ML20196B156
| ML20196B156 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | Leugers M HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6615 OL-3, NUDOCS 8806300204 | |
| Download: ML20196B156 (146) | |
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'88 JLil 27 P6 '43 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA .cc NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [0Cdf1N., SY;e i /rg-e:v.w.
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing BW In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shorek:n Nuclear Power Station ) (School Bus Driver Issue)
Unit 1) ) (Hospital ETEs)
LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE REMAND ISSUES OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVCR ROLE CONFLICT AND HOSPITAL EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETEs)
Hunton & Willimms 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 June 22,1988 8806300paa ono6N PDR ADUC K 05000413 g I'DR g h
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing reard In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shorehan Nuclear Power Station ) (School Bus Driver Issue)
Unit 1) ) (Hospital ETEs)
LILCOS PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE REMAND ISSUES OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVER ROLE CONFLICT AND HOSPITAL EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETEs)
Hunton & W1111mma 707 East Main Stmet P.O. Box 1535 Richmanti, Virginia 23212 1
June 22,1988 d
LILCO, June 22,1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
Defore the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) (School Bus Driver Role Conflict)
Unit 1) ) (Hospital ETES)
LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE REMAND ISSUES OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVER ROLE CONFLICT AND HOSPITAL EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (ETEs)
I. Introduction This is a Partt. anitial Decision on offsite emergency planning issues pertaining to the application of the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) for an operating 11-cense at Unit 1 of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Shoreham). The decision ad-dresses the adequacy of the number and availability of school bus drivers for the evacu-ation of school children and the adequacy of the evavation time estimates (ETEs) for three hospitals in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. The number and availability of school bus drivers and the hospital ETEs are evaluated for compliance with NRC regulatory standards on emergency planning codified in 10 CFR S 50.47, Ap-pendix E, and the criteria of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. Also, the dictates of the Appal Board in Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986), and the Commission in Long Island Lighting Co.
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383, 395-99 (1987), are required to be considered. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were sub-mitted by LILCO, New York State, Suffolk County, and the Town of Southampton
(Intervenors) and the Nuclear Regulatory Staff (Staff). - All of the proposed findings of
-fact and conclusions of law have been considered. Any such finding or conclusion not incorporated directly or inferentially in this Partial Initial Decision is rejected as unsupported in fact or law or unnecessary to the rendering of this decision.
II. Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers A. History of the Issue
- 1. Phase I "Role conflict" of emergency workers has been under consideration by this Board off and on for about six years. Role conflict as a postulated problem in a radiological emergency.was first raised as part of Suffolk County's. Contention EP 5 in the "Phase I"
-(onsite) portion of this proceeding. See Appendix B to September 7,1982 Supplemental Prehearing Conference Order (Phase I - Emergency Planning), slip op at 5-6 (Oct. 4, 1982), listirg the "admitted phase one contentions."
In Contention EP 5 Suffolk County contended that LILCO had failed to provide reasonable assurance that "onsite assistance from offsite agencies would be forthcom-ing." In addition, the contention alleged that LILCO had not demonstrated adequately that it would be able to augment its onsite emergency respnse staff in a timely man-ner. The first reason alleged for these shortcomings was in EP 5.A:
A. It does not appear that LILCO has addressed or analyzed l the possibility that offsite personnel and/or onsite augmenting I
personnel expected to report to the Shoreham site for emer-( gency duty, would fall to report (or report in a timely manner)
{
because of conflicting family (or other) duties that would i
arise in the event of a radiological emergency.
Ld. slip op. at 6.
Suffolk County filed written testimony on this contention. Direct Testimony of l
l Dr. Kai T. Erikson and Dr. Stephen Cole on Behalf of Suffolk County Regarding
Contention EP SA (Role Conflict] (Oct. 12, 1982). That written testimony addressed LILCO personnel who might be offsite at the time of an accident but who might be ex-pected to report to the Shoreham site, as well as non-LILCO personnel such as "volun-teer fire departments." Ld. at 4. The Suffolk County Phase I testimony also explic!tly addressed school bus drivers:
Suffolk County recently undertook a survey of volun-teer firemen and school bus drivers, both groups of which could be necessary to perform important emergency services during a radiological emergency. School bus drivers, for in-stance, could be expected to drive school children or persons without transportation away from a potential area of danger.
Likewise, volunteer firemen are likely to be assigned evacua-tion, ambulance, rescue or fire fighting duties.
Ld. at 7-8. As attachments to that testimony .the County witnesses included the September 1982 survey of volunteer firemen and the September 1982 survey of school bus drivers.
LILCO also presented "Phase I" written testimony on role conflict. Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro, Russell R. Dynes, Dennis S. Mileti, and James Rivello on Behalf of the Long Island Lighting Company on Phase I Emergency Plannirg Contention 5(A) -
Role Conflict (Oct. 12, 1982). Among other things, LILCO's witness Russell Dynes, head of the Disaster Research Center reported that in over 6000 interviews by the DRC, he had been unable to determine an example of non-reporting, or of leaving one's emer-gency responsibility. Id. at 8.
None of this Pice I testimony was heard because of the Board's dismissal of the i
. Phase I contentions. The explicit inclusion of role conflict of school bus drivers in Suffolk County's Phase I testimony brings the issue within the scope of the Board's dis-missal of the Phase I contentions, a decision that was affirmed by the Appeal Board.
l l Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), LBP-82-115,16 NRC 1923, l 1936 (1982), aff'd in princloal Dart, ALAB-788,20 NRC 1102,1176-79 (1984). This would l
l l
l 1
be an independent reason for denying a hearing on this issue. Nevertheless, as directed by the Appeal Board, the Board has reached the merits, as discussed below.
- 2. 1983-84 Hearings In ' Phase II" of this proceeding, Suffolk County again raised the issue of role con-filet of emergency workers. This time the issue was raised in Contention EP 25. Con-tention 25 alleged that "a substantial number of emergency workers relied upon under the LILCO Plan will resolve such conflicts by attending to their other obligations prior to, or in lieu of performing the emergency functions assigned to them by LILCO." 21 NRC at 981.1 Contention 25 in its various subparts covered the following emergency personnel and auxiliaries: all LILCO personnel assigned to perform emergency response functions (25.A); Brookhaven National Lab personnel (25.B); school bus drivers (25.C); teachers, other school employees, and crossing guards (25.D); ambulance drivers and people providing "medical and paramedical support services in the buses, ambulances, railroad cars and airplanes to be used in evacuating special facilities and handicapped persons" and Long Island Railroad personnel, private airplane crews, and employees of a lumber company (25.E); and relocation centers staff including the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and groups such as "churches, industries, and select volunteers" (25.F).
21 NRC at 981-83.
As to all of these groups of people who were stillincluded in the plan at the time of the hearing, the Board decided in LILCO's favor in its. Partial Initial Decision, Lo_ng n Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12,21 NRC 644, l 1/ Contention EP 11 on "conflict of interest" also addressed role conflict, this time l the alleged conflict between the role of LILCO employee and the role of emergency manager. See PID,21 NRC at 964.
671-79 (1985) (hereinaf ter cited as "PID"). School bus drivers were included in this find-ing. PID,21 NRC at 675-76,859.
- 3. Appeal Board Review The Intervenors, now including New York State, sought review of the Board's Partial Initial Decision. In ALAB-832, the Appeal Board affirmed the Board with re-spect to role conflict of all these grouos, including school teachers, except school bus drivers. It remanded the issue of role conflict of school bus drivers. A LAB-832, 23 NRC 135,149-54 (1986). In particular, the Appeal Board concluded that the Board had erred in excluding testimony relating to the September 1982 survey of voluntee-firemen. The Appeal Board s Jd that, in its view, "the results of a survey as to the po-tential for role conflict among firemen, if they had been part of the emergency re-sponse, would provide insight into the likely course of conduct of school bus drivers."
M. at 153 (footnote omitted). The Appeal Board distinguished LERO personnel on '.ne ground that they had undergone considerable training with regard to their required du-ties and responsibilities. M. at 153 n.64. It distinguished teachers and health ca:e per-sonnel on the grounds that they "essentially continued to perform their regular duties during a Shoreham emergency." Ld. at 153 n.65.
In concluding that the Licensing Board should consider the September 1982 fire-man poll, the Appeal Board relied on its earlier opinion in the Zimmer case. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 772 (1983). The Appeal Board had found in Zimmer that there was evi-dence in the record that "raises a serious question as to whether bus drivers could be depended upon to carry out their responsibilities in these counties in such an emergen-cy." ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 772 (1983). Apparently this evidence was the testimony l
of New Richmond Life Squad Assistant Chief Feldkamp.2/ M., citing Feldkamp, ff. Tr.
2/ Mr. Feldkamp's Zimmer testimony is Attachment 3 to these propcsed findings.
1
5467, at 2-3, and Tr. 6461. Chief Feldkamp had testified that "approximately 95% of
- he New Richmond life squad personnel and 25% of the fire personnel have indicated that they will not respond to the Zimmer station in the event of a nuclear emergen-cy."E Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-47,15 NRC 1538,1597 (1982). Me. Feldkamp's opinion was apparently based on conversations with his co-workers.SI There is ne indication in the Zimmer decisions (either LBP-82-47 or ALAB-727) that there was any testimony about human behavior by experts. Indeed, in Zimmer the role conflict issue "simply was not considered at the hearing stage." ALAB-727,17 NRC 760, 772 (1983). The Zimmer Licensing Board did find, however, that the historic record showed that role abandonment had not been a problem:
- 78. While many witnesses expressed doubts about whether volunteers would respond to a Zimmer emergency, some also testified that volunteers h1ve always responded to calls to duty in the past (citations omitted). This is consis-tent with the testimony of Applicants, FEMA, Kentucky and Ohio that, as a general proposition, volunteers readily respond during emergencies (citations omitted), as well as the 3/ Mr. Feldkamp also believed that the community would overreact and probably panic. Feldkamp, ff. Tr. 5467 in Zimmer record (Doc. No. 50-358), at 4.
3/ "During the course of my involvement as both a life squadsman and fireman in association with the members of the life squad and firemen of the Village of New Richmond, approximately 95% of the life squadmen have indicated and (sic) will not respond in a volunteer emergency response role in the event of a Zimmer Station acci-dent. As to. firemen, approximately 25% will not respond in an emergency role."
Feldkamp, ff. Tr. 5467.(Doc. No. 50-358), at 2-3, Mr. Feldkamp was "talking mostly of lifesquad people." JTr.'5475. Later on he testified ' the people that told me that they would not respond are life squad people." Tr. 5491.
The New Richmond life squad had 16 members and the fire department had 30 members. M. at 1. Four people were a member of both, M. at 1-2, so a total of 42 peo-ple were involved,38 on either the life squad or the fire department and four on both.
l l Mr. Feldkamp testified that he himself, as long as he was able to monitor himself and the surroundings, would perform the duties as well as he was able to. Tr. 5476. But he said he would first get his f amily out of town. Tr. 5492.
l t . _. _ _ _ _. ._ _
testimony of some of the volunteers thamselves (citation omitted).
_Zimmer, LBP-8'i-47,15 NRC 1538,1599178 (1982). The Zimmer remand was never heard because the plant was canceled.
- 4. Remand On remand, LILCO moved for summary disposition of the school bus driver role conflict issue. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of Contention 25.C ("Role Con-flict" of School Bus Drivers), Oct. 22, 1987. The Board denied the motion for a number of reasons. Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Applicant's Motion of October 22,1987 for Summary Disposition of Contention 25.C Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers)(Dec.
30, 1987). We held that the -Appeal Board expected.its remand directive to be weighed in the environment of a litigated proceeding. Id., slip op, at 4.
LILCO then moved for a ruling i_n limine to define the scope of the remanded issue. The Board granted LILCO's motion.E! Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO Motion In Limine and Motion to Set Schedule) (Feb. 23, 1988). We held that "questions concerning availability of buses, reception centers for school children, and evacuation time estimates are not within scope of remanded bus driver issue." Ld., slip op. at 4.5/
The basic issue to be explored by the Board is whether, in light of the potential for role conflict, a sufficient number of school bus drivers can be relied upon to perform emer-gency evacuation duties. Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Applicant's Motion of October 22, 1987 for Summary Disposition of Contention 25.C Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers) at 5 (Dec. 30,1987); see also Tr. 20,052-56,20,068 (Judge Gleason).
1/ When a licensing board receives a case back on remand it has jurisdiction only over issues remanded to it. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-526, 9 NRC 122,124 (1979); Portland General Electric Co.
(Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-534,9 NRC 287,289-90 n.6 (1979).
l f/ Likewise, many other issues about early dismissal, sheltering, and evacuation of school children were litigated earlier and not remanded. See PID,21 NRC at 855-74.
l
- Six days of hearings were held on this issue. On May 16,17,18, and 19 LILCO presented its witnesses Douglas M. Crocker, Robert B. Kelly, Michael K. Lh fall, and Dennis S. Mileti. On May 26 Suffolk County presented testimony of several school board officials: Bruce G. Brodsky, Edward J. Doherty, Howard M. Koenig, Nick F. Muto, Robert W. Petrilak, Anthony R. Rossi, J. Thomas Smith, and Richard N. Suprina. On June 2 Suffolk County presented testimony by sociologists Stephen Cole, Ralph H.
Turner, and Allen H. Barton. The State of New York, the NRC Staff, and FEMA2I pres-ented no witnesses.E By contrast, the original hearings on role conflict of all the groups of people covered by the contention in 1983 and 1984 were held on seven hearing days.E In 1983 Suffolk County's prefiled written testimony, covering all the groups covered by the con-tention, consisted of only 101 pages of written testimony (not counting attachments).
On remand the County's written testimony covering school bus drivers alone was 140 pages, exclusive of attachments. In short, the Board feels that it has gi the re-manded issue a thorough airing, even though some of the County's testimony was out-side the scope of the remanded issue and therefore was stricken.
l 2/ FEMA's witness Mr. McIntire did attempt to address role conflict of school bus drivers in 1983. He testified that training about radiation plus being equipped with per-sonal dosimetry helped bus drivers in the Indian Point plan mitigate their fears that they would be contaminated. . Tr. 2142-43,2157-58 (McIntire). Extra compensation also helped. Tr. 2143-44 (McIntire). LILCO testified at the time that it would offer basic radiological training to school bus drivers and reim* m them for the time spent in such training. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 35; Tr. 96v at,1172 (Weismantle).
B/ Attachment 1 to these proposed findings is a list of witnesses; Attachment 2 is a list of evidentiary exhibits.
9/ Dec. 6-7 (Cordaro et al.), Dec. 8 (Dilworth et al.), Dec.12 (Erikson and Johnson),
Dec.15-16 (McIntire),1983, and Jan. 25,1984 (Petrilak et al.).
1 l
B. Background of the Role Conflict Issue
- 1. Other Cases "Role conflict" has been litigated and resolved in several other cases. Some of -
the same witnesses who testified before this Board have testified in those other cases.
In each case the licensing boards have concluded that role conflict was not an obstacle tc a full power operating license.
In 1981 role conflict was addressed in the Three Mile Island case. MetroDolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211, 1486-89 (1981), aff'd in princloal part, CLI-83-22,18 NRC 299 (1983). On the "larger issue" of role conflict, the TMI board concluded that there was no evidence that contra-vened the finding that there would be an adequate number of emergency workers.14 NRC at 1489. The intervenors'"main concern," said the board, appeared to be "that the problem will lie in reliance on parents of small children to work during the evacuation process, in particular those mothers who are school bus drivers." Id.
The TMI board also found as follows:
1815. E3 sed on our detailed review of the evidence befors us, we find no reason to believe that the majority of the emergency workers in the area surrounding Three Mile 131and will do other than to perform their assigned duties in the event of an emergency, nuclear or otherwise. Therefore, while we understand the concern of the intervenors we reject the contention that there is no assurance that school bus driv-l ers will perform as assigned. In doing so, we recognize that
! . school bus drivers are not necessarily as likely as emergency workers in general to be available during an emergency, in that some or even many school bus drivers are homemakers who may have cor.flicting f amily responsibilities. However, given the void in the evidence on this particular point, and the general evidence of availability of emergency workers in other emergencies, in our subjective judgment v.e do not be-lieve that so many school bus drivers will fall to perform their duties that the evacuation of schools will be disrupted. Given proper procedures in place to provide the buses, we believe it l 1s highly unlikely that back-up davers, such as school teach-ers or police personnel, cannot be quickly utilized to make up any deficit of expected schcol bus drivers. While it may be
arguably prudent to provide now for back-up drivers, it will '
always be arguably prudent to provide more in planning for an emergency. In this instance, we believe that planning is not required for a specific list of back-up drivers, as there are many sources of such drivers available on short notice, cm, through the school's own resources (teachers), police person-nel, and through the County Transportation Coordinator.
14 NRC at 162911815.
The TMI board discussed the evidence about school bus drivers in considerable detail. 14 NRC at 1631-41. In particular, the board considered a series of interviews with, among others, school superintendents. Ld. at 1632. Apparently these interviews produced statements, like those from Intervenor witnesses in the Shoreham case, that school bus drivers could not be relied on. For example, one school superintendent ap-parently commented that "(s]ome bus drivers evacuated early during the last crisis."
M. at 1635 n.202. A statement by one bus company representative that 108 of his com-pany's 110 bus drivers had reported for duty during the TMI-2 accident did not find its way into the TMIintervenor's report. M. at 1634.
The TMI board held that written school plans should be filed promptly. M. at 1638, 1640. As a condition of restart, the NRC Staff was directed to certify to the Commission when school plans had been completed and reviewed for adequacy. M. at 1706. Role conflict was not an obstacle to full-power operation.
Role conflict was also litigated in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nucle-ar Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756,767-68 (1982), aff'd, C1.I-84-13, 20 NRC 267 (1984). The~ focus of concern in Diablo Canyon was on "volunteers" or gen-eral workers such as gas station attendants and b'as drivers. M. at 768. The board ac-cepted that some general workers might not report for duty. Ld. But it also found suf-ficient "mitigating circumstances":
We are convinced that most responsible workers world re-solve their conflicts in a common-sense fashion by seaing to their families' safety snd then r7 porting for duty.
M. at 768,805 E In its specific findings the board found that Experience from actual emergencies c.es not indic.ite that emergency workers fail to perform their duties during an emergency.
Ld. at 805 (citing Dr. Kai Erikson and another witness). The board noted that no special emergency training would be given volunteer workers (described as performing noncritical but useful functions). Ld. at 805 1 45. And the board found that a scientific sociological survey of emergency workers as advocated by Drs. Erikson and Johnson was not necessary. Ld.146.
In the Indian Point proceeding, New York State witnesses testified that profes-sional emergency workers do not forsake their duties. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811, 959 (1983) (citing Davidoff/ Czech),E reviewed, CLI-85-6,21 NRC 1043 (1985). The board said that there remained a concern about teachers and bus drivers, but that these conflicts could be readily resolved by proper planning and implementation.18 NRC at 959. If letters of agreement were ob-tained for bus drivers, presumably those drivers would not be subject to, or would have resolved, conflicting duties. M.E 1_0/ Similarly, making prior arrangements for one's family was referred to by a wit-ness in the Th-ee Mile Island case as "the old common sen e scenario." Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211, 1489 (1981).
f M/ The New York State witnesses also testified in favor of an early dismissal plan.
18 NRC at 983-84,985.
M/ FEMA had found a defielency in the lack of agreements for Westchester County bus drivers.18 NRC at 930,935,955.
Similarly, a decision by the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulatlan in the Fermi case noted that in the past volunteers have performed well both in drills and in real, nonradiological emergencies. The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermt Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), DD-84-11,19 NRC 1108,1116-18 (1984) (it is the experience of FEMA and the NRC in evaluating well over 100 full-scale emergency preparedness exercises
- at nuclear power plants across the country that volunteer emergency workers willingly l
l participate in and respond to simulated radiological emergencies, as they do to actual l
emergencies involving toxic and hazardous materials, id. at 1116). The Director found reasonable assurance that Fermi 2 would meet applicable regulatory requirements and guidance, id. at 1126-27.EI More recently, role conflict of both school teachers and bus drivers was litigated in the Limerick case. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1
& 2), LBP-85-14, 21 NRC 1219,1292-95,1320,1326, remanded, ALAB-836,23 NRC 479 (1986). With respect to bus drivers the board found:
342. The evidence in the record of this proceeding supports the historic record that drivers will perform assigned functions. FEMA witneses testified that the history of re-sponse to emergencies shows a willingness by individuals to perform their duties and that individuals who have a clear un-derstanding of their roles in an emergency plan do not aban-don these roles in time of emergency. A comprehensive training program for bus drivers is needed to provide a clear l understanding of what is required. FEMA was unable to make M/ The Director of the NRC's Office of Inspection and Enforcement declined to in-stitute S 2.202 proceedings to revoke the license at the Davis-Besse plant despite a bus driver union's nonbinding resolution not to participate in planning for evacuation.
Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), DD-86-17,24 NRC 753 (1986).
l
_C_f. Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-68, 6 NRC 1127,1158 (1977), affirmed, ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978)
(finding that the emergency plan could contain littl? more than it did to assure that l utility employees would remain at their jobs or to assure the response of offsite emer-gency organizations).
any determinations as to the adequacy of the ongoing bus driver training because it was not familiar with the specifics of such training. Asher and K! nard (Admitted Contentions),
ff. Tr. 20,150, at 26-27. The lesson plans that have been re-viewed by FEMA are, however, for the most part, comprehen-sive in nature. Kinard, Tr. 20,208. As of December 3,1984, in Montgomery County, thirty-nine bus drivers had received training. Bigelow, Tr.14,140. In Chester County, as of January 23, 1985, forty-three bus drivers have been trained.
Campbell, Tr. 19,890. Verbal and written notice by the Montgomery County Office Of Emergency Preparedness has been made to all bus providers; however, at the time of the hearing no bus provider in Montgomery County had taken ad-vantage of bus driver training offered by Energy Consultants.
Bigelow, Tr. 14,140-41, 14,188-90. Training will continue to be offered. Bigelow, Tr.14,140.
21 NRC at 13201342. The board concluded:
363. Based on the evidence developed for this conten-tion, the Board believes as it stated in the conclusion finding of LEA Contention 12, the human response assumptions un-derlying these plans are reasonable, i.e., that in an emergency individuals show a willingness to perform their duties and do not abandon their roles when they have a clear understanding of these r' es. FEMA testified that procedures had not yet been developed to provide reasonable assurance that adequate numbers of bus drivers will be available during a radiological emergency. FEMA's conclusion was based on plans submitted in December 1983. Bd. Fdgs. 337, 531. However, we note that the record addresses facts that took place subsequent to FEMA's review. The Board's findings and conclusion in LEA 11 and 12 lend support to our findings in LEA 15. With suffi-cient buses (Bd. Fdg. 216) and the demonstrated history of i human response in an emergency (Bd. Fdgs. 139, 141, 143-145, l 240-244), the Board is satisfied that there is no merit to Con-tention LEA 15. Based upon this record, we find that there is reasonable assurance that adequate provisions are being made to assure availability of bus drivers and there will be a suffi-cient number of bus drivers willing to participate in response to an emergency at Limerick.
21 NRC at 13261363. The imue of availability of bus drivers was remanded by ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479 (1986), Commission review declined, July 24,1986. The Appeal Board l found a deficiency only with regard to the number of drivers for two school districts.
LBP-86-31, 24 NRC 451, 463 (1986). The licensee arranged to maintain a pool of 200 or
more utility company bus drivers, and on remand the licensing board found this accept-able. Id. at 472.
The adequacy of school bus drivers was also litigated in Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 227-29 (1985),
aff'd, CLI-87-1, 25 NRC 1 (1987). Intervenors' contention said that half the school bus drivers were high school juniors and seniors as young as 16 and a half years old and could not be trusted to perform in emergency situations. M. at 227. The applicants filed for summary disposition, arguing that the emergency tasks of the school bus driv-ers would be little different from the tasks they competently performed daily during the school year, that they would be well-informed about what would be expected from them in an emergency, and that there is no evidence in the historical record of emer-gency response to suggest that high school students would not perform their assigned rons. M. at 227. Despite the opposition of the Intervenors, the Board granted summary disposition in the applicants' favor. M. at 227-29.
Another contention in Shearon Harris focused on whether adult school bus driv-ers in a "role strain" situation would "subordinate their driving duties to family obliga-tions." Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899,915 (1985), aff'd, CLI-87-1,25 NRC 1 (1987). This contention was litigated in an evidentiary hearing, but the intervenors elected not to file findings on it, and it was dismissed. 22 NRC at 915.
Finally, role conflict is being litigated in the Seabrook case. See, e_&, the writ-ten Testimony of Donald J. Zeigler, James H. Johnson Jr., and Stephen Cole, Doc. No.
50-443-444-OL, at 36-54 (Sept.14,1987).
1 In short, the role conflict issue has been litigated in several proceedings, with I
much the same evidence on both sides being presented each time. Never has it been found to be a significant problem.
l
- 2. Earlier Record in this Case The Board views the evidence on the remanded issue in light of the earlier record on role conflict in general and role conflict of other emergency workers and auxillaries. There is an extensive record from the 1983-84 hearings, for example, on the general theory of role conflict. See PID,21 NRC at 671-73.
