ML20148D993
| ML20148D993 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 02/12/1988 |
| From: | SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148D992 | List: |
| References | |
| AP.28, NUDOCS 8803240407 | |
| Download: ML20148D993 (33) | |
Text
i s .
EFFECTIVE DATE
- 02-12-88 Rev. 10 HP-0075P 0-0031P AP.28 to--
POST TRIP TRANSIENT INVESTIGATION, ASSESSMENT, AND REPORTING 1.0 PURPOSE 1.1 Pre-Startuo Investiaation and Assessment To provide a systematic method for diagnosing the cause(s) of a Reactor trip, ascertaining the proper functioning of safety-related and other important equipment during the trip, determining any detrimental effect on plant equipment caused by the trip, and making the-determination that the plant can be restarted safely.
1.2 Trio Recort Develooment and Accroval To provide for a detailed account of the trip, and to develop and adopt long-term corrective actions to be taken.
2.0 REFERENCES
/COMMITHENT 00CUMENTS 2.1 References to-~ 2.1.1 AP.78, Engineering Action Request 2.1.2 Adapted from INP0 Good Practice OP-211 -
2.1.3 Technical Support Guidelines, MEG.203 2.1.4 AP.1, Responsibilities and Authorities to- 2.1.5 Plant Operations Manual, Procedure A.75, A.75A - Plant Computers
- 2.1.6 RSAP-0803, Hork Requests 2.1.7 AP.39, Distribution of Nuclear Operations Correspondence to-- 2.1.8 AP.23.25, Shift Technical Advisor Transient Evaluation Guidelines 2.2 .COMMITHENTS 2.2.1 Technical Specifications 6.2.2.g 6.5.1.6, 6.9.4.1. 6.10.2.f 2.2.2 R. J. Rodriguez to J. F. Stolz (NRC): letter of 1/21/85 (RJR 85-40)
THIS FNCEQbRE/ MANUAL IS DISTRIBUTED THROUGil '
THE NAro2W-DOCUMENT CONTROL-PROCECUPc.S AND ~
MAY NOT REFLECT THE LATEST REVNION.
ASSIGNED 10 fWUn' " 1 J 8803240407 880316 PDR ADOCK 05000312 P DCD
I DEFINITIONS (Continued) 3.0 DEFINITIONS to- 3.1 Data Package - Enclosure 8.1 thru 8.4 and their attachments.
- Any transcriptions of taped Plant Personnel statements. In the case of a Type I Event Review, the PRC Data Package may be summarized.
3.2 Event Type Definitions 3.2 .1 Type I:
At the time of trip classification, by consensus of all members of Shift Management, the plant is in a condition to be safely restarted and operated with all the screening criteria in Enclosure 8.5 circled "Yes."
3.2 .2 Type II:
to-The cause of the trip is not positively known, QR Safety-related or other important equipment functioned in an abnormal or degraded manner during the trip with the malfunction not positively corrected, unless redundant
- equipment is available to allow start-up.
3.3 Management Duty Officer (MOO) - person so-appointed by the Director, Operations and Maintenance.
3.4 Plant Trip - Generator, Reactor or Turbine Trip that is not part of a planned plant progression.
3.5 Shift Management - the combination of Shift Supervisor Assistant Shift Supervisors, and the Operations Technical Advisor, to-- 3.6 TAP - The Babcock and Milcox Co. (B&W) Transient Assessment Program.
3.7 TAP Team Coordinator - A SMUD employee designated to be the liason with TAP.
3.8 Trip Mitness - an individual involved in the trip, e.g. Reactor Operators, Maintenance Technicians, etc.
4.0 PREREQUISITES 4.1 Any of the following conditions shall cause this procedure to be activated:
4.1 .1 A Plant Trip occurs 4.1 .2 The Shift Supervisor elects to activate this procedure on a non-trip plant transient to-- 4.1 .3 The Supervisor of the Independent Investigation / Review Group elects to activate this procedure on a non-trip plant transient.
Rey, 10 --
AP.28-2
5.0 PRECAUTIONS 5.1 Prior to the initiation of data gathering, the Shift Supervisor shall judge that data gathering will not impede the Operators' control of the plant.
5.2 Record CR0 breaker positions and SFAS initiation status before any reset (Enclosure 8.1).
5.3 If plant conditions change, any licensed Operator may temporarily interrupt the performance of this procedure.
lo- 5.4 If it is the decision of the Independent Investigation / Review Group Supervisor-to enter this procedure after the witnessing Operations crew has gone home, the crew has two requirements: to complete its sections of this procedure on its next regular shift in, and noting in "remarks" sections if its recollections are indeterminate.
5.5 The original Trip Classification and Startup Approval (Enclosure 8.5) should be placed in the Trip Report File Cabinet as soon as possible.
This enhances the chances of easy retrieval for the "permission to start up" signatures.
5.6 The completeness doublecheck shall be finished before releasing Trip Hitnesses from their shift. Exceptions are:
5.6 .1 The Shift Supervisor determines that the individual will otherwise work more than three hours beyond limits of AP.1 or successor procedures. For the purpose of completing Plant Personnel Statements, this procedure step shall be considered the prior written permission by the Director, Operations and Maintenance.
! - 5.6 .2 Trip witnesses can be released earlier, by decision of Operations l Senior management.
