ML20133K292

Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Safeguards & Security 850507 Meeting W/Nrc,Doe & Consultants in Washington,Dc Re Sabotage Protection at Power & Nonpower Reactors

ML20133K292
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/19/1985
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
REF-GTECI-A-29, REF-GTECI-SA, TASK-A-29, TASK-OR ACRS-2312, NUDOCS 8510210161
Download: ML20133K292 (15)

Text

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SUMMARY

AND MINUTES OF THE MAY 7, 1985 MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY WASHINGTON D.C.

Purocse:

The primary goal for the meeting was to review and evaluate the NRC Staff position and review practices with regard to sabotage protecticn at power and non-power nuclear reactor facilities.

The Staff discussed the threat of sabotage, the potential consequences of sabotage at non-power reactors, and sabotage prctection at power reactors with the Subcommittee, in addition to presenting the revi ew practices and procedures used to evaluate licensees' security plans. The Staff also briefed the Subcomnittee on the status of Generic Issue A-29, " Nuclear Powsr Plant Design for the Reduction of Vulnerability to Sabetage."

Notice of the meeting, published in the Federal Register on Tuesday, April 23, 1985 is reproduced and shown in Attachment A. The schedule for the meeting is Attachment B. Sign-in sheets of meet:ng attendees are contained in Attachment C.

Attachment D contains a list of meeting handouts kept with the 04' ice ccay of these minutes. Fortions of the meeting were open to public attendance, however, those portions that dealt with confidential and secret safeguards information were closed to the public. This version of the " Summary and Minutes of the Megtino" covers only the open porti ons of the meetino and, hence, is NDT Classified. Three oral statements by members of the public were scheduled and made; there were no written -

comments submitted by members of the public to be read into the transcript of the meeting. Mr. John McKinley and Mr. John Schiffgens were the assigned ACRS staff members for the meeting.

Attendees:

ACRS NRC Staff J.C. Mark 1 Subcommittee Chairman R.F. Burnett, NMSS/D/SG J.C. Ebersole, Member T.R. Allen, NMSS/SG C. Michelson, Member R.A. Erickson, NMSS/SG 5510210161 850619 PDR ACRS 2312 PDR u u...a ,y ungI;;AL i

, Certiflod By

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MEETING Juno 19,1985 MAY 7, ICSS - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES ACRS '

NRC Staff G.A. Reed, Member W.B. Brown, NMSS/SG C.P. Siess, Member D.M. Carlson, NMSS/SG C.J. Wylie, Member R.J. Dube, NMSS/SG H.W. Lewis, Member C.E. Gaskin, NMSS/SG J.D. Schflfgens, Staff G.W. McCorkle, NMSS/SG J.C. McKinley, Staff C.J. Withee, NMSS/SG P. Baker, Jr., NMSS/SG Others R. Rosano, IE P.C. Carr, Bechtel L.L. Bush, Jr., IE G. She wood, DOE /NE E.W. McPeek, DL P.J. Dev2s, DOE C.D. Thomas, NRR/SSPB D. Knuth, FMC H.N. Berkow, NRR/SSPB D. Hirsch, UCSC R.E. Carter, NRR/SSPB B. Ramberg, UCLA P. Ting, RES S. Murphy, UCSC J.S. Wermiel, NRR/ASB D. Horner, NCI D.D. Parr, NRR/ASB S. Setr., MITRE L. Rubenstein, NRR/D/ CPS F. Leventhal, NCI R.W. Hernan, NRR/PPAS B. Ge11erman, NPT W.B. Andrews, Consult. (PNL)

J.N. O'Brien, Consult. (BNL)

Meeti ne Hi chli chts. Acreements, and Reouests:

Opening Statements - C. Mark Mr. Mark discussed briefly the meeting schedule and objectives. He mentioned that Mr. Reed had called to his attention an April 24, 1995 report from Region IV concerning an erroneous emergency evacuation command at Wolf Creek which had the effect of unlocking doors in protected and vital areas. Mr. Siess added that there were actually two errors because somebody else confirmed the command.

Intreduction - R. Burnett Mr. Burnett discussed the schedule briefly before addressing the incident at Wolf Creek brought up by Mr.

