ML20235B515
| ML20235B515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 09/18/1987 |
| From: | Davis A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235B474 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-87-138, NUDOCS 8709240129 | |
| Download: ML20235B515 (3) | |
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NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Northern States Power Company Docket No. 50-282 Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant License No. DPR-42 Unit 1 EA 87-138 j
As a result of an inspection conducted during the period June 18 through July 2,1987, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,"
10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.A.1 requires, j
in part, that a reactor not be made or maintained critical nor heated or main-tained above 200 degrees F unless two safety injection pumps are operabic, except as permitted in Specification 3.3.A.2.
l Technical Specification LCO 3.3.A.2 requires, in part, that during startup oper-ation or power operation, one safety injection pump may be out of service pro-vided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and provided that startup operation is discontinued until operability is restored.
If during power operation, operability is not restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in the hot shutdown condition.
If the requirements of TS 3.3.A.1 are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition.
Contrary to the above, from May 27 to June 18, 1987, while in startup and power operations, one safety injection pump was out of service. Startup operation was not discontinued nor, after commencing power operation, was the reactor placed in hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. The safety injection pump was out of service in that its power supply breaker was not properly placed in the full racked in (connect) position after maintenance on May 22, 1987 until discovery cn June 18, 1987.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I)
Civil Penalty - $25,000 Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Northern States Power Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a " Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, (3) the
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SEP ; g 1997 corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be ':odified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalties by letter to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the amount of civil penalty proposed above, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in whole or in part by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.
Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an " Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:
(1) deny the violation listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalty, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the five factors addressed in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1987), should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.,
citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which subsequently has been determined i
in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, i
or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282c.
The responses to the Director, Office of Enforcement, noted above (Reply to a Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
Director, Office of Enforcement, a
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l SEP 1 8 1987 i.
I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, Illinois, 60137, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility which is the subject of this Notice.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
6VA dJ ns A. Bert Davis Regional Administrator Dated t Glen Ellyn, Illinois this), day of September 1987 l
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l U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM15510N REGION III Report No. 50-282/87011(DRP)
Docket No. 50-282 License No. DPR-42
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m Licensee:
Northern States Power Company 414 Nicollet Mall Minneapolis, MN 55401 Facility Name:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Inspection At:
Prairie Island Site, Red Wing, Minnesota Inspection Conducted:
June 18 through July 2,1987 Inspectors:
J. E. Hard M. M. Noser A.&
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Approved By:
R. DeFayette, ief 7/
Reactor Projects Section 2B Datt '
Inspection Summary Inspection on June 18 throuah July 2,1987 (Report No. 50-282/87011(DRP))
Areas Inspected:
Special safety inspection by resident inspectors of the conditions surrounding the failure of the No. 11 Safety Injection (SI) Pump to start during testing on June 18, 1987 and of the investigative and corrective actions taken by the licensee.
Results:
One apparent violation, failure to maintain SI pump operability as required by Technical Specifications, was noted.
I DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted L. Eliason, General Manager, Nucler.r Plants
- E. Watzl, Plant Manager l
D. Mendele, General Superintendent, Engineering and Radiation Protection M. Se11 man, General Superintendent, Operations
- A. Hunstad, Staff Engineer J. Curtis, Production Engineer
- Denotes those present at the exit interview of July 1,1987.
2.
Introduction and Summary On June 18, 1987, during a monthly surveillance of the Unit 1 Safety Injection System (SI), with the reactor at 94% power, the No.11 SI Pump failed to start when the start signal was initiated in the control room.
Investigation determined that the SI pump
- circuit breaker was not fully racked in and that this condition may have existed since May 22 (approximately 27 days).
Plant technical specifications require both SI pumps to be operable with Reactor Coolant System (RCS( temperature greater than 200 degrees F and certain actions are required if one SI pump is not operable during startup or power operation.
These technical specification requirements apparently were not met for the period May 24 through June 18,1987.
3.
Conditions Noted On June 18, 1987 At 8:23 a.m. on June 18, 1987, while Unit I was operating at 94% power and Unit 2 was operating at 100% power, the monthly surveillance Procedure 'SP 1088 Safety Injection Pumps Test" was being performed on the Unit 1 Safety Injection (SI) system.
This surveillance performs an operability test of both Unit 1 SI pumps, each of which can deliver 100%
capacity to their independent trains.
The last time that this surveillance had been performed was on May II,1987, near the end of the scheduled refueling outage.
During initial heatup et the conclusion of the outage, the licensee discovered that one of the steam generator (SG) tubes which was supposed to have been plugged was inadvertently missed.
The reactor therefore was taken back to cold shutdown to make this repair.