In the 1983-84 hearings, no witness reported that he had seen or heard of an ac-tual case of true role "abandonment". See Tr.1237,1239,1243,1268,1J83 (Dilworth),
3167 (S.olth), 3130, 3133, 3167-68 (Smith, Rossi), 3138, 3169, 3185-86 (Jeffers),1399-1400 (Erikson) (no empirical evidence about role abandonment by people who had roles l
in an established emergency plan), 1171-72 (WeismIntle, Cordaro) (no cases of role abandonment in storm restoration); 1237,1239,1243,1261,1265,.1268,1283 (Dilworth)
(no failure of police to respond, though it is difficult to reach off-duty officers),3185-86 (Jeffers) (teachers asked supervisor to cover for them), 3111 (Smith) (checked on his family by phone), 3130 (Rossi) (staff worked to get everything done in past emergencies), 3133 (Rossi) (bus drivers refused to pick up children because roads were too bad), 3167-68 (Rossi) (drivers report in sick on snowy days and sometimes miss work or have to leave because of family problems),3169 (Jeffers) (absenteelsm in bad weath-er). The closest the County's witnesses came to a real-life example was a single case of a bus driver who attended her own child first af ter an accident. Tr. 3166 (Smith). This was not role "abandonment," strictly speaking, since attending her own child was part of her bus driver role.
l Thus, as LILCO said in its 1984 proposed findings:
l
- 45. It is not going too far to sum up the record on role abandonment by saying that, of the witnesses who appeared in this proceeding, no one has seen it happen, no one has heard of it happening, no one has done it, and no one thinks he will do it in the future. There is no evidence that "role conflict" has t ver rendered an emergency response ineffective. Tr.
914 Wileti), 918-20 (Dynes),1135 (Sorensen); Cordaro et al. f t.
Tr. 831, at 28. No witness had ever seen "role conflict" make an emergency response ineffective. Tr. 3114 (Muto),
3094 (Petrilak), 3128, 3133 (Rossi),1237,1239,1243, J68 (Dilworth),1171 (Weismantle, Cordaro). No one knew of any case where it had. Tr. 1399-1400 (Erikson), 3147, 3186 (Jeffers). No witness had himself ever abandoned his duties in an emergency. Tr. 1249 (Dilworth), 3111 (Smith), 3136 (Rossi), 3147, 3187 (Jeffers), or thought he would in the fu-ture, Tr. 3113 (Muto), 3147 (Jeffers); Doremus, ff. Tr. 9491, at 9.
LILCO's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Offsite Emergency Plan-ning, at 27-28 (Oct. 5,1984).M In 1983 LILCO's witnesses explained that role conflict has not been extensively studied because it has never appeared to professional researchers in the field as a prob-lem worth studying:
Some scholars study emergencies af ter they happen and try to reconstruct what they think happened at the time. By con-trast, there are researchers who have focused research on ac-tual behavior in emergencies with long research experience in a wide variety of emergencies, such as the Disaster Research Center and the Natural Hazards Group in Colorado. Re-searchers who have had' extensive experience in observing emergency behavior (Qaarantelli, Dynes, and Drabek) have in-dicated that role conflict is a non problem.
Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 41-42. See also Tr. 923 (Mileti) (problems created by the loss of personnel have "not been evident in other emergency situations"), 1135 (Sorensen) (since role abandonment really has never occurred in disasters that have
, M/ Recently Dr. Brodsky, a school superintendent, became the first Suffolk County l witness to suggest that he himself would abandon the school children in his care. Tr.
20,406 (Brodsky). The Board does not believe Dr. Brodsky would in fact abandon the children; as this proceeding has shown, preemergency statements of intention are quite unreliable.
1_5/ LILCO's witnesses acknowledge that role "conflict" will occur in an emergency, as it does in everyday life. Tr. 19,512-13,19,539 (Mileti). They admit it may cause anx-lety during an emergency. But the issue is whether role conflict will cause bus drivers to abandon (or delay in performing) their roles.
l
_ ~
been studied, we really had no basis for speculating on what the potential causes of it would be),1018 (Dynes) (in looking over the interviews, and they were coming in from a wide variety of disaster events, the whole notion of role conflict being a problem for emergency organizations simply didn't hold up ), 919 (Dynes) (this is a case of asking for evidence of a "non problem").
LILCO's witnesses also explained, both in their (unheard) Phase I testimony and at the hearings in 1983, about the "emergency consensus," which is a temporary "shif t in values" that gives the highest priority to protection for threatened people. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 19; PID,21 NRC at 674.
Finally, LILCO's witnesses explained that people can perform more than one role at a time:
"Conflict" implies equally weigated contradictory alterna-tives, requiring a person to choose one role to play while abandoning another. This condition is rarely. If ever, found in actual social life.
Cordaro et al., if. Tr. 831, at 10 (emphasis in original).
The Board concluded in 1985 that role conflict "will not be a significant problem at Shoreham." PID, 21 NRC at 679. The Board is now asked to determine whether school bus drivers are different in this respect from all the other groups for which role conflict has been litigated.
. C. The (Alleged) Problem Defined l
- In 1983 LILCO's witnesses testified that "most of the examples used to illustrate role conflict are based on classic stereotypes of family life that are, in reality, quite l
i 16/ Dr. Lindell has had the same experience as the DRC: when he talked to people who had been in evacuations, no one volunteered that they had experienced role con-filet to the degree that it resulted in role abandonment. Tr.19,439 (Lindell). See also Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 48 (Lindell) (people associated with offsite prepared-ness have reacted with surprise to indignation to suggestion of role conflict).
E arpleal." Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 14 (Dynes, M11eti). They explained this as fol-lows:
The classic stereotype postulates the following hypothetical family and social situation: an employed (and competent) male whose place of employment is separated from the loca-tion of his unemployed (and incompetent) wife, who is with their small (and anxious) children. The family's location is in potential danger. This isolated f amily segment is presumed to lack alternative sources of immediately available support, i such as kin or neighbors. Further, it is presumed that there l
will be a lack of communication lines, thus making it impossi-l ble for the husband to obtain knowledge about the safety of l
the rest of the family while on the job. Finally, it is presumed that the employee-husband has a vague and perhaps inconse-( quential emergency responsibility.
l From this mix of assumptions, one might prophesy that the. strong. . competent husband might leave his post and go home to take care of his family, or delay.doing anything, until he somehow was personally assured that his wife and children were being taken care of. . . .
Moreover, there are several other factors that make this situation more hypothetical than real. In the first place, families with an employed male and unemployed wife with small children at home constitute only about 13 percent of American families according to the 1980 census. This sug-gests that the family system visualized in the classic "role conflict" example is an atypical living arrangement.
Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 14-15 (Dynes, Mileti).
Now the Intervenors offer a theory based upon a different stereotype. They point out that many of the regular school bus drivers are women. See Brodsky et al., ff.
Tr. 20,259, at 10,15,17, 47, Tr.19,533 (Mileti), 20,143 (Crocker), 20,354 (SmL i.III They then postulate that many of these women will have family members (presumably helpless ones) at ho.ne. Finally, they reason that the bus driver will attend to those family members before driving her school bus.
11/ See also, in the earlier record, Tr.1271 (Cole) (great majority of bus drivers are women),3167 (Smith)(about 95 percent of drivers in one school district are women).
d d
Suffolk County's school administrator' witnesses emphasized how responsible, carefully selected, and well-trained their regular school bus drivers are. For example, the Director of Transportation for Middle Country Central School District personally interviews and approves each driver. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, at 8. He looks for the "composure and capability to gain the confidence and respect of children and par-ents." Ld. at 9. Among other requirements, each bus driver for that District must sub-mit three letters of reference and undergo fingerprinting to verify that she does not have a criminal record. Ld. at 9. Bus drivers for the District then undergo 40-50 hours of instruction. g.; see also id. at 15 (Riverhead Central School District),18 (Longwood Central School District),20 (Superintendent of East Meadow Union Free school District personally approves drivers),21, 22 (Superintendent of Mt. . Sinal School District person-ally approves drivers; Transportation Director personally interviews every driver); 23-
. 26 (extensive supervised on-the-job training for all drivers, including biennial refresher courses and additional meetings), Tr. 20,344-50 (Doherty, Koenig, Rossi), 20,35?-53 (Rossi). As a result, the drivers take their jobs seriously, or else they are removed from duty. Tr. 20,353 (Smith). The Board has already found that regular school bus drivers are expected to drive school buses in an evacuation of school children. PID, 21 NRC at 859.
Also, the drivers are assigned to drive the same routes every day so they "can learn who the children are on their bus, and hopefully develop a first name relationship with - the kids." Tr. 20,353 (Smith). One witness indicated that the school district strives for a "feeling of f amily on that bus." Tr. 20,354 (Suprina). The mostly women f
drivers do a "terrific job." Tr. 20,354 (Doherty). "The rapport that drivers establish with children going to school on an everyday basis is sound and it is strong." Tr. 20,403 (Suprina). But the school administrators argue that this rapport does not "override" commitment to family. M.
L
If the woman bus driver's concern is an adult member of her family who is dis-abled or lacks an automobile, see Tr.19,536 (Mileti), the Board notes that LILCO has provided ambulettes to evacuate the homebound handicapped and t.uses to evacuate people without their own cars. PID,21 NRC at 849-55,817-32. LILCO has also provid-ed a means for identifying in advance people who need assistance. PID,21 NRC at 847.
It is also likely that homebound adults coud be evacuated by friends, neighbors, or f am-ily members other than the school bus driver.E!
Of more concern to the Intervenors appear to be the bus driver's children. If the children were in school in the EPZ, then presumably they would be evacuated with their schoolmates by bus.EI It is pos'ulated, however, that the bus driver might have chil-dren at home rather than in school. The Intervenors' concern therefore appears to be children who are too young for school or who are home sick and yet are lef t alone with-out adult supervision. See Tr. 19,534-35 (Mileti). It is unlikely that a school bus driver, who as noted above is likely to be a responsible person, would leave preschool children 1_g/ In the Indian Point proceeding FEMA witnesses testified that disaster history has shown that friends and relatives will assist special populations, such as latchkey chil-dren, during an emergency. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit Nos. 2 & 3),
LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811, 994.(1983). There New York State witnesses expressed the view that "relatives and friends should recognize that the total burden of protecting special populations cannot be borne by government." M. at 992,996.
In Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Statiors, Unit Nos.1 & 2), LBP-87-13. 25 NRC 449, 454 (1987), the board found that, while the applicant's program clearly depended on some degree of cooperation among friends, relatives, and co-workers that was beyond its ability to control, there was nothing in the record to suggest that such reliance was unreasonable.
M/ The Intervenors suggested that school bus drivers might abandon their jobs to pick up their own children at school. The alleged problem of parents going to the schools to pick up their children was litigated and resolved in 1983-84. See PID, 21 NRC at 866. Then the contention was that parents, upon notification of an early dis-missal, would depart for the school to collect their children. The Board found "no evi-dence or basis to believe that this activity will be of such a magnitude as to result in significant disruption of early dismissal." M.
l unattended. Tr.~19,535,19,538 (Mileti). . As a Suffolk County witness said, bus drivers with preschool children "make other arrangements, I assume, for the care of their chil-l l dren while they are driving." Tr. 20,354 (Koenig). Even assuming that the female bus '
driver had lef t her preschool child at home unattended, one would expect that friends, neighbors or other family members might help the child evacuate.
In short, the Intervenors' concern is based on a very implausible scenario or on the argument that bus drivers would abandon their jobs to be with members of their family even though that might not, strictly speaking, be necessary. This concern is highly speculative and contrary to the evidence. Very few bus drivers are likely to leave small children unsupervised. As for the claim that they will join their families whether or not the families need them to help evacuate, this appears to be another ver-sion of the Intervenors' theory that people are so afraid of radiation that they will be-have irrationally. See Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 18 (citing high level of fear of radi-ation that Long Islanders have). The Board has already rejected this theory. See PID, 21 NRC at 667,669-71.
If a school bus driver did have helpless dependents, there are a variety of ways that she might resolve her role conflict.E# She might arrange for another family member or a neighbor to evacuate the children, or she might even take the children with her on the school bus, Tr.19,535 (Mileti), although Suffolk County witnesses testified that there is a rule against this, Tr. 20,354 (Koenig), 20,404-05 (Smith). The evidence shows.that school bus drivers in actual emergencies have resolved their role conflict this way. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 30,31. LILCO's witnesses point out l
M/ As the DRC data presented in 1983 show, people sometimes call home, engage in l on-the-job search activity, or even leave their jobs temporarily to check on their fami-lies. See Tr. 1035,1039-40 (Dynes).
that the reason that role abandonment is not usually a problem in emergencies is that there are many ways to resolve "role conflict" other than abandoning one of the roles.
This evidence comports with common sense.
Suffolk County's sociologists acknowledge that people may try to resolve role conflict by atten.pting to perform both roles, but they say that this approach "is of ten counter productive, with the result that both roles are performed poorly, if at all."
Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 13. They cite no actual cases.
As individuals have ways of resolving role conflict, so organizations have ways of adjusting to the absence of workers. For example, school bus companies have extra drivers. See Tr. 20,342-43 (Doherty). One school district plans to use teacher volun-teers to dri/e buses if there is a shortage of drivers in an emergency. Tr. 9544, 9547 (Doremus).
Thus, it appears at the outset that role conflict is, as Professor Dynes testified in 1983, a "non problem." Indeed, LILCO witnesses in the most recent hearings confirmed earlier testimony that role conflict is not a real problem. See Crocker et al., ff. Tr.
19,431, at 48 (Lindell); Tr. 19,435,19,480,19,481 (Kelly) (role conflict was never really an issue in other cases),19,439 (Lindell) (no indication in the literature that role con-flict was a problem),19,539 (Mileti) (Long Island is the only place people have tried to address role abandonment in putting emergency plans together). Dr. Mileti clnsses role abandonment as one of the "myths" about emergencies that many people believe, Tr.,
19,538-39,' 19,636-37 (Mileti), like looting and panic, Tr. 19,541-42 (Mileti).E Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that a fast-breaking Shoreham emergency found many regular bus driversE with loved ones dependent on them, the
, M/ See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470 (shadow phenomenon), at 14,17 (panic).
0 4
22/ The role conflict issue on remand inutves only regular school bus drivers, not LERO school bus drivers. Role conflict of LERO workers was fully litigated in 1983-84 (footnote continued)
Board has weighed the evidence on both sides. The Board sees the weighing of the 1.w i-denco as having two parts. First, both sides have a theory. Second, both sides have empirical data. We take each of these two parts of the case ia urn.
D. Theory LILCO's witnesses testified, first in 1983 arid then in 1938, that emergency workers do their jobs if role clarity exists - that is, if the workers tinderstand tha" they have a role and what it is.E See Tr.19,507 (Mileti).W One of the purposes of having emergency plans is to produce this role clarity. E One w: yW lt is impa:'ted is by training.W Anothee is by having emergency workers do in an emegency the same thing they do every dayN; bus drivers are likely to know they have a role in an (footnote continued) and not remanded. See PID, 21 NRC at 674, 675, 676-77. No evidence was presented that LERO school bus drivers are different f:om other LERO workers.
Mi This time around LILCO addect s psychologist, Dr. Liridell, to its pitnel. He cited
. line of research on "bystant%r intervention" suggesting that people in general, includ-n.g regular school bus drive s, would be motivated to help school children in a ra-dialogical emergency. Crocker et al., f f. Tr.19,431, at 18-22.
2_4/ Similarly, an NRC Staff witness testified in 1964 in connection with the "conflict of interest" contention that the important consideration is for emergency workers to understand the concept of "responsibility." Tr. 15,211-12 (Sears).
2_1/ Tr.1136,1146 (Mileti).
M/ LILCO's witnesses have always said that training is only one of the means by which role clarity can be achieved. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 15: see also Tr.
1110 (Mileti) ("One way they can gain that certainty (about their emergency role) is through training"),1146 (Milt ti) ("The whole point of emergency planning is to make it clear to emergency workers that they have a certain understood emergency role and that's the point of training. And that objective could be achieved through othe'* mecha-nisms besides training . . . .").
27/ Tr.1137 (Weismantic), 1109-10 (Mileti), 939 (Sorensen).
M/ See Tr.1145-46 (Mileti).
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . __ __ _ .____J
emergency because ~of the "normative overlap" between their ordinary jobs (driving children to and from school) and their emergency ,iobs-(driving children from school).
Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 15 (Mileti); tes also Tr. 19,499,19,650-52 (Lindell),
19,509 10,19,565,19,971,19,980-81 (Mileti).
I.ILCO's witness testilled that, of all the goups *.nvolved in an emergency, the ones least l'kely to have prcblems f role abandonment would be schcol bus drivers:
I feel confident in saying that of all the role conflict, role abandonment, roles we could be arguing the one to be least concerned about in my opinion is getting children out. If there were species of humans who didn't care about children, they would die out.
~
Tr.19,567 (Mileti). Evacuating school children is raised to a very high priority in emergencies. Tr.19,529 (Mileti). It will. occur to school bus drivers that they have a role because they are the very ones who deposited the children in the risk area in the morning, with the expectation that they would pick them t'p later. See Tr 20,188-89 (Lindell). As noted above, a County's school administrator witness testified that the drivers drive the same children each day and, it is hoped, get to know them on a "first name" basis. Tr. 20,353 (Smith).
In contrast, Suffolk County's witnesses say that "the sociological literature dem-onstrates that la our society, family roles tend to be the most important." Cole et al.,
3 ff. Tr. 20,672, at 14 (emphasis in original). The County expert witnesses predicted that "a very large number" of school bus d-ivers would attend first to their f amilies:
It is also our opinion that a very large number of them would choose to attend first to the safety and needs of their fami-lies. Only af ter they had fully satisfied themselves that their families were safe - which in this case maans out of the area at risk - would they be willing to perform their bus driving functions, if they ever would at all. This will have negative cordequences for the rapid evacuation er early dismissal of school childton from the schools.
Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 17-18. This opinion, as the witnesses candidly admit, is based on f actors in the literature, as applied to bus drivers. Id. at 18. Nowhere in the County's testicony is there documented an actual case of role abandonment.
In weighing the opinion evidence, the Board gives more weight to LILCO's wit-nesses. The school administrators who testified for Suffolk County are experts in op-erating schools but not experts in human behavior and certainly not in human behavio in emergeacles.E See Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, Attachments 1-8.E The Coun-ty's three sociologists are experts in sociology, and two of them, Professors Barton and Turner, have published works on emergencies.
Of Suffolk County's witnesses, Profeswr Cole is not an expert on disasters at all.
Professor Barton published his last worx on disasters in 1969. Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, Att. 3, at 4. He nas not done field recearch on disasters. Tr. 20,678 (Barton). Professor M/ In this respect the school administrators are at best fact witnesses, not expert witnesses. g. Suffolk County Objections to Prehearing Conference of Counsel Orders and Motion for Reconsideration at 14-15 (Dec. 8,1983) ("The school teacher witnesses are, as pointed out at the Conference of Counsel, f act witnesses. Their te ,timony con-cerns facts based on their personal knowledge and experiences.") Presumably the school administrators are offered in the same light.
See Texas Utilities Elec. Co a (Com.Mehe Peak Steam Elec. Station, Units 1 ind 2), LBF-84-55,20 NRC 1666,1651 (1984)(giving no weight to testimony of nonexperts in metallurgy); PhiladelDhia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-819,22 NRC 681,733 (1985) (refusal to let retired art therapist testify on pipe-line location and accidents was proper); Florida Power & Licht Co. (Turkey Point Nucle-ar Generadng Pl'nt, Units 3 and 4), LBP-86-23, 24 NRC 108,116 (1986) (weight to be
. eccorded expcet witness's testimony was influenced by the fact that he was a mathema-tician with little expertise in engineering); Public Service Elec. and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-15, 7 NRC 642, 687 (1978) (witness could not be accorded as much weight as an expert who is reporting results from care-ful and deliberate measurements).
3_0/
One of the school administrators has a bachelor's degree in political sci-ence/ psychology. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, Att. 7, at 1. He testified that he teaches courses dealing with role conflict. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, at 6. It ap-pears, however, that these have nothing to do with behavior in emergencies. Tr.
20,261-68, 20,271-78 (Koenig).
\
Turner's research has dealt mostly with !' anticipations of disas'.er." Tr. 20,677 (Turner).
He, .too, has not collected systematic data at the scene of a disaster. Tr. 20,677 (Turner). Cf. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 2-8 and Att. C and D. The Board con-cludes that LILCO's expert witnesses are better qualified to address role conflict.
Both sides made reference to the literature on disasters. For their analysis of the literature, the Intervenors' witnesses rely almost entirely on articles and books written in 1969 or earlier. See Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 27-40. Of this older litera-ture on emergency behavler, e ratable example is a 1969 book entitled Communities in Disaster by Suffolk County's witness Professor Allen Barton. This book was identified by LILCO's witnesses in 1983 as a discussion of what they called the "first generation" of such literature. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 52, 58; see Tr.19,552-53,19,566 (M11eti). One of the early cases cited as an example of role conflict was the Texas City fire, where workers' homes were next to the dock area wher: 'he ship exploded, and the workers could see that their own homes had caught fire. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.
19,431, at 23. However, even at Texas City:
In Texas City, most of the refinery workers stayed on the job until their units shut down as they had been trained to do (Killian 1952, page 311).
Tr.1339 (Erikson).b The Intervenors presented no literature references in the most 31/ It is obvious that the pre-1969 reports of role abandonment must be viewed with caution. For example, in their 1984 proposed findings the Intervenors relied on a study of Hurricane Audrey by Fred Bates (1963). They cited 1r. 980-995, where Dr. Mileti explained that he had spoken with the auther of the paper and learned that there were only three emergency workers .n the community studied and "those three emergenef workers stayed on the job, did their work." Tr. 993 (Mileti).
Likewi?.a, in 1984 the Intervenorc cited in article by Frit2. (1961). The passage relied on by Intervenors, however, said that "ceparation anxiety" may persist and cause considerable stress for "paople with c!uarly defined dMster jobs." LILCO Ex. 4, ff. Tr.
1334, at 205; Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 65
recent hearings that were not discussed in the 1983 hearings. .They did cite a 1987 pub-lication by Russell Dynes (also cited by LILCO), but th!s was based on the DRC inter-views that were cited in LILCO's "Phase I" testimony and then discussed in detail in the l
Phase II hearings in 1983. See Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 37-39.
In contrat, the Applicant's witnesses rely primarily on articles published since l
1969. Crocker et ab, ff. Tr.19,431, at 9-15. So far as the record shows, the literature l since 1969, with the exception of a single article by Dr. James Johnson (a former wit-ness for Suffolk County in this case), clearly supports LILCO. Indeed, most of it was l
! written by LILCO's witnesses. See Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 9-15. Moreover, Dr.
Milett has attempted to reconcile the early literature with the more recent, see Tr.
19,634-35 (Mileti), whereas the. Intervenors have attempted primarily to critique LILCO's 1983 testimony on the early literature. If the Board were to decide this case solely on the literature alone, then,it would be compelled to decide in favor of LILCO.
E. Empirical Data However, as LILCO points out, the test of the scientific thwry is found by resort to empirical data.EI Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 24. Thic is the scientific meth-l od. See Tr.19,568 (Mileti). LILCO therefore urges the Board 10 look at the empirical record to determine whether role conflict is likely to be problem in a radiological emer-gency. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 24.
I M/ "[W)hstever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis" (Isaac Newton, in a letter to Robert Hooke of February 5,1675/1676). Courts excluding expet opinion for lack of basis of ten note that it is speculative cr without any f actual foundation. Arent Orance Product Liability Litigation. 611 F. Supp.1267,1281 (D.C.
N.Y.1985), citing Merit Motors. Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 56? F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.1977),
affirming a grant of summary judgment despite opinion by an opposing expert that was, in the trial court's opinlui, %Twi solely on speculations and hypotheses." 569 F.2d at 672.
But the parties differ fundamentally on what empirical data should be used. Sim-ply stated, the Intervenors' witnem believe that the Board should rely on polls of what people think they would do in a future radiological emergency. LILCO believes that the Board should rely on the historical record of actual behavior in actual emergencies, both radiological and nonradiological.
The Board will first discuss opinion poils and then turn to the historical record of real emergencies.
- 1. Opinion Polls The empirical evidence for the Intervenors consists of opinion polls taken by Dr.
i Stephen Cole. See Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 40-58. In the 1985 PID the Board found as follows:
The Board finds that the actual behavior of any partic-ular bus driver during an emergency would be influenced by the specific conditions existing at that time. Thus, the school bus driver survey cannot predict what drivers will do at the time of an accident. Id. at 8-9; Cordaro at_al., ff. Tr. 831, at
- 35. People behave differently in an unfamiliar . situation from the way they say they will when speculating about their fu-ture behavior. Tr.1085 (Mileti). The Board agrees with Dr.
Milett's conclusion that opinion polls are very poor predictors of behavior in an emergency. Tr.1166 (Milet!). See also Board Finding I.A. Even if we assume the survey has some predictive value, it does not suggest a massive defection of drivers because only 3% said they would immediately leave the evacuation zone. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 34-35.
1 1 PID, 21 NRC at 676. Although we understand the Appeal Board's concern that, as an evidentiary matter, a poll of firemen would provide insight into school bus drivers (ALAB-832,23 NRC at 153), we find no more reason now than in 1985 to conclude that polls can predict emergency behavior. Indeed, the intervenors presented no additional evidence on that point, unless the same opinion of two new County witnesses be counted as such.N If, as the evidence indicates, the key to role performance is role 3_3/ See, eL Tr. 20,679 (Barton) ("surveys don't produce precisa, numerical accuracy with respect to future behavior, but they prcduce broad findings which all(aw you to an-ticipate the overall consequences").
certainty, then it is hard to give much credence to a poll of volunteer firemen who have no role in the LILCO emergency plan and were simply asked to assume one for the poll. In contrast, the Board agrees with LILCO that regular school bus drivers who had taken children to school in the morning and who are expected to pick them up in the af ternoon (and in the event of an early dismissal due to the weather, for example) would understand that they had a role picking them up for an evacuation.
