ... .r,,, , , , y ,,n,c.t ,,g , .n t.,,o, .nn t enc...e rewns 22 M oc ee stor . wec s 100 i.i. s i.c t *me+. a isis 'eme 3*J- O

15. Crrtecal mass 4 g,"' 24 maw % m e w Geaonese het.een fue' :cses

16. Core 6ead nq at ratoo gscweer f 6 e ac U:

17. Avevooe snecific powser en f uel ,1 Sh W so U? ^

• 23 O'***'I**'  %%

F U E L E LF M E NT

u. . . . ._.=-=.:=--=:

24 'orm and r * *~ enower r . es pr o,,,,, .c , n,.,,.. ,. m 25 Cincoeng , , , , , , , , , , , c. c,, ,,,g. , , , , ,

coriusa s+t on setnmo n w a n m.- .n, ,c.n

, 3 3,c -

t'. 9 4* C , *6 - - - - - - - - -

. - ys, s 6,,,  %,, y,.x,.,,,,

l e ^ .' ' '

26 b usesse mne.es

• rw* '<**t.* sm .n se n *

• t r < ' r a *.

• 6 ~'a * +.; s n,e m.

,. ., o..,,,

{ . ' ' 5 u . f.

$ lhh&e& H S$ _

CO4 E H E A r TR ANSFE A =

...:.__- . . . ~

. . - . u =. ,----

21 reeet te v. ster ,

22 Caa.ent eness I

• aree 133 3 Md ( f a# 4 es.besseenrp, rune.ou,4g.ep s frow rate e T.;:t eso cao m '41 :oae%teca

-~

2T. Heet flus N C3*"I 3**'** *

%***sa.ue .h testeget atue es ,4.cetev acuve amo.ene

23. Pues esement 34 Hot chenael .g,,,,,.,, j t empee e sur et 800 ewedeo e f4Glors e

3o. seet tr.nse., i c o s e e.e.e,,t  ; Not a. o.e 11 Caoemar flow 35. Snut.Joan l aree & veeocity l Appros 900cmJ(fo 24 sucesammtHvconfoquesteon) heetre.noesi 'so peovision

~

CONTROL -

38. Consens. regu.

• W 4aat'c T u'c ". 7 *'"' '

f ateng mes.s

. stum-seiefv beedas. active 'enestn .;0 c.m ' d en I 3a. Scram time &

raer n en.sen =v ** C l '*C safsty rods . requenteng bemoeg. active engen 10 cm t 4 en 1: U4r ",3 ..'a"va.ttree 03 sec "N' oesce xtive esen 4 cm W 15 .a p

'3" *>sao= ausse w orn 15 cm (0 59 a.

4 anutusown beenee 39. Sensitivity of 4+8 rHeoes )to 4 d Ciao wegn tournen.um. 160 cm (63.a e teng auto, contros No autornetic conte A I Warin os sn en.saderv Simoes 12 % '"

k 4 .g . g 40. Temperature -t Worta 68 ' N* beene 0 4 a% .::- Wnren of "S" Siace 011 % :- coef fsceeats -6 10- a % p,

• C u

Mr'a ut mus-cewa beartog 2.4 % 2 g k.

41. Burneble I

! Sae.d ne < nim..eeer, martee 0 5 cmis c = 4 < 10-8 s 5 */sec 9 0' **"

g

0"*

f 4 So ws <> ' A* eagueanao biane 0 5 cm, sec = 4 . 5 0 -

• 5 5.*. nec 42. Otne< coate06 sa'e', as saut. ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,

5 0***8 of '.8.. <-quianao bemoe 0 5 cm/sec = I 3 10 * % r.- sec dowa praw'*'oa' 4

l 37. 4eectivet, f .. . . i o . .m, ,ec . p

. .dou..e. ,.te l lu s el t

REACTOR VE SS E L & OVE R ALL DIM E N SIO N S.

4 sum fu=6 bosee, e cn cone rung *d- *'" 9" A aaYo'. .$*n. ,,w.e sun. , ,9,- , ,

(See No. t 3) e I

• 45. Reactor with sh.e6deag 4 5 4 5 cm. 2.5 m n.gn (14 d .14 d Pt. 3 2 ft hign)

. s R E FLE CTO R A N D S HIE LDING _._

S.oes 125 m asevv coacree osocas. ceas.ry 3.5

43. Reflector Creon.to bsecst. 20 = .20 < 40 c m. sentirw i 65 48. Shee+ ding

. Cuts.de o meas.nne or re,ieete, 1.2 2 2m: 9 0" ant '

I .'emer as taveness 40 cm . T.,o 35 cms:oncrete 50 cm coac'"' no onus 50 cm adoitoonal

• Centree esq.on reav ee <amovest to orm :3,qv +ce corm'a 6' art kna's oO=' avion eso.m eaeg t

• i I

4 7. A ediation le== e 2.5 ene.ms er

'I et i,

! C O NTAI N M E NT _

i

• Tf ** *ad **'

m~.a. { ne No ...,ee wrua. .,eent meat

.e,

50. surrounoines M no.

• adv, ',*'*'* ad .,5a,***'

s ow _,i 'm"*"'*'_**

. 't r '"'"

. .te . _. ~,,n, _e Due.oeaq l *!

C O ST ESTIM ATE =

31. R.ertor aae l aeee o. soooco ou 53. Operating costs N U " "* ' " 3# #

l *> .lo.e.ay -a.n.n.no :cycau to* 3 *o<en **'an'

[ _

, om.. s

52. Suoport ,,,,,,,,,,,,, s.: seset requer - , 3 ann, r,y .>.,,nn e f ic,s.t.o. . me<.t > I 2 - r ar .es _

l us u ea,,* a . A m.n.'O 150 ,

I i i i

?

"6 (ITALY) R B 'Z R EATTO R E ARGO N AUT AGIP-N U CLEAR E

, PURPOSE: Fesearch DATE OF INFORMATION Novemcer 1964 GENERAt.

A,g f type, s . s., 4 20'.) "

E. Own.r .nd

i. .utor tvp. . .. . . . .. . e e .r h. . . . . - ,*. ,,,,,,,,,

,A,C,W t ,..o. , y o,,

, ,, _**.ca

. .n.i. cier j s. o n., .no acee .

50 .* .. ,

tm6o.c se.am LAnoaarons 6 l  !

, 7. P, nt at.tus ,

2. ro.

l s.w., .*~<>. .

- .. ; l m ;;- ~ ~ -. . , . -

I 1

t.w..- ., i.. . u . .u. i

, 4. w. , ,,,,

. . . . . i

!I I RE ACTOR PHYSICS

!  ! io. 6.ui,. T*"'"*'**"""*****

e. k.ut,on en.,9y l in. -.. eso.

.ne i.e.t.m. p ... 2 tc- * .n ,

s . co,. p.,. ~,. . - 2 os .-i f= p =. 9

% . ,0 81 6 . . s oc2  ;

Fest .e.. e f ce., ,

1~,............, C. 612, 1,....c..., u

b...nc. P..a >c.e 0.5*. 7 i

l 1 1

CORE 7

i "12. Sh.p. and A . ,12 m h.gh. 0 9 m . 0 6 m ed. I 18. A.e,.pe pow.r

( o*nsity en co .-

o.m.ns.ons , f i

i l

19. Sv.aup i.,,,,,,,,,,5;,

l l i

13. No. of ca.nn.ss j 26 6..n ..ch h.. , i s e.1. s... p.. l 20. Fu.I lo.d.ng l , .. 9, i .nd uneced.ng suosu.mo6..s I

i e s 21.er,.d . .d fo.: ,

1,24 .a.... .. .. % . . . of . .f

14. L.es c. 37 5,m ) s t o, o g e 5  ! (

1 i

j l "'9"'"**"  !

15. Cr.t.c.l ,n.ss I 22. M o.. at o, =,.2"7 C. m.m mc 10C C, e. e.e ,c a..g

' 2 en a 5 & , "U .cen-...c e n,. . + ,,,.. . . 4 l 4 l g

f 1s. co,e ia.o.aa .t , , y 3 o. y lI

,1

... . l

. l l

12. m .... .n.ca.c - 2.2 5 6 w .g N ' 23. Bl.n6.t n.s lN .

g po ., .n eue,  ! _

I FU E L E LEM E NT I

.. nc . 7; , 2 2 4. F c, ,, 6.c .. .e 25. Cl.od.no

as...... 0$ --e.4.

.o, na.=- i t , . U. C, * .. . . .... m ~. . .

c omne .

I $

t 2 f . 5 ub s..a.r....s .. ..-=.-..~..'..e.-. ,

f J

. . . . . , , e. .sv 1 5C7

d 8

.~.

e

1. . uS w /. - S A R.G R AZ h

SIEM ENS ARGON AUT REACTO R GR AZ l

1 l .

PURPOSE. Research and Trw.mq DATE OF H3ORMA!!ON O mcroer 1 %

u y GENERAL

.- 5. ..c,., t L.,..........r..........a.

i .. . _ ... e .a. .e ....a...e

6. o~..- ,,-a .....a . . .

. . . . . . . o.e,

....a. . .a ... . . . . . .

4 r

1 l  :. peom.n.e rew.ctor 6. D...gn.r.nd l

, p.,, t.'*

hveio.r bt * ** * *"*** * *

• G t r.. .ea . n,,. . =.a.

l' 5 'a* l

7. Pre nt st.tus l I

3 P ""'"**

3. coa.truct.on ims.a l re.<......, .a. ...,..u e....., l ,

j .ch.d ut. t >..et .I a e .et.s a L.ee.ag 19 7

. he.c e e r.e.a .: . . , 160

4. Locat ott ,,,,,,,,,,,g., g,,, .

I i 1 i m ...,,e,

.. .. . .. ... ...... - .. ... _ , ., .. t.. .. .. u>. .

. ~ ,. .a o... ,... v . ,n. .. .a . . .... e. ..

N *.a.t.st .3 1(* a v eec l

A.. om. cit.S .ewee en 6.e s . 0 $ e W .g S tJ *ce .a. ...e . e C 777 ww es av w .aa...e r.re lee .e.e.,e... ..,: 9 e pee.g. Nr .a e,.ac e.

C.a.c.4 e e a saem.s..... s .em..m p.. 270 - 2% C T. ms a ..g.a.a. e e .e m a e ..s 770 720. t 74 .a

w. .re. et s...m .ne ., . e .ee ...as e .. s

~'

3 e. c - e. a. ,.ae .. ........n.

R E S E ARC H FACILITIE S

-. ._. - - . - . . . _ = ----._--- = -.= -- _ _ _ - . . . _ _ . . _ _ . . _

e t I e Owf ul dimensions l d

Neutron fluz Dessona teon No i Pos etsor. Hemarks

i. (cm) 1 t (nfrm hec)

I 8

a i it .

a. v.c. e. .- . . .e k . a. s . . .* r, ac a..==. ...., e. t20 .. L w

.s. .r.. t .c.

i t i , c3 e,t .,7

.10.-

i 6= .s...e e. ..,.c.e-- -. as . . e .

t c.o. 11 i

. 0 10 m 1 7 . t r' .. W n .

l . e3.-

! t

..m.,.....e w= .. .... g ee .e , , .  !

e.

• 7 8

=c.... + ...e* n * . vv e

t.

f i i.....~ . ... . s, . .s 7 : m7  ; u . . im.- l I

l ,

Sai .e .. 1 t? 7.e t.127 "0 ' d. e.. . I e .e. . .

