Text

Proposed Tech Specs 3.6.1.3,revising Condition E to Add Time Limit for Plant Operation If Penetration Flow Path Isolated by Single Purge Valve with Resilient Seal & Adding TS for Cb/Sbgt IAS
	ML20154P662
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	10/15/1998
From:	; IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20154P660	List: ML20154P662; NG-98-1764, Application for Amend to License DPR-49,revising TS 3.6.1.3 Condition E & Adding TS for Cb/Sbgt Ias,Per NUREG-1433;
References
	NUDOCS 9810230039
	Download: ML20154P662 (15)
	v • d • e

-. -

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas 3.7-14 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System.............

3.7-16 3.7.8 Soent Fuel U nrace Pool Water Ievel 3.7-18 j --

T 6*,+rel BaM9y/.TM4y :5st'7~etatmJ kss.,,,,,p. 4,. y,+w,,,

3,y.gy

]

f3.1. C) ~

3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS................

a.e-1 3.8.1 AC Sources-0)erating 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - 51utdown................

3.8-11 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil. Lube 011. and Starting Air 3.8-14 3.8.4 DC Sources-0)erating 3.8-17 3.8.5 DC Sources - 51utdown................

3.8-21 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters 3.8-23 3.8.7 Distribution Systems-0)erating 3.8-27 3.8.8 Distribution Systems-S1utdown...........

3.8-30 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS..................

3.9-1 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks...........

3.9-1 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9-3 3.9.3 Control Rod Position................

3.9-5 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication 3.9-6 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling.........

3.9-8 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level 3.9-9 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)-High Water Level 3.9-10 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)-Low Water Level....

3.9-13 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS........ t..........

3.10-1 3.10.1 System Leakage and Hydrostatic Testing Operation..

3.10-1 3.10.2 Reactor Mooe : witch Interlock Testing 3.10-4 3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown 3.10-6 3.10.4 Sin le Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown....

3.10-9 3.10.5 Sin le Controi Rod Drive (CRD) emoval-Refueling 3.10-13 3.10.6 Multinic Control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling.....

3.10-16 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing-Operating...........

3.10-18 3.10.8 SHUT 1.n0WN MARGIN (SDM) Test-Refueling 3.10-20 4.0 DESIGN FEATURF.S 4.0-1 4.1 Site Location 4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core......................

4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage......................

4.0-2 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS 5.0-1 5.1 Responsi bi li ty.....................

5.0-1 5.2 Organization......................

5.0-2 5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications 5.0-5 5.4 Procedures.......................

5.0-6 5.5 Programs and Manuals..................

5.0-7 5.6 Re orting Requirements.................

5.0-19 5.7 Hi h Radiation Area 5.0-22 9810230039 981015 PDR ADOCK 05000331 P

PDR DAEC iii

--Amend.cr,t 223-T:rcR-oc6

PCTVs 3.6.1.3 4

(b.

ACTIONS' (continued) n"s

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more D.1 Restore leakage to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months penetration-flow paths within limits.

with one or more MSIVs not within leakage limits.

E.

One or more penetration flow paths E.1 Isolate the affected 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with one or more enetration flow path containment purge use of at least valves not within one closed and purge valve leakage de-activated

limits, automatic valve, g,Q closed manual valve, or blind flange.

g z

-...aerc---.

Onlyegutrad4e

\\

g L

p. r ~s if I

~ eseps v Ivs g,

........N0TE---------

" " ral"**+

Isolation devices in m.

)

- - / #

high radiation areas Mak may be verified by A*w s..

use of administrative

. means.

L.su,. 14 7 2 A.ucs

+ w h Nifs.

Verify the affected Once per 31 days penetration flow path for isolation is isolated, devices outside containment

[

E.

P rform 3.

1.3.

Onc per jforth res ient day seal urg valv clo ed t comp y wi j

Re4uire Acti n E..

/

(continued)

.5 f.b8 DAEC 3.6 11

^==.it 223-73*dA'

co G

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System 3,7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 ' Control Building / Standby Gas Treatment (CB/SBGT) Instrument Air System LCO 3.7.9 Two CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1,2. and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One CