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Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Sys Trip Setting Limits,Rcs High Point Vents,Leakage & Leak Detection,Reactor Coolant Inventory & Auxiliary Electric Sys
	ML20155B848
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	09/30/1988
From:	; SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
To:	;
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ML20155B814	List: ML20155B811; ML20155B848;
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	NUDOCS 8810070102
	Download: ML20155B848 (40)
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ATTACHMENT II i

RANCHO SECO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS .

PAGES AFFECTED BY PROPOSED AMENDMENT NO. 166, REVISION 1 f

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0010070102 PDR 000'730ADOCK 05000:11D l'NU P

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL $PECI"ICATIONS .

Safety Limits ud Liniting .

Table 2.3 1 Safety System Settings REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TRIP SETTING LIMITS --

One Reactor Coolant Pump Four Reactor Coolant pumps Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating in Each Loop Operating (Nominal Operating (Nominal (Nominal Operating Shutdown 0 + rating Power - 1001) Operating Power - 751) Power - 491) Bypass

1. Nuclear Power. 1 of rated, man. 104.9 104.9 104.9 5.0(3)

2. Nuclear power based on flow (2) 1.06 times flow minus 1.06 times flow minus 1.06 times flow minus Bypassed and Imbalance. % of rated, mas. reduction due to reduction due to reduction due to Imbalance (s) Imbalance (s) Imbalance (s)

3. belear power based on pump (5) NA NA 55 Sypassed monitors. 1 of rated, man.

4. High reactor coolaet system 2355 2355 2355 1820(4) pressure, psig man.

5. Low reactor coolant system j Pressure, psig ein. 1900 1900 1900 Bypassed I

6. Variable low reactor coolant 12.% Tout-5834 W 12.% Tout-5834(I) 12.% Tout-5834(I) Bypassed system pressure, psig ein.

7. Reactor coolant tesp. F., man. 618 618 618 618 j

8. High Reactor Building 4 4 4 4 pressure, psig mas.

9. Anticipatory reactor trip (6) Autostgilpressure Autosty7gilpressure Autost 7ylipressure (Turbine Trip) 50 psig 50 psig 50 psig pressure, min.

10. Anticipatory reactor trip (9 MFPgovpp>roilpressure MFP gov, or all pressure MFP govgor oil pressure (Less of both Main Feed Pwps) 50 psigt 50 psigt 50 psig pressure, min.

(1) T out is in cegrees Fahrwheit (F).

(2) Reactor coolant system flow.1 g (3) Administratively controlled reduction set only during reactor shutdone.

(4) Automatically set when other segments of the RPS (as specified) are bypassed.

(5) The pump monitors also produce a trip on: (a) loss of two reactor coolant pumps in one reactor coolant loop, and (b) loss of one or two reactor coolant pumps during two-pump operation.

(6) This trip is disabled below 451 power. (power channel)

(7) Indicative of a Turbine Trip.

(8) Indicative of loss of both Main Feed pumps.

(9) This trip is disabled below 201 power. (power channel) l Preposed Amendment No. M . 33. 166. Revision 1 2-9

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation

3. Decay Heat Removal Loop (A)

4. Decay Heat Removal Loop (B)

B. With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant ' cops to OPERABLE status as soon as possibic; be in COLD SHUTOOWN within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months .

3.1.1.6 Reactor Coolant System High Point Vents A. The vent path on Loop A and vent path on Loop B shall be operable and closed during power operation. Except for surveillance testing, power to the valves is removed and is under administrative control.

B. The vent path on the pressurizer shall be operable and closed during power operation. Except for surveillance testing, power to the valves is removed and is under administrative control.

C. With one of the above reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuator of all the valves in the inoperable vent path; restore the inoperable vent path to OPERABLE status within 30 days. If the status is not restored to operable in 30 days, be in HOT STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

D. Hith two or more of the above reactor coolant system vent paths inoperable; maintain the inoperable vent paths closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least two of the l' vent paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . If the status is not restored to operable in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , be in 1:0T STANDBY within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . I l

Proposed Amendment No. A. 31. 71, 80, 93, 97, 166. Revision 1 3-2

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.1.6 LEAKAGE and LEAK DETECTION Apolicability Operational modes from HEATUP-COOLDOWN through P0HER OPERATION, inclusive. l Objective To limit and detect RCS leakage.

Saecification 3.1.6.1 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BCONDARY LEAKAGE, i b. GPH UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, l

c. 1 GPH total primary-to-secondary leakage through the steam

, generators and 500 gallons per day through the tubes of any one generator,

) d. 10 GPH IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System, and 1

e. 16 GPH CONTROLLED LEAKAGE at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2155 e 10 psig.

f. 1 GPH leakage from any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.3-1, which shall be included in IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE. ;

Action A. Hith any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN l within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

B. Hith any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the l i

above limits, excluding DRESSURE BOUNDAR' LEAKAGE and leakage from I Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolatiri Valves, redu e the leakage l rate to within limits within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months c' be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SrUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

! C. The LCO and Action for leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure l l Isolation Valves is provided in Specification 3.3.2. :

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l l Proposed l Amendment No. 87, 97, 166, Revision 1 3-12

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.1.6.2 The following Reactor Coolant System leak detection methods shall be OPERABLE:

a. Sump Levels

b. Radioactivity

c. Reactor Coolant Inventory Action Hith only two of the above required leak detection methods OPERABLE, reactor operation may continue for up to 30 days. After 30 days be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . If the inoperable leak detection method is the method sensitive to radioactivity, grab samples of the Containment atmosphere shall be obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for up to 30 days. After 30 days be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

I',' less than two leak detection methods are OPERABLE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Proposed l Amendment No. 166, Revision 1 3-12a

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RANCHO SECO UNIT I YECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation j l

C. Reactor Coolant Inventory - Total Reactor Coolant System leakage rate is periodically determined by comparing indications of reactor power, coolant temperature, pressurizer water level and makeup tank level ;

over a time interval. All of these indications are recorded. Since :

the pressurizer level is maintained essentially constant by the j l

pressurizer level controller, any coolant leakage is replaced by i l coolant from the makeup tank resulting in a tank level decrease. The .

makeup tank capacity is 31 gallons per inch of height and each !

graduation on the level recorder represents 1 inch of tank height.

This inventory monitoring method is capable of detecting changes on the order of 31 gallons. A 1 gpm leak would therefore be detectable !

within approximately one-half hour. L As described above, in addition to direct observation, the means of detecting reactor coolant leakage are based on two different principles, i.e., activity and sump level and reactor coolant ;

inventory measurements. Two systems of different principles provide, l therefore, diversified ways of detecting leakage to the Reactor ;

Building.

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary ll coolant will be normally maintained within those chemistr/ limits found to !

result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary !

coolant chemistry is consistently not matchined within these chemistry limits, i l over some period of time localized corrosion ceuld occur and might result in I stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the i primary coolant system and the secondary coolant system (primary-to-secondary i

, leakage = 1 GPH). Cracks having a primary-to-secondary Icakage less than this !

limit during op6sation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating l plants have demonstrated that primary-to-secondary ledkage of 1 GPH can be '

detected by monitoring the secondary coolant. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown during which the leaking tubes will be located and

! plugged.