2 l

L T

'l ,

1 1

l I

I I

t i

i e

( '; ...a.... .. .-

M hmwx_wa -; .:mu - w - 1

()( N $3 k .,

D

.- [ 7)

HAZARDS AN ALYSIS BY THE TEST & POWER REACTOR SAFETY BRANCH DIVISION OF LICENSING AND REGULATION UI THE MA'1TER OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA (UCLA)

DOCKET NO. 50-142 By application amendments dated February 23, 1961 and April 15, 1961, T,he University of California (UCLA) has requested AEC authorization to make several minor modifications to their LO Kw training reactor. These modi-fications are discussed below:

Discussion of Proposed Modifications Low Temperature Inhibit Condition Rod withdrawai is currently inhibited if the moderator temperature is below 800F; this condition was considered necessary at the design stage of the UCLA reactor as calculations indicated a positive temperature coefficient below this point. Recent measurements have indicated that the coefficient is actually negative below this temperature (-8.5 x 10-5 delta k per centi-grade degree over the range 32 F to 120 F) . The applicant has therefore

(. proposed to eliminate this inhibit conditlon. .

Short Period Inhibit Condition Rod withdrawal is currently inhibited in the event of a reactor period less than 10 seconds. The applicant proposes to change this set point from 10 seconds to 6 seconds in order to avoid spurious period indications that have become an operational inconvenience. This modification will not affect the period scram set point which will remain at a setting of 3 seconds. .

Low Count Rate Inhibit Rod withdrawal is currently inhibited if the neutron count level is below 10 counts per second. The applicant proposes to change this inhibit con-

dition to 1.5 counts per second in order to allow withdrawal of the BF3 startup counter to a lower flux region. The value of 1.5 counts per second is consistent with values specified for other research reactors; e.g., the f University of Florida reactor, an essentially similar type, requires a minimum of 2 counts per second.

Chance of Source -

q The applicant proposes to replace the 2 curie Pu-Be source with a 10 millicurie 3a-Be source. The present Pu-Be source has been determined to give a much stronger indication than required for safe startup. Both Q types of sources have been utilized successfully in research reactors; we T-( anticipate that no additional hazard will result from the replacement of I

Pu-3e source with the Ra-Be source.

!,ti 1 -

2 = ;a.r u .m. u. _ . x ,== -,

.-,m -

m -- m , ~ . m m_ _ - , c , [

(-

-) '

I

'ae have examined the safety aspects of each of the modifications described above. In our opinion, these modifications all represent minor changes andwill not adversely affect the safe. operation of the UCLA reactor.

i By further application amendmen t dated March 21, 1961, the University has requested authorization to perform a number of experiments. The Staff con-sidered it advisable at the time of issuance- of the operating License to limit the performance of experiments as there were essentially no experimental procedures described in the original applicrtion, and proposed experiments other than those in the initial testing program were not specifically described.

We believe that sufficient information now hrs been submitted in support of the experiments requested by the March 21 application to enable us to make a safety evaluation. The experiments requested by this application are described below:

Discussion of Proposed Experiments Neutron Beam Experimen ts These experiments util allow the applicant to extract a beam of neutrons from the reactor core upon removal of shield plugs and stringers associated with the beam ports, access holes, or thermal column. Adequate shielding will prevent -

over exposure of personnel. Experiments of this type are very common for f3 University research reactors.

s Operatibn With Shield Blocks Removed The applicant proposes to operate at power levels below one watt with the portable central shield blocks removed and to bypass the interlock which .

inhibits withdrawal of the control rods if the reactor closures are not in place. l' i

Radiation levels at power levels below one watt will be sufficiently

' Iow to allow removal of the blocks; radiation surveys and personnel monitoring will be employed to detect any possible radiation hazards.

Irradiation of Special Nuclear or Source Materials The applicant proposes to irradiate up to 250 grams of fissionable material in double sealed containers for periods less than four hours at full power. This material will be irradiated at the outer face of the thermal column. Calcu-lations and experiments indicate that the introduction of fissionable materials at this point (48 inches from the core fuel) will not consitute an increase of reactivity for the reactor itserf. The limitation to less than 250 grams insures that the material irradiated cannot assume a critical configuration.

We concur with the applicant as to the reactivity coupling and criticality effects; we believe no safety problems will be created by the irradiation of this material.

Control Rod-Positions

) The applicant proposes to operate the reactor with the three safety rods partially inserted to varying depths so as to make flux distribution studies possible. The regulating rod will be on i ts down limit during any manipu-lation of a safety rod and the reactor will be brought to criticality only through withdrawal of the regulating rod. The experiment will not involve an y c h a.9 ? e in the 31Icvsble excess reacti"ity (0.6". delta k/k).

l "'

2.* . .: .s . e. 2 .  : ._ w , ~ - , _ _, , -- - ww . v. -- s n w -. s

- f-t k ,

='

i, Irradiation of Other Material l The applicant proposes to irradiate absorbing material in the core, reflector, shield, thermal column, or shield tank of the reactor. Only material resulting in negative reactivity will be involved and no change of fuel loading will be I pemitted. Since the reactor will be loaded to a maximum of 0.67. delta k/k, no serious insertions of reactivity would result upon inadvertent removal or failure of experiments. Irradiation of absorbing material is very common in University research reactors.

Reactor Oscillation i

The applicant proposes to perfonn reactor oscillation experiments, utilizing g a rotor-stator type pile oscillator. No changes in fuel loading will be pennitted and the magnitude of the oscillation will be adjusted so as to result in a power variation of no more than plus or minus five per cent.

Similar experiments have been performed in other research reactors; we anticipate no new safety problems will result from the use of the pile oscillator in the UCLA reactor.

Water Level Variations \

l The applicant proposes to operate the reactor at powers up to one watt with f the reactor core water below its normat operating level and with zero coolant l flow. To accomplish these experiments, the core water level, primary coolant y pump, and water flow safety interlocks will be byp assed. The written pro-t cedures employed during normal startup will be followed at ea.ch new water level; the rods will be reinserted before any change in water level is made.

Reactivity effects will be negative upon lowering the water level and in no experiment will the excess reactivity be permitted to exceed 0.67. delta k/k.

Undesirable temperature rises will be avoided by operating the reactor at low power levels; an alarm light and an alarm horn will be actuated in event of a high moderator temperature. It is our opinion that these experiments can be performed as proposed without presenting any hazard.

Temoerature Variations The applicant proposes to perform experiments involving reactivity changes induced by varying the core coolant temperature over the range 339F to 120 F.

Reactivity changes will be introduced by successively bypassing the primary pump and coolant flow safety interlocks, stopping the primary coolant flow, establishing a different coolant temperature, and then restoring the coolant flow. The maximum reactivity insertion possible is about 0.47 delta k/k, which corresponds to a period of about 5 seconds. The 3 second scram will be operative during these experiments. The coolant flow will be interrupted only when the reactor is .at power levels below one watt. We believe that experiments of this type can be conducted safely in the manner proposed.

It is pertinent to note that the experiments described above will be con-ducted under the direct supervision of the Reactor Supervisor or his licensed deputy in accordance with written procedures approved by the UCLA Reactor Hazards Committee. We are satisfied that performance of the proposed experiments will not present undue hazard to the public or operating personnel.

- - - - - - -- - - . . _ ..- . . _ - _ .. .. g ,

. k -. } .  !

UNITED STATES Eb /. p 0b* 3 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION i

I * *

• l

, WASm NGToN 25. D. C.

, n y r

• "o e '

g,...  ;

I!

THE REGEN 15 0F THE UNIVERSITY CF CALIFCRNIA DOCKET NO. 50-142_

LICENSE License No. R-71

1. This license applies to the Argonaut-type nuclear reactor (hereinafter r2ferred to as "the reactor") designed for 10 kilowatt (thermal) operation which is owned by The Regents of The University of California and located en the University of California campus in Los Angeles, California, and dsscribed in the application dated June 24, 1959, and amendments thereto dated Jar uary 4,1%O, and June 23, 1960, (hereinaf ter collectively referred to as "the application").

2. Pursuant to the Atcraic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, (hereinaf ter referred to as "the Act") and having considered the record in this matter, the Atomic

) En rgy Commission (hereinaf ter referred to as "the Commission") finds that:

A. The reactor has been constructed in conformity with Construction Permit No. CPRR-42 issued to The Recents of The University of California and will operate in conformity with the application and in conformity with the Act and with the rules and regulations of the g Commissien; B. There is reascnable assurance that the reactor can be operated at the designated location without endangering the health and safety of the public; C. University of Califernia is technically and financially qualified to operate the reactor, to assume financial respcnsibility for payment of Commissien charges for special nuclear material and to undertake and carry cut the proposed use of such =aterial for a reascnable period of time, and to encage in the proposed activities in accordance '

with the Commissien's regulations; D. The possession and operation of the reactor and the receipt, possession and use of the special nuclear material in the manner proposed in the applicatien will not be inimical to the ccx=non defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and i

" T r.?57 T. _n - -se n ___ --_mu-+- . - - - - -- T ru 9. _ 1

%' l L

.'. APPENDII 'A' ,

E UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA t

FACILITY LICENSE No. R- 9  ;

ll Eatimated Schedule of Transfers of Special Nuclear Material frcm the Comission to l '

tha University and to the Commission from the University -  ;

(1) (2) (3) (h) ($) I l

Transfers Net Yearly Cumulative f Distribution Dis tribution g Data of fran AEC Retums by the University Including Including g T ransfer to the to AEC Kgs. U-235 Cumulative Cumulative ,

(Fisemi University Recoverable Spent Losses Losses

}

Tcar) Kgs. U-235 Cold Scrap Hot Fuel Kgs. U-235 Kgs. U-235 e 1960 h. coo 0.660 -

3.3ho 3.3ho .h 1961 - - - -

3.3ho 1962  ;

3.3ho 1963 - - - -

3.3ho  !

196h - - - - 3,3ho i 1965 0.010 -

o.005 o. cog 3.3h5 1 1966 - - - -

3.3h5 t.;

I l 1967 - - - -

3.3h5 ,!

i 1968 - - - -

3.3h5  !

1969 - - - -

3 3h5 l l 1970 0.010 -

0.005 0.005 3.350 1971 3.3ho* (3.3ho) .olow h.020 0.660 3.350 0.olow l

0 Inventory to be ret'arned so Bumup losses ,

l l

l 1

, eA

.c n

J.

a"LIC2.TI.T 1.. C.': " TUCTIJ." "3;I? i 701 A T.'.AIEI' G ilCTOR ."aC LITi

- ;! I

'll b

D.,to of applicatior.: "ay 30, 1959  : A To : U. 3. Atomic - narcy Comission 1901 Constitution 'ivanue ' ,

achincton 25, D. C. l A httention: Divicica of Civilian Application  ! .

Application based on: Code of Federal taculntions l P

Titic 10, ,crt 50 4

Secticn 50.33

c. I!cs.c of Applicant: Collage of :ncin:cring University of California ".

at Loc i.ngeles '

b. iddross of Applicant: Loc Angelos 2h, California '

c. Ceceription of bucinocs or occupation of conlicant: jducation and racecrch in all brcnchor of ancinearinc. ~~ (s;.

d. (1) and (2) not apolicable.

(3) (1) itate whera or7anized: California Ikf# ,

rincipal location of bucinacs: Los tingeles 2h, California f.

I 4

j (ii) ihmcc, addrasses, nr.d citizonchip of rrincipcl officars: s.

t-t;

ar.o Title address Citizenchio Clark i'orr 'rosidant Jorholey, Cal. U . .S .

t. i. c.llon Chancellor Los i ncalec, Cal. U. S. ,

! Loc ltn:cles Caa puc i

L...C. Boelter Dann, College of Los Angolas, Cal. U. 3.

t in;inaaring ~

i Y,

T. ~. Hicks /.csociata l'rofescor Los ancalas, Cal. U. 7. f

\ .