In 1983 LILCO's witnesses testified that preemergency statements of intention, such as those provided by polls, cannot prslict actual emergency behavior, because it is determined by "situational" perceptions of risk at the time e' the emergency. Tr.1085-86,1164,1121-22 (Mileti).U! In the rceeption centers hearing last summer Professors Mileti and Lindell again testified that behavioralintentions are an unreliable predictor of actual emergency behavior. See LILCO Ex.1 (Crocker e_tfl.) at 14,15,19; Tr. ,
17,772-73 (Lindell).b 4
M/ The LILCO witnesses' opinion that opinion polls do not accurately predict emer-gency behavior was well founded in the research literature. In their "shadow phenome-non" testimony Professors Dynes and Mileti said that since the first work was done on how well attitudes and behavior relate to each other (a 1934 paper by R.T. LaPierre),
"the great majority of investigators who have looked at the question have concluded that there is only a weak relationship, it any, between attitudes and actual human be-havior." Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470 (shadow phenomenon), at 69. The LILCO witnesses then reviewed a whole series of papers, both for and against their position: Wicker (1969), Kiesler and Munson (1975), Dillehay (1973), Kiesler et al. (1969), Rokeah and K11ejunas (1972), Wicker (1971), Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), Snyder and Swann (1976), and Plecolo and Louvier (1977). See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 69-76.
3_5/ LILCO witnesses have always acknowledged that sometimes polls to predict voter or consumer behavior are successful. Tr.1165-66 (Mileti),17.772 (Lindell). But polls are very poor predictors of emergency behavior. Tr.1166 (Mileti).
Even with respect to polls of voters, Suffolk County witness Dr. Cole testified as follows:
There are other reasons why there can be differences between results indicated by an election poll conducted a (footnote continued)
Indeed, there is evidence that using opinion polls for planning as the Intervenors propose can be harmful. See Tr.1087 (Mileti)-(it's dangerous to use people's specula-tions about behavior to predict behavior). Dr. Mileti explained why:
- 40. Q. Suffolk County's witnesses argue that emergency planners should use opinion polls in planning.
What is your opinion?
A. [ Lindell, Mileti) If we accept their thesis, we conclude that planners should provide more per-sonnel than are necessary to carry out an emer-gency response because a large percentage of personnel will not be available because of role conflict. But the empirical fact, demonstrated in many past emergencies, is that there is of ten an oversupply of personnel. See Cord 1ro et al.,
ff. Tr. 832, at 17.
[Mileti] That is why I have advised against using opinion polls, at least in the way Suffolk County urge *, for emergency planning. It is not just that they are unreliable; they are harmful.
If believed, they fecus the planner on the wrong problem - indeed on a hypothetical problem that is the opposite of what actually happens in emergencies.
I (footnote continuea) week before the election and the actual results of the elec-tion. For example, some voters can change their minds about who to vote for in the last week, particularly in this election, that you are referring to, where there were three candidates and Javits never showed a very high proportion.
Some of his su,"porters, at the end, could have felt that vot-ing for Senator Javits would have been wasting their vote and could have switched to one of the other two candidates.
so I don't believe the discrepancy between the poll data and l
l the actual outcome says anything about whether the poll was right or wrong.
! Tr. 2798-99 (Cole). Put another way by LILCO witnesses, behavioral intentions ob-tained, for example, through public opinion polls, cannot be used to accurately predict responses, because a host of factors present at the time action is taken can influence behavior to make it inconsistent with an attitude reported in a poll. Cordaro et al., ff.
Tr.1470, at 71; Tr.1940 (Richardson); see Cole, ff. Tr. 2792, at 30.
l
Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 46-47. _C_f. Tr. 20,180 (Kelly) (at Mississaugua too many doctors and nurses reported to the evacuating hospital and too few to the receiving hospital); Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 13-14 (about twice as many people show up to evacuate nursing homes and hospitals as there are people who need to be evacuated);
Tr.17,666 (Linnemann) (reception centers hearing) (people in the field of radiation wei-comed the opportunity to help at Three Mlle Island; the problers wasn't that there weren't enough people but that there wasn't an organization into which to fit theJr tal-ents and use them expeditiously).
The Intervenors continue to insist that opinion polls can predict future behavior, though they disclaim precise numerical predictability. The Intervenors have made Dr.
Cole's surveys the centerpiece of their evidence on shadow phenomenon and role con-filet in 1983-84, on credibility in 1984, on the exercise results in 1987, on the reception centers in 1987, and now on role confilet again in 1988. The Board has already conclud-ed in this case that "poll results have no literal predictive validity." LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 667 (1985); see also id. at 655-71.E! More recently the Board has held that Dr. Cole's polling techniques tell only what the situation is now, not what it will be at some undetermined future date.E! Partial Initial Decision on Sultability of Reception Centers, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP 13, 27 NRC , slip op, at 24 (May 9,1988), notice of appeal filed May 20,1988.E 3_6/ The Board's reasoning was that the public, in an actual emergency, would have additional information that respondents would need to determine their attions in an emergency. The Board therefore gave little weight to the predictive findings of public opinion polls. 21 NRC at 655-71. This finding passed Appeal Board review and the time for Commission review and has become final agency action.
M/ FEMA does not consider the County's polls to be a reliable data base from which to estir. ate the number of people who might be concerned about contamination. Tr.
18,324 (Keller).
3_Q/ In Long Island Lightier Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LEP-88-2, 27 NRC 85,174 (1988), the Frye Board found it unnecessary to consider Dr. Cole's sur-vey data.
.~
There is no reason to change that opinion now.EI Dr. Milett testified a second timeW about an elaborate study of behaviora: in-tentions that he had done in which he attempted to predict how people would behave in response to a scientifically reliable prediction of an earthquake in California. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 81; Tr.1103-05 (Mileti); Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 40-42.
He and his coworkers predicted large social and economic costs. When a subsequent "near prediction" of an earthquake occurred in California, one of the Intervenors' wit-nesses, Dr. Turner, studied the results and found none of the results that Dr. Milett had predicted. No doubt there were many differences between the scenarios used in Dr.
M110ti's study and the actual near prediction that occurred; Dr. Mileti admits as much.
But, as he says, that is precisely the point. The situation in an emergency would with-out question be quite different from any scenario created for a study. As Professor Cole testified, "(1)t would be impossible to ask people about the infinite variety of pos-sible accidents which co'11d happen." Tr. 20,675-76 (Cole).
On page 57 of his testimony in the most recent hearings Professor Cole says that school bus drivers do not have the "experience, training, or commitment of firemen" and therefore even more bus drivers would abandon their roles than firemen would.
Yet if one compares his two 1982 polls, one of bus drivers and one of firemen, one finds that 69 percent of the bus drivers said that they would make sure their families were M/ The view that polls of behavioral intentions can predict behavior is a minority view, as explained earlier in this proceeding. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 69-76; Tr.
1817 (Dynes, M11eti).
10/ Dr. M11eti made the same point in 1983 testimony. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 81; Tr.1103-05 (Mileti). He testified that he was co principal investigator of the
, largest "what would you do if" study he believed the NatJanal Science Foundation has l ever funded, and that the report from that study clearly po:nts out that one cannot pre-dict human behavior from what pecple told the investigators they would likely do.
Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470, at 81.
l safe first and that 68 percent of the firemen said so. These numbers are almost ideati-cal. Thus the difference in behavior that Dr. Cole postulates is not revealed by the sur-vey resulte.UI If, however, the survey results reflect current attitudes rather than fu-ture behavior, the results make sense. Drs. Milett and Lindell postulated that the survey results measure attitude towards the utility or toward families, Crocker et al.,
ff. Tr.19,431, at 43, and this interpretation seems borne out by the survey results.
Attempts to correlate the results of Dr. Cole's opinion polls with real-world el-ther have been not been made or have been unpersuasive. For example, in the "shadow phenomenon" litigation the County argued that the actual behavior at TMI validated its opinion polls, relying on the similarity between the numbers at TMI and the numbe:s at Shoreham inside 10 miles. At the same time, the County argued that the disparity in results (outside 10 miles) showed that Shoreham is even worse than TMI. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.1470 at 83-86.E
! 41/ In the firemen poll conducted six years later in 1988 a larger percentage of the
! firemen said that they would take care of their families first. There are no 1988 bus j driver results to compare to this, however.
1 l
42/ As Figura 5 to Zeigler and Johnson, ff. Tr. 2789, between pp.19 and 20, shows, the actual behavior at TMI was close to intended behavior as reported in the April 1982 survey on Long Island for people 0 to 5 miles and 5-10 miles from the plant,less close for people from 10-15 miles from the plant, and not close at all for people 15 to 25 and 25 to 40 miles from the plant. Dr. Cole concluded from these data that the surveys should be taken into account in part because "we find a high level of correspondence between what people on Long Island tell us they would do and what people at Three Mlle Island actually did do." Cole, ff. Tr. 2792 at 28. But at the same time, Dr. Johnson explained:
Beyond the 10-mile zone, the (survey) results at Shoreham suggest an even larger evacuation shadow than at TMI. Specifically, within 10 to 15 miles of TMI, one-third of
, the population evacuated. At Shoreham, an estimated one-
! half of the population within the 10 to 15 mile zone is likely to evacuate. If one compares actual evacuation behavior at TMI and intended evacuation behavior at Shoreham beyond l
(footnote continued)
Dr. Mileti and Dr. Lindell offer the alternate interpretation that Dr. Cole's polls are measuring not future behavior, but rather people's (favorable) attitudes toward their families or (unf avorable) attitudes toward the utility. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at
- 43. This view is supported by the fact that the same sorts of polls appear to elicit the same sorts of responses at places other than Long Island. For example. Dr. Johnson has done a poll of school teachers in California and found that nearly a third of them said that they would not assist in an emergency evacuation of schools. Crocker et al., ff.
Tr.19,431, at 14.E! Large amot.ats of role conflict have been reported by Dr. Cole at Seabrook as well.E Indeed, it is clear that people will say that their families come first. For exam-ple, one of the bus drivers interviewed in LILCO's survey apoarently made such a re-mark. See Suffolk County Bus Driver Ex. 23 at 5. What this meant in practice, (footnote continued) 15 miles of the plant (see Figure 5), one finds that within the 15 to 25 mile distance zone at TMI, only about 12 percent of the population evacuated; at Shoreham, approximately 33 percent of the population in this distance zane said they would evacuate. Outside the 40-mile zone, less than one percent of the people at TMI evacuated, but one-fourth of the population in this zone on Lorg Island said they would evacuate.
j Zeigler and Johncon, ff. Tr. 2789, at 20.
M/ Similarly, when Dr. Cole did polls to determine whether there would be a large "shadow" evacuation acound the Seabrook plant, he got results similar to what he found at Shoreham. Tr.17,872 (Cole). Indeed, Intervenors have used the fact that their polls l consistently show large numbers of people saying they would evacuate to argue that fear of radiation and the resulting knee-jerk urge to evacuate are universal and rela-tively unchanging phenomena.
M/ See written "Testimony of Donald J. Zeigler, James H. Johnson Jr., and Stephen Cole . . . ." Sept. 14, 1987, in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), Doc. No. 50-443-444-OL, at 36-54.
however, was merely that she was delayed about 15 minutes while she helped her f amily evacuate before reporting for duty. Tr. 20.185 (Kelly).EI
- 2. Pa.ct Emergencies Denying the value of opinion polls to predict emergency behavior, LILCO's wit-nesses emphasize the record of actual behavior in past emergencies. Dr. Mileti summa-rized the Applicant's position in these words:
To the best of my knowledge, I know of no case in the history of this country, and I mean from 1776 forward, where anyone has lef t school children on the curb whether or not there was emergency planning.
Tr.10,529-30 (Mileti). We turn now to the App)lcant's empirical data, which consists of a number of studies of actual past emergencies,
- a. DRC Data First, Professor Dynes has testified in this proceeding,EI and published in 1987, 4_5/ As noted above, the Diablo Canyon board found that a sociological survey of emergency workers was not necessary. 16 NRC at 805146. Similarly, in Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-86-11,23 NRC 294,389 (1986), the board found that a poll of whether people would warn their neighbors was not very reliable.
M/ The DRC interviews were addressed in considerable detail at Tr. 1012-53 (Dynes). The DRC did not set out to study "role conflict," because role conflict has never seeaed to be a real problem to researchers who studied real emergencies. See Tr.1015,856,918 (Dynes). The DRC was founded to create a research tradition in the study of disasters. Tr. 852,1151 (Dynes). Thus, the DRC raF. archers went to actual emergencies, of ten during or shortly af ter the impact, ano stue;ed how people behaved.
They compiled a vast body of data, amounting to some S,000 interviews from 150 disas-ters over a period of 10 years. Tr.1018 (Dynes).
One of the things that became obvious to the researchers over the courso of this research experience was that role conflict was not a problem. Tr. 880,918-19 (Dynes).
l in all cases, the emergency organizations continued to function. In many cases there were too many people, for some people who were not on shif t reported even though they were not exptected to. Tr. 1040-41 (Dynes). The DRC researchers were not tak-ing a poll to find out who would confess to abandoning his job; they were trying to find out what happens in emergencier. Thus they talked to people in charge who would be familiar witn whether or not they had a shortage of personnel; in addition, they talked (footnote continued)
his findir; that, in over 6,000 interviews by the Disaster Research Center, he had found no instance where the functioning of an emergency organization was undercut by per-sonnel not reporting to duty. See Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 11-12; Tr.19,527-28 (Mileti); see also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr, 831, at 16-17. The DRC interviews covered about 150 disasters, but Dr. Dynes had reviewed about 400 events for his 1970 book Organized Behavior in Disaster. Tr. 919 (Dynes). i.: a sample of 443 person.s who held positions in emergency-related organizations, not one abandoned his emergency role ob-ligations to opt for f amilial-role obligations. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 12. Of I those who were not at work at the time of the emergency, less than one percent indi-cated some delay in reporting to work. Id.
(footnote continued) to lower-level employees. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 15-16:
Q. If you were interviewing someone about their perfem mance of their job, would you expect someone to tell you, "I did not report to perform my job, but I was supposed to. I was needed there and I didn't." Is that something you would expect?
1 A. Oh, you might not expect that, but the question is need you have other cross-checks on that. In other words, you're interviewing other people in the organi-zation, the observation, if somebody didn't report (s_ic in transcript].
Tr.1045 (Dynes). Moreover, the researchers were actually present during some emergencies and could observe how the organizations functiored.
No one has ever denied that people may engage in on-the-job search activity or I
attempt to contact their families as they do their emergency work. Tr.1035 (Dynes).
And some people who are not on the job may see to their family before they report, or l
there may be other reasons for c'elayed reporting. Tr.1037 (Dynes). In the DRC study, when people temporarily lef t their jobs, the lapse of time in most instances was very short. Tr.10N (Dynes). Generally sp3aking, these dozen or so people were not needed for the organization to do its work at the time. Tr. 1039-40 (Dynes). The point is that in all ca;es the organization continued to function, and as a general matter there were too many people, not too few. Tr. 1040-41 (Dynes).
l 1
i-l Suffolk County's expert witn"sses testified that the DRC data are "not reliable" I and "not relevant." Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 38. They cite six arguments why, mcat of all of which the Board has considered before. The fact remains that the DRC data cover a large number of real emergencies in which role abandonment did not prove to be a problem. No amount of Iabricating distinctions can alter that. To say these data are "not relevant"is overreaching,
- b. FEMA DRQ's Second, FEMA since November 1986 has collected information about major emergencies on a reporting form called a Disaster Response Questionnaire (DRQ).
Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 32-33. Among other things, these DRQ's are used to report problems encountered during emergencies. M. at 33. In the 300 of these DRQ's compiled since 1986, no mention was made of role abandonment as a problem in real emergencies. M.t Tr. 19,964-66 (Kelly). The Intervenors would distinguish these data on the ground that they were not about radiological emergencies.
- c. LILCO's Phone Surveys In addition to already-existing sources of data on past emergencies, LILCO un-dertook to gather information of its own. At LILCO's request, its witness Mr. Kelly re-viewed information on 50 U.S. evacuations. In a project for a different client, Mr.
Kelly's company had started with a population of approximately 249 emergencies (Tr.
19,839 (Kelly)) and from it selected 50 evacuations, using a rating system that tended to select large, quickly developing, problem-laden evacuations in densely populated areas, particularly near nuclear power plants. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431 at 26; Tr.19,836-40 (Kelly). Of these 50 cases, Mr. Kelly identified 16 large-scale evacuations in which buses had been used to evacuate people. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 27. For these
- 16. Mr. Kelly reviewed secondary sources such as newspaper clippings, af ter-action
~-
reports, communications logs, police / emergency services reports, and sociology reports.
These sources revealed no evidence that any bus driver had failed to drive. Ld. at 27 and Attachment E; Tr. 19,842,19,855 (Kelly).
Af ter this study was completed, Mr. Kelly identified three additional evacutions in which buses had been used, making a total of 19. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 27; Tr.19,844 (Kelly). Seventeen of these involved technological hazards and two natural hazards. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 28. Most of the evacuations involved tne use of buses to evacuate non-school populations; four involved the evacuation of two to seven schools. Ld. at 28. Four or five hundred buses were involved in total. Tr.19,938 (Kelly).
-To gather additional information, Mr. Kelly and people under his supervision phoned "knowledgeable people who had emergency responsibility" at each of the 19 di-sasters. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 27. Two separate studies were done. The first surveyed organization 21 respondents, and the second surveyed bus drivers who had actu-ally responded to the emergencies. For the organizational study, generally one or two "emergency manaFN" and one or two bus company officials were interviewed for each of the 19 accidenh;. See W., Att G. Forty-eight interviews in all were held. See id.
For the survey of individual bus drivers,27 drivers participated in 10 of the 19 evacua-tion cases. M., Att. I at 1. Mr. Kelly testified that it was difficult to find more bus drivers to interview because of privacy concerns. Tr. 19,936-37 (Kelly).
LILCO summarized its findings as follows:
- There were no refusals to drive the buses by any notified bus drivers.
All bus drivers reported for duty af ter being contacted.
- In three cases bus drivers were reported to have ar-rived late for duty. One bus company in the Marysv1110 incident reported that 1 or 2% of the drivers were
_ _ _____-___-_____________ ______ _ ______________-____a
delayed due to traffic congestion. In the Pinellas inci-dent about 10 percent of one bus company's drivers (about 20 drivers) showed up lata because they first helped "take care of families." In the Miamisburg inci-dent it appears that a few drivers showed up late due to f amily concerns.
Af ter receiving the duty call, only 3-5 bus drivers in one event (Miamisburg) helped evacuate their families before showing up for duty, decpite the fact that in nine evacutions,5% to 100% of the drivers had f amilies in the area at risk during the emergency.
There were no reports of bus drivers not doing their job as well as they could have.
- In seven of the 19 evacuations, bus drivers did not know beforehand that they had an emergency role.
- In all of the evacuations, there were enough drivers to drive evacuation buses. . . .
- In all cases everyone who needed to be evacuated was evacuated.
Crocker et al., if. Tr.19,431, at 28-29.
l LILCO testified that the data collected from the individual bus drivers were in line with the date collected from organizational response. M. at 29. No bus drivers re-fused to drive buses, and only two drivers reported doing something before beginning their bus driver functions. M. at 29-30. The first of these two reported a few minutes later and the other 20 minutes later. M. at 30.
One of the County's expert witnesses testified, based on a cursory review of the LILCO data, that the data are "completely irrelevant." Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 59.
As with the County witnesses' opinion of the DRC data, this opinion overreaches.
LILCO made a concerted effort to search for actual role abandonment and f ailed to find it. Indeed, when two of the phor.a calls indicated that a few bus drivers had abandoned their roles, Mr. Ke:1y made follow-up calls to get additional information. Tr. 19,920-21 (Kelly). He found that in fact there were no refusals to drive. Tr.19 921(Kelly). This l
cisnee may be subject to some criticisms, but it is by no stretch of the imaginat.'on "completely irrelevant," and no f air-minded witness would say so.
- d. Intervenors' Records Fourth, evidently the Intervenors, like LILCO, could find no evidence that role abandonment has been a problem in past emergencies. Suffolk County made inquiries to each of its school administrator witnesses and found that the school officials have no documentation or additional information about role conflict. Board Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO Motion to Compel Answers to Certain Interrogatories and Re-quests for Production of Documents), at 2 (Apr.14,1988). Likewise, New York State has not been able to locate any instances of bus drivers, in any emergency, attending to the safety of their own families before reporting to perform their bus driving duties.
Response of the State of New York to LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admiss;oas Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers at 3 (Mar. 4,1988). See Attachment 4 to these proposed undings.
Moreover, according to the Response of Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southampton to LILCO's First Set of Requests for Admissions Re-garding the Remand Issue of "Role Conflict" of School Bus Drivers (Feb.1,1988), coun-ty emergency plans for other nuclear plants in New York State expect bus companies to maintain their normal responsibilities (Westchester and Oswego County plans) and I
assume that public school bus drivers will respond to perform evacuation assignments (Westchester County plan).N See Attachment 5 to these proposed findings. Finally, 1
l l 47/ The Board notes that the recently disclosed "County of Suffolk Emergency Op-erations Plan," which expressly applies to radiological emergencies, including nuclear war, does not appear to be concerned with role conflict. It contains an Annex F with a number of plans and procedures for schools. F r example, Annex N. Appendix 2, contains a "School Service" section. (School Service is apparently a service of the County Division of Emergency Preparedness.) One of the "Assumptions"is that (footnota continued)
I I
it is not disputed that "bus driver training conducted in accordance with plans for nu-clear plants in New York State other than Shoreham does not address caring for fami-lies of bus drivers in emergencies." Response of the State of New York to LILCO's Sec-ond Set of Requests for Admissions Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers at 2-3 (h.;r. 4,1988).
- e. Anecdotal Accounts Fif th, many anecdotal reports suggest that role abandonment has not been a problem in real emergencies. See, e_&, Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 25-26.EI Conversely, the only recent reports of role abandonmant have been anecdotal.
Dr. Mileti reported an account of a policeman who, under extreme circumstances, lef t his job. But this was an extreme situation, and even he attempted to come back to work when his family had been taken care of. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 38-39.
LILCO's witnesses admit that role abandonment can occur, but they say it is very unlikely - an "outlying" kind of event. Tr.19,530 (Mileti).
(footnote continued)
B. Schools can provide personnel and facilities useful in mitigating the effects of a disaster to the extent that school disaster plans are coordinated with local and State agency plans.
One of the School Service's "Standard Operating Procedures" is to
- 3. Caperate and coordinate with other jurisdictions in the acquisition and use of school personnel, f aellities and equip-l ment to mitigate the effects caused by the disaster.
M/ See also LILCO Ex.1 (reception centers proceeding) at 21 (witness who was present during the Ginna accident testifies that "[ claim prevailed" both onsite and offsite; witness who was at Palomares, Spain clean-up of plutonium spill saw no evi-dence of either U.S. personnel or Spanish residents fleeing; some 3000 U.S. soldiers and airmen participated).
l t
The only specific case cited by the Intervenors (both in 1984 and in the most re-cent hearings), was a case of a school bus driver who tended to her own child's injuries af ter an accident. Tr. 20,420-21 (Smith). In the County witness's opinion, the bus driv-er was devoting too much attention to her own child and "overlooked" another, more serious injury. Tr. 20,421 (Smith). The school administrators also cited, both in 1984 and 1988, the ordinary type of family-job conflicts that happen all the time and, in 1988, one case involving people asked to volunteer for emergency duty. Tr. 20,406 (Suprina)(people not available during hurricane to assist with transportation to shelter areas or to serve food cr to help supervise). Apparently these were school personnel who felt that "If the schools are closed today, I really don't have an obligation to come in there." Tr. 20,406 (Suprina).
- f. Radiological Accidents Sixth, in the testimony that has been presented to us on past radiological emergencies, there is no evidence of role abandonment having ever caused a problem.
The radiological emergencies that have been discussed in some detail are Hiroshima, Windscale, Three Mlle Island, Ginna, and Chernobyl. Nuclear attack, as at Hiroshima, is a "category apart" as emergencies go, Tr.19,541 (M11eti), because there the community l was physically destreved, including the disaster response organizations. Even though most of the doctors and nurses were killed or injured, some of them mobilized at a school and attempted to provide medical care until they were simply overwhelmed by the number of casualties. Tr.19,462-63 (Mileti). No evidence has been presented to l
show that "role abandonment" to care for one's family was a problem in these disasters.
l At Three Mile Island, there was no evacuation of the schools. However, there was an early dismissal following the Governor's advisory. Tr. 19,453-55 (Mileti). De-
! spite the extensive literature on this emergency, no one reported seeing any reference l
l
to any problems at all occurring with the early dismissal of schools.E! Tr. 20,181-82 (Lindell, Mileti).E With respect to emergency workers other than bus drivers, Dr. Mileti had phone calls made to a variety of organizations in the TMI area. He found that by and large most people went to work. PID,21 NRC at 673; Tr.19,450 (Mileti); see also Cordaro et a_1., ff. Tr. 831, at 73-76. Moreover, the Kemeny Comm!Mion Report devote 71y a sin-gle short passage to the reports that some hospit: sis were undermanned during the acci-dent. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 72; Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 34-35.E Dr.
Mileti explained, both in 1980 and in the most recent hearings, that there was no medi-cal emergency at TMI and that a variety of other factors helped to explain the small number of doctors at local hospitals. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 78; Crocker et al.,
ff. Tr.19,431, at 35, Tr.19,971,19,973,19,981-82 (Mileti).