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Proposed Amendment No. 13, 86, 166, Revision 1 3-14a

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation l B. Each Reactor Coolant System core flood tank shall be OPERABLE l with:

1. A contaired borated water volume between 1010 and 1070 cubic feet (or a level between 12.56 and 13.44 feet) of l borated water between 575 and 625 psig.

2. A boron concentration at not less than 1,800 ppm boron.

3. The electrically operated discharge valve from the core l j flood tank shall be open and power removed from its motor !

l operator when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is t greater than 800 psig. ,

4. An OPERABLE pressure instrument channel.

5. The electrically operated vent valves (HV-26511 and :

HV-26512) from the core flood tank shall be closed and i power removed from the motor operators except during l normal venting operations. }

Action ,

a. With one core flood tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank i to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or be in at least HOT r SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN l within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,

b. With any core flood tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT SHUTDOHN within I hour and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

i C. Reactor Building spray s;tstem and Reactor Building emergency

cooling systen.

t The following combination of system components must be operable:

1. Two Reactor Building spray pumps and their associated spray headers with a minimum of 32 percent N60H solution in the spray additive tanks and,

2. A minimum level of 78 inches of solution shall be available ir each spray additive tank.

3. Four emergency cooling units, two with charcoal filter units. There are two cooling units in each of two emergency cooling trains (Train A and B).

Proposed Amendment No. 97, 166, Revision 1 3-19a

i RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Hith one containment spray system inoperable and four emergency cooling units operable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTD0HN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Hith one train of the above required containment cooling units inoperable and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of cooling units to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Hith two trains of the above required containment cooling units inoperable, and both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore at least one train of cooling units '.o OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT SHUTOCHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the fo1 lowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Restore both above required trains of coo'ing units to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or 'e ia at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months W ic G LO SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With one train of the above required centainment cooling units inoperable and one containment spray system inoperable, restore the inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . Restore the inoperable train of containment cooling units to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT SHUTDOHN within the naxt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

D. The borated water storage tank shall be OPERABLE with:

, 1. A minimum contained borated water volume of 390,000 gallons,

2. A minimum concentration of 1,800 ppm of boron, and

3. A minimum water temperature of 40'F.

AC110D Hith the borated water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in at least HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Proposed Amendment No. 4, H 166, Revision 1 3-20

. 1 RANCHO SECO UNIT 1

'ECCICAL SPECIFICATIONS .

Ttble 3.5.1-1 (Continued) Limiting Conditions far Operction ,

INSTkJMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (C)

(A) (B) Operator Action if Functional Unit Total Nmber of Minimum Channels Conditions of Columns A Channels Operable and B Cannot be Met

9. Reactor Building Purge Isolation 2 1 Operation may cantinue provided the purge on high radiation inlet and outlet valves of the inoperable channel (s) are closed and their respective breakers de-er.ergized or comply with 3.5.1.2. At cold shutdown or refueling, each of the purge inlet and outlet valves will be closed.

10. Borated Water Storage Tank 2 1 See Section 3.5.1.2 Level

[mergeon eedwater r Initiation

nd Control (EFIC) Systen

1. AN Initiation

a. Manual 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4.

b. Low Level, SGA or B (Note 2) 4/SG (Note 1) 3/SG See Actions 1, 2 rad 3. May be bypassed below 750 psig OTSG pressure.

c. Low Pressure, SGA or B 4/SG (Note 1) 3/SG See Actions 1, 2 and 3. m y be bypassed bel > 750 psig OTSG pressure.

d. Loss of MN Anticipa- 4 (Note 1) 3 See Actions 1, 2 and 3.

tory Reactor Trip toss of MN Anticipatory Reactor Trip is effectively bypassed in RPS bele M percent power.

e. Loss of 4 RC Pumps 4 (Note 1) 3 See Actions 1, 2 and 3. May be bypassed below 750 psig OTSG pressure.

f. Automatic Trip Logic 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4

2. SG-A Main Feedwater Isolation

a. Manual 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4.

b. Low SGA Pressure (Note 3) 4 (Note 1) 3 See Actions 1, 2 and 3. May be bypassed below 750 psig OTSG pressure.

c. Automatic Trip Logic 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4.

Note 1 For channel testing, calibration, or maintenznce the Total Number of Channels and/or the Minimum Channels Operable may be reduced by one for a maximum of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months providing the remaining channels are OPERABLE. l Note 2 Low level AN Initiation has a maximum of a 19.0 second delay.

Note 3 Low pressure A N Initiatioc has a maximum of a 3.0 second delay.

Proposed Amendment No. JI, 47, f3, PJ, 97,166, Revision 1 1-W

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RANCHO SECO UNIV 1 .

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI C S .

imiting Conditions for Operation Table 3.5.1-1 (Continued)

INSTRUMENTS OPERATING CONDITIONS (C)

(A) (B) Operator Action if Functional Unit Total Number of Minimum Channels Coe.ditions of Columns A Channels Operabl:, and 8 Cannot be rhet

3. SG-8 Main Feedwater Isolation

a. Manual 2 (Note 1) 2 (Nota 1) See Actions 3 and 4

b. Low SGB Pressure (Note 3) 4 (Note 1) 3 See Actions 1. 2 and 3. May be bypassed below 750 psig OTSG pressure.

c. Automatic Trip Logic 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4.

4. A N Vsive Commands (7 ecto.")

a. Vector Enable 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 3 and 4.

b. Vector Module (Note 4) 4 (Note 1) 3 See Actions 1 and 5.

c. Control Enable 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 1 and 3.

d. Control Module 2 (Note 1) 2 (Note 1) See Actions 1 and 3.

Note 1 f or channel testing, calibration, er maintenance the Total Number of Channels and/or the Minimum Channels Operable may be reduced by one for a sunimum of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months providing the remaining chmnels are OPERABLE. l Note 3 Low pressure AN Initiation has a maximum of a 3.0 second delay.

Note 4 SG Pressure Difference AN Valve Command (Vector) has a maximum of a 10.0 second delay.

Proposed Amendment No. FJ. 166. Rev'sion 1 3-30b

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RANCHO SECO UNIT I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation l

3.7 AUXU1AR ' ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS Soeci ficallDD 3.7.1 Deleted l Soecification 3.7.2.A. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission r.stwork and the onsite Class 1 distribution system.

Apolicability ,

i HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS l Action l s

! Should all but one offsite circuit be removed from service

a. Within I hour the operability of the remaining offsite circuit shall be demonstrated by obtaining acceptable results from performing surveillance requirements 4.6.1.A and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter.

b. If any diesel generator has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , demonstrate its operability by performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A 4 for each such diesel

generator, separately, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *.

1 If at least two offsite circuits aie not in service within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable l ,

1 diesel generator is restored to OPERABLE status, i

{ i j Proposed l Amendment No. 46, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 l 3-41 ,

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation Snecification 3.7.2.8 Both diesel generator trains (a diesel generator train is made up l of two diesel generators GEA and GEA2 for one train, and GEB and GEB2 for the other train. One or two inoperable diesel generators in a train result in that train being inoperable) shall be OPERABLE, each with:

a. Separate day tanks containing a minimum volume of 65 percent of tank capacity (265 gallons) of fuel for each A and B and 50 percent of tank capacity (315 gallons) of fuel for A2 and 82.

b. A separate fuel storage system containing a minimum usable volume of 37, 000 gallons of fuel for each A and B and 42, 000 gallons of fuel for each A2 and 82.

c. A separate fuel transfer pump for each engine cf a train.

