ML20064N849
| ML20064N849 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000142 |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1982 |
| From: | Hirsch D COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064N821 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8209130011 | |
| Download: ML20064N849 (119) | |
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DOCKETED UNITED STATES CF AMEP.ICA USNRC NUCLEAR REGUIA'ICRY COMMISSICN BEFORE THE A'IUMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING EOARD '82 SEP -9 P',
1 In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 OL cn n or:EcRET
' ~ s & SEF?
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THE REGENTS CF THE UNIVERSITY (Proposed Renewal of D CF CALIFORNIA Facility License)
(UCLA Research Reactor)
CBG MOTICN FOR 9UMMARY DISPOSITION AS TO CCNTENTION XVII (Seismic)
I. THE MOTION Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.749 arxi the Boani's Order of July 26, 1982, the Committee to Bridge the Gap (CBG) respectfully moves the Atomic Safety and Licensin6 Board for partial summary disposition as to Contention XVII.
The conts tion asserts that the site characteristics of the UCLA reactor are unsuitable in that the reactor is located in a seismically active area, that the existence of three stories of classrooms and offices supported by relatively thin columns above the reactor (added on after the reactor buildind was completed) create the possibility of the entire structure collapsing onto the reactor core, and that the core itself could be crushed and otherwise damaged were the maximum credible earthquake possible at the site to occur, an event which could release fission products to the environment.
Because of admissions by both the Applicant and the NRC Staff as to the above matters and assertions that neither party intends to present affirmative evidenes to the contrary, CBG respectfully 8209130011 820907 PDR ADOCK 05000142 G PDR
- )S 03
/
. moves for summary disposition thereon, to which it is entitled as a matt.er of law, as no genuine dispute exists.
CBC will demonstrate, infra, that there is no dispute as to the following material facts: that the reactor is located in one of the most seismically active regions of the country; that it lies in the path of at least one active earthquake fault; that it is within 2 miles of the Newport-Inglewood Fault which was responsible for the worst earthquake in Los Angeles County in historical times and which is currently viewed as capable of a 7 5 magnitude quake with an annual probability of occurrence of .1%; that it is within 1 mile of the Santa Monica Fault which is also estimated as capable of a 7 5 magnitude earthquake; that it could also be affected by the southern San Andreas Fault along which an 8.3 magnitude earthquake has an accepted probability of occurrence of between 2 and 5%
annually; that a major earthquake could bring down the several-story structure that has been added atop the reactor building; that a major earthquake could thus crush the reactor core and break apart the fuel; that this core-crushing could occur from lateral accelerations even without the above structure collapsing; that severe mechanical damage to the fuel could result and fission products escape; and that a major earthquake could cause the Stone Canyon Dam just north of the reactor site to fail and flood the reactor room and cause fission products to escape.
Furthermore, that neither Staff nor Applicant has done a detailed seismic analysis of the area nor a detailed structural analysis of the reactor structure and related buildings, both assuming in their respective safety
- , analyses the capability of a severe earthquake causing severe damage to the i
reactor core.
l I I I
i
CBG perceives that, although no dispute exists as to the seismic ,
I activity of the site and the capability of a major earthquake causing severe damage to the reactor core with attendant release of fission products, a factual dispute does exist as to the magnitude and acceptability of the attendant radioactive release. Therefore, this latter matter is not appropriate for summary disposition and CBG requests herein only partial summary disposition, to wit: that there is no dispute about the seismic vulnerahtlity of the reactor, but that dispute roamins as to the magnitude and acceptability of the attendant fission product release.
II. DISCUSSION Because there appears no dispute about these matters, the following discussion will be brief. The NRC Staff in its SF"i has chosen as its design basis accident an earthquake which cavaes disruption of the reactor core and breaking apart of the reactor fuel, resulting in off-site releases Y
of fission products. The Applicant has likewise in its revised SAR W
assumed an earthquake is capable of such damage and has further conceded the potential for subsequent flooding of the reactor room because of the earthquake and release of radiatioactivity into the floodwaters.
Furthermore, Applicant at the June 30, 1982, prehearing conference (transcript sections formerly M camera, released for public disclosure by Boarti Order of August 26,1982) stated that it "would stipulate" that an earthquake could bring down the structure above the reactor and crush the core. 'Ihere thus appears to be no dispute except as g SER, 2-6, 14-8 M Application, III/8-3 to 8-5 g id, III/8-5 i
to how many Curies of radioactivity could be released due to such an event and what the doses would be to personnel and the public at 'various distances from the reactor.
- 1. %e reactor is in a seismically active region.--Application, page III/3-1 states: " Southern California is seismically active. . . .In Southern California, the region from the Mohave Desert to bayond the off-shore islands is traversed by a series of active faults. These faults extend from 20 to 50 to many hundreds of miles in length. * *
- Earthquakes have occurred in California for a long time in the geologic past, ani it is extremely probable that they will recur from time-to-time in the future."
Staff's SER says at page 2-6, " Southern California is criss-crossed with geologic faults."
- 2. he UCLA reactor / i the nath of at least one active earthauake fault.-SER, page 2-6, states: "...it is recognized that the UCLA campus may be in the path of an active seismic fault.. "
- 3. %e UCLA reactor is within two miles of the Newport-Inglewood Fault.-
Application, as amended, page III/3-1, "The nearest major fault to the reactor site is the Inglewood fault running in a north-westerly direction about two miles east of the campus." Note that the Fault may be closer than two miles and that there is uncertainty as to where it ends:
as the Application indicates, it appears to be headed westerly towards campus at its last certain location. (see California Division of Mines Geology nap, attached, of the Beverly Hills Quadrangle Special Studies Zones also Newport-Inglewood Zone map, showing the fault zone further to the west, and TID-25363 by USGS for AEC)
4 The Newport-Inglewood Fault was responsible for the Long Beach Earthquake of 1933. -- California Division of Eines and Geology, "A Review of the Geology and Earthquake History of the Newport-Inglewood Structural Zone", abstract and map attached.>
5 %e Newport - Inglewood Fault is capable of an earthouake of 7.5 magnitude on the Richter Scale.-Page III/8-3 of Application:
FEMA report, sutra, p.15
- 6. The current probability of occurrence of a 7. 5 magnitude earthauake_
along the Newport-Inglewood Fault is at least .1% annually, or a one in 'ifty chance during the proposed twenty-year license period.--
PageIII/8-3ofApplication. Note that there is a greater protability than .1% annually that one or more riamaging earthquakes of somewhat smaller magnitude than the postulated 7.5 quake will occur along the Newport-Inglewood fault. FEFA report, supra, p.15
- 7. The Santa Monica Fault Zone is within one mile of the UCLA reactor.--
Map of the Newport-Inglewood Structural Zone and Other Structural Features of the los Angeles Area, Southern California, by the California Division of Mines and Geology. Note that UCLA sits on the upper plate of the Santa Monica Fault and is quite close to where the Newport-Inglewood Fault Zone and the Santa Monica Fault Zone are believed to intersect.
(SeealsoTID-25363)
- 8. _he Santa Monica Fault Zone is capable of a 7.5 magnitude earthquake The document cited by Applicant at page III/8-3, Maximum Credible Rock Acceleration from Earthquakes in California, by Roger Greensfelder, California Division of Mines and Geology, gives the capability as 7}.
l i
- 9. The reactor could also be affected by_ an earthquake along the southern San Andreas Fault, which has a capacity of 8.3 magnitude with a probability of occurrence of bstween 2 and 96 annually, or greater than 50% over the next thirty years. "An Assessment of the Consequences and Preparations for a Catastrophic California Earthquake Findings and Actions Taken" Federal Emergency Manag sment Agency, November 1980, page 17
- 10. A major earthquake could bring down the several-story structure built atop the reactor building and crush the reactor core.-Applicant's counsel indicated on the record of the pre-hearing conference that he "would stipulate" to this matter. Furthermore, Applicant's interrogatory answers indicate it has no information as to the strength of the supporting columns or other aspects of the structure to indicate otherwise, and that the original seismic specifications or design criteria for the buildings, as well as the drawings of bnWing modifications, have either not been retained or have been lost. In absence of a structural analysis to the contrary, Applicant and Staff have rightly assumed in their safety analyses such damage can occur. Application page III/8-3 and 8-4 also SER 14-8.
l
- 11. Mechanical damage to the fuel (i.e. breaks in- the' cladding and fuel meat) could result from core-crushing.--SER, p. 14-10 l
- 12. Core-crushing could result from lateral accelerations in an earthquake, with or without the above structures collapsing. " Fuel Temperatures in an Argonaut Reactor Core Following a Hypothetical Design Basis Accident" by G.E. Cort of LANL, NUREG/CR-2198, p. 2 l
l 4[ Applicant's 5/20/81 interrogatory answers, attached.
l Note the virtually complete lack of information possessed by Applicant as to l the seismic chancteristics of its site and structures.
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< j 13. Mechanical damage to the fuel resulting from an earthquake could result i
in fission products escaping to the environment.- SER P.14-8, "...it is i postulated that there could be severe mechanical da==Se to the fuel from i
the collapsing superstructure and a significant release of fission products."
l 14. It is conceivable that subseauent floodiu of the reactor room could occur as the result of earthauske-induced failure of the Stone Canyon l
i Reservoir which is positioned in the hills to the north of the UCIA campus.--
ThisisadirectquotefromtheApplication,pageIII/8-5.
i
- 15. subseauent floodina of the reactor could result in the disnersion of l
j fission product releases in the flood water.-This is al< o a direct quotefromApplicationpageIII/8-5.
i j 16 Neither Staff nar Applicant has done a detailed seismic analysis of i
! the reactor site nar a detailed structural analysis of the reactor structure i
j and related_ buildings as to how they would respond to notential earthauakes i
j (i.e.. ability to withstand various resnonse snectra without sufferim displacement).-SER, page 2-6,* Application, III/8-3 ("a detailed seismic analysis is not warranted").
}
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- 17. BLrthauake-induced fission product release could cause doses in unrestricted i
areas of at least 10 Rem to the thyroid.--SER p. 14-10 concludes that the j doses would be 30 Rem to the thyroid, the Battelle Study (p. 26 and 48) i
- referenced in the Application and relied upon by Staff suggest a higher figure.
1 .
There appears no dispute the figure could be as high as 10 R, the only i dispute is how much higher, a matter to be resolved at hearing.
f/ See also the study referenced in the Application, portions attached, i that give astonishingly high annual probability figures for a major earthquake
! capable of destroying the dam and flooding the reactor. Ayyaswamy, et al, l Estimates of the Risks Associated with Dam Failure, performed for USAEC.
_ __ _ . _ _ ~
i e
8 l
- 18. The Uniform Building Code according to which the reactor structure !
l and the h2ilding above it were built had no provisions for reactors and has since been substantially strengtheneds and buildings built to UBC
_ standards have failed in relatively moderate earthauakes. (Plotkin declaration)
The detailed evidence supporting these undisputed material facts is found in the documents attached, consisting of the declaration of Dr. Sheldon C. Plotkin, a safety engineer specializing in accident analysis; numerous official documents from the government agencies within whose responsibilies and competence seisaic and geological matters fall and Staff and Applicant documents.
III. CONCLUSION Sere is no dispute that the UCLA reactor is in a seismically active area and that the core can be severely damaged in an earthquake, resulting in fission product release. The only matter in dispute is the magnitude and acceptability of the resulting radioactivity release.
As a matter of law, CBG is entitled to summav7 disposition on those matters as to which no genuine dispute exists. Until the matter of the consequences to the public of earthquake-induced radioactivity releases '
is resolved by the Board, the facts as the possibility of such earthquake-induced damage are material ard relevant. Se proceeding would be expedited and simplified, and justice served, if partial snama}y disposion as to
/
Contention XVII were granted. ,
Respectf M t'ted, i
ni 1 HirscW President COMMITTEE TO BRIDGE THE GAP
_9_
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FAC'IS AS 'IU WHICH NO GENUINE DISPUTE EXISTS
- 1. %e reactor is in a seismically active region.
- 2. he UCLA reactor is in the path of at least one active earthquake fault.
- 3. he UCIA reactor is within two miles of the Newport-Inglewood fault.
4 The Newport-Inglewood Fault was responsible for the Iong Beach Earthquake of 1933.
- 5. The Newport-Inglewood Fault is capable of an earthquake of a magnitude 7 5 on the Richter Scale.
- 6. he current probability of occurrence of a 7 5 magnitude earthquake along the Newport-Inglewood Fault is at least .1% annually, or a one in fifty chance during the proposed twenty-year license period.
- 7. The Santa Monica Fault Zone is within one mile of the reactor.
- 8. The Santa Monica Fault Zone is capable of a 7 5 magnitude earthquake.
- 9. The reactor could also be affected by a quake along the southern San Andreae Fault, which has a capacity of 8.3 magnitude with a probability of occurrence of between 2 and 5% annually, or greater than 50% over the next thirty years.
- 10. A mjor earthquake could bring down the several-story structure built atop the reactor building and crush the reactor core.
. 11. Mechanical damage to the fuel (i.e. breaks in the cladding and fuel ment) could result from core-crushing.
- 12. Core-crushing could result from later accelerations in an earthquake,
, with or without the above structures collapsing.
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- 13. Mechanical damage to the fuel resulting from an earthquake could result in fission products escaping to the environment.
- 14. It is conceivable that subsequent flooding of the reactor room could occur as the result of earthquake-induced failure of the Stone Canyon Reservoir which is positioned in the hills to the north of the UCLA campus.
- 15. Subsequent flooding of the reactor could result in the dispersion of fission product releases in the flood water.
- 16. Neither Staff nor Applicant has done a detailed seismic analysis of the reactor site nor a detailed structural analysis of the reactor structure and related buildings as to how they would respond to potential earthquakes (i.e., ability to withstand various response spectra without suffering displacement.
- 17. Earthquake-induced fission product release could cause doses in unrestricted areas of at least 10 Rem to the thyroid.
- 18. he Uniform Building Code according to which the reactor structure and the building above it were built had no provisions for reactors and has since been substantially strengthened; and building built to UBC standards have failed in relatively moderate earthquakes.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIAIORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket No. 50-142 TE EM T THE EMm (Proposed Renewal of CF CA W OR M Facility License)
(UCLAResearchReactor)
DECLARATION & DR. SHELDON C. PIOTKIN I, Sheldon C. Plotkin, do declare:
- 1. I am President of S.C. Plotkin & Associates, a consulting engineering firm specializing in accident analysis. % professional qualifications are attached hereto.
- 2. As a member of a review panel established by the Southern California l
Federation of Scientists to assess fundamental safety aspects of the UCIA nuclear reactor, I have conducted an examination of factors affecting the seismic safety of the facility.
- 3. This examination consisted of three on-site inspections of the areas external to the Nuclear Energy Lab facility and a separate inspection of the areas within NEL itself. The review also included examination of the available architectural, mechanical, and structural drawings of the reactor building and associated buildings.
- 4. The purpose of this declaration is to identify facts ascertained in the above review and conclusions drawn therefrom.
i
- 5. It is widely recognized that Southern California is very active seismically.
- 6. The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency estimates that an earthquake of Richter Scale magnitude 8 3 along the southern part of the San Andreas Fault has a 2-5% annual probability of occurrence, with greater than a 50%
chance in the next thirty years. The effects of such a massive earthquake would be widespread and could readily cause considerable damage at the reactor site.
- 7. Other faults, of slightly smaller capability and probability of occurrence, could cause even greater structural damage at the reactor site. This is because these faults arc extremely near the site.
- 8. The Newport-Inglewood Fault Zone (estimated capability, 7 5 on the Richter Scale) and the Santa Monica Fault Zone (similar capability) are believed to intersect very near the UCIA campus. While the nearest approaches of these fault zones to the reactor site are uncertain, due to the limited study performed to date and the heavy urbanization which has covered up surface indications, it is well established that the Newport-Inglewood Zone comes within two miles, and the Santa Monica Fault Zone within about one mile of the reactor site. The nearest approach could be much closer.
- 9. Because of the seismic activity of the region and the nearness of major active faults, aprincipal concern in a safety review of a reactor in such a location is the ability of the reactor facility and the reactor itself to withstand a major accident without damage. My review of this particular facility leads me to conclude that the particular site characteristics in question are so unfavorable as to make it quite likely that the reactor core could be severely damaged in a major earthquake.
10 The reactor was originally in a two-story building when first constructed.
Over the years additional buildings were added on top and to the sides of the original building. These included three stories of classrooms and offices supported by relatively thin columns above the original reactor building. A two story " void area" exists between the upper stories and the original two-story reactor building.
- 11. The reactor building and the addition on top are structurally independent of the adjacent buildings, separated by a half-foot earthquake
" shake," so that the structure atop the reactor building receives no support except for those thin columns.
12 Were a severe earthquake to occur, those columns could buckle or fracture, causing the building above to collapse, accelerating through approximately twenty-four feet until hitting the reactor room ceiling, which could not withstand such an impact. The building above would j essentially collapse onto the reactor core, crushing the core.
l l 13. Even were the building above the reactor core not to collapse,
, lateral accelerations of the reactor itself could cause core-crushing by rapid shifting of the core internals by the tremendous forces involved.
l 14 The fuel would be severely damaged in either case, with substantial amounts of fission products released.
I 15. Additional damage to the reactor core could be initiated by such an earthquake in the form of failure of the Stone Canyon Dam just north of the reactor and subsequent flooding of the core, or by earthquake-induced fire.
l . 16. The fact that the reactor structure was built according to the then-current l
Uniform Building Code provides no assurance whatsoever that it will survive the magnitude of earthquake possible at the site. There was no provision in the UBC for reactors, which must be built to considerably stricter standards than structures posing less risk to public health and safety, I
l
l l and the UBC has been substantially strengthened since the reactor building and related structures were built. A building built to the UBC standards then in effect could not pass current UBC standards for normal structures, let alone the standards that should be applied to a nuclear reactor.
l t 17. Furthermore, buildings built according to modern Uniform Building
! Code standards have been substantially damaged in even relatively moderate earthquakes. 'the Olive View Hospital, built according to the most modern
, UBC then in effect and dedicated only a few weeks before the 1971 San Fernando 6.4 magnitude earthquake, collapsed during that earthquake.
l And the County Services Building in Imperial Valley, California, had the
- steel-reinforced concrete pillars of the building virtually sheered off,
, even though the building was reportedly engineered to withstand an earthquake l
of magnitude 8. The Imperial Valley earthquake was only of magnitude 6.6.
t
, 18 For the above reasons, it is my opinion that a major earthquake is likely to occur of sufficient magnitude and proximity to the reactor site that severe damage to the reactor core and fuel could occur and result in the release of substantial fission products to the environment.
- 19. I took the attached eleven photographs of the reactor building and the structure built atop it. They point out some of the features which affect its seismic vulnerability. Photograph 1 shows the three floors of classrooms supported by columns over a two story void area containing equipment for the reactor. The large vertical feature in the center is a sheet metal enclosure encompassing the reactor effluent exhaust stack, which is released from the eighth floor through a small stack in the right hand corner of the windscreen on the roof. The reactor is directly below the three floors of classrooms and the two-story void area. Thus floors one and two are below grade in this pictures the void r area represents floors three and fours floors five,six, and seven are I
classrooms and offices and the eight floor encompasses the reactor stack.
- 20. Photo 2 is a view from the courtyard on the third floors photo 3 is a view of the void area. Photo 4 shows the separation between the building atop the reactor and the adjacent buildings-where I have drawn a circle you can seen the metal plate covering the empty space between the buildings. Photo 5 looks upward along the same views where I have drawn another circle you can see the ending of the earthquake separation. There is about a half-foot separation designed between the buildings. Photo 6 shows the separation on the left side.
Photos 8, 9, lo, and 11 given different views of the metal plates covering the earthquake separations.or " shakes." The, photographs demonstrate that the sole support for the structure directly above the reactor are a few columns which could give way in an earthquake.
I I, Sheldon C. Plotkin, swear under penalty of perjury under'the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. ,g _ _
Executed on August 23, 1982 :^
at Los Angeles, California / x ' k / < ' C' '
Sheldon C. Plotkin, Ph.D.
l l
l l . _ _ - _ , _ _ - , . - . , . - . _ _
DR. SHELDON C. PLO'1%IN PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS liy name is Sheldon C. Plotkin. I am President of S.C. Plotkin & Associates, a consulting engineering firm specializing in accident analysis. I am also a member of several review panels established by the Southern California Federation of Scientists to assess fundamental safety aspects of the UCLA nuclear reactor.
I have over thirty years experience in analysis and design of electronic, electro-mechanical, mechanical, human factors, chemical and computer systems, as well as combinations thereof. Py previous employers include:
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico -- 1946-7, design arx' construction of electronic equipment U.S. Naval Air riesile Test Center, Point Mugu, California -- 1949-50 conducted and evaluated missile flight tests University of California, Berkeley--1950-56 1950-54, teaching assistants in Engineering Department 1954-56, Project Enginner, in charge of operatioh of the Cosmic Ray Iaboratory Energy Systems (formerly Levinthal Electronics), Palo Alto, California -- 1956-68 Senior Project Engineer for design and safety of high voltage, high power pulse modulators.
Hoffman Electronics Corporation -- 1959 to 1961 Consultant in the Communications Systems Department University of Southern California - 1958 to 1961 Aesistant Professor of Engineering I'eghes Aircraf t Company, Culver City, California -- 1961 to 1967 Staff Engineer for G&C Advanced Systems Iaboratory TIN Systems, Redondo Beach, California -- 1967 to 1969 Senior Staff Engineer, ESD Systems Engineering Iaboratory RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California -- 1969 to 1971 Senior Engineer in the Engineering Sciences Department.
! From 1971 to the present I have run a consulting engineering firm vehich l specializes in safety engineering and systems approaches to accident analysis.
! I have published several hundred papers, reports, and intra-company documents.
Accident and Product Failure Analyses. (book). Introduction to Accident, Safety, and Forensic Engineering" (seminar).
1 l I am a Registered Professional Safety Engineer, and a member of I.E.E.E. , Pi Mu Epsilon, Eta Kappa Nu, Sigra Xi, and the Executive Board of the Southern California Federation of Scientists.
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m 131r c AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR A l
CATASTROPHIC CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE:
i
- FINDINGS AND ACTIONS TAKEN
- PREPARED BY j FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l FROM ANALYSES CARRIED OUT BY THE
! NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL .
ad hoc COMMITTEE ON ASSESSMENT OF
! CONSEQUENCES AND PREPARATIONS FOR A MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE 1
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.] fe era emergency management agency Washington, D.C. 20472 i November 1980 l
t CilAl'IER I i
EXECUTIVE SUMM ARY OF FINDINGS, ISSUES. AND ACTIONS I
A. 13ACKGROUND i
I After viewing the destruction wrought by the eruption of Mt. St. llelens in Washington State in May 1980, President Carter became concerned about the impacts of a similar event of low probabihty but high damage potential, namely a catastrophic earthquake in Cahfornia, and the state of readiness to core with the impacts of such an event.