Mark. He began by reviewing the history of Commission interest in the safety-safeguards interface (i . e. , those areas where security precautions could inhibit adequate safety response). A Commission study group found that some plants did a very good job of considering security precautions and how they would affect ingress or egress during a safety event, while others did nothing. The outc6me of the study was a) a proposed rule (f or which the public comment period has just closed) which would require

SG EGUAPDS AND SECURITY. MEETING Jun2 19,1985 MAY 7, 1985 - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES l i c e'n,s ees to evaluate security precautions from a safety perspective, and b) an information notice suggesting that licensees begin such an evaluation immediately (i.e.,

before the rule is promulgated).

Li2 nLees have been advised that'all electrically-controlled doors should have manual overrides (e.g.,

keys, which should never leave the site) as required by the rules. Mr. Mark asked how quickly access to vital areas must be made available. Mr. 'Burnett said that the Staff allows each licensee to determine this for his plant. Some licensees prefer to issue keys to the operators, some prefer to have keys spaced throughout the

. facility, and some gi ve the keys to the guard force.

Entry by key, without notifying the access computer, should cause an alarm to sound. Mr. Michelson asked if there could be a common master key. Mr. Burnett replied that the security force almost always has master keys that can overrade the subsystems, and the total system.

For feci11 ties that have electrical controls, the Staff has allowed a central position like the control center to have the capability for personnel to press certain combinations of keys on the computer access panel that will open either individual vital area doors or, in the event of an emergency, all doors. Licensees have the authority to do this according to the current rules. The Sta4f has evaluated this practice from both safety and sefeguards points of vi ew, and finds it acceptable. In the new rule, it is made clear that the site supervisor can declare a saft-ty emergency and can drop vital area controls. With regard to Wolf Creek, Mr. Burnett said that a new recruit, familiarizing himself with the panel, hat the three or four numbers'of the code that opens the doors, it appears that the code entry was validated by a second person, and the doors opened. He said that the Staff d.fd not have enough detai l ed information yet to fully explain the event.

With regard to vital areas, Mr. Ebersole asked what is meant by " vital." Mr. Burnett said that many years ago it was noticed in-this agency that there were areas within nuclear reactor facilities where a single act of sabotage could disable major portions of the safety systen, so a methodology was devel oped f or identifying these " vital" areas. In the proposed " insider threat" rule, the Staff has laid the groundwork for a new method of identifying vital areas and islands. It should be noted that for secu7ity evaluations, the Staff does not give credit for the mitigation capabilities of the operators, only f or

SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MEETING Jun2 19,1985 MAY'7, 1993 - PROFOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES automatic features. They analyce to determine whether the automat 2c features are disabled by the sabotage event.

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START OF THE CLOSED PORTION OF THE MEETING

- CLASSIFIED -

Threat Consideration - J. Davidson Commissicn Pacer on Threat - R. Burnett Consecuences of Sabotage at Non-power Reactors - R. Dube END OF THE CLDEED PORTION OF THE MEETING Review and' Evaluation of Security Plans.for Non-Power Reactors

- W. Brown Mr. . Brown said that his talk would describe how the Staff performs security plan reviews for non-power reactors. He

'~

pointed out that the rules basically deal with categories

'of materials. Category 1 is an amount of material containing 5 kilograms ~or more of the U-235 isotope in uranium at an enrichment greater than or equal to 20 percent (i t is also called'the formula quantity).

Category 2 material is a material of moderate strategic significance (e.g., material with greater than or equal to 1 but less than 5 kilograms of U-235 enriched to 20 percent or greater, or 10 kilograms of U-235 enriched to between 10 and 20 percent). Category 3 material is of low strategic significance (e.g., material with less than 1 kilogram of U-235 enriched to greater than or equal to 20 percent, or between 1 and 10 kilograms of U-235 enriched '

to 10 to 20 percent). j Mr. Brown said that there are a set of regulations in 10 I CFR Fart 73 that are structured to provide safeguards for these categori es. For examp1e,.categcry 3 material is covered under section 73.67 (f), category 2 material is  ;

covered under section 73.67 (d), and category 1 material (f or non-power.. reactors) i s covered under sections ~ 73.67 i

.(b) and 73.60. The licensee has to make a determination  !

and decide what category material he possesses to  ;

l safeguard. At this time,.there are no category 1 reactors .

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i

SAFEGUARDS AtJD SECURITY MEETING Juna 19,1985 MAY'7, 19E5 - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES in lahe non power reactor community, there are 27 category 2 reactors, 30 category 3 reactors, and 10 others. Mr.