As required by procedure during such delays, the 4160 volt circuit breakers for the~
SI pwnps were racked out.
Af ter the SG tube was plugged, the breakers were racked back in on May 22 and reactor startup commenced.
The surveillance test on the SI pumps was not (and was not required to be) redone at this time. The reactor coolant system was heated above 200 degrees F on May 24, 1987; startup operations continued through May 28, 1987; and power operation was conducted until June 18.
When the No.11 SI pump start signal was initiated at the control room console on June 18, as part of the surveillance test, the white
disagreement" light illuminated and the pump did not start even though the indicator lights in the control room indicated the pump was
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operational.
Per plant procedure, an operator was dispatched to verify that the 4160 volt breaker was racked in.
The operator observed that the ITE 4160 volt breaker indicating lights were nonmal and that the breaker appeared to be racked in but just to make sure, he inserted the crank in the racking screw and was able to rotate the handle about 1/2 turn when he heard the characteristic click of the mechanical latch on the racking screw. The No.11 SI pump was then retested and operated successfully.
(The No.12 pump had been successfully retested immediately upon discovery of the No. Il pump failure.)
m Investigation disclosed that conditions of the No.11 SI pump being inoperable may have existed since the re-racking of the breaker on May 22, 1987, some 27 days' before this' surveillance.
The other pump, No.12, appears to have been operable during this entire period.
The cause of the failure appears to be a design deficiency that allows breaker position indicators (warning lights and racking screw position)
I to appear normal whereas in reality the primary disconnects (stabs) of the breaker were not engaged.
This same phenomenon was observed on a similar type breaker at Prairie Island in*1982 and as a result, new racking tools were purchased to preclude such an event from recurring.
This corrective action appeared to solve the problem since there were l
no recurrences of it in the intervening five years.
It now appears it i
may not have completely solved the problem.
4, Technical Specification Requirements l
Technical Specification 3.3. A.1 states, in part, "1. A reactor shall not be made or maintained critical nor shall it be heated or maintained above 200 degrees F unless the following conditions are satisfied except as permitted in Specification 3.3. A.2....
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Two safety injection pumps are operable...."
Technical Specification 3.3. A.2 states, in part, "2. During startup operation or power operation, any one of the following conditions of l
inoperability may exist for each unit provided startup operation is l
discontinued until operability is restored.
If during power operation
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operability is not restored within the time specified, the reactor shall
.l be placed in the hot shutdovn condition.
If the requirements of l
TS 3.3. A.1 are not satisfied within an additional 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in the cold shutdown condition..,.
a.
One safety injection pump may be out of service, provided the pump is restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The other safety injection pump shall be tested to demonstrate operability prior to initiating repair of the inoperable pump."
As noted above, the Unit I reactor coolant system was heated above 200 degrees F on May 24, 1987; startup operation proceeded to May 27; and power operation was conducted between May 27 and June 18.
The No.11 51 pump was inoperable for this entire period; therefore, the Technical Specification requirements listed above were violated.
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5.
Other Observations Other observations made by the resident inspectors are as follows:
The inoperability of the SI pump was identified by the licensee.
a.
b.
The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of the problem by the licensee within a few minutes of its identification.
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A licensee event report is being prepared and will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.
d.
Visual verification that a breaker of this type is correctly racked in is difficult.
The indicating lights were normal and visual observance of the breaker racking screw would lead one to believe the breaker was racked in.
e.
The No.12 pump was always operable.
6; Status of Licensee Investigation as of JuTy 2,1987 a.
The plant Operations Committee had. met several times to discuss the event and corrective actions.
b.
An Investigator had been assigned from the plant staff to obtain all details of the event.
All operators who may have been involved in the racking of the c.
breaker had been interviewed.
d.
The licensee concluded that although the operator involved is experienced and adequately trained, the highest probable cause of the event was the failure to correctly rack in the breaker.
e.
All other safety-related breakers of this type were checked to assure they were operational.
Of those checked all but two had been operated successfully since they were last racked in.
Those two were visually examined and racking screws physically checked to assure that the breakers were fully and properly engaged.
f.
The licensee had obtained a training breaker of this type and will re-train all operators in its operation, g.
Appropriate modifications to plant procedures were being made to assure that safety equipment will be test operated following breaker operations of the type which resulted in this event.
h.
A mechanical inspection of the subject breaker was being performed.
1.
Independent verification procedures for 4160 volt breakers were to be updated to reflect the lessons learned from this event.
N' 7.
Exit interview The Senior Resident Inspector set the licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 2 at the conclusion of the inspection on July 1,1987.
The inspector discussed the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.
i The inspector also discussed the likely information content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed tor s the inspector during the inspection, The licensee did not identify any document / processes as proprietary.
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