ML20137D666

Discusses 970221 Event Re Improper CR Movement During Shutdown at Plant.Ait Charter for Insp of Circumstances Associated W/Shutdown & Improper CR Movement Encl

ML20137D666
Person / Time
Site:	Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	02/25/1997
From:	Caldwell J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Dapas M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
NUDOCS 9703260259
Download: ML20137D666 (2)

Text

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• February 25, 1997 1

' MEMORANDUM TO: Marc Dapas, Team Leader, Augmented Inspection Team 1

l (AIT), Zion Nuclear Station l

FROM: James L. Caldwell, Director, Division of Reactor Projects i

SUBJECT:

ZION AIT CHARTER l

l On February 21,1997, an event occurred involving improper control rod movement during I a shutdown at Zion Unit 1. This event raises concerns involving operatet actions, shift I management oversight of control room activities, and licensee control of reactivity I manipulations. Based on discussions with the Offices of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data regarding improper control rod movement during a shutdown of Zion Nuclear Station, Unit 1, I have decided, with NRR concurrence, to conduct an AIT in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0325. Section 05.02.f of Manual Chapter 0325 states that an AIT may result from events involving questions / concerns pertaining to either licensee operational or managerial performance.

l Attached for your implementation is an AIT Charter for the inspection of the circumstances associated with the shutdown and improper control rod movement. The objectives of the team are to identify and communicate the facts surrounding the shutdown activity as well as any potential generic issues, and to document the findings and conclusions of the onsite inspection. The inspection should begin on February 25,1997, and be completed within approximately one week. The report should be ready for regional management's signature within approximately two weeks from the end of the inspection.

We will consider the need for additional inspection resources based on the results of our initial review and understanding of the sequence of events.

Please contact me if you have any questions regarding these objectives or the enclosed Charter. I

Attachment:

AIT Charter cc w/ attachment:

S. J. Collins, EDO A. B. Beach, Rill B. C. McCabe, OEDO '

G. E. Grant, Rill A. E. Chaffee, NRR C. O. Thomas, NRR 7[

y } b S. A. Richards, NRR R. A. Capra, NRR C. Y. Shiraki, NRR SRI, Zion Station 200033 DOCUMENT NAME: A:\ ZION.AIT To receive a copy of this document, Indscate in the box "C" = Copy without attach /enci *E' = Copy with attach /enct "N" = No copy OmCE Ril [ NfWAEOD [ Rif gf/

NAME Depas/co )6N-4< Cea ' *

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DATE 2/ 6 97 2f*797 Ihl 7 OFF4G4AL RECORD LOPY 9703260259 970225 MENkEkE! k PDR ADOCK 05000295 G PDR

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' Auamented Inspection Team Charter - Zion Nuclear Station Examine the circumstances surrounding the Technical Specification-required shutdown of Unit 1, including improper control rod movements and the associated impact on safe operation of the plant. This examination should include, but need not be limited to, the ,

following areas:

1. Develop and validate the sequence of events, including plant response, related to  ;

the Technical Specification-required shutdown of Unit 1 including control rod manipulations.  ;

2. Evaluate licensed operator knowledge of expected plant response to continuous control rod withdrawal and insertion evolutions. If operator knowledge deficiencies are identified, evaluate the extent of associated training weaknesses.

3. Determine the normal role and responsibilities of the nuclear engineering department ,

during plant shutdown activities and evaluate how that role was exercised during I the Unit 1 shutdown. I

4. Evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's root cause analysis in response to the improper control rod movements identified during the Unit 1 shutdown. ,

5. Evaluate the command and control function, including shift management oversight, and the communication which existed between shift management and reactor  ;

operators, during the shutdown. In particular, evaluate shift management's actions  ;

regarding direction to maintain the reactor critical at the point of adding heat vice sub-critical in hot shutdown. Evaluate the extent of activities in the control room and the potential impact of distractions.

6. Review procedures used during the Unit 1 shutdown and determine if any procedure adherence and/or procedure adequacy problems existed. )

7. Evaluate the licensee's actions regarding identification of improper control rod manipulations and subsequent followup actions including reportability and determination of event significance and operator performance concerns.

8. Observe and assess the licensee's immediate corrective actions.

l