I i

l 1

s O

- 5

=

h^k E

e. -

(iii) Foreign Relationships: The applicant is in no way owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, is or foreign government. 8 (b) Agent: The applicant is not acting as the agent or represent- T ative of another person in filing this application. The ;TJ applicant is the principal party.

f(r w

e. Class of license applied for: f 3-Construction Permit only. In August of this year we will 7 ask that the Construction Permit be converted to a Class 1Ch t, License. p 5

Use to which the facility will be put: {

h.

The reactor and its supporting laboratories will be u:ed for u the training and education of senior undergraduate and i graduate students in nuclear engineering and related sciences.

In addition to formal courses and demonstrations, the reactor

[

r, will be u md to support research at the Master's and Ph.D. 4 level. L v

Period of time for which license is requested: If At the time the Class lCh License is applied for, in a k supplement to this doc ur.ent, we will ask that the license f run for ten (10) years, or until November 30, 1969. Ej u

Other licenses applied for in connection with this facility: I Special Nuclear Material - (1) h.C0 Kg 90% enriched U-2M ['

p (2) Pu-239 as 2 curie Pu-se neutron source. An allocation of Special Nuclear Material is requested in this application. ,

f. Financial qualifications of the applicant:

s The College of 2ngineering is a part of the University of I California, Los Angeles, which is part of the combined University of California - a state university and land 4, grant college. Its financial support is primarily frem f appropriations of the California State Legislature. Additional ,

income is derived from fees, grants, and contracts. The fiscal 1959 budget of the University is approximately $200,0CO,CCO, of which approximately 32,CCO,CCO is budgeted for the College of Engineering, Los Angeles. The budget request for operation of 4 the reactor facility in 1960-61 is $97,CCO. Sufficient funds s are available to operate the reactor facility on a contir.uing [

basis for the duraticn of its license.*

I" 3

• h*c te : See Iten e of this dec r.ent.

_E

-  ?

'I; J

, a under this applica tion and future supplements. The following 9 information is provided as required under this section. j

1. The applicants financial qualifications are discussed in Section 50.33 paragraph f. ',.

2, 3, and h. Estinated date for receipt of first shicment of Special nuclear material: It is desired that Is Kg of U-235 ,,

as 90% enriched fuel be received in Los Angeles, California 4 approximately October 1,1959. Approximately 660 grams '

contingency allowance will be returned to AEC on or about <

Decenber 30, 1959.

Prior to shipment to Ios Angeles this fuel is to be fabricated -

into fuel plates as specified by AFF Atomics, the reactor fabrica tor. An allowance of 10% excess fuel should allocated for waste in fabrication.

It is desired that the 2 curie Pu-Ee source containing 30 gms.  ;

of Pu-239 be received in Los Angeles on or ab'eut August 15, 1959 Estimated schedule by years for subsequent receipts, consumotion and transfer:  ?

Transfer Pu Year Recelot by UCLA Consumption to Commission Production 1960 None 0.975 gm. 235 None C.f.0$ p . i 1961 None 0.975 gm. 235 None 0.05 gm. j 1962 None 0.975 gm. 235 None . 0.05 gm. -

19643 None 0.975 gm. 235 0.05 gm.

196h 10 gm. 235 0.975 gm. 235 gfonegm 235C07ng Fu 0.05 gm. p 1965 None 0.975 gm. 235 N ne 0.05 gm. '

1966 None 0.975 gm. 235 N "* 0 05 G"-

1967 None 0.975 gm. 235 N "* 0 US 4"- _

1968 None 0.975 gm. 235 None 0.05 gm. i 10 ga.. 5gm 235 a7mg Fu 0.05 gm.

1969 235 0.975 gm. 235 o n .. q This schedule is based on the assumption that reactivity will [

be replenished by adding one replacement fuel plate containing -

10 gm U-235 at five-year intervals.

]

It is assumed that there will be no return of the entire core to the Conmission due to cerrosion or obsolescence during the ten year period for which this schedule applies.

Since no fabrication or reprocessing will be done by the '

university, there will be no operating losses of special nuclear ma terial.

Succortinz date for above estimates:

+

a. Fuel loading for UCLA training reactor j Fuel enrichment 90%

3 i

Calculated cold clean am U-235 I critical macs 32C0 f

~

(d 1,Y ' I O #

h,t'f,4 'T -

jg 4 yg u p' .. .

U. '

'-c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORMA, LOS ANCELES c6 l'Wif*.

Regulatory File Cy.

/~ ,

stPIE:.zY

• DAvrs

• IRv NE Los ANcEtts . RivERstDE

• SAN D1ECO

• SAN FRANCISCO [ , d*[ SAhYrA BARB ARA

• SANTA CPSo b't.*f.QJ 2g,6y*

~~.

SCHOOt. OF ENCINEERISc AND 4PPLIED SCIENCE LOS ANCELLs. CALIFORNIA 900 4 00 3 June 1970 Dr. Peter A.. Morris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris:

We wish to request permission to have on site in the Nuclear Energy Laboratory on additional 4.3 Kg of Uranium-235 for the purpo;e c' refuelirig . Money has been grented us by the Division of Nuclear Education and Training for a new fuel leading consisting of 24 bundles for o complete core change and 5 spare bundles for low power experi-(-_. mentation. Our current license permits us to have only 3.5 Kg of U-235 in the Nuclear Energy Laboratory at any one time. Howev er, during the cetual refueling, we would have approximately 7.8 Kg of U-235 and after refueling and shipment of the old fuel bundles approximately 4.3 Kg.

Our present plans are to refuel the reactor during the summer of 1971.

Y frs truly, hN inomes E. nicks, Director Nuclear Energy Laboratory

z. m TEH:ch A',

., N[ ' ' -

\'( \ g g l / fM Q ,h '

^7 .. e  ?, .

$ x:ma 'g X

• ~ oY T:,9.;

< a. 1

\-

a: - ~

ex D JUN8 1970 > C5 S$M[ d,4.- dj

- RE7JWOW df

/s =

%'\O.'F,%g%~O"

. * *; 'L-N',.

y

• ,% 'i

a. j

.w s e ,A o ('

$/ Vfd SECT'.ON/- '\ X.

DCChiI C"M $ sk'\,%.~.-

f , ^4c'

/ \ - : :- 'f' ,r '

/

I ty \ p\ -

C.'O:.E AR rNERGY L ABOR ATORY THC%Af E. HICK!. Puf es ser e .c Direct or

• I i-.

., sTRIBUTION - . . . . .:. :: 3

~

Co=p1iance (2) g,.,,,...,,.._...

.:u].~ DRL Reading  ;.;.....,.

....~ ~

Branch Reading  ;.,.

"]"

JUN 2 4 1970 A ocket File D. J. Skovholt ==dii :

R. H. Vollmer (('

,,_. 5. . .~.

F. Schroeder Docket No. 50-142 _

H. K. Shapar, OGC FF EM D. L. 2iemann . :: :.=.=

E. R. Fleury s.

R. Diggs University of California at. PDR I/ "~'"..r Los Angeles Sch.aol of Engineering and

$ h ._.