5.7 Once the event is classified as a Type II, no reclassification to Type I is allowed.
5.8 A person other than the duty SS or duty AsdT or duty OTA shall make the restart decision.
6.0 PROCEDURE 6.1 The responsibilities listed below apply to their performance of this procedure.
6.1 .1 Director, Operations and Maintenance (DOM) 6.1 .1.1 The decision to start up the reactor.
6.1 .1.2 The Designation of Management Duty Officers empowered to make the restart decision.
Rev. 10 AP.28-3
RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued) 6.1 .1.3 The Approval of the Trip Report and desirable Recommendations.
6.1 .1.4 The formation of investigative team (s) for a Type II Event.
6.1 .1.5 Approval of TAP report.
to-- 6.1 .2 Independent Investigation / Review (IIR) Group Supervisor 6.1 .2.1 That lessons learned are used to improve plant safety and reliability.
6.1 .2.2 The transfer of inhouse experience of generic interest to the industry.
6.1 .2.3 The r.aintenance of the Trip Report File, until turned over to Records Information.
to- 6.1 .3 Hanagement Duty Officer (MD0) 6.1 .3.1 Notification of the SMUD TAP representative and other appropriate members of management.
6.1 .3.2 Notification of the NRC Resident Inspector (s).
6.1 .3.3 Making the restart decision if so designated by the
- Director, Operations and Maintenance.
6.1 .4 Plant Personnel 6.1 .4.1 By means of the Plant Personnel Statements of Section 6.4.6, providing a member of Shift Management or Senior Operations Management with:
6.1 .4.1.1 Objective comments that describe their own observations of the event.
6.1 .4.1.2 Objective comments that describe their own participation in the trip event.
6.1 .4.1.3 Recommendations to prevent recurrence of the event.
6.1 .5 Plant Review Committee (PRC) lo-~ 6.1 .5.1 Review of the Data Package and Sequence of Events. In the case of a Type II Event, the PRC shall complete its review
' prior to restart, if so directed by the AGM, Nuclear Power Production.
Rev. 10 AP.28-4~
RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued) to- 6.1 .5.2 Review of the formal Trip Report recommendations. Because the Trip Report Hriter is allowed to make subjective recommendations, the PRC can recomend disapproval of a recommendation, Out needs to negotiate amendments with the Trip Report Hriter.
6.1 .5.3 Adding Recommendations to make the Trip Report complete.
- C.1 .5.4 Review of TAP report.
to ~ 6.1 .6 Operations Department 6.1 .6.1 Investigation phase of Data Gathering.
6.1 .6.2 The Shift Supervisor can yield, at directed by Operations senior Management, the review and approval of the investigation results.
6.1 .6.3 Trip Classification 6.1 .6.4 Only the Shift Supervisor can make the recommendation to restart the reactor.
6.1 .7 Operations Technical Advisor (OTA) 6.1 .7.1 Formulate and express judgement to the H00 and appropriate others on the classification of the trip.
6.1 .7.2 Data gathering, subject to the limitation of AP.23.25 that gathering may not proceed until one hour after the end of the transient. Assistance during the Investigation phase.
6.1 .7.3 That transcripts be made of tape recorded Personnel Statements.
l 6.1 .8 Trip Report Writer 6.1 .8.1 Control use of the original Data Package. If access must be granted to other individuals, (e.g. a TAP team), develop administrative controls so that the original Data Package can be filed with the Trip Report.
6.1 .8.2 Use enough explanation in the Trip Report Sequence of Events section so that it could be used as a stand-alone document for experienced plant personnel.
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Rev. 10 AP.28-5
. RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued) 6.1 .8.3 The supporting Trip Report sections need to objectively analyze selected events and explain, to the level of someone with system training, the relationship between those selected events.
6.1 .8.4 When a Trip Report Recommendation is subjective, ensure the reasoning behind it is explained within the recommendation.
6.1 .8.5 Delivery to the DOM of a draft-for-approval Trip Report within 28 days of the event, or as otherwise negotiated with the Director, Operations and Maintenance.
6.1 .8.6 The delivery to the IIR Group Supervisor of file, and the organization of the file for the approvet frip Report,
- including copies of EAR).
6.1 .9 Transient Assessment Program Coordint.or 6.1 .9.1 Notify B&W of trip - negotiata B&W representatives to report for trip review.
6.1 .9.2 Schedule TAP Team Review ana escorts and clerical support.
6.1 .9.3 Conduct entrance review and exit meetings.
6.1 .9.4 Turnover draft report to Trip Report Writer and PRC.
6.1 .9.5 Send final tr:p report to TAP Program Manager.
l to- 6.2 General Instructions (Information Only)
The post-trip transient review process has six major steps, as follows:
SIIE RESPONSIBILITY l Initiation / Data Gathering Operations Department l 6.2 .1 6.2 .2 Nuclear Safety Assessment / Operations Department Trip Classification 6.2 .3 Start-up Decision Director, Operations and Maintenance I 6.2 .4 Data Package / Sequence of PRC Events Review 6.2 .5 Trip Report Writing Independent Investigation / Review Group Supervisor 6.2 .6 PRC Review and Review of TAP PRC/ Director, Operations l and Maintenance l
Reports / Approval Rev. 10 AP.28-6' l
l
PROCEDURE (Continued) 6.3 Initiation (Pre-Startup) ,
g1II: Management Notification should be made in advance of NRC red phone notifications, if possible, to afford additional evaluation of the events.
