05000285/FIN-2013008-36
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Finding | |
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| Title | Deficient Evaluation of NRC Bulletin 88-04, Strong Pump Weak Pump Due to Failure to Consider the Effect of AFW Pumps Discharge Check Valves Leakage |
| Description | The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to properly evaluate NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, regarding the auxiliary feedwater pumps. Specifically, from November 28, 2010, through February 2013, the licensee failed to properly evaluate NRC Bulletin 88-04, for strong pump, weak pump, interaction regarding auxiliary feedwater pumps FW-6 and FW-10. The evaluation failed to consider pump-to-pump interaction that may result due to pump discharge check valve leakage. In addition, the licensee failed to re-evaluate the condition after surveillance testing performed on November 28, 2010, and September 1, 2012, identified leakage past both pump discharge check valves. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR 2013-04680 and CR 2013-04806. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program; and (5) did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding or severe weather event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that appropriate corrective actions were promptly implemented |
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
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| Report | IR 05000285/2013008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Klett C Smith M Davis J Josey C Bickett G Warnick M Hay J Brand J Groom M Keefe R Latta W Schaup J Watkins B Hagar A Allen J Wingebach K Martin L Wilkins S Morrow R Deese F Ramirez |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.1, Identification |
| INPO aspect | PI.1 |
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Finding - Fort Calhoun - IR 05000285/2013008 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Fort Calhoun) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Fort Calhoun)
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