'~

~~~"

Applied Science Los Angeles, California 90024 Attention: Dr. Thomas E. Hicks, Director ~

Nuclear Energy Laboratory  :=r Gentlemen:  : h2=.

Your letter dated . une 3,1970, requested an increase of 4.3 kilo-in the quantity of __,

srams (from 3.5 kilograms to 7.8 kilograms) "~' '.ii; uranium 235 which the University may possess at any one ti=e under

~"":=

Facility License No. R-71, to accoucodate the refueling of your Argonaut-type research reactor which is planned for the summer of ==

1971. However, the license currently authorizes the University to ";

receive, possess, and use 4 kilogrs=s of uranium 235 which, when =

increased by 4.3 kilograms, is a total of 8.3. Please advise us

{, whether you wish the new limit to be 8.3 kilogra=s or 7.8 kilograms.

If you do not plan to receive the additional quantity of material "

for refueling prior to the su=mer of 1971, we vill take action on ~~.. T this request at the same time we consider your application dated February 20, 1970, for renewal of License No. R-71 and the incor-Please indicate your plans  ; .;,;.

poration of Technical Specifications. . =

in this regard.

. 9

h. ~;"

Your request will necessitate an amend =ent to your license. Please note that Section 50.30(b) of 10 CFR Part 50 requires that applica-tions for amend:nents be filed under oath or affirmation with three s12ned originals and nineteen additional copies. Therefore, your response to this letter should be filed in accerdance with Sectic:

50.30 (b) and incorporate by reference the letter dated .:une 3, 1970.

Sincerely, eg.3a1 WW H ii:.

L neM Donald .,. Skovholt ~,; ..,.

Assistant Director for Reactor Operations "

~ Division of Reactor Licensing ..

s '4 < -

C 21,1, / . x (, /o 3 l0 2s . . ...

^* UE UEL E - . . . 555 ..

cmu> . . . ... . .. .EE .t .<'{. .:. .. .,9.RLQ K.Diggs :pdis i p /'

kov N F.O...h,, i.s

..E.R. .F..l. e. u..r r . W..w. . J.S. h..a. p2... a. k.eh. d..N /S..y.

n no...i t F S.cO..f.

, o e d e r. . . . . .

,,...y> .. ..

e r..

6/,'j,;',0 6/ ~ /70 6 /%' / 70 6/1,,/70 m, 6 C /~0' 6/'d /70 n, : .. u . . . . e . v.

.2 s:n. -r- .ew a m.cwm

~~

. cw.(:a..17 J ...----- - - - . -

~

. 4Rijdiab@ Fils Cy.

USIVERSITY OF CALIFORMA, LOS ANGELEF. , . ~ .e

_q m ,

. + (4 T

ararrLzy Dwis a tRvtxt Los ANCELES

• R!YER.1IDE

• SAN DIECO

• SAN FROCISCO [ , k'M

• Ml SANTA BARE.4M * $ANTA CRt"

, v .i p, .

scnoot.or r>cisttRixc sxo Aretken,citjcs *- >-

k.s'(MD

[

g } ,, Los AscEtrs,!pt'gorNtA s,'oo: 4 g - ,

~

9 July ^1970

.g 4e #1 -]NOh ,

3  : ~.

eIQ*r

• • /

\g \@l@f '

- g,g , i>. g

.]<D -l Mr. Donald J. Skovholt -1 4 f Assistant Director of Reactor Operations M 8 #. /8 N [f %j/ [b3 ) /

N Division of Reactor Licensing 4 #. -

+

U. 5. Atomic Energy Commission O Wcshington, D. C. 20543 '6 .:

Dear Mr. Skovholt:

In reference to your letter of 24 June 1970, the cmount of odditional fuel we expect to receive will be 4.3 kilogrcms. Therefore we would like rhe new limit to be 8.3 kilogrcms of uranium-235. ,,

{

Cur present piens cell for refueling iry June c(1971. We would prefer to ..

have the renewcl of License R-71'epproved/rother then writing en emendment te our current license. The croposed license which we rent with our ~

Technical Specifications includes the provision of up to 6 kilogrcms of fu el * '

in storage for refueling (peregrepb;3B). ,

~ /

Yoms truly, - ' ?'

j , ,

/ d r

l( N Thomes, E. Hicks, Director i Nuclect Energy Lcborcrory T EH :ch +

l

/

s_ /

,o M;CLE AR ENERcY L ABOR ATORY THOMAS E. HICKS. P ofesser anc Directs 9

k_ ~

.. _ _ = - . ._

j -O g UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORMA. LOS ANGELES _

!- ,s .

f\,.gaw?/

{ }J(f

^

DrJr,rLEY = 1;4v[s IPv1NE = LQ5 ANCELES

• RfvER5fDE

• SAN DIEGO

• S AN FMNC15CO SANTA BARBAlh * $4hTA CRIO

'\ ,

~

~

SCtlOOL OF ENCIS t.Elt!NC AND 4PPLIED SCIENCE Lo% ANCELES. CALIFOl!NIA 90024 4-

~~

%,C')'

,,,. cw. r..nq '.Z - 10 September 1970

\r.7..

.w .

Q! .

, / ..

s. s . . .. .

. -e . - -

~ Q$; , o l- .*"" '

- ' ~ . ."s

~

- - - .q.2 y. 7o V Dr. Peter A. Morris Division of Reactor Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545 p w Decr Dr. Morris:

Previous requests for permission to possess cdditional 93% enriched U-235 in the

/ form of a new fuel loading for our recctor were based on the proposed final composition of the fuel elements.

(,~

We have now been advised that in order to process these fuel elements, it will be

necessary to provide the manufacturer with 6 kilograms of melt stock. Any meterici

! remaining (over cnd above thct contcined in the finished plates, less en estimated 2% loss during manufacture) would be delivered to UCLA with the fuel elements.

Based on the cbove we need to possess a foral of 10 kilogrcms of 93% enriched U-235 (i.0 kilogrcms now coverec by our R-71 license plus 6.0 kifogrcms recuired to febricate our new loeding).

Our request for Technical Specificetions contcins provision for possession of 10 kilograms of 93% enriched U-235. However, delays in negoticting these Technical Specificctions n. eke it necesscry that we now esk for en cmendment to our existing license in orcer to expedite fabricction of these fuel elements, l

l l '

l Nt;CLE AR ENERGY LABOR ATOR Y THOMAS E. H!CKS. Profes sor an Diree r-l

Dr. Peter A. Morris 15 September 1970 Division of Reactor Licensing Pege Two Enclosed are three official copies of the Application for Amendment to the Facility License R-71 and nineteen additional copies. If there cre.cny cuestions regarding this recuest, please contact Mr. D. N. Jones, Leberetcry Menager (213) 825-2187 Very truly yours, l\ Auc.g l!l*~ *'

o .

Themes E. Hicks Director, Nucleer Energy Lcboratory TEH:ch

Enclosure:

22 copies of cpplicction O

l t

l i

,r -..

e. .. .

.. .J__ W'7C

._ \ . : . m c

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT qi.id'.J

.c . _ .

.~

to the

~. Se .- -t.P .

Fecility License (R-71)

/? ,*

-4' for the .

UCLA Training Receter

(. _

Amencment Recuest Neber 5 1

1 10 September 177:

1 i

l I

L J

We wish to emend sub-paregraph 3B to read:

3B. Pursuant to the Act end Title 10 CFR Chapter I, Part 70, Special Nuclear Meterici, to receive, possess and use up to 4 kilograms of conteined U-235, 32 grams of plutonium in a Pu-Be source, and one grcm of plutonium in the form of foils or wires for the purpose of mcking flux distribution mecsurements, plus 6 kilograms of 93% U-235, required for fabrication of a new fuel loeding (24 bundles and 5 spare bundles; e totcl

.1 of 319 pictes essembled), all for use in connection with the reactor; . . . .

Note: Underlined portion represents the change recuested, b

y

f.m,a. n ..'. . , ,u e  !

.n w f 0- /c/2 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORMA, LOS ANGELES -

. J ...q <

BE7X.ELEY

• DAVIS

• IRVINE * !.05 ANCELES

• PRER5!:E

• SAN DIEGO

• SAN FRANCI5CO h h {. SANTA BAR&AAA

• SANTA CRL7.

%.:287 TM Regulatory F.le i Cy.

OFTICE OF THE CHANCELLOR LOS ANCELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

+ />/

1 February 20, 1970 L

%s 4 \ \**i1ltN// / s

.re . i. . t*T. .t.3 x ,/,

u

- .. _xm..,c1. .

4

.

:1 -:c.n: cirecter for aeactor operations

- FEB 2 41970 > --

Divi:10n of ..eactor Licensing g,. g, g ,g

-w....

r. 4 . e g b..,.,,

.u .. e.. 0-4 C : ..a.. g*/ CO..._4--4cn oo.

L.,. -e-4.vTIC"a 0/~ '-

".72 hingen, D.C. 205h5 0 E G CE" D

%/ 5

. v. . .e.. ., e.,.yw. ,. -.. .

/c6 s,.s ;ia\

~

...g,,..

~. . .- so.

,,- . ie".e' c 4' e1 . .

~-

ow".".=.~~- / ' C.,70,- - . . a"..".=. ". ar e 2= ~~ n

• e <,.. " . .

. .w. o.. .. -..n , . u .. .. e ... < .;e .yc e

.. .. ., u.m.. ..ea.

. . r., --.4

. 4-

., ~ - .e . .u e . . ., . :. . - ..

LO,. -- 4 ,. . 4 c .w.

.. 4 .,. O.

a

. %.. Lr e..,.c

. . . .. c e .y ., O.e Ca.14eA . O .,. 4.E, c 3 ,.C7oc. m. .w 4a- c,.yy ..a.. . . . .

.csC.w.n4 ., e.1 .po n. .e e.dC . u, t.4Ons, *.j, ,...

• rw u - o' Ve.**ed

.d ."6 . b.8.- I..'.*'*a..".'... C' d

. k. . a.

~ . g

. . .e . 4 . 4 " *. e .'**.

• D, '.' .".s .# .s D i', # * ' '

L4 .. .\.e w .o e i .j. . Oc .a w .,_1 4 e-.O.c.4

.. c .. .

.. . w..e 4

. A 4 .. . e 1 2 ..-4 4 . .. . .4 \... .. ...h.,.4... . . ,

4 s ..e .. . .ea .4- .

-w w..a, ,

1.e ,

e

. yCL,

.r.3 , C n w... 1

. .. - . 0,3 Lt 44.Ve..J.),n..... v v%14e.C c . 4. . . . a .sO .e.

A,..y - o. .o. .c ,

~m

..oo , .~e

. n.s -a. .nea, e n.14e.. 4 s<--.n..... a, Ja.:. .

e -

. w. ,. . aC c. 3 0.4.., .. E. U."A . A C .,. c1 .O .,.057. . a.s.. 14......

.. . r. ,s. . . . . . . . ., . . . . .

. .. . . .e. .,. . . .. ,

-a u..

4

...,y.,e 4e.. . . .3. . .. a- 4

. .. u. .. . . , e-

. .  : v .. .. .

..4.

... . . ,, - u.. . , . w

.. .. -~n.

c,.a ~e..,. v^<. .e _e...,, ,. , -...e....a..... _ . . .. . e.

,,4 4. c,.

. . . . .4- ,-  ; ., ., .t -o..,e

.e , Lee. ...s .,-n3

,e....'c...- '^ ^22

.. .s .4 .,. .. e. <,- 4 ,4 .4......m....

, 4 ,. ,

c.-,, 4.n .w ...e Ls.e.e .t ,. . e

. . 4 e .,. ,.,.m.a U.ealth an i Safety.

),

de - _4 c ..ua.1-

. ~- r, =. a. .d c '. .. a. ' e _a * ...a' c.* 4 -' i.. .d

• v.e".. . . ,v

• a.

. y, - . . . ' _ ' ' .

u, .. , s aa u .,. . .. .

.. ,--. . n. .e.e.de ." c.' .=. . .v' -'. .. ~. .~. .'. c ' = . = . ' .. * . c.~ '.- . = = ' . = . ~ ~ . .

. .a.. . . - -

.. ,, e. .?

., . .: a . a --- . -.. , . , , . . a .;

.. : -- a .. 4... . . .

o.

u. 4..,.,...,......-.--.4,,,.

. .. .e .

.w. n. e . . , . . e . . . . a - ---- .e

. . . . . . . . . : .. .y e.2.

.,.a..>...

.. . h. .a.

y.wy.

. 1- . .w. c.a - p a. . .,. : -.

.. .. . . .. ee.. C* *,3.

s; .

• k.. . a.  : .: J, . e ...:- r. . e. ,.:.---.a.

4 ,, 4 ., .,

.v r. g e. a.

. . . . . . go , e. A w..

vg . w.

. e.

v ( ,v e 4.,.4 A. a ~~T*.

..y i a ...  : ..e .t ., . ne . . : .c....

. . a .g

. s,_4.

. . ...- . e a. , . . r., 4

< . . . . .a. .n ,... - y,ee.y. n...a. ..

.; ad .. t .c a . ~.

e

. n. .c..

.s..e 4

.e.

wym o. . . . J. . . . - y.

s . .,. n. .c

..r.e c. .g a. 4 1. 4 . ,e. . . p,.,g g g..g g,gg o . ou ngo.

. . n .

.m s a wg o. A..,

e .a #. .

• t..... . ,. _ . .,.. ,

. . ~ .

s C

&' J*

. .a .a .?.. .?...

. gM ,- ,

.- c....

~w

...n.

. 4 . a.

..a..,c_.. ..

.. , . ./, . ..-

....g*......qs.g.

p p

'*".,,e>,.

M# .

.1#

y /-

/ #p.

• g,

L_

Proposed License UCLA-1 Resecrch Re cter

1. Applicebility:

This licen:e supersedes end recleces License R-71 and its emendments and chenges . It is cpplicable to the UCLA Argonout -type resecrch recctor (hercinefter referred to es "UCLA-1") which is owned by the Regents of the University of Californic, and is located on the ccmpus et Los Angeles, Cclifornie, (hereinefter coiled "the University").

2. Demen:treted Feiformence:

. .By its record in constructing the recctor end opercting it tefely for c i . .

.m:ncia perice c;.10 years, tne Un.iversity .nc: c emenstr tec. .ts i tec.nnice,. en:, g.

cuelificcticns to operate the reacter in occardence with the United 5 teres Atcmic Energy Commissien's reguictions, (hereinafter colled the "Cemmissien"),

and in a manner consistent with the hecith and sofer1 of thee ublic. -- . ._

Therefere, for the purpose of this license ier.e e:1, the University's cuero:ing recero wi i ce accepte , c: :ct. . .is ying tu..e requirements c section .g0.e ,

cf Part 50, of the Commission's regulation:, except fer the restrictions spelled -

ett in this licence.

3. License:

-voicct te :ne cenci ... ens end requirements .ince ;:re e. ne eir., t, e e.. .. ..

n Uriversity here'cy requests the Commi<sion to. license :' cs fe!!cv..

A. Persuant to Section 104: of the Atemic Enerev, Act of -1954 end Title 10, CFR, Chapter i, Pcrt 50, " Licensing cf Froduction ond Utilitotion Facilitic:", to possess end cpercte UC!.A-i es c utiliz: tion fnciliiv c' ti.e designcted iccotion in Los Angele:,

Cclifornie, ir accef t.nce I 'E : precepc-es and limi :tiens described in the opplic ic, cr: this lice re; i B. Fursucnt to the Act end Title 10, CF , Cncpte: 1, Pc- 70, "Special Nuclect tv. :eric!", tc receiv 2, pessess end use v; 10.0 kilegrcms (' .0 kg in the reccier end e: :c d.C kg of fuel in storep for refueling) cf uranium 225, 5'O gre .s of p!utenium, cnd 250 grcms of urcnium 222 for use ir, cenr.acticn wi: Opercticr. cf the reacter or ether resecccb projects; I

t

! C. rursucnt to the s, c: nne . . ,it.e .c, a e-rm u cp'r., rcr' .,