6.3 .1 Shift Management shall call the Management Duty Officer.
6.3 .1.1 The Management Duty Officer list and schedule is available in the Control Room.
6.3 .1.2 The contacted Management Duty Officer will then notify the Manager, Operations Department, and the AGM, Nuclear Production.
6.3 .l.3 The Manageinent Duty Officer contacted shall assure that a management representative informs the NRC Resident Inspector as soon as possible.
6.3 .l.4 The NRC Resident or his designes may call the Control Room once notified of the transient situation to request a briefing. The Shift Supervisor or his designee will provide the NRC Resident a description of the event with the 1
appropriate detail and length commensurate with the operational demands placed upon the Shift Supervisor and crew. In briefest form, the report may be one or two
- sentences describing the basic nature of the event.
6.4 Data Gathering (Pre-Startup) 6.4 .1 Record CRD breaker positions and SFAS initiation status before any reset. (Enclosure 8.1) 6.4 .2 As simultaneously as possible for all Control Room recorders, time-mark the charts adjacent to the pen /printhead. A precise,
- narrow mark soon after the transient ends can aid later i
sequence-of-events resolution.
6.4 .3 For chart gathering, there are three acceptable methods. The Control Room Operator can be consulted for preferences, 6.4 .3.1 Charts may be snipped, photocopied, then spliced to the f
i original. .
to- 6.4 .3.2 Charts may be photographed.
! 6.4 .3.3 If a photocopier is close by, charts may be wholly removed,
- a portion copied, and the roll wholly replaced.
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l 6.4 .4 Label each collected chart with its source.
Rev. 10 AP.28-7 i
J
r-PROCEDURE (Continued) to-~ CAUTION: Bailey computer "Sequence of Events" and "Memory Trip Review" functions, if cancelled, are lost.
Because the utility typer must be shared for real-time monitoring and trip data gathering, call up only one Bailey function at one time.
6.4 .5 Retrieve computer printouts.
6.4 .6 Complete Enclosures 8.1 and 8.2.
6.4 .7 Plant Personnel Statements 6.4 .7.1 After the plant is in a safe, stable condition, Shift Management shall ensure each Trip Witnesses provides a statement concerning his/her involvement in the reactor trip.
6.4 .7.2 These statements may be obtained in one of the following ways: 1) self-written statements; 2) tape recorded interviews with personnel involved in the reactor trip, to- conducted by the Operations Department. Written sumaries
- of the tapes may be prepared and used.
6.4 7.3 For self-written statements, use Enclosure 8.3. Read and
- initial statements of nearby personnel so that, with your statement's assistance, an accurate and complete picture results.
6.4 .7.4 The written statements shall be included in the reactor trip data package to assist in the event reccnstruction.
6.4 .7.5 Restrict statements to facts concerning the event; the facts should be stated chronologically, if possible.
to- 6.4 .7.6 Tape recorded interviews will be transcribed, usually within
- 5 working days.
6.5 Data Completeness Doublecheck (Pre-Startup) 6.5 .1 The OTA will r3 view the collected data.
6.5 .2 Any followup questions are best asked at this time, while the events are fresh in everyone's mind. Use "Remarks" areas for the documentation space.
6.6 Nuclear Safety Assessment (Pre-Startup) 6.6 .1 The purpose of this section is to review the collected data so that a trip classification can be performed.
Rev. 10 AP.26-8
m . ._ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __
. PROCEDURE (Continued) 6.6 .2 Analysis of Transient to-- Operations Department personnel will reconstruct the transient by completing Enclosure 8.4 using the collected data. A chronological '
description of the event will be developed, using all available data. Pertinent alarms, trips, actuations, and isolations can ce to-- listed or marked on the alarm typer printouts. Pertinent plant ,
parameters should be incorporated into the chronological list of
< events during the reconstruction.
i 6.6 .3 The trip and transient shall be compared to the expected trip response, based on the training and experience of licensed operators.
CAUTION: FSAR transients are "worst case" or limiting '
conditions. Do not assume that because a transient did not result.in peak parameters exceeding the FSAR values that the plant response was acceptable.
to-- 6.6 .4 As directed by the Director, Operations and Maintenance the Operations Department shall perform a comparison with previous trip repcrts or FSAR transients.
6.6 .5 Analysis of Equipment Behavior g)II: Look beyond the obvious indications to diagnose the cause of the trip and evaluate the plant response. Review the available information thoroughly. Look for (1) abnormal indications or degraded trends in equipment performance, (2) events occurring out of the normal or anticipated sequence, (3) failed or degraded response of equipment to control signals, (4) unusual chemistry results or radiation readings, and (5) unanticipated alarms.
6.6 .5.1 Determine:
6.6 .5.1.1 If all major safety-related and other important equipment l involved in the trip operated as anticipated or expected, l
and l
6.6 .5.1.2 If the trip / transient caused any detrimental effects on l plant equipment, and 6.6 .5.1.3 The est probable cause of the trip.
6.7 Trip Classification 6.7 .1 Based on the results of the analysis and evaluation of the plant trip and subsequent response, Operations Department Personnel shall classify the event as a Type I or Type II Event (on Enclosure 8.5).