As a result of the President's concern, an ad hoc committee of the National Secunty Council was formed to conduct a government review of the consequences of, and preparation for such an en nt. In addition to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Committee included representatives from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the United States Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior, the Department of Def nse, the Department of Transportation, and the National Communications System, at the Federa! level; State of California agencies and California local governments at the State and local levels; -
and consultants from the private sector. Dunng the summer of 1980, the participants in this review prepared working papers on relevant issues and problem
- areas, for the consideration of the ad hoc committee. Pertinent facts, conclusions and recommendations were reviewed with the Governor of the State of Califorma. The President reviewed the ad hoc committee's findings and approved the recommendations for Federal action. This report summartzes the results of the assessment and notes these actions.
A number of Federal legislative and administrative actions have' been taken to bring about, in the near future, an increased capability to respond to such an event.
The Earthquake llazards Reduction Act of 1977 (P.L 95-124) authorizes a
- coordinated and structured program to identify earthquake risks and prepare to lessen or mitigate their impacts by a variety of means. The coordination of this program, the National Earthquake llazards Reduction Program (NEliRP), is the responsibility of the Federal Emerpency Management Agency (FEM A), which is charged with focusing Federal efforts to respond to emergencies of all types and lessen their impacts before they occur. The NEHRP has six high-pnority thrusts:
- Overall coordination of Federal departments and agencies' programs 1
-- t
- Mamtenance of a comprehenuve program of research and development for earthquake prediction and hazards mitigation
- Leadership and support of the Federal Interagency Committee on Seismic Safety in Construction as it develops seismic design and construction standards for use in Federal projects
- Development of response plans and assistance to State and local governments in the preparation of their plans
- Analysis of the ability of financial institutions to perform their functions after a creditable prediction of an earthquake as well as after an event, together with an exploration of the feasibility of using these institutions (3 foster hazard reduction
- An examination of the appropriate role of insurance in -
mitigating the impacts of earthquakes.
More recently, a cooperative Federal, State, local and private 4ector effort was initiated to prepare for responding to a credible large magnitude earthquake, or its prediction, in Southern California.
B.
SUMMARY
The review provided the overall assessment that the Nation is essentially unprepared for the catastrophic earthquake (with a probability greater than 50 percent) that must be expected in California in the next three decades. While current response plans and preparedness measures may be adequate for moderate earthquakes, Federal, State, and local officials agree that preparations are woefull/
inadequate to cope with the damaFe and casualties from a catastrophic earthquake, and with the disruptions in communications, social fabric, and governmental structure that may follow. Because of the large concentration of population and industry, the impacts of such an earthquake would surpass those of any natural disaster thus far expenenced by the Nation. Indeed, the United States has not suffered any disaster of this magnitude on its own territory smcc the Civil War.
The basis for this overall assessment is summarized below and discussed in more detail m the subsequent chapters of this report.
2
1 l
C. LIKELillOOD OF FUTURE EARTilQUAKES Earth scientists unanimously agree on the inevitability of major earthquakes in California. The gradual movement of the Pacific Plate relative to the North American Plate leads to the inexorable concentration of strain along the San I Andreas and related fault systems. While some of this strain is released by moderate and smaller earthquakes and by slippage without carthquakes, geologic studies the vast bulk of the strain is released through the occurrence of major indiane that with Richter magnitudes of 7.0 and larger and earthquakes-that is, earthquakes capable of widespread damage in a developed region. Along the Southern Ln
- f. Andreas fault, some 30 miles from Los Angeles, for example, geologists 1,200can demonstrate that at least eight major earthquakes have occurred in the past years with an average spacing in time of 140 years, plus or minus 30 years. The 1857. Based on these statistics and other geophysical last such event occurred in the probability for the recurrence of a similar observations, geologists estimate that earthquake is currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. Geologic evidence also indicates other faults capable _
of generating major earthquakes in other locations near urban centers in California, including San Francisco-Oakland, the immediate Los Angeles region, and San Diego.
and are Seven pctential events have been postulated for purposes of this review '
discussed in chapter 11. The current estimated probability for a major earthquake in these other locations is smaller, but significant. The aggregate probability for a i catastrophic carthquake in the whole of California in the next three decades is well in excess of 50 percent.
D. CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY DAMAGE Casualties and property damage estimates for four of the most likely .
catastrophic carthquakes in California were prepared to form a basis for emergency preparedness and response. Chapter til gives details on these estimates. Deaths and injunes wculd occur principally because of the failure of man-made structures, particularly older, multistory, building and unreinforced bnck masonry buildings built before codes. Experience has shown that some the adoption of earthquake-resistant modern multistory buildings-constructed as recently as the late 1960's but not the current understanding of requirements adequately designed or crected to meet for seismic resistance-are also subject to fcilure. Strong ground shaking, areas. For which is the pnmary cause of damage during carthquakes, often extends over vast which occurred in 1857, stiong ground example, in an earthquake similar to that shaking (above the threshold for causing damage) would extend in a broad strip along the Southern San Andreas fault, about 250 miles long and 100 miles wide, and include almost all of the IAs Angeles-San Bernardino metropolitan area, and all of Ventura, Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Kern counties.
i 3
P I
I.
CilAPTER II GEOLOGIC EART!! QUAKE SCENARIOS A. \f AJOR EVENTS For purposes of assessing the consequences of a major California earthquake, scenarios for seven large earthquakes were developed. The scenarios depict expectable earthquakes that could severely impact on the major population centers of California. In each case they are representative of only one possible magnitude of earthquake that could occur on the indicated fault system. On each fault system
! there is a greater probability of one or more damaging earthquakes of somewhat smaller magnitude than the postulated event. The postulated earthquakes are listed in the following table.
TABLEI MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKES
. Current Annual Likelihood Probability of of Occunence Richter Occurrence in Next Region Fault System Magnitude ' (Percent) 20-30 Years Los Angeles- Southern San Bernardino San Andreas 8.3 25 High San Francisco Northern Bay Area San Andreas
. 3.3 1 Moderate San Francisco Bay Area Hayward 7.4 1 Moderate Newport.
Los Angeles Moderate-Inglewood 7.5 0.1 Low (continued on following page) 4 j -
8 6
m
- . - ~ - - - - -
TABLE I MAJOR CALIFORNIA EARTliQUAKES (Continued)
Current Annual Likelihoo Prnhability of of Occurrem Region Richter Occurrence Fault System Magnitude' in Nest iPercent) 20-30 Ye; San Diego R.ase canyon 7.0 0.0) Low Riverside San Bernardino Cucamonga Moderate. -
6.8 0.1 Low Los Angeles Santa Monica 6.7 0.01 Low i
1 level of'This is the estimated largest magnitude earthquake expected a at a reason t probability. The main shock can be expected to be followed by Ian aftershocks over a period of weeks of longer. Each large aftershock would capable operations. of producing additional significant damage and hampenng disaster assistan.
the These earthquake scenarios represent the larFest magnitude events estimated c basis of a variety of geologic assumptions. The appropnateness of the-assumptions depends on the intent of the analysis and the state of geolog k nowledge. Therefore, the resulting estimates may not be appropnate for ot!"
purposes, such as the development of seismic design critena for a specific site T!
development of such criteria commonly requires detailed analyses of the site and i-immediate geologic environment beyond the scope of this report. Consequenth detailed site analyses may require modification of the conclusions reached in th report, particularly fault systems other than the San Andreas and llayward faults .
B.
GEOLOGIC EVIDENCE Some of the possible earthqua kes listed are repeat occurrences of histone; events. others are not, but geologic evidence indicates that these faults before setticment of the region. Based on available dataearthquakes occurred 0:
, the postulate.
earthquake macnstudes would be the largest events that could be expected at 16
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me
I i
reasonable level et probabihty. They represent a selection of esents useful for planning purposes, but are by no means the only such esents likely to occur either on these or other fault systems. !
The historic record of seismicity in California is too short to determme confidently how often large earthquakes reoccur laformation on past earthquakes must be gleaned from the geologic record and therefore, presents a picture of past seismicity that is incomplete and not yet fully deciphered. Current knowledge about the recurrence of large earthquakes on specific faults is rudimentary. The ;
probabilities of occurrence shown above are orderef-magmtude estimates and subject h
, to considerable uncertatnty, especially for the less probable events.
(
C. DESCRil' TION OF EVENTS Following are brief descriptions of postulated events. Figure I gives their geographic location.
6
- 1.
- Los Angeles-San Bernardino/ Southern San Andreas Fault (Magnitude 8.3)
For the past several thousand years, great earthquakes have been occurring over a 300 km length of the San Andreas fault approximately every 100 to 200 years, 140 years on the average. The last such event took place in 1857. The j
probability of occurrence of this earthquake is e.timated to be currently as large as 2 to 5 percent per year and greater than 50 percent in the next 30 years. The ,
fault skirts the edge of the les Angeles San Bernardino metropolitan region, thus
- most of the urbanized area lies further than 20 miles from the source of strong, ,
r shaking. Because of the distance, shaking would be more haza rdous for large !
structures than for one- to two-story houses. The long duration of shaking could f trigger numerous slides on steep slopes and cause liquefaction in isolated areas.
- 2. San Francisco Bay ArearNorthern San Andreas Fault (Magnitude 8.3)
A repeat occurrence of the 1906 earthquake, in which the San Andreas fault broke over 400 km of its length, would cause severe damage to structures g throughout the Bay Area and adjacent regions. The extensive urban development on i lowlands and landfill around San Francisco Bay would be especially hard hit and liquefaction in many of these areas would intensify the damage to structures erected on them.
17
~ -
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l
- 3. San Francisco Bay Arcaillayward Fault (Magnitude 7.4)
The last large events to occur on this fault were in 1836 and 1868. Shou a major earthquake occur, severe ground shaking and liquefaction is espected t cause damage throughout the entire circum-bay area nearly as severe as that resultir:
from a 1906-type earthquake on the San Andreas fault. This earthquake would E of particular concern because of the many dams located along or near the fault.
4 Los Angeles / Newport-Inglewood Fault (Magnitude 7.5)
This earthquake would be a serious threat to the nearby, dens ly-populate areas of Los Angeles. Shaking would cause extensive structural damat throughot the IAs Angeles Basin and liquefaction near the coast would add still mot destruction.
~
- 5. San Diego Area / Rose Canyon Fault (Magnitude 7.0)
This fault-a segment of an active zone of faults extending from th .
Newport-Inglewood fault to Northern Mexico-would present the greatest earthquak- -
risk to the San Diego area. Severe damage due to shaking and liquefaction could t expected in the coastal areas. Because of unstabic sea bed sediments in the offshor-area, local tsunamis (tidal waves) are possible.
- 6. Los Angeles / Santa Monica Fault (Magnitude 6.7 and 7.0) and Riverside / San BernardinoiCucamonga Fault,(Magnitude 6.8)
These faults are part of a system of east west tending faults bordenng the northern edge of the Los Angeles basin. This fault system caused the 1971 Sar Fernando earthquake and is geologically simdar to the system that generated the large 1952 Kern County eart hquake. Although smaller in magnitude than the earthquakes previously desenbed, these postulated events are potentially q uite dangerous because of their vicmity to high population densities in Southerr California.
D. EARTHQUAKE EFFECTS Detailed maps were prepared for each event show mg qualitative estimates of ground shaking intensity resulting from each earthquake. These estimates are indicative of the Feneral severity of damage to ordinary structures. Empirical formulae providing quantitative estimates of peak ground motion at vanous distances from the postulated earthquakes were developed for use in the effects of severe ,
18 i
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,. , _ _ _ . . I _ . . .. . _ _
4 9
1 ground shaking on individual structures or critical faalities. No estimates were made of localized effects, such as ground failures related to liquefaction (the complete failure or loss of strength, of a saturated soil due to shaking), landslides, and fault rupture. These effects can be far more destructive than ground shaking alone, M
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..0" UCLA ENG-7423 MARCH 1974' P. AYYASWAMY C
4- ESTIMATES OF THE RISKS ASSOCIATE ENGINEERING & MAlti [)EMATICAL B. H AUSS g
.r- 4 WITH DAM FAILURE SCIENCES W' RARY T. HSElH A. MOSCATI I_ UNIVERSITY Of Calif 0RNIA T.E. HiCxS LOS ANCELES, CAllf. 90024 D.OKRENT
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The techniques for calculating flow characteristics in the channels downstream from the dans studied are fairly reliable, although some simplify-ing assumptions have been made. It is worth noting that the calculations of
[. consequences of dam failure have been compared an one case to the actual g
' ~
observations of flood waters resulting from dam collapse. The St. Francis
, dam failed in 1928. A wall of water 125 feet high was reported traveling
_;. f down the canyon beneath the dam. The water wall was 78 feet high 10 miles
.RE
~Ylf downstream from the dam. Calculations of the water height at the dam and at
. :-2 _
f%f 7 miles downstream, using the methodology developed in this study, gave
. .f.l f.?6 values of 130 feet and 85 feet, respectively. This agreement with observa-
- {sy tions is considered excellent, and provides support for the calculation a technique used.
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The consequences of dam failure, ir. terms of mortalities and property damage, are therefore forecast with an implicit error band. These calculated V consequences are predicted on the assumptions made regarding earthquake fre-
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- p. i regarded as mainly illustrative and very tentative.
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- 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ..
8 The assu=ption of complete and instantaneous dam failure reflects the .
worst ccnditions that are theoretically conceivable. However, both experience $' .'
and theory indicate that such failure, resulting f rom earthquake action, is a b
JOP real possibility. With this in mind, estimates have been made of the proba- 59.
bilities of earthquakes in areas containing the California da=s studied in 5-
,r this analysis. These dans are listed in Table 1, along with esticates of C'.'
e.r, .
probabilities of earthquakes with Modified Mercalli intensities of VIII, IX T3 e
V and X for the das environs. It is assumed that an earthquake of MM inten- /k -
.)--
sity VIII results in a significant probability of dam failure; an earthquake
) '-)'
j i 6
- of 501 intensity IX results in a substantial probability and an earthquake of 3g, 301 intensity X results in a high probability. The probabilities listed for ["[
earthquakes are those generated by corputer analysis adjusted as in Section
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1.5 (on computer estinates) . The predictions for "M X have the greatest ,.,
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unce rtainty , since little empirical basis exists. jC
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Table 2 lists estimates of expected property damage and mortalities due -.
k to total and instantaneous failure of the dams investigated (assuming that (I:
/'.
/.
the dans are filled to capacity when the failure occurs). Mortalities range r.
./,
from as low as 11,000 to as high as 260,000; property damage ranges fron $50 h' ,
million to $720 million.
Table 3 gives estimated flood heights at various reaches downstreas of h;
's the dans investigated (a reach is a section of the dam channel which is a *ys F,-
convenient hydraulic reasure taken in order to analyze the downstream flood- t' ;
ing. Ine length of the ceasure itself =ay change depending on the particular )){:
topography. For exa:ple, in the case of the Van Norman Dam three reaches of
(
12,000 feet each have been selected to investigate the desnstream floeding.
t See Section ' of this report for the rationale of this assuration.
ve.-
The first reach is from dam site to c point 12 000 feet downstream; the second reach is 12,000 feet to 24,000 feet, etc.). Floodheights, for the cases investigated, range in the primary reach from 10 feet t o 147 feet. The l , total flood length ranges between 10,000 feet (Lake Chabot Dam) and 40,000 feet (Stone Canyon Dam) .
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- 7. COMPUTER PREDICTION OF EARTHQUAKES IN CAIIFORNIA BY FAULT THEORY 7 7.1 Introduction g In an attempt to estimate the seismic risk of an earth dam, one has first y-4[.
l to estimate the earthquake intensities and their corresponding probabilities -
at the dam location. Secondly, one also has to decide what minimum intensity of earthquake leads to a complete failure of an average dam or any specific dam. For the latter task, one can apply some sophisticated methods such as #!
finite element analysis to obtain the structural response of a dam, which pre- ,
e.
I '
sumably can predict the load at which the dam will completely fail. However, -
since the current state of the art of predicting earthquake probability l
h.
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involves a much greater degree of uncertainty, it may not be well justified y~
to do too many elaborate calculations for the second task. It seems to be a reasonable alternative that one can rely on experts and experienced engineers' q opinions on the minimum intensity which will lead an average earth dam to a -
V complete failure.
- /
In a paper on " Foundations and Earth Structures in Earthquakes",2 Duke hr g
/
indicates that the minimum intensity of shaking to produce damage to the older f.
'j' dans appears to be about VII on the Modified Mercalli scale (see Table 4) . y, However, only two out of eighteen cases which Duke had considered were com-pletely failed. The complete failures resulted in the emptying of the contents >
of the dam reservoirs (one at intensity VIII, another at IX). In all cases of
()'
damaged da=s, the dass were constructed without the use of modern compacting N h.I control techniques. The minimum intensity for failure could probably be assumed to be somewhere about VIII or even greater. /'s e
YCT 21
/
t i
Table 4 MODIFIED-MERCALLI INTENSITY GROUND ROSSI-FOREL INTENSITY SCALE SCALE (1930), WOOD AND NAUMANN ACCELEPATION (1883) I a 1 Detected only by sensitive cm a j instruments. sec g 3 1 The shock felt only by ex- 11 Felt by a few persons at j perienced observer under very rest, especially on upper -2 -
t favorable conditions. floors; delicate suspended 11 Felt by a few people at rest, ects m swing -3 -
. recorded by several seis-
- " #** 7 "' "' ~
n t always rec Knized as a 4 mographs. .005g-a quaie; standing autos rock -5 _
'j ,Ill Felt by several people at slightly, vibration like -6 q l rest; strong enough for the passing truck. -
-fj duration or direction to be IV Felt indoors by many, out- -8
- appreciable.
doors by a few; at night -9 .Olg-
? IV Felt by several people in some awaken; dishes, vin- -10
-b motion; disturbance of dows, doors disturbed; motor
% movable objects, cracking of cars rock noticeably.
~
II "* V Felt by most people; some
~4 V Felt generally by everyone; breakage of dishes, vindows, -20 -
/ disturbances of furniture, and plaster; disturbance of tall objects.
-30 -
ringing of some bells.
VI General awakening of those VI Felt by all; many frightened -
asleep, ringing of bells, and run outdoors, falling -40 plaster and chit:neys; damage -50 *05E-
% , swinging of chandeliers, -
',[f startled people run outdoors, small. -60 -
4
-70 g.4 VII overthrow of movable objects VII Everybody runs outdoors, dam- -80 -
a fall of plaster, ringing of age to buildings varies, de- -
g d bells, panic with great dam-age to buildings.
pending on quality of con-struction; noticed by driv-00
- E~
VIII Fall of chimneys; cracks in en of autos.
Th walls of buildings. VIIIPanel walls thrown out of ,
ra es; a wa s, nu- - 00 IX Partial or total destruction cents, chimneys; sand and of some buildings. ,
mud ejected; drivers of -300 J, X Creat disaster; ruins; dis- autos disturbed.
- turbance of strata, fissures, IX Buildings shifted off foun- -
rockfalls, landslides, etc. dations, cracked, thrown 00
. 5r'-
out of plumb; ground cracked. -500 h underground pipes broken. -600
[
[ X Most c:asonry and f rame structures destroyed; ground il cracked; rails bent, land-
-900 1I
-1000
- , slides.
d., XI New structures remain stand-M@j l ing; bridges destroyed; -2000 fissures in ground; pipes
{fN broken; landslides; rails bent.
-3000
~
W 5 XII Damage total; vaves seen on -
, -4000 S,] ground surface; lines of Sg-M sight and level distorted; -5000 ,
Q objects thrown up into air. -6000 ,
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where E sg I,'
u= p) g
, (fcF; sgeSG) (12)
T?
with the su==ations extending to those segments and faults which are effective $,'
v at that particular location. The effectiveness of each segment of any fault is to be determined by equation (7). -1 The probability of earthquake at any location in California with inten- ,
sity greater than or equal to s up to time t is P(S 2 s, t) = 1 - e -u (1 - (s)) (13)
As analogous to equations (2) and (3), the expectation of recurrent time Y
is :.' .(hl.
E[T;s] = (14) h;;
p(1 - G(s)) 47-7.3 Discussions on Some of the Code Outputs
[
Although the first recorded earthquake in the United States was as early ~.,,
e.
as 1534,1 abundant instrumental data are only available after 1905.5'9 g. ,
V Thus the relatively short historical record of seismicity in the U.S. =ay not f encompass a long enough time period to represent the true secular seismicity. de h:
/
Predictions based on data obtained under such conditions can only provide a
.k, relative earthquake risk guideline. G 4
The conditions of the soil which overlays the bedrock at the site play an important role in the severity of shaking on the ground surface. Sof t soil sites usually shake more severly than rock sites. This was demonstrated in b\
'. ,c the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. ?tructural damage was consistently greater f.
for buildings erected on filled land, whereas on the higher bedrock hills, dam- Qr
., 3 15 age was much less, even in areas closer to the earthquake center. In general, [,
damage is greater on soft, weak ground, but there are some evidences of an inverse relationship in the case of rigid structures due to soil dynamic i
yor
'7
- ,Di
amplification effects. In the computer code, it assumes firm soil throughout California for simplification. The firm soil corresponds approximately with fine to medium grained sand in San Francisco area and with marine terrace deposits in the Los Angeles region.' For an extra-soft soil site, such as l
artificially filled sites, the probabilities against intensities probably should be modified upward one unit on the Modified Mercalli scale (for j example, the probability of intensity X of an extra-soft site may actually l
l correspond to the probability of intensity XI). On the other hand, for extra l, ,
firm soil such as igneous, metaigneous, granite and metamorphic rock, the pro-1 i babilities against intensities probably should be modified downward one (or a m
fraction more) units on the Modified Mercalli scale (i.e. , for extra firm site,
[ the probability-of intensity X, for instance, becomes probability of intensity
~
IX or a f raction lower) .
[ Some sources on predicting earthquake recurrent times for a few locations
') in California provide a check against some parameters such as the soil condi-s j tion used in the computer code.
c j A. The Borrego Mountain earthquake of April 9,1968 was believed to be
)
17
% a 200-year event. The ground acceleration was estimated at about 1 g which
~
1 roughly corresponds to intensity X.18 The magnitude was 6.4.