Licensing cf Eyprec.c: l.' et erie!" , te :::s u n .. .c: :: sece c:e such hyproduct r"::cd cI4 :sr"Gy he p'O N c!! C';' :) ere' ion c5 Ihc reLO O' I

I I

l I

L

This license shall be deemed to contain and be subject to the conditions specified in Part 20; in Sections 50.54 end 50.59 of Port 50 and Section 70.32 of Port 70, Title 10, Chepter 1, CFR, and to be subject to all cppliccble provisions of the Act, and to the rules and regulations end orders cf the Commission, now or hereafter in effect, and to the cdditional conditions specified below:

4. C perating Restrictions:

A. Maximum Power Level The University is cuthericed to operate UCLA-1 et power levels (steady-stcte or trcnsic;Tt) up tc 500 kilowetts thermel, so long es the operating and safety limits described in the Technicel Specifications (Appendix A) cre not exceeded.

B. Technical Specificctions The Technical Specifications for opercting UCLA-1 cre contcined in Appendix A. They are part of this license. The University shall operate the fccility in cccordence with the Technice! Specifications end may mcke changes therein only when cuthoriced by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of section 50.59 of Title 10, CFR.

C. Records and Reports The University shcIl meintain records c described in the Technical Specifications.

D. T erm This license is effective c cf the dote cf isscence end she!! ex; sire et midnight , I.'.crch 30, 1950.

.V f~:"

' 3 =' $1

=-.=-..=..

AUG 31 SD I1 I.n Y **

=-

=

Dockat No. 50-142

g. ... . . . . .

==

E;==

v:.====

The Regents of the University .

of California ATTN: Mr. H. V. Brevn (.

Environmental Health and  : .-

~ ~ ~

Safety Officer cur

[...

Departsent of Engineering g._;_...

Los Angeles, California 90024 c=

centlemen: i__:'q: .

Your application of February 20, 1970, requested renewal of Facility Efe~r License No. R-71, authorization to increase the steady state power ..=:=..

level of the UCLA-1 research reactor from 100 kut to 500 kWt, and an .

increase in the quantities and kinds of special nuclear material that ..

you nay receive, possess and use in connection with the operation of .; .;

the reactor. Proposed Technical Specifications for operation of your [6. . .

Argonaut-type research reactor vere also sub=itted.  :...: ..

L:. ;._

On the basis of our preliminary review of your application,we find I~

that we need the following additional infornation to complete our evaluation:

A description of the physical forn of the 250 gra=s of h:::: -

1. E"!=

uranium 233 and the additional 467 gra=s of plutonium requested and a description of the proposed use of this .

caterial. i

3. f-~

2. A supplemental safety analysis report, as described in -

Section 50.34 of 10 CFR Part 50, in support of your request to increase the power level to 500 kWt.

3. A revision of the for=at and content of the proposed .~

Technical Specifications to co= ply with the require-nents of Section 50.36 of 10 CFR Part 50. In this regard, copies of the Technical Specifications for the University of Florida Argonaut-type research reactor and the Ar=y Materials and Mechanics Research Center pool-type reactor are enclosed to provide additional gcJ. dance "

as to the for=at and content desired. Any changes in the  : ::

facility or in the operating limitations as described in the U .

currentiv neereved S M eev A nivri9 Rerert. as 2 -en de d .

that are incorporated into your proposed Technical Specifi- . g . . . ._

~ met >

. . . . . . . .g . .y ...g g. .g.g.g.g.3..g.g..g.g. .g.( . . . .. . 3 l

safety analysis report.l ..

l  !

• = g,q,..

l u.:3 =

f.! ==-

ibMi The Regents of the University. Agt 3 1 1970 f'7

.. =

t =.

of California b..=.. ?-

.=;

?$?

':he above information should be filed as an amendment to your appli- "~Ej) cation with three signed and notarized original copies and nineteen ==.=..

additional copies. In addition, your letter of July 9, 1970, which .f.'."?

requests an increase in the quantity of uranium 235 which the University [:[.I:1 may possess under Facility License No. R-71 to 8.3 kilogra=s, should be E.i" ~..

incorporated in the amendment by reference.  :

If you desire further information or clarification of these requests, T.i please contact Messrs. Dennis L. Zie= ann or James b'. Shapaker. _

==- :

-~

Sincerely.

origi::! : ped hr .

. j, nokt .-..

.=

• i.E Donald J. Skovholt 'n Assistant Director for 9 F-Reacter Operatiens I'6.

Division of Reactor Licensing

~ - -- .- . _ _ . - . . ..

Enclosures:

..m

1. 10 CFR Part 50 '

( 2. Ar=y Materials and Mechanics Research Center Technical Specifications 4., 3. University of Florida Technical .

mg, Specifications i.

.u DISTRIBUTION kPDR i

Docket File DRL Reading 3 ranch Reading 2-d DJSkovholt OGC (2)

CO (2) i O'.Zie: ann L'Shapaker l RFleur -

l RDiggs l

l l

l l

l t

cm:t> ...D. .?.l. n.. .. . . S. . . . ..D..?.l. /,A D' i .....? . . W

. .. s.p' . .! . .g[ ..

L

. .p. '.?.y . ... . . . . . . .

s% / e

• er:bsc- ERFlwrv \ l J'n'Shapaker l DLZiena- - *ckevhclt .

SUp's A WE ..>.' ~. RhT .

/

' ' ' ' I #/~ ' 'D%

wr ,- S V[170.. . . . 8k..h70  ! SibH70 EiWrio . el:7/70 r Qi 4:

....e-a.....,

j form AEC-He Aes 9.R AECM 0240 e i so. s . . .e . .... . .. on.cs l . . _ . . . . . . .

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFOR.NtA, LOS ANGELES DrPIEtry . DAvu . IRvtNE Los ANGELES

• RIVETSCL

• SAN DIEGO * $AN FMNCISCO [h I

Mj-

$1 SANT4 BARSARA * $ANTA CRIZ SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE LOS ANCELES CALIFORNIA 900:4 7 October 1970 Dr. Peter A. Morris Division of Reacter Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Wcshington, D. C. 20545 Docket No. 50-142 File Cy.

Regulatory Dect Dr. Morris:

Enclosed is e revised cpplication for renewcl of license R-71. In cccordance with the letter received from Doncld J. Skovholt, Assistent Directer for Reactor

(' Operations, dated 31 August 1970, we have revised our license end technical specifications to include the additionci information required.

Our request for 250 grcms of uranium 233 hcs been deleted. The recuest for 467 crems of plutonium has been revised to 33 grcms of plutonium, es outlined in the license. We have not included the supplementcl scfety enclysis suggested in the letter of 31 August 1970, es we hcve omitted the recuest to increase the power level to 500 kilowerts.

The technical specificctions (Appendix A) have been revised to conform to the form cnd centent of the technical specificctions prepered for the University of l Floride Argonaut-type research recctor.

The license ene techniccl specifications hcve been reviewed enc cperevec by

he Radiction Use Ccmmittee end :ne Rcdiction Sciety Committee.

N

/s' e rm ' x -

,\x

/

j , s'/ -

-,g j. ,

~; .

,_ \

~ r~~, .

-- u, . .- -

. ~ . _ - -.

Q"

• N -44 , ",,e N

COLI A7 ENERGY LABOR ATORY THOMA$ E. H:CKS. Prof es ser an: Direc --

I 1

i l

l l

l l

l l

l Dr. Peter A. Morris Page two i Division of Reactor Licensing 7 October 1970  ;

l 4

We would appreciate your prornpt ettention to our request for opproval of the enclosed license and technical specifications and look forwcrd to your reply.

If there are further questions, please contcet Mr. D. N. Jones, Laborctory Menager, (213) 825-2157.

Ve7 truly yours, A

k A Ct w &A / 4 CO Thornes E. Hicks, Director Nuclecr Energy Laboretory TEH:ch

Enclosure:

license application a

S

y v n , r , ,- r-i j.,k,t u c,%,

' ' ~

UNITED STATES E

• ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

'. ./ 5

, - ,

• WAST 44NG TON O C. 2050 ff,7{gT Docket No. 50-142 NDY l B D The Regents of the University .

of California Nuclear Energy Laboratory ATTN: Mr. Thomas E. Hicks Director Los Angles, California Gentlemen:

Your letter of October 28, 1974 stated that UCLA was considering methods to reduce their Special Nuclear Material inventory below the- formula quantity specified in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73.

As of this date we have not received a written confirmation that you have reduced your Special Nuclear Material inventory nor have we received a request to review your security plan assuming the inventory was reduced.

You are reminded that your original plan, as submitted, was not acceptable and that you may be in violation of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 73. Noncompliance with the Regulations would require that appropriate enforcement action be taken by us.

Your response is requested within seven days of the receipt of this letter.

Since r,cly , f

,L n '- C<b'/

I I George Lear, Chief

. Operating Reactors Branch #3 Directorate of Licensing

Y

/

f

~%

3 "

P

' .;f A-) '/ .

$ - ; - ct-J .

I'\l\ F.hsl:T OF CAI.lFOliNTA, I.OS A.V:El ES

.k. I

• , . , . . J

, / ,' * <) _ _ -..... __

e. s v g j t . .is; u , s .15

• li ' is E a t*3 s s( rtes - P.:st't:'E **N aO***N e"as- 14 0 ,-( (, . s -Q j  % ' v7 4

• a

-_s s -vi- -g- ( n rZ SC HOOL OF ENC **.E E PINC AND A P TI 1[D (CIENCE I OS A N A LE.S, CA t I F O P';t 4 9002 4 Boelter Hall 2567 March 1, 1979 fir. C. A. Berger, Contracts 3 ranch U.S. Department of Energy San francisco Operations Office 1333 Brcadway Oakland, Cali fornia 94612 Re: Contract EY-76-03-034, P.A. 192

Dear Mr. Berger:

By copy of our letter of flovember 9,1978 to Dr. Rogosa; you were advised o'f our request to DOE for support of the cost of shipping some excess irradiated fuel to the Idaho Cliemical Repro-cessing Plant. The estimated cost of the operation is approximately

$4000, and support was sought under the subject contract.

Mr. D. G. ficIntosh (DOE / SAN) has been helpful in arranging for the physical transfer and shipment. These plans are going fonsard.

Paragraph 3 of our letter to Dr. Rcgosa outlined the basis of -

our request. We have not yet received a response. He are presently f in technical violation of our Slim possession limit, and further ~

delay could invite a Notice of Violation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Your immediate action is now requested. Please call us if you have any questions.

Sincerely, o 1 a

[Ad W (  %(

Ivan Catton, Professor and Director Raray Dhil)'on ' Nuclear Energy Laboratory Contract and Grant Officer (213) 825-0695 (213) 825-2040 IC/li cc: D. G. McIntosh, DOE / SAN

/G. L.' Rogosa, DOE, Division of fluclear Physics R. R. O'Neill, Dean, UCLA/ SEAS C. E. Ashbaugh, UCLA/ SEAS /flEL R. H. Engelken, USNRC, Region V s

gv AN CATTON. Director tJ sit-t v a n FNF R GY f.A RO R ATO R Y

.)

6s k,6:4l) .

IAEA-TECDOC-233 l

! RESEARCHREACTORCORE C0llVERSION FROM THE USE OF IIGHLY ENRICHED llRANRIN TO THE ISE OF LOW ENRICHED URANIIM FUELS GUIDEBOOK PREPARED BY A CONSULTANTS' GROUP, COORDINATED AND EDITED BY THE PHYSICS SECTION INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY I

A TECHNICAL DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENENGY AGENCY, VIENNA,1900

. l Y L. ,? '~

CDerTRIBUTIIBG ORGAlf1ZATIOtBS Atsoome aetteen1 1.aboratery AM. Ualtad 8 tatoo ef Aesrica Ate 4c Etergy Besaareh totab11ebeast Earwell AERE Rareall Daited Elegdom Ceemietba Rectemal de Emersia Ar k en MA Argencias Ceeteaariat a l'$margie Ateedges GA Freer .

Ceepassle Fear l' Etude et la Raa11estime GECA Freece de .sabnet.1hlee Atomiquee tida. Isotitut fEr Raskterforaew EIR Switserland Ge. ,rel Atomic Campany GA Datted States of America General Electric Campsey Beacter Equim Ltd. CBC Omited Kingden laternettomale Ateereaktorbes Ce48 INTERA2WE Federal Republic of Coreamy Jopes Atssic Energy Reemarth Isotituta JAERI Japaa Karsf ot echmagesentre Karlsruhe Gets EFE Federal Republic of Gerassy (fote Calveretty Research Reacter Isetitute EIRE 1 Jopee S. TEM Gehe MERIT Federal Republic of Germany 6 e ta tre tchlec hs 5 t ud toegese 11achalt 60 GAR Anetria fur Atomenetgie The IAEA le gratafal for the contributions webarmared by these etasaisations and thanks their esperte for properias the detailed investigettees med for evalesting med emanarising the reemits presented na this Guidebook.

l l