Rev. 10 AP.28-9~
PROCEDURE (Continued) 6.7 .2 Management Notifications Once the reactor trip event is classified, notify management again as per steps 6.3.1 of this procedure.
6.8 Determination of restart conditions (Pre-Startup) 6.8 .1 Type I Event Based upon this classification, the Shift Supervisor can recommend restart of the reactor. Use Enclosure 8.5 "remarks" to document pre-startup corrections.
6.8 .2 Type II Event A team or teams will be appointed to perform the further investigation of the trip to determine necessary corrective action before restart.
HQIE: Sources of expertise that should be considered include nuclear steam supply vendors, vendor engineers, onsite engineering staff, corporate engineering staff, and other experienced operations and maintenance personnel, to-- 6.8 .3 The team will analyze the event reconstruction, emphasizing the most probable cause of the trip and the resolution of abnormal or degraded indications. Use available expertise to resolve questic concerning the cause and plant response. Supply and document on to- Enclosure 8.5 the following information to the Director, Operations
- and Maintenance:
6.8 .3.1 The actual or most probable cause of the trip; 6.8 .3.2 The maintenance and testing necessary before reactor restart including additional measur:s to verify the most probable cause; 6.8 .3.3 Additional monitoring or trending required during .,nd/or after reactor restart; l
l 6.8 .3.4 Necessary briefings to operations and/or maintenance personnel concerning specific equipment indications or possible malfunctions; and 6.8 .3.5 The conditions necessary for a reactor restart.
Rev. 10 AP.28-10
y
~. . - . - . - . - . -. - -
T' s PROCEDURE (Continued) g' <,
to- 6.8 .4 Startup Decision ,
1 !.
The Director, Operations and Maintenance or Designee s?.all evaluate .
the recommendation made by the personnel performing th'e trip investigation. For Type II Events, the AGH, Nuclear Power ), '
Production should consider convening the PRC tofreview the trip investigation prior to reactor restart.
to-- The Director, Opera.tions and Maintenance shall ensure the following was done before allowing reactor restart:
6.8 .4.1 The most pgobable cause of!the t' rip 13 known and corrected.
6.8 .4.2 Major safety-related and other important equipment functioned properly during the transient, or corrective ;
maintenance and satisfactory testing has been performed or :
will be completed when plant conditions permit.
6.8 .4.3 The plant response during the event has been analyzed and the plant responded as anticipated, or abnormalities are understood and corrected as required by Technical Specifications except as described below.
If the cause of the trip has not been posit 8vely identified, the to-~ Director, Operations and Maintenance shall determine if the cause '
and the circumstances surrounding the enura have been analyzed adequately. Adequate measure must be implemented to prevent repetitive challenges to safety systems syririg future power operations.
6.9 Trip Report Writing (Usually Post-Startup) to- 6.9 .1 The Supervisor of the Independent Invest gation/ Review appoints the head Trip Report Writer.
6.9 .2 The SMUD TAP Team Coordinator will determine if a P,&M TAP Teard site visit is necessary and the arrival date for the team. The B&W Resident Engineer will notify E4H of this decision. The TAP representative arranges for typing at the site.
6.9 .3 When B4M dispatches a TAP Team, the team helps evaluate the transient and prepares a draft asdsisment report.
6.9 .4 An ent'rance interview will brief any TAP Team on the transient. At ,
- least one trip witness should be present.
to- 6.9 .5 Once a Operations Superintendent allows, the Writer acquires custody of all original collected data.
.s r j Rev. 10 i AP.28-11
-,r,,,-, ,,--,-,n -- - - - , , -
,-,--,,,-m.~ ,,.r..___,,,,n-,,,-nv. , _ , , , . . _ , _ . , , - - - - - - . - ,
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PROCEDURE (Continued)
N 6.9 .6 Hake a verbal agreement with the TAP Team for sharing access to tF Data Package, especially when a decision is made that photocopies are undesirable.
. 6.9 .7 A trip report number will be obtained.from the Indegandent Investigation / Review Group custodian of the hardcopy Trip Report files and entered on the Trip Data Form.
fiOIE: A draft-for approval in 28 days can assist in the development of any associated Licensee Event Report (LER).
6.9 .8 The number issuer will complete a Engineering Action Request (EAR) 4 and forward it for a 28 day due date.
6.9 .9 The post-trip review data package will be reviewed to determine its significance to plant safety and reliability.
fiO11: Technical Support Guideline HEG.203 contains information on the Trip Report itself.
6.9 .10 During the generation of the Trip Report, the event will be evaluated to produce recommendations for corrective actions (e.g.,
procedure changes, design modifications, operator and plant staff training). -
6.9 .11 A comparison should be made with previous similar trips in order to identify abnormal or degraded concitions, to- 6.9 .12 Any TAP Team will conduct an exit interview to discuss the transient. It is recommended that the TAP representative; Operations Manager, Unit Operations Superintendent, Shift Operations Superintendent B&H ResHent Engineer, a member of Shift Management on duty at the time of the transient, and all members of the TAP Team be present for the interview. Other staff members and a SMUD Nuclear Engineering Representative may be present.
6.9 .13 The TAP Team will retain a copy of the draft report and a photocopy of plant data package upon departing the site.