Mark asked if this meant that there is no non-power reacitor operating which has as much as 5 kilograms formula amognt of fresh fuel. Mr. Brown said yes. Mr. Mark asked i f '-fhe f uel in the reactors was meeting the 100 rem ,

requirement. Mr. Burnett said yes and pointed out tha6 the fuel in the pool was also, noting that bef ore it f alls below the limit it is shipped off site.

Time Requested for Oral Statements - S. Murphy, D. Hirsch, and B. Ramberg Mr. Hirsch introduced Ms. Murphy and Mr. Ramberg. He said that they anticipated talking about the design basis threat to power reactors, the threat to non-power reectors, and then the consequences of sabotage of power reactors. Mr. Hirsch said that his program, the Adli a. E.

Stevenson Program on Nuclear Policy at UC Santa Cruz, has been d,oing a study of sabotage risks both for power and non power reactors, focusing on current data ( i . e. , since the design basis threat was defined in 1973). Mr. Ramberg has done r esearch at Princeton University, and currently at UCLA, on the vulnerability of nuclear facilities to military destruction in war. Ms. Murphy is a research assistant to Mr. Hirsch at UCSC.

Ms. Murphy summariced some recent terrorist trend data, focusing or. how they may affect the design basis threat.

She said that terrorist incidents have escalated to almost three times what they were when the design basis threat was fo-mulated, and that the numbers of fatalities have also increased dramatically (e.g., 250 people were killed in the 1953 bombing of the U.S. Marine Compound in Beirut). Mr. Lewis pointed out that many people have known for a long time how to kill large numbers of people in an act of sabotage, yet they have not committed such acts. Ms. Murphy said that she thinks that terrorists are looking at reactors as symbolic targets of power and showed data to demonstrate an increase in bombings of nuclear installations abroad since the design basis threat was pr omul g a ted. She said that terrorism is increasing all over the world, and that bombs have been found at nuclear facilities in this country (e.g., she mentioned a pipe-bomb at a research reactor in Illinois, and a quantity of dynamite at the Indian Point Reactor). Mr.

Bush of'the NRC Staff suggested that they may have been hoax,es.

Mr. Hirsch said that just-as we don't wait for a core melt 1

. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MEETING Juna 19,1915 t NAY 7', 1965 - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES ,

down.to try to prevent one, we should stop research reactors from having weapons grade material stolen before some is stolen, and we should make sure that power reactors are protected against major radiological sabotage befgfe such an event happens. He said the current design basis threat stems from three considerations: 1) There ,;

were no known groups with the combination of moti vati on ,

skill, and resources to attack a fuel facility or nuclear power reactor. He thought that the Staff should reexamine the situation to see if this is still true. 2) Redundant safety systems were thought to make severe core damage "non-credible" (i . e. , a class nine accident was considered i mpossi bl e , hence, so was intentionally induced severe core damage). He said that the Three Mile Island accident and the Rasmussen Report caused the Commission to accept the possibility of a class nine accident. 3) Terrorists were thought to be unwilling to undertake actions involving large numbers of lives. He expressed the view that terrorists are, now, not only willing to kill large numbers of people whom they have never met, but kill themselves in the process (although he acknowledged that this sort of thing has not reached our shores yet).

With regard to research reactors, Mr. Hirsch said that the primary requirement concerning theft is that you must be abl e, after the theft has occurred, to report-that the material is missing. He said that if you convert to HEU then you have to increase the level of security to  !

sabotage preventicn; post-theft detection and reporting would not be sufficient. The second threat is sabotage.

Mr. Hirsch thinks it is a logical step along the path leading to attacks on f ully-operati onal power reactors.

Research reactors are often in densely-populated areas, often in politicized environments, and often are such that many people have access to them. He thinks more security is needed in this area than is currently employed (there are currently no explicit sabotage prevention requirements, however, theft prevention requirements do bring some limited sabotage protection).

Mr. Ramberg discussed his recent book, " Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for th,e Enemy: An Unrecognized Military Peril ," which addresses $.he policy imriications and y potential consequences er intentional destruction of -

nuclear energy facilitzes. He believes that an important threshold was passed in June 1981, when Israeli aircraft bombed and destroyed the Osirak Research Reactor while being constructed outside of Baghdad. That this was neither an isolated incident or a phenomenon restricted to just research reactors was demonstrated just three months O

e

SAFEGUAFDS AND SECURITY MEETING Juno 19,1985 MAY'7, 1985 - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES ago,*in February of this year, when aircraft of Iraq bombed a nuclear power plant under construction in neighboring Iran. He feels that attacks on operating nucFear reattors are merely the next step in an escalating process that began with the 1981 bombing.