6policability HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS Action Should any single diesel generator (GEA, GEB, GEA2, or GEB2) become inoperable then complete all of the following actions:

a. Within I hour the operability of at least two offsite circuits shall be demonstrated by obtaining acceptable results from performing surveillance requirement 4.6.1.A; and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter; or go to 3.7.2.C.

b. If any single diesel generator became inoperable due to any l cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, then if any diesel generator has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4 for each such diesel generator, separately, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *: or go to 3.7.2.E.1 or 3.7.2.E.2.

c. If the inoperable diesel generator is not restored to OPtRABLE STATUS within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months from when the inoperable condition was i established, the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the :

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the to11owing 30 i hours. ;

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the ino,1erable l diesel generator is restored to OPERABLE status.

Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42

i RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation Soecification 3.7.2.C. At least two offsite circuits and both diesel generator trains l shall be OPERABLE.

Apo11cability HEATUP-COOLDOHN through P0HER OPERATIONS l Action Should all but one offsite circuit and one diesel generator train both become inoperable l

a. within I hour the operability of the remaining offsite circuit shall be demonstrated by obtaining acceptable results from performing surveillance requirement 4.6.1.A; and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter,

b. within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months each diesel generator shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE by obtaining acceptable results by sequentially performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4*. This surveillance requirement shall not be performed on diesel generators already running.

If either the offsite circuit or the diesel generator train is not restored to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD S$1UTD0HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With the diesel generator t. Tin restored to OPERABLE status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , follow 3.7.2.A. with the remaining 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO which commenced at the time the offsite circuit was not in service. With the offsite circuit restored to service within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months , follow 3.7.2.8 or 3.7.2.E.1, with the remaining 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO which commenced at the time the initial diesel generator or diesel generator train was not in service.

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable l diesel generator is restored to OPERABLE status.

Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50. 68. 87. 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42a

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RANCHO SECO UNIT I TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operatfor, SnerJtfication 3.7.2.0. At least two offsite circuits shall be in-service. l Applichlit.ty HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATIONS l Action Should both offsite circuits become inoperable l

a. within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months each diesel generator shall be demonstrated to be OPERABLE by obtaining acceptable results by sequentially performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4*, This .

surveillance requirement shall not be performed on diesel '

generators already running.

If at least one offsite circuit is not returned to service in 24 !

hours, the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

With one offsite circuit restored to service within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , i follow 3.7.2.A, whose 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO commenced at the time the initial l inoperable condition was established. l l l

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This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable l l diesel generator is restored to OPERABLE status. ,

i Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42b l

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. .. s RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS i

limiting Conditions for Operation l Specificatipa I 3.7.2.E.1 Diesel generator combinttions GEA and GEAf.; and GEB and GEB2 shall l be OPERABLE.

App]icability HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS Action Should the following diesel generator combinations (GEA and GEA2; or GEB and GEB2) become inoperable then complete all of the l

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following actions:

a. Within I hour the operability of at least two offsite circuits shall be demonstrated by obtaining acceptable results after performing surveillance requirement 4.6.1.A; or go to 3.7.2.C.

b. If any diesel generators become inoperable due to any cause l ,

other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, then l if any diesel generator has not been successfully tested withire the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4 for each such diesel generator, separately, within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months *; or go to 3.7.2.E.2. ,

c. If GEA and GEA2; or GEB and GEB2 combinations are inoperable l 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after the first inoperability, the reactar shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN !

within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . l

d. If one inoperable diesel generator in the GEA and GEA2; or GEB 1 and GEB2 combination is returned to OPERABLE status within :

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , follow the 3.7.2.B.c LC0 which commenced at the time l the initial inoperable condition was established. I i

This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable l diesel generator is restored to OPERABLE status.

Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42c !

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l l l RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l Limiting Conditions for Operation l

Soecification !

l 3.7.2.E.2 Diesel generator pairs GEA and GEB; GEA and GEB2; GEB and GEA2; l and GEA2 and GEB2 shall be OPERABLE. ,

Aeolicability HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS l l l

Action l

l Should diesel generator pairs GEA and GE8; GEA and GEB2; GEB and :

GEA2; or GEA2 and GEB2 become inoperable then complete all of the l

following actions: !

a. Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months the operability of at least two offsite circuits I shall be demonstrated by obtaining acceptable results after '

performing surveillance requirement 4.6.1.A; or be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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b. If GEA and GEB; GEA and GEB2; GEB and GEA2; or GEA2 and GEB2 diesel generators are inoperable 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after the second l inoperability, the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the !

next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following -

30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . -

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c. If one inoperable diesel generator in the GEA and GEB; GEA and I GEB2; GES and GEA2; or GEA2 and GEB2 inoperable pair is !

returned to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months go to 3.7.2.B and I follow the LCO which commenced at the time the initial !

inoperable condition was established. l j t

l Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50, 68, 87, 94, 166 Revision 1 3-42d

. _ _ - . - - . - . . _ = . --

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation Soecification 3.7.2.F. Nuclear service 4160V buses 4A, 4A2, 4B, and 482 and nuclear service 480V buses 3A, 3A2, 38, 382, 2A1, 281, 2A3, 283, 2A4, and 284 shall be OPERABLE.

Apolicability HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATIONS l Action One nuclear service bus or one train of nuclear service buses may be removed from service for not more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months provided that all equipment on the other train of nuclear service buses is OPERABLE.

Should one nuclear service bus or one train of nuclear service buses become inoperable for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , I

a. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next f hours and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Soeci f_i eation 3.7.2.G. Nuclear service batteries BA, BB, BC, BD, BA2, BB2, BC2, and B02 l shall be charged and in-service.

Apolicability HEATUP-Cr4LDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS l Action Should one nuclear service battery become inoperable for greater l than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ,

4. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 56, 68, 87. 94, 165 Revision 1 3-42e

i RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICAT;0NS Limiting Conditions for Operation Soecification 3.7.2.H. Each normal nuclear service battery charger shall be operable and aligned to its vital 125 volt DC bus (vital buses SOA, SOB, SOC, 500. SOA2, S002, SOC 2, and S002). ;

Acolicability HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATIONS l, Action Should one nuclear service battery have no battery charger for '

greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , ,

a. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUT 00HN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . ;

If a standby charger is aligned in place of the normal charger for l ,

greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months

b. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and i in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . ,

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Soecification 3.7.2.I. Nuclear service inverters SIA2, S182, SIC 2, and SID2, and static !

switches H8TA3, H8TB3, H8TC3, and H8TD3 shall be OPERABLE. !

Apolicability f

HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATIONS l Action :

Should one inverter or static switch become inoperable for greater l than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , i

a. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUTDOHN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOHN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

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l Proposed Amendment No. 31, 46, 50, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42f

i i RANCHO SECO UNIT 1

! TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation i

Speci ficatjan 3.7.2.J. The switchyard voltage is at least 219 KV. l{

l Apolicability 9 l HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS l l

Actiori i Should the switchyard voltage drop below 219 KV, ;

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a. positive actions, within the District's procedures, will be i implemented in an attempt to return the voltage to at least !

. 219 KV. i l

b. both diesel generator trains shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months by obtaining acceptable results from performing

surveillance requirement 4.6.3.A.4.

Should the switchyard voltage not be restored above 219 KV within j the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . -

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j c. the reactor shall be in HOT SHUT 00HN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and t in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . !

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l Proposed Amendment No. 94, 166, Revision 1 3-42g

- - - _ - _ = . _ - .- . - . _ _ -- ..- _ - _

! RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 ;

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation Specification ll 3.'.3 The voltage protection system trip settings shall be as stated in l Table 3.7-1. i Aeolicability i HEATUP-COOLDOHN through POWER OPERATIONS i !

i ACtlon !

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j Hith a trip setting not as specified in Table 3.7-1, follow the

Specification 3.7.4 requirements and Actions. l

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! i Specif_tcation i I 3.7.4. The Voltage Protection System shall meet the minimum requirements and !

action statements present6d in Table 3.7-2. l

i 1 Apolicability l

) HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATIONS 1 Action i Hith the number of voltage protection channels less than the number d

allowed by Table 3.7-2. the plant shall be brought to HOT SHUTDs '

within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , i

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l Proposed

] Amendment No. 31, 44, 68, 94, 166 Revision 1

3-43 i

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1 RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 l TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1 i i j

4 TABLE 3.7-1 I

VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM RELAY TRIP VALUES l

i EQUIVALENT TIME DELAY j UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYS 4160 BUS VOLTS (SECONOS) i (VOLTS) Note 1 l l

' I i A. Definite !

l Time Delay l

Trip Setpoint 3771 a 38 5.0 a 0.5 i

] (Drop Out) !

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B. Inverse 3771 a 38 N/A I l Time Delay l i Trip Setpoint !

(Drop Out) !

i 70 Percent of Setpoint 2640 a 27 3.0 a 0.5 j j

i Note 1 - For bus tripping, an additional 0.5 second time delay must be added. l i t l

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l Proposed Amendment No. 46, 50, 87, 94, 166 Revision 1 l 3-43a !

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 :

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE 3.7-2 (Note 1)

VOLTAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITIONS :

2 Total No. of Minimum l j Functional Number of Relays / Channels Channels Action i i Unit Channels Channel To Trip Operable !

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i Undervoltage 3/8us 2 2/8us 2 A r

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ACTION STATEMENTS Action A - Hith the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the total i

. Number of Channels, operation may continue provided both of the l[

] following conditions are satisfied: f i a. The Inoperable Channel is placed in the tripped condition ,

) within one hour. !

'! b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one l additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for

surveillance testing. '

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j Note 1: The table is not applicable when the plant is iti cold shutdown. [

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Proposed Amendment Nc,. 46, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 3-43b

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.28 TDI Diesel Generatof_ Control Room Essential Ventilation System Specification

. 3.28.1 Both TOI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation trains i shall be OPERABLE.

Apolicability HEATUP through POWER OPERATIONS Action

a. With one TOI Olesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to l OPERABLE status within 3 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ,

b. Hith both TOI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation trains inoperable, restore at least one inoperable l train to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months or be in at least HOT SHUT 00HN within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUT 00HN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . With one inoperable train rettored to l OPERABLE status, continue with Action a. above using the time

the remaining inoperable condition was established as the start l of the LCO.

I flaiti The TDI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation System i is required to maintain the temperature in the control ra m below i 122'F to protect required electrical components. !

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Proposed 4

Amendment No. 9A, 166. Revision 1 3-93a l

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RANCHO SECO t! NIT 1 i

TECHNICAL $PECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards TABLE 4.1-1 (Contin 6ed)

INSTRUMENT SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

Cha9.nel 015Ei ption Cheth Test Calibrale Remarks

20. High pressure injection, M R NA Reactor Building isolation, l and Reactor Building emer-gency cooling Channel A manual trip.

21. High pressure injection NA R NA Reactor Building isola-tion, and Reactor Build-lag emergency cooling Channel 8 manual trip.

22. Low pressure injection NA R M Channel A manual trip

23. Low pressure injection NA R NA Channel 8 marval trip

24. Reactor Building spray NA R M pump Channel A manual trip

25. Reacter Building spray NA R NA pump Channel 8 manual trip

26. Reactor Bu81di.M spray NA R NA valve- M* wl A manual trip Proposed ~

Amendment No. 21, 166. Revis en 1 4-6

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards 4.2.3 L1Akage Surveillance 4.2.3.1 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be demonstrated to be within each of the limits of Specifications 3.1.6.1 and 3.1.6.2 by: l

a. Monitoring the containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitor by verifying the monitor is indicating below the alarm setpoint at least once per day when the reactor is in HEATUP-COOLDOWN through P0HER OPERATION, inclusive. l

b. Monitoring the containment sump (drain accumulator tank) inventory and discharge at least once per day when the reactor 1

is in HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATION, inclusive. l

c. Heasurement of the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE to the reactor coolant pump seals when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is 2155 i 10 psig at least once per 31 days when the reactor is in HEATUP-COOLDOWN through POWER OPERATION, inclusive. l

d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per week when the reactor is in HEATUP-COOLDOWN l through POWER OPERATION, inclusive. ,

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l Proposed 1

Amendment No. 76, 97, 166 Revision 1 4-13

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards 4.6 [HERGENCY P0Hf.R SYSTEM PERIGOIC TESTING SQttil1L51LQD 4.6.1 Each of the required independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1 distribution system shall be:

A. Determined OPERABLE at least weekly by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability, and B. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per REFUELING interval by transferring nuclear service 4160V buses 4A, 4A2, 48, and 462 l from the normal startup transformer supply circuit to the alternate startup transformer supply circuit.

Anglicability HEATUP-COOLDOWN *.hrough POWER OPERATIONS l 1

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Proposed Amendment No. 28, 46, f8, 81, 94, 166, Revision 1 4-34 i i

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l RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 !

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

Surveillance Standards !

4.6 EMERGENCY POWER SYSTEM PERIODIC TESilRG (Continued) i Sneci fications f 4.6.2 Nuclear service 4160V buses 4A, 4A2, 48, and 482 and nuclear service !

l 480V buses 34, 3A2, 38, 382, 2A1, 281, 2A3, 283, 2A4, and 284 shall i be determined to W OPERABLE at least weekly by verifying correct !

l braaker all'gnment arid indicated power availability. ;

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l Applittbi11ty l HEATUP-COOLDONN through PONER OPERATIONS l {

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l Proposed Amendment No. 38, 46, 68, 87, 94, 166, Revision 1 4-34a

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS l

Surveillance Standards

( 6. Verifying the diesel generator operates for at least 24 [

l hours (Note 1). During the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months of this test, '

the diesel generator shall be loaded between 2650 and 2850 kw for A and B and 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and B2 and for the remaining 22 hours2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded between 2550 and 2750 kw for !

i A and B and 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and B2. Within five minutes after completing this 24-hour test. (

l perform survalliance requirement 4.6.3C.4.b). (Note 2) l [

7. Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel i generator do not exceed the 2000-hour rating of 2750 kw l for A and B and 3300 kw for A2 and 82.

i D. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect interdependence, by starting all four diesel i generators simultaneously (Note 3) and verifying that they l

! accelerate to a nominal 900 rpm for A and B and a nominal t l 450 rpm for A2 and 82 within 10 seconds after the stcrt f signal. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 4160 j (1420) volts and 60 (11.2) Hz within 10.0 seconds after the start signal. [

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Note 1 All planned engine starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period. With the exception of once per 184 days, all planned engine starts may be preceded by warmup procedures recommended by the ;

manufacturer and may also include slow starting (greater than 10 i seconds) and giadual loading (greater than 90 seconds) so that t mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine is minimized. The l' testing performed once every 184 days shall include fast starting (less than or equal to 10 seconds) and fast loading. (less than or !

equal to 90 seconds). Whenever a fast start is performed, the [

diesel generator shall start within 10 seconds. :

Note 2 If Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3C.4.b is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test. Instead, the diesel generator may be operated between 2550 and 2750 kw for A and B, or between 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and B2 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or until operating temperature has stabilized.