6.10 PRC Review 6.10 .1 Type i Event The Trip Report Recommendations and Sequence of Events shall be reviewed by the PRC. This review is not required prior to reactor restart.
Rev. 10 AP.28-12 1
1
-- -- - - . . - - ~ . - . - - - - _ ,_,- _ _ _ _
.p
/
j PROCEDURE 3 Continued) ,
6.10 .2 Typ'i II Event f i l
' If directed by the AGH, Nuclear Power Production, the PRC will
, review a Type II Event before a reactor restart is commenced. In
, any case, a Type II Trip Report will receivs a PRC review.
r.iG .3 PRC amendments may be made on Enclosure 8.6 y)thout retyping the report. Justify amendments to recommended corrective actions, to- 6.11TripReportAproval(UsuallyPost-Startup; Submit the ukendM repent to the Director, Crerations and Maintenance, for approvatfof the req;mmended corrective actions.
J WIf.: The Engine ging Action Request (EAR) system will be used to track the implementation of the r:comatended ccrrective actions, to- 6.12 Review of TAP hports 6.i2 .1 After the exit interview with the B&H TAP Team the draft TAP repcrt fan be' modified to incorporate comments generated in the exit.
Membere'pf Shift Management on duty at the time of the transient
, shali receive a copy of the TAP report for comment.
- l. I '
5.12 .2 The drafi TAP report can be radified or even rewritten as deemed necessary by the SMUD TAP representative.
6.12 .3 After the applicable Shift Supervisor and exit ir.tervi9w comments havC been incorporated the draft TAP report will be scat for (
tp,mqayy review.
6.12 .4 /The Plant Review Comittee r.nd the Director, Operations and Mairtenance will'ioview and approve the TAP report, thus making it
< the t'inal report. '
6.13 Distribution of TAP Reports
} One of the major objectives of the program is ;he dissemination of available,information'to participating organizations. TAP reports should be released by SHUD to B&H within approximately 60 days of the transient.) B&W will then distribute the reports to each participating C
~ utility. ,
~
6.14 Dissemination spthe Industry (Time Frama Independent of Startup)
The Supervisor of the Independen0 Investigation / Review Group wil's determine what, if any,"infotiation on the trip will be useful to the industry, and is responsible for its dissemination via Nuclear Network, to-- subject to AP.69, Usage cf Nuclear Network at Rancho Seco.
i Rev. 10 AP.28-13 f'
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PROCEDURES (Continued) 7.0 RECORDS The trip report and data package shall be retained for the life of .the
. plant. (
Reference:
Technical Specification 6.10.2.f)
'8 . 0 ENCLOSURES 8.1 Trip Data 8.2 Secondary Safety and Dump Valves Temperature Stickers Data Sheet 8.3 Plant Personnel Statements 8.4 Analysis and Evalu'ations 8.5 Trip Classification and Restart Approval 8.6 Trip Report Amendment and Approval 8.7 Typical TAP Report Format e
e Rev. 10 AP.28-14
ENCLOSURE 8.1 TRIP DATA (Responsibility: Operations except for Trip No.) ,.
Trip No.
to-- Independent Investigation /
Review Group t[QII:
Of prime importance are those values or observations that are only obtainable from witnesses. Operator's
~
statements must be ccmoleted before the end of their shift except as waived by the Operations Superintendent or higher management for Technical Specification 6.2.2.g compliance.
10-~
- 1. Plant Conditions Immediately Prior to Trio:
- 2. Igallna/ Maintenance or Contributina/Comolicatina Factors Prior to Transient:
NONE/AS FOLLOHS (Circle) l l
l Rev. 10 AP.28-15 l
ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP OATA
- 3. Stanoov Eauioment Resconse/ Status:
CAUTION:
Circle only one status per period.
During During Pre-Trip At Post-Trip Transient Trip Transient How, Why, and Remarks HPI Pump A On/Off On/Off On/Off HU Pump On/Off On/Off On/Off HPI Pump B On/Off On/Off On/Off Open for minutas SFV-23811 Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut HPI ve.zzle SFV-23809 Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut HPI Nozzle SFV-23812 HPI Nozzle Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut SFV-23810 HPI Nozzle Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Aux Feed Pump P-?,18 On/Off On/Off On/Off Aux Feed ___ .
Pump P-319 On/Off On/Off On/Off Rev. 10 AP.28-16
. o ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP DATA e
- 3. Standbv Eautoment Resconse/ Status: (Continued)
During During-Pre-Trip At Post-Trip Transient Trip Transient How, Why, and Remarks minutes ooen Secondary Safety Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Valves minutes coen Atmospheric Dump Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Valves Turbine Bypass Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Open/ Shut Valves Auto / Manual Auto / Manual Auto /Hanual A-0TSG BTU Limits In/ Normal In/ Normal In/ Normal B-0TSG ___.