'C7 Sabotage Protection at Power Reactors - T. Allen Mr. Allen seid thet the requirements in the regulations now have been deemed, within the body of those regulations, to protect against the given design basis threat. He said that, basically, safeguards requirements take the form of licensee commitments that are reflected in three different kinds of plans.

~

There is a physical protection plan which describes the physical protection system itself, including the existence of a security organi:ation, and such items as barriers, communications, and hardware. There is a guard training and qualification pl an wher e the suitability of, and the physical requirements and training curriculum for the guard force is discussed and committed to by the licensee. There is also a safeguards contingency plan wherein specific events are enumerated (i.e., a description is provided for coordination with the local law enforcement authorities; responsibilities are laid out on how to handle particular incidents, and response strategies are discussed).

With regard to the insider, under the present commitments li censees have made in their security plans, most licensees conduct background investigations, and some conduct psychological tests and have behavioral cbservation programs (similar to those described in ANSI Standard 18.17 and its successor, ANSI Standard 3.3).

Guards come under a separate requirement within the guard training and qualification requirements. They consistently get the psychological testing and training.

For general application to the work f orce, the industry is split down the middle on the value of psychological testing and behavioral observation.

Status of Generic Issue A J. Singh Mr. Singh said that resolution of Generic Issue A-29 ,

(Nuclear Power Plant Design for the Reduction of Vulnerability to Sabotage) involves evaluation of design features, damage control measures, and physical security in an effort to identify additional measures of protection against sabotage. He described an action plan consisting of srx tasks: 1) To evaluate the vulnerability of standard plants to sabotage. Mr. Michelson requested more

S4rE, GUARDS AND SECURITY MEETING Juna 19,1985 MAY 7, 19ES - FROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES written information to support the Staff position that the GESSAR II design is adequate in this regard. 2) To evaluate foreign plants for sabotage inhibiting features.

The -Staf f pointed out that most European countries do not >

reccgnize the insider as a threat. 3) To ovaluate ale 6rnative system design, plant layout, and safeguard features. The objective is to identif y potential modifications to both new and existing plants for improved protection against sabotage and tampering. 4) To have PNL and BNL, independently, develop methodologies for ranking the alternative system designs by attempting to quantify the sabotage contribution to risk. 5) To evaluate a sample of operating pl ants using the methodologies developed by BNL and PNL to determine their sabotage  !

vulnerability. This task is expected to begin this Fall.  ;

6) To prepare a regulatory package for any recommended new  ;

criteria. The Staff expects to make a decision by mid- ,

1986.

Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Power Reactors -

C. Gaskin Mr. Gaskin stated that physical security plans are reviewed a.g a i n st Part 10 CFR Section 73.55 (b) throuch (h) and the supportino outdance, and not aoainst the desian basis threat. Plans that satisfy these requirements are presumed to satisfy the design basis threat, including the +

insider. Generally, the basis for the review is NUREG-090E, w5ich is a compilation of all the Staff *s previous [

guidance. The Staff uses NUREG-0907 (essentially, just a scoring document) to determine whether the response force which the applicant has chosen is adequate to meet the requirements of Section 73.55.

The SRP requires the Staff to make two specific site visits. '

The initial site visit, generally two to three years prior to the anticipated OL date, is a plant walk- l through (with drawings) and a discussion of security philosophy. The final site visit, generally five to six l months prior to the anticipated OL date, is to determine if licensee installed what he said he was going to install. Later on, the Inspection and Enforcement Staff will pick up on the operation of the equipment during their preoperational inspection.

Mr. Gaskin said that the (5 to 10) designated armed i responders have other duties, but these duties are such that they-can be dropped immediately when the need arises.

TherE are other armed individuals trained to act as responders, they are just not the " designated armed i

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. I r

. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MEETING Junn 19,19ES MAY'7, 1985 - PROPOSED

SUMMARY

/ MINUTES response force members" at that time. When notified of an intrusion, the responders first make an assessment and then respond. .There are very few reactor sites that have the -@inimum number of designated armed responders and some, at least one, even have more than 10.

~~OP ll Future Mc-et i nas:

The ACRS is scheduled to discuss the Saf eguards and Security issues reviewed at this subcommittee meeting during the 301th ACRS meeting, May 9-11, 1995, t i

i t

NOTE: A complete transcript of the OPEN PORTION of the  ;

meeting is en file at the NRC Public Document Room at  ;

1717 H St., NW., Washington, D. C. or can be obtained  ;

at cost from ACE Federal Reporter, Inc., 444 N.  !