Note 3 All planned engine starts for the purpose of this surveillance testing may be preceded by an engine prelube period. The testing shall include fast starting (less than or equal to 10 seconds).

Proposed Amendment No. 94, 166, Revision 1 4-34g

RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ,

Surveillance Standards <

4.6.4 Rgjfar Service Batterv Ogerability Applicability HEATUP-COOLDOWN through PCHER OPERATION SDLCif1 Cit 10A1

! Each 125 volt DC battery and battery charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1 j a. At least weekly by verifying that: ,

i 1. The electrolyte level of the pilot cell is above the plate ;

separators, i 2. The pilot cell specific gravity, corrected to 77'F and full j electrolyte level, is no greater than 0.010 below the average .

corrected value of all connected cells taken from the previous month, '

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3. The pilot cell voltage is greater than 2.07 volts, and

4. The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to

125 volts DC when on float charge. ;

b. At least monthly by verifying that: l

1. The electrolyte level of each cell is above the plate separators, 1 l l 2. The electrolyte temperatures in a representative sample of cells consisting of at least every sixth cell are within i 5'F.

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3. The average specific gravity of all connected cell , corrected to j 77'F and full electrolyte level, is greater than or equal to 1.200,

! 4. The minimum specific gravity, corrected to 77'F and full electrolyte !

) level, of each connected cell is no greater than 0.010 below the j average value of all the connected cells,

) 5. The voltage of each connected cell is greater than 2.07 volts, and i

, 6. The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 125 volts DC when on float charge.

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c. At least every refueling interval by verifying that:

The cells, cell plates and battery racks show no visual indication 1.

of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and spaces between cells and between each end cell and its battery rack are within the i

! required seismic design tolerances, i

Proposed i Amendment No. 46, 94, 97, 166. Revision 1

4-34h I ,

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f I RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 l jl TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ;

1 j

! Surve111ance Standards i i

. 2. The cell - to - cell and terminal connections are clean )

l and are coated with an anti-corrosion material. ;

3. The total resistance of all cell - to - cell and terminal l j connections is less than or equal to 20% above an established base-line or benchmark value, and l f 4. The battery ch'arger will supply at least the established !

I current output necessary to re-charge the battery ;

i following an emergency discharge in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or less, j

d. At least once per refueling interval, during COLD SHUTDONN, by J verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and i

maintain in OPERABLE status, all of the actual or simulated ;

emergency loads for the design duty cycle or load profile when i j the battery is subjected to a service test.

e. At least once per 60 months, during COLD SHUT 00HN, by verifying :

that the battery is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating l when subjected to a performance discharge test. This '

! performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the

battery service test required by Emergency Power System Periodic Testing Specification 4.6.4.d. provided that the

performance discharge test is performed in the "as-found" :

{ condition.

j f i I j f. Each vital 125 volt DC bus SOA, 508 SOC, 500 SOA2, SOB 2, :

j SOC 2, and 5002 and each vital 120 volt AC bus SIA2, $182, i

SIC 2, and S102 eall be determined OPERABLE and energized at I j least once per i days by verifying correct breaker alignment !

, and indicated power availability with an overall voltage of I j greater than or equa' to 125 volts DC and 120 volts AC, respectively.

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i 1 Proposed i Amendment No. 97, 166. Revision 1 I 4-341

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RANCHO SECO UNIT 1 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Surveillance Standards 4.12 AUXILIARY AND SPENT FUEL BUILDING FILTER SYSTIMS Apglieabi11ty Applies to the Auxiliary 9uilding exhaust filter system and to the Spent Fuel Building exhaust ventilation system when irradiated fuel which has decayed for less than 30 days is being stored or moved in the Spent Fuel i Building or when operating the crane with loads over the spent fuel pool.

OMutin To verify that the Auxiliar Building exhaust filter system and components willbeabletoperformthefrdesignfunctions.

Sanifiution 4.12.1 Hith irradiated fuel which has decayed less than 30 days in the l j spent fuel pool:

A. The Spent Fuel Building exhaust ventilation system shall be verified to be operating with all Spent Fuel Butiding doors closed (excepting intermittent personnel use) prior to fuel movement and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months during either fuel I movement within the spent fuel pool or crane operation with j loads over the spent fuel pool.

j 4.12.2 Proper operation of the ventilation system shall be:

} A. Verified at least once per 31 days by observing flow through the i operating HEPA filter and charcoal adsorber train and verifying that the train operates with <6 inches water gauge pressure drop across the combined HEPA and charcoal filter banks and verifying system operation for at least 15 minutes.

I B. Verified at least once per refueling interval, or once every 18 j months, whichever occurs first, or after each partial or complete replacement of the HEPA filter bank or charcoal adsorber bank, or following painting, fire, or chemical release

{ in the operating air makeup system, or after any structural i j maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, by: l j 1. Verifying that the charcoal adsorbers remove 199.5 percent

of a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas when they ,

i are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI NS10 while r 9 operating the filter train at a flow rate not exceeding !

43,400 cfm a 10 percent, j I 2. Verifying that tt t HEPA filter banks remove 199.9% of the l 00P when they are tested in-place in accordance with ANSI 1 N510 while operati,g the filter train at a flow rate not l exceeding 43,400 cf.ei 10 percent.

1 i Proposed i Amendment No. 39, 166 Revision 1 j 4-43 1

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i i i Factitty Change Safety Analysis Log No. 1050, Ray. 6

! Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision 1 Page 1 of 5 l l

j ATTACHMENT III j DESCRIPTION AND REASON FOR CHANGES

'l 3 Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision I consists of various editorial and !

technical changes to the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications. A description

); of and reason for each change is presented below' I f

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1. Change _DestrJetion: Table 2.3-1, page 2-9, Item 9: Add the wgtds j e "(Turbine trip)"; add new Item 10 "Anticipatory reactor trip N (Loss

) of both Main Feed Pumps)"; change degree symbol to percent symbol in hote l j (2); add Note (9), "This trip is disabled below 20% power. (power :

i channel)."

j Reason: Proposed Amendment No. 140 (issued as Amendment No. 83 on ,

2/3/87) failed to provide the distinction that changing the arming ;

threshold for anticipatory reactor trip from 20% to 45% of full power l I applied only to the Main Steam turbine and not to the Main feed Pumps. $

This proposed change provides that distinction.

j! i j 2. Changt_Dtict.ipilon: Specifications 3.1.1.6A and B, page 3-2: Add ,

"Except for surveillance testing, power to the valves is removed and is J under administrative control."

i Reason: The Bases for Specification 3.1.1 state that the power to all !

j the valve actuators in the high point vent path has been removed. The ;

4 specifications require that the vent path be operable. This statement is ;

added to clarify what operable means for this case. ;

! 3. Change _Descrht19n: Specification 3.1.6, page 3-12, new page 3-12a, !

j and page 3-144: Rewrite the i.eakage Specification to clarify the leakage l 1 requirements and incorporate the Standard B&W Tech Specs, NUREG-0103, i j Rev. 4. Also, add leak detection requirements to Specification 3.1.6 !

using the Standard Tech Specs as guidance. j

. t 1 The title of Tech Spec 3.1.6 is expanded to include Leak Detection. !