BTU Limits In/ Normal In/ Normal In/ Normal __
Big Boiler E-360 Run/Off Run/Off Run/Off Small Boiler E-365 Run/Off Run/Off Run/Off Throttle Stops Not C1/Cl Not C1/C1 Not C1/Cl On HISS Indication Governor Rapid / Slow /
Valves No/Hovement Not Cl/Cl Not C1/C1 On H1SS Indication -
Rev. 10' AP.28-17
ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP DATA
- 3. Standby Eauioment Resoonse/ Status: (Continued)
During During Pre-Tr.ip At Post-Trip Transient Trip Transient How, Why, and Remarks RH Stops Not C1/Cl Not C1/C1 Not Cl/Cl On H1SS Indication RH Intercepts Not C1/C1 Not Cl/Cl Not Cl/Cl On HISS Indication
- 4. Other Eauiement Resconse:
Taken to Manual Performance ,
Anytime Acceptable Remirks Rx - SG Haster Yes/No Yes/No -
l I
10~- ATc controller YES/NO Yes/No t' i
l Rx Master Yes/No Yes/No l
Diamond CRD Yes/No Yes/No Loop "A" FH Demand Yes/No Yes/No Rev. 10 AP . 2 8-18.. . _ .
l l
t
ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP OATA
- 4. Other Eauioment Resoonse: (Continued)
Taken to Manual Performance Anytime Acceptable -
Remarks Loop "B" FH Demand Yes/No Yes/No "A" Feed Pump Yes/No Yes/No "B" Feed Pump Yes/No Yes/No "A" Main feed Valve Yes/No Yes/No "B" Main Feed Valve Yes/No Yes/No A
"A" Startup Valve Yes/No Yes/No l
1 l
! "B" Startup Valve Yes/No Yes/No I "A" Turbine l Bypasses Yes/No Yes/No l Rev. 10 ' - - ~
l AP.28-19 l
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ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP OATA
- 4. Other Eauiement Resconse: (Continued)
Taken to Manual Performance Anytime Acceptable Remarks "B" Turbine Bypasses Yes/No Yes/No 10-Main Turbine Yes/No Yes/No EFIC Yes/No Yes/No Main FH Block Valves N/A Yes/No __
Condenser i Vacuum N/A Yes/No
- 5. Transient Reactor Coolant System Boundina Values:
EQlE:
If pre-trip value, signify with an asterisk (*).
RCS Parameter Maximum Minimum RCS Temp (Max The, Hin Tc)
Pressurizer Level (INCHES)
Observed Subcooling Margin (*F) 10**
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Rev. 10 AP.28-20
__ s
- ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP DATA
- 6. SFA Initiation Information If RCS pressure decrease below 1650 psig or RB pressure maximum is above 2 psig, complete this section.
SFAS HPI Trip Lamp LPI Trip Lamp Analog Channels Channel A bright / dim bricht/ dim Channel B briaht/ dim bricht/ dim Channel C bricht/ dim bricht/ dim SFAS Analog B Analog C Channel Trip Lamps Digital Analog A Trio Lamo Trio Lamo Trio Lamo Channels bright / dim bricht/ dim bright / dim bricht/ dim 18-H PI bricht/ dim bricht/ dim bricht/ dim 28-LPI bricht/ dim bricht/ dim bricht/ dim bricht/ dim 1A-HPI bricht/ dim bricht/ dim bricht/ dim bricht/ dim 2A-LPI bricht/ dim If SFAS has occurred and then returned to normal, take a set of tank level readings per Casualty Procedure C.41, "Recovery From SFAS Actuation" Step 2.14. This will ensure no unintended flow paths have resulted during the recovery.
SS/ Asst Review Signature
- 7. Control Rod Breaker Assessment:
If the Bailey Computer Sequence of Events" or the alarm typer printouts is irretrievable, explain why:
Not Applicable /As Follows (circle)
RPS Channel Trip Time (From Bailey Computer Group 4)
Parameter Time Initial Trip Channel: Channel Parameter Time Second Trip Channel: Channel Time From Alarm Typer: CR0 Trip Confirm (2004):
Rev.10 AP.28-21
s ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP DATA
- 7. Control Rod Breaker Assessment: (Continued)
HQII:
Acceptance criterion is: not more than 2 seconds difference. The Bailey Computer's design can allow an indicated two second difference for simultaneous events.
Control Rod Breaker Opening Time: , Subtract Time second Second Trip Channel (Sequence of Events preferred) From Trip Confirm (Alarm Printer)
CRD Breaker (local)
A-AC Breaker Indicates Trip Yes/No B-AC Breaker Indicates Trip Yes/No C-DC Breakers (CBI and CB2) Both Indicate Trip Yes/No D-DC Breakers (CB3 and CB4) Both Indicate Trip Yes/No Logic Cabinet Ammeters All Read Zero (Contractors E.F) Yes/No
- 8. Transient Secondarv Plant Boundina Values:
Lowest OTSG Startup Range Levels (Observed - not from charts or computer)
Lowest OTSG Pressur'es (Observed - not from charts or computer)
Horst Condenser Vacuums Observed HP: LP:
REMARKS:
Rev. 10 AP.28-22 ~ ~ ~
._. . _ . .. . - _ ~ _ .. - _ _ __ _.
e ENCLOSURE 8.1 (Continued)
TRIP DATA
- 8. List Eauinment Damaaed Durina the Transient:
- 9. REMARKS: Hork Request No. complet'ed to replace temperature recording stickers on Secondary Safety Valves and Atmospheric Dump Valves.