At Windscale in England in 1957, reportedly large vehicles of some sort were mo-bilized in case an evacuation were needed. Tr. 19,986-87 (Mileti). Dr. M11eti has been able to find no references to role abandonment except a single passage in a 1975 g/ As noted above, one btri company reported that 108 of its 110 drivers had re-ported for duty during the TMI-2 accident.14 NRC at 1634.
M/ Similarly, in 1983 Professor Erikson testified that teachers in the early stage of the accident at Three Mile Island stayed in the schools with their students and in gener-l al did not abandon their posts. Tr. 1347-49 (Erikson). He explained that this was before l any kind of advisory about evacuation or other precautionary action. Tr. 1347-48 (Erikson). "[T]he accident was in progress for a long time at TMI before an advisory was broadcast, and it is that interim period of time I was talking about . . . ." Tr.1414 (Erikson). At the time there was "a great circulation of rumors but no advisory to evac-uated . . . . " Tr.1414 (Erikson). There is no evidence that teachers abandoned their jots at any time during the TMI accident.
SJ/ Dr. Dynes, head of the Task Force on Emergency Response and Preparedness for the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Icland, Tr. 1474-75 (Dynes),
testified that role conflict was not a "major variable"in what happened at TMI;it was a "meaningless concept" as far as the Commission was concerned. Tr. 1162-63 (Dynes).
n,-4 ,J- , s -
44-popular book citing a reporter who had talked to a "scientist" who had packed his fami-ly away at the time of an emergency. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 38. There is no indication that the scientist had an emerge.cy job with respect to the Windscale acci-dent. Tr.19,988 (Mileti).
The Ginna accident has already been discussed in the Board's PID. PID, LBP 12, 21 NRC 644, 673-74 (1985). At Ginna the emergency operations center was acti-vated and offsite radiological monitoring teams reported for duty. PID,21 NRC at 673-
- 74. All utility workers remained at their jobs, and police and firemen who had offsite emergency jobs responded. M. at 674. We have seen no evidence to change these 1985 findings about Ginna.E! Indeed, in the reception center hearing last summer a State witness confirmed that emergency workers had performed well at Ginna. Tr. 18,174-75 (Czech).
Finally, at Chernobyl some 1,100 buses from Kiev reportedly were mobilized and used to evacuate people from around the accident. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 36.
There is no evidence that bus drivers abandoned their roles to protect their families or for any other reason. M. at 36-37. At the time of the evacuation people in Kiev may not have regarded themselves at risk. Tr. 'l0.190-91 (Mileti). At most, this means only that the experience at Chernobyl is not dispositive of the issue; at least, Cherr.obyl constitutes one more real (radiological) emergency in which no role confilet problem has been documented.UI M/ See also, in the 1983-84 record, Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 93, Att. 8; Tr.
1166-67 (Weismantle, Cordaro); see Tr. 2170-71 (McIntire). See also Consolidated Edison I Co. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2), LBP-83-68,18 NRC 811, 959 (1983) (the experiences at ,
TMI and Ginna support the orthodox assumptions about human behavior, particularly with respect to the responsiveness of professional emergency workers).
4 M/ The same may be said for accidents or near-accidents like the HRX reactor acci-I dent at Chalk River, Canada in 1952; the SL-1 accident in Idaho in 1961; the Fermi Unit 1 accident in Detroit in 1966; the Browns Ferry fire in 1975; and others. See Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 37-38.
We can sum up the historical record as follows. There are at least three ways of looking at the issue of role abandonment. One is organizational: Have organizations ever been unable to perform their tasks because of role abandonment? The answer is that never in the history of the country has an emergency organization not been able to do its job because of role conflict. Tr. 19,540,19,633 (Mileti). As Dr. Mileti put it:
I am resting that (my opinion) on the basis of my judgment or interpretation or reading of the historical record of emergencies in this nation that we have experienced with and without emergency plans, that there has never in the history of the country been an organization that has been unable to do what it was supposed to do in an emergency because of role abandonment or role conflict or role stress, whatever label we want to use.
Tr.19,570-71 (M11eti). This testimony is uncontradicted on the record.
A second way of looking at the issue is functional: Did the job get done? No evi-dence has been presented, either in 1983-84 or in the most recent hearing, that any emergency job ever failed to get done because of role abandonment.E Indeed, the re-sponses to LILCO's phone survey of organizations showed that in all cases everyone who needed to be evacuated was evacuated. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 29. There were no reports of bus drivers not doing their job as well as they could have. Ld.
A third way of looking at the problem is at the individual level: Have any individuals ever abandoned their roles? Once again, there is virtually no evidence that any irdividual bus driver, or for that matter any emergency worker, has ever com-pletely abandoned his role because of his family. There are cases of people having de-layed (usually for a short time) before reporting to work because of family concerns.
5_4/
Lewis Killian, in his 1952 article, observed that "in none of the four communities studied [one of which was Texas City) did the disastrous consequences contemplated above seem to have materialized." Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 54; see also id. at 13 (Killian, while seeming to present cases of potential conflict, pointed out that none of this had any real effect on the operation of the emergency social system).
See, n. Tr. 20,185 (Kelly), 20,189-90 (Mileti). There are also cases in pre-1969 re-search papers reporting that some people abandoned their jobs to protect their fami-lies. But the clear weight of the evidence is that individuals do not abandon emergency-relevant jobs in time of emergency.
There is an evacuation about once a week in the United States. Tr.1962 (Dynes).
Newspapers would be likely to report cases of role abandonment if they had occurred.
Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 27. Moreover, it is likely that emergency managers would be aware of significant defections by emergency workers. Given all this, it s would be astonishing if role conflict had been a problem and yet gone unreported.
Faced with this record, the choice f aced by the Board is clear-cut. Do we con-clude that Dr. Cole's opinion polls and the predictions of experts on school operation.
but not human behavior in emergencies, accurately foretell the future? Or do we rely on the opinions of experts on human behavior (weighed against other such experts with less experience with emergencies) and on the entire historical record from 1776 for-ward? It is quite clear that if one asks people whether they think people would take care of their families first in a future, hypothetical radiological emergency, many of them will say yes. See, g, Harris, ff. Tr.1218, at 12,15 (hospital administrators stat-ed their staff would be unlikely to report); Tr. 1250-53 (Harris). It is equally clear that if one asks them what happened in true emergencies in the past, they will report that emergency workers did report for duty. See Tr. 1254-56 (Harris) (policemen, volunteer firemen, and volunteer emergency medical personnel reported af ter the Grucci fire-works explosion). In light of the fact that Dr. Cole's polls do not predict the future, that the applicant's experts were better qualified, and that there is no historical evi-dence of any failure of a bus driver or other organization to f ail to perform, the Board can only find in LILCO's favor.
F. LILCO's Efforts With Regular Drivers The Contention here at issue, 25, alleges that the LILCO Plan "falls to address the problem of emergency worker role conflict." 21 NRC at 981. The evidence shows that this is not true.
LILCO has offered trainingEEI to regular bus company personnel, including bus drivers and dispatchers.EEI Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431 at 59; Tr.19,490-93,19,536-37 (Crocker). Training consists of a saven-hour course in radiation, the Shoreham plant, and personal dosimetry and further training on the individual procedures. Crocker e_t l al., ff. Tr.19,431 at 59; Tr. 20,095 (Crocker). Also, LILCO has also made available to regular school bus drivers its family tracking system and LERO family reception center.
Crocker et al., f f. Tr.19,431 at 59; Tr.19,503 (Crocker).El/
G. Number of Bus Drivers Needed To determine the number of bus drivers needed to evacuate all schools in the Shoreham EPZ, the student populations of each school must be determined. Suffolk 5_}/ Training consists of a seven-hour course in general emergency proparedness, LERO, communications, rad protection, dosimetry, and personnel monitoring, a one-hour class dealing with the LERO school bus driver procedure. In addition, for LERO drivers there is bus driver training and about eight hours of "road rallles," all done an-nually. Tr. 20,095 (Crocker).
t 5_j/ See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154 (Vol. II of May 30,1984 transcript) at 60.
51/ The Family Tracking System is a formalized means for LERO workers to be in contact with their families. Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 22-24; Tr. 894-901, 904 (Weismantle). - So f ar as any of the witnesses know, no other plan has such a feature, Tr.
900 (Weismantle), 2155-56 (McIntire). Their families have a special relocation center.
Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 831, at 21. The plan has always been to advise outside groups, as I well as LERO workers, about the tracking system and special relocation center. Tr. 905 I (Weismantle).
LILCO emphasizes, however, that the Family Tracking System and special family relocation center are not necessary. LILCO regards them as "extras" designed merely to ease the minds of emergency workers.
[ _
. County spent'a good dea: of hearing time cross-examining on the precision of the school population figures used by LILCO as a planning base. See Tr. 19,746-814. The population figures used by LILCO were based on a telephone survey conducted in July 1987 end are set forth on a school-by-school basis in Attachment K to LILCO's written testimony and in LILCO Bus Driver Ex.1. The total population of the students was 27,099. New York State and Suffolk County figures totaled 26,537, as provided January 19, 1988. See LILCO Bus Driver Ex.1, 3, and 4. LILCO checked its numbers and the Intervenors' numbers with another telephone survey in April 1988 and came up with 26,453. See Tr.19,747-49, 20,169 (Crocker). LILLO Bus Driver Ex.1; Tr.19,747-51, 20,168-70 (Crocker). According to Mr. Crocker and the information in LILCO School Bus Driver Exhibit 1, there was little variance among the different population numberc for each individual school as provided by the parties. Tr. 20,167-71 (Crocker).EE In its testimony, Suffolk County did not provide a complete set of population fig-ures, and none of the County witnesses knew the stu.1ent populations for the school dis-tricts they did not represent. Tr. 20,319-20 (Smith, Suprina, Petrilak). In any event, the enrollment figures for each schools are likely to go up or down during each year, Tr.
20,297 (Petrilak), and the compiling of yearly figures is a task that LILCO has commit-i ted to perform, Crocker et al., if. Tr.19,431, at 52; Tr.19,804,19,814 (Crocker).5_2/
See also Tr.19,822 (Crocker) (LILCO is committed to provide sufficient resources).
1 13/ Concerns were raised about whether LILCO's plan provides for Mt. Sinal high school students who attend school in Port Jefferson. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, at
- 39. LILCO explained that these students would be evacuated with the other students who attend schools in the Port Jefferson school district. Tr. 20,175-76 (Cro;ker).
5_2/ See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. [9154] (Vol. II of May 30, 1984 transcript) at 25
("the circumstances of the schools change from year to year, with openings and closings of schools, shif ts in enrollment, changing transportation requirements . . . .").
Once the number of students was known, LILCO determined the number of driv-ers needed. LILCO reduced the student populations of each school by 5% to account for daily absences and reduced each high school population by 20% to account for students who drive to school or ride to school with another student. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.
19,431, at 50-51. These were the same assumptions litigated during the 1984 emergency planning hearings. Ld. at 51. The Board believes that it is reasonable to reduce all stu-dent populations by 5% and high school populations by an additional 20% for planning purposes. There is sufficient evidence in the record from both LILCO and Suffolk County to support an average 5% absentee rate at public schools. Crocker e_! al.,it. Tr.
19,431, at 51; Cordaro gt al., ff. Tr. 9154, Vol. II, at 55; Tr.19,754-56,19758-60 (Crocker); Tr. 20308-10 (Muto, Suprina, Petrilak). LILCO also provided credible evi-dence from a school district in the EPZ to support the 20% reduction for high schools.
Tr.19754-57 (Crocker). According to LILCO witness Crocker, the LERO Plan has suffi-cient flexibility buut into it to accommodate any daily deviation in the student popula-tion that would create a need for additional drivers. Tr. 19,.59-60 (Crocker). Given these facts, the Board finds this part of LILCO's calculations to be reasonable.
Next, LILCO computed how many drivers would be needed based on the number of students that could be loaded safely on a bus. For this purpose, LILCO used industry standards, that is, 40 students per bus for high school and 60 for lower grades. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431. at 51. Suffolk County witnesses argued that these figures were too high for long afstances and for middle school students. Brodsky g1 al., f'. Tr. 20,253, at 41-42. The Board acknowledges that some of the buses may be crowded. However, we l
b not believe that the health and safety of the school children will be endangered. In t
drawing this conclusion, the Board notes that there is some flexibility in the actual number of students who will be loaded on a bus, since the student populations at each l
-5 0-school are not evenly divisible by 40 or 60 (thus some buses will not be filled to capaci-ty) and since LILCO.does not intend to combine student populations from different schools to fill up each bus. Crocker at al., ff. Tr.19,431, at Att. K.
Also, many of the buses that will be used to evacuate schools have 22 seats; thus they can hold 44 high school or 66 elementary and middle school children. Brodsky e_t al., ff. Tr. 20,259 at 14,21; Tr. 20,319 (Petrilak). The Board also believes that it is rea-sonable to expect that the school districts would use all the buses and drivers available to them. Thus buses and drivers that normally go to schools outside the EPZ could be used for schools inside the EPZ. Drivers of smaller buses and vans, which are not ac-counted for in LILCO's numbers, also could be used.
Using the above figures and assumptions, LILCO calculated that 509 bus driv-ersN are needed to evacuate the entire EPZ in a single wave. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.
19,431, at 50; Tr.19,743-44 (Crocker). LILCO has determined that the number of the "regular" (la, non-LERO) drivers is 301, based on bus counts and information from bus company owners.b LERO therefore needs to supply an additional 208 drivers to
!.0/ Of this number, 470 bus drivers are needed for public schools,15 for parochial schools, and 24 for nursery schools. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 50. Only the bus drivers of public school children are the focus of the "role conflict" issue, since paro-chial and nursery schools normally do not provide their own transportation and since i
LILCO plans to provide for all of their transportation needs. M. at 51-52; LILCO Sup-piemental Testimony, ff. Tr.19,431, Att. O at II-20a.
Sl/ In addition, there are a certain number of "extra" drivers employed by or on con-tract to the school districts, for which LILCO takes no credit. Tr. 20,174 (Crocker).
LILCO also takes no credit.for those bus drivers employed by or on contract to the school districts who drivo smaller sized buses and vans. Id. See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr.
9154 (Vol. II of May 30, 1984 transcript) at 59 (according to one bus company, school districts require at least a 10-15 percent reserve of bus drivers); M. at 61 (one school l
district's plan provides for teachers or custodians to drive buses if bus drivers cannot be reached); Tr. 9315 (Robinson) (bus companies have extra drivers); 9315-16 (Cordaro) (in l some school districts teachers and other school employees are quallfled to drive buses).
Cf. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), LBP-81-59, l 14 NRC 1211,1629 (1981) (many sources of back-up school bus drivers are available on short notice, e&, teachers).
l l
effect a single-wave evacuation of all EPZ schools. Tr.19,689 (Crocker).
H. LERO School Bus Driver Procedures LERO's procedure for school bus drivers is Attachment 14 to OPIP 3.6.5.
LILCO's Supplemental Testimony, ff. Tr.19,431, at Att. P. That procedure provides for two types of LERO school bus drivers: (1) "backup" drivers who would serve as backups to the regular drivers and will drive if one of those drivers decide not to drive, and (2)
"primary" drivers who would drive the extra number of buses needed for a single-wave evacuation. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 49. In the event of a Shoreham emergen-cy that would require the evacuation of EPZ schools, the LERO drivers would be mobi-lized and would report directly to a pre-designated bus yard. W. at 53-54; Tr. 20,028-33
- (Crocker). Primary drivers will automatically pick up a bus pursuant to contracts be- ,
tween the bus yard and LILCO. Back-up drivers will only drive if asked to by the bus dispatcher. Both backup and primary LERO drivers will drive to the school designated on the assignment packet that they will pick up from the LERO box. Crocker et al., ff.
Tr.19,431, at 54-55. LERO boxes will either be stored at the bus yard or will be brought to the yard by LERO at the time of an emergency. Regular school bus dt! vers who decided to drive a bus to evacuate schools will also use the assignment packets. M.
l at 59. Regular drivers who have not received LERO training will be told what to do by the bus dispatchers and helped by LERO drivers. M. at 59-60. Assignment packets contain all the necessary information they need to help evacuate a particular school out of the EPZ.- See LILCO Supplemental Testimony, ff. Tr.19,431, Att. P. It also contains KI and dosimetry for their use in protecting their own health. Crocker et al.,
I i ff. Tr.19,431, at 60.
LILCO has committed to provide 100 percent LERO backup for the regular ,
l school bus drivers and 150 percent coverage of the additional "primary" LERO drivers l
f f
r
neeued to accomplish a "single wave" evacuation. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 53; Tr. 20,022 (Crocker). At present LILCO expects to have 613 LERO school bus drivers.
Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 52. Most of them have already been recruited and trained. Tr.19,704 (Crocker).
Suffolk County spent a good deal of time at the hearing cross-examining on the details of LILCO's procedure for supplying LERO school bus drivers. The Board allowed the County considerable leeway to do this. However, most of the questioning was out-side the scope of the limited remand issue. Moreover, it went to the sort of detail that a Licensing Board is not supposed to considor under the Waterford decision. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Stream Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732,17 NRC 1076, 1106-07 (1983).. Also, much of this questioning appeared to be in furtherance of a theory that there would be too many, not too few, bus drivers. See, e_&, Tr. 20,040 (Crocker). For example, the County suggested during its cross-examination that the large additional number of bus drivers would be difficult to handle in the limited areas of the bus yards. Tr. 20,041-43 (Crocker).
Suffice it to say that the applicant's witness Mr. Crocker made it clear that all of the hypothetical problems raised by Suffolk County have been cor.ddered and ad-
! dressed in LILCO's planning.N! The possibility that there might be congestion in the l bus yards or that it might take several minutes more or less to check out a bus and leave the yard (see Tr. 19,725-27 (Crocker)) is not material. The Board finds, in short, that LILCO's plan provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective actions can and will be taken in a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
, M/ See also Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154 (Vol. II of May 30, 1984 transcript) at 50 (There is a (LERO) Public School Coordinator and a Private School Coordinator re-sponsible for seeing that each school district is called).
I. Adecuacy of the Number of Drivers Based on his 1988 survey'of volunteer firemen, Professor Cole concluded that "less than one third of volunteer firemen can be counted on to help out during an emer-gency at the Shoreham plant. Cole et al., ff. Tr. 20,672, at 55. He also concluded that because school bus drivers "do not have the experience, training, or commitment of firemen," it is likely that, consistent with the results of the 1982 school bus driver sur-vey, substantially more than 60 percent of the school bus drivers would look first to the needs of their family and that "only a small fraction" could be counted on to report on time. M. at 57. The 1982 survey of 246 school bus drivers showed that 24 percent said that they would report to work. W. at 41. Professor Cole also thought that, if any-thing, the level of role conflict has increased sir 91982. M. at 42.
l If we attributed precise numerical predictive validity to Dr. Cole's surveys (and we do not), his results would show that perhaps 20-30 percent of the regular bus dri'lers would show up for work. This is so even if we assume that "taking care of their family t first" meant total abandonment of their roles. Even if we make these bold assumptions (that polls predict the future and that only cne role can be performed), there would still be 120 percent coverage of the regu:.ar school bus positions. The 50 percent l overstaffing of the LERO principal driver positions and the additional driversE that the school bus companies have available provide additional assurance.
6J/ For example, in the Riverhead Central School District the Transportatior Super-visor has a list of drivers' names with their telephone numbers, including alternate numbers if necessary. Tr. 20,341 (Doherty). The District has a call system witt. a few drivers acting as "captains." Tr. 20,342 (Doherty). The Transportation Supervison's of-fice staff attempt to contact drivers that the call system has not been able to reach.
M. There is also a list of substitute drivers, and the Supervisor has on occasion gone to l
the homes of drivers or to restaurants they frequent. Tr. 20,342-43 (Doherty). The Su-pervisor testified that this system provides "pretty good coverage." Tr. 20,344 I (Doherty).
l l
l l
J The Intervenors have attempted to make much of some school districts'
. unwillingness at present to cooperate with' LILCO. LILCO admits, for example, that two bus companies and one school district that owns buses "will not talk to" LILCO. Tr.
20,050-51 (Crocker). But this does not alter the Board's finding that LILCO's planning is adequate. LILCO has incorporated various measures to compensate for the possible unprepardness of regular school bus drivers. For example, LILCO's public and private schools coordinators call each school district in an emergency. Crocker et al., if. Tr.
19,431, at 56-57; Tr.19,729 (Crocker). Written instructions will be available at the time of an emergency. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 54-55. Each LERO bus driver will be able to explain the evacuation procedures to school personnel. ld_. at 57. LERO auxiliary bus drivers will help regular drivers understand what to do and may in some cases accompany the regular drivers. Id. at 60.W The Intervenors' case with respect to the LERO drivers rests in the final analysis on two propositions, one legal and one political. The legal argument is that LILCO's emergency bus drivers do not meet all of the legal requirements for regular school bus drivers. The political argument is that the school administrators would decline to use LERO's buses and drivers.
LILCO's answer to the legal argument is as follows. Suffolk County's school ad-ministrator witnesses testified that their regular bus drivers must be certified in accor-dance with State law provisions to be morally and physically quallfled, as well as com-petent to transport school children. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, at 50.b This 6_4/ Also, it is not likely that the school districts would choose to remain in a state of ignorance af ter the Shoreham plant had a full power license. See Tr. 20,388-93 (Rossi, Doherty, Smith, Suprina, Petrilak).
55/ Suffolk County school administrator witnesses also testified that a "1987 Nassau County law" makes it illegal for an unlicensed Suffolk County bus to enter Nassau Coun-(footnote continued)
apparently refers to "Regulation 19-A " which specifies driver qualifications. Tr.
20,361 (Smith, Doherty, Rossi). However, Article 19-A, entitled "Special Requirements for Bus Drivers," does not apply to temporary, emergency bus drivers such as LILCO proposes to provide. As used in Article 19-A, the term "bus driver" expressly does noj include persons "who, as a volunteer, drive a bus with passengers for less than thirty days each year; . . . ." N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law S 509-a(2) (McKinney's 1986) (At-tachment 6 to these proposed findings). Also, the Governor and local county executives have the authority to override particular laws if they interfere with an emergency re-sponse. N.Y. Exec. Law, Article 2-B, SS 24.1.f,29-a (McKinney 1982). Finally, there is evidence that legal restrictions do not apply, or are ignored, for other nuclear plants in New York State. Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 58; Tr. 20,142-43 (Crocker).
In short, it is simply not plausible that the existence of legal restrictions on reg-ular school bus drivers would be allowed to interfere with saving school children in a radiological emergency. To the extent that the alleged legal restrictions appear to be based on health and safety considerations, LILCO has successfully demonstrated that the concerns underlying them would be taken care of in an emergency. For example, the concern about supervision of the school children would be handled under the LILCO Plan by having school administrators or teachers accompany the children. See Crocker et al., ff. Tr.19,431, at 58.
(footnote continued) ty. Brodsky et al., ff. Tr. 20,259, at 55. First, this testimony is not sufficient evidenti-l ary foundation for a finding based on the cited law. Second, the existence of such a law is irrelevant to the issue of the number and availability of bus drivers. Third, it is sim-ply not credible that public officials would allow such a law to prevent the evacuation of school children l'1 an emergency. Fourth, if such a law were to be mindlessly en-
! forced in an emergency, presumably it would mean either that someone would have to pay a fine or that the buses would have to stop at the county line until other transporation could be arranged. In either case, radiological health and safety would not be ,)eopardized.
t 1
- .. . - - _ _ - . - _ _ _ _ _. - ..- . , _ . - - - _ . . - _ = _ __
Similarly, the Board accepts LILCO's answers to the political objection raised by the Intervenors. The political objection, as we note above, is that the school adminis-trators will not allow school children to ride with a LERO bus driver. This issue is not within the scope of the remanded issue. See Tr. 20,107 (Judge Gleason). The Applicant is not required to guarantee that its resources will be used.
The Board is confident that the school administrators, including those who testified in this hearing, would do the best they could in an emergency to provide for the school children. If there was sufficient time (despite the fact that an evacuation had been recommended), the schools could use their own limited number of bus drivers in multiple waves if they chose. (It is anomolous, however, that the County's witnesses are concerned about the willingness of drivers to drive and yet propose to have a few of them drive into the EPZ time and time again.) If speed were of the essence, we believe that they would use LERO drivers, accompanied by teachers or administrators, in the interest of taking the children to safety as fast as possible. See Tr.19,709,19,710 (Crocker). Indeed, the NRC's new emergency planning rule, which presumes that gov-ernments would follow a utility plan unless they have something better, applies to school districts if their governing bodies are popularly elected or appointed, directly or indirectly, by popularly elected officials. This is the case on Long Island. Tr. 20,260-61 (Petrilak, Muto, Suprina).
The Intervenors' argument boils down to the proposition that victims of an emer-gency must consent in advance to be saved according to the plan.N Nothing in the e
!!/ See Cordaro et al., ff. Tr. 9154 (Vol. II of May 30,1984 transcript) at 31 (LILCO does not regard schools as "support organizations" for which written agreements are re-l quired); M. at 32 (schools have their own agreements with bus companies; LILCO's un-derstanding is that NRC regulations do not require agreements with individual bus driv-I ers).
NRC regulations imposes or even suggests such .a requirement.EI LILCO has committed to provide drivers sufficient to evacuate all school children in a single wave.
LILCO's plan for making these buses and drivers available is acceptable. Nothing more is required.