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' The Applicability statement is modified to reflect the Appitcability [

! statement recommended in the Standard Tech Specs. !

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! The Action statement portion of Specification 3.1.6.lf is rewritten and !

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added as Action C. to Specification 3.1.6.1. Reference to Specification :

1 3.3.4 is changed to 3.3.2. Tech Spec 3.3.4 does not exist. The proper i I reference is Tech Spec 3.3.2.

f Existing Action statement C to Specificatto 3.1.6.1 is rewritten and

moved to the new leak detection Specification . 1.6.2.

A leak detection Specification is added and desi nated Specification l 3.1.6.2. The format and content for this Specif cation are adopted from the Standard Tech Specs.

Delete paragraph in bases of Specification 3.1.6. page 3-14a which addresses a leakage limit of 30 gpm.

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Facility Change Safety Analysis Log Ns. 1050, Rev. 6 Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision 1 Page 2 of 5 Reason: The Standard Tech Specs present two separate Specifications for RCS Leakage. One Specification addresses RCS leakage limits and the other addresses RCS leak detection requirements. The present Rancho Seco Leakage Specification combines aspects of both Standard Tech Specs. and creates uncertainty as to how the Specification should be applied for leak detection requirements. A new Tech Spec (3.1.6.2) is developed to address RCS leak detection requirements separately. The RCS leakage limit portion of Specification 3.1.6 reflects the Standard Tech Specs and is modified only slightly.

The proposed Tech Spec change will segregate the two leakage Specifications and bring them into conformance with the format and content of the Standard Tech Specs.

The most significant changes proposed are the addition of the three leak detection methods into the Leakage Specification and the modification of the leak detection Action statement. The Bases for Specification 3.1.6 discuss in detail the three leak detection methods listed for new Speci fication 3.1.6.2. The Action statement proposed for the operability requirements on the leak detection methods represents the actions prescribed in the Standard Tech Specs. The current Action statement for the leak detection method sensitive to radioactivity (shut down the plant if inoperable for 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months ) is overly restrictive and unclear as to its applicability. Adoption of the Standard Tech Specs for leak detection will provide appropriate operability requirements and clarify the applicability of t M ivak detection method limits.

The paragraph in the Bases (Tech Spec page 3-14a) which addresses an upper leakage limit of 30 gpm is deleted because the paragraph describes a leakage limit that was deleted with Amendment No. 97. The information in the parag"aph is no longer applicable. The subject paragraph is not a basis for any current or proposed Leakage Specification.

4. Change _Destdnlon: Specification 3.3.1.8.1, page 3-19a: Change "core flooding system tank" to "core flood tank" in first line; change "12.75" l and "13.25" to "12.56" and "13.44"; delete "the breakers shall be open i and so tagged" and add "powet removed from their motor operators".

Reason: Editorial clarification. The levels added by Amendment No. 97 do not correspond to the design basis of the core flood tanks. The tank levels are adjusted to represent the required core flood tank volumes.

I Using the wording "power removed" instead of "breakers shall be open" is consistent with the wording in Standard Tech Specs,

5. Change _Destdation: Specification 3.3.1.C, page 3-20: Add an Action statement for one containment butiding spray system incperable which is I consistent with Standard Tech Specs.

Reasoa: There is no specific Action provided for one containment l building spray system inoperable. The Action requirement proposed for one containment spray system inoperable is taken from the B&H Standard Tech Specs, NUREG-0103.

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Facility Change Safety Analysis Log Ns. 1050 Rev. 6 Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision 1 Page 3 of 5 i

6. Change _ Dei.cr.lation: Table 3.5.1-1, pages 3-30a and 3-30b: Note 1 ;

I changes the n.aximum number of hours that a channel can be out of service for testing, calibration, or maintenance from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Reason: Surveillance testing of the RPS requires placing an EFIC channel in maintenance bypass, thus entering the conditions of Note 1.

Past experience indicates a minimum of an 8-hour shift for this RPS test.ng. Allowing for possible test interruptions by operations i i

evolutions or minor discrepancies, an additional 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is prvposed for conttrgency. !

7. Change _Deitr_1ption: Specification 3.7, pages 3-41, 3-42 through 3-42j, and 3-43 through 3-43b: Delete Specification 3.7.1. Re-format and/or i editorially change Specifications 3.7.2.A through 3.7.2.J. 3.7.3, and i 3.7.4. Change the AppItcability statement for Specificatiors 3.7.2.A I through 3.7.2.J from STARTUP through POWER OPERATIONS to HEA%P-COOLDOHN ,

through POWER OPERATIONS. Add an Applicability statement to Specifications 3.7.3 and 3.7.4. Add an Action statement to Specification !

3.7.3. Modify Specification 3.7.2 B.1 to include the requirements in existing Specification 3.7.1 which are not already contained in Specifications 3.7.2.A through 3.7.2.J. :

Reason: Specifications 3.7.2.A through 3.7.2.J are revi:ed and i Specification 3.7.1 is deleted to simplify and clarify the LCOs for the i operability requirements listed in Specification 3.7.1. The changes '

conform to the format found in the Standard Tech Specs, NUREG-0103. All the Specification 3.7.1 requirements are met or exceeded in revised i Specifications 3.7.2.A through 3.7.2.J. The Applicability statement is expanded to include the operational modes above cold shutdown. This ensures the Auxiliary Electrical System LCOs apply above cold shutdown. l Also, the plant would not be allowed to come out of cold shutdown, according to LCO Specification 3.0.4 unless the Specification j requirements of Tech Specs 3.7.2.A through 3.7.2.J are met. This was the (

intent of Specification 3.7.1. ;

1 The changes proposed for Specifications 3.7.3 and 3.7.4 clarify the !

intent of and the relationship between the two Specifications. The l Specifications are editorially rewritten into the proper Tech Spec format i and provided with specific and appropriate Applicability and Action j statements which clarify the intent of the Specifications, j

8. ChangtJescription: Specification 3.28 Action, page 3-93a: Delete the '

phrase "demonstrate the operability of the remaining train", and revise Action statement 3.28.la to read "Hith one TDI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation train inoperable, restore the inoperable train to operable status within 3 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ."

Editorially change the word "non-OPERABLE", which occurs six times in Specification 3.28, to "inoperable."