4
- 10. Reauired Comnuter Printouts: Attached to-~ 1. Bailey: Alarm Printout -- Alarm Printer (Automatic)
Alarm Summary -- Function 13 Group 1 Hemory Trip Review -- Function 13, Group 3 Sequence of Events -- Function 13, Group 4 Contact Status Summary -- Function 13, Group 5 Bad Input Summary -- Function 13, Group 7 Deleted Point Summary -- Function 13, Group 8 Deleted Monitor Summary -- Function 13, Group 9 Long Term Data Collection -- OP A.75, Attachment 4.3 to-~ 2. IDADS: Alarm Printout -- Alarm Printer (Automatic)
- 11. Strip Charts Retrieved (Circle)
RQIE:
Retrieving all before startup is not required.
Trip Report. writer to retrieve the balance.
XR-00403 Pcreent FP PR-21092 RCS Press HR l XR-00205 Log N LR-21503 Przr Lvl TR-21023 T PR-20543 Hdr Press
! Stm Flow FR-21027 RbFlow FR-30119 i TR-21031 The FR-20535 FH Flow A TR-21025 Tave FR-20536 FH Flow B PR-21037 RCS Press A LR-20503 SG A Lvl l PR-21038 RCS Press B LR-20504 SG B Lvl l XR-30504 Turbine
- 13. Cooldown Rate curves initiated (attach photocopy if so) YES / NO Completed By date Rev. 10 - --
AP.28-23
ENCLOSURE 8.2 SECONDARY SAFETY AND DUMP VALVES TEMPERATURE STICKERS DATA SHEET
("X out" Heat-blackened dots)
(Responsibility: Operations Department)
PV-20571 PV-20562 A /0000/_ /0000/ A /0000/ /0000/
B /0000/ /0000/ B /0000/ /0000/
C /0000/ /0000/ C /0000/ /0000/
SECONDARY SAFETIES ATHOSPHERIC OUMP VALVES C B A C B A _ _
_,_ 180-250F 310-340F Setpoint PV-20571 PV-20562 PSV-20545 C(_ /0000/ /0000/ 1050 psi PSV-20547 og_ /0000/ /0000/ 1050 pst PSV-20549 C4_ /0000/ /0000/ 1070 psi PSV-20551 C4_ /0000/ /0000/ 1070 psi PSV-20553 D4_ /0000/ /0000/ 1090 psi PSV-20555 /0000/ LQQQQL 1090 psi PSV-20557 /0000/ /0000/ 1090 psi PSV-20559 /0000/ /0000/ 1102 psi PSV-20533 LQQQQL /0000/ 1102 psi
..............** .... E7 PLAN VIEH OF FUEL BUILDING -.
3 N
Setpoint PSV-20534 D$ /0000/ /0000/ 1102 psi PSV-20558 Da /0000/ /0000/ 1102 psi PSV-20556 Ch /0000/ /0000/ 1090 psi l
PSV-20554 Dh /0000/ /0000/ 1090 psi PSV-20552 Dh LQ9QQL /0000/ 1090 psi 1070 psi
! PSV-20550 Ch /0000/ /0000/
PSV-20548 DB /0000/ /0000/ 1070 psi PSV-20546 DB /0000/ /0000/ 1050 psi 1050 psi PSV-20544 Dh /0000/ /0000/
(
Rev. 10 AP.28-24
r ENCLOSURE 8.3 PLANT PERSONNEL STATEMENTS (Responsibility: Trip Hitness) to- The purpose of this statement is to record pertinent information as seen by you during a transient condition. Read and initial those statements of the individuals that were near your location. If there are conflicts, provide more detail of what you saw on plain paper attached to your own statement.
Name/ Title Location
- 1. What were initial plant conditions? (Include ICS mode and pertinent testing, operations, or maintenance in progress or recently completed.)
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- 2. What was the first indication or alarm which keyed you to a problem?
What actions did you take as a result of these indications?
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-3. Were any alarms or indications out of service or did any fail during the course of the transient? Did any indications or alarms mislead J?
Could the control room alarms or controls have been relocated in such a manner to have aided your actions on this transient?
Rev. 10 -
AP . 28
~
ENCLOSURE 8.3 (Continued)
PLANT PERSONNEL STATEMENTS
- 4. Did existing Plant Procedu.res provide adequate action for this transient? Has it necessary to take action beyond their scope?
- 5. What additional information or guidance did you feel would have assisted you during the transient? What are your recommendation to prevent recurrence?
- 6. Summarize the transient including both indications and manual actions.
Discuss any equipment problems observed.
Rev. 10 AP.28-26
a .