J. Board Decision on School Bus Driver Role Conflict In weighing all the evidence, the Board finds that LILCO has met its burden of proof. The evidence on both sides can be summarized thus:
Weighing the Evidence For LILCO For the Intervenors Empirical Historical record Opinion polls Data Theory Theory of emergency Theory of roles and consensus and "role love of family certainty" Literature Post-1969 literature Pre-1969 literature s Opinion Opinions of Drs. Opinions of school Lindell and M11eti officials and Drs.
Turner, Barton, and Cole Back-up LERO drivers to replace Argument that they postulated missing would not be used regular bus drivers The Board finds, again, that opinion polls lack predictive validity and that the historical record shows little or no evidence of role conflict ever having been a signifi-cant problem in any emergency, radiological or nonradiological. On this ground LILCO
! has by far the better case.
l E/
The Board has already found that LILCO need not obtain written agreements with schools. PID,21 NRC at 858. And it has found that there is no requirement for written agreements with parents for transportation of their children. Id.
As for theory and literature, LILCO's. theory is based on more recent literature by researchers with experience in actual emergencies and, more important, is sup-ported by the historical record. On this ground, too, LILCO has the better case.
As for expert opinions, the County's school administrators are not experts at all in human behavior. The County's sociologists are less qualified to address emergency behavior than LILC0's witnesses. Again, LILCO has the better case.
Finally, the Intervenors simply have no ans;ver to LILCO's commitment to fill in for the regular bus drivers in case some of them are missing, except an answer that is outside the scope of the remanded issue and in fact outside the requirements of the NRC.
In short, the Board finds for LILCO. As we found generally in 1985 (PlD,21 NRC at 679), the Board now finds that, with respect to school bus drivers, role conflict will not be a significant problem at Shoreham and that a sufficient number of school bus drivers will respond in a timely fashion to perform their assigned duties.
Indeed, in light of the overwhelming empirical evidence that role abandonment has not been a problem in past emergencies, that bus drivers in particular have been l
willing to drive in past emergencies, and that school bus companies on Long Island have substitute drivers they can call on other than LERO's back-up drivers, the Board finds that it is not necessary, and not required by the NRC regulations, for LILCO to provide the "back-up" drivers (as distinguished from the "primary" LERO drivers that are needed to accomplish a single-wave evacuation of the schools).
! III. Hospital Evacuation Time Estimates A. History of the Issue
- 1. Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision Previously, the LILCO Plan provided for sheltering in the hospitals as the
preferred protective action measure for patients, and provided for evacuation of hospi-tal patients only on an ad hoc basis. In our Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Plan-ning ("PID"), we agreed with LILCO that, since the three hospitals in question were near the EPZ boundary and provide good uteltering protection, sheltering would be pre-ferred in most cases. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 840-46 (1985). Accordingly, we did not require exact esti-mates of the time needed to evacuate these hospitals. Id. at 846.
- 2. ApDeal Board Ruling The Appeal Board, however, remanded the hospital evacuation issue to this Board citing the regulations regarding emergency planning, and specifically requiring LILCO to provide specific evacuation time estimates for the three hospitals near the EPZ boundary. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,156-57 (1986). It held that "the Licensing Board should have required the applicant to fulfill the same planning obligations with regard to possible hospital evacuations as the Board imposeo in connection with the nursing / adult homes."
Id.
- 3. Commission Review The Commission reviewed the question of whether the "NRC's regulations in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1) require evacuation plans for hospitals in the EPZ even though shel-tering would be the preferred option in most circumstances." Commission Order (Sept.19,1986) at 2. The Commission agreed with the Appeal Board that "the regula-l tions require the applicant to fulfill the same planning obligations with regard to hospi-tal evacuation as the Licensing Board imposed in connection with other like segments of the EPZ, such as nursing / adult homes." Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383, 385 (Nov. 5,1987). The Commission further noted that:
I Under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), the Licensing Board could still approve the LILCO Plan if it is found that the deficiencies re-lated to hospitals were not significant for Shoreham. In fact, the Licensing Board did identify factors that may have rele-vance to this question, such as distance from the plant and construction characteristics of the hospitals. However, it is not clear to us that this was a matter adequately presented to or considered by the Licensine Board, since the Licensing Board did not specifically diset - 0 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1). On remand, LILCO and Staff are fru io raise the issue for appro-priate resolution.
CLI-87-12,26 NRC at 385. '
- 4. LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition On December 18, 1987, LILCO moved for summaay disposition of the hospital evacuation issue on the ground that no genuine triable issue of material fact existed, and that LILCO was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LILCO based its Motion on the Commission's invitation to this Board to consider LILCO's existing hospital plans under 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1), without further hearings, and to find them adequate if any deficiencies are "not significant." M. In the alternative, LILCO argued that the existing record considered along with the additional details regarding hospital ETEs which were contained in Revision 9 to the LILCO Plan satisfied Appeal Board and Com-mission concerns about its evacuation plans for hospitals. In response to LILCO's mo-tion, the Intervenors asserted twenty allegedly disputed f acts.N 6_8/ Statement'of Material Facts as to Which.There Exists a Genuine Issue to be Heard on Matters Raised by LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Hospital Evacuation Issue, attached to Governments Response to LILCO's Motion for Summary Disposition of the Hospital Evacuation Issue, dated January 15, 1988. In our Order, we stated that "[m]any of these ' facts' are not facts but are questions whose resolutions are of the nature of ultimate findings." Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO's Mo-tion for Summary Disposition of the Hospital Evacuation Issue) (Feb. 24,1988), ASLBP No. 86-529-02-OLR, 27 NRC , slip op. at 9. We address those questions in this pat-tial initial decision.
l l
L.
With regard to "matters of identifying the reception hospitals and their resoure-es," we ruled that "[d]etermining whether these hospitals and their resources exist are matters we believe to be clearly ministerial matters properly lef t to the Staff." Memo-randum and Order at 10. Furthermore, we stated that LILCO's reliance upon the figure of 14% availability for space in the receiving hospitals "provides a reasonable planning basis for (determining] the number of beds which would be free at some indeterminate time in the speculative future during the occurrence of an unlikely event." Id. at 11.
We reaffirmed this decision in our April 14,1988 Memorandum and Order (Ruling on In-tervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of Board Order on Summary Disposition of Hospi-tal Evacuation Issue), ASLBP No. 86-529-02-OLR,27 NRC , slip op. at 3.
Thus, the Board decided that "only the narrow issue of the accuracy of the evac-uation time estimates seems to us both unresolved and important. . . . We therefore will hold a hearing on the matter, restricthig it to the narrow confines of the bases and ac-curacy of the evacuation time estimates presented in Revision 9." Ld. at 12.El Three days of hearings were held on this issue. On May 27,1988, the NRC Staff presented its witness Thomas Urbanik, II. LILCO presented the testimony of its wit-nesses Diane P. Dreikorn and Edward B. Lieberman on June 2,1988. On June 3, the State of New York presented the testimony of its witness David T. Hartgen. Suffolk County and FEMA presented no witnesses on the issue of the bases and accuracy of LILCO's hospital ETEs.
B. LILCO's Position l
l There are three hospitals at issue in this proceeding. Two (John T. Mather Me-monal and St. Charles Hospitals) are located just inside the 10-mile boundary, and the l
l g/ Revision 10 was issued on May 16, 1988; the hospital ETEs are the same as those contained in Rev. 9.
l 1
1
third (Central Suffolk Hospital) is just outside the.10-mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). Testimony of Diane P. Dreikora and Edward B. Lieberman on the Remanded Issue of the Bases and Accuracy of LILCO's Hospital Evacuation Time Estimates (April 13,1988), ff. Tr. 20,586 at 3 [hereinaf ter LILCO Testimony).
Af ter the Appeal Board's remand of the hospital evacuation issue, LILCO re-tained KLD Associates to develop evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for these hospitals.
Ld. at 5. These estimates serve as a basis for a reasoned protective action recommenda-tion regarding whether to shelter or evacuate at the time of an emergency. Ld. at 4; Tr. 20,652-655 (Kline, Dreikorn); Tr. 20,801 (Shon).
The general methodology used to calculate evacution time estimates consisted of a dynamic, event-based, simulation of vehicle movements from within the EPZ to re-ception points. Rebuttal Testimony of Edward B. Lieberman and Diane P. Dreikorn on the Remanded Issue of the Bases and Accuracy of LILCO's Hospital Evacuation Time Estirnates (May 18,1988), ff. Tr. 20,586 at 18 [hereinaf ter LILCO Rebuttal). The im-plementation procedure calls for the homebound disabled to be evacuated first, fol-lowed by those who are in special facilities located closest to the nuclear power station, and then those progressively more distant facilities from the power station within the
- EPZ. LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,586, Att. C at IV-178. Since the three hospitals are located on the periphery of the EPZ and sheltering would likely be the protective ac-tion of choice in the majority of cases, they are evacuated last. _See_ LBP-85-12, 21 NRC at 846. Thus, the hospitals are generally evacuated by vehicles during the second l and third waves. The procedures used to calculate the ETEs are straightforward but I
highly detailed. They involve the following steps:
(1) UDdating Information, as necessary:
Number, type, and locations of all special facilities and hospitals; t
t
Number, type, and locations of all host facilities; and Number, type, and schedules of availability of all emergency vehicles.
(2) Stating Postulates:
Estimates of travel speeds, stratif ted; Estimates of times for driver processing, passenger loading and unloading, and monitoring; and Establishing sequence of evacuation activities.
(3) Develoolnr Data Base:
Estimating travel distanc-as and delineating routes.
(4) Pe,rforming Calculations:
Selecting the sequence of f acilities to be evacuated; Defining the "platoon" of vehicles for each run; Delineating the path of travel for each run and for each "pla-toon"of vehicles; Calculating the travel time for each route segment, the times for loading and unloading passengers, any queuing delays asso-clated with the loading / unloading activities, and time for briefing and reassignment; I
Estimating the starting time of each run based on vehicle i availability; and Establishing the identities of all vehicles which perform mul-tiple runs.
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(5) Summarizine Results:
Establishing a schedule of all runs; and Identifying the elapsed times to evacuate the hospitals for three separate evacuation scenarios:
Central Suffolk Hospital, only John T. Mather Memorial and St. Charles Hospitals, only All three hospitals, concurrently LILCO Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,586 at 5-8.
In developing the assumptions and calculating the hospital ETES, KLD followed the guidance of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E and NUREG-0654, Appendix 4 and Rev.1, Supp.1. Ld. at 8. The methodology employed for calculating the hospital ETEs is the same is that used for special facility ETEs and found to be appropriate.
LBP-85-12,21 NRC at 835-38. Additionally, the dynamic analysis method used was di-rectly responsive to NUREG-0654, Rev.1 Supp.1. LILCO Tet '"sny, ff. 20,586 at 10.
A variety of estimates and assumptions were used in the course of these calcula-tions, and are stated in Revision 9 of Appendix A to the LILCO Plan. Ld. at 8-9. Most of these assumptions were litigated previously, including the availability of adequate ambulances and ambulettes, capacity of vehicles, loading and unloading times, travel speeds, and priority of evacuation. LBP-85-12, 21 NRC at 835-46. _Se_e also LILCO's l Testimony on Contentions 72.A and E, ff. Tr. 9101. Certain of these previously liti-gated assumptions were clarified in LILCO's Testimony:
l In calculating the hospital ETEs, the arrival of vehicles at evacuating facil-l ities was scheduled to avoid or minimize queuing. LILCO Testimony, ff.
20,586 at 9.
1 1
As vehicles became availab:e for reassignment, they generally were allo-cated to the evacuating hospitals in proportion to the number of patients remaining. M.
Ambulances needed for multiple trips generally received assignments to re-ception hospitals that were closer to the EPZ than the reception hospitals to which ambulettes and buses were assigned. M. at 10.
These assumptions and estimates, including the clarifications of the previously litigated assumptions, were not refuted by the Intervenors. Other assumptions included the rate at which vehicle resources become available at the Brentwood and Peconic dis-patch centers, the amount of time required to brief drivers and provide them dosimetry, and the time allocated to monitoring occupants of vehicles. Ld. at 11-12.
These assumptions also were not refuted.
The results of the ETE analyses are contained in Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan.
M. at Att. C at IV-181 through IV-185. The LILCO Plan contains ETEs for normal weather conditions and for inclement weather conditions (rian and snow). Specifically, for a full 10-mile evacuation in normal weather, the evacuation time estimate for John T. Mather Hospital is 12:00 hours; for Central Suffolk Hospital,12:19 hours; and for St. Charles Hospital,12:20 hours. Longer ETEs were determined for the inclement weather conditions.
Subsequent to the manual calculations of these hospital ETEs, whose results are j
displayed in Revision 9 and Revision 10 of the Plan, KLD developed a computerized
( spreadsheet model of the computational procedures. LILCO Rebuttal it. Tr. 20,586 at 2,5-9. This model was developed as a result of the State's professed concerns about the f
absence of sensitivity analyses on LILCO's ETEs. Ld. at 2,9-13; Tr. 20,590 (Lieberman).
The results of this modeling were included in rebuttal testimony filed on May 18.E H/ Corrections to this testimony were submitted on May 31,1988 to correct several minor errors in the KLD computer model. The corrections did not cause material changes in the ETEs.
l
The sensitivity analyses performed using the KLD model confirmed and verified the results obtained from the manual calculations and demonstrated the relative insensitivity of the ETEs to reasonable changes in travel speeds. LILCO Rebuttal, ff.
Tr. 20,586, at 8-18; Tr. 20,645 (Lieberman). The sensitivity analyses further demon-strated that two factors play a doml? ant role in determining the ETE: the policy of evacuating facilities closer to Shoreham first, and the schedule of availability of vehi-cles at the dispatch center. Tr. 20,656 (Lieberman).
C. Intervenors' Position New York State's witness, Dr. David Hartgen, reviewed LILCO's hospital ETEs to assess the bases and accuracy of the methodology and the results. Direct Testimony of David T. Hartgen, Ph.D., P.E., on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding Hospital Evacuation Time Estimates (April 13,1988), ff. Tr. 20,692 at 7 (hereinaf ter Hartgen Testimony). The scope of Dr. Hartgen's review involved relevant portions of the LILCO Plan, the worksheets prepared by KLD in calculating the hospital ETEs, and the input and output tables for the KLD computer model. M. at 3-6, Hartgen Surrebuttal, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 3. Although he testified that he is familiar with the use of sophisticat-ed computerized transportation models and has experience with transportation plan-ning, including traffic time estimates and methods for computing them, Hartgen Testi-mony, ff. 20,692 at 1-3, Dr. Hartgen testified that he has neither calculated, reviewed, or critiqued ETEs for any other nuclear power plant than Shoreham. M. at 20,699-700, 20,788 (Hartgen).
Dr. Hartgen argued that many of the underlying assumptions and estimates in-corporated in KLD's analysis render the hospital ETEs unreliable. Hartgen Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 7-35. Furthermore, Dr. Hartgen maintained that errors in KLD's spreadsheet model raise further questions about the accuracy and rellat'111ty of the
sensitivity analyses. Surrebuttal Testimony of David T. Hartgen, Ph.D., P.E., on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding Hospital Evacuation Time Estimates (May 26, 1988), ff. Tr. 20,692, at 4-9,18-19 (hereinaf ter Hartgen Surrebuttal); Tr. 20,694, 20,697 (Hartgen).
Other issues raised by Dr. Hartgen included (1) perceived inaccuracles in the es-timated distances used to represent routes from facilities inside the EPZ to reception facilities outside the EPZ, Hartgen Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 28-30, (2) LILCO's as-signment of patients from evacuating hospitals to reception hospitals, Id. at 19-25; Tr.
20,701-704 (Hartgen), and (3) that there is little excess room available at the reception hospitals so that any decrease in available space will greatly increase ETEs. Hartgen Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 24-25.
The State believes that to the extent that the assumptions used in the KLD anal-ysis are inaccurate or fail, the evacuation time estimates can change accordingly.
Hartgen Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 7-9; Tr. 20,710-711 (Hartgen). Dr. Hartgen testified that on the basis of his sensitivity runs the ETE could be up to 66% longer than estimated by LILCO. Hartgen Testimony, ff. Tr. 20,692 at 12-18. He also argued that the actual circumstances during an emergency could differ in detail from the assump-tions represented in the XLD model. M. at 8-9, 18, 21-23, 29-30, 33; Hartgen Rebuttal, if. Tr. 20,692 at 16-17; Tr. 20,704-706 (Hartgen). Dr. Hartgen indicated that evacuation time estimates are useful to personnel who are implementing the evacuation only if those assumptions are true at the time of the accident. M. He argued that it is ques-tionable whether LILCO personnel could successfully develop a complex vehicle and tv-ception hospital assignment scheme based on the scheme develuped by XLD, and that the hospital evacuation time estimates upon which a protective action recommendation would be based could be lengthened. M.
Dr. Hartgen assessed the sensitivity of the ETE with respect to some of the as-sumptions specified in Appendix A of the LILCO Plan, Rev. 9. Kartgen Testimony, ff.
Tr. 20,692 at 17-18, 34. These assumptions specify the average speeds of travel over various roadways, both within the EPZ and outside the EPZ, and for various time peri-ods ranging from before the end of evacuation to periods af ter the evacuation of the general public is completed. In his assessment, Dr. Hartgen s.s "traces" of the last vehicles which evacuated St. Charles Hospital. IA. at 17. Variations on the speed esti-mates used by KLD were introduced into the trajectories of these trace vehicles to cal-culate a different ETE. Id.
Dr. Hartgen introduced an article by Mr. Lieberman which, he claimed, demon-strated that the speeds used by KLD were too optimistic, and indeed "arbitrary." Id. at 12-18. The results of Dr. Hartgen's sensitivity tests indicated that the ETE could vary by as much as -27% to +66% of the estimates provided by KLD. Ld. at 17-18, 34. This led Dr. Hartgen to conclude that knowledge of the actual speeds at the time of an acci-dent would be useful. Tr. 20,706-712 (Hartgen).
D. NRC Case The NRC Staff's witness, Dr. Urbanik, testified that the hospital ETEs calculated using the KLD analysis were more comprehensive and extensive than those he had re-viewed for any other nuclear power plant in the United States. Tr. 20,516, 20,523 (Ur-banik). He testified that the ETEs were accurate, Tr. 20,530-531 (Urbanik), and respon-sive to the guidelines set forth in NUREG-0654. Tr. 20,491-495, 20,515 (Urbanik),
t Testimony of Dr. Thomas Urbanik, II (April 13,1988), ff. Tr. 20,460, at 6 [hereinaf ter Urbanik Testimony).
l Dr. Urbanik also testified that planning studies, such as the calculations of ETES, i always involve assumptions regarding future events, and that there are uncertainties in I
virtually every number that goes into the calculation. .Urbanik Testimony, ff. "
Tr. 20,460 at 5-6 Tr.' 20,482-491 (Urbanik). The mere presence of uncertainties does
[ not make the estimates unreliable. Reliabilit/ of the results of such studies depends ;
L l upon the reasonableness of these estimates and assumptions, Tr. 20,482-491 (Urbanik),
and Dr. Urbanik testified that the estimates and assumptions used by KLD were reason-able. Urbanik Testimony, ff. Tr. 20.460 at 4. Specifically, with regard to travel speeds, 2
Dr. Urbanik stated that even under severe congested conditions, the average speed along a limited access highway would not fall below 20 mph - a figure which is slightly higher than the 15 mph figure used by KLD. Tr. 20,486-488 (Urbanik). In Dr. Urbanik's opinion the KLD speed estimates were conservative, and if anything were low. Tr.
20,515 (U *mnik).
Dr. Urbanik testified that the results from the KLD computer model confirmed, and were confirmed by, the results of the manual calculations set forth in the Plan.
Tr. 20,473 (Urbanik). Furthermore, the computer model is particularly useful for con-ducting sensitivity analyses and generating revised ETEs for future updates to LILCO's 1
i emergency plan. Tr. 20,503, 20,528 (Urbanik). Dr. Urbanik also pointed out that, for
- what he perceived to be reasonable assumptions and reasonable variations of assump-tions, all of the computed ETEs before the Board produced similar results. Tr. 20,471, i 20,508-511, 20,530-51 (Urbanik).
I l E. Board Decision on Hospital ETEs We have given the positions of the parties and the portions of the record which support them careful consideration. The narrow issue on remand for decision by this Board is, as we defined it in our Memorandum and Order ruling on LILCO's motion for summary disposition, "the accuracy and bases of the (hospital) evacuation time esti-mates presented in Revision 9 to LILCO's Plan."
, Revision 9 of the LILCO Plan sets forth hospital evacuation time estimates for the three hospitals located at the edge of the 10-mile emergency planning zone.UI In-cluded in Appendix A to the Plan are numerous assumptions portulated by LILCO in cal-culating these ETEs. It is primarily those assumptions that we seek to evaluate, be-i cause they form the bases of LILCO's ETEs.
At the outset, we note that guidance for determining ETEs is set forth in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 and NUREG-0654. Intervenors contend that LILCO's ETES f all in many respects to conform to this guidance. As we noted in our first partial initial decision, LILCO's primary protective action recommendation for hospitals within the EPZ to shelter is consistent with these requirements. We still find that to be so. Upon order of the Appeal Board and Commission, LILCO is req: fred to have ETEs for the hospitals and those ETEs also must conform to this guidance. As we describe in more detail now, LILCO's hospital ETEs conform to both 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 and NUREG-0654.
l The Applicant's witness, Mr. Lieberman, argued that the assumptions and esti-mates used by LILCO were realistic and reasonable. As he correctly points out, many
[ of the assumptions are the same as those used in calculating ETEs for speelet facilities
, y ,.
i which we approved in our earlier PID. LBP-85-12,21 NRC at 835-46. Other assump-tions are slight modifications or new estimates necessitated by the special circumstanc-es surrounding the hospitals.
The State's witness, Dr. David Hartgen, argued that LILCO's travel speeds are unreasonably high, and therefore, the ETEs actually should be much longer than those in LILCO's Plan. We find his concerns to be lacking in factual basis. For example, LILCO's estimated speed of 15 mph along the westbound LIE during the evacuation, U/ As noted previously, Revision 10, issued on May 16,1988, makes no change to the hospital ETEs contained in Revision 9.
I L
w'.tich was applied in the KLD analysis, was slightly lower than the 18 mph which the Joard already accepted as reasonable in our PID on reception centers. 1one Island Lighting Co (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-13,27 NRC _. (1988),
slip op, at 45-48. Other assumed speeds are comparable to those tvund arceptable e by the Board in the earlier decision. LBP-85-12,21 NRC at 805-09 There1 ore, the Board
{
finds that these actimates of speeds are reasonable and rejects t>.e lower speeds as-sumed by the State in its testimony. Specifically, Dr. Hartgen criticized KLD's speed of 15 mph for congested controlled access roads during the evacuation, and cited a speed
- - of 8 mph by reference to a paper co-authored by Mr. Lieberman. This value does not
! represent an average value over the entire length of the highway but applies to only l one small intersection (or ramp) considered in that paper. Furthermore, the NRC Staff's witness, Dr. Urbanik, testified that an average speed of 20 mph is reasonable for
} these conditions. All parties agree that speeds vary over time and location. The Board agrees that LILCO's use of reasonable average speeds is appropriate.
{
!, The LILCO Plan specifies the reception hospitals which are assumed to be avall-
! able in the event patients in the three hospitals are evacaated. These hospitals are at least 5 miles from the EPZ boundary and capable of treating contaminated, injured indi-f
.i viduals. These criteria comply with guldence set forth in the regulations noted above, i Furthermore, we reject New York State's criticisms regarding the availability of suffi-cient space for evacuating patients, as an improper attempt to relltigate our ruling on
- LILCO's motion for summary disposition and our ruling on the Government's motion for reconsideration of that Ordee. Matters regarding the existence and sufficiency of re-i sources and facilities for an evacuation of the EPZ hospitals is a matter appropriate for oversight by the Staff.
l l
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LILCO's general plan to first use those reception hospitals closest to the EPZ and then those farther away, is a reasonable means of reducing overall evacuation times. I Further, given the high degree of sheltering provided at the evacuating hospitals and the desirability of evacuating persons nearest the Shoreham facility first, it is reason-able to evacuate the hospitals last, i Other New York State criticisms of LILCO's ETE calculation process, including [
the selection of evacuation routes, are without support and hence rejected.
New York State's primary concern regarding LILCO's hospital ETEs was the lack of sensitivity analyses. Dr. Hartgen developed a simple model following the two "trace" vehicles in order to perform several sensitivity runs. He concluded that the ETEs are partleularly susceptible to changes in speeds, with as much as a 66% increase for one set of assumptions. LILCO responded to the criticism regarding sensitivity enalyses in ;
its Rebuttal Testimony and subsequent Corrections. The Board finds the assumptions used by Dr. Hartgen to obtsin a 66% increase in ETE to be unreasonable. Specifically, .
his assignment of a speed of 6 mph for the LIE over a 20-hour period is contrary to ;
common sense and the testimony and experience of Dr. Urbanik and Mr. Lt.Aerman, i Furthermore, the Board agrees with Mr. Lieberman that Dr. Hartgen's sensitivity run :
does not fairly portray reality since Dr. Hartgen retains an extremely low travel speed long af ter the evacuation of the entire EPZ has been completed.
Comparing the credible sensitivity analyses of both Dr. Hartgen and f Mr. Lieberman, the Board finds the experts in essential agreement. Mr. Lieberman has i
( developed a sophisticated computer model which describes the dynamic process encom-passing the entire evacuation of special facilities, including the hospitals. Using that computer model, Mr. Lieberman performed a variety of sensitivity runs, including sev-
{
eral of those described by Dr. Hartgen. The ETEs are relatively insensitive to j l f
+
_ hm- w-.-- , - , _.- --
reasonable variations and uncertainties in speeds. On this basis, the ETEs computed by LILCO are reasonable and in compliance with NUREC-0654.