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t Facility Change Safety Analysis Log No. 1050, Rev. 6 Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision 1 Page 4 of 5 l i

s Reason: The term "demonstrate the operability" is used inappropriately i in Tech Spec 3.28, TD1 Diesel Generator Control Room Essential i

Ventilation System. Other Diesel Generator related Tech Specs in which the term "demonstrate the operability" is used contain a requirement to 1 perform a specific surveillance procedure. In Tech Spec 3.28 no -

i surveillance procedure is specified in conjunction with "demonstrate the i operability." The reason for requiring the performance of a specific <

surveillance procedure is to ensure a common mode failure does not exist :

in a Diesel Generator electrical system; however, a failure of one train :

i of TDI Diesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation will not cause i l a failure of the unaffected train. Furthermore, other essential Ventilation and HVAC related Tech Specs (e.g., NSEB, Control Room) do not ;

contain the "demonstrate the operability" term and do not require the performance of a surveillance procedure when one train of the system is 1 declared inoperable. !

t The intent of the term "demonstrate the operability" in Tech Spec 3.28 is !

to ensure the operability of the unaffected train is verified using !

l administrative methods. Adequate administrative controls exist in plant i

administrative procedures which require that the operability status of r

systems is known and tracked by plant operators in operator logs and at i shift turnovers. Administrative requirements are performed during every j shift which ensures the operability status of Tech 5pec required l j equipment is known. j It is unnecessary to perform a surveillance on the unaffected train of j TOI Olesel Generator Control Room Essential Ventilation when one train is f declared inoperable; therefore, the Action statement in Tech Spoc 3.28 is I modified. To make the TDI Ventilation Tecn Spec consistent with other Diesel Generator and essential HVAC Tech Specs, and to remove any ambiguity in the requirementt of Tech Spec 3.28, the phrase "demonstrate j the operability of the rema'aing train" is removed, j I 9. Change _Destdpilon: Table 4.1-1, Items 20 and 21, page 4-6: Change l

! the test frequer.cy from monthly (H) to refuelir.g interval (R). i i Rttion: Comp 10.s testing, which includes the manual pushbutton, cannot :

i be performed during operation without initiating a manual trip. Channel !

j testing, exclvding the manual pushbutton, is presently performed monthly j in compliance with Item 16 of Table 4.1-1. This surveillance frequency i

is in accord with the Standard Technical Specifications Table 4.3-2, '

Note (1), r I

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10. Change _.Destdption: Specification 4.2.3.1. page 4-13: Add "and

] 3.1.6.2" to 4.2.3.1 and change "HOT SHUTDOWN" to "HEATUP-COOLDOWN."

Reaton: Identify new leak detection Specification 3.1.6.2 an't change the Applicability for Specification 3.1.6.1 to conform with the Standard i Tech Specs.

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Fari W.r Change Safety Analysis Log No. 1050, Rev. 6 Proposed Amendment No. 166. Revision 1 Page 5 of 5 ,

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11. Change _Qticrigtion: Specification 4.6, pages 4-34, 4-344, 4-3ah, and :

4-341: Add an Applicability stateesnt to Specification 4.6.4. Make

! Specifications 4.6.1, 4.6.2, and 4.6.4 consistent with the changes made to Specifications 3.7.1 and 3.7.2. Specifically define the equipment referenced in Specifications 4.6.1B, 4.6.2, and 4.6.4f. !

l Reason: The Applicability of the battery surveillance was not clear.

1 The changes proposed are consistent with Standard Technical i j Specifications.

12. Change _Delctbilon: Specifications 4.6.3C.6 and 4.6.3C.7, page 4-34g: l j Add Note 2 ror Specification 4.6.3C.6 as follows: l

); "If Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3C.4.b is not satisfactorily !

completed, it is not necessary to repeat the preceding 24-hour test. !

i Instead, the diesel generator may be operated between 2550 and 2750 '

i i kw for A and B, or between 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and 82 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1 or untti operating temperature has stabilized, l I Also, in Specification 4.6.3C 7, change the 2000-hou' rating shown for ;

j diesel generators A and B from 2850 kw to 2750 kw. i Re11on: The addition of Note 2 for Specification 4.6.3C 6 eliminates :

an unnecessary 24-hour diesel run if the test is unsatisfactory. Tht t purpose of the 24-hour test is to demonstrate functional capability at !

i full-load temperature conditions. This is achieved by Note 2, and is i

consistent with the technical specifications at other nuclear plants. l j The 2850 kw previously shown in Specification 4.6.3C.7 is the actual ;

q 2-hour rating, not the 2000-hour rating which is 2750 kw, as changed. ;

r i 13. Change _Desttistion: Specifications 4.12 and 4.12.1A, page 4-43:

i Expand the wording in the Applicability statement for Specification 4.12 ,

l to include the condition when the crane is being operated with loads over !

]

the spent fuel pool. In Specification 4.12.1A, change 90 days fuel decay d

to 30. !

i Reason: Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.12 and its corresponding LCO

! Specification 3.13 were approved by the NRC in Amendment No. 39 t (9/13/82). The accompanying NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) stated l 1 for the LCO specification that the Auxiliary and Spent Fuel Building

! filter system must be operating whenever spent fuel movement occurs -

i unless the spent fuel has decayed for a continuous 30-day period. The i SER goes on to say that after such a decay period (30 days) the doses t would be less than those calculated for the fuel handling accident with !

, the Auxiliary and Spent Fuel Building filter system operating. l j for consistency with the LCO Specification 3.13, the i

Accordingly,iod required per of fuel decay during which the Spent Fuel Butiding exhaust venttiation System must be operating is changed from 90 days to i

!' 30 days. The Applicability statement in Specification 4.12 is expanded to include crane operation to make it consistent with the wording in 4 Spectfication 4.12.1A.

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ATTACHMENT IV SAFETY ANALYSIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS The proposed changes described in Attachment III have been evaluated by the District using the standards of 10 CFR 50.92. The conclusion has been reached that the changes constitute no significant hazard to the public. Following are the bases for the District's conclusion:

1. Except for Proposed Change Nos. 3, 6, 9, 12 and 13, the changes are purely administrative, consisting of editorial corrections, renumbering and relocating of specifications, and specification clarifications.

The proposed administrative changes have been judged to not constitute a significant hazards consideration because the changes:

a. Hould not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated since the proposed, purely administrative changes do not affect existing plant designs or cause changes to existing plant operations.

b. Would not create the possibility of a new or lfferent kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the proposed, purely administrative changes do not introduce any new operational requirement that could affect plant safety,

c. Would not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety since the purely administrative changes, by their very character, could not cause a reduction in the conservative nature of the Technical Specifications.

2. Proposed Change Nos. 3, 6, 9, 12, and 13, which are not purely administrative, are discussed individually below:

a. Proposed Change No. 3 consists of a rewrite of the Leakage Specification (Tech Spec 3.1.6) to conform with the C&H Standard Tech Specs (NUREG-0103, Rev. 4).

The proposed amendment to Tech Spec Section 3.1.6 addresses leakage and leak detection requirements separately in the format presented in Star.dard Tech Specs. Presently, aspects of both leakage and leak detection are combined into a single Specification. Ambiguity exists in the current Tech Spec. The leak detection requirement is unclear and does not represent the requirements stated in the Standard Tech Specs.

The proposed Specification restricts reactor operation to 30 days when only two leak detection methods are operable. If the leak detection method sensitive to radioactivity is inoperable, Containment atmosphere grab samples are required once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for the 30-day period during which operation may continue.

~ . l The existing Specification imposes no operating limit then only two leak detection methods are operable unless the leak detection rrethod l sensitive to radioactivity is inoperable. If the leak detection j method sensitive to radioactivity is inoperable, an overly restrictive 48-hour LC0 is imposed. Otherwise, operation may continue i indefinitely when only two leak detection methods are operable. j Conformance to the Standard Tech Specs regarding leakage end leak i detection is proposed. An operating limit when only two leak detection methods are operable is propostd, and relief from an overly restrictive 48-hour LCO is sought.