~
The computer Y'
- a. predictions are N
5 x
Intensity (EH scale) Recurrent Time (yr.)
- k d
3 IX 29.11
-x 5 X 59.06 5
$d XI 167.48 i
y This comparison shows that if the prediction of the reference is valid,
$ IJ the intensity scale of the computer predictions should be lowered about one 7
< ,t q
L' sn (1
- y 28
~
_. .____-- c .r x ~x ..__w .w - - -. x ._ ~. -- wa x . a: _ m _u-._ - ,,
d, 3
t
- 2 -
.Y b
t
- nit, (i.e., the expectation of the recurrent time for intensity X is about 7 }
JC $
.67.48 years).
19
- 3. Reid predicted that about every 100 years an earthquake of April ~~.-
7
.8,1906 intensity will repeat at San Francisco. The maximum intensity of the b-d- .
L906 San Francisco earthquake was XI. The corresponding computer predictions j ,
tre
) i u .
Intensity (MM scale) Recurrent time (years)
{e k
f X 43.68 XI 143.55 !
Y '
XII 893.27 I Y
.' .\.
P- i The prediction for intensity XI seems to be in a reasonable agreement with g, g
?.G. )-
leid's. However, as discussed above, the most severe shaking occurred at the V site of filled land which is about one intensity scale softer than what was
. i' assumed in the computer code. In other words, compared with Reid's prediction, ;;
- ~.
the computer code also predicts that 1906 San Francisco earthquake is roughly +Z. j
/s p
1 100-year event provided those parameters used in the code can be considered ,*. l Xe is of soft soil instead of firm soil. g C. The February 9,1971 San Fernando earthquake is generally believed Y
g;.
to be a 200 year event. The intensity at Van Norman Dam was IX. The computer .Y it. .
- ode predictions for Van Norman Dam are Intensity (MM scale) Recurrent time (years) ,
!\
IX 68.58 'i J
X 205.49 r<
k.'I XI 36861.80 This co=parison shows again that if the intensity scale of the computer #
- ode is lowered by one unit, the prediction for intensity IX at Van Norman Dam %[-
U cation then seems more reasonable.
Tor 29
[~
~
y (#-
If o
l D. At the San Onofre nuclear power plant site, the intensity and corre-sponding expectancy of earthquakes and the computer predictions are listed below:
INTENSITY (MM SCALE) RECURRENT TIME (PRED.) RECURRENT TIME (COMPUTED)
VIII 100 years 49.40 years IX 600 years 173.96 years X - 1081.50 years Again, the comparison shows that there is about one unit (or slightly more) difference in the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale between predictions by the computer code and deduction from historical records.
In summary, the computer code based on the fault theory does estimate the relative seismic risks. The parameters assumed for firm soil are more likely associated with a softer soil (about one intensity scale unit differ-ence). The probabilities associated with various earthquake intensities should therefore be modified according to the sof tness of the soil at the the earthquake site. Keeping these observations in mind, we see that the computer code used herein seems to be a convenient and useful tool that pro-I
' vides a general estimate of the earthquake probabilities in various large regions of California.
Table 5 shows the computer predictions for some earthen dam sites in California. Their locations are indicated in Figure 1.
It is believed that the uncertainties in the predicted recurrence inter-vals are greatest for the largest earthquakes, e.g., MM X, for which little empirical basis exists.
I, l
1 I
l J 30
' P*
y = .:- .: 1 - = - - x,........ - . + . _ __ w .. n_ w _ ._ . - ,
i N.
q.
' w TABLE 5 's
] l' EARTHQUAKE PREDICTIONS FOR SOME EARTH DAMS IN CALIFORN N N
- f 0 -
DAM NAME INTENstAi I'RGIi. / Ax. RECURRENCE TIME (YR) g$ ,
W Lake Chabot VII VIII ~ _ ' ' ~ 0.17 0.22 4 5
.h '<
IX _ ' '-0.12 8 X
XI
~ _ ' ~ 0.057 -0.021 2 x 10 5 x 10
- I
,d. i San Andreas Lake VII _ ' 0.20 5 $
VIII IX
_ ' 'O.11 ' -0.044 8
2 x 10 i
.y X
_ '~~ ~ 0.014 7 x 10 3 x 102 p
XI ' -0.0032 g
,j.
San Pablo W.
VII
' ' ' 0.18 5 P'-
VIII
_ ' ' 0.12 8 d IX 0.076 1 x 10 X
3 x 10 (3
_ _ ' ~ -0.032 -
XI 0.011 9 x 10 /,.
Van Nor=an VII f
VIII _ _ ' ' 0.10 0.042 9
2 x 10 3
IX ,' ' - 0.014 7 x 10 7
' -0.000027 X -0.0049 2 x 102 y XI 4 x 104 ,T Lower Franklin VIIA.
VIII
, ' ' ' ~ 0.084 0.036 1 x 10 3 x 10 h
K.
IX ' ' ~ -0 013 . 8 x 10 /
X
'. _' ' - 0.0018 6 x 102 /,r,'
XI -0.00045 2 x 103 (-
W- .
Stone Canyon VII VIII
~ _ ' ' 0.084 0.036 1 x 10 3 x 10 /
IX _ ' ' -0.012 8 x 10 X ~ ' ~~ ' -0.0014 7 x 102 (
' -0.00033
\
XI 3 x 103 '
S Chatsworth VII 0.097 1 x 10
/. c.
VIII _ '-0 039 . 3 x 10 -
IX - ,' ' -0 013 . 7 x 10 p/5 X [ ' ' --0.0028 4 x 102 XI ~ -0.000026 4 x 104 %-
r Modifications, depending on the softness of the soil at the site, are not included. The dotted lines shown are only to remind the reader that,
generally for a firm soil site, the intensity scale is off about one unit.
See the discussions in Section III.
yo-31 -.-
I TABLE 5 (Continued)
EARTHQUAKE PREDICTIONS FOR SOME EARTH DAMS IN CALIFORNIA DAM NAME INTENSITY PROB./YR. RECURRENCE TIME (YR)
Encino VII ,' 0.088 1 x 10
-0.037 3 x 10 IX X
_ ' ' ' ' -0.012 8 x 10 8 x 102 XI
' ' ~-0.0013
' - 0.00016 6 x 103 ,
1 M*ulholland VII ' ~ - 0.089 VIII 1 x 10 3 x 10
__ ' ' ' - 0. 03 7 IX ~ _ ' ' '0.014 7 x 10 3 x 102 X
XI
-- ~ ' ~~ ' '~0.-0.00040 00 31 3 x 103 San Leandro VII' - _
0.22 4 VIII 0.17 5
~ ' ' '-0.12 8 IX ~
X-- ' ' ' ~-0.063 2 x 10 XI ' ' ' ' -0.023 4 x 10 I
t 6
32 m
y= . ._ -_= -
- ~ . - .
s-1_ .w=~,.-n-n-.-- .c. _ _ _ _
, m 4
3!
E Duke and Egouchi gave the following estimates of MM intensities for ,..
four of the dam sites of this study as follows:
Dam Name Intensity Prob./Yr. 7' Y-Van Norman VIII >0.1 Wl IX 0.053 I X 0.0080 py, i Stone Canyon VIII 0.051 /
IX X
0.019 0.0086
{h-Q.
l Chatsworth VIII 0.064 i IX 0.026 ^.
X 0.011 k, .
o.
Encino VIII 0.092 ('(
IX 0.032 P X 0.014 2i M
C Some basis for comparison between history and the predictions of Table 5 Y>
g -
is available. There are 30- hydraulic filled dams in California, one of which i 7, .
o currently contains no water, and one has failed. Many of them are restricted y.
A to levels well below the spillway. These dams have operated for a total of .~.[
W' 1,794 years. One das failed due to the 1971 San Fernando earthquake after 50 '4 years of operation. One earth dam, which is not included in either Duke's or k
/
[$
Sherard's survey, failed in 1963 af ter 12 years of operation, not the result X' of an earthquake but due to settling. This dam was a model of modern design and construction. Four and a half hours of notice was available before this .
's failure and evacuation began two and a half hours before the failure. Five %
J people died with an esti=ated property damage of approximately 15 million I' d-dollars. s h d.
/
YC 33
,7
~
I 4
l t
j 5
l I
l l
k a
~
SAN PABLO LAKE CHABOT LOWER SAN LEANDRO i SAN ANDREAS VAN NORMAN CHATWORTH LOWER FRANKLIN ENCINO STONE CANYON I
Figure 1. Some Earth Dams in California.
34 2
- n : ,- . w .x. . u : . - . , ._ +
4
--s.
S:
.u
- 8. EFFECTS OF EVACUATION ON MORTALITY PREDICTION r C
3.1 Introduction W
w The procedure for estimating the effects of evacuation entails initially y ,
g:
assuming a particular shape for the evacuation rate histogram. Ihis assump-tion of the shape is largely based on experience. Figure 2 indicates such a histogram. Based on this, by a numerical integration, an " Integrated I
Histogram," which predicts the cumulative percentage of the total population .
evacuated in each hydraulic reach as a function of time, can be obtained. l Figure 3 is the integrated histogram. To compute the percent of people b' evacuated, it is now only necessary to determine the wave head position as a W.
function of time. Through the use of the equation V = {Q /(A@y )}, the
,%g ,
e average wave velocity in each hydraulic reach can be calculated, and hence I
?>
. l the wave head position at any specified time can be determined.
S. 1 In this study, it will be further assumed that the time in which the .q ;
i n
people in a given hydraulic reach must evacuate is determined solely by the :
time taken by the wave head to arrive at the middle of such a reach. This ,h'.
assumption results in a time averaging over the reach lengths.
- kr ,
Finally, with a knowledge of the time taken for the wave head to arrive g. I "d
at the middle of any given hydraulic reach and the percentage of the popula- y tion that can be evacuated from there in the same length of time, an estimate .
[
i of the number of people evacuated may be made. This estimate is merely the 3 F\
product of the number of people in the reach and the percentage of population {
J which can be evacuated in the available time. The mortality number can now be obtained by subtracting the above estimate f rom the actual number of people living in the area defined by the chosen hydraulic reach. Since there U h
exists a possibility that fewer people are present in the area during the day- ~
time as compared with the nighttime, the results for the number of people evacuated between :he day and the night may dif fer.
35 y-
r
/ l
}; 8.2 Evacuation Ef fects for Stone Canyon Dam
"~
8.2.1 Determination of Water Velocity Within Each Reach:
Q*
is given The average water velocity, V,y,, is given by V,y,
= Q n).
6 3 by (SC.5) as 2.37 x 10 ft /sec.
1 Approximate Ax 10' V ave (f t./sec.)
Reach Length (ft.) 'y in ft. in ft.2 8,000 ~124 4.0082 59 1 0-20 12,2270 19 2 8,000 - 16,000 17.9050 13 3 16,000 - 24,000 16 24,000 - 32,000 16 23.5450 10 4
30.8650 8 5 32,000 - 40,000 16 Schematic Diagram of Wave Front Position l
vs. Length of Time Af ter Break:
0 ft. O min.
4,000 ft.
8,000 ft. 2.26 min.
12,000 ft. 5.77 min.
16,000 ft. 9.28 min.
14.41 min, f 20,000 ft.
24,000 ft. 19.54 min. :
a 28,000 ft. 26.21 min. I 1
32,000 ft. 32.F8 min.
i 36,000 ft. 41.21 min.
40,000 ft. 49.54 min.
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,s.ha4 s SCFP 1 Flood Plain Below the Stone Canyor
EXHI3IT E
- g. ,,, Second Report of the Governor's Earthquake Council l
~
l % . $
I: -,w$ U lo l $
y ,
= =* '
53 M 9 2 . ["D . September 1974 . ,
M3
~
5
~
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Y-
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RON ALD RE AG AN. GOVERNOR STATE OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S E ARTHQU AKE COUNCIL g _
ROOu 1115 RE SOURCE 5 SUILOfNG e 14 f 6 NIN TH STR E E T
- SAC R AMEN TC 95814 September 30, 1974 i The Honorable Ronald Reagan Governor, State of California State Capitol ___
Sacramento, California 95814 ,.
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Dear Governor Reagan:
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The Second Report of the Governor's Earthquake Council is transmitted herewith. It contains a summary of the progress 2;
that has been achieved on the 26 recommendations that were set ~~~
forth in the first report of the Council submitted to you November 24, 1972. :r-Since its appointment by you in January 1972 your Earth-quake Council and its several committees, subcommittees, and task ,g forces have identified the major earthquake-related problems that gC beset California and have implemented activities aimed to alleviate fL or eliminate them. The Council has worked with the Legislature's Joint Committee on Seismic Safety toward this end. Conside rable
~
progress has been made, but the mission is by no means completed.
Earthquake preparedness is a never-ending responsibility.
In the last few years rapid strides have been taken in the advancement of earthquake engineering, and serious attention has been focused on socioeconomic problems relating to future disasters in the State. These advances were stimulated by the San Fernando earthquake of February 9,1971, which was particularly distressing not only due to the death and destruction wrought but also because of the realization that this was a comparatively mild shock (magnitude 6.4, Richter scale) by comparison with the great historical California earthquakes such as the 1857 Tehachapi and 1906 San Francisco temblors, both of which are believed to have exceeded magnitude 8 on this same scale. Great earthquakes will occur again in California at times presently unpredictable.
Because of the increased population and consequent developments, -
more people and facilities will be exposed to their ravages. 'e' Therefore, a continuous effort to increase our preparedness for these future events must be sustained. This effort deserves our support.
Sincerely yours,
/
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James G. Stearns Chairman Enclosure
INTRODUCTION t
Following the disastrous San Fernando earthquake of February 1971, Governor Ronald Reagan created the Governor's Earthquake Council, which he charged with responsibility for preparing recommendations of whatever kind for reducing losses in future California earthquakes.
The Council has consisted of 35 members representing __--
federal, state, and local agencies, universities, and representa- a tives of the public and private sectors. The tasks of the Council ==
have been determined and directed by a Steering Committee composed of representatives from the interests noted. Working committees on =6 Research and Investi organization chart) gation and onthe considered Preparedness and Response needs for further research (see in ..
the fields of seismology, engineering, and geology and proposed "
procedures for reducing earthquake hazards in structures and improv-ing response to earthquake emergencies. nr
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Through the efforts of these committees the First Report of the Governor's Earthquake Council was distributed in November ._s 1972. That report consists of 26 major recommendations for reducing , ,*,sE earthquake losses. Recommendations 1 through 14 were developed primarily by the Research and Investigations Committee and Recom- -
mendations 15 through 24 by the Preparedness and Response Committee, ;~
decommendations 25 and 26, which concern the term of the Governor's Earthquake Council and consideration of a successor body, were originated by the Steering Committee. All 26 recommendations were approved by the Governor, who issued instructions that steps be taken to assure their implementation.
Recommendation No. l 'of the First Report called for the creation of a coordinating body consisting of representatives from state agencies and universities to assist with the implementation of the remaining recommendations. The Governor's Interagency Earthquake Committee was appointed for this purpose. A number of task forces and subcommittees were also formed to consider scecific recommenda-i tions (see table of organization).
The Second Report of the Governor's Earthquake Council i was assembled by the Committee from reports submitted to it by the ur working groups. It consists of abstracts of these reports and .re i contains for each recommendation a brief introductory statement, a
- review of progress achieved during 1973-74, and a summary of pro-posed future actions. The complete reports of the task forces and subcommittees upon which these abstracts are based are preserved in Sacramento in the files of the Committee.
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OLIVE VIEW HOSPITAL FOLLOWING THE SAN FERNAUDO EARTHQUAKE OF FEBRUARY 9, 1971 (Recommendation No. 7)
Three peo le were killed at this facility and damage was estimated at about 60 million.
Research programs are now proceeding with the objectives of developing better understanding of the ground motions that occur during severe earthquakes and improving the seismic criteria required for designing structures to withstand them.
Plans submitte-1 for all new hospitals in California now must be accompanied by a report which evaluates geologic hazards including seismic history of the sites proposed. These reports are prepared in accordance with guidelines published by CDMG.
(Photo courtesy CDMG)
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LOUER SAN FERNANDO DAM, LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Recommendation No. 4) cr-
{k This dam, which was severely' damaged during the San Fernando ?,l earthquake of February 1971, is typical of the hydraulic fill dams p which were constructed between 1870 and 1935 The susceptibility i of this type dam to liquefaction during an earthquake is clearly evident.
As a result of the near failure of Lower San Fernando Dam. 'M l to DUR conduct has requi' dynamic red the stability owners of each of In analyses. 29 general, such dams althoughin the State all atudies have not been completed, those dams in the Sierra Nevada [
f have been found satisfactory; whereas most of those in the coastal y,,
areas, where seismic expectancy is greater, have been found deficient. p l Removal, repair, or replacement is being considered for the #
,potentially unstable structures. (Photo courtesy DUR)
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HIGIGAY 5 INTERCHA1:GE FOLLOUING THE SAN FERNANDO EARTHQUAKE OF FEBRUARY 9,1971--AN AERIAL VIEW M (Recommendation No. 2) h H
Critical facilities such as this severely damaged highway g interchange possible after an earthcuake. must be cleared and service restored as rapidly as k Technical studies must therefore i begin gency operations. inmediatcly before useful data are obliterated by the emer- i Q% Recommendation No. 2 provides for expeditious and coor-dinated postearthauake investigation and prompt dissemination of '3 information. Arrangements have been made with the California Wing, M s.j Civil Air Patrol, to provide aerial photographic surveys on short mL notice thereby preserv$ng observations of damaged facilities which i' could te dest. rayed before ground parties have an o portunity to . conduct on-site examinations. (Photo courtesy DUR : r
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EXhE IT F ) A REVIEW OF THE GEOLOGY AND EARTHQUAKE HISTORY OF THE NEWPORT-INGLEWOOD STRUCTURAL ZONE, ! SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ! l l i 1974 l 1 C AllFO RNI A DIVISION OF MIN ES AND GEOLOGY PREPARED IN C00FERATION nITil Tile COUNTY l OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF COUNTY ENGINEER AND Tile LOS ANGELES COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT l
,Wh Dtp SPECIAL REPORT 114 f fh, fs, S l
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Special Report 114 A REVIEW OF THE GEOLOGY ' AND EARTHQUAKE HISTORY OF THE NEWPORT-INGLEWOOD STRUCTURAL ZONE, t, SOUTHERN CALIFORNI A ; This report is based on work completed in 1972. By , Atlan G. Barrows Geologist, California Division of Mines and Geology ^ Los Angeles, California , 1974 California Division of Mines and Geology '; Resources Building, Room 1341 1 1416 Ninth St. Sacramento, C A 95814
- Prepared in cooperation with the . .E i
County of Los Angeles Department of County Engineer and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District
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[. ' s ( STATE OF C ALIFoRNI A
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THE RESOURCES AGENCY RoN ALD R E AG AN, GOVERNOR NORM AN B. LIVE RMoRE, JR. SECRE T AR Y DEP ARTMENT OF CoNSERV ATioN DIVIStoN O F MINE S AND geology i RAY 8. HUN T E R DIREC tor JAMES E. Sto S S o N. S TA TE GEo L O GIS T I I
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ABSTRACT c The Newport-Inglewood structural zone trends northwesterly from Newport Mesa to the Cheviot Hills along the western side of the Los Angeles basin. This belt of domal hills and mesas, formed by h the. folding and f aulting of a thick sequence of sedimentary rocks,is the surface expression of a major Q zone of deformation. 4 g Near-surface faults associated with the uplifts act as barriers to the flow of ground water across F the zone. The level of the water table east of the zone is thereby raised. In addition, the barriers help to 3 prevent the contamination of the fresh water supply by blocking the intrusion of sea water. 3 Anticlinal upwarping of predominantly marine sedimentary rocks, combined with associated com-plex faulting, provides traps for large quantities of petroleum and natural gas. The cumulative produc- j tion of more than a dozen oil fields along the zone exceeds 2.5 billion barrels of oil. Some of the fields - have been producing for 45 to 50 years. : The Newport-Inglewood structural zone, commonly referred to as the Inglewood fault by k seismologists,is seismically active. The largest and most destructive of the numerous earthquakes that have occurred along the zone during historic time was the Long Beach earthquake of March 10,1933. ; The epicenter of this 6.3 magnitude shock lay offshore near Newport Beach whereas the aftershock ; activity extended along the zone northwestward to Signal Hill. Most of the 120 deaths and more than i 540 million in damage resulted from the failure of inadequately constructed buildings due to strong ~, seismic shaning of the weak alluvial materiais upon which they were ouilt. Notable among the lesser '. shocks also ciscussed in this review are the 1920 Inglewood earthquake (4 9 magnitude), and some e during the 1940s mth which was assoc:ated subsurface faulting that damaged oil wells in the Q Dominguez and Rosecrans oil fields. .y No surface faulting along known faults has been observed resultir g from h:storic earthquakes. E-Surface geologic effects of earthquakes include: surface cracking of alluvial materials due to turching -< or settling; development of mud or sand craters where water has been elected during a shock; land- p slides or rockfalls from sea cliffs and roadcuts; elevation changes. both positive and negative; changes in the level of the water table in wells; and disruption of structures built on or in the ground - such as pipehnes, roads, and bridges. ' w Differential subsidence is associated with at least three of the oil fields along the zone; Inglewood
--Q (totals about 5.6 feet); Long Beach (totals about 2.0 feet); and Huntingtor) Beach (totals about 5.1 feet). [
Surface faulting, in the form of eartheracks, appears to be related to subsidence in the Baldwin Hills. " Failure of the Baldwin Hills reservoir in 1963 has been attributed to dicplacement across eartheracks. The en echelon arrangement of the uphfts along the zone, combined with ev.dence for right-lateral \f strike-shp offsets along some of the longer exposed or near-surf ace faults, has led mhny to postulate that the aligned structures are the rest.ht of deformation at depth along a through-o6ng strike-slip ". N fault. First-motion studies of earthquakes tend to support the Concept of a right lateral fault at the depth of origin of earthquakes. Near the surface, however, the picture is complicated locally by ]h evidence for normal, reverse, and left-lateral faulting. T w This paper contains speculations on the significance of the abrupt change in trend of the zone .,,; north of Dominguez Hill, which leads to the inference that the Newport-Dominguez.Pfaya del Rey trend l- ';. i may be the major structure with the Dominguez-Baldwin Hills reach considcred an offshoot of it. vf The nature, extent, and direction of continuations of the zone beyond its known limits within the d Los Angeles basin are discussed. Based upon the review of allinformation currently available,it is ten. J yy,_ FA tatively concluded that the portion of the zone north of the Baldwin Hibs curves toward the west of the D
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Cheviot Hills oil field and is overridden by northward-dipping reverse faults of the Santa Monica Mountains frontal fault system. ()M Southeast of Newport Beach. where the Newport-Inglewood structural zone trends out to sea, the Sc continuation of the zone can be inferred to extend as far south as Laguna Beach on the basis of the > locations of epicenters. Farther to the southeast, between Laguna Beach and Oceanside, recent in. N@V - tensive subbottom profihng surveys reveal the presence of numerous faults, one of which has been dN Called the South Coast Offshore fault. This feature can be traced for 40 miles approximately coinciding with tne edge of the continental shelf 2 to 7 miles offshore. The known and inferred similarities bet. ween the onshore Newport-inglewood structural zone and the South Coast Offshore f ault provide a g-W-
%(( 2 cogent argument for concluding that the Newport-Inglewood zone does extend offshore parallel to the "ky southern Cahfornia coast and that the South Coast Offshore fault is a continuation of tne Newport.