Dr. Hartgen also krgued that errors in the KLD computer model render the re-sults questionabis or inaccurate. We dismiss this argument, noting the reasonableness of the input assumptions, and the relative agreement of results among the three meth-ods presented to the Board (LILCO's manual and computer analyses, and Dr. Hartgen's spreadsheet analysis).
Finally, Dr. Hartgen argued that the KLD model has little or no utility in an ac-tual emergency, that more sensitivity runs are necessary to assess its validity,'and that greater planning effort at this stage is necessary to build flexibility into the evacuation strategy > The model, of course, as explained by LILCO's witnesses, is not designed to be
'used during an emergency evacuation; rather, it is a tool used.itradvance of the order to evacuate to predict likely evacuation times so that decisionniakers can m,ake more in-formed decisions in an emergency, such as whether to shelter or evacuate hospital pa-tients. Tr. 20,607 (Lieberman). Indeed, Dr. Harigen was at a loss to explain how data on variations in average speeds at the time of an accident could even be collected, as a practical matter. Tr. 20,706-708,10,711-713 (Hartgen). Further, it seems to us that more that. sufficent analysis and attention has been devoted to assessing the reliability of LILCO's ETEs. We find LILCO's evacuation strategy to be reasonable'and workable.
Furtheratore, we are satisfied with the bases and accuracy of LILCO's hospital ETEs.
The Intervenors have failed to show any lack of compliance w', regulatory standards.
AccordinCly, we hereby approve LILCO's ETEs for hospitals.
I I
l IV. Boart! Conclusions l
l The foregoing sets forth the Board's findings of fact. Based on these findings, and upon consideration of the entire evidentiary record in this proceeding, the Board
f i
t
, makes the following conclusions of law: the Applicant's planning basis for school bus l r
drivers and its plan for providing additional bus drivers and its evacuation time esti-i mates for hospitals are adequate and satisfy the NRC's regulatory standards and criteria
- of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) and NUREG-0654, f
Order On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law and opinion,
- and the entire record, it is this ,_ day of ,1988 l l ORDERED
- ;
- 1. The issues remanded by the Appeal Board in ALAB-832 and CLI-87-12 of l school bus driver role conflict and hospital evacuation time estimates are resolved in ;
favor of the Applicant as described in this Decision.
- 2. In accordance with 10 C.F.R. SS 2.760, 2.762, 2.764, 2.785, and 2.786, as arr 4, this Partial Initial Decision shall barcome effective immediately and will con-st, - ', with respect to the matters resolved herein, the final decision of the Commis-sion tiJrty (30) days af ter issuance hereof, subject to any review pursuant to the above-cited Rules of Practice. Any party may take an appeal from this Partial Initial l Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within ten (10) days af ter service of this Decision.
Each appellant must file a brief supporting its position on appeal within thirty (30) days af ter filing its Notice of Appeal (forty (40) days if the Staff is the appellant). Within thirty (30) days atter the period has expired for the filing and service of the brief s of all appellants (forty (40) days in the case of the Staf f), a party who is not an appellant may i
i file a brief in support of, or in opposition to, any such appeal (s).
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Tile ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD James P. Gleason, Chairman ADMINISTR ATIVE JUDGE Dr. Jerry R. Kline ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE Frederick J. Shon ADMINISTR ATIVE JUDGE Datec. 3ethesda, Maryland this _ th day of ,1988.
Respectfully submitted, Mary Jo Leugers Rita A. Sheffey Counsel for Long Island Lighting Company
}{unton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: June 22,1988 l Attachment 1- List of Witnesses 1
2- Exhibits by Party and Number 3- Testimony of Richard Feldkamp, Zimmer proceeding l
4- Response of the State of New York to LILCO's Second
~ Set of Requests for Admissions Regarding Role Con-flict of School Bus Drivers (Mar. 4,1988) 5- Response of Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southampton to LILCO's First Set of Requests for Admissions Regarding the Remand Issue of "Role Conflict" of School Bus Drivers (Feb.1,1988) 6- "Definitions" from New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, Article 19-A i
l
LIST OF WITERCCWC LILCO LILCO presented the following witnesses:
Witness Position Tr. Location 1/
Douglas M. Crocker Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, Nuclear Op- 19431 erations Support Department, Long Island Lighting Com-pany, Central Islip, New York Dianc P. Dreikren Supervisor, Offsite Plans and Facilities, Long Island 20586 i
Lighting Company,' Central Islip, New York Robert B. Kelly Senior Project Manager, Roy F. Weston, Inc., 19431 Washikigton, D.C.
Edward B. Lieberman Vice President, KLD Associations, Inc., Huntington 20586 i Station, New York Michael K. Lindell Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, 19431 Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan Dennis S. Mileti Professor, Department of Sociology, and Director, Haz-19431 ards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, 1/ Resumes or professional q'talifications of all witnesses in this proceeding are bound in with their n
[
testimony. The transcript pages listed in this column indicate the location of their admitted testimony. g S
o n
Pd 4
LIST OF MITNESSES SUFFOLK COUNTY MITNESSES Suffolk Ccunty presented the following witnesses:
Witness Position Tr. Location Allen H. Barton Professor of Sociology, Columbia University, New York, 20672 New York Bruce G. Brodsky Optometrist; Trustee, Middle County Central School 20259 District Stephen Cole Professor of Sociology, State University of New York 20672 at Stony Brook; President, Social Data Analysts, Inc.
Edward J. Doherty Supervisor of Transportation, Riverhead Central School 20259 District Howard M. Koenig Superintendent of Schools, East Meadow Union Free 20259 School District Nick F. Muto Superintendent of Schools, Longwood Central School 20259 District Robert W. Petrilak Owner, ACH Data Systems, Mt. Sinai; Trustee, Mt. Siani 20259 School Board Anthony R. Rossi Transportation Supervisor, Middle County School Dis- 20259 trict J. Thomas Smith Transportation Coordiator, Longwood Central School 20259 District Richard N. Suprina Superintendent of Schools, Riverhead Central School 20259 District Ralph H. Turner Professor of Sociology, University of California, Los 20672 Angeles, California
, LIST OF WITNRCCRC NEW YORK STATE 1
i New York State presented the following witness:
i Witness Position Tr. Location David T. Hartgen Director of Statistics and Analysis, New York State 20692 Department of Transportation, Albany, New York 4
4
)
1
.i NRC STAFF NRC presented the following witness:
4 Witness Position Tr. Location Thomas Urbanik, II Associate Research Engineer, Texas Transportation In- 20460 stitute, Texas A&M University System, College Station, j Texas 1
a i
l 1
-. m Attachment 2 EXHIBITS BY PARTY AND NUMBER i
School Bus Driver Exhibits Identified at Disposition at Exhibit Number Description Transcript Page Transcript PageII LILCO Bus Driver Exhibits LILCO Chart of Various EPZ Public 20168 20172 Exh.1 School Population Figures LILCO Excerpt from Deposition of 20263 (not admitted)
Exh.2 Howard M. Koenig, dated February 16,1988 LILCO Response of the State of New 20300 20307 Exh.3 York to LILCO's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers (January 19, 1988)
LILCO Response of the State of New 20300 20307 Exh.4 York to LILCO's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers (February 10, 1988) l I
l I/ nless U otherwise indicated, the exhibit is admitted in'o evidence on the transcript page cited.
i l
t
Identified at Disposition at Exhibit Number Description Transcript Page Transcript Page Suffolk County Bus Driver Exhibits S.C. Exh. "Role Conflict and Abandon- 19629 19637 1 ment in Emergency Workers,"
by Dennis S. Mileti, Emergen-cy Management Review, 1985, Vol. 2, No.1.
S.C. Exh. Excerpts from OPIP 3.6.5 19768 20157 2 (Rev. 9)
S.C. Exh. Letter to Michael S. Miller, 19773 19829 3 Esq. from Mary J. Leugers (5/6/88), enclosures OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 3a and Att.
21 (Rev.10)
S.C. Exh. Suffolk County's Fif th Sup- 19807 19828 4 plemental Response to LILCO's First Set of Interrog-atories and Request for Pro-duction of Documents Re-garding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers (April 12, 1988)
S.C. Exh. Memo to All District Office 19817 19829 5-A Managers from S. J. Maslak (10/8/87), re Appeal for Addi-tional LERO Participants S.C. Exh. Memorandum from W. F. 19817 19829 5-B Wilm (10/19/87), re LERO Recruits S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 19871 19876 1 6 Survey Data Form, Marysville l Flood (A. Colbert)
S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 19874 19876 7 Survey Data Form, Taf t,
! Loulslana (P. Emig) i
Identified at Disposition at Exhibit Description Transcript Page Transcript Page S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 19879 19926 8 Survey Data Form, Hurricane Elena (D. Bilodeau)
S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 19883 19926 9 Survey Data Form. Hurricane Elena (L. Newman)
S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 19891 19926 10 Survey Data Form, Hurricane Elena (J. Gray)
S.C. Exh. Individual Bus Driver Survey 19943 19962 11 Data Form, Marysville Levee Break and Flood (J. Pratt)
S.C. Exh. Individual Bus Driver Survey 19943 19962 12 Data Form, Marysville Levee Break and Flood (R. Laird)
S.C. Exh. Organizational Respondent 20011 20058 13 Survey Data Form, Marysville Flood (P. Gasdner) l l
-S F' l% 7. . ll3 ,_ ;ygy .;,a ;;
~ is
- ~
, g_ g,
-n
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i l
I 1
Hospital ETE's Exhibits 1
Identified at Disposition at Exhibit _l%scription Transcript Page Trauucript Page LILCO ETE Exhibits LILCO KLD Computer Model Output 20651 20651 Exh.1 Table 5A LILCO KLD Computer Model Output 20775 20776 Exh.2 Table 12 LILCO KLD Colaputer Model Origin 20776 20777 Exh.3 Destination Input Table LILCO Reception Hospital Assign- 20781 20782 Exh.4 ment Worksheet New York State ETE Exhibits N.Y. Exh. LILCO Plan, Rev. 9, Appen- 20479 20520 1 dix A, pp. IV-172 through IV-187.
N.Y. Exh. NUREG-0654, Appendix 4 20520 2
N.Y. Exh. NUREG-0654, II.J (Protective 20498 20520 3 Response), pp. 59-65
,- ;.~ a .
Attachment 3 13-12 5466 If A Yes.
2l o 0 Were you aware that other members of the Monroe 3
l Township life squad attended that class?
4 A
1 That's when I found out that it was held.
I a 5l 0 So there was training that was provided that you 0 i E did not attend; is that correct?
,~ ;
- 7
' A That's correct.
n I
5 8 i a
a i
Q And your knowledge of this training is throuch other .-
9i; .
]. members of your life squad who attended this training course; is j 10 l that correct? i i
II 5 A Yes.
s I2 '
$ MR. CASSIDY:
E '
Thank you. No further questions.
{
.=
13 JUDGE FRYE: Redirect?
$ 14
! MR. DENNISON: No, your lionor.
15 l JUDGE PRYE: Ms. McIntosh, we thank you very much 16 e i for corning .!nwn today.
I 17 E (W i t:no n n o:<r'Isod . )
74 18
,i Your !!o no r ,
MR. D I:N N I C O M :
5
- th. no :< t wirr.ess will be
.r 19 Pi ch.) til l ld kamp .
20 Wini r o rio n ,
2l !'
4 RIC!!ARD PELDKAMP 22 w.i:, , .i ( ) erl a: .i wi trv':;a by anel on beha 1f at' In te rvono r ::AC 23 anel, h.ivirol h ,on f I r :: t elu l - : worn, w.u o :<.un i nm i and t ' n t i C ' .' < !
24
.v. : < 31 1. )w . .
25
_ - . . .s. . m_ --
13 13 5467 XXXX I l DIRECT EXAMINATION f
2l BY MR. DENNISON: 1 3
Q Mr.
Foldkamp, would you state your name and address 4
for the record, pleaso? '
l c 5 A
9 Richard Foldkamp, 861 Washington Street, New t g 6 - !
Richmond, Ohio. ,
c.
b 7 Q And would you spell your last narro for the reporter?
s
$ 8 A F-es - L -<!- k -a-m- p .
~.
9i x o Mr. Pettdkamp, I will hand you a papor that in 1
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e i captioneirl "Olcoct Toritimony of Richard Poldkamp," whleh l I
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)n II I '
ptir po r t:1 to bont yOtt r t41'Jna turn, dl(OU11to'l litit!O r oa t h on the !
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= 6 th d.iy ol' Jantia ry 19112, attd t will ank you '.o revlow that i 3
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e anti 1dvtno inn 1f thnt in lli Cac h yotir d t ruet wr i f.Lon 1:entiloony? '
b (N I I:II oIllj I, f.'o n 1 ! ) Ilf l t !!)IIlllflf 7IlI.
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I7 MR. Ol;lllll Coll:
E I At 1. h l 's t i nie ' , '/< i u r llon o r , I would IO
[' ank thit i.lio ell roet toni.1 mony of I!I . lin t l
- n' lith.uno be placotl in t!te raf tfo ril .1 t Ihid po i n f; .In li i n 'l i r: f: 1. " M i: ititOlly.
20 ,
,f,,g,;g ,,117 C : ob j o r. t: f o n n .'
2I Without. ob jerf t: ion, i f- will bei ailm i t h"I . -
U '
( 'I'h e ' re:1imony of I! ::ha rel l'o l 'lk a rnt ,
f< > l l ow : : )
23 24 2 's
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7 O.P UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
.g7 , g j.2 P 3 $
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of :
CINCINNATI GAS & ELECTRIC : DOCKET NO. 50-358 COMPANY, et al.
(William H. Zimmer Nuclear :
Power Station) :
APPLICATION FOR AN OPSRATING LICENSE DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD FELDKAMP AD . THE ZIMMER AREA CITIZENS-ZIMMER AREA CITI' CKY CONTENTIONS 20c (3), (5); 20e ( 3) , (4) ; 1); 23(
24 (6), (7) .
s p ..
State of Ohio ) -
) SS: - ,jg I U IS82h .~ '
County of Clermont ) .
{ Qpnos Richard Foldkamp, being first cautione swor my i
toutimony atato su follown.
I am tho annistant chlaf of the V111ago of New Richmond life nquad, and in that capacity I am romponsiblo for cho operation of the life nyuad for the Villago of Now Richmond, Oh.'u. I Nvo been a member of the Now Richmond lifo squad sinco March, 1980. I am a i
raambor of tho Villago of Now Richmond firo dopartment, as a firefighter, and havn boon ninco 1971. Iloforo March, 1980 I I
had nervori an a inernher o f the Villayo of Now Itichmond life squad for the porlo<1 of 19'e 7 to 1975. My horne addreon is 861 Washington l
Street, New Richmond, Ohio.
I hold a certif f cato as an ome'rgency rnodical technician in my life squad participation and an a firofighter I am the instructor in fire service. The Village of New Ri chinand life squad has 16 momborn anr1 tho lir" <!"pa r ' ino n t ha: ~10 rne mborn; h r;we vo r , 4 rnernbers ,
- - b y >0 1 -.
l
, _ _ .% :_ . . - 'a -- ~ ~ --~- - - - - - - - - _
n -. c.
war - - ----s- ~ s- y l
of which I am one, are both members of the life squad and fire department, 1
()
v in which there are actually 38 members on 1ath fire and life squad rather than 44. 4L I have undergone and received radiological tra. . .g .
! The life squad and fire departn:ent of the Village of New Richmond are totally comprised of volunteer personnel. Of the i fire and life squad personnel, 3 life squadsmen have received radiological trairing and approximately 6 to 9 firemen have received radiological training to date. I have been advised that the role of the life squad in the event of a Zimmer Station 1
i emergency will be to provide emergency assistance to individuals injured and thereafter to be involved is. monitoring. The function of firemen in the event of a Zimmer Station emergency will be to provide fire service, if needed, and to engage ir. monitoring and I
door-to-door verification of the population located in the Village of New Richmond and in Ohio, Pierce and Monroe Townships.
During the course of the working day, from approximately 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.,
there is a low availability of life squad and fire personnel bceause of employment circumstances. Conversely, during the evening and night hours there is a higher availability of such volunteer personnel. During the course of my involvement as both a life squadsman and fireman in association with the members of the life squad and firemen of the Village of New I( Richmond, approximately 95% of the .8Fa ;quadamen have ind Jated and will not respond in a volunteer emot rency response role in the 2
t p p rm. a .<n. % g. n p .,
, a y event of a Zimmer Station accident. As to firemen, approximately 25% will not respond in an emergency role. As for myself, I have a grandmother,
, mother and my family located within the plume exposure pathway of the Emergency Planning Zone for the Zimmer station and I must fulfill my obligation to my family and conduct an evacuation of my grandmother, mother and family an , after having evacuated them, I will then determine whether or not to i
return to the area to undertake an emergency response role. {
l I have been a resident of the Village of New Richmond for l i
35 years and, based upon my knowledge and experience of the population residing in the Village of New Richmond and Ohio and Monroe Townships, thesc individuals will not follow direction presented to them prior to a Zimmer Station accident and they will not follow direction during a Zimmer S ta tion acciden t. One of the emergency rouponse rolos assigned to firemen is to verify the notification of the publ.le, in which tha t public will be directed to place a gremn card or, in the absence of that green card, a
- t. o w e l at thoir front door or mail box. Based upon my experience of t.hi n commun i t.y , approxima tely half of the popula tion will place auch ve ri fica ti on noLJ co. "
The n nnmun i t.y living within the plum c.<posure planning pat.hway of the Zimmer Sta tion han been exposed to a great deal of publici ty concerni ng the conntruction of this plant and, most 6
recently, publica t i on of construc tion de fects and other ma t ters which they believe indicitou faulty conutruction of this plant.
l l
l 3
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i s
i In the event of any kind of an accident at the Zimmer Station,. the community will overreact and probably panic, there will be numerous vehicular accidents and insufficient manner or means to cope with such situations, and an inadequate number of emergency response personnel, including police, to control such a situation and to provide for the safety of the public. During the course of such events, automobiles will travel U.S. 52 and S.R. 132 as if they are raceways. .
Because of the inability of the community to follow directions, their anxieties and related reactions, and the insufficient number of emergency response personnel, the failure to post notification verification card or towel, the control of the public during an evacuation, whether declared or not, is totally unrealistic and can not be implemented for the safety of the community at the time of a Zimmer accident.
I, with my other volunteer response personnel, pa rticipa ted in the November 18, 194l drill exercise. In approximately September, while in a t tendance a t an emergency preparedness meeting held at the Bethel fire house, I and another volunteer were approached by Ed Canfield ind Steve Woolen (phonetic sp.), engineers employed by the Stone I, Webster Engineering firm.
At tha t time I anc the volunteer with me were requented to take the day off f ror.. ou r employment on November 18, 1981 to participate in the drill exercise and we were promised to be reimbursed by the sum of S50 for our lont wages. I was further requested to also have available momborn of the life squad and my companion was reques ted to have
s 1n a c: e y' ==- r %~ :,, 4 available firemen, all of whom would be reimbursed by the sum of $50.
It was concluded that I would have available three extra life squadsmen, to be paid, as an extra crew of life squad personnel on November 18 because the crew on duty that day had previously indicated that they would not participate in either a
Zimmer drill or a Zimmer accident. I further understood that such arrangements and promises were also made to members of other fire and life squads.
On November 17, 1981, at approximately 11: 00 P.M., I received a telephone call and was advised tha t the life squad extra crew would not be needed for the drill exercise, that such advice had been given by Ed Canfield and Steve Woolen of Stone & Webster, and that the extra crew would not be paid.
Five firemen were to be paid to be available and that they would be the only ones receiving pay. I remained from my employment on November 18 to participate in the drill and I did participate in the drill an a f;refighter.
prisr to November 18, I and other volun teer response support g:,up personnel had been advised and were prepared and available to pa ticipate in tho November 18 drill exercise. This drill exercise does not present any means of evalua tion of the competency of that drtil in the face of the response group personnel being totally prepared to ungage in *he drill on November 18, that large portions of the emergency response group personnel remained from their employment, an did I, to be available and present to commence partie:pation in the drill upon not t fica tion that tt wan <:omme n c i n q .
I further find that, in addition to the foregcina,
'here <:an not be any competent eva lua tion of a drill to determtne 5
g ~.: + ,- um ~ ~
, .. v.
4 i
the ability to implement current emergency plans unless there is participation by all segments of the community in that drill, including the erection of access control devices, notification to the public and responsive verification, and an involvement of the public in evacuation.
In the evsnt cf an accident at the Zimmer !
Station, and consicering the comunity , the emergency response ,
i personnel who would be available and would perform, the reactions '
of the public and the emergency response personnel, all result in'the inability to implement an emergency plan to in ar.y manner protect the health and safety of the public.
4 LdsAW... o Michard Feld6. amp Sworn to and subscribed in my presence this L% day of January, 1982.
bC Lu ~ _ [3 kw MAXINE 5 LOUX flOlJf y II4 Dl'(, $1Jte o' Oh.o My Corn.mj$$600 (JSilfl }&A. 29 $$
6 1
b muyi----
-_ x----- m. m m M 13-14 5468 i
I JUDGE FRYE Mr. Wetterhahn or Mr. Conner?
XX 2 CROSS EXAMINATION 3
BY MR. WETTERHAHN:
O 4 a The ,irst minor ,oint. on to, o,pa,e 2, we g5 discussed at your deposition the addition of 38 members a,.9 l 6 16 members in the life squad and the fire department having 7
30 members, with four members being a member of each, and you 8
d have a number 46 on the third line of page 2. Should , tha t d 9 number be 42?
10 A That's right. Yes, sir.
5 That's -- when I recounted h II it, I believe that's the way that it -- there was a slight a
y 12 mathematical error there.
II MR. DENNISON: That is correct, your Honor, and if I4 I might, we could have Mr. Feldkamp correct that on the original 15 6
as at a convenient time in this proceedina. It is a typograohical j 16 w mathematical error on the numbers,
[ II JUDGE FRYE: Why don't we corrcct it now?
IO O
MR. WETTERHAHN: Are there any other changes, Mr.
I9 Dennison?
g 20 MR. DENNISON: I don't believe so.
2I 1
For the record, so that we all know what is occurring, 22 *four Honor, he has -- '
23 '
MR. WETTERHAHN: He changed the number 46 in the 1
24 g third line of the second page to 42.
l ,
25l MR. DENNISON: May I explain?
t The circumstances in l i
I i !
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, l
l 13-15 5469 I
the second line, it states 38 members and it should state 42.
G 2 To compoumd the pros 1em, s,.
,,1dxamp inadve, tent 1, changed 3
the next number down in the third line. We just corrected i
h 4 46 to the 42.
j 5 JUDGE FRYE: Why don't we just ask him? Show him i I j 6 the testimony.
7 X Mr. Feldkamp, I see the second line on the top of
, j 8 t
0 page 2 says "in which there are actually 38 members." Is 9
that 28 correct?
10 i
i!! THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.
t x l II JUDGE FRYE: And then it goes on in the next line 1 i
f s
I2 and says, rather than 46, and that, I take it, should be 13 j changed?
l b I4 THE WITNESS: Right. To 42.
, P
! g 15 i = JilDGE FRYE: It should be 42.
1 E IO ut MR. DENNISON: That has been what has been corrected, i I7 i h your Honor.
IO l C JUDGE FRVE: Pine. Mr. Wetterhahn.
20 Q
Mr. Feldkamp, you have received some training 21 l with regard to your response role at the Zimmer station 22 si.ould there be a radiological incident?
23 A Yes, sir, it is.
24 O
By way of clarification, you wear two hats, do you !
)
25 .l not?
l q ll A
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
l'
13-16 5470 I
A Yes, sir.
O 2 O one is a fireman.
I will call it an ordinary _
I 3
fireman, and the other one is the head of the life squad; is 4
that not correct? l 5
A That's true.
JUDGE FRYE: Excuse me. Mr. Feldkamp, would you
$- 7 X mind taking the nicrophone out and holding it? We'll be able k to hear you a little better.
d THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. WETTERHANN: Was the Board able to hear the E
l previous responses?
BY MR. WETTERHAHN:
' l Q By way of background, you wear two hats in New Richmond; one as a fireman, one of the rank and file firemen, 15 if I can call it that; and then as assistant chief, and that title of assistant chief puts you at the head of the life h
a:
squad in New Richmond. Is that not correct?
18 A Yes, sir, that's true.
A 19
) Q Have you received radiological training with 0
regard to your response role at the Zimmer station?
A Yes, sir, I have.
Q Have you received it as a fireman or as the life 23 '
squadsman, or both? i i
h A Both organizations were trained together, I f 2$j Q How many -- is that a Plektron or is that a Minotar? i l 1 l --ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC _ ._. I
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13-17 )
5471 I A 1
That's my work calling ma.
- 2 0 Okay.
I would note for the record there was a 3
beeping sound in the general direction of Mr. Feldkamp.
4 (Laughter.)
5 JUDGE FRYE:
I'm sure the Applicant has arranged l 6 that so we can see how well these communication systems work.
{ 7 MR. WETTERHAHN: Certainly.
a We will take credit.
g 8 (Laughter.) :
d ci 9 2 BY MR. WETTERHAHN:
10 0 How many peopic were trained at that time?
E E
4 I1' A
D The exact number I can't give you. I know that f 12 there was probably -- there was probably 12 people altogether 13 that finished it. Of this, there were three that were life b I4
$ squad people, and then there was -- the rest of them are 15 firefighters, strictly firefighters. And when I say three as j 16 w life equad people, I'm including myself, who is also a fire- !