i SUMARY This Guidebook has been prepared to assist reactor operators and phyuicists in determining both the feasibility of converting their specific reactors from Hell to 1.EU f uel and the option a available for implementation. A wide variety of information is presented on the physics, therusi-hydraulics, and fuels of light water moderated and cooled research and test reactors. Most of the methods discussed in this Guidebook can also be directly applied to the analysis of research reactors containing heavy water as moderator and/or coolant. However, in consideration of the special features of heavy water rasctors, an addendum to this Guidebook la planned to add ess the feasibility of converting these reactors to 1.EU fuel and the options available for implementation.

The following is a brief outline of how the results were obtained, and how this Guidebook can be used most ef fectively.

1. Actions Needed For Conversion From HEU* Fuels to LEU

• Fuela Section 1.5 gives a omry of the type of studies that are needed to prepare for core conversion.

It is possible for these studies to be performed by the reactor operators /

physicists themselves, or with the aid of laboratories which have of fered technical assistance. Appendiz C lists the typical data needed for enrichment reduction conversion studies. Section 1.4.2, Chapter 3, and Appendix H contain inf ormation on the current statuc, development potential, and commercial availa-bili y of fuels with high urania densities. Appendix 1 analyses the main economic aspects of core conversions to 1.EU fuel.

2. Generic Studies Calculations have been performed by different laboratories for two generic

1TR-type reactors with power levels of 2 W and 10 W to determine their potential for conversion. The results are summarised in Section 2 and include the uranium densities that would be required with different fuels and fuel element designs, the corresponding thermal-hydraulic safety margins, and the performance that would be expected f rom the converted core. Detailed inforestion on the methods and procedures used and the results obtained for the various core conversion options are presented in, Appendices A through D.

3. Specific Studies The methods and results of core conversion studies for two specific reactors with power levels of 3.5 W and 50 W, respectively, are provided in Appendix E.

l l

4

_ Benchmark Calculatione In order to compare the accuracy of calculattoa esthods used la the difforent research centers, benchmark problems were defined and calculated with ,

the different methods. The esta core calculations using 935, 453 and 203 '

enrichment ace based on an idealised 6 x 5 element, plate-type core with a power of 10 MW reflected by stagle graphite rows on two sides, and surrounded by water. Reruits of the calculations, includtag cross section data, and descrip-tions of various burnup conditions are summarised la Section 2.4 and described in detail in Appendix F. As a first step la core conversion, it is recommended that reactor operatore/ physicists use their own enthods and codes to calculate this benchmark probles, and to cogare the results.

5. IAEA Assistance The IAEA can be contacted, through official chaansla, to provide assistance f or the core conversion of specific reactors. The IAEA can offer coordinating assistance between reactor organisations and those laboratories in the USA, the FRC, and France which have of fored technical assistance (Section 1.3). If necessary, the IAEA can r.lso preside fellowships to visit those laboratories for jutnt studies on core conversions. The preparation of a second guidebook addressius safety and licenatag issues related to core conversions is planned under the auspices of the IAgA.

• For simplicity, the following definitions have been adopted for this publication:

HEU -

Highly Enriched Ursalue (170 wtg 235g)

MEU - Medium Enriched Uranium ( 45 wtg 215n)

LEU - Law Enriched Uranium (<20 wtg 235g)

REU - Reduced Enriche8 Uranium (tacludes MEU and LgU)

1 e CONTENTS Mejor Ceesider 15 attoe 12 letredacties s inacte RerC s

Seeseen for ..............oever R

ton e 1.3 Assec tee eactor Coev s ........... .................

n Ameistan ae d Labo er tems to LI:U ....................... .....

13.1 hce .ith the Co 1.3.2 Reduced ratortee Ac 11abl ev s e er ions e to P ...............

133 The Reduc e d Enrichment Pr ogr.......rovide

.........c Te he1 cal 13.4 The tedec e d Enrichm ent Progr ee of Franc e ... ....

1.4 The Redeced Enrichmentess of Pro .......

Mete Optio Enrichm gree of the Federal..........

e ent Pr ogram Japse Republ ........

1 4.1 of of Gener a lne AvCo1Leble ev for the United............ic Corne 1.4 2 Noeting DesirTechnicaleretoes States .............

Status of ed Sasia to I. 5 CurteetCriteria ..Achiev.............

e ........

Note Activiti e 151 Near-Teru,Laand........Coev ersi ns ............. .....

........o Char es We dedto Pr ag-Te rn 152 acteriesttee a Feel...............

of epar tion for Technologies .....

I.53 Forfocuse e tC e Typi 1 5.4 Engineettag StalculatioPresentns Perf Conv ormance .. cal ersion 155 Safety Ae Effecta ce U o lyst ad1ee. ......w.ith IEU and LEU ........ ......

I 1 5.6 e

15.7 Ev leationoftilisation a Revisione .............. ..................... .

end Licea . .... .

15.8 Detailed v c Credeal ............steg ... ........... ........

TLee end e hnical Transition le ........... ........... .... I 2 Cost EattenteSpecificattoe esibility Deso ................. 14 21 estra tio n of s . . . . . ........ . . .s .......... ...

14 Oweview Coev erstee ....................... ........ 14 22 ............. Calculattoca ............ ....... 15 S

tudies .......

2 2.1 of Ceeeric 2 .............................. 1$

222 Conver Coev e

ton tudie MW Ra c S e tor Coev .............. ...........

2 2.3 s Re l$

Coev ersion Studie ......

2.3 Studies of ersto s Ben d oe TRICAsed e Studlee Seaed e s os CaramelFue!

a Plate-to IEJ e

. . . .... Type Fuel.

16 1$

to MEU and LED Generic MW10 Fuel ..... .................. 18 2 3.1 Fuel Rea Conv 232 ere'on S .......ctor Coe

........verstes f ........................ 3834 2.3.3 CoCoew eeaos tudie S tudies Saeed o

........ rom NEU s

2.4 nver ion S s Based o s Cleasical Flat............

e-T e TRICA "Senchnert* Cal tudies Rosed o culottoes n Carassel........ FuelFuel . . .. 39. ype Fu

....... 40

............... ........................ $2

.............. ........... $8 60

~

k 1

1

3. Status and Development Fotential of Resear6h and Test Reactor Fuels ......... 71 3.1 Ove rview ............................................................ 71 3.2 Status of Plate-Type Fuel Technology ................................. 71 3.2.1 UAla -Al Fuel ................................... ............. 74 3.2.2 U33 0 -Al Fuel ................................................. 75 3.2.3 U3 Si Fuel .................................................... 75 3.2.4 Samary ......................................................

75 3.3 Status of UZrH Rodaad Fuel Technology ................................ 76 3.3.1 Up to 1.3 U/cm3 (20 wet U) ................................... 76 3.3.2 Up t o 3. 7 U/cm3 (4 5 we t U ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3.4 Status of UO2 Flate-Type Fuel ........................................ 77 3.5 Status of UO2 Rodded Fuel ............................................ 79 APPENDICES APPENDIX A Cei eric Enrichment Reduction Calculations for both Plate-Type and Rod-Type Reactors. AFL (USA) .............. 81 APPENDIX 8 Ceneric Enrichment Reduction Calculations f o r Rod-Ty pa Reactors, CA (USA) .............,,.. ................. 241 APPENDIX C Generic Enrichment Reduction Calculations. INTERATOM (FRC) ........ 287 APPENDIX D Ceneric Enrichment Reduction Calculations. CEA (France) .......... 359 APPENDIX E Methods and Specific Examples f Enrichment Reduction Calculations E-1. CNEA (Argentina) .......................................... 401 E-2. JAERI (Japan) ............................................. 411 APPENDIX F Benchmark Calculations F-0. Specifications ............................................ 44 3 F-1. ANL (USA) ................................................. 447 F-2. INTERATOM ( RC) ........................................... 469 F-3. EIR (Switzerland) ......................................... 485 r-4 5ScAE (Austria) ........................................... 531 F-5. CEA (France) .............................................. $$3 F-te . JAERI (Japan) ............................................. $83 F-7. OlEA (Argentina) .......................................... 609 APPENDIX C Typical Research Reactor Data Needed for Enrichment Reduction Conversion Studies. OSCAE (Austria) .................... 629 APPENDIX H Notes on the Status and Development Potential of Research and Test Reactor Fuela. ANL (USA) ....................... 659 APPENDIX 1 Econoajc Aspects of Reactor Core Conversions 1-1. Classical Plate-Type Fuel. 5SGAE (Austria) ................. 679 I-2. TRIGA Fuel. CA (USA) ...................................... 699 A/PENDIX J List of Participants in the Consultants' Meetings ................ 707

m. - . _. __

l

1. MMOR CONSIDERATIONS IN REACTOR CONVERSIONS

1.1 INTRODUCTION

g i

( .

In the 1950s and 1960s, low power research reactors were built around f f

he world which utilized MTR-type fuel elements containing (20% enriched uranium (LEU). This value was chosen because it was considered to be a limit for weapon usable asterial. However, the densed for higher specific power created a need for greater 235U concentrations and led to the substitution of highly enriched uranium (MEU) in place of the LEU fuel previously utilized. HEU also yielded other benefits including longer core residence time, higher specific reactivity, and somewhat lower cost. HEU then became readily available and was used for high power reactors as well as low power reactors where LEU would have sufficed. The trend toward higher and higher specific power also led to the development of the dispersion type fuels which utilized HEU with a density of about 1.6 - 1.7 g/cm3 In the 1970s, however, concerns were again raised about the proliferation-resistance of fuela and fuel cycles, and since enrichment reduction to less than 20% is internationally recognized to be a ful y adequate isotopic barrier to weapons usability certain Member States have moved to minimize the international

• trade in highly enriched uranium and have established Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Programs. The goal of these programs is to develop the technical means, such as design modificatiene and development of ass fuels,

'to assist in implementing reactor conversions to LEU fuels with minimum penalties.

These programs have been established in the U.S., France, the Federal Republic

' of Germany, and Japan. It is anticipated that through the continued efforts of these programs, and with IAEA coordination, many reactors currently utilizing j fuel element materials and Jesigne less advanced than currently feasible any soon be converted to the use of LEU fuel. For other reactors, whose conversion to the use of LEU fuel any be feasible only af ter significant fuel development, a temporary decrease of the enrichment to an intermediate range of 45Z (MEU) would be a worthwhile improvement in proliferation resistance.

Concern has also been espressed about t.he presence of plutonium in spent fuel, especially when the fuel is irradiated in reactors utilizing very low enrichment and/or operating at high powers, and it is necessary to consider both the plutonium produced and the enriched uranium in the overall assessment of the

roliferation potential of a particular reactor.

O 1.2 REASONS FOR REACTOR CONVERSIONS TO LEU Operators sf research and test reactors that use highly enriched uranium ,

I asy consider converting their reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuels '

for several closely related reasons. One could be the desire to reduce the proliferation potential of resesrch reactor fuels. A second reason could be a desire to increase the assurance of continued fuel availability in the face of probable restrictions on the supply of highly enriched uranium. A third reason could be the possible reduction in requirements for physical security measures during f abrication, transportation, storage, and use. All these reasons are connected with each other and cannot be considered individually.

L The Reduced Enrichment Proatas of the United States The U.S. Reduced Enrichement Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) Program