Infewood zone. (g Q.} w Vii ~ i
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-- unsrr c NUREG/CR-2198 R
Fuel Temperatures in a.n Argonaut Reactor Core Fo' lowing a Hypothetical Design Basis Accident (DBA) Prepared by G.E. Cort June 1981 , Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, NM 87545 - for the - Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- U.S. Noclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 NRC FIN A7122 y
l the " graphite stack can safely withstand the 0.25 G maximum earthquake f loading". The review also concluded that vertical motion was unlikely to dislodge the stack of graphite blocks and that large deformations in any direction would be resisted by the biological shield. The acceleration forces that should be applied to the ARGONAUT.for seismic analysis will depend on local conditions such as the distance
- from the nearest fault. Therefore, it cannot be estimated whether
- 0.25 g's ground acceleration would be conservative or unconservative.
However, if we assume an extreme acceleration of 1 g's, the maximum I compressive stress in the graphite is still less than one-tenth the l compressive strength. Because the blocks are not interlocked, tensile j stresses should not occur. There may be some chipping at corners and . l abrasion from compressive shear, but these small changes in geometry j should not adversely affect the heat. transfer. } . d, ! i . The probability and extent of crushing cannot be predicted without i dynamic structural analysis. The dynamic analysis of the seismic. l l response of an HTGR core (Ref. 1) that was completed at Los Alamos in 1975 is an example of the type of modeling needed to predict lateral crushing. It is interesting that the maximum impact force between adjacent graphite blocks with a 1 g's horizontal base acceleration was l calculated as 0.3 MN (67,000 lb). . l MT,
- locks. These components are interlocked and supported by the reinforced concrete shield. Even though the concrete in the shield may crack and spall, it is difficult to imagine that large displacements could occur that would allow these interlocked components to fall.
1 I I
- M. Any crushing that takes place will tend to " squeeze the air out" i from between the fuel plates so that heat conduction to the surrounding
] graphite will be improved relative to the uncrushed State.
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D R A WING 9 g3pg,p.jpggg w gg.g g (,,, w 3 ngp, M(.4 7w d Required for terrnit Shall include s hot 311 ENGIN EEHING ILEGt't.A TIONS 4 '+0 3
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DRESSIN G ROO*f S (Stages) Construction of. . Tw)3 Excavations, foun.f ations and retalning walle 1.tve and dead loads . M asonr y (qustity and design).. 2*ng. !<1 2T* 2M1 23 1 inct
, Erits frorn .......
It 1 2C.' t v.C f a Fire protection of.
. 33 C Reinfurced cencrete (quality and draten).. ... N1 0Ci t r. ..
Location of . 3801 Steel smo tron (quality and des gn) C 01.M18 ! M , y.iol Wood (qaality and design) ;VJ1 2516 '".c u ? (( DitlFTING, When not permitted ;717 ENTRY, Jtight of O'23 (d) C '.1 IIILINMING FOUNT AIN, Required. 605. 705 EttrCTION bh5 eo- DRY CfL4NING PL%NTS Concrete forms , M) pi ClasstSe,1 as . . .. . Bla.*onry w alfs .Ct' t ;ter *
- 1901 Nem t>utidinge .
4 ;4 Fla.rn m a ble liquids regulated. . hPA ?'n r" w In P are Zone ho. I . . .1602 tc)
!!adio ruasts. . . 34"2 f%N in Fire Yone No. 2 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Steel . U:'
160't (c) Stearn fire estir:gutshing apparatus. EXCAVATIONS [% 1; Ventilaten of , Ines 3(75 General Detalls for .2*f.1. F ?. C1a:'er 7's Protection of (2.A
+e-DitY STANDPIPTS (see STANDPIPES)
D t
- CTS Water to t>e retrios ed frorn m hen.. y:9te' 4fM 3Y Enclosure of .. . . . . . . . . ........... 3tM3 (M For sent11atton of motion picture booths. .. 4005 EXISTING Int:II. DINGS g.g lleating . 6105 (1) Additions. alterations. repa!rs 3 r,g D t'3t n.W A I T EIg Apiteatlen of Code to. F4
;y[i L Construction cf m alle 1706
"' '" ~
DUTlu EXISTING OCCrrANCY, Continued u=e M fo [M '#
'1 Of Board of Appeals ,. 204 EXIIS Depnf tfnn of 4v rg Of Building Off setats (see BUILDING OFFICIAL). 202 General requirementsI' . 73N 4;M tt D W EI.I.I N G Number required . 3.a. J y
Classified as Group I occupency.. 1441 Obstruction prohibited.. .. .. . ...3Y1 f*6 Panic hardware required. . ..... 394. 3317. 3t'. 31!S f.p. f i When constructed en roof n rcQ'utremerds iAf t'e he'u3a'n~c3[
..1409. 3601 1 0 #
' '.[4 h"[p'g"" #'"#""'"##"E*"# ' ' *
$ E EX1T 1.lGIITS ?212 Q.1 EXI'lltATION OF PEttMIT 3'"2 ( d ,
M.j E-oCCr r * *.Ci r.S 1001 EXrI.OSI4 ES. Storige 2001 d'. J, E A ftTII f
- Ult E, Calculations for . 2309 p EXTFILIOtt Ol ENING. PltOTECTION REQl' IRED
,, EAltTIIQ t. h M. Prosistons for. 2312
' 11ecause of location in Fire Zone 16a2. 1T1
$N FCCE'.'T illC 1.O A ug In reinforced concrete . ,,620 (h )
Hecause of location on prq+rty ... Eecause of Ty pe of Coti truction (see TYPF9 OF
... . M4 ' t '
h..) . In stect 7703 CONSTitrCTION) EGitEW (see Chapter 33, r.XTUrtIOrt STAlltWAYN (%
, f 4j'
.3P5 ,
El.ECTHIC It ANGES A ND 110T PLATES (see Cf.EAll ANCE) EXTrit10lt WAI.I.9 El.ECT3 TIC WEL111NG (see WELDING) Construction of (see IOCATION ON PROPERTT.
%$ TYPES OF CONSTRitCTION WALLS)
EI.EVATOft 51I AFTS (see VERTICAL OPENINGS) Q' h' r EM Elt G ES CY Controls for proscenturn curtain.. F
- h. .A.D Eults for occupancies . . . . ....
.. . .. 4104 M '
Helease for rnot6on g acture booth openings. . . . . . . . . . .
. Chapter 33 4W)4 (c) F-OCCitPANCIES . . 11 y..
ent lators'. , .. . F A RIllCATOft, AI*I'ItOVED 3'6 (cl. (*2
- $ ENCI.ONt'Itn OF VEltTICAI. OPENINGS (ace OCCUPANCY.
.h"'d
- v.
- f g,i TTPFS OF CONS'iftUCTION and STAIRS AND EXIT.9)
Construction requirernents . 1706 FACTuttIE% Moderately harardous (gee GROttP F) I t '" Fire-resistance required. 1701 j Nonhn7ardous (see GROUP G). IE y.WA
%. For eles ators . . . . . . . 3102 Fc'r stairs and ramps . . . 3309 FA Mil.Y, Definition of 4?!
Miscellaneous opentrigs h.g. i]1
- j. Re utred wl.en . .. . ..........
170G 3301. 3'f03
't' e t't yg grq L ee also Occupancy,.. .,06 . ,,. . Sections) Additional fee sequfred. when N3
.%,y,q . Smokeproof enclosure. w he n . . . . . . . . . . 3309 ubled hen ' .
E3 d.a)
. Througn occupancy separations, wt.en 503 (c) [. , h(', w"f IM.7 g p, /'#"M' '
t ,
' M'2 b, 378 y@t$)
379 lh gm
-bb m__ -
- ,,.... m .m, .--- - e..~ m ~ .. . . . . . . ....y -
w pky Secflons 2303-23n; UNil'Olt.it 15Ulf.IHNG f'ogy h UO0f When the form factor, as determined by wind tunnel tests On open. framed structures the arca used in computirg Winda e l oads or other recognized methods, Indicates ve'rtical or horizontal wind pressure shall be one and one. half times the net stu I r of the framing members exposed to the wind. I - y, ( :ont'd.) loads of lesser or greater severity than those produced by er the loads herein specified, the roof structure may be *de- Greenhouses, fath houses, and agricultural buildings shit signed accordingly be designed for a wind pressure of not less than 10 pou? 9
*gr: Snnw load, full or unbalanced, or wind load shall be con. per square foot.
sidered in place of loads as set forth in Table No. 23-15 where f t* ky such loading will result in larger members or' connections' ICI U' N "' U## "" wind pressure shall in no case exceed two thirds o
$1 6d MM nsWM med d Iteduction Sec. 230G. The following reductions in unit live loads as of Live loads set forth in Table No. 23-A for floors shall be permitted in The weight of carth superimposed over footings may ,_e j
g: f, the designing of columns, piers, walls, foundations, trusses, ured to calculate the dead load resisting moment. 4- beams, and flat slabs ^ (d) Combined Wind and Live Loads. For the purpMe
' M Fxcept for places of public assembly, and except for live of determining stresses all vertical design loads execpt the t
l yh loads greate r than 100 pounds per square foot, the design live root live load and crane loads shall be considered as actirg p, i ad on any member supporting one hundred and fifts squar" simultaneously with the wind pressure. et (150 sq. ft.) or more may be reduced at the rate of
.g 0.08 per cent per square foot of arca supported by the Sec. 2308.The live loads for which each floor or part there- Ihelesde member. The reductio 1 shall not exceed C0 per cent nor of of a commercial or industrial building is or has teen 9 Post ed R as determined by the following formula: signed shall have such designed live loads conspicuouCy D posted by the owner in that part of each story in which 19y
*M R=231 1 4. _
I,
/
\ apply, using durable metal signs, and it shall be unhwic! *a remove or deface such notices. The occupant of the bu f-
; wny,gg Ing shall be responsible for keeping the actual load be.S w the allowable limits.
f R=Heduction in per cent D= Dead I a l per squnre foot of aren supported by the ,rni e e f t e r ta 1 a cr! n necord ce v 9 accepted engineering practice, walls retaining drained o.nu h'~ L= Unit Ilve load per square foot of area supported by the may be designed for pressure equivalent to that exerted by rncmber a fluid weighing not less than 30 pounds per cubic foot and g(i For storage live loads exceeding 100 pounds per square having a derth equal to that of the retained earth. Any nr-Jg foot, no reduction shall be inade except that design live loads , charge shall be in addition to the equivalent fluid presnre. p on columns may be reduced 20 per cent. ' i Sec. 2310. See Section 2805. rootinC
.W q Sec. 2307. (a) General. Buildings and structures and every U'dK" Wind i j.[q Pressura portion thereof shall be designed and constructcil to resist Sec. 2311. Walls and structural framing shall be c re"ed Walls and u the wmd pressure as specified in this Set. tion. All bravinC {' true nnd plumb in accordance with the design. Uracing sh11 Structural y systems both horizontal and vertical shall be designed and
}
be placed during erection wherever necessary to take (are of Framing all loads to which the structure may be subjected. , _ _ ~ . - - f ,j constructed to transfer the wind 1o351 3 to the foundations. g (b) Wind Pressure. For purposes of design the wind pres. Sec. 2312. (a) General. Every building or structure and Bracing Iateral sure shall be taken upon the gross area of the vertical every portion thereof, except Type V bu.ldings of 'r51 Gro.p in tI r.arthq usk e 4 g projection of buildings and structures at not less th'an 15 occupancy which are less than twenty.five icet h pounds per square foot for those portions of the building less height, and sninor accessory buildirgs, shall be des!gned and Hagulations ! than sixty feet (CO') above ground and at not less than constructed to resist stresses produced by lateral force as g%j 20 pounds per square foot for those portions mnre than provided in this Section. Stresses shall be calculated as the M , sixty feet (60') above ground- effect of a force applied horizontally at cach rionr or r7of fp , The wind pressure upon roof tanks or other exposed roof level above the foundation. The force shall be assumtd tc stimctures and their supports shall be taken as not less than come from any hortzontal direction.
,.j D
, 3[ 30 pounds per square foot of the gross nrea nf the planc sur. All bracing systems both horizontal and ver*1 cal E..all
- t. face, acting in any direction. In calculating the wmd pressure transmit all forces to the resisting members and shall t* of g4 on circular tanks, towers, or stacks this pressure shall b* su(11clent extent and detall to resist the horizor.tal fUces assumed to act on si+ tenths of the plujected nica. provided for in this Section and shall be located symr(ttri-cally about the center of inns, of the building or the buuting
{h (For roof mgns, see Chapter G2.J U DG -
.c
*O ,
De 34 g t
. I ?..
Secilon 2312 UNIFOlt3t HUgg,33gyo COIW. 1,04 AN431:1.l;% COUNTY Settlon f3fl ! N* I.aterr.1 h y TAlli.c No 23-C--IIOltIZONTAg' g W U IMlOlts 2. For tanks, "W" shall equal the total dead load plus f I.aferal ( t 1 ( : y PAftr on PollTioN v^ LIT OF "C"l N Njb N Machine 9/ or other fixed concentrated loads shall % con-sidered as part of the dead lead. Floors, roofs columns [anit
.Y [0 A0]
bracirig in any story of - - Any ducWon "C" equsts a numerical constant as shown in Table No. M a building or the strue. M + 1% horizontally 2 'l- C. ture as a whole" g -- (c) I'oundation Tien. In the design of buildings of Typs 1 E> tt rior bearing and non. 8 11, and III. where the foundations rest on piles or en soil
,; - - bea rir g walls. interior having a safe bearing value et less than 2000 pounds per bearmg walls and parti- [030] square foot, the fotmdations shall be completely fr.ter-tions, mterior non-bear- With a miniumm Normal to connected in two directions approximately at right angles to
}(i-ing walls and partitions of five pounu each other. Each such Interconnecting member shal t'e over ten feet ( 10') in per square foot f M capabic of transmitting by both tension and comptrssion at q{ [ight. mnsonry- fences least 10 per cent of the total vertical load carried by the sx ee t (6') in heavier only of the footings or foundations connected. The Q l ght minimum gross size of each such member if of reinforced concrete shall be twelve inches by twelve inches (12' x 12")
p; Cantiterer parapet and other cantilever walls Noimal to 1; [1 00) sud"" and shall be reinforced with not Icss than the minimum re-except retaining walls ' f W"Il inforcement specified in Sectinn 2620. If the interconnecting i t _
- members are of structural stett, they shall be designe3 a9 P Exterior and interior or- A" provided in Section 2702, and encased in concrete. A rein-4 n and a p. [] oo} direction forced concrete slab may be used in lieu of intercer.nacting
'k nl{nt ttions horizontally tie members, providing the slab thickness is not less than
~~
k; When connected to or a one forty eighth of the cicar distance between the cont.ected part of a building: tow. foundations; also providmg the thickness is not less than y ers, tanks. towers and Any
' six inches (6").
a e tanks p!1s contents; [03 J direcfkn Interennnecting slabs shall be reinfntccd with not ten u chiinneys. smokestacks, hor i7nnt ally than eleven-hundredths rqu tre inch ( .11 sq ini of stcc. f.[ and pent houses. . per fo t of slab in a longitudinal direction an Tha1 the mme bott'a of Tanks, cicvated tanks amount of steel in n transverse direction. h stpokestacks. stand; Any such slab shall be not more than twelve Inches (12") abora p Pipes, an't smlilar struc- [0.lo j . direction the tops of at Icast 80 per cent of the picts or foundations.
- f. tures not supported by ho izontally The footings and foundations shall be tied to the slab in such l ; a bmlding. a manner as to be restrained in n!! horizontal d 'Miion, N " m id prn.hne (d) Plans and Design I)ata. With each set of plans filed.
hi t lon71 hh t u a brief statement of the following items shall be included: h tN
.tre nuniber of storias ut.me the " "' Y ""'ler n.mbler o n."n-
^"'
P l'rm ia.is j that for f:ncrs or hors "* * "* H I"2 enb tW 1. A summation of the dead and live Inad of tha bu?!in!!. was used in Mudng h @cm N d< numb *r of stork
- conmbuting ISud Onm W w jj, bhall be designoJ for the resulting rotational forces attout i which tha building is designed.
y the vertical axis. A brief desedption of the bracing system uni. the Iforizontal Forco Formula. In determining the'hort- manner in which the designer expects such system to act. [. orce to be resisted, the following formula shall be and a cicar statement of any assumptions u=cd. Assu nption g{ as to locatinn nf all points of counterficxure in tv-nbers P:=CW j must be etnted. ( gggg
- 3. Sample calculation of a typical bent er equivalet "F" equals the horizontal force in pounds.
a [f b.' W' equals the total dead load, tributary to tIie point under consideration. { (c) Detalled Itequirements.1. Honding and tying. Co r-g nlces and ornamental details shall be bnnded in the str*1citirt EXCUpTIONH so as to form an integral part of it. This applies to the D houses. "W" shall equal the interior as wcll as to the exterior of the buildinr. total dead load I f the vertical design I. live load tr!butary to t e int mler consideration- 2. Overturning inoment. In no case shall the ca'.eulated hp overturning moment of any building or structure dua to the j g g 1 99 g u y
a
' .i Sectiona 2312-2313
. UNIFOft31 flUII.DtNG ColtE 3.0% AN68;s,1;s rot'NTV wtNn 24014801 1.ateral forces provided for in this Section exceed two-thirds of tlw
} tiracing moment of stability of such bu" ding or structure. Moment gyg#g7g;gg q* __01ASONin' j (Cont'd.) of stability shall be calculated using the same loads ne used in calculating the ovetturning moment.
Sec. 2 801. All masonry shall conform to the regulatim 3ccPa
- 3. Additions. Every addition to an existing build;t'g or of this Code.
structure shall be designed and constructed to resist and withstand the forces provided for in this Section. nnd in nny Sec. 2802. For the purpose of this Chapter certain terns Definttfor.s case where an existing building or structurc is increased in are defined ns follows: height all portions thereof affected l'y such increased height DI511:NSIONS, Dimensions given are nominal; actw.
, shall be reconstructed provided to resist and withstand the fnrces for in this Section. dimensions of unit mas mry rnay not be decreased ty mere than one-half inch ( %").
- 4. Alterations. No existing building or structure shall be G1 toms CI;OSS-SI UTIONAI. AltI A OFIIOI.I.OW I N3 3 $
j 4 altered er reconstructed in such n manner thit the resistance the total area including eclis of a sectmn perper dicu r to the forces provided for in this Section will he IcFs than to the direction of loading. Ite-entrant spaces are inc ude O that before such alteration or reconstruction was made; pro. In the gross area, unicss these spaces are to be occu;ied ... p vide I, however, that this provision thall not apply to non- masonry by portions of adjacent units. bearing partitions, and shall not apply to other mJnor altera-( tions which are made in a 5tASONity UNIT. any brick, tile, stone, or block cor.- Ituildin; Department. manner satisfactory to the forming to the requirements specified in Sectien 2403. f
- 5. Sec. 2103. The quality and design of masonry materia:s 5f aterials y
Iluthling separations. All portions of buildings and structures shall be designed nnd ennstructe<t to act as an used structurally in buildings or structuses shall conNm M 1
", Integral in resisting lateral forces unh ss structurally sepa- the requisements specified in this Chapter and to the fG
; rated by a distance of at least one inch (1"), plus one-half I w ng s na s.
inch (%") for each ten feet (10') of height above twenty g3g 1 feet (20'). MATERIAIS AND DESIGN ITSIGN ATW. linihling Itrick
.] The details of sliding fragile joints shall be mada satis- Clay or Shale . 2I" t
factory to the Building Orncial. Sand.I,ime ,
'3 i Concret e ' -"e, nI" # '-
i (f) Intention or Interpretation of I,ateral Force Pro- Concrete Blasonry Units s isions. These lateral force requirements are intended to Hollow I.nnd.Itcaring
/ make buildings carthquake.rcsiMive. The provisions of this Solid I.na I. Bearing f
- I* #
P, Section apply to the buildings as a unit and also to all parts IInllow Non.I.nad-1:ea:Ing 21- W thereof, inchiding the structural frame or walls, floor and Ste notural Clay Tile roof systems, and other structural features. ,,3 For Walls - 1,nad-Itcating . - ' O- '
> The provisions incorporated in this Section are general For Walls -Nonbca:Ing and, m r,pecific cases, may be interpreted or added to as to For Floors 23{
detail by rulings r,f the Building Official in order that the intent shall be fulfilled. { G3 3mm Par tition Tile or Illock . ,,
' I - I 0 ' 0, Anchorage I General . 2 Sec. 2313. Concrete or masonry walls shall be anchmed Itrin foi ced .
- I to all finors and roofs which provide later al suppor t for the l) Cast Stanc ,
' , ' 3 3,g 4
wall or are required to prnvide stability for the wall. Suc_h Cement anchorage shall be capable of resisting the horizontal forces 20 IM
' specified in this Section or a minimum force of 20d pounds Portland Cement . . . . . . . ~ . -
per linear foot of wall, whichever is the larger. Air-Entraining Portland Cement.. 21 14.y Blasomy Cement . 23*I W i icklime .. ... . . . . .. 2 8
- I #M
- l Ilydrate ! I.ime for Masonry Pur poses . 21 -I I-M I
, l Blurlar NW Other than Cypsum - Agpcgates for 5fne tar %l-l W Testing g Brick 23*2 W Gypsum _ 2 4 21.M 1 100 a y 101 4 1
. . . . . - . . . w. . . . . . . - - . . . . - - - . . .- - -- -
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1 ..' 2.i" / r THE LIBRARY . a r. OE. , Mp'A..,I s THE UNIVERSITY e / " ~ " ,c. ' i ," ! OF CALIFORNIA , /' r 2 esi, wm Butt Dt..(, c
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LOS ANGELES
!. cet e/
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fhf a bml 3 @ nd N$j H H (Wa]v (-l ein '
$85.9 t I"!d 3 ' Q. 7,q ' YAln "
N..:I d[a'/@i e w h a EDITION
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- M, n', " ' ' ' - 3 300 rg t a" N Gtas s . . . . . ...,.- - -- 3'4 M ELECTRIC YfELD'N Q (ses %ELDiNG)
May not prefect over pub 9c pecoorty . E"**' - j, ,7 f1FVATO2 SHAFTSisa*%ERTIC AL OrEN NGS)
, 17 t t ie m en[g, ElfVATOR$ . ...... ... .