I7 fighter.
h 1 l f18 0 Did your course of study relate to monitoring of E
g 19 M yourselves and your surrounding areas, should you be in or near 20 a plume as a result of an incident at Zimmer?
21 A Yes, sir, it did include that.
l 22 0 Did it discuss what the limits were with regard to 23 '
the radiation dose you could get as part of your duties as a !,
24 .
Q life squadsman or a fireman?
25 A Yes, it did.
I ll ALDERSON REPORT;NG COMPANY. INC. !
I 13-18 5472 I
Q And this training also encorppassed decontamination 2
efforts, first for your own equipment and yourselves, should 2
that be necessary, did it not?
4 A It did.
5 Q That training encompassed such subjects to enable f 6 you to assist at evacuation and decontamination centers also; 7
2 is that not correct?
g 8 A It did, yes, sir.
0 0 9 z
, Q Let me briefly descriue, since I believe it's a h 10 d contention, as to what would occur at one of these relocation 11 h decontamination centers, as you studied it in your course of a
f 12 study.
If my characterization is incorrect, please let me know.
13 MR. DENNISON: Your Honor, I'm objecting simply from
@ 14 the standpoint that is beyond the scope of direct. I do realize 15 that it is a pertinent and relevant area of inquiry.
, 16 A
JUDGE FRYE: I didn't hear that. k I7 i, l MR. DENNISON: I do, however, recognize that it is a 18 h pertinent and relevant area of inquiry. It's just simply that k 19 p
.4 the Applicant has from time to time reminded me of the certain 20 bounds. I thought perhaps it was time to remind him.
21 MR. WETTERHAHN:
I think the case is different here.
22
) I have this morning and this afternoon heard the fact that no 23 j I
matter what the label on the contention was, we had to address 24 somehow the substance of the testimony. I don't know what 25l the bounds of this testimony is, really. It certainly goes to l
k '
s
.ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. l
.. .. ~
s
9 5473
)
I i his training and what he wculd do with regard to radiological 2 i emergencies. I am really hamstrung. I cannot rely on the 3 j title to indicate which contentions it covers, and I really have 4
! to rely upon the scope.
'l JUDGE PRYE:
The title in this case seems to be 6
y,77 3p,cggge,
,E -
7 MR. DENNISON: Of course, your Honor, if the 0 Applicant wishes to abide, my position has always been that it ought to be robust, free and open, and if he wants the latitude to both sides, that's fine with me.
MR. WETTERHAIDh Jo, I certainly don't want to <Jo f I2 beyond the scope of the direct testimony, and if I did, I'm sorry.
- BY MR. WETTERHAHN:
O Just for clarification, ao you intend the title of f16
~
this testimony to be part of your testimony?
17
$ MR. DENNISON:
- Your Honor, I'm going to object.
The document speaks for itself. There is a caption above it.
19 l l !
This witness' affidavit portion does not ccmmence until below it.
l 21 1
JUDGE FRYE I think that's quite obvious. i J :
l BY MR. WETTERHAHN:
23 '
O Have you read the contentions enumerated in the title to your testinony which is not part of your testimony? !
, 5 A
Are you asking me if I have read my testimony? l i '
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, i
_g y ,,9, ew- ' " ' _ _ _ - . - - - - - -- - -
M.mm. .
13020 5474 I
Q No, not the test.uany, the contentions as admitted O 2 by this Atc.nic Safety G Licensing Board. I believe the date is 3
on December 11, 1981.
- O 4 j
i A I don't believe I have.
a 5
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5475 1 O You states A large percentage of firemen and/or
. O 2 11fesguad memeere possisiv w111 noe respond to an emergency 3
at the Zimer Station. Is that not correct?
4 A.
When I was speaking of that, I was talking mostly 5 of lifesquad people.
Most of my lifesquad people have said l 6 that they could not or would not respond. 1 I
7 0 To Zimer?
8 A.
d That is in connection with a nuclear disaster at l d 9 the Zilnmer plant.
That is not in connection with any kind of a 10 3 a medical emergency other than a nuclear disaster.
11 0
tl2 Are you saying that these people would perform g 12 g their function at all points within the plume EPZ, except 13 they wouldn't respond to a request for asnistance at 1 the le 14 Zimmer Station? Is that your testimony? '
2 15 W
(Pause.)
f 16 A.
w You mean, if they would stand a chance of being tj 17 contaminated?
18 0
5 I am distinguishing between a call for a lifesquad 19 in an area within the designated area you.would be primarily 20 responsible for in the plume EPZ after an incident at 21 Zimmer.
Are you saying that these individuals would not 22 respond to such a call?
1 23 A. I don't know. The thing they told me they would 24 not respond to is Zimmer.
So I don't know what their 25 l feeling would be in the surrounding area, because I really i
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
~2 jwb 5476 1
pressed for them getting all of the radiological training 2 that they could get.
3 0 These individuals for the most part are not the j
4 ones on the lifesquad who have obtained this radiological a 5 b
training. Isn't that correct? l i
l 6 A.
That's correct. l 7
4 Do you as Assistant Chief intend to offe[ fnat 8
training to these individuals?
O i d 9 A.
It was offered to them before at the same time I t 10 took my training.
11 4 And they decided not to accept it?
I
( 12 A. Well, there were several people. The majority of
'5 13
- g the people did not take it.
14 0 Do you know whether they will be given another 15 opportunity to take such courses?
g 16 A.
d I have heard of no other classes being offered, 17 0
Would you, yourself, because of your training
= 18 respond to an emergency? Would you perform your duties, as
!h 19 g you understand it, after a radiological incident at Zimmer 20 Station? You, personally?
21 l
A.
As long as I was able to monitor myself and the 22
{ surroundings , I would perform the duties as well as I was 23 able to.
24 g Have you been provided, or do you know whether you 25 !
will be provided, with such equipment to monitor yourself I '
i ALDERSON REPORT!NG COMPANY, INC.
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.4-3 jwb S477 1 and your aquad?
h 2 A.
We have been provided with that equipment.
3 0 What type of equipment? Can you generall describe 4 it?
5 ..
We were given two - we were given dosimeters, 6 pocket dosimeters, and we were given two different types of
$7 like geiger counters.
8 0 And do you know how to use them?
d d 9 A. Yes, sir.
10 0 3 Have these - Let's talk about firemen for a 11 second. I'm sure when these individuals respond to a fire Ul g 12 there is an increased risk to them as soon as they - even
- ) b 13 leaving the fire station, is there not - because of their B
14 going to a fire?
15 A.
There's always a certain amount of risk; yes, sir.
16 0 d
e There is a certain espirit d' corps among these d 17 volunteers since they are not paid on both the firemen side 18 and the lifesquad size? Is that not correct?
9 19 X
A, I don't know if I completely understood the 20 question.
- 2) Q Are you proud of your lifesquad?
22 A. Yes, sir, we are, very.
I 23 l 0 Do you think you have the best one in the county?
l 24 A. Yes, sir, we do.
25 , O No question about that?
h ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
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I 14-4 jwb 5478 1 A That's right.
2 O In your role as fireman, have you ever entered a 3 burning building?
,O 4 A Yes, sir, I have.
5 0 In order to rescue individuals?
l 6 A If there was any to rescue, yes, sir, I have.
7 0
,, You have searched the premises of a burning j 8 building not knowing whether there were individuals inside?
d d 9 A If we were told there was r possibility of someone 10 being in there, yes, sir, we have, sir.
l is 11 0 That's an immediate risk to your health and safety,
{ 12 is it not?
13 7. Well, let's put it this way: Somewhat. If you 14 die, you're going to die in ;there. It's not going to be 15 something that's going to hit you pretty quick without even j
16 \
knowing it.
e d 17 0 But there is some risk you are going to die?
h 18 A Yes, sir, there is, }
i k 19 4 And it's not a small risk. Firemen have died, even 20 in Clermont County, as a result of their duties. That's an i 21 unfortunate fact, isn't it?
22 A Yes, sir; that's right.
! 23
'O But still people are volunteer firemen. Isn't that !
'Q 24 correct?
l i
25! A That's right.
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1 With regard to low availability of lifesquad h 2 personnel, that is a day-to-day fact; is that not correct?
3 A In the daytime hours.
4 0 That's a problem you faced before. Zimmer, and it's
= 5 a problem you'11 probably face after Zimmer. Zimmer doesn' t 5 !
l 6 relate to that? Isn't that right? Isn' t it just because of 7 employment?
A g 8 A 14anpower shortage due to unemployment; that's right.
O ci mi 9 0 It's really not related to Zimmer?
. h 10 A No, sir, it's not.
i
! E l 1) G With regard to page 3 of your testimony, you talk g 12 about people not following dtractions. Is that not correct?
13 A That's very true.
l 14 0 One of your jobs is to notify - is to run the 15 U
roads, if I can use that term loosely, to verify that people j 16 have evacuated? Is that not correct?
us g 17 A That's true, i
h 18 0 You are very familiar with the . roads in your h 19 jurisdiction and outside of it?
R 20 A That's right, sir.
21 0 l
Have you yet divided up the roads so that you 22 know which particular vehicle is going to cover which road?
23 , Have you gotten that far?
24 A We have it broken down into three different 25 divisions, or sectors, f
i ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
14-6 jwb S480 I O Now if some percentage of the people along these O 2 roads fail to folicw instructions - that is, put the green 1 3 card in the window - are you familiar with the green card?
O 4 A. Yes, sir.
i 5
4 cr tie towels on the mailbox - that's going to l
j 6 slow your verification, isn't it?
7 A. Very much so.
3
{ 8 4 In your opinion as a resident in the area, if r) d 9 people are informed to do this by the document Circle of h 10 Safety, a certain percentage vill do that?
3 Is that not h Il correct?
is y 12 A.
I would have to say that some would, yes.
13 O If some more of theta hear about it over an EBS 14 station - do you know what that is? An Emergency Broadcast 15 Station over the radio or TV?
j 16 A Yes, sir, e
F 17 0 You would think that some, after hearing instructions a 18 to do so, would do that, too?
h 19 g A. Let's hope so.
20 0 If, furthermore, people knew about instructions to 21 the same effect in their phone book, hopefully still a 22 greater percentage of the population will also use that 23
- signaling? Is that not correct?
] 24 A. I would sure hope so.
25 ,
G But if you don't see that signal, you're going to !
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. l
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1 14-7 jwb l S481 l I go up to that residence and you're going to check that out? l O 2 Is that noe correct?
3 A That's correct.
4 0 Have you studied systematically any major emergencies 5 requiring evacuation in the past of large sections of a j 6 Particular jurisdiction?
7 A You' re talking in connection with a nuclear 8 emergeacy?
O l d 9 0 No, non-nuclear.
1 i Are you familiar, for example, 10 with a large avacuation which occurred in Canada last year 4
g 11 or the year before?
I a g 12 A No, sir.
I didn't follow that.
13 4 So your conclusion on page 4 that automobiles l
14 will travel U.S. 52 and 132 as if it were a raceway is not li 15 1
based upon prior emergency situations and the traction of j 16 People in those situacions?
w d
w 17 A It is within our village, yes, sir.
h 18 0 In an evacuation you would think there are a Ir,rge :
19 number of care on the road, would you not?
20 A Right.
l ,
21 0 It would really be pretty difficult to drag down
! 22 U.S. 52? Is that not correct?
s 23 , A
. I'd be willing to say you'd even have cars going on 24 the westbound lane, or the eastbound lane on 52. You'd have l, 25 , four lanes going west.
'I I I I
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! 14-8 jwb 5482 1 0 That would empty out the town pretty fast, 2 wouldn't it?
3 A.
Provided they all made it out; right. If you've 4
got five or six cars piled up in an intersection, it's kind 5 of hard to get through.
l 6 0 Do you know the function of law enforcement 7
officials during an emergency?
8 o
A.
I believe I've followed that pretty closely.
ci 9 0 As part of their function, their function would be i
h 10 to control traffic, would it not?
3 l
in 11 A. Yes, sir.
end( 12 (P ause . )
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14A 1inas jb 5483 1 Q As a result of the November 18 exercise were you O 2 caued upon either as a fireman or as a 11fe squadsman to 3 respond?
4 A That particular day I responded in the capacity of 5 a firefighter.
l 6 Q Did the firefighters -- did someone critique the 7 response?
A Did someone evaluate the response of the firefighters ?
l 8 A I believe there was a gentleman there from one of d
d 9 z the organizations that was watching us.
h 10 0 Was there a self-evaluation by any member of your 3
I h
a 11 volunteer fire department?
l 12 A We had a short meeting afterwards just among the 13 people that participated and we discussed our performance and l
14 the way we more or less did an evaluation on ourselves.
15 0 Were you entirely satisfied with your performance?
j 16 A
vs Not at all.
17 '
h Q You weren't even satisfied even though you knew f18 about the exercise in advance, is that right?
E II j A For my part I wasn't, that's right.
20 Q You recognized that one purpose of the exercise is 21 to give you an opportunity to correct any deficiencies that 22 you find. Is that not right?
A Yes, sir, that's right.
i O o iiave you he9un to correct deeicienciee taae you ,
25 '
' yourself and other firemen found as a result of your self- i l
l l l
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=-...z.n., ... a . g 14A;2 5484 I evaluation?
2 A Well, the one big one would be the fact that I knov 3 now that they have the water supply within the building there O 4 and that I don't have to drag hose from the fire truck all the e 5 way to the fire site.
H j 6 0 So it was a good idea to have an exercise?
7 A On that portion I would say we should have had a X
$ 8 little more training prior to that.
O o 9 MR. WETTERHANN: May I have thirty seconds?
i h 10 JUDGE FRYE: Yes.
E II h (Pause.)
is j 12 BY MR. WETTERHAHN: (resuming) t 13 Q Are you familiar, as part of your performance of 14 your duty, either fireman or life squadsman, familiar with 15 floods in the area?
m A Yes, sir, I am.
hI O And there are people on -- well, there are people b 18
- near the Ohio River that are potentially exposed to flood E
19 l levels?
20 g .
Yes, sir, there is.
2I There is usually sufficient advance warning :o Q
evacuate those people, is there not?
23 i
,' A In most cases.
O For large floods, many if not all of the people leav,J ,
J is that not correct?
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1 ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
'IAt3 5485 I A Yes, sir, that's correct.
2 Q For the other ones that say do you know for a fact 3
whether either you or other firemen, life squadsmen, or police-4 men have indicated that they would be in some danger themselves?
5 A Yes, sir, we have.
l 6 Q Is there any way under Ohio law or any other law l 1
7 that you know of that you can physically remove people who are O
not going to evacuate in the case of a flood in their homes?
d
," 9 A 1 have no idea. We have never done that before.
10 i!i Q You have never physically removed anybody?
h II A No, sir.
D g 12 Q For those people who have stayed, have you ever s
lhj13 participated in a rescue operation?
A Yes, sir, I have.
Q And you were able to perform your rescue duties even 0
though the area was flooded, is that correct?
d 17 w A Yes, sir.
b 18 Q At some rish to yourself, I would imagine.
19 l A I would imagine.
20 Q Based upon your training, can you venture an i
21 l opinion as to whether the onset of releases due to a cuclear 22
.f i incident would be gradual or instantaneous?
23
- A They should be gradual.
I 24 l i Q llave you ever read the Zimmer Station Radiological ,
j 25 ' Emergency Plan? l l -
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1 A No, sir, I don't believe I have.
O 2 < Pause.)
3 MR. WETTERHAHN: No further questions.
4 .JDGE FRYE Mr. Barth?
a 5 CROSS EXAMINATION 5
l 6 BY MR. BARTH:
!XXXXX 7 Q Mr. Feldkamp, I direct your attention to page five 8
rJ of your testimony, sir, lines 8 and 19, wherein you state that d 9 z
"I received a telephone call and was advised that the life h 10 squad would not be needed."
5 The second reference is you II h testified that you and your group were prepared and available m
l I2 to participate in the November 18 exercise.
13 A Yes, sir.
14 Q How are you normally notified that you will be 15 called? How are you normally notified, sir, that you will be 16 h 5 needed for your duties?
e II h A By the Plectron and Minitor.
h 18 O Are those the same as the beeper you carry on your /
E g belt which went off at the beginning of your testimony?
20 A No, sir, it's somewhat different.
l Q Where are the Plectron's located, sir, in your house?
A The Plectron is located in our homes.
23 'i Q And you carry the beeper when you are not in your O 2' '
home2 25l' A That's correct. i I
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC. !
T 14c:5 5487 i 1 Q This is che primary method by which you are notified I
2 that you have a duty or a call to duty?
3 A
, That's right.
4 Q Are they both, to the best of your knowledge, a 5 reliabl- sir?
5 l.
6 Yes, sir, they always have been.
R }
N Q How far from here to t!.a stati.on would you set your l 8 beeper off?
O o 9 z, A I didn't understand.
10 3
Q How f ar away from here is the transmitter that cets m
II 4 your beeper off?
D j 12 A For the life squad?
13 0 You have a beeper on your belt.
14 A Oh, the beeper I have on my belt is for my job here 15 in the city and there are towers right within the city here that sets this off, so this is really far closer than the tj 17 1 g station would be for setting off the Minitors that we have.
$ 18 I have no further questions of the MR. BARTH:
k
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witness. Thank you, sir.
20 MR. CASSIDY: I have a few brief ones.
I 21
!XXXX CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. CASSIDY:
23 '
Q Mr. Feldkamp, with regard to the training you stated O "l you received eer11er in your testimoar, ea aid you unaereo 25 that training? Do you recall?
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) A The exact date I couldn't give you. It was in the 2 fall.
3 0 If I suggested to you it might have been earlier than l
4 that, around June of 1981, would that refresh your recollection?
5 A It could possibly have been.
l 6 0 And how many members of the fire department and life 7
squad attended that training, if you can recall?
2 l 8 A I believe it was somewhere around 12. I think I
'd d 9 stated that earlier.
10 l MR. DENNISON: I was just going to ask for a clari-5 11 h
s fication, did he mean New Richmond or did he mean all fire j I2 life squad.
f 3
j IO MR. CASSIDY: I meant New Richmond.
! I4 BY MR. CASSIDY: (resuming) i 15 0 If I suggested to you that the number may have been 16 i
e as high as 21 would that refresh your recollection?
I7 A No, sir, I don't believe so. I am talking about i 18 people, maybe, that completed. On.the night of the actual fI9 sign-up I believe there were more people than actually 20 completed. I could be off on the number, but I don't think I'm II that far off.
l 22 l l 0 By "completed" do you mean attended all 12 to 16 ,
hours of the training?
. A That's right.
(.,:
2I '
O With regard to nur testimony en crosc examination I ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC. l [
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and you stated in your written testimony and on cross you i O 2 seaeed thae. sever.1 of the peog1e on ene 11fe sguad indicated j 3 they may or may not resrona to an accident at Zimmer, is that 4 correct?
5 A That's correct.
f 6 Q I wanted to try and be clear on one point that you k7 stated. Were you referring -- is it your understanding that 8
they were talking about an accident at the Zimmer site?
U j d 9 A 5,
At the Zimmer site in connection with a radiation 10 re1 ease, yes, sir.
h II i
in Q They were not saying that they would not perform I2 N their function in Clermont County away from Zimmer, is that o 13 correct?
14 A No, sir, they didn't say that.
15 Q So your testimony is in effect that they would I0 perform their required functions in Clermont County outside of h'l the Zimmer facility, is that correct?
b 18
- A That's correct. The select few that you have on the E
j 17 life squad probably would, yes, sir.
20 0 With regard to those who said they would respond, I
' 21 l
..m asking and I understand from your last answer, that they i
would respond to a call to perform their functions in Clermont 23 i County but not to go to Zimmer, is that correct?
O 24j , ,,,, ,,, ,,1, ,,,,, ,,,1, ,,,,,1,,, ,,,y,, ,,1,1,,
25 j about their functions in regard to a radiological release, or l
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are you talking about their functions as ENTs?
2 0 I am talking in regard to their functions that the {
l 3
Clermont County Radiological Emergency Plan asks them to O 4 perform.
m 5 A I only have three members on the life squad that are 5
$ 6 n capable, that have had the training to do any kind of monitoring 7
l or checking in any of the relocation centers or anything in 8
connection with any kind of radiation.
! 0 9
Q With regard to the other functions that the plan 10 also addresses to the fire department and life squad personnel, h II a that being checking doors and checking homes in Clermont g 12 County to see if people are evacuated, is it your understanding '
13 that t.hese people that indicated that they would not go to I*
$ Zimmer would perform that function within Clermont County?
A I believe there is a little confusion here. I l think when you are addressing that question you are addressing that to me as the life squad and it's the fire department's 18 primary duty to chock the door-to-door, make the door-to-door 19 l check.
20 0 Wearing your hat as a fire department official as l opposed to a life squad official, would the members that indicated to you that they would not go to Zimmer perform their 23 !
duty within Clermont County, performing the f unction of door-to-24 '
O door checks?
25 j A Well, I still think the question is somewhat ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
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1 confused for the simple reason that the people that told me 1 0 2 eh e ehey ou1d noe respond are 11f squad peop1e, and the tife 3
squad people are not involved in the door-to-door check.
4 Q Okay, so it's only your life squad people; it's not 5
the pecple in the fire department, then, is that correct?
$6 A Right.
7 Q
! x Okay, and of the three people that you said you had l
l 8 who were qualified to perform the monitoring functions in the :
d o 9 i life squad, I believe your testimony is those people would 10 E perform those functions within Clermont County.
,5 h II A
- Well, I have lost one of those members since then,
'Y 12 so we're down to two.
13 Q
Would you answer the question, whether they would 14 respond to their function in Clermont County?
15 A I believe they would, yes, sir.
IO 1
MR. CASSIDY: Thank you. Nothing further, Your N I7 i llonor.
d
{ 18 JUDGE FRYE: fir. Dennison?
E I9 g MR. DENNISON: Thank you, Your Honor.
!(XXXX 20 REDIRECT EXAMINATION II !
BY MR. DENNISON:
Q Mr. Feldkamp, you were asked some questions about 23 acceptance of risk.
Do volunteer firen.en accept all risk, or O 24l ,,,,,,, ,1,,, , , , 1, ,1, ,, , , , , , , , , ,1, , , , ,, ,1, x , ,
25 ,,1 m m , , , , ,,,
A f
As a volunteer if a man is afraid to go to a top of I
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65-foot aerial, he is not made to go to the top of it. If he 2 is afraid to do it, he isn't made to do it.
3 O All right. As to the life squad personnel, l 4
volunteers in New Richmond, are they required, as a result of 5 I their volunteer responsibility when they become a life squad
{ l 6 member, to accept any and all risk which would be attendant:
7 to them discharging their duties as a life squad person? ,
8 l
t d
A I believe so.
l c 9 t Q Would this include radiological expoaure as a risk 10 to be accepted?
E z
II 4
- A I really can't say that honestly.
g 12 Q Now you had stated in response to a question that e
13
{ you would perform your duties as well as you could during some t
b I4 U accident at the Zimmer station.
hI ac A Yes, sir.
0 Would you be in a position of performing those hI '
duties if the accidental release or the accident and its b 18 related release at Zimmer was sufficient to cause the declaratic n E
j of evacuation of the populus of New Richmond? Would you still 20 be in a position to perform your duties?
21 A No, sir.
22 O What duties would you perform under a circumstance l l 23 ,
in which there was evacuation of the New Richmond area relative p' l to an accident at the Zimmer station?
25 '
A First off, I would get my family out of town.
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Q All right, have you had any opportunity to -- of your O 2 own xnow1.dge, to xnow whae the ciroomstance wou1d he as to the 3
fireman and the life squad personnel of the New Richmond Life iO 4 and Fire Squad relative to whether they would respond during an 5
evacuation circumstance at Zimmer to their families or to their l 6 duties as either firefighters or life squads? --
7 MR. WETTERHAHN: Objection, this is repetitive to the 8
direct.
0 9
JUDGE 7 RYE: I think it does sound like it may be a 10 bit repetitive to the direct.
E .
II y MR. DENNISON: However, we had not -- at least my II
$ recollection of the direct, scanning through it some moments 13 ago, it was not clearly touched upon but it was inquired into on I#
cross examination relative to these dirferent circumstances in which Mr. Feldkamp in many instances dealing with verification '
stated that he would hope so, as it pertained to residents and ti 17 w part as it pertained to volunteers.
b 18 i
JUDGE FRYE: All right, we'll allow it.
k 19 l BY MR. DENNISON: (resuming)
I Q Do you recall the question?
21 A I am going to answer it like this. I feel that you h 22 y have got a select few people that would probably respond.
I 23 ;
feel that it is the duty of the majority of the members to make h sure that their fa 'ies are taken care of first, and then I 25 '
would say it would go from there.
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1 Q Thank you, Mr. Feldkamp. You were asked about the 2
-- your personal knowledge of the population in and around New 3
l Richmond as it related to flooding. Related to flooding, have l
4 l
there been certain plans in existence relative to the evacuation 5
or at least to the people leaving their homes which were soon l 6 ta come into some sort of water involvement?
7 A Well, everyone who has ever lived in the New Richmond X
'l 8 area knows at approximately what water level the water will l0 9 get their homes.
,a So for that reason there is some preplanning 10 3
involved insofar as they know when they have to leave.
5
{
llI II Q All right, and with the presence of t.his preplanning 12
,l what has been your experience as to those individuals actually i I3 j leaving at the designated time?
14 A I have seen times that everyone has just sat without 15 ever makin the fi-at move.
IO i
O All right, and did that require some police involve-fI7 ment in t' i area of New Richmond?