The District has reviewed the above proposed change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and concludes that no significant hazards would result. Revising the Leakage Specification to conform with the Standard Tech Specs would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or !

consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because RCS 1 leak detection requirements are added which ensure sufficient leak detection capabilities are available during reactor operation when previously evaluated accidents may occur. l l

11. Create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because revising the l leakage and leak detection requirements to conform with the l Standard Tech Specs will not create a condition which has not been previously evaluated in the Rancho Seco accident analysis.

iii. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safsty, because the leakage and leak detection requirements presented in the Standard Tech Specs are designed to ensure appropriate margins of safety are present in Tech Specs. The changes proposed incorporate the requirements and limits of the Standard Tech Specs.

b. Proposed Change No. 6 increases the length of time one EFIC channel may be out of service for surveillance testing, calibration and maintenance from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The 6-hour time in Note 1 of Table 3.5.1-1, Instrument Operating Conditions, was based on the estimated time required to perform surveillance testing on one EFIC channel. Not considered in estimating the EFIC channel out-of-service i duration was the condition when RPS channel surveillance testing is performed. During RPS testing the associated EFIC channel is disabled. RPS surveillance testing requires at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , and allowing for minor calibrations or maintenance, the District considers a 12-hour period to be a more realistic duration for the EFIC channel 4

to be disabled.

The District considers the 12-hour time duration to be acceptable l because the remaining EFIC channels must be OPERABLE, and the time I allowed before an LC0 ACTION is required for one EFIC channel inoperable is greater than the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months proposed in this change. The j

12-hour out-of-service allowance would permit surveillance of the RPS channel to be completed without entering the associated ACTION.

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The District has reviewed the above proposed change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92, and concludes, for the following reasons, that no significant hazards would reruit. Extension of the EFIC channel out-of-service time duration from 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because redundancy maintains sufficient instrument channels in operation to protect the plant from any previously avaluated accident.

ii. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because the p~ed change does not lessen the operator's ability to %i .:ne plant in a safe condition under all circumstances.

iii. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed time extension is well within the EFIC channel LC0 time limits for one channel inoperahle.

c. Proposed Change No. 9 involves changing the surveillance test frequency of High Pressure Injection, Reactor Building isolation, and Reactor Building emergency cooling manual trip (Items 20 and 21 of "ble 4.1-1, Instrument Surveillance Requirements) from monthly (M) to fueling interval (R). Complete testing of these instrument channels t

..icludes the manual pushbutton which, if actuated during operation, initiates a manual trip of the associated channel. Since the channel testing, excluding the manual pushbutton, is performed monthly in accordance with Item 16 of Table 4.1-1, the District considers complete testing on a refueling interval frequency to be an acceptable time span for confirming the operability of the manual pushbutton.

The District has reviewed the above proposed change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92, and concludes, for the reasons presented below, that no significant hazards would result. Extension of the test frequency of High Pressure Injection, Reactor Building isolation, and Reactor Building emergency cooling manual trip from monthly to refueling intervals would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because the manual pushbuttons for which the time extension of surveillance testing is requested are very reliable devices, and testing on a refueling interval frequency is consistent with the trip test frequency for the other SFAS channels (Items 22 through 27 of Table 4.1-1).

11. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, because the proposed change does not introduce new equipment or design, nor lessen the ability to maintain the plant in a safe condition.

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1 111. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed extension in test frequency is consistent with the test frequency for the other SFAS channels for which their margin of safety has been found acceptable.

d. Proposed Change No.12 involves Specification 4.6.3C.6, which presently requires an auto-start of the emergency diesel generator within 5 minutes of completion of the surveillance 24-hour run. The Specification does not address what step to take in the event the restart does not occur within the prescribed 5-minute period, or is otherwise not satisfactorily initiated or co.apleted.

This lack of alternate instructions implies that another 24-hour run is necessary before the restart can again be attempted. It should be explained that the purpose of the diesel generator restart within 5 minutes of the 24-hour run is to demonstrate the functional capability of the diesel to start and pick up load while still in the full-load temperature condition. Note 2, as follows, was added to Specification 4.6.3C 6:

"If Surveillance Requirement 4.6.3C.4.b is not satisfactorily completed, it is not necessary to repeat the 24-hour test.

Instead, the diesel generator may be operated between 2550 and 2750 kw for A and B, or between 3000 and 3300 kw for A2 and 82 for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or until operating temperature has stabilized."

The addition of Note 2 eliminates an unnecessary 24-hour run while still accomplishing the surveillance required restart of the diesel while at full-load operating temperature. This alternate surveillance instruction is consistent with the technical specification provision at other nuclear plants.

Because the alternate surveillance step presented in Note 2 of Specification 4.6.3C.6 results in the required surveillance demonstration of the diesel's functional capability, the District concludes that the proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed l alternate surveillance step still accomplishes the required surveillance objective while eliminating an unnecessary 24-hour l run of the diesel. Since the proposed change involves equipment !

undergoing surveillance testing, and not in actual operational !

I use, an increased probability or consequences of an accident already evaluated is not foreseen.

ii. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident i from any accident previously evaluated, because the simple elirnination of an unnecessary run of the diesel generator cannot be foreseen as contributing to the creation o' the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident )

previously evaluated, iii. Hould not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed change, the addition of an alternate step in surveillance testing, will have no effect on the design or operation of the plant.

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e. Proposed Changa No. 13 consists of a revision to the wording of Surveillance Requirement 4.12.1A that presently requires verifying the operation of the Spent Fuel Building exhaust ventilation system when the irradiated fuel has decayed for less than 90 days. The proposed change requires that the system be verified to be operating for the first 30 days of fuel decay for consistency with LCO Specification 3.13.

The NRC's Safety Evaluation Report for Amendment No. 39 (September 13, 1982) which introduced both the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and the Surveillance Requirement (SR) stipulating the fuel decay period for the system's operation stated:

. . ., it is our position, based upon the doses calculated for a fuel handling accident that the auxiliary and spent fuel building filter system must be operating whenever spent fuel movement occurs ualess the spent fuel has decayed for a continuous 30-day period. After such a decay period, the doses would be less than those calculated for the fuel handling j accident with the auxiliary and spent fuel building filter system operating."

The LC0 (Specification 3.13.2) is in accord with the above NRC statement. Specification 3.13.2 states:

"One Auxiliary and Spent Fuel Building filter system must be operating whenever spent fuel movement is being made unless the spent fuel has decayed for a continuous 30-day period."

Since there is no further LCO requirement that the system remain OPERABLE for an additional 60 days of fuel decay, the District proposes to change Surveillance Requirement 4.12.1A to be consistent with the LCO. It should be noted that the ventilation system is verified operable every 31 days. The method for doing so is addressed in SR Specification 4.12.2A.

The District has reviewed the above proposed change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92, and concludes, for the following reasons, that no significant hazards would result. Requiring verification of !

ventilation system operation prior to spent fuel movement when irradiated fuel has decayed less than 30 days would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, because, as stated in the NRC's SER, after a 30-day decay period the doses would be less than those calculated for the fuel handling accident with the auxiliary and spent fuel building filter system operating.

11. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated, because the requirement for ventilation system operation until fuel decay has reached 30 days remains unchanged, iii. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, because the proposed change does not affect the limiting conditions of plant operation.

Based on the evaluation of the proposed changes against the standards of 10 CFR 50.92, the District concludes that Proposed Amendment No. 166, Revision 1 does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

ML20155B848

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