Cr ac'ee M a'c a g :,vs C*ac er t DOR M& TOR V E mergency operation aad corr munic ev , . p. l O d8o* - Enclosu r es . . . l'M i ; on ,'"s,ou, 43 F or hig4 rise buildings . . . * *0 F 't t ., L F or rna'cueet . . . . . toads. .- 1a: .s f.es n e 21. a F or roof s. general. . , yp; ,r) EMERGENCY EIff S DRAFT STOPS ' 3.w . , Generat . C*ac t" M Residentist .
- 2517 m. 3205 tb) 87.8 i DR AIN AGE 1 n ENCLOSURE OF VERTIC AL OPENINGS nr+ 0CCUF ANCY.
a Arou ,,qd b,uddings 3 gig,g * ' M CONa4UW MEA r FoQr p 2#M* lt) Constr uCiton requiremen's . L, .*..,I* A pp**n' =3.10,', ; rerp
- Fire res,.s'ance, F or siai s and amp s ired 4 . DR A WINGS tsee rta NS) F ot open partiing garages .
1". ' 's 'w#. Required . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . .
.. . B .:
{! DRESSING ROOMS fSts;es) Streep'oef enclosure ... 06 's*30es C*ap'e16 80.1209.1'A 1Ye
- Con s truction. . 3V4 E u.ts 3W Throughoccupancy sera ations 50 t V t oc erisn' '
(', DRiFi 3MF 3403 ENCL OSURE W AL L S(see W At L S) l ENERGY. conservation in bulldings - A f0*T e C*+ac'er !' f 2312 (h) DRINMINO FCUNTAIN. REOUIRED . "O D N" ' gog,97,y fi DROPPEDCE LINGS
- ENTRY, right of .
)
4i ,nf,), - 2'"2 T g*, n 730s. Tables Nos 23 B.23-J ER E CTION, bracing during constructeen Cr apter a2 2T9a. fl} installateof ..-.. 1207 {I ESCAL ATOR$ tsee EL EVA TORS) DRY CL E ANINQ PL ANTS DC AVATIONS tsee GR ADeNG- E A RT H) gj C'a wt..o . . . . . . . ... Definste g e- Flammabia liquids regulated - pg, g,,,,,,oncetails s . . .. . . .
... ADfw % IW V'"l'ea tion . 94 Pro 2Mt N.2.W 3 Apsenoam Cracter 7
,p wa,te,c, 2933 tbL aa ' Appeos C'4:rer C gg4 , o tion.
p, ,e. moved. . . .. .. . . { DRYW ALL lspe GYPSUM WalLBOARDI XS 'a* DH AUST VE N TIL ATION isee VE f4TIL ATIO% ld DUCTS (see a'so For venraation UN1f 0RM or mation pic tureME CH ANICAL CODE) boettis DISTING 90tlDINGS l 4%$ Additions. a'teraltons. sepales f'
- DuM swAIT E R Conservet.oEN kahs' ^
DUTIE S ptM t e d As pendis chapter 51 1706 i
#EE De h"#nition8" C"d' -
Histor6c . ,C4 i
)' '
Of Deard ot Aepea y busic speaas no enspettoe of reciais asee r s . .. . .. . DurLO'NG OF FICtA Li' .
.. 2 L oad ie sts . . - - . . . . . .
Noncor. forming Group R t Occupancies DISTING OCCUPANCY. continued use , A pp*W s t 211 2* T.
'04 ci DWEL Lf NG UUS ass fred as GroupiOccupancy.
g,
," - ,43 "g"". d.
' 405
. . . 3 y,i ,
Unit '" 400.12cc f ac neties . . . . . . . . . . . '04* sections C% acte 1 S to Ga C*e: e M
' p or amu sement structures . .
*/ 4 1 aOS F or farrowl shetters i
For behstops . . . . . . . . . 8DDeroe*'N For open park 6ng garage . ~!O E rai M; Gene,on,re,quirements no,, , ... C 3 m'.e:'c M, litumination for. . . n.3x E -OCCUP A NCIE S . 13*I Chapter 8 3317 "**Q" 'd ~ Obstruc't orip"rohibned' . EARTHQUAKE Anchorage of $chtmne,s fsee t ATF - - RAL
- - FORCF.PROvlSIONS) i Panic tiardmare required IA't i
% ;/.'* 1 ?
Passage *ay . . . . SUS 4dL M'6 tal 331F E a-thquake recrudleg mstruments . 3704 (c) 3D t. 33u General ... . . .... . .. --
' a p' pen' dis 23 2 ft) Reviewing stands . . . . , . . ..
T Specie regerements. occupancies Se smsc conside ations for fugh rise buildings f.
- 2312 709 tgt. t Fl%Ict M f 5. U '6. 33' T M
- Mitc) sno (g)
- EAVES Stage . W 3Z W y,2{
P oleCt'on Widm . .- 1Y2 C'onstruct on.. *,04 rat and 412. m.
- 1#'9 EDUCATIONAL USES - Dif LIGHTS. . M'2 701. Po t EORESS dsee Chapter 33) DPIR Af TON OF PE RMIT. FJ
DPLOSIM VE NTING PN 704 lf 70$ I_ Y . g @ *8 g
- 4 .. . h. . .
k ik II :i 5 05
2311 2312 UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 1979 EDITION 2312 (e) Anchorage Requirements. Adequate anchorage of the roof to walls B ASE is the lesel at which the earthquake motions are considered to be and columns, and of walls and columns to the foundations to resist over- imparted to the structure or the level at which the s'ructure as a dynamic turninF. uplif t and sliding shall be provided in all cases. sibrator is supported. (f) Solid Towers. Chimneys, tanks and solid towers sha!! be designed BOX SYS1 EM is a structural system without a complete serticalload-and constructed to withstand the pressures as specified by this section. carrying space frame. In this system the required lateral forces are resisted multiplied by the factors set forth in Table No. 23-G. by shear walls or braced frames as hereinafter defined. (g) Open Frame Towers. Radio towers and other towers of trussed con- BRACED FRAME is a truss s> stem or its equivaler.t w!.ich is provided struction shall be designed and constructed to withstand wind pressures to resist lateral forces in the frame system and in which the members are specified in this section, multiplied by the shape factors set forth in Table subjected primarily to axial stresses. No. 23-II. 11UC11LE MOMENT-RFSISTING SPACE FRAME is a momem-Wind pressures shall be applied to the total normal projected area of all resisting space frame complying with the requirements for a ductile the elements of one face (excluding ladders, conduits, lights, elevators, moment resisting space frame as gisen in Section 2312 (j). etc., which shall be accounted f 7r separately by using the indicated factor ESSENTI Al. FA CI L111 ES-See Section 2312 (k). for these mdividual members).
. I.ATERAI. FORCE. RESISTING SYSIEM is that part of the structural 12 feet m he. utht, systegn assi I gre(h) Miscellaneous Structures. Fencesshall less F ned to resist the lateral forces prescribed in Section 2312 (d) 1.
I enhouses, lath houses and agricultural buildings be than designed la
'lj the horizontal wind pressures as set forth in Table No. 23 F except that,if thc height zone is 20 fect or iess, two-thirds of the first line of fisted values MOMENT-RFSIS11NG SPACE FRAQIF is a sertical load-carry.ing space frame i,n which the members and jomts are capable of resistinF may be used. The structures shall be designed to withstand an uplift wind forces pnmanly by flexure.
'i pessure equal to three-fourths of the horizontal pressure. SIIEAR WALI.is a wall designed to resist lateral forces parallel to the I '
(i) Moment of Stability. The overturning moment calculated from the wall {I 3 wind pressure shall in no case exceed two-thirds of the dead load resisting moment.
'the weight of earth superimposed oser footings may be used to calcu.
SPACE FR AMEis a three-dimensional structural systera without bear-ing walls, composed of interconnected members laterally supported so as to function as a complete self contained unit with or without the aid of i
- ,. late the dead load resisting moment. horizontal diaphragms or floor-bracmg systems.
!l (j) Combined Wind and IJse 1.oads. For the purpose of determining VERIICAI. I OAD-CARRYING SPACE FRAME is 2 space frame
't stresses, all vertical design loads except the roof live load and crane loads designed to carry all vertical loads.
;j shall be considered as acting simultaneously with the wind pressure. (c) S3mbols and Notations. The following symbols and notations apply
,I l'XCEPIION: Where snow loading is required in the design of roofs. at only to the provisions of this section:
' C = Numerical coefficient as specified in Section 2312 (d) 1.
least 50 percent of such snow load shall be considered acting in combination
'f with the wind load. The building of ficial may require that a greater percent-age of snow load be considered due tolocal conditions.
C#= Numerical coefficient as specified in Section 2312 (g) and as set forth in Table No. 23-J. Earthquake Regulallons D = The dimer.sion of the structure,in feet,in a direction pa ah' ! l Sec. 2312. (a) General. Every building or structure and every portion to the applied forces. l thereof shall be designed and constructed to resist stresses produced by 6' = Deflection at level i relative to the base, due o applied later lateral forces as provided in this section. Stresses shall be calculated as the forces, %f,, for use in Formula (12 3). effect of a force applied horizontally at each floor or roof level above the I;F,,F, = Lateral force applied to teseli. n or 2, respectis ely. tuse. The force shall be assumed to come Itom any horizontal direction. F, = Lateral forces on a part of the structure and in the direction Structural wncepts other than set forth in this section may be approsed t under consideration. by the building official when evidence is submitted showing that equiva- F, = That portion of V considered concentrated at the top of the lent ductility and energy absorption are provided. structure in addition to F,. Where prescribed wind loads produce higher stiesses, such loads shall be f, = Distributed portion of a totallateral force at leveli for use in ? I used in lieu of the loads resulting from earthquake forces. For mula (12-3). { , ! (b) Definitions. The following definitions apply only to the provisions i g = Acceleration due to gravity. of this section: h,h h, = IIcight in feet abose the base toleveli, n or x respectisely. 1"G W
' ' cf . ; q -
FYWN&.N'Y'mibin r " k.ci * .a
. wcm YD
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II.{rldNh y k/;*k M. . i _ .
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UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 1979 EDlilON 2312 4 i. 2312 IQ / = Occupancy importance Factor as set forth inlable No. 23 K. The salue of C shall be determined in accor dance with the fo!!owing for. g) mula: ! ,L K = Numerical coefficient as set forthin Table No. 23-I.
'd Les eli c= 13I \ T, ,
/ = Lesel of the structure referred to by thesubscript i.
',.]
/,' i= 1 designates the first lesel above the base.
The s aluc of C need not exceed 0.12.
= That lesel which is uppermost in the main portion of the The period T shall be established using the structural properties and . 1.;
structure. deformatim! 8.aracteristics of the resisting e'ements in a prcpert. ' v g ,,, ,, , substantiated analysis such as the following formula: [/
'I - 1 hat lesel which is under design consideration, I
x = 1 designates the first lesel abos e the base. l# T=2n d.") + (a ff,d,I J N = The total number of stories above the base to level n. ,,,, f l ]h ; S = Numerical coefficient for site-structure resonance. ld3-T = Fundamental clastic period of vibration of the building or structure in seconds in the direction under consideration. w here the values off, represent any lateral force distributed approxir.ately I II2-3 ' i
,y T, = Characteristicsite period. m accordance with the principles of Formulas (12 5),(12 6) and (12 7) or I '
V = The totallateral force or shear at the base. any other rational distribution. The elastic deflections, 6', sha!! be ca!ct - ig IV = The total dead load as defined in Section 2302 m, cluding the lated using the applied tateral forces,f,.
- partition loading specified in Section 2304 (d) where ap-
[,] In the absence of a determination as indicated abose, the $ a!ue of T fc-
. .. plicable. buildings may be determined by the following formula:
LXCl PIION: 15'shall be equal to the total dead load plus 25 percent i of
*g the floor hse load in storage and warehouse occupancies. Where the des,gn
" snow load is 30 psf or less, no part need be in'cluded in the salue of Il*. Where T = gg2.. ..,
, , ( j ;.3 A p the snow load is greater than 30 psf. the snow load shall be included; \D d ,- '
' howeser, where the snow load duration warrants, the buildinF official may I.D allow the snow load to be reduced up to 75 percent.
9 Or in buildings in which the lateral force resisting system consrsts of
' w,w, = That portion of IV which is located at or is assigned to leveli ductile moment-resisting space frames capable of resisting 100 percent of p; or x respectis ely. the required lateral forces and such system is not enclos d by or adjoined IV, = 't he w eight of a portion of a structure or nonstructural by more rigid elements tending to prevent the frame from resisting 'atera.
e
?* l1 component. forces:
2 = Numericalcoefficient dependent upon the zone as deteimined . " O' I U, ' - .U24P by Figures No. I, No. 2 and No. 3 in this chapter. For loca-
"U *i tions in Zone No. I, 2 = L. For locations in Zone No. 2 d ! Z = L For locations in Zone No. 3, Z = M. For locations in
-d Zone No. 4. Z = 1. ' " all be determined by the following ferr."nas, b:.: sh;
.i b l- Ia -
'fi (d) Minimum Earthqual,e Forces for Structures. Except as presided in i Section 2312 (g) and (i), escry structure shall bei des,gned and constructed T I y'."' .
" "' S " I U + y,- 0 5,[y],P ~i i
? to resist minimum total lateral seismic forces assumed to act nonconcur-l '
d rently in the direction of each of the main axes of the structure in ac- . . tl2a. cordance with the following formula: d V = Z1KCSlV. .(12-l) t lM. l Fm Trr,p.g.rdum to S-I1+o67,T_g3[7] r,j
$. .. T he s aiuc ef K shall be not less than that set forth in Table No.i 231.1 he ,
value of C and S are as inacated here.:!ter euept that the product of CS
,";s <
- . . .. .. (! 2- t A r
' need not exceed 0.14.
129 1 "!
l y ;312 UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 1979 EDITIO M 2312 tion of the lateral forces in structures which hase highly irregu!ar shapes, WilEltE: large differences in taterai resistance or stiffness between adjacent stories.
' T in I ormulas (12-4) and (12-4A) shall be established by a properly or other unusual structural features, shall be determinco considerirl the ' F substantiated analysis but Tshall be not less than 0.3 s::cond, dynamic chaiacteristics of the structure.
i I The range of values of T,may be established from property substan_ 4. Distribution of horisontal shear. Total shear in any horizontal plane
! tiated geotechnical data, in accordance with U.B C. Standard No. 23-1, shall be distributed to the sarious elements of the lateral force-res: sting except that 7,shall not be taken as less than 0.5 second nor more than 2.5 s> stem in prepottion to their rigidities considering the rigidit) of the hori-seconds. T, shall be that salue within the range of site periods, as deter- 7ontal bracing sptem or diaphragm.
mined above, that is nearest to T. Rigid elements that are assumed not to be part of the bteral force-resist-ing system may be incorporated into buildings provided that their effect on I i When T,is not properly established, the s alue of S shall be 1.5. LXUPilON: Where T has been established by a properly substantiated the action of the 5) stem is considered and provided for in the design. analysis and escceJs 2.5 seconds, the salue of S may be deter mined by assum. 5. llorirnntal torsional moments. Provisions shall be made for the in. ing a s atue of 2.5 seconds for T,. crease in shear resulting from the horiiontal toision Jue to an eccerm: city
,' o l (c) Distribution of 1.ateral Forces.1. Structures hasing regular shapes or between the center of mass and the center of rigid .. NeFatise torrena!
framing systems. The total lateral force V shall be distributed over the shears shall be neglected. Where the sertical resistu e elements depend on height of the structure in accordance with I'ormu:as (12-5), (12-6) and diaphragm action for shear distribution at any !csel, the shear res sting i .' ', elements shall be capable of resisting a torsional moment assumed to be [ . (12 7).
. i etluivalent to the story shear acting with an eccentricity of not less than 5 I -
V =- F, 4 Y F. . . . . . . ..(12-5) percent of the masimum building dimension at that level. i llj Y' (f) Oserturning. Every building or structure shall be designed to resist E ,; , the overturning effects caused by the wind forces and related require:nents
' specified in Section 2311 or the carthquale forces specified in this section.
7 I J ! 'lhe concentrated force at the top shall be determined according to the whicheser governs.
,i following formulat At any level the incremental changes of the design osertur ning mcment,
)
; 1, ' " .the story under consideration, shall be distri'outed to the sarious resistmg elements m the same proportion as the distribution of the shears h' Fr - 0 07TV- -* *
** - (12-6) in the resisting system. Where other sertical members are prosided whict pl di are capable of partially resisting the os erturnHg moments, a redistribution
' '* F, need not esceed 0.251'and may be considered as 0 where Tis 0.7 sec-may be made to these members if framing rnembers of sufficient strength
;! ond or less. The remaining portion of the total base shear V shall be and stif fness to transmit the r equired loads a re presided.
- distributed over the height of the structure meluding level n accordmg to Where a s ertical resisting element is discontinuous, the os erturnine mo-3 l d
the following formula: ment carried by the lowest story of that element shall t< carried dekn as loads to the foundation. [ 13 ,t [db . , .... . . . (12 7) (g) 1.ateral force on Elements of Structures and Nonstructurel Com . p<ments. Parts or portions of structures, nonstructural components and y g y' their anchorage to the main structural system shall be designed for *atera: . j7g foicesin accordance with the following formula: At each level designated as x, the force F,shall be applied oser the area Fr 2/CrH', - (12
- 0 of the building in accordance with the mass distribution on that level.
- 2. Setbacks. Buildmgs having setbacks wherein the plan dimension of The salues of C#are set forth in Table No. 23-J. 'Ihe 5 alue of the /ce' ~
- j ficient shall be the value used for the building-the nower m each direct on is at least 75 percent of the corresponding plan ~
dimension of the lower part may be considered as umform buildmgs wtth- I.XCEPl!ONS: 1.1 he salue of I for panel connecters sW! be as pen out setbacks, provided other irregularities as defined in this section do not Section 2312 (j) 3 C.
'[* [f, g;,, g ,
an [ age of inachinery and egnment rea red f
- 3. Structures hasing irregular shapes or framing systems. 'Ihe distribu-
{: k 131 1 4 ; 130 t c} _ _ __ _ _ t s
. - - - - - ~ ~ - - ,,~ . .~,m m , .. . -
- .m.-- ~ ~
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-+ - h a a. _
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. b. 1979 EDtitOr4 UNIFORM BUILOttJG CODE ~312 N' 23:2 would tend to pt esent 11 'e Ming lateral forces whe. -
'Ibe distribution of these forces shall be according to the gravity loads ctn be shown that the a j ' e rn se rigid elemems wit; impair the s ertical and !ateralload resisting ability of the space frame j pertaining thereto.I'or applicable forces on diaphragms and connections F. Necq fer exterior gg a
" # *'"I4csistinR space frame a!! l be presided by a frame of s ral steel with moment-resiuir,g cor~ t
[ ]h panels, retcr to Sections 2312 (jl 2 D and 2312 0) 3 C.(h) Drif t and Huilding Separations tions (complying uich S "" 'i'*'C 200'5 N 3' story relative to its adjacent stories shall not exceed 0.005 times the and story No. 4 or Section 2723 I r bu " " n ones No. I and Ne h {}
- height unten it can be demonstratert that greater drift can be tolerated- or by a reinforced concrete f " "8 " h Secti n 2626 for t.5.
ings in Seismic Zones No. 3 a
'Ihe displacement calculated from the application of the requiredSecu Seismic Zones No. I and No. 2)-
- n 2625 for bui!dir;i in lateralforces shal shall be not less than 1.0. " b'd'.'" ment resisting space f ranc, .n All portions of structures shall be designed and constructed to act as anSeismic kones No. I a d "'" " I*C I ffea'er tha* t .0 1 sha!I compty with Section 2626 or 2 22- *
[ integral unit in resisting horizontal forces unless separated structurally bya distance G. In Seismic Zones No. 3 and No. 4 and ( i i "E"" 9 or wind forces. rtance factor Igreater than 1.0 located in S " "'"*" i (i) Alternate Determination and Distribution of Seismic {rs m Forces. braced frames shall be designed for 125 [i Nothing in Section 2312 shall be deemedI"dcco to P prohibit dance with Sectionthe 2312 (d). ull capacity of the members submission Connectio s shal b or shall ofproperl
"# i'~
I distribution by dynamic analyses. In such analyses the dynamic character- 7 w E
' istics of the structure must be considered. de- i[8 I m . hout the one-third increase usually perm t ed for s r
.i (j) Structural S3 stems. l. Duerility requirements. A. All buildingsB d d k j signed with a horizontal force factor K = 0.67 or 0.80 shall have men duct be s er tu [ n buildings shall be composed of asially loaded b I i
' 40, A441. A501. A572 (except Grades 60 and moment-resisting space frames. 43gg II n ete rnembers conforming to S B. Buildings more than 160 feet in height shall has e ductile moment.re- requirements of Sectihn 26 .