Capitol St., Washington, D. C. 20001, Telephone (202)  ;

347-3700.  !

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n ATTACHMENT A

~imm Federal Registae / Vol 50, No.-7s / Tuesd:y, Aprft 23. toss / NoH-

• E. Quaetiestive Safety Coals-he g la for the seb ect meeting w Dtscum NRC Staff evaluation of two.shall

@ar trial penod and plan for be as follows:

t port 6ans that deal with confidential implementauon d the pro %ndoy. M@ Nfsp uishi Safeguards quantitative safety goals, posed NRC the public. Infonna tion will be cloemd in .

th Maioit ofksiness ne agenda for the subject meeting

• F. Firture ACRS Acttvities-Discuss %e Subcommittee w anticipated. ACRS activities including operating ocemm:es. ill discuse recent shall be as follows:

preparation of the ACRS report to the NRC regarding the sed safety Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the MMthe concA.sion W./MN ofbusiness

d. ,

reseen:h proyam and udget for FY.

19Er and proposed reveiw of scram concence of the Subcommittee ne Subcommittee willreview the '

plants. for Westmshouse PWR nuclear systems Chairman wntten statements will bepotential consequences of sabotage at accepted and made available to the nonpower reactors, be briefed by NMBS

'G. EPA Standan/s for #1gh-Le6 el Committee. Recordings will be permitted on sabotaae protection at power Bodioactive Woste Repcsitories- only during those portions of th reactors and bear bow the NRC Staff Discuss epa environmental standards meeting when a transcript is being kept, reWews and evalosta licenee( security and questions may be asked only by py,,,_ .

for management and disposal of high.

levet rsdiosettve wastes in geotolpc members of the Subcommittee,its repositories consultants, and Staff. Persona desiring Oral statements may be presented' by' W d the W W h b

• H. Prioritization of Unresolved - to make oral statements should notify

! Cenericlasuee-D:scuss proposed the ACRS staff member named below as Chairman; written statements d hhim -

prionties for a new list of approsimately farin advance as is practicabhaccepted so that and made available to the 23 unresolved generic safety rela ted appropriate arrangements can be made. ,

issues. During the initial portion of the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the

• L ACR53ubcommittee Activities- meeting the Subcommittee, along with Discnu safety related activines of any ofits consultants who may be meeting when a transcript is being kept.

designated ACRS subcommittees present. may eschange prehminary ~ and questions may be asked only by includmg hydrody.2amic effects in BWR views regarding matters to be ~ members of the Subcommittee,its dynamic contamments and the effects of considered danng the balance of the consultanta, and Staff. Persons desiring meetmg. to make oral statements abould notify insulation debns on containment sump performance foDowing a LOCA The Subcommittee will then hear' the ACRS staff member named below as

'J. Mestatg w presentat ons by and hold discunions far in advance as is practicable so that Conmusamnersith Discaas A NRCxeport with representatives of the NRC Staff- appropriate arrangementa can be made.

regardag the roles of the in its consultants, and other interested Dunna the initialportion of the review and evaluation of the proposed persons regarding this review. meeting. the Subcommittee, along with DOE proyam for ==nagement and Further information regardmg topica any ofits consultants who may be dispa=at of rsdioactive wasfee. to be discuned whether the meeting l present, may exchange pre 1iminary

'K. Activit.rse ofACRS Mernbers- has been cance, led or rescheduled, the . d ' * * "8di"8 "' "'" '"

Hear and Aarnas reports of ACRS Chair nan's ruling on requests for the members regardmg actmtaes as opportunity to present oral sta tements considered dunn3 the balance of the

"" U"8' individual ACRS members- and the time allottad therefor can be

• L ACRSProcedures andProctices- obtained by a prepaid telephone call to The Subcommittee imill then hear Proposed ch,anges to ACRS Bylaws will the cognizant ACRS staff member Mr. presentations by and hold discussions be conaldemd with res et to the Herman Alderman (telephone 202/834- with representatives of the NRC Staff.

conduct of ACRS mem rs as part of the 1414) between 8:15 a.m. and SCO p.m.. its consultants, and other interested collepal body and as indmduals. EST. Persons planning to attend this penons regarding this mysew.

