ML20211N865

Responds to 970829 Memo Requesting write-ups for Events Which May Be Reportable as Abnormal Occurrences or Other Events of Interest for Fy 1997 Rept to Congress.Specifically Assessments for Two Oconee Events,One at Zion & Haddam Neck

ML20211N865
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee, Haddam Neck, Zion  File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	10/07/1997
From:	Roe J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Rossi C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
References
NUDOCS 9710170152
Download: ML20211N865 (2)

Text

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} NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 20046 4 001

• .... October 7, 1997 MEMORANDUM TO: Charles E. Rossi, Director Safety Programs Division Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data l '

FROM: J W. Roe, Acting Director ision of Reactor Program Management ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE INPUT FOR FY 1997 Your memorandum dated August 29,1997, requested NRR assessments and write-ups for events which may be reportable as abnormal occurrences (AO) or "other events of interest" for the FY 1997 Report to Congress. You specifically requested assessments for two Oconee events and one at Zion. You also stated that a series of events at Haddam Neck had been proposed as a potential AO.

The NRR assessments of the two Oconee events were provided in a prior memorandum to you dated September 30,1997. We concluded that the unisolable leak at Oconce Unit 2 was not an AO. However, the loss of all high pressure injection pumps at Ocones Unit 3 was judged to be an AO. As a result, a draft AO discussion of this event has been prepared and sent to Region 11.

We understand that Ragion ll will be providing you with the formal AO write-up.

NRR reviewed information related to both the series of management deficiencies at Haddam Neck and the reactivity changes at Zion and determined that neither of these two events is an AO. A synopsis was prepared for each of these two events and it and our bases for our conclusions are provided in subsequent paragraphs.

Our considerations utilized the final abnormal occurrence criteria approved by the Commission for publication in the Federal Reaister and contained in Management Directive 8.1, " Abnormal l Occurrence Reporting Procedure."

SYNOPSES

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zi9n On February 21,1997, the licensee was approaching the end of a 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> limiting condition for operation for Zion Unit 1. The licensee had completed corrective maintenance on the containment spray pump, but had not completed post-maintenance testing. Therefore, a reactor shutdown was initiated. However, the shift engineer, in anticipation of the containment spray pump being retumed to service, directed that the reactor be maintained critical. Paor command

Contact:

T.J. Carter, NRR 415-1153 EC llE CElWER 08PY 1 ( L v, .,&

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e C. Rossi October i,1997 and control by the operations department supervision resulted in the reactor initially being taken subcritical by a period of continuous rod insertions. With the reactor substantially suberiticai, a licensed reactor operator withdrew control rods continuously in an attempt to teke the reactor critical, contrary to procedural controls for conducting a reactor startup. Before criticality was reached, the reactor was tripped to shut it down within the time specified by the technical specifications. Although this event was considered safety significant from a human performance perspective, it did not result in a major rcduction in the degree of protection of the public health or safety. Therefore, NRR does not believe this event warrants being reported as an abnormal occurrence.

Haddam Neck NRR initiated 3 special team inspection in the Spring of 1996 to evaluate the condition of the licensing and de:3gn basis of the Haddam Neck facility. Programmatic weaknesses and violations in desigt, calculations, problem identification and corrective actions, poor licensing and design basis docun entation, operations, and material classifications were identified. In addition, on August 14,1996, !icensee personnel during an emergency preparedness exercise failed to recognize early in the exercise the need for an "a'ert" declaration and accurate protective-action l

information to the State. In late August 1996, while the unit was shutdown nitrogen gas accumu!ated in the reactor vessei wi'hout detection. In November 1996, two workers had unintended intakes of airbome radioactive materials while working in the spent fuel transfer canal. In addition to this foss of control, the subsequent evaluation of the raciologic consequences of this event was inadequate in that it failed to consider the history of failed fuel and the potential for the intake of transuranic materials, Col ectively, these situations are considered a serious deficiency in management and procedural controls in major areas.

However, these deficiencies did not result in a major reduction in the degree of protection of the public health or safety. Therefore, NRR does not believe the conditions identified constitute a basis for declaring them an abnormal occurrence. It should be noted that the management deficiencies were included in the discussion of " Prob' ems at Millstone ... and Haddam Neck" in the Report to Congress as one of the "Other Events of Interest" for Fiscal Year 1996.

DISTRIBUTION:

Central file W. Leschek C. Shiraki PUBLIC . - D. LaBarge N. Fields PECB RlF P.McKee J. Carter SRichards "

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES DOCUMENT NAME: G:\TJC\AO 1097R T3 receive e copy of this document. Indicate in the boa: *C" = Copy without enclosures *E* = Copy with enclosures *N* = No copy 0FFICE PECB C:PECB c (A)D:DRPM (A)AD AD NAME JCarter* SARichards* JWRoe* BWSheron* RZimmerman*

DATE S/30/97 10/01/97 10/03/97 10/06/97 10/07/97 0FFICIAL PECORD COPY I

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