9 j sisting space frames capable of resisting not less than 25 percentg ofg;the re* d concrete shear walls for all buildings shall conforr- to l quired seisms forces for the structure as a whole. the requir ents f Section 2627, att.piloN: Huitdings more than 160 feet in height in Schmie /ones y gn structures where K = 0.67 and K = 0 F0, the special ductility re. I I f, 1 Nos. I end 2 may has e concrcre shear walls designed i 2312 0) ! G in accordance quirementswithforSec-structural steel or reinf n re'e specified in Sec-wn K f 'j s tion 2627 er braced frames designedin conformance with Sect onof this code in lieu of a ductile 2312 (j) 1 F. shall apply to all structural el "* d s alue of Ilxf or I.33 is utilisedin the design. ' 4uired to transmit to the foundation 11 forces resuhing from latral i I , ', d s. C. In Seismic Zones No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 all concrete l space frames re- [ f' 1 'l quired by design to be part of the lateral force-resisting duc- system , 2.and Designal requirements. con-nons may be made in existing build A. Minor alt n Umetural ahra-
' '# crete frames located in the perimeter line of vertical support shall be n her umcmrei. but .he tile moment-resisting space frames. reststance to lateral forces shall be not less t n that before such ahrs-M
' ' ,' 13Cl.PilON: frames in the perimeter line of the serlical support Imns buAtmo designed with shi.u nalls taking 100 percent of the dehnlm,al of Mre made, unless the buildinE as attered meets the requiremen9.,r this section.
i - forces necd only confor m with Section 23 t 2 0) I D. "'"' '" " $ "'} "' '"nete All elements wi t loca di S - - n s No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 which are f D. In Seismic Zones No. 2 No. 3 and No. 4 all framing elements notconcrete be in- te- shall F
'l .orced so as to qualify as reinforced mas U
f quis ed by design to be part of the lateral force-resisting i capacity ' system crete shall ued ns Ch pters 24 and 26 Principal re . J vestigated and shown to be adequare for sertical load-catty he ng in masonry si al b ""' n center in t'uildings 'a I I and induced moment due to 3/K times the distortions resulting imm t nioment-resisting space an e' f code required lateral forces. The rigidity of other elements shall be con- b sidered m accordance with Section 2312 (c) 4. ge;3y;c fC Confned sertleal
- and horizontal forces. In computin ads, grasity load s res e .
E. Moment-resisting space frames and ductile moment-resistingduced racem men ers .g ,
, etcept roof lis e loa d,
] frames may be enclosed by or adjoined by more tigid elements which
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*J 1979 EDITION 23t2 tJNIFORM BUILDtNG CODE 2312 4
.c i d. I h shall be considered Consideration should also be gisen to minimum grav- " g ha" ji nts which are attached Io or encime the cuer- l b ity loads a cting in combination wich lateral forces. Nd shall acco 0 date mo ernents f the stru u resu i f I k D. Disphragms. floor and roof diaphragms and coltectors shall be designed to resist the forces deternuned m accordance w,ith the follow,mg forces or temperature changes. The concrete panels or other s n lar e e ments shall be supported by means of cast-in place concrete or mechanica! gj formula: amnections and fasteners in accordance with the followirg prosisions:
- p Connections and panet joints shall allow for a relatise mosemer.t be-p ,
r,, . f' w,, (12-9) tween stories (3.0/K) times theofcalculated not less than elastictwo times stor) story driftcaused displacement canedb)by wind or ! required g% SC"""C I0fCes. or M mch, whichever is greater. Connections to fermit j
,, mosement m the plane of the panel for story drif t sha'l be properh de- 1 h g. .,
signed slidm, g connections using slotted or osersized holes or may te con 0 g . ~ yl , l F, = the lateral force applied tolevel f. w, = the portion of W at levell. necticms which permit mosement by bending of steel or other connect:ons providmg equisalent sliding and ductility capacity. Lj llodies of connectors shall has e suf ficient ductility and rotation caf.acit', T o w,, = the weight of the diaphragm and the elements tributary therero at level x, including 25 percent of the floor lise load in storaFe and so as to preclude fracture of the concrete or brittle failures at or near ., M e b w arehouse occupancies. uelds. @E
'I exceed The body of the connector shall be designed for one and one-third times The force F,, determined from Formula (12-9) need not kd the force determmed by Formula (12 8). Fasteners attacNng the connector !
id f , 0.30Zlw,.. When the diaphragm is required to transfer lateral forces from the ver- to the panel or the structure such as bolts, inserts, w elds, dow els, etc., s halt i hd tical resisting elements above the diaphragm to other vertical resisting be designed to msure ductile behanor of the connector or 55a'l te des sned (
> clements below the diaphragm due to offsets in the placement of the f r f our times theload determined front Formula (12.S).
- 'h Fasteners embedded in concrete shall be attached to or hooked around l clements or to changes in stiffness in the settical elements, thesereinf forces remg steel or otherwise terminated so as to effectisely transfer forces ;
$hl lI ' shall be added to those determined from Formula (12-9).
' ' ' " ' " E "I ' J b !-t, llowever, in no case shall lateral force on the diaphragm be less than qq i The salue of the coefficient I shall be 1.0 for the entire conr.ector
' i 0.l.82/w'$gms Diaphr supporting concrete or masonry walls shall have con-assem y m Forn la (124 I'h I
! tinuous ties between diaphragm chords to distribute,into the diaphragm, (k) Essentist Facilities. Essential facilities are those structures o-
& build,mgs which must be safe and usable for emergency rurposes af cr ar the anchorage forces specified in this chapter. Added chords may be used t h.. g e rthquake m order to preserve the health and safety of the general rn::c to form sub-diaphragms to transmit the anchorage forces to the main d ~' cross ties. Diaphragm deformations shall be considered in the design of Such facilities shallinclude but not be timited to:
'.Q i the supported walls. See Section 2312 (j) 3 A for special anchorage re. 1. Hospaals and other medical facilities hasing surfery or emet.:ncy M,,j quirements of wood diaphragms. trcaunent areas.
4 f ,
- 2. l,tre and po! ce stations.
M UT
- 3. Special requirements. A. Wood diaphragms providing lateral sup.
port for concrete or masonry walls. Where wood diaphragms are used to 3. Municipal gosernment disaster operation and communicatier-laterally support concrete or masonry walls the anchorage shall conform centers deemed to be vitalin emergencies. [, to Section 2310. In Zones No. 2. No. 3 and No. 4 anchorage shall not be The design and detailing of equipment which must re-ain in pla:e an; accomphshed by use of toenails or nails subjected to withdrawal; nor shall be functional following a major earthquake shall be based upon the re-y' wood f raming be used in cross. grain bending or cross-gram tension. quirements of Section 2312 (g) and Table No. 23-J. In addition, their y B. Pile esps and caissons. Indisidual pile caps and caissons of every design and detailing shall consider effects induced by structure drif:s of V building or structure shall be interconnected by ties, each of which can not less than (2.0/K) times the story drift caused by requ: red seismic forces lh carry by tension and compression a minimum horiiontal force equal to 10 nor less than the story drift caused by wind. Special censideration sha" also be gn, en to retatne mosements at separation joints. M percent of the larger pile cap or caisson loading, unless it can be demon. g strated that e.tuivalent restraint can be provided by other approved (1) Earthquake recording Instrumentations. I cr carthquale reurdM 1 h) I, methods. C. Exterior elements. Precast or prefabricated nonbearing, nonshear i instrumentations see Appendis.Section 2312 (1). 4;' l l 333 [4:l 134 3
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l* i 1979 EDITION i UNIFORM DUILDING CODE 23C 23-B I T ABLE NO.23 C-MINifAUM ROOF LIVE LOADS-F OOT NOT ES FOR T ABLE NO.23.B I 1he tabufated loads are minimum heads. Where other sertKat loads re- OD1 UE1PM 2 quned ty this code or required bs the design would cause greater stresses 1RIBUTARV LOADED aRE A tad ' 8 they sha?) N used SOUARE Fg[1 F OR ANY W SThucTun At wneetR tounds I : hnea! foot. - tatesal smay twacing loads of 24 pounds per foot parallel and 10 pounds ROOF SLOPE o to 200 poi to son o,,, 600 LOAD see c e-. te . .: ,,,y . ys foot perpendicular to seat and footboards ,' en ,
*Allloads are in gcunds per Imeal foot. !!caJ blosk mells and shease beams ',"' '
shall be designed for a'lloft block mellloads tributary thereto. Shease py, ggg, 3,3 bloshs shallbe deVgned with a factor of safety of fne. or J..me . n n yo g A, O
'Ibes not apply to cedmst mhich hase sufficient total access from beh>m, rhelew than
- on ophth of such that access is not required methin the space abose the ceihng Does not apply to ceshngs if the afric areas abose the cedmg l are not prosided mith au;ess. T his lne load need not be considercJ actmg simultaneous y 2 Rne 4 anshes mich othes hse loaJs imgesed upon the ceshng framing or its supp >ttmg #' '* I'55 '
+
"han t 12 inches structure. J d p,,
'Where Appendis Chapter Si has been adopted, see reference stan ar or dome mish 16 34 M M S cited therem for adJieional design requirements. rne one eighth of span to lew
'The impact factors induded are for cranes with steelNe wheets to ridmg on steel 8han three.
f ails.They may be modified if substantiatiiig technical data acceptJ d ophon of span the buddmg of ficialis submitted t ise loads on er anc support I o, sirders an I 3 R he $ 2 mches iheir coime(tions shatt be taken as the masirnum c'me wheelloa-is. Mr f oot and petidant-operated trasetmg crane support girders and their sommtens, j ( 'ii' ' the impact f actors shati be l .10. 8]'dE, ^m' p* I5* U $2
'This arplies in the dircetion par allel in the sono a3 : ads (hmgitudmsfl. T he rise nhece.
5-
't
( fastos for forces ytpendgular to the raelis 0 20 y the tranuerse trasel- c,ghths of span 4 i ,' ' ' ing loads (trelley. cab, hook s and hfred loads).1 orcesd shall be apphed at or greater top of rad and may be distributed among ads of mul:rple rad crancs an
, 5 g 5 5 g , ,3,,,0 %
- Amnmys ewe,pe -
' ' shall be distributed arth due regard for lateral stillness of the structures sloih sosereJ 6mit .c j <d ,'; l i supportmg these rads k 5 (,seenhouses, j 'A load per lmeal foot to be applied hoiirontau) at rivht angles to the top lath houses and 10 go 10 30 i ,} vai as tracultural
{ = Vertical membess of sionage sacks shall be protected fiom impad forces buildmas* j '} of opesatmg equipment or racts shall be Jesigurd sobays that f adure of one ' l< sertical member udl not cause cutlapse of cnnte than the t ay or Where sno* loads ' ' I"" Q ll directly g.pported by that member. loads as determined by the b ns offi Ls # '{h special pur pose roofs, see Section 2305 (e).
'See Section 2306 f or live load ieductions l h
,s 2306 l'ormula (tLI) shall be as indicated in th tabt he ai a
' seduction R shall not escced the 6 alue indicated in the t able j
'As deimed in Section 4506
,' 'See Section 2305 (e) for comentratcJ toad tequirements for gree.oose i I toof members. j c ,
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i 23 D,23 E.23 F UNIFORM DUILDING CODE j 1979 EDITION s, g T ABLE NO. 23 G-MULTIPLYING FACTORS FOR WIND b TABLE NO.23 0-MAXlMUM ALLOWABLE DEFLECTION FOR ST RUCT URAL MEMBERS' s ( PRESSURES-CHIMNEYS T ANKS ANDSOLID TOWERS
'glh. ... MIMett LCADED wiTM i It0ltI20NTAL CROS$ sititCN Faciet tivt LC AD l'LUS 4
MtrattR titADED Wille , Squarc or restancular 1.t.O
~ i ,,+e Llyt 1080 CNLY DEAS 10AD ivPt er MtMste it.t I tt t *RDtI linacon.d os atap.nal Ofo qj .
Rouiuf or cHiptical OSt j ,'- lloof hfeml r Supportmg 1,/240 --- Flaster or Fl.or % rulu r J./360 3 Q'q
~l }
) Suf feoent slope er samNr shall tie proudcJ tor flat roofs in suordame
' * * ' woh %e.n m 23tM t0 1.L = i n e load
.g j T ABLE NO. 23 H-SHAPE FACTORS FOR R ADIO TOWERS DL = De ed load I A . I actor an determmed t'y l able No U t. AND T RUSSED TOWERS l.
l ly':j - t envih of meniher m ume umti as def1cenon iTPE OF ttPC$ttt FACTC# d
,dq . - - - - . . - .- . _ . - ___
I . Wind normal to one f ace of tower
~.d Four.wrnered, flat or angular set tions, steel or wi ,d 2 2n !
*N . U"nM ruernl, fla; or angular sntions stn! or l
',h
. ..z ; f TABLE NO.23 E-VALUE OF"K" wood 2 po .
- 000
- 2. Wind ,on corner, four-cornered tower, IIat er angular sections 2 4n van ne.es seneaer snmestta ccuertt- srnt
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e E"'
' 03 12t.VJ.U]Tuti o flat or anedar settions I t,n io l {'-
. ; i J .t. factors for towers with O tndris'al l elements are ap. . SeasoneJ iumber n turober haung a moisture content of ten than 16 percent N
'.i ll ?
?
at nme of installation and uwd under dry condinom of use such as in coscred struauret Pro 4iniateIY two-thirds of those for Similar towers with flat or angular mtions
$.%'ind ett indnidual tuctial+rs
(' t 3ee ahoSecnon 2NN Ai = Arca ct sempetwon remfo r cemem. Cyli.ndrical nctulu as j 4> A. - Area ot norprestrewed tensian temforceu.cns. ,g g g t Over two inches in diameter 0.S0 I [ Flat or angular se(tions 1,y, l f ja ' i i* I
' rl '
- T ABLE NO. 23 F-WIND PRESSURES FOR V ARIOUS HEtGHT ZONES ABOVE GROUND' a
WIND pat 550Rt MAP Att A5 (pMd5 per situart feet) litlGHT 20NES
,8 (18 I"Il 20 25 30 35 40 [45 50 lA'st fla.an 30 13 20 23 25 30 f r, 30 I
20 23 30 33 40 ' 4 ', 30
' 30(O 43 5'. Un 50 to W 23 30 40 43 50 30 40 43 53 60 70 75 100 in 4% 70 ho 90 Soutollw 35 3i 53 f' O
, 10 50 00 To so no ion
' 1200 and m er 1 i . _ .
See Iigu'e No 4 % m.1 prenure column m the uble shoutJ tw wiesicJ whish
', l
' n ticaJed t*y a >t,esorreemdmg to the mmm.um perpuwtle vesumsm .
'ed f or the particular lo afity wind prewure '
Ihe tistures yiu sommenstcJ as m mn um. I N w requiremem. J. e.,4 U, 4: proude for t.' ' 141
140
$&'hbW%2.k $.u: &h & *
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a ; ;,. - _ a.-- ~. 4 0 1 Z b 23 I UNIFORM DUILDING CODE 1979 EDITION m
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T ABLE NO. 231-HORIZONT AL FORCE FACTOR K FOR TABLE NO.23-J-HORIZONTAL FORCE FACTOR C, FOR 7 9 ELEMENTS OF STRUCTURES AND NONSTRUCTURAL COYPONENTS g l BUILDINGS O R OTH ER ST RUCTURES. i I D'R E CTION [
. vsLut'or OF HOP 6 g
h TYPE OR a RRaNG(MENr OF REsisilNG EtEMENtS PART OR PORTION OF 80tLDINGS ORC rC g I. A!! busLhng franunt sntems excpt as hereinafter dawfkd 1.0:1 M t 1.33 I. f sterior bearing and nonbearing walls, Nortnalio 0.3' )
- 2. Buildings with a bot sptem as spccified in Section 2312 (b) - mtenor bearing walls and partitions,in- flat terior nonbearing walls and partitions surface l 3 Buildings with a dual bracing sistem consisting of a
~
ductile moment resisting space Isame and shear walls or -see also Section 2312 0)3 C. Mason-ry or concrete fences os er 6 f eet high i braced frames usmg the following design criteria: a 1be f rames and shear walls sha'l resist the totallateral 2. Cantd.eser elements: Normalto I force m accordance with their relatise rigidities consider. 030 a. Par apets f'at j OJi mg the interaction of the shear walls and frames surfaces
! b. Ihc shear walls auing independently of the ductile ,
moment-remting portions of the space frarne shall resist ,
- b. Chimneys or stacks Any ,
the total required lateral forces i' ., c.1he du,; tile moment resisting spac: frame shall hase dirution ; e
/
0 - the capacity to redst not less than 25 percent of the '
- 3. Exterior and interior ornamentations
! N Any j 0.8
! required iateral force and appendages direction i ' ;
i "b e 4. Buildmgs with a ductde moment-resisting space frame desiened in accordance with the following criteria: lhe 0.67 4. When connected to, part of, or housed 1 [l ;j ducti'c moment-resisting space frame shall hase the tapnity to temt it'e totat tequired iateral for(c within a buildmg:
- a. Pe.nthouses, anchorage ar.d supports '
@ " t nd tanks in-
$di' ""c \$
bE[esated tanks plus full contents, on four or more cross- ner s br aced legs and not supported by a building. 2.5
,. _ b.5rotage racks with upper storage lesel Any 0.38 ' ,
- 6. Steuetures other than buildings and other than those set at more than 8 feet in height, plus direction j
d f forthin 1alde No. 23 J 2 ll0 contents ,
. J' c. Allequipment or mach,mery ;
i ;p i M!i 5. Suspended ceiling framing systems tap- Any ! 0.3* i - 'Whcie ind loaJ as spetified in Section 2311 would produce higher stresses.
, i
- this icad shali be used inlicu of theloads resulting from earthquake forces. plies to Seismic Zones Nos. 2, 3 and 4 direction f
'See Iiaures Nos. l. 2 and 3 in this chapter and definition of Z as speafied m only) {
*1
- Section 23 t 2 (c). 6. Connections for prefabricated struc.
0.3'
.Any h *' 'the minimum satue of KC shall be 0.12 nd the maximum satuc of f.C need tural elements other than walls, with direction '
not encred o 25. force applied at center of gravity of 4 Jt t The to+ct shall be designed for en accidental torsion of 5 percent as specified assembly I" ' l. in Scetion 2312 (c) 5. Eles ated ianks hich are supported by buildings or do , not conform to type or arrangement of supporting elements as described b I abose shati be designed in accordance mith Section 2312 (g) usin g Cp = .3- 'C,, for elements isterally self-supported or ly at the ground lesel may be : o-thirds ef sa%e + show n.
.I
'W,, for storage racks shall be the wei t ht of the racks plus antents The seNe of C, for re .es
} ,
i oser two storage surtvrt leseis in beight shall be 0.24 for the lese!s beim ne top =o lee s in lieu of the tabulatcJ salues s!cel storage racks may be designed m ascorcance a th U.P C.
]N g Standard No. 27.1I.
t Where a number of storage Iack units are mierconneered so that IScre etc a rnmirr um ro L - l
% sertical elements in each direcnon on each column ime designed to res v *iori:e ral tot.ei. -
- a the design coefficients may be as for a t uildmg with A salues from Table 'o. 2 31. CS e 22 ',
for rack-rated the use in the formula tapacity. l' mthe
% here ZIACS W and Jeugn and rack W cQual to the configuranor.s are intotal dead lost asectdante plus with :*.s 50 per
; paragraph, rhe design prosisions in U.ti.C. Standard 140. 27.II do not a:;N ;
, Tor ficaible and flenibly motmied equipment and mashiner y, the a;; eopria e s atues or C, s' a be determined math consideration given to both the dynamic h properties of *
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] 9 ,
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[ FOOT NOTES FOR T ABLE 23 J-(Continued) .s=- t n
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; I tr:achinery and to the buitairs or structure in w hii h it is placed but shall be not less than the q
I listed salues. The design of the equipment and mact:inery and their anchorage is an integral I'y i
f' / ,, "'^
part of the design and specifwatron of such equipment and ms-hinery. ' A For cuential facdines and hfe s.afety systems. the design and de' ailing of equipment w hh h 4 1Y . .M, s
.#p
,\ f n s
I muu remain in rfne and t e functior.at fottoming a major earthquake sha'l ccmider drifts in M'
;:) , ,/ %.J . h \ $
E i accordance a n h 5caion 2312 (k).
"y. \ ~~
'<* w ('t . s tMy 1 Uja
,{ g 1'eihng meight shall include alt light flutures and other equipment w hich is later a!!y supported
( by the ceilmg. I u pi. pmes of determining the lateral force, a cedmg weight of not leu than 4 '
.r.Mfey j \ \
. . ~ . ' ~ 4*
1
- ;~ -
o l
# pounds per square foot sha?! be used. \
.f s k n \ ,g 6 o g
)- :' P j
'the force shall be reuucJ t y poutive anchorage and not by friction. ,, ,."h .'sI; 7,,/ ;
,) 0..
s< t 'See a'so Season 2)C9 (b) for minimum loaJ and deflection etiteria for interior parinions. - s, "T. I.. l; I .
- s. e.3 .f , ;-
1 l ks ' \ 'g M e\. ,
-~~~~~~
E
-{ Q ,,-z p - 7 o'.[
I k TABL E NO. 23 K VALUES FOR OCCUPANCY IMPORTANCE FACTOR I i l,. 3 s~ J' t T. l n I*t. Oi O(( Li'ANC i I
-{'%i -,.*j p4 twnnal I aohiiN 1.5 / { [N ~~~~"f ~d
\n> hmhlmp ubete the primary occupanc) n lcie awemb!) use t'or more lhan 3n) perwns 1.25 g
- ( ~~ f f [h' [ !
" ; *! t on .,ne roomi
\ttothers :o s l <)/.___ _ __4
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1
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f J. p 4. -_.-.- , h see 5.ca.on 312 os for det.nnion anJ aJdioonal requacments f or cunn.,1 " *
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I i l 23 2 II 23-2,23-3 j 1979 EmM
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^ '* Chapter 23 eq n s r onI nej m rb t be required for such rooms mirh EARTHOUAKE I?'STntlMENTATION
- n te method of obtaining the fire protection and sa et te t iref Earthquah Recording instrumtintation peals, including as a s ti g e ber for used unless the lloard of Ap.
C 'e Sec. 2312.(l) 1. General. In Seismic Zones No. 3 and No. 4 e. cry build-department, finds that such alternate me h d p vides protection and ing oser sis stories in height with an aggregate floor area of N>.000 square safety equivalent to t hat r equired herein. feet or more, and every building oser 10 stories in height regardless of l floor area, shall be provided with not less than three approsed recordinF l accelerographs. 2 I ocation. The instruments sha:I be located in the baseme :t. midpor. tion, and near the top of the building. Each instrument shall be located so that access is maintained at all times and is unobstructed by room con. ' tents. A sign stating " Maintain Clear Access to lhis Instrument" shall be posted in a conspicuous location. l 3. Maintenance. Maintenance and sersice of the instruments shall be {. provided by the owner of the building subject to the a;preval of the building official. Data rroduced by the instruments shall be made l available to the building official upon his request. l 4. Instrumentation of esisting buildings. All owners of esisting struc. ' tures selected by the jurisdiction authorities shall preside accessible space for the installation of appropriate earthquake rec.ording i struments. i Location.of said instruments shall be determined by the jurisdiction authorities. The jurisdiction authorities shall make arranger .ents to pro. side, maintain and service the instruments. Data shall be the property cf the jurisdiction, but copics of indisidual records shall be made as ai'a tie t: the public upon request and the payment uf an appropriate fee. SEISMIC ZONE TABULATION For Areas Outside the United States location Seismic Zone location %ismic Zone ASIA Keflasik 3 Turkey PACIFIC OCEAN AREA Ankara 2 Caroline Island i Karamursel 3 Koror. Pautau ATI. ANTIC OCEAN AREA Ponape f, Aiores 2 Johnston Island ; Bermuda i Kwajalein CARIBBEAN SEA Mariana Islands 3 Bahama Islands 1 Guam 1 Canalzone 2 Saipan 3 1.ceward Islands 3 7inian i Puerto Rico 3 Marcus Island Trin; dad Island 2 Okina w a 3 NORTil AMERICA Philippine Islands 3 Greenland I Samoa Islands 3 lectand Wak e Island 0 664 68 5 p..M y M ~~~ ygg ,. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , ( 'g [, h (k >) I D, 4.. .m.. ..; ; p ,,
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EXHIBIT .T from CBC's July 31, 1981, Interrogatories to the NRC Staff as to the safety Evaluation Report e
- 33. Please describe all centrol blade nalfunctions at the UC1A i reactor irdividually, by date, describing incident, and cutlining cause.
34 Cr what specific factual basis does Staff determine the control blade systen to be reliabic through the proposed license period? 3 c. What control blade ralfunctions is Staff aware of at other Argonaut reactors? Flease describe all such instances individually by date, reactor, description of incident. and cause.
- 36. % hat efforts has 5taff made to ascertain uhat control blade problems have been experienced by other Argonaut reactors?
- 37. Is a bicycle-type chain used in the control rod drive system?
If so, has it ever failed? Give details if known. 3P. Has the control blade logic system at UCLA ever failed? If so, please describe each such incident.
- 39. SER states **he graphite prism is surrounded by a biological shield of both conventional and heavy (magnetite) aggregate concretes."
3ER states further the shield was designed in the late 1950's.
- a. Reactor was designed in the late 1950's to operate at 10 kw in a building with no members of the public on floors above. Both conditions have since changed. Please detail with specificity all alterations to biological shield (and other shielding) since reactor was originally designed. In particular, please describe ':y drawing and description placement of all paraffin and lead.
- b. What is the density of the magnetite and the conventional concretes?
- c. What is the minimal thickness of the concrete shield?
- d. What level (in curies and in mrem /hr. dose contact) of activation products has the shield acquired to date,&what level could be expected by end of license period (year 2000) if operating licensed limit were met for the next 20 years?
- e. Applicant asserts maximum dose from streaming radiation outside biological shield is 200 mr/hr. Does Staff have any independent information by which to measure that assertion? If so, please provide said information.
/ (]h5)3ERstates, "This shield was designed in the late 1950's with an adequate factor of safety aFainst seismic forces for a Zone 3 earthquake area."
- a. Precisely what is the numerical size of the " adequate factor of safety"?
l ~
- b. Against what criteria does Staff determine the shield to have "an adequate factor of safety. "? Please specify the particular code sections, industry standards, or other standards.
-7
- c. Precisely hou tuch a'cceleration in the vertical & horizontal E *i,
- '-s) d,irections was the biolecical shield designed to withstand?
- d. *! hat is the largest capable fault near the reactor site?
- e. How close is the nearest apprcach of said fault to the reactor site?
- f. What is the accelerogram--that is, the shape of the curve of acceleration--for that fault at the reactor site in the ucrst case scenario?
- g. What is the maximun ground acceleration possible and maxinum possible magnitude in Fichter Scale for that fault?
- h. Show by calculation and reference how the maximun credible earthquake at the largest capable fault near the reactor site could be withstood by the reactor's biological shield.
- i. Have earthquake design standards for reactor components such as ,
biological shields changes since the late 1950s? If so, please detail how they have changed as such changes would relate to current standards for building a biological shield for a research reactor at the UCLA site.
- j. Does the reactor have a seismic scram device other than the embedded switches in the monolithic shield? If so, please detail the rature of said device.
SER t. 1-6
- 41. Please describe all notification received by the Conmission from UCLA at the time of the additional construction next to and on top of the reactor building in 1968. (Cive title and date of all dccuments related thereto
- 42. Please describe all analyses done by the Commission prior to 1974 of the effects of the new construction done in 1863 in terms of radiation protection to the public and seismic risk to the reactor. Give title and date of all documents related to said analyses.
- 43. Describe in detail all shielding additions made related to the new potential areas for public radiation exposure.
h4. Was the Connission notified in advance of said construction, and did it grant approval for the 1968 building additions? hf. Did the Commission analyze, prior to 1974, the effects to public health of having the Fath Science building ccnstructed next to the reactor building and the placement of the exhaust stack where it now is in relation to the IS air inlet? If so, please provide said analysit- if not, please explain why not.
I
*ka- "crecisitation, runoff cr risine ground water. " Flesse trovide all arilyses that have teen nade of risk cf flooding of the reactor fren causes other thar these. I*tervenor ir this question refers to the risk o' floodirt the reacter, not the risk from ficodirg it.
133. The paragraph about "Evdrology" does rot addrpss the question of co-taniration of rround water. Please provide all aralysis dore by 3taff rerardine that natter. 134. The pararraph about " Hydrology" does not address the question of whether uells exist in the vicinity or not. Please provide all information 3taff car produce as to the existence of wells on campus er in the vicinity. 3E? 2 6
- lle 337 states: "Though it is recognized that the UCLA canpus may te path of a active seismic fault, it is difficult to deternire ard verify the derree o' activity of such faults and the potential damage that can occur to the reactor or reactor building."
- a. Which particular active seismic fault nay UC1A be ir the path of?
'c. When was it nost recently active, what uas the size of the associated seisnic event (in Richter 3cale and in crourd acceleration maxinun),
what damage occurred fron said activity?
- c. Please provide the information asked in 135b atove for seistic activity prior to the most recent seismic event alorg that fault,
- d. Precisely why is it difficult to de'ternire and verify the decree of activity of such 'aultsi Particularly address why such determinatier is difficult in this case but has been accomplished in other reactor proceedines.
- e. Precisely why is it difficult to determine the potential damage that can occur to the reacter or reactor building from such faults?
Again, particularly address why such determination has been possible ir l other reactor proceedirgs. l f. Please provide all aralyses perforned by 3taff in an attempt to
" determine and verify the degree of activity of such faults and the potential darare that can occur to the reactor or reactor buildirg" and indicate ubat difficulties were encountered ir performirg such aralyses.
l
- g. Please shou by calculation ard reference the shape of the accelerogran of the 33E at this site, the maximum grourd motion (ir each direction) associated with it, ard the response spectra of the reactor and the reactor building in such a 33E.
- h. Please provide all reunark-type analyses perfer ed for this site.
- 1. Uhat is the maximun acceleration the reactor core is capable of sustaining without damage in the east-west, north-south, and vertical directions?
j
- j. h* hat is the specific potential event at the prircipal capatle j
fault which limits reactor design at the "CLA site? l
- k. What is the strain erergy release on that fault which is the limiting condition for reactor design at the UCLA site?
- 1. What is the accelerogram that would te associated with the event identified ir 135j above?
- m. What damage related to the 1971 earthquake was Applicant referrirg to ir its 1976 and 1977 Anrual (Specialized Activity) Reports?
- n. What other seisnically-related damage is Staff aware of for the reactor?
136. JE3 states: "in order to circunvent these facters, the staff obtained laterater" analyses cf the inpacts of earthquake induced cere disruption 7 Arreraut-type reacters. "
- a. Did Staff specifica11;* recuest dose estimtes and/cr fissicr product )
release estimates ir case of earthquake-irduced fracturing of the fuel? i
- b. Precisely where in each study can such estimates te found?
- c. I.os Alanos stud;' deals with cre earthquake effect--reduction cf coclirg to plates followirg scram; 3atte11e study considers triefly charges in core geometry, with arother consideraticn of floodirg, and elaeuhere a corsideratior of reactivity acciderts, fire, and chenical reactions, each considered separately. Please provide all analyses of fissier product release ard dose estinates corsequertial to an accident initiated W ear'thquake but which resulted in an occurrerce which combined two or nere of the effects the laboratory sttr!ies analyzed sirgly. 7cr example, reductier in coolirg followirg a temperature rise caused b/ earthquake-irduced reactivity insertion. Please provide all analyses per'ormed b/
cr for 3taff of such conmon-mode events: 1.e. the pcssible permutations of two or more everts caused br same initiating event (earthquake). SE*4 n. 3-1 137. Please provide all facts you can produce that support the statement that the reactor is "in awell drained locatior." 13 . a l aster's thesis prepared by Richard lee Rudmar entitled "3imulation g of Earthquake-Induced Vibrations in a UCIA Feactor Fuel 3urdle" dated 106 refers to the October 1966 vibration tests of producing accelerations of a maximum of .01 g rather than the .lg reported in the JER. Please irdicate which is the correct figure and show all faets you can produce to support that answer. . 130 Please show, be calculation and reference (including page it and paragraph) the extrapolation that produces acceleratiens of .5c. 140. 'n* hat analysis has Staff performed to verif;' the Applicant's conclusions from the "out-of-core fuel element vibration tests"? In particular, [ uhat anal,vsis has Staff undertaken as to the effects of pouer esci11ations in conjunction uith other seismically induced reactor effects? Please show said analyses. Ih1 Ooes 3taff consider the Uniform Building code in effect at the
.ine of the reactor's construction to include design considerations for seisnic forces adecuate for construction of a reactor in the Los Angeles region toda$I Flease show all "3C guides or other documents that indicate ~ adequate seismic design for reactor construction in seismically-active re61ons can be met by following the guidelines of the 1959 Uniform 3uilding Code.
142. SER states: "According to the in# creation in the application, neither the reactor facility or other campus structures suffered any structural damage due to the severe earthquakes in 1952 and 1971."
- a. Descrite all efforts made by Sta'f to ascertain the accuracy of the information from the Application cited above and provide all independent information obtain by Staff.
EXHIBIT K from Staff's March 17, 1982, Responses to CBG's Interro6atories as to the Safety Evaluation Rept.
?
Interrogatory Number 39 (d)-(e). No information available. InterrogEtoryNumber40 (a). Presumably the design requirements contained in the Uniform Building Code requirements include an adequate safety factor as do all structural design guides. For detailed information see the Uniform Building Code and associated references. , (b). Uniform Building Code - However SER indicates that public safety is only minimally affected by a seismically induced collapse of the superstructure onto the reactor. (c). Refer to the Uniform Building Code. (d)(e). Staff did not consider it necessary to determine the size or location of any faults'since the analysis in the SER assumed that a maximum damaging earthquake would occur. (f). See(d)(e). (g). Sea (d)(e). (h). See(d)(e). (1). No information. . (j). No. Interrogatory Number 43 None. Interrogatory Number 44 No. This was not required. Interrogatory Number 50 No
I _g-assumed tnat they would verify the various prevalent meter ~ological conditions from which subsequent calculations of dilution and concentration can be developed. Interrogatory Number 129 See correspondence referenced in responses 127 and 128. Interrogatory Number 132 (a). Two visits. (b). April and September, 1980. (c). I don't recall the total number of hours. Interrogatory Number 134 No infonnation. Well construction and/or use was not considered in the SER. Interrogatory Number 135 No infonnation. Interrogatory Number 138 I No information. Interrogatory Number 140
)( None.
l Interrogatory Number 141 SER jndicates a severe earthquake would have little effect on local
/ or regional safety from consequences to the UCLA reactor. Accordingly, no analyses were done.
Interrogatory Number 144 Unknown. i
EXHIBIT _L_ 'l fromCBG's4/20/81InterrogatoriestoApplicant 1 i s s b 4 s k w h O L i s-4
%s
i fromCBG's4/20/81 Interrogatories XVII -1 INTERROCATORIES AS TO CONTENTION XVII
" Seismic" Intervenor herein incorporates by reference pages i through vil of this submission relating to definitions and general provisions to be used in answering these interrogatories.
- 1. Have the person (s) preparing the answers to these interrogatories read the definitions and general provisions for these interrogatories which are set forth on pages i through vii above?
l
- 2. Has any person or persons, other than Applicant's attorneys, furnished information of any type whatsoever used by Applicant in answering the following interrogatories or provided other assistance in the preparation of the following interrogatories? If so,
- a. Please identify each and every such person.
l b. Please state the number of each interrogatory with respect to which j that person was consulted.
- c. Please indicate the nature of the information or other assistance i -
which that person supplied to Applicant in preparation of the answers to these interrogatories.
- 3. Page 10 of the NEL 1966-1967 Annual (Specialized Activity)
Report indicates "A U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey strong motion seismograph is presently housed in Engineering Unit I at UCIA. Early in 1968 the strong r motion seismograph will be moved to the Nuclear Energy laboratory and the t
XVII -2 reactor will be instrumented."
- a. How long prior to 1968 was the strong motion seismograph housed in Engineering Unit I at UCLA?
- b. Was it indeed moved to NEL in 1968?
- c. If the answer to 3b is negative, was it moved to NEL at some other time?
- d. If the answer to 3c is affirmative, when was it moved?
- e. Is the strong motion seismograph still in place at NEL?
- f. If not, where is it located?
- g. In what form (s) do data from that seismograph exist?
- h. Does Applicant have any records of data from that seismograph?
- 1. If the answer to h is affirmative, specify all such records Applicant has in 1cs possession, including the period of time covered by said records, and whether Applicant will produce said records absent a formal motion to produce?
i
- j. What other records of data from that seismograph exist or may exist but are or may be in the possession of others than Applicant, and in whose possession .are those records (including institution, name of custodian of records, address, and phone number. )?
- k. What is meant by the statement quoted in 3 above that "the reactor will be instrumented."? Precisely what kinds of instruments were to be associated with the reactor, and precisely where were they to be placed?
13 What other seismographs or other seismic instruments exist on the UCIA campus? Please specify the type of instrument, its precise location on the campus, the nature and period of time of records of data from said instrument, the custodian of said records, and whether Applicant i 1
XVII'-3 will produce said records absent a formal motion to produce. 5 Besides those instruments identified in response to interrogatories 4 and 3, specify all instruments which might provide data or other indications of the response of the NEL reactor and/or Boelter Hall to seismic activity,
- s. Please indicate the nature of the instrument, its precise location, the period of time it has or had been in place, the nature of the data produced and the form in which it is or was recorded, the custodian of such records, and whether Applicant will produce said records absent a formal motion to produce.
- 6. Page 10 of the 1966-1967 Annual (Specialized Activity) Report indicates that Professor Fatthieseen "is conducting a two-year vibration study of the reactor building and its associated laboratory. These experiments have been conducted while part of the building has been under construction and provide detailed information about the building response."
- a. What were the results of the two-year vibration study?
1
- b. Were any seismic vulnerabilities of the building or the reactor indicated or suggested during the study?
- c. If so, precisely what vulnerabilities were indicated or suggested?
- d. If no vulnerabilities were suggested or indicated during the study, ,
does Applicant contend the study was comprehensive and exhaustive enough to support a ecnclusion of no seismic vulnerability?
- e. What published reports, papers, articles, or books resulted from the study? Please specify date of publication & Jcurnal or publisher.
XVII -4
- f. What unpublished reports, papers, articles, or manuscripts resulted from the study? Will Applicant produce said materials absent a formal motion l to produce?
l
- g. What data was generated in the course of the study, in what form l 1s that data, who is its custodian, and will Applicant produce records of said data absent a formal motion to produce?
- 7. Page 9 of the 1966-67 Annual (Specialized Activity) Report refers to " vibration tests of reactor structures" and concludes: "Despite core accelerations reaching 0.1 C, the reactor operated without any anomalous behavior."
- a. What is the maximum core acceleration possible (in the N-S, E-V, and vertical directions) from a maximum earthquake affecting the reactcc-?
- b. If the maximum core accelerations possible are greater than 0.1 G, what relevance does Applicant contend the vibration tests have for indicating reactor response during a maximum earthquake?
- c. Did the scram meenanism shut the reactor down at any point during the vibration tests?
- d. If not, at what level of core acceleration would the reactor 1
scram automstically?
- e. How was the answer to 7d determined? Please provide all calculations, and indicate all studies, reports, and other documents that support the answer to 7d and indicate whether Applicant will produce said documents absent a formal motion to produce.
- f. Has the scram mechanism that is to shut the reactor down automatically in case of earthquake ever been tested? If so, please give dates of said tests, results of said tests, and indicate all documents related to said tests and whether Applicant will produce said documents absent a formal motion to produce.
l XVII -5 8 Pa6eIII/3-2ofApplicationstates,"TheUniformBuildingCode, representing the accumulated wisdom of the engineering profession in this field, takes specific account of the earthquake hazard. Virtually none of the structures built according to the specifications of this Code have suffered any d===ge from earthquakes."
- a. Do these two sentences appear vertatim in the UCIA 1960 Hazards Analysis on page 9?
- b. If the answer to 8a is affirmative, what specific efforts were made by Applicant to determine that the accuracy of that statement had not been altered in the twenty years since it had been written?
- c. When was the Uniform Building Code, according to which the UCIA reactor building was built, written?
- d. Has it been revised since? If so, please indicate the date of the revisions.
I
- e. Does the Uniform Building Code that was in effect at the time of the construction of the UCIA reactor and the reactor building take specific account of building code provisions for reactors and reactor buildings?
If so, please specify the sections of the Code that so apply.
- f. According to applicable regulations today, could a nuclear reactor building be built today according to the Uniform Building Code provisions in effect when the UCIA reactor was built?
- g. If the answer to 8f is affirmative, please cite the various regulation sections which support that answer.
- h. If the answer to 8f is negative, please cite the various regulation sections which support that answer.
- 1. Did Applicant assess the experience of Code-complying structures during the Imperial Valley earthquake of October 15, 1979, prior to making the above-quoted statement in its Application for license renewal?
XVII -6
- j. Did Applicant assess the experience of Code-complying structures during the Imperial Valley earthquake of October 15, 1979, prior to making the above-quoted statement in its Application for license renewal?
- k. If the answer to i or j is affirmative, please indicate how that assessment was made and what its results were.
- 1. If the answer to i or j is negative, please indicate on what basis Applicant determined the 1960 statement to still be applicable in 1980, absent a review of such recent earthquake experience.
- a. Please indicate all UCIA geologists, geophysicists, earth scientists, structural engineers, or other specialists in seismic strength of structures who we re consulted prior to making the above-quoted statement in 1980.and the nature of the information they provided.
- n. Please indicate all non-UCIA geologists, geophysicists, earth scientists, structural engineers, or other specialists in seismic strength of structures who were consulted prior to naking the above-quoted statement in 1980 and the nature of the information they provided.
- o. Please indicate all geologists, geophysicists, earth scientists, structural engineers, or other specialists in seismic strength of structures who have been consulted subsequent to the above-quoted statement being I submitted in the Application and the nature of the information they provided.
- 9. Page 9 of the 1966-67 Annual (Specialized Activity) Report refers to " vibration tests of reactor structures" and concludes: "Despite core accelerations reaching 0.1 C, the reactor operated without any anomaljmsbehavior."
a'. a Master's thesis prepared by Richard Lee Rudman entitled "SimulJtion of Earthquake-Induced Vibrations in a UCIA Reactor Fuel 3undle" dated 1968 refers to the October, 1966, vibration tests and
. =
XVII -7 states: "there were no scrams and power operation could be controlled manually or by the automtic controller despite the vibrations and peak accelerations in the core area of 0.01g". Which is the correct figure for peak core accelerations--0.01 G or 0.1 G? (Rudman quote from p. 1 of thesis.)
- b. Please indicate the cause of the discrepancy.
l l
- 10. The master's thesis by Rudman referred to in interrogatory 9a states: "Vitti has shown that increasing the space between adjacent fuel plates results in a positive reactivity change. The moderator gap between adjoining fuel plates is approximately one-half of the optimum moderating distance. The present plate spacing is a nominal 0.137 in, while the spacing required for optimum neutron thermalization was experimentally determined by Vitti to be 0.290 in." (p. 3) a."Since the reactor lattice spacing is optimized.for minimum crititical mass, any structural rearrangements which might result from a severeearthshockwouldreducereactivity."(Application,pageIII/3-2).
l l Please explain the apparent contradiction between the Rudman statement and that from the Application.
- b. If there is a contradiction, which statement is correct?
- c. On what basis does Applicant make its answer to 10b?
I d. Rudman indicates in his thesis that on one run of the 1966 vibration tests a power oscillation was detected. His thesis concluded that seismically-induced vibrations could cause positive reactivity effects and power changes, but that at the rate of core accelerations being studied the effects from that alone would not be catastrophic. How does Applicant respond to Rudman's conclusions of possible positive reactivity effects which contrast with Applicant's statement quoted in 10a above that any severe seismic effect would reduce reactivity?
XVII -8
- 11. PageIII/3-1oftheApplicationstates: "The nearest major fault is the Inglewood fault running in a north-westerly direction about two miles east of the campus."
- a. Smith and Matthiesen's " Vibration Testing and Earthquake Response of Nuclear Reactors" at page 16 indicates that the Inglewood fault is
" considered responsible for the 1933 Long Beach earthquake." Does Applicant take issue with this statement by Smith and Fatthiesen?
- b. If the answer to lla is negative, why was this information not included in the Application when discussing area seismology and the Inglewood fault in particular?
- c. Has Applicant assessed the ground motion, building accelerations',
degree of destruction, and other relevant seismic information from the 1933 Long Beach earthquake as these relate to the maximum earthquake possible along the Inglewood fault and the'possible effects of r,uch a maximum , earthquake upon the reactor structure and upon Boelter Hall? l l
- d. If the answer to lle is affirmative, please indicate the results of l that assessment and describe all documents in Applicant's possession which l
l provide information useful in that assessment and whether Applicant will produce said documents absent a formal motion to produce?
- 12. In the third floor equipment room, is there a domineralized water system or part thereof? if yes,
- a. describe precisely the system or the part thereof
- b. whether a tank of water is there and if so, the size of the tank and volume of water contained therein 1 -
13 On the eight floor in the area inside the windscreen wherein is contained the reactor exhaust stack, is there an airconditioning apparatus? If so,
D'II-18 and calculations and identify all documents from which this an-swer was taken. Will Applicant provide all such documents absent a formal motion to produce?
- e. What level of accelerations are the sample, core and top shielding secured against
- 1) in the upward vertical direction
- 11) in the E .I direction i44) in the N-3 direction iv) laterally
- f. Please provide all facts and calculations upon which the answer to e was made. Identify all documents upon which it -
was based. Will Applicant produce all such documents absent a fomal motion to produce?
- g. Please provide a drawing of secured experiments in an irradi-ation port showing the spacer and graphite plug and means of inserting the experiment into the port. What precisely is the spacer made of, and on what is it supported, and how is it secured?