18 A I would say it has, yes, sir.
I9 Q All right. Now you indicated in response to a questien 20
-- I believe the way the question was put was the utilization 11 of State Reute 132 and U.S. 52 an a race course. For what l 22 l reason would that be utilized as a race course during an 23 i evacuation at the Zirner station? What would be the reacon that 24 i
l it would become a race course?
25 l A Decause those are the two basic routes that we have l ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC, l
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out of the Village of New Richmond in the direction that we 2 would have to go to leave the plume area.
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L5titmaster 5496 1 Q What I am getting to is I recognize those as 2 evacuation routes. What I am getting to is your characterization 3
-- the underlying reason for your characterization that these O 4 would be race courses.
5 A Oksy, if everyone was given a specific t12ne, say, j 6 let's evacuate the area because we've got a radiological release 7
at Zimmer, you would have up to -- you know, you can safely 8
d evacuate within three hours. It would be the case everybody I
I,
- 9 would wait until two hours and 45 minutes of that hour was 10 gone and then everybody would be in a rush.
II Q Now you were asked a question of your understanding g 12 from your radiological training whether or not the release 33 would be gradual. Is it your understanding that all accident I4 progress and related radiation release is on a gradual basis?
A That was the way I understood it, yes, sir.
I*
O In all instances?
tl w
17 A Yes, sir, it was.
b 18 Q Now you have indicated that if the population with 19 j which you would involved in door-to-door verification as a fire-20 man, as to whether that population would place either a towel or 21 a green card to advise notification, /ou indicated that you 8 22 23 ,
had hoped so.
A Yes, sir, I did.
O 24 Q
' My guestion to you is based upon your knowledge of 25 l that community. What is the likelihood that they wil'1 place any
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sort of notice such as the green card or the towe.'.?
O 2 MR. WE22ERuAaN: os3eceton. Ie is contained in the .
3 direct testimony, in the written testimony.
4 MR. DENNI. ION: It was touched upon on direct.
5 JUDGE FRYE It was slso gone into on cross.
l 6
MR. WETTERHAHN: On cross no other area was opened up.
7 It was merely repetition of direct. I don't see why this X
j 8 opens up this to additional subjects on redirect. '
O d 9 JUDGE FRYE: As I rect 11, he was asked specifically 10 5 whether he thought people would foli',ow instructions with h II n regard to placing those cards and towels and what not. I think l 12 ite s proper.
13 BY MR. DENNISON: (resuming)
I4 0 Do you recall your response to that question by Mr.
15 Wetterhahn was that you hoped so? My question is based upon 16 youe knowledge and experience of the community with which you N II must deal in this door-to-door verification as a fireman, as to I0 whether or not that posted verification will be present.
19 g A I believe that you and I talked about this once 20 before and I gave you a number somewhere around fif ty percent probably would.
O Now, taking fifty percent that would, as to the 23 ;
fifty percent who would not, I believe you testified on cross O "
that this wou1d indeed s10 down eh, >rificetion procees by 25 '
, I the fireman.
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It would because we would have to go krock on a door e
2 and wait for a re*ponse.
3 Q l l During your radiological training has anyone indicated
! 4
(
to you that time is of any importance during the release into 5
the atmosphere of radioactive discharges from the Zimmer station j 6 in an accident situation?
7 A We are able to monitor ourselves to the point that 8
we know when we are starting to get into the danger area so o
d 9 that we can leave.
10 i5 Q If you get into that danger area, as I assume would l
D 11 be indicated to you by your pocket dosimeters --
g 12 A Right, sir.
3 13 Q -- and you had not completed the door-to .loor verifi-14 cation, are you aware of any type of relief or alternate plan 15 to relieve you to continue that door-to-door verification af ter j 16 d you have come to the, let us say, saturation limit by your d 17 dosimeter?
18 A No, sir, I know of none.
i I9 g Q Having achieved that particular level by the reading 20 o f your dosimeter, what would you and your fellow firemen do 21 in such circumstances?
22 f A Well, I hope we would be ready to leave.
23 l MR. DENNISON: I have nothing further, Your Honor.
7 (Doard conferring.)
25 JUDGE FRYE: The Board has no questions. Mr. Feldkamp, ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
3 .
, _ _ _ _ ---m
315:4 5499 I
we thank you very much for being with us today. We appreciate t
'O 2 your testimony.
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
'U 4 (The witness was excused.)
s, g5 JUDGE FRYEt Let's take about a fifteen minute j 6 recess before we go to the next witness. Off the record.
7 (A brief recess was taken.)
0 JUDGE FRYEt Shall we go back on the record?
O d 9 JoEtta Goode, I understand, is next.
10 E MR. DENNISON: Yes.
II Whereupon, f II JOETTA GOODE II war called as a witness by counsel for Intervenor Zimmer Area N
Citizens and, having been duly sworn, was examined and testified
! 15 g ,, gggyny,,
X d' DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DENNISON:
I0 Q Would you state and spell your name for the record,
- h 19
} g please?
20 A
JoEtta Goode, the first name J-e-e-t-t-a, G-o-o-d-e.
', 21 Q And your business address, Mrs. Goode?
A 233 Main, Batavia, Ohio.
23 l 0 Now, Mrs. Goode, I will hand you a document which 24 O ,,,,,, ,1,,,, ,,,,,,,,, ,, ,,,,,, ,,,,,, ,,,
,,1,, ,,,,,,,, ,,
25 '
- bear your signature, executed under oath on January 7, 1982. I ,
ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY. INC.
Attachment 4 DATE: March 4, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board In the Matter of )
)
IDNG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
)
Unit 1) )
)
RESPONSE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TO LILCO'S SECOND SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING ROLE CONFLICT OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS This is the State of New York's response to "LILCO'c Second Set of Requests for Admissions to New York State," dated February 23, 1988 ("LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admissions").
This response is being made with the understanding that LILCO commits "to dispense with Mr. Papile's deposition, and not seek a subpoena from the Board," as stated by LILCO's counsel (Mr.
Christman) in his letter of February 23, 1988.
The State of New York objects to LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admissions on the ground that it constitutes untimely, improper, last-minute discovery.1 The Board's 1
113 "Governments' Response to Board Request for Schedule Proposals and Motion to Reconsider Discovery of Orders," dated March 1, 1988, at 11.
, ,.L 2 D W' ff'
February 19, 1988 Memorandum and Order makes no statement about extending "the' discovery period in part to give us time to resolve this dispute," as LILCO's counsel alluded to in his February 23, 1988 letter. What the Memorandum and Order does say is that the Board extended discovery from February 19, 1988 to February 26, 1988 "for the purpose of completing depositions on designated witnesses." Since the State of New York has not designated Mr. Papile as a witness, and since LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admissions is not a deposition, LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admissions is an untimely, unauthorized form of discovery. Without waiving this objection, the State of New York responds as follows.
LILCO's Recuests for Admissions Nos. 7-8
- 7. Bus driver training conducted in accordance with plans for nuclear plants in New York State other than Shoreham does not address caring for families of bus drivers in emergencies.
Response of the State of New York to LILCO's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers and Amendment and Supplementation of the State of New York's Response to LILCO's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers (Jan.
27, 1988) at 6 (Interrogatory No. 27).
Response: The State of New York admits that the pleading referenced in LILCO's Request for Admissions No. 7 contains the i following statement, which was verified as being true then and remains true now: "Without agreeing to the relevancy of this interrogatory, upon information and belief, bus driver craining 2
a
conducted in accordance with plans for nuclear plants in New York State other than Shoreham does not address caring for families of bus drivers in emergencies."
- 8. Other than information or documents submitted or developed in the emergency planning proceedings in 1983-1984, the State of New York has not been able, to date, to locate any inatances of bus drivers, in any emergency, attending to the safety of their own families before reporting to perform their bus driving duties. Id. at 4 (Interrogatory No. 24); Response of the State of New York to LILCo's Third Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers (Feb. 10, 1988) at 8-10 (Interrogatory Nos.
35-37).
Resconse The State of New York admits that the pleading referenced in LILCo's Request for Admissions No. 8 contains the -
following statement concerning LILCo Interrogatories Nos. 35-37, which statements were true then and are true now, with one qualification: "other than information or documents submitted or developed in the emergency planning proceedings in 1983-1984, the State of New York has not been able, to date, to locate any responsive information or documents within the possession, custody or control of the State of New York." The qualification is that, upon information and belief, instances of bus drivers attending to the safety of their own families before reporting to perform their bus driving duties in any emergency have been referenced or discussed in discovery, such as depositions, of I
which LILCo is fully aware, that has occurred subsequent to the filing of the pleading referenced in LILCo's Request for Admissions No. 8.
l l
l 3 i
- ~4 bh Fibian G. a sisfo Richard J. ahnleuter Special Counsel to the Governor Attorneys for Mario M. Cuomo, Governor, and the State of New York t
i i
9 4 ,
r l
.*- rve,www-www+v- rw- -- _.+-s-wwwe--me-,vww- -* ----+ - - - = - m-
I i
i DATE: March 4, 1988 ,
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C090tISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board In the Matter of ) '
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CONPANY ) Docket No.-50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station )
) '
Unit 1) ) '
)
l.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the "Response of the State of New York to LILCO's Second Set of Requests for Admissions Regarding Role Conflict of School Bus Drivers" have been served on the following this 4th day of March 1988 by U.S. mail, first class, except as noted by asterisks. ;
Mr. Frederick J. Shon Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board William R. Cumming, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agenc 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 ;
Washington, D.C. 20472 L i
Dr. Jerry R. Kline Mr. James P. Gleason, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionh Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 !
r
?
P
i Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq. Joel Blau, Esq.
General Counsel Director, Utility Intervention Long Island Lighting Company N.Y. Consumer Protection Board 175 East Old Country Road Suite 1020 Hicksville, New York 11801 Albany, New York 12210 Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi Mr. Donald P. Irwin clerk Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature 707 East Main Street suf folk County Legislature P.O. Box 1535 Office Building Richmond, Virginia 23212 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L.F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section-Executive Director Office of the Secretary .
Shoreham opponents coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 Adrian Johnson, Esq. Hon. Patrick G. Halpin New York State Department of Law Suffolk County Executive 120 Broadway, 3rd Floor H. Lee Dennison Bt'ilding
. Room 3-16 Veterans Memorial Highway.
New York, New York 10271 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MMB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committee l Suite K P.O. Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 3
E. Thomas Boyle Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
- Suffolk County Attorney Kirpatrick & Lockhart i Building 158 North County Complex 1800 M Street, N.W.
l Veterans Memorial Highway South Lobby - Ninth Floor Hauppauge, New York 11788 Washington, D.C. 20036 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger George Johnson New York State Energy Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agency Building #2 Washington, D. C. 20555 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223
Mr. James P..Gleason Douglas J. Hynes Chairman Town Board of Oyster Bay Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Town Hall 513 Gilmoure Drive Oyster Bay, New York 11771 Silver Spring, MD 20901 David A. Brownlee, Esq. Mr. Philip McIntrie Kirkpatrick & Lockhart FEMA 1500 Oliver Building 26 Federal 1-laza Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 New York, New York 10278 Mr. Stuart Diamond Business / Financial NEW YORK TIMES 229 W. 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 I(
RichardJ.Aah6ff'ter, Esq.
Deputy Sp(gial Tounsel to the Governor Executive Chamber capitol, Room 229 Albany, New York 12224 (518) 474-1273
- By Telecopier
- By Federal Express .
Attachment 5 February 1, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
RESPONSE OF SOFFOLK COUNTY, THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND THE TOWN OF SOUTRAMPTON TO LILCO'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING THE REMAND ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SMML BUS DRIVERS On January 20, 1988, LILCO filed its "First Set of Requests for Admissions Regarding the Romand Issue of ' Role Conflict' of School Bus Drivers" (hereafter, "First Request for Admissions").
Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.742, Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton (hereafter, "the Governments") hereby respond to LILCO's First Request for Admissions.
LILCO Admission No. 1
- 1. That the Radiological Emergency Preparedaess Plan for Westchester County (Rev. 1/87) ("Westchuster County Plan")
states that, in the event of a radiological emergency at the Indian Point nuclear power station, bus companies under con-l tract to school districts in the EPZ will provide a suf-
! ficient number of buses and drivers to support the evacua-tion of schoolchildren, in the following words:
l Bus companies providing service to individual i school districts will maintain their normal l
I I
I 7?f%$$ loff
responsibilities to the school districts until all schoolchildren have been moved to their homes or predesignated school reception cen-ters as directed.
Westchester County Plan at A-20.
Resoonse Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that the Westchester County Plan (at page A-20) states, in part, as follows:
Bus companies providing service to individual
' school districts will maintain their normal responsibilities to the school districts until all schoolchildren have been moved to their homes or predesignated school reception cen-ters as directed.
LILCO Adm_Jssion No. 2 That the Westchester County Plan assumes that, in the event of a radiological emergency at the Indian Point nuclear power station, the evacuation of schoolchildren will
! not be adversely affected by "role conflict" among school bus drivers, in the following words:
L
- d. Assumptions: . . . (3) That sufficient numbers of Westchester County public school bus drivers WILL respond to perform evacuation assignments.
Westchester County Plan at A-29 (emphasis in original).
Resoonse Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that the Westchester County Plan (at page A-29) states as follows:
- d. Assumptions: . . . (3) That sufficient numbers of Westchester County public school
bus drivers WILL respond to perform evacuation assignments.
The Westchester County Plan also states, however, that in the event of a radiological emergency at the Indian Point nuclear power station:
- d. Assumptions: . . . (2) That some or all of the Westchester commercial bus drivers will EQI respond . . . .
Westchester County Plan at A-29 (emphasis in original).
LILCO Admission No. 3 That the Wayne County Radiological Emergency Prepared -
ness Plan (Rev. 4 10/1/86) ("Wayne County Plan") provides that, in the event of a radiologi. cal emergency at the Robert E. Ginna nuclear power station, additional buses will be provided to schools as needed by the local response organi-zation to effect a single wave evacuation:
Evacuating schools within the 10 mile EPZ without adequate transportation to transport their entire student body in one coordinated move will be furnished additional buses or transportation on a priority basis by the County Response Organization. When these schools are in sessica, this action may re-quire that students be held at the school pending further instructions. If required this information will be announced to parents over the EBS broadcast system.
Wayne County Plan at A-8.
Rescoq1g Denied. Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that, under the Wayne County Plan, School Districts and BOCES Superintendents are requested to address a number of "coordinating instructions." In Request No.
3, however, LILCO has taken separate "coordinating instructions" and combined them into what would appear to be one instruction.
The Governments therefore object to and deny Request No. 3.
LILCO Admission No. 4 l
That the Wayne County Plan provides that, in the event of a radiological emergency at the Robert E. Ginna nuclear power station, buses from outside the EPZ will be used if necessary to support the evacuation of schoolchildren:
Upon receipt of notification of any emergency at GINNA, School Superintendents with schools l outside the 10 mile EPZ will be requested to immediately place their school bus fleet and drivers on standby for possible dispatch to an evacuating school or the general public within
- the EPZ.
Wayne County Plan at A-8.
Resconse Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that, under the Wayne County Plan, School District and BOCES Superintendents are requested to address a number of "coordinating instructions," one of which partially reads as follows:
Upon receipt of notification of any emergency at GINNA, School Superintendents with schools outside the 10 mile EPZ will be requested to immediately place their school bus fleet and drivers on standby for possible dispatch to an evacuating school or the general public within the EPZ.
Wayne County Plan at A-8.
LILCO Admission No. 5 That the Wayne County Plar provides that, in preparing their individual school evacuation plans, the School Dis-trict Superintendents should provide for backup school bus drivers, as follows:
Alternate bus drivers should be identified, predesignated, and trained (from the school staff).
Wayne County Plan at A-7.
Resoonse Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that, under the Wayne. County Plan, School District and BOCES Superintendents are requested to address a number of "coordinating instructions," one of which reads as fol-lows:
(iv) Alternate bus drivers should be identi-fled, predesignated, and trained (from the school staff).
Wayr.e County Plan at A-7.
LILCO Admission No. 6 That the Oswego County Radiological Emergency Prepared-ness Plan (Rev. 7/85) ("Oswego County Plan") provides that in the event of a radiological emergency at the Nine Mile Point or James A. FitzPatrick nuclear power plants, bus com-panies under contract to the school districts in the EPZ will provide a sufficient number of buses and drivers to support the evacuation of schoolchildren, in the following words:
Bus companies providing service to individual school districts will maintain their normal responsibilities to the school districts until 1
l
l l
all schoolchildren have been moved to their homes or to the predesignated reception cen-ter.
Oswego County Plan, Appendix A, Attachment 3 at 17.
Resconse Without conceding the relevance of the requested admission, the Governments admit that the Oswego County Plan, at Appendix A, Attachment 3 at 17, states, in part, as follows:
Bus companies providing service to individual school districts will maintain their normal responsibilities to the school districts until all schoolchildren have been moved to their homes or to the predesignated reception center.
Respectfully submitted, E. Thomas Boyle Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Michael S. Miller J. Lynn Taylor KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County i
l
t l) U A Fabian' G . Palomino J1?P7/fA [L
, Richard J. Zahnleuter Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Al any, New York 12224 Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo Governor of the State of New York Steptfen B. Latham W
l Twomey, Latham & Shea 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 l
Attorney for the Town of Southampton i
i l
February 1, 1988 l
February 1, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
(
l )
l In the Matter of )
)
i LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
l Unit 1) )
l )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of RESPONSE OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND THE TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON TO LILCO'S FIRST SET OF REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS REGARDING THE REMAND ISSUE OF "ROLE CONFLICT" OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS have been served on the following this 1st day of February, 1988 by U.S. mail, first class, except as noted:
James P. Gleason, Chairman Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Saf ety and Licensing -Board Atomic Safety and Licensi.ng Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Hegulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 James P. Gleason, Chairman William R. Cumming, Esq.
513 Gilmoure Drive Spence W. Perry, Esq.
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Office of General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agenc:
Dr. Jerry R. Kline 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Washington, D.C. 20472 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
- Hunton & Williams Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. P.O. Box 1535 Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq. 707 East Main Street Special Counsel to the Governor Richmond, Virginia 23212 Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224
Joel Blau, Esq. Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.
Director, Uti.licy Intervention General Counsel N.Y. Consumer Protection Board Long Island Lighting Company Suite 1020 175 East Old Country Road Albany, New York 12210 Hicksville, New York 11801 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq. Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk Suffola County Attorney Suffolk County Legislature Bldg. 158 North County Complex Suffolk County Legislature l
Veterans Memorial Highway Office Building Hauppauge, New York 11788 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office.of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 Alfred L. Nardell!,, Esq. Hon. Patrick G. Halpin New York State Department of Law Suffolk County Executive 120 Broadway, 3rd Floor H. Lee Dennison Building Rocm 3-116 Veterans Memorial Highway New York, New York 10271 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committae Suite K P.O. Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger George E. Johnson, Esq.
New York State Energy Office Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Offica of the General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Albany, New York 12223 Washington, D.C. 20555 David A. Brownlee, Esq. Mr. Stuart Diamond Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Business / Financial 1500 Oliver Building NEW YORK TIMES Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 229 W. 43rd Street New York, New York 10036
Douglas J. Hynes, Councilman Town Board of Oyster Bay Town Hall' Oyster Bay, New York 11771 Michael S.~ Miller KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891
- By Federal Express
l Attachment 6 l l
l l
l \
l ARTICLE IS-A-SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BUS DRIVERS Section 509-a. Definitions.
509-b. Qualifications of bus drivers.
509-<. Disqualification of bus drivers generally.
509-ec. Disqualification of drivers of school buses.
509-d. Qualification procedures for bus drivers, maintenance of files and availability to subsequent employers.
509-e. Annual review of driving record.
509-f. Record of violations.
509-g Examinations and tests.
509-h. Operation by person not licensed to drive a bus.
509-i. Notification of a conviction resulting from a violation of this chapter in this state or a motor vehicle conviction in another state and license revo:stion.
509-j. Compliance required.
509-k. Ill or fatigued operator.
509-l. Drugs, controlled substance and intoxicating liquor.
509-m. Duties of the department.
509-n. Exempt carriers; reporting requirements.
509-o. Penalties.
New York Codes. Rules and Resulations Special requirements for bus drivers, see 15 NYCRR Part 6.
{ 509-a. Definitions As used in this article the term: (1) bus shall mean every motor vehicle, owned, leased, rented or otherwisa controlled by a motor carrier, which: (s) is a school bus as defined in section one hundred forty two of this chapter or has a seating capacity of more than ten adult passengers in addition to the driver and which is used for the transportation of persons under the age of twenty <ne to a place of vocational, academic er religious instruction or service including schools and camps or, (b) is required to obtain approval to operate in the state as a common or contract carrier of passengers by motor vehicle from the commissioner of transportation, the New York city bureau of franchise or the interstate commerce commission, or (c) is operated by a transit authority or municipality and is used to transport persons for hire. Provided, however, that bus shall not mean an authorized emergency vehicle operated in the course of an emergency, or a motor vehicle used in the transportation of agri-cultural workers to and from their place of employment; (2) driver or bus driver shall mean every person: (i) who is self employed and drives a bus for hire or profit; or (ii) who is 698
-. . - . .- -~ -- -. - --. - -. --
BUS DRIVERS Art.19-A {509-a employed by a motor carrier and operates a bus owned, leased or l
rented by such employer, or (iii) who as a volunteer drives a bus which is owned, leased or rented by a motor carrier, Provided, however, bus driver shall not include those persons who are en-gaged in the maintenance, repair or garaging of such buses and in the course of their duties must incidentally drive a bus without passengers, or who, as a volunteer, drive a bus with passengers for less than thirty days each year; (3) motor carrier shall mean any person, corporation, municipali-ty, or entity, public or private, who directs one or more bus drivers and who operates a bus wholly within or partly within and partly without this state in connection with the business of transporting passengers for hire or in the operation or admmistration of any business, or place of vocational, academic or religious instruction or service for persons under the age of twenty one including schools and camps, or public agency, except such out-of-state public or governmental operators who may be exempted from the provisions of this article by the commissioner through regulation promulgated by the commissioner; (4) intoxicating liquor shall mean and include, alcohol, spirits, liquor, wine, beer and cider having alcoholic content; (5) drug shall mean any substance listed in section thirty three -
hundred six of the public health law not dispensed or consumed pursuant to a lawful prescription; (6) controlled substance shall mean any substance listed in s,ection thirty three hundred six of the public health law not dispensed or consumed pursuant to lawful prescription.
(Added L1974, c.1050, 61; amended L1975, c. 853, i 1: L1979, c. 740, i 1; L1984, c. 843, il 3, 4; L1985, c. 675, i 1.)
H'storicaJ Note 1985 Amendmeat. sum (1). L1985, "employs" and "or place of vocational,
- c. 675, ( 1, eff. Sept.1,1985, in sentence sesdemic or religious instruction or ser-beginnmg "As used in" inserted in el. (a) provisions relating to number of vice for persons under the age of twen-n.
gets and use of a school bus, els. tyone includ;ng schools and camps," for (b) and (c) and omitted former els. (b) "school, camp-
I, and (c) which related to seating espacity; Subd. (5). L1985, c. 675, l 1, eff.
e in sentence beginning "Provided, how- Sept.15,1985, added sum (5),
' deleted reference to vanpool ve-
!' Subd. (6L L1985, c. 675, i 1 eff.
I Sabd. (2). L1985, e. 675, i 1, eff. Sept 15, M, added sM E Sept.15,1985, reorganized the text and 1984 Amendment. Subd. (IL L1984, inserted references to volunteers. e. 843, f 3, eff. Aug. 5,1984, subetituted Subd. (3). L1985, c. 675, i 1 eff. "vanpool vehicle" for "motor vehicle l
Sept.15,1985, substituted "directs" for used in vanpooling operations" 699
LILCO, June 22,1988
[>0&L iiD S N h' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE *88 JUN 27 P6 :43 0FFfCL e - tic In the Matter of I,(!.h #
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN THE FORM OF A PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON THE RE-MAND ISSUES OF SCHOOL BUS DRIVER ROLE CONFLICT AND HOSPITAL EVACUA-TION TIME ESTIMATES (ETEs) were served this date upon the following by telecopier as indicated by one asterisk, by Federal Express as indicated by two asterisks, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
James P. Gleason, Chairman ** Adjudicatory File Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing 513 Gilmoure Drive Board Panel Docket Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline **
Atomic Safety and Licensing Richard G. Bachmann, Esq. **
Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm One Whito Flint North East-West Towers, Rm. 427 11555 Rockville Pike 4350 East-West Hwy. Rockville, MD 20852 Bethesda, MD 20814 Herbert H. Brown, Esq. **
Mr. Frederick J. Shon ** Lawrence Coo Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Board Kirkpatrick & Lockhart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South Lobby - 9th Floor East-West Towers, Rm. 430 1800 M Street, N.W.
4350 East-West Hwy. Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Bethesda, MD 20814 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. **
Secretary of the Commission Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Attention Docketing and Service Special Counsel to the Governor Section Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 1717 H Street, N.W. State Capitol Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, New York 12224 Atomic Safety and Licensing Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq.
l Appeal Board Panel Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 120 Broadway Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 3-118 New York, New York 10271 I . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 fl
George W. Watson, Esq. ** Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq. Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street j 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Evan A. Davis, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol l Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 l E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.
! Stephen B. Latham, Esq. ** Suffolk County Attorney Twomey, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Street Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 298 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Monroe Schneider Mr. Philip McIntire North Shore Committee Federal Emergency Management P.O. Box 231 Agency Wading River, NY 11792 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
, New York State Department of l Public Service, Staff Counsel Three Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 ames N. Christm, n Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: June 22,1988 i
l l -
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