des s ix interacting technical elements. These are illustrated in Fig. 1-1 n* 1e u r t bed be low.

..).4.1 Evaluation of HEU Export Requests This activity provides the U.S. Executive Branch with a technical evalua-

! ! 'n of every significant request for export of highly enriched uranium (HEU).

The technical and economic justification of need for HEU subeltted with

' W h Export License Application is reviewed by the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and .i short lead-time technical evaluation is perfomed for the specific reactor (s) for which the application is made. Each evaluation addresses the potential of the reactor (s) for conversion to reduced enrichment fuel and provides the E secutive Branch with a technical analysis of the tradeoff s among experiment n rf o rmance, core lifetime, econceles and licensing issues.

1.3.4.2 Generic Reactor Analysis and Design This activity provides generic core analysis and design (physics, safety, thermal-hydrauliss, st ructures and fuels) and reactor-f acility analysis and design (heat rejection, hydraulics) stuJies of the major types (U, U 38 0 . or al,/H;0, U-ZrH/H 20, UO 2/H20 and U-A1/0 0) 2 of research and test reactors with red x ed enrichment. Performance and fuel cycle cost lep11 cations, and the probicos associated with plutonius production and fuel supply, are addressed.

For each reactor type, in-depth redesign studies are undertaken for representa-tive existing reactors to evaluate the potential for coeverting them f rom the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel to the use of reduced uranius enrichment.

'n-depth design studies are performed also for new research and test reactors in the design phase, to evaluate reshaced-enrichment fuel alternatives. Collabo ra-tive studies with personnel from the reactor projects involved are carried out as appropriate.

I 1.3.4.'J Specific Reactor Technical Support This activity is structured to expedite application of reduced enrich-ment replacement fuel to specific foreign and domestic reactors by providing technical support to the fuel element engineering design, component design, p r ocu reme nt specification preparation, and safety analysis revisions necessary to initiate fuel procurement. Wherever possible, the support work is carried out in close cooperation with the affected reactor operating organisation and f uel sanuf acturers. If appropriate and contributory to expediting priority applications, drawings and other documents supporting the procurement specifica-tions nay also be provided by ANL to the reactor operating organisation.

Tech,1 cal support during procurement negotiations and fuel fabrication are l pro vi ded by ANL, if necessary.

1.3.4.4 Fuel Development This activity is a long-term fuel development effort intended to yield f.ibrication techniques for research and test reactor fuels of high uranium density. The fuel development activity consists of four parallel fuel develop-3e n t etforts. Three of these ef forts are concerned with development of plate-t y pe tJAl,-Al fuel elements, plate-type U33 0 -Al fuel elements, and rod-type

.-ZrH, (TRICA) fuel elements with uranium loadings such greater than those l currently available. These three ef forts are further developments of fuels that i are now utilfred in research and test reactors. The fourth ef fort is the deve lopme nt of new research and test reactor fuels (such as U 51, 3 U-Mo, UO2 )

' b.a t accommodate very high uranium loadings beyond the development potential of c e rent fuels.

7

e e g -

IM i

i in s-i 3-

.I 8

I 3 8 22 ~.

,; 9 g w" 12 8 g 3") -

g 3 !T I

!.  !. 7i= , .~ .

-2 I = ,- -

ts ,-

. . =- ts - s- y a

l 3

e l Ii

a j

ti II n 'l n

g

,5 i jE i g-l l T l g I 6 g ' * - * *

• _ a e o e a .e e e _a  ; a K

si.

I a s e a s . ..

a a =g. 4 :iig-

. i. i. .

$ e e

5 mi e

e 1

• e 3

• I I I I l  !

' W-s s-g ~

~

I :. g-2gm m

- m e

i

- 3 i

' ,g -

3:.

)

.  :  : 3 j 3-  : e3 i

jf -?-- . l -

j)a ir ~

-l 1 3 1

t . i 3 2 ' I I I I l v

Jt .'

i J.1

• - - 9 m

. . - - - r - ,6 . m.

' ' 34 4 2" ja " AJ I

.  !,} 2 l i

jj = jj si -

g}

= .

,e

,3

_a

} J -j

-. s

• ' l I I I I 5 I ._jal.-. e 3 .

, t y 8 l w. l e  ; e i , e

,- . . e I I 8 8 8 8 I i 0 - I l J 8 0 - 8 I IE I

_ g[ .i 8

O

,), 0 O

e i I .

. ,I es 4

• a a l ~=*

7

=

l I=

, .i 5 I

8 i

l

1.3.4.5 Fuel Demonstration The objective of this activity is to demonstrate to the users and operators

.of research ano test reactors that the operation of such reactors with reduced uranium enrichment fuels meets all the required criteria of reliability, performance, safety, core lifetime, and economica. The fuel demonstration activity inc;udes three types of tests. The first test type consists in irradiating in a high-flux f acility some elements of each relevent fuel type beyond their normal life burnup limit, and in verifying the ability of the fuel to stand such a test .

sith acceptable metallurgical performance. The second test type consists of a whole core demonstration in a reactor in which detailed physics measurements can be made to assess any change in the physics and safety characteristics of the i core. The third test type consists of a whole-core demonstration in a reactor l In which the burnup rate is suf ficient to adequately study the physics / safety characteristics of the core throughout the entire fuel cyc.le. The fuel demonstra-tion activity includes the planning of the tests, the procuremer.t of the fuel elements / cores for the tests, the performance of the irradiations and cxperi-ments, post irradiation examinations, and analysis of data.

1.3.4.6 Fuel Commercialization This activity is to provide the technical support to ensure that the fuel needed for the operation of all research and test reactors which can operate with reduced-enrichment fuel can become commercially available, on a worldwide basis, and without the need for significant government financial support. This part of the program includes: (1) identification of the potential commercial domestic and foreign suppliers of reduced enrichment fuel for research and test reactors,' (2) evaluation of their fabrication processes and capabilities, and (3) technical support and implementation for the transfer of technologies, wherever such transfer is appropriate and may contribute to the commercialization goa l.

1.4 MAIN OPTIONS AVAILABLE FOR CONVERSION 1.4.1 General Technical Basis to Achieve Conversions Meeting Desired CriterIs In assessing the practical feasibility of utilising lower enriched fuel in existing research reactors, the agreed criteria are that the safety margins l

and fuel reliability should not be lower than for the current design based on highly enriched uranium, major reactor modifications should not be required, and that preferably neither any loss in the overall reactor performance (e.g.,

flux per-unit power) nor any increase in operation costs should be more than ma rginal. It is also recognized that the feasibility of reduced-enrichment use in each specific reactor must be objectively assessed on an individual basis taking into account all technical, programmatic, economic and licensing factors.

However, it should be noted that there are specific applications requiring high flux reactor operation that can only be met with high enrichment fuel.

Enrichment reduction by simple substitution of lower enriched uranium in existing fuel designs has the immediate ef fect of reducing core performance and cannot meet the above criteria. Core reactivity is decreased, and therefore fuel burnup capability is decreased and fuel costs are increased, and/or core size is increased and therefore flux per-unit power performance is decreased.

Enrichment reductions are feasible for most research and test reactor designs when the 2350 content in the fuel element can be kept approximately the same while the enrichment is decreased, or when it is increased, so that the reactivity loss due to the greater 238U content is compensated to provide adequate lif etime.

9

,w , , ,--e--v----. , , . ,,---,--..m.---------,.------,---n- - , - - - . ,, , , - ,,.--,_,,--.,,--,-.,-----,-----,-----..-------n- - - -

Matching 235U content (i.e., maintaining the same 235g v,13ht in each fuel element) would result in in core flux per-unit power perforr.ance coeparable to that of the unmodified reactor but, because of the poisoning effect of 238U , would generally result in lower reactivity and reduced burnup potential. Burnu potential can be matched to that of the unmodified reactor by increasingthe23gUcontent in the reduced enrichment core by some amount over that of the 93% enriched case at the expense of some decrease in in-core thermal-flux per unit power performance. The importance of these flux ef fects is dependent on the particular reactor, the type of application, and conversion scheme '

adopted. For example, thermal flux decreases in the reflector and in flux traps are generally much less than in-core. Another possibility is to reduce costs by increasing the fuel cycle length. This could be accomplished by further increas-ing the 235U content.

The increase of the overall uranium content per fuel element can be achieved by increaming the volume fraction of the fuel meat and/or by increasing the uranium concentration in the fuel meat.

Increasing the volume fraction of the fuel meat normally requires redesign of the fuel element. Three options are open: decreasing the clad thickness, decreasing the coolant voluwe fraction and/or decreasing the number of plates per element. The achievable reduction in the clad thickness may be limited by the minimum thickness needed for fission product retention. The achievable reduction in the coolant volume fraction may be limited by the need to avoid excessive pressure drop in the core and by the need to adequately moderate the neutron flux in the core. Otherwise the excess reactivity and cycle length would be significantly reduced. The reduction in the number of plates may be limited by the minimum heat transfer surface neaded to prevent onset of nucleate boiling at a given reactor power.

These limitations may make it difficult to significantly increase the fuel meat volume f raction in some high performance reactors that are designed very close to their thermal-hydraulic limit. In a majority of the research and test reactors in operation, however, and especially in those of low power, the volume f raction of U.e fuel meat can be increased above current values. Some-times, a practicable way seems to consist in increasing the fuel meat thickness and coolant channel width by the same fraction, thereby reducing the number of fuel plates correspondingly. This is illustrated in Section 2 in more detail.

Increasing the uranium concentration in the fuel meat without changing the meat thickness has only negligible effects on the thersel-hydraulics pro-perties of the core, and, therefore, it does not normally require redesign of the fuel element. (Only in some very rare cases might it be desirable to increase the coolant volume fraction to balance the hardening of the neutron

,p,ctrum caused by the increased uranium content). The only limitation to this approach is posed by the highest uranium concentration feasible with the most advanced fuel fabrication technology. This approach can be immediately applied to all those research and test reactors in which the uranium density in the fuel meat is less than currently qualified technology allows. Its application in reactors which already use the most advaaced currently qualified fuel fabrica-tion technology requires development of new fabrication techniques y191 ding even greater uranium densities in the fuel meat. Development of the new fabrication techniques is currently underway in the U.S. RERTR Program, in the French Reduced Enrichment Program, in the Reduced Enrichment Program of the Federal Republic of Germany, and also at the CNEA in Argentina, but it is anticipated that the desired fuel properties will be achieved only af ter several years.

For the rod-type UZrHx fuel, enrichment reduction is achieved by an increase in the uranium concentration in UZrH z alloy. The geometry of the fuel elements remain identical to the highly enriched version replaced.

1 i0

