ML20101Q719

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Recirculation Pump Trip Min Operable Channels
ML20101Q719
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/09/1996
From:
IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:
Shared Package
ML20101Q717 List:
References
NUDOCS 9604150151
Download: ML20101Q719 (7)


Text

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS k

j G. RECIEULATION PUMP TRIP (RPT) AND G. RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP (RPT) AND 2 ALTE tnTE ROD INSERTION fARI) ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION fARI)

J INST t~.' 4ENTATION INSTRUMENTATION I

i 1. (ATWS) -RPT/ARI 1. Each RPT and ARI instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated 1 The instrumentation that trips OPERABLE by the performance of the

the recirculation pumps and CHANNEL CHECK, FUNCTIONAL TEST and i

initiates ARI as a means of CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at i ILmiting the consequences of a the frequencies shown in Table 4.2-1 failure to scram during an G.

i anticipated transient shall be 4

OPERABLE as shown in Table 2. LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and 3.2-G. simulated automatic operation of all ATWS-RPT/ARI instrumentation j channels shall be-performed at least-

(EOC)-RPT once per operating cycle.

k l i The instrumentation that trips 3. Time response testing of the RPT i

the recirculation pumps during breakers shall be performed at least i stop valve or control valve fast once per operating cycle.

3 closure improv for:J;ransient

' margin lt)at end-l of-cycl nall be OPERABLE as

, shown i able 3.2-G with the RPT i SYSTEM TIME RESPONSE as shown in f

Table 4.2-G.

Acolicabilityt l

1 As shown in Table 3.2-G 1

Actiont ,

I With one or more (ATWS)RPT/ARI or (EOC)-RPT instrument channels

, inoperable, take the ACTION

! required by Table 3.2-G.

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RTS - P_6 (o f8I*Eo$8d$$888331 PDR J, lifqg l b Amendment No. 2 ,Y#f,9 .193 3.2-34 I

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m Table 3.2-G s

  1. fATWSIRPT/ARI AND EOC-RPT INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUN OPERABLE APPLICABLE ~
  • CHANNELS OPERATING

" TRIP LEVEL SETTING TRIP SYST MODE ACTION TRIP FUNCTION

~~

ta) s 1140 peig 2h 1 80 (ATWS) RPT/ARI ~

Reactor High Pressure (a) 2: +119.5 inches 2h 1 80 .

(ATWS) RPT/ARI

  • Reactor Water Level-Low-Low

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i There shall be one OPERABLE tr p system

  • or each parameter. If this cannot be eet, the y (a) indicated ACTION shall be taken.

! w i l (b) There are 2 trip systems. The instruments are arranged in a two-out-of-two once logic.

i (c) If an instrument (s) is(are) inoperable, it may be considered to be OPERABLE if placed in a tripped condition'. .

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q g ACT - . va. Inn r OPERABLE status within 7 days'or be in at least-HOT STANDBY within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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b. With both instrument channels inoperable, restore at least one instrument channel to o

OPE BLE' status wit.hin' 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />' or be at least HOT STANDBY within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

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L Table 4.2-G (ATWS)RPT/ARI AND EOC-RPT INS E ATION SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS .

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  • R OPERATING 6 s ~

" CHANI(EL HODES FOR WHICH l 2 CHANNEL y IONAL CHANNEL ' SURVEILLANCE ' i TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALTBRATION REQUIRED 1 NA A A 1 (ATWS) RPT/ARI ~

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p A 1

, (ATWS) RPT/ARI l4A Reactor Water' Level-Low-Low (EOC) RPT Logic NA 4PQ NA I

RPT Breaker NA R NA w

ro i h END-OF-CYCLE iEOC) RECIRCULATION PUNP TRIP SYSTEN RESPONSE TIME '

TRIP FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME

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RPT Systentl(Turbine Confrol Vebc 6d d/owrs) m s 14D angc,.1

[PT System (Tu< Moe Sfer alve V C les* rs) A 15e ensec ** ' 's I

<eers r=~ ken of the- f.-st a.et.h seta.ord * --._ur__ ~ _ _ . . . , _ _

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  • This response time is lf rom l '~ ~~

3 l Cic;r: to actuation"olf'the breaker secondary'(ausiliary) contact q 3 RFr 7 Ul 8 *'h f* ^

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! l For each parameter monitored, as listed in Table 3.2.F, there are at least two 1 (2) channels of instrumentation. By comparing readings between the two (2) channels, a near continuous surveillance of instrument performance is available. Any deviation in readings will initiate an early recalibration, thereby maintaining the quality of the instrument readings.