June 6-4. NAgnede to be ineeting are urged to contact the above Furtherinformation regarding topics canouannt named individual one or two days to be discussed whether the meeting July 11-13.1985-Agends to be before the schduled meeting to be has been cancelled or rescheduled, the annouacod-advised of any changes in schedule, etc.. Chairman's ruling on requesta for the Dated Aprilit 1sai which may have occurnd opportunity to present oral statements khe C. tWo. Deted. 4pnl 1s.1ss5. and the time allotted therefor can be AdvisoryhM ra~nsOffscer g,,,,, w, ,n a. w obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Auj,,,o,n,cygir,pu,ccarf,f pf, c: the cograzant ACRS staff member. Mr.

[PR Doc. s64'30 Filed 4-22-4& 145 suuma osas sus.ews a, aml view. John Schiffgens (telephone 202/834-

.. 1414) between 4:15 a.m and 5:00 p.m,

[nt Doc. s64777 Phd 4-23-46 t45 aml

..= ocos - EST. Persons planning to a ttend this meeting are urged to contact the above Adviemey Consnittee on Reactoe named individual one or two days Setaguarde, andscommittee on Reactee 'C, Comnettee en Reacher before this scheduled meeting to be L

80 " " 8 Sefoguards, W..c.;'.W. on advised of any changes in schedule.etc.,

""" which may have occured.

"1%e AdtS Mrrenmtttee on Reactor Deted. Aprilta tons.

Operations wE hand a meeting on May 'the ACRS Subcommittee on t.1955. Rocas 1048.171y H Street. NW. Safeguaeds and Security will hold a u.,sse w. uberkta.

WasheWoo. DC. ~.. meeting on May 7.1985. Room 1046,1717 3,7,,,,,, n,cy,j,, af,,,,,fo, p,,,,,

5 3,n,

~ 13eemers mesdag wtB be opse to H Street. NW, Washington. DC.

MBtelema. -

Portions public of fhe attendence, meeting however, those win be open to [m Doc. 854778 Ned 46 aos sm

- = ones res.*e y

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REVISED May 3, 19"5 PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE MAY 7, 1985

.' j MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON

, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY  !

8:30am Opening Statements C. Mark 10 min 8:40 Introduction R.F. Burnett 10 CLOSE MEETING 8:50 Threat Consideration J.J. Davidson 50 (secret) 9:40 - Break - 10 9:50 Commission Paper on Threat R.F. Burnett 50

- ' (conf i denti al )

10:40 Consequences of Sabotage at Non-Power Reactors R.J. Dube 50

. (conf i denti al ) ,.

I 11:30 - Lunch - 60 .

OPEN MEETING 12:30 Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Non-Power Reactors W.B. Brown 45 1:15pm Time Requested for Oral Statement D. Hirsch 25 min B. Ramberg 25 S. Murphy 25 2:30 Sabotage Protection at Power Reactors T.R. Allen 40 3:10 - Break - 15 3:25 Status of Generic Iniue A-29 J. Singh 40 4:05 Review and Evaluation of Security Plans for Power Reactors C.E. Gaskin 40 4:45 Gubcommittee Discussion (M. Carbon's draft letter) 45 5:30 - Adjourn -

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ATTACHMENT D

. HAND 0UTS [

OF MAY 7, 1985 MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY  :

I A. General Threat Considerations B. Current Commission Paper - Re: Threat j B.

2 Vehicle Barrier Analysis Study  ;

C. Potential Consequences of Attempted Sabotage of Non-Power Reactors D. 1. Nonpower Reactor Security Plan Review

2. Acceptance Criteria for Special Nuclear Material of Moderate i Strategic Significance i

3. U. S. NRC Regulatory Guide 5.59 Revision 1, Feb.1983  :

4. Acceptance Criteria for Special Nuclear Material of Low l Strategic Significance '

E. 1. Statement of Stephanie A. Murphy

.2. Charts - Accident Probability per Year [

3. Nuclear Terrorism: A Growing Threat /Rpt. by D. Hirsch & S.  ;

Murphy  ;

4. Statement of Dr. Bennett Ramberg Re Intentional Destruction of ;

Nuclear Energy Facilities i

5. Intentional Destruction of Nuclear Energy Facilities t F. 1. Physical Protection for Power Reactors .

G. NRR Staff Presentation to the ACRS Re Generic Issue #29 H. 1. Review of Security Plans for Power Reactors

2. NT0L Vital Area Reviews .

3. NUREG-0907 Acceptance Criteria for Determining Armed Response Force Size at Nuclear Power Plants

4. NUREG-0908 Acceptance Criteria for the Evaluation of Nuclear Power Reactor Security Plans 1

LP