- h. Please provide all facts, and calculations uoon which this l
l statement is based: " Cohesive forces sufficient to produce down-ward accelerations greater than 1 g are unlikely." Please identify all studies, experiments, articles, literature searches, reports, and other documents upon which that statement is based.
'cl4 ll Applicant produce said documents absent a for.al motion to produce?
- 1. The above-quoted statement concludes: "The sample would not
- Eove relative to the core." Please provide all facts and cal-culations upon which that conclusion is based. Please identify all documents known to Applicant which support or contradict that conclusion. Mill Applicant produce all such documents in
XVII-19 its possession absent a formal motion to produce?
- j. Has Applicant done any tests to confirm the statement quoted at the beginning of this interrogatory? If so, please@.dentify all such tests, their dates, and results: also any records that document those tests. Will Applicant produce those records absent a formal motion to produce?
- k. Would not an upward acceleration send the sample flying out of the reactor core? Please provide all facts and calculations that support or contradict your answer, and indicate whether you will produce said documents in your possession absent a formal motion to produce?
- 1. ',lould not the building falling on the reactor have a far greater impact force upon the reactor than the effect of the ground motion
( acceleration alone on the reactor?
- m. Could not the buming fall on the reactor from the first wave of the quake and land upon the reactor at the moment that the second wave or motion produced a downward acceleration or upward acceleration?
- n. Does Applicant contend that it is impossible for a dynamic effect of an earthquake event to include several forces acting upon the reactor in different directions within short intervals of each other, the resonance effect of which could jerk the sam-ple out of the core area?
- o. Could a " ping pong" type reaction occur that could cause the sanple to bounce out of the reactor core?
- p. Could an earthquake crush a sample container? If so, could the contents be squirted out of the core area, or trickle down out of the core area? Please give all facts, diagrans, and calculations in your po session s that relate to your answer
IVII-20 and identify all documents so related and indicate whether you will produce said documents absent a formal motion to produed
- q. Does Applicant contend that no acceleration greater than 1 g in any direction is possible at this reactor? If so, pro-vide all facts that support that contention, indicate all docu-ments that support it, and indicar,e whether you will produce said documents absent a fomal motion to produce?
- 27. ;lhat is the most likely accelemgram spectrum to which the reactor design must be tested?
- a. Has it been so tested?
- b. What document (s) is answers to d27 and 27a based on?
- c. Will Applicant produce said document (s) without a fomal i '
motion to produce? 28 Sir _ce Applicant has found a natural frequency within the reactor based on its experimental vibration testing, what dynamic tests has Applicant done at that frequency to simulate true earthquake dynamic conditions? l 29. What failure testing (testing to failure) of the reactor's l l control blade system has been done to assure that they cannot be made to break off, fallout, jump out, or other wise move relative to the reactor core during an earthquake or other severe shock, causing a sudden reactivity inserticn and a potentially destructive power excursion? 4. 30 'that analyses have been done indicating the force, twisting, shifting, bending, etc. the blades can withstand without breaking;
XVII-21
- a. .lhat analyses have been done showing what force would be necessary to bound the blades out of the core?
- b. 'that is the structurally weakest point for the control ,
blade system?
- c. '.that documents are the above answers to interrogator / 30-30b based and will Applicant produce the documents absent a formal motion to pmduce?
- 31. 'dould an earthquake causing the collapsing building to fall at 1 g onto the reactor structure cause additional accelerations of two or three g's?
- a. What failure testing and other dynamic analyses have been done to detemine what effect such an impact on the reactor i
coupledwith ground motion would have on the control blades and their position relative to the cora? (e.g. , flipping control blade up with an upward force and then smack it with a 3 g downward force and see where it flips up and breaks.)
- b. What documents is above answer based on and will Applicant -
produce said document (s) absent a fomal motion to produce? l l ! 32. ilhy is Applicant using the " seismic Zone" classification and the Uniform Building Code zoning system as a criterion for evaluation? l
- a. Jhat does the seismic zone classification system have to do with nuclear reactors?
- b. lJhat does the t'niform duilding Code have to do with nuclear reactors?
- c. .lhat document (s) are in .spplicant's possession that support or contradict the answerscontained above, and will Applicant produce said document (s) absent a formal =otion to produce?
IG-22
- 33. Ilhat is the~ principal capable fault which lhits reactor design at the UCLA site?
~
34 What is the specific potential event at that fault which limits reactor design at the UCLA site? ,
- s. What is the strain energy release on that fault which is the limiting condition for reactor design here?
- b. '.that is the accelerogram that would be associated with the event identified in f34 above?
- 35. Jhat data are in Applicant's possession regarding response of UCLA's structures to the 1971 earthquake? ilill Applicant produce said data absent a formal motion to produce?
- 36. 'lhat is the specific damage that occurred to the UCLA reactor from the 1971 earthquake referenced in the 1976 Annual (Specialized Activity)
Report on page 3: "The Feburary 1971 earthquake gave rise to minor problems that worsened with time and ultimately required a major maintenance effort in 1972."
- a. Precisely, detail each and every problem that the earthquake gave rise to.
- b. Precisely detail exactly how each problem worsened with time,
- c. Precisely detail the maintenance effort made in 1972 to deal with these problems,
- d. '.that docu=ents are in Applicant's possession (including but not li=ited to engineering change orders, maintenance logs, etc.)
that relate to a,b.and e above. '.lill Applicant produce said documents absent a formal motion to p:uduce?
iXII-23
- 37. Applicant's answer of 8-27-80 to 2c staff question 13 indicates that the control / shim blades are " firmly fixed to horizontal drive shafts."
- a. Precisely how are they fixed to the drive shafts?
- b. ht is the thickness and width of the blade at the point of connection to the drive shaft?
c 'dhat is the blade material at the point of connection with the drive shaft?
- d. dhat is the thickness and material composition of the drive shaft at the point of connection?
- e. '.that is the lifetime use of those blades before the connection with the drive shaft becomes questionable?
- f. .lhat force can that point of connection between blade and drive shaft successfully withstand?
- g. What failure testing experience and/or other tests and/or
~{ analyses is Applicant aware of regarding the connection point between the blades and the drive shaft?
- h. What documents are in Applicant's possession that above answers are based on, and will Applicant pmduce said documents absent a formal motion to produce?
- 28. ht is the thicYcness of the magnesium shmud wall around the control blades?
- 39. Applicant's 8-27-80 answer to NaC staff question 13 indicates "In regard to the ' frozen-blade' senario with all four blades locked, it may be remarked that the reactor has been operated in a simulation of this
= ode for many consecutive hours." Please detail the dates, nature, and results of this simulation and all documents relating to it. Mill Applicant produce
DII-24 said documents absent a for al motion to produce? 40 '.lhat were the accelergrams and maximum accelerations at UCLA associated with the '52 and '71 earthquakes and how would those compare to the expected m W m m possible? .that documents are in Applicant's possession that the answer is based on, and will Applicant produce said document (s) absent a formal motion to pmduce?
- 41. ilhat data does Applicant possess regarding the seismic experi-ence of the UCLA area during the Long deach earthquake of 19337 .ihat document (s) is answer based upon, and will Applicant produce said document (s) absent a femal motion to pmduce?
- 42. '.lere any buildings built according to Unifom Suilding Code i
standards damaged in Long Beach or. nearby because of the Long Beach earthquake? 4 hat document (s) is answer based upon, and will Applicant produce said document (s) absent a formal motion to produce? l 43. 'that is the failure point for the top floor of the reactor building-l what is the shear stress that can be withstood before it fails? ilhat document (s) is answer based upon, and will Applicant produce said document (s) absent t l a fomal rotion to produce? I 1 - 44 The UCLa Daily druin of April 30, 1980, indicates that " University architects are currently conducting a study of buildings on all UC campuses to rank them according to their need for seismic renovation." ! a '4 hat is the precise rank of the reactor building, and out of how many in the list?
- b. What specific findings were =ade about the reactor building?
( -
- c. 'Jhat is the precise name of the seismic study referenced in l
47II-25 the above Bruin article?
, d. What other seismic studies related to the reactor building and other buildings on the UCLA campus is Applicant aware of?
- e. Will Applicant produce those studies identified in c and d which are in its possession absent a fomal motion to produed
- 45. Jhat is the MW= Design Earthquake for which this reactor was originally built to withstand,
- a. Identify all documents upon which your answer is based.
- b. Is Applicant willing to produce all said documents in its possession absent a formal motion to produce?
- 46. What is the iM*= Design Earthquake Applicant currently believes reactor could withstand?
- a. Identify all documents upon which your answer is based,
- b. Is Applicant willing to produce all said documents in its possession absent a fomal motion to produce?
l i
- 47. 'dhat is the Maximum Earthquake the reactor could possibly experience given its siting?
- a. Identify all documents upon which your answer is based,
- b. Is Applicant willing to produce all said documents in its possession absent a fomal motion to produce?
l' I
XVII-26 in the Application
- 48. Precisely on which pages and which sections of pa6e,ddoes the information required by 10 CFR 50 34(b)(1) appear?
- a. Please provide all information required by 10 CFR 50.34(b)(1) that does not already appear in the Application.
- 49. A press statement released by the Chancellor of UC 3erkeley about the Applicant's research reactor there indicates a number of seismic studies and analyses and scenarios have been prepared about the reaction of the Applicant's reactor in 3erkeley to a potential seismic event.
Please describe with specificity the types of analyses Applicant has conducted regarding seismic questions of its Berkeley reactor. Please identify each and every such study or document, prepared by Applicant or by others, in Applicant's possession and whether Applicant will produce said documents absent a formal motion to produce. s
EXHIBIT h Applicant'sInterrogatoryAnswersdated5/20/81 I i l 1 l
\
l l l l
from Applicant's Interro6atory Answers dated 5/20/81. (CONTENTION XVII) Applicant's Response To: Interrogatory No. 3. a.
- b. It was moved to NEL, probably in 1968 but the date in not known for sure,
- c. Not applicable.
- d. Not applicable.
l e. 6
- l .
l t= M i 9 h 149 i
.~s 1
- h. Not to applicant's knowledge.
- i. Not applicable. '
)
I
- j. Unknown, but possibly the USGS, Menlo Park, i California.
)
- k. This likely pertains to accelerometers used in I comjunction with the vibration testing studies.
Applicant does not know precisely where they were 1 placed. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 4. Applicant is aware that the State of California Division of Mines and Geology placed approximately ten accelerometers in or on the Math-Science Structure directly'above the reactor building ( sometime in the late 1970 's. This activity'was not related to reactor operations but apparently to the fact that the Math-Sciences Building has been the subject of several dynamic response tests during and since its construction. To applicant's knowledge the earlier studies were reported in masters thesis which can probably
' be lo'cated in the engineering library under thenames R. Shannman, J. Scott and B. Bunce.
Applicant's staff have not examined this literature. To applicant's knowledge the Division of Mines is using Kinemetrics accelerometer systems, Model CR-1, although it is believed that no records have been generated yet by this system since its installation. Apparently the testing is part of a larger l sample testing of buildings in Los Angeles that is being conducted by the Division of Mines. H. 1 LaGesse of the Division of Mines ~ is l 150 l l
.m -
i l the individual who services the instruments and collects any data: California Divisions of Mines, 28110 Street, Sacramento. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 5. Applicant is unaware of any instruments other than those described in the vibration studies of C.B. Smith, those installed by the Bureau of Mines, and the USGS instrument. l a. Not applicable. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 6. a. M e results should be reported in "A l Simulation of Earthquake Effects on the UCLA I i Reactor Using Structural Vibrators" by Matthiesen and Smith, October 1966.
- b. _~~~__
- c. a s sumesp W RM W 995.
- d. 6
- e. Unknown.
- f. Unknown.
l Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 7.
- a. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and uncertain.
- b. h l c. A but see operating logs.
151
)
/
- d. 6 , but see any reports made from the study referenced in Interrogatory no. 6.
- e. Not applicable.
*% \
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 8. j l < a.- &~
- b. M
- c. g d M
- e. .
- f. espuma, 9 Not applicable.
I h. Not applicable.
. i. M
- j. M
- k. Not applicable.
- 1. There was no reason to believe that that 1
earthquake experience was relevant.
/ m. N
- n. g
- o. p Applicant's Response To Interroaatory No. 9.
- a. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that 152
l l I l l ct e
- b. See response above.
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 10.
- a. In practice, the mass is mass minimized under a constant volume constraint, and the Rudman/Vitti statement represents a more general situation.
Realization of the positive reactivity effect requires a physical expansion of the' core and the I' addition of water. There is no contradiction.
- b. Not applicable,
- c. See response to a, above.
d. t nd p., M-153
Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 11. v &
- b. The statement adds little to the discussion; in
. any case, applicant
, c. 6 ds N[tapplicable.
i Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 12. Yes.
- a. The system provides demineralized water upon demand.
- b. There are three vessels, one of which contains a resin de-ionizing bed. The system volume is not
(~ more than 100 gallons. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 13. Yes.
- a. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that the question seeks information which applicant cannot provide without conducting extensive scientific and engineering studies and evaluations. The applicant has neither the time, nor the personnel, nor the resources to conduct such studies.
- b. See response above. -
154
j Applicant 's Responise To Interrogatory No. ' 14. l l
- a. The floor panels are approximately 6 inches. '
- b. Reinforced concrete.
- c. Yes.
7 d. M
- e. Approximately 2000 square feet.
- f. Approximately 625 square feet.
. 9-
, h. g
.' i. g
, j.
- x. eumuum
- 1. m ummuk m.
- n. Reinforced concrete of approximately 150 pounds per cubic foot.
- o. Or ten tons.
- p. It is not.
9-l l r. pUnknown.
- s. p
- t. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that the information sought is privileged i
material that has been held in strict confidence by applicant in order to insure the security of the facility and its contents, including its critical records and documents. 155 l _ _ _ _
- u. Approximately three weeks. '
- v. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that it is. vague, ambiguous and uncertain.
I
- w. Probably the center.
Applicant's Response To' Interrogatory No. 15.
- a. Reinforced concrete.
- b. @ requires detailed examination of working drawings and specifications.
c. d. l
- e. ~
f. ( ( - m , h.
- i. nds pli-a-
or such . 1
- j. .
k.
- 1. s m.
156
7 o - l l ( n. o. p. Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 16. he e a-
- a. See response above. '
- b. Not applicable.
- c. Not applicable.
- d. None, 6 hough applicant m the Inglewood fault is the most likely seismological feature to cause a severely destructive earth-quake at UCLA.
l i Applicart's Response To Interrogatory No. 17.
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable,
- c. Not applicable.
- d. Not applicable.
157
; m .-
l 1 I' ! Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 18. I -
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable,
- c. Not applicable.
- d. Not applicable.
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 19. vY
- a. Not applicable.
i
- b. Not applicable.
- c. Not applicable.
- d. Not applicable.
\ (~ , Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 20. 1 I
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable.
- c. Not applicable.
- d. Not applicable. -
i Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 2{..
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable.
- c. Not applicable.
158 l
1 I Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 22.
)
The seismic scram interlocks are not specifically earth- l quake sensors, and are referred to by applicant as " closure sensors." They are conventional microswitches, six in number, wired in series, and are actuated by displacements of the shield blocks.
- a. Assuming the sensor is actuated, the sensor response time is almost instantaneous. The shut down time in' dictated by rod drop time (less than one second) or time to dump core water (approxi-
\
mately 20 seconds to dump 20% of the water). After either of these events, the power level - will decay exponentially from the prompt-drop level on an 80 second period. (. '
. b. Displacements of approximately one-eighth to three-sixteenths inches will actuate the sensors,
- c. Not to applicant's knowledge.
- d. Circuit continuity is checked prior to each reactor start-up. Positioning is checked whenever shield blocks are moved for core maintenance.
- e. Not applicable.
- f. Not to applicant's knowledge.
l g. None, except for what applicant has mentioned in I response to these interrogatories.
- h. None.
- i. No.
l l 159 ,
j . I
- j. Yes.
- k. Unknown.
- 1. None.
ra. Applicant is undecided at this time and will make a determinaton as to the documents it will produce only after a request for production is ~ received. l Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 23. \ i M-l l ( M-
- Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 24.
eumuummuumusum - e. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 25.
- a. -
- b. 6
- c. N 160 >
.m. .
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 26.
- a. Yes,
- b. Those that would bond (in tension) the foundation to any underlying soil that might be hypothesized i i
to accelerate downward at more than one g. 1 l l c. g Applicant is undecided at this time , and will make a determinaton as to the documents it will produce only af ter a request for production is received.
- d. Anything less than one g. The facts are normally expressed by the physical laws of Sir Isaac Newton (164 2-1727) , English mathematician and natural philosopher.
- e. d.
- f. Not applicable.
- g. See Exhibit B.
l h. It is a general observation to the effect that 1 most soils have negligible tensile strength. l . I instead on the absence of any facts, information or documents which would contradict applicant's response. 161
- i. It is a general conclusion based upon the stated Premises and d
eliMEM888"'"- l
- j. l k.
Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and uncertain. 16
- m. y
- n. p
- o. Applicant objects to the question on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous and uncertain.
/ p. M l
- q. e -
(, Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 27.
/
e hout 1, I l l Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 28. s Applicant 's Response Tb Interrogatory No. 29. 162
l Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 30. 4.==== mose!!gR. Emmem== Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 31. aw
- b. Not applicable.
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 32. Nu; the items are merely relevant factors..
' b.
- c. None.
i Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 33. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 34.
~
M b. Not applicable. 163 l 1 l 1
, Applicant's Response Tb Interrogatory No. 35.
To applicant's knowledge the only data that may be in existence relates to routine maintenance reports, work orders, etc. ; Applicant is undecided at this time and will make a determinaton as to the documents it will produce only after a request for production is received. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 36. Applicant's staff believes that the attribution of a water leak to the earthquake was found, upon core entry, to be either erroneous or at.least not clearly related to the earthquake. Applicant's staff believes that the leak source was ultimately traced to corrosion in piping that was embedded in concrete below (~ the core rather than piping or fuel box failure within the core. To the extent that the applicant has knowledge of the information requested it is contained in applicant's records and documents, although such records and documents are likely to be incomplete particularly for the earlier years of reactor operations. The following records and documents are the main sources of such information as applicant has available: documents no. 1, 2, 3, Sa and 10.
- a. See response above.
- b. See response above.
j c. See response above. Applicant has observed that the imbedded piping was abandoned and new piping was substituted by core drilling for passage ' 164
<s -
through the concrete. New fuel boxes were built to adapt to the new piping.
- d. See response above. Applicant is undecided at this time and will make a determinaton as to the documents it will produce only after a request for production is received.
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 37.
- a. The information requested can be found in the following records and documents: document no.
41.
- b. See response above.
- c. See response above.
I
- d. See response above. *
- e. Unknown.
- f. Unknown.
- g. None.
- h. See a above.
, Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 38.
Approximately one-eighth inch. Applicant's Response Tb Interrogatory No. 39. To the extent that the applicant has knowledge of the information requested 1.t is contained in applicant's records and documents, although such records and documents are likely to be 165
i<. l l l incomplete particularly for the earlier years of reactor opera-tions. The following records and documents are the main sources of such informa'. ion as applicant has available: document no. 1. Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 40. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 41. Applicant 's Response To Interrogatory No. 42. Not to applicant's knowledge; it is unlikely that the Uniform Building Code was in effect. - (.. Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 43. t Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 44. The Daily Bruin article is in error. The University has contracted with outside consultants to prepare a study of UC build-ings. The study is to establish priorities for the funding of seismic studies by the state in the future. The current, study is not a seismic study at all. The study is in progress but it is expected that the study will be completed and reported to the state within the next several months. The buildings will apparently be ranked according to square footage, occupancy,-type construction, l l 166
reconstruction costs and other factors. The entire " findings" for each building will be contained on a single line entry and will consist only of the type factors mentioned above. On the basis of the rankings the state will decide for which buildings it will fund seismic studies,
- a. See r6spdn e above.
- b. See response above.
- c. Unknown.
- d. None.
- e. Applicant is undecided at this time and will make a determinaton as to the documents it will produce only af ter a request for production is received.
(. Applicant's Rcsponse To Interrogatory No. 45. MM
- a. Not applicable.
I-
- b. Not applicable.
l l ( Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 46. 1 m
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable.
Applicant's Response Tb Interrogatory No. 47. 167
EXHIBIT SHEET Exhibit A Declaration of Dr. Sheldon C. Plotkin B Photographs taken by Dr. Plotkin C FEMA Report selections D Estimates of the Risks Associated with Dam Failure 6'/selections E Photos of 1971 Olive View Hospital Quake Damage armi related : items from Second Report of the Governor's Earthquake Council l F Abstract from Fal W ornia Division of Mines and Geology l Special Report 114 "A Review of the Geology and Earthquake History of the Newport-Inglewood Structural Zone, ; Southern California", 1974 l G portion of NUREG/CR-2198 H 1958 Uniform Building Code I 1979 Uniform Building Code J portions of CBG's July 31, 1981 Interrogatories to NRC Staff as to the SER K portions of Staff's responses to said Interrogatories L portions of CBG's 4/20/81 Interrogatories to Applicant ,, / M portionsofApplicant's5/20/81responsestosaidInterrogatories u N portions of Preli=4=7 Geologic Environmental Map of the Greater Los Angeles Area, California (A Study Pertinent to Nuclear i Facility-Siting and Design) prepared by National Center for Earthquake Research, USGS, prepared on behalf of USAEC,1970 g 0 Map of the Newport-Inglewood Structural Zone and Other Structural Features of the Los Angeles Area, Southern Californis, by California Division of Mines and Geology,1974 P Map of Beverly Hills Quadrangle Special Studies Zone hr 10/ California Division of Mines and Geology l
$/preparedunderAECcontractbyUCLASchoolofEngineering two of the authore were 'Ihomas Hicks, the late Director of NEL, and David Okrent, formerly on Radiation Use Committee, currently on Radiation Safety Committee, l
at UCIA. l 7/ emphasis has been added by underlinin6 key admissions 8/ reactor site location has been added by an "+" mark 9/reactorsitelocationhasbeenaddedbyan"+" mark g the map only shows the faults within the special studies zone, marked by straight-line segments connecting encircled turning points: in this case, all that is shown is one trace of the Newport-Inglewood Fault, indicating its proximity to UCIA and possible even closer proximity due to uncertainties about its endpoint. s ,
. g
- a. Not applicable.
- b. Not applicable. _
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 48. No information is required.
- a. Not applicable.
Applicant's Response To Interrogatory No. 49. Not to the knowledge of applicant's staff.
, , , _ , .__..wame--ew - - - e--*
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