~~~~

The main properties cf the currently qualified fuels and the status and  :

development potential of tha new fuels are summarized in the next section. More detailed information on the fuel development programs is provided in Section 3.

1.4.2 Status of Current. Near-Tern, and Long-Tern Fuel Technologies Fuel seat materials currently qualified for use in research reactors are:

V (1) U-Al Alloy, with uranium densities up to 1.1 g/cm3 .

(2) UA1x-Al Dispersions, with uranium denalties up to 1.7 g/cm3.

(3) U30 8-Al Dispersions, with uranium densities up to 1.7 g/cm3 .

(4) U-ZrHz, with uranium dersities up to 1.3 g/cm3 .

Excellent burnup experience has been acquired on these fuels, albeit with uranium enrichment frequently greater than 20%. . e enrichment is net expected to affect in any significant manner metallurgical performance of the fuel, and tests already in progress are anticipated to prove conclusively that the experience gathered with these fuels does not depend on the fuel enrictment.

(5) U02 with density of 9.1 g U/cm 3 is currently used with rod cluster geometry. This fuel is qualified with plate-type geometry (Caramel) in low and medium power range and is under demonstration for high power reactors.

A high potential exists for increasing the maximum loading of many of these fuel types significantly above currently qualified values. In addition, greater uranium loadings can be achieved through the development of new fuel types, such as U 3Si and U-Mo. An ovarview of the development potential of the various fuel types is provided in Table 1-1, and the anticipated dates of commercial availability of suitably qualified fuels are given in Table 1-2.

1.5 MAIN ACTIVITIES NE.',DED IN FREPARATION FOR A TYPICAL CONVERSION Several technical activities must be accomplished before a reactor conversion from the use of HEU fuel to the use of LEU fuel can be physically implemented. Because of their nature, a few of these activities are the exclu-sive responsibility of the organization to which the reactor to be converted belongs. Most of the activities may be shared, however, to a greater or lesser extent, with other organizations equipped with the needed expertise, resources, and willingness to assist in the conversion process. It is especially in this connection that the various national reduced enrichment pro,e, rams can provide conversion assistance to the research and test reactor community, through IAEA coordination.

1.5.1 Characterization of Present Performance Identification of key characteristics of reactor performance with the fuels currently utilized must be made. This, of course, must be responsibility of the reactor organization. This information is needed to identify any unique characteristics and special requirements of the reactur, and to establish a reference against which calculations with reduced enrichment may be compared.

Needed information would include, for instance, the power distribution in the core, the neutron spectrue, the temperature coefficients of reactivity, the centrol rod worths, the thermal-hydraulic margins, the core lifetime, etc. Much of this information may be already available; however, collection and organiza-tion of the data in a form suitable for the intended purpose may be needed. In addition, experimental determinations may be needed in those cases in which the data are not available. Appendix C summarizes the reactor data normally neede?

as a basis for reduced enrichment conversion studies.

Il a

Table 1-2. Anticipated Dates of Commercial Availability of Suitably-Qualified REU Fuels Uranium C netty Meat Thickness Date of Fuel System an Availability m/cm3 UA1x -Al 2.6 0.5 - 1.5 1983 U 380 -Al 3.0 0.5 - 1.5 1983 3.2 - 3.5 0.5 - 1.5 1985 UO2 plates 9.1 >1.4 1980 4.5 1.2 1983 UO2 -rods 9.1 8.2* 1980

. U-ZrH x 3.7 13.7* 1980 U 3 Si-Al 4-8 0.5 - 0.8 1986

• Rod Disas ter.

1. 5. 2 Performance Calculations with MEU and 1.EU Before the conversion to reduced enrichment is studied in detail, the priority of design criteria for the conversion has to be specified. Possibi..-

ties include: minimum reactor core modification, minismre changes in operational characteristics and neutron flux values, minimum licensing problems, minimum fuel cycle coste, reoptimization for highest perforasnee under certain boundary conditions (given maximum flow or power).

When the target is specified, the dif ferent options available should be compared which allow enrichment reduction to 20% or less. If no option satisfies the requirements, 451 enrichment would be considered.

This study will generally require calculations of the neutronic and thermal-hydraulic performance of the reactor with some parameter variations.

The reactor data discussed in Section 1.5.1 must be calculated for the design variations considered to accompany the fuel enrictment change. Neutronics considerations include composition and thickness of the fuel aset, clad thickness, number of plates or rode per element, core size, fuel management strategy, etc.

13

Tile STATUS AND DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF RESEARCH AND TEST REACTOR F The concern about the proliferation potential of HEU fuels and about anticipated restrictions on HEU supplies has stimisted development programs on fuels with higher uranium content which would allow the use of uranium of lower enrichment. Fuel development programs are underway in the U.S., Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Cernany, Japan, and Argentina. a The fundamental objective of these fuel development programs is to develop existing and new research and test reactor fuels of both plate-type and rod-type to their maximum feasible uranius loading, with the intent of 1:nproving l the performance of reduced-enrichment reactors.

H.1 PLATE-TvPE FUELS A variety of fuel element asterials are under development for plate-type fuels. Some of these materials correspond to extensions of asterials which are in current use, while others are entirely new. The enrichment reductfon poten v It is evident f roin the tial of the current and new fuels are shown in Table Hl. reduc- f table that extensions of currently utilized fuels will permit enrichment tions to <20% enriched fuel in low and high power rese rch and test reactors, but that only the new fuels will permit such reJue: ions for very high power reactors. J It is also evident f rom the table that enrichment reduction to <20% for low power reactors fuels could be accomplished with existing technology.

I In the fellowf == rections, the presently utilized fuels and the new o uranium content and performance, and the limits l fuels are characteri ~ _. fuels for plate-type reactors are estimated.

of uranium loading o.

O Table Pfl. Uranium Density and Enrichment Reduction Fotential of Candidate Feels for Researea and Test Reactors with Plate-Type Fuels Current /Near-Ters/Long-Ters Current Near-Ters Long-Term Enrichment Reduction Fotential,Z Uranium Uranium Uranfue Leading, Low-Fawer Nigh-Power Very Nigh-Fower N Leading, Leading, Reactors g/cm3 g/cm3 E4acters Reactors Fuel Type 3/cm3 70/45/45 93 1.6 CO j

U-Al Alloy 1.1 1.3 ~

C0 45'20/20 13/45/45 Y 1.7 2.2-2.6 2.6-2.8 l UA1,-Al ~ 73/45/45 2.2-3.3 3.3-3.8 C0 45/20/20 U3 0g-Al 1.7 00b

- C0 00 UO2 Caramel 9.la -

93/45/20

', - 4.2-1.0 7.0-8.0 00 93/20/20 U3 si-Al 93/93/20 93/93/20

- - -11 00 U3 51 (bulk) j The deaefty of the 2

a8.7 if the sircaloy spacera are smeared withis the f2e1 seat.

UO2 is 10.3 g/ce3 .

bror vety high power reactors, UO2 would have to he fa%eicated la very this secticua to provide proper heat reaeval.

I.

- _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - - --vr-- W r--

1

! B-2 4

i INTRODUETION General Atomic Company has developed ' shroud' e d 4-rod and 16-rod clusters

]

utilizing the TRIGA low-enriched uranium zirconium hydride (UZrH) fuel for use in converting and upgrading existing MTR plate-type reactors and also for J

fueling new TRIGA reactors. The use of low-enriched uranium is in keeping .

( with non proliferation policies and is readily exportable. The 4-rod cluster l

is designed to operate at power levels up to 3 MW and the 16-rod cluster is

designed for power levels up to 10 MW in existing reactor core structures.

j Both types of clusters use fuel-moderator rods which contain the well proven UZrH fuel in an incoloy cladding. The rod diameter in the 4-rod cluster <

(3 24 cm) is only slightly smaller than that used in standard TRICA fuel for

! more than 20 years. The 16-rod cluster uses a rod of 1.295 cm diameter and is identical in design to the fuel rods used in the 14 MW TRIGA now in operation at the Romanian Institute for Nuclear Technology. The fuel alloy used in the 4-rod cluster contains 20 wt-% uranium and in the 16-rod cluster 45 wt-t uranium. This provides a very high U-235 content with low enrichmert. i.e.,

440 grams u-235 in the 4-rod cluster and 880 grams U-235 in the 16-rod cluster.

A small amount of erbium is included as a burnable poison and is a major J contributor to the pronet negative temperature coefficient', the dominant safety feature of the TRIGA fuel. The high uranium loading combined with the burnable poison result in a very long burnup lifetime and favorable fuel cycle economics.

l j This Appendix is divided irto two parts: B.1, which describes a 2 MW reactor

! using the 4-rod cluster and 8.2, which describes a 10 MW reactor using the l

16-rod cluster.

I l

i l =

l l

i 242 L i

8-12 4.5 PROMPT NEGATIVE TEMPERATURE C0 EFFICIENT The basic parameter which provides the great degree of safety in the operation of a TRIGA reactor system is the prompt negative temperature coefficient. This temperature coefficient (m) allows great freedom in steady-state operation, since the effect of accidental reactivity changes occurring from experimental devices in the core is minimized.

The prompt negative temperature coefficient for the TRIGA-LEU core is *,;;;d on the same core spectrum hardening characteristic that occurs-in a standard

• TRIGA core. The spectrum hardening is caused by heating of the fuel-moderator elements. The rise in temperature of the hydride increases the probability that a thermal neutron in the fuel element will t

gain energy from an er. cited state of an oscillating hydrogen atom in the lattice. As the neutrons gain energy from the ZrH, the thermal neutron spectrum in the fuel element shifts to a higher average energy (the spectrum is hardened), and the mean free path for neutrons in the element is in-creased appreciably. For a standard TRIGA element, the average chord length is comparable to a mean free path, and the probability of escape from the el. ment before bel.eg captured is significantly increased as the fuel temperature is raised. In the water the neutrons are rapidly re-thermalized so that the capture and escape probabilities are relatively insensitive to the energy with which the neutron enters the water. The i heating of the oderator mixed with the fuel in a standard TRIGA element th : n us.. the spectrum to harden more in the fuel than in the water. As a result, there is a temperature-dependent disadvantage factor for the unit cell in which the ratio of absorptions in the fuel to total cell ab-sorptions decreases as fuel element temperature is increased. This brings about a shift in the core neutron balance, giving a loss of reactivity.

In the 4-rod cluster TRIGA-LEU fuel, the temperature-hardened spectrum is used to decrease reactivity through its interaction with a low-energy resonance material. Thus, erblum, with its double resonance at s0.5 ev, is used in the TRIGA-LEU fuel both as a burnable polsion and as a material ,

to enhance the prompt negative temperature coefficient. The ratio of the )

absorption probability to the neutron leakage probability is in:reased for the 4-rod cluster TRIGA-LEU fuel relative to the standard TRIGA fuel because the U-235 density in the fuel rod is about 2 5 times greater and also because of the use of erblum. When the fuel-moderator material is heated, the neutron spectrum is hardened, and the neutrons have an increasing probability of being captured by the low-energy resonances in erbium.

This increased parasitic absorption with temperature causes the reactivity to decrease as the fuel temperature increases. The neutron spectrum shift, pushing more of the thermal neutrons into the Er-167 resonance as the fuel temperature increases, is illustrated in Fig. 3 where cold and hot neutron spectra are plotted along with the energy dependent absorption cross section for ER-167 As with a standard TRIGA core, the temperature coefficient is ,

prompt because the fuel is intimately mixed with a large portlun of the i

moderator; thus, fuel and solid moderator temperatures rise stanultaneously, producing the temparature-dependent. spectrum shift.

• A standard TRIGA core conta1ns U-ZrH fuel with no orbium. The uranium enrichment is 20%, and the fuel element (rod) diameter is about 3.8 cm (1.5 in.) with a core water volume fraction of about 0.33 252

. ._ _ _. - -- - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - - _ - . - - _ . _ - _ . . _ _ . . . .. - - _ - __ _ - _ . -