ENCLOSURE 8,4 ANALYSIS AND EVALUATIONS (Responsibility: Operations) e PROBABLE CAUSE OF TRIP Comments:
UNEXPECTEb ASPECT OF TRANSIENT BEHAVIOR (if event compared with previous similar transient, note the transient with which compared)
Comoared With Previous trip on /
Date Time FSAR Transient page number IDENTIFICATION OF SYSTEMS HITH INADEQUATE PERFORMANCE System /Comoonent Descriotion of Problem Initials Reviewer Approval Rev. 10 AP.28-27
1
. ~ . \
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ENCLOSURE 8.4 (Continued)
ANALYSIS AND EVALUATIONS
/
Performed By Name Date Time Signature
/
Reviewed By -Name Date Time Signature i
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Rev. 10 AP.28-28
~ ,
i ENCLOSURE 8.5 TRIP CLASSIFICATION AND STARTUP APPROVAL (Responsibility: Operations)
TYPE I SCREENING CRITERIA (Circle) 10- (a) RCS Pressure Remained Above 1700 psig Yes No (b) RCS Pressure Remained Below 2400 psig Yes No (c) RCS Temp Response Ranged Between 540*F Yes No
- and 560*F (F.orced Circulation) or 540*F and 585'F (Natural Circulation)
(d) Reactor Coolant Was Contained Within Yes No The Primary RC5 and PRT 10- (e) Indicated Pressurizer level remained above Yes No 10" without using HPI beyond the "B" pump and the "A" valve, but below 275".*
(f) Indicated SG Level Remained Between Yes No 18" and 60" startup (forced circulation)
- or Between 18" and 60% (natural circulation)
(g) RPS Channels Did Not Fail to trip Properly Yes No (h) On RPS Trip All CRD Breakers Tripped Yes No and the Reactor tripped within two 10- seconds of demand (Enclosure 8.1) and
- all control rods inserted. Yes No (1) Adequate S.ubcooling Margin Existed Yes No (j) Post-trip, the Electrical Distribution System Functioned properly Yes No 10- (k) The Post-trip Steam Generator Pressure Response Ranges Between 925 and 1115 psig.
(1) Enclosure 8.4 documents the reasons Yes No
- that the event is not Type II event.
- If Pressurizer Code Safety (ies) lifted, concurrent with Pressurizer level at or above 275", take plant to depressurized cold shutdown (Commitment 2.2.2).
Comments:
Initials Shif t Supervisor OTA Rev. 10 -- --
AP.28-29'
O
- O
- ENCLOSURE 8.5 (Continued)
TRIP CLASSIFICATION AND STARTUP APPROVAL Classify trip as Type I or II according to definition in procedure.
The event on at : is a type Date Time I, II to- Use this space for / __
signature (s) of other Shift Supervisor Date Time Shift Management on duty.
/
Assistant Shift Supervisor Date Time
/
Assistant Shift Supervisor Date Time
/
- OTA Date Time Notification to-- Director, Operations and Maintenance, or designee, notified of Type classification /
Date Time Remarks:
PERMISSION TO START UP to-- Director, Operations and Maintenance, notified and permission granted to start up the reactor.
/
Shift Supervisor Date Time l
/
Duty OTA Date Time l
10-
/
f Time Signed
- DOM or Designee (Can Follow S/U) Date Rev. 10 AP.28 -
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ENCLOSURE 8.6 TRIP REPORT AMENDHENTS AND APPROVAL (Responsiblity: PRC and 00H) ,.
Prepared By to-- Date PRC Amendments and Remarks:
PRC review of event on , meeting number Minutes of the meeting (s) are attached e.
PRC Chairman Date to-- Director, perations and Haintenance, Remarks:
r Director, Operations and Maintenance Date to--
Rev. 10 AP.28-31
ENCLOSURE 8.7 TYPICAL TAP REPORT FORMAT ROIE: This is not a requirement, but h format seen in many TAP Reports. A TAP Team typically writes draft Reports to this
. format.
I. Executive Summary This section should include a short description of the event.
A. Plant Data - An identifier of the plant, transient and date of occurrence.
B. Description - Short review of transient.
C. Root Cause - A short description of the root cause of the event.
D. Pteformance Anomalies - a listing of the various post transient ev67ts that were departures from the expected.
II. Transient Assessment A. Sequence of Events - This section should contain those major events or conditions, which delineate the progressive course of the transient. This is usually a composite of the IDADS and Bailey Computer alarm typers, strip charts, IDADS history, Bailey Compute'-
Trip functions, and control room operator and management logs.
B. Plant Response
- 1. Pre-Trip Review - This section should contain a statement of the plant conditions prior to the transient. Such information as power level, ICS status, maintenance or testing in progress and equipment deficiencies may be supplied here.
Additionally, this section should provide the framework for evaluating the initiating event and root cause of the transient.
- 2. Initiating Event - This section should be included in the report when a transient is initiated by a complex series of events such that detailed analysis is required to delir.eate l
the occurrences.
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Rev. 10 AP.28-32 1
1 - .. . - - , . . .
an a I l
, c.
ENCLOSURE 8.7 (Continued) )
TYPICAL TAP REPORT FORMAT l
- 3. Plant Post-Trip Response - This section should include a I discussion of the response of the NSS and BOP from a process point of view, i.e. Tave, RC Pressure, Pressurizer Level, Feedwater Flow, OTSG level, and Main Steam Pressure. These parameters should be plotted versus time and annotated to indicate major events, departures, etc. to support the text of this section. Also, this section should include a discussion of performance of components and their departures from the expected.
- 4. Operator Actions / Procedural Adequacy - This section should include information concerning specific operator actions taken during the transient which have not been included in any previous sections. Additionally, procedures followed during the transient, and any information which would be beneficial to other operators should be included. This section could be used for input into procedure revisions.
C. Safety Considerations - This section should include the bases for which safety, as it relates to the transient has been considered.
Those basis might include plant design requirements, FSAR accident analysis, or other information.
O. Assessment Conclusions & Corrective Actions - This section should be a summary of the significant aspects of tho transient, including departures from expected component and plant performance. Proposed corrective actions and corrective actions previously completed may be included in the text of this section.
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END Rev. 10 AP. 28-33 ' ' ' ' -' '
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