ML20141C139

Corrected Page 2 of NOV Dtd 970430

ML20141C139
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	05/12/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20141B926	List: IR 05000306/1997002 ML20141C139
References
50-306-97-02, 50-306-97-2, NUDOCS 9705160162
Download: ML20141C139 (1)

Text

o 4 M. Wrdi:y second control failed when your staff did not establish containment integrity prior to l moving a heavy load over the open reactor vessel. These administrative barriers are l important since the containment polar ciane is not single failure proof. While the system engineer was directly responsible for the heavy load transfer, the safe passage should have i been the responsibility of all involved personnel. It is especially imperative that operations ;

personnel fully understand activities which need control room approval to ensure that I these activities are safely completed. I The administrative controls that should have been in place to allow the containment to ,

perform its safety function failed. If the reactor coolant pump motor rotor had fallen into I the reactor vesselit could have caused a significant release of fission products outside of j containment. Therefore, this violation has been categorized in accordance with the

" General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement i Policy), NUREG-1600 as a Severity Level Ill violation.

In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, a base civil penalty in the amount of $50,000 is considered for a Severity Level lll violation. Because your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions within the last two years,' the NRC considered whether credit was warranted for /dentification and Corrective Action in accordance with the civil ,

penalty assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. The NRC i determined that credit for Identification was warranted because the error was promptly identified and reported by alert shift supervision on February 4,1997. The shift supervisor realized the error when maintenance personnel attempted to return the reactor coolant pump motor rotor to the reactor coolant pump vault using the incorrect path traversed on February 3,1997. The NRC determined that credit for Corrective Action was warranted based on the results of the licensee's root cause analysis and prompt corrective actions.

The reactor coolant pump system engineer was instructed on the requirements of D58, and subsequently prepared a procedure with the appropriate controls to return the pump motor rotor to the reactor coolant pump vault. This transfer was successfully completed.

Training provided to maintenance workers on the event and on heavy load requirements was effectively completed. Finally, the Error Reduction Task Force investigation initiated to review this event successfully identified program weaknesses and recommended several programmatic improvements.

Therefore, to encourage prompt identification and comprehensive correction of violations, I, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation with no Civil Penalty in this case. However, significant violations in the future could result in a civil penalty.

9705160162 970512 PDR ADOCK 05000306 O PDR

'A Severity Level 111 violation with a $50,000 civil penalty was issued on January 23,1997 (EA 96-402).