3 On July 26, 1984 the NRC published their final rule on Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS), (10 CFR $50.62). This rule requires all BWR's to make e certain plant modifications to mitigate the consequences of the t unlikely 1 occurrence of a. failure to scram during an anticipated operational transient, j The bases for these modifications are described in NEDE-31096-P-A,

" Anticipated Transients Without Scram; Response to NRC ATWS Rule, 10 CFR j 50.62," December, 1985. The Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS) was modified

for two-pump operation to provide the minimum required flowrate and boron

! ' concentration required by the ATWS rule (see section 3.4 Bases). The existing ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) was modified from a one-out-of-two-once j logic to trip each recire. pump to a two-out-of-two-once logic to trip both recire. pumps, ("Monticello" design). This logic will also initiate the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) system, which actuates solenoid valves that i bleed the air off the scram air header, causing the control rods to insert.

l The instrument setpoints are chosen such that the normal reactor protection system (RPS) scram setpoints for reactor high pressure or-low-water levei_will be exceeded before the ATWS RPT/ARI setpoints are reached. Because ATWS is l l considered a very low probability event and is outside the normal design basis j for the DAEC, the surveillance frequencies and LCO requirements are less  ;

stringent than for safety-related in et r=== a* =

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, @ar Has 1 w:h $*r*r* l'_* j The End-of-Cycle (EOC) recir (in~de 'onCore pump trip was added to the plant to j improve the operating margin uel thermal limits, in particular Minimum 1 Critical Power Ratio (MCPR). h EOC-RPT trips the recire. pumps to lessen 4

the severity of the power inc a es caused by either a closure of turbine ~stop j _valv== a =- *==t closure of the u bine control valves with reactor power

! - ...... .... 930% and a simulta s fail turbine bypass valves to

  1. (L - open. The operating limit MCP..q,' :::ti... 2.12.C s calculated assuming an svates. If the requiremeh h vr able 3.2-G are not met, then

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The accident monitoring instrumentation listed in Table 3.2-H were specifically added to comply with the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Generic

. Letter 83-36. The instrumentation listed is designed to provide plant status for accidents that exceed the design basis accidents discussed in Chapter 15 of the DAEC UFSAR.

l Action 94 of Table 3.2-H deviates from the guidance of Generic Letter 83-36 as continued operation for 30 days (instead of 7 days as recommended in the i is allowed with one of two torus water level monitor (TWLM) l l generic channels letter) inoperable. Redundancy is available in that at.least one channel of Agnendment No.193 3.2-47 l

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{ Attachment 3 to j ,, , NG-96-0299 Page1ofI t

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! ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION l

10 CFR Section S t.22(c)(9) identifies certain licensing and regulatory actions which are eligible for categorical exclusion from the requirement to perform an environmental assessment. A proposed l 3

amendment to an operating license for a facility requires no environmental assessment if operation of l the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant hazards

- consideration; (2) result in a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and (3) result in a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. IES Utilities Inc. has reviewed this request and

  • determined that the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment needs to be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. The basis for this determination follows:

Basis The change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section -

1 51.22(c)(9) for the following reasons:

1

1. As demonstrated in Attachment I to this letter, the proposed amendment does not involve a l- significant hazards consideration.

[ 2. The proposed amendment includes changes which affect the End of Cycle Recirculation 1 Pump Trip ((EOC)RPT) system operability and surveillance requirements. The result will still be operation of the DAEC with no reduction in margin to the safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) for reactor fuel. Thus, there will be no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite. ,

3. The proposed amendment includes changes which affect the End of Cycle Recirculation  !

' Pump Trip system operability and surveillance requirements. The result will still be operation of the DAEC with no reduction in margin to the safety limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) for reactor fuel. Thus, there will be no significant increase in either

individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

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  • O RTS-286A Attachment 4 to t ,- NG-96-0299 Page1ofI SAFETY ASSESSMENT
1. Introduction By letter dated November 15,1995, IES Utilities Inc. requested changes to the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Specifications (TS), Section 3.2.G. The requested changes would clarify

" Applicable Operating Mode,"" Minimum Operable Channels per Trip System," and the " Operating Mode for which Surveillance Required," and revise the " Action" for End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip ((EOC)RPT) inoperable, surveillance interval and Allowed Out of service Time (AOT) and response time test acceptance criteria. These changes will assure that the (EOC) RPT continues to perform as designed to mitigate the turbine trip transients and, in the event (EOC) RPT is not T OPERABLE, require that additional margin be applied to the operating limit Mimmum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) to preclude exceeding the safety limit MCPR during the postulated transients.

2. Assessment The proposed changes will clarify the functional requirements which must be satisfied in order to call the (EOC) RIrr OPERABLE. They will also provide a new Action for those times when (EOC)

RPT is inoperable. The result will be TS requirements which assure that the DAEC is operated with adequate margin to the safety limit MCPR under all conditions.

Other changes are proposed to provide editorial clarifications and to revise the surveillance interval :

and AOT. These changes are consistent with the argument used for the same changes to the RPS TS as documented in GE Topical Report NEDC-30851P-A, " Technical Specification Improvement +

Analysis for BWR Reactor Protection System" and " Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Control Rod Block Instrumentation," NEDC-30851P-A, Supplement 1, October 1988.  ;

These changes have been accepted per NRC Safety Evaluation Report for Topical Report GENE-770-06-1.

These changes will result in no degradation of operational safety of the DAEC, nor will they result in a reduction in the margin to any fuel limits for normal operation or transients.

Based upon the above assessment, we conclude that this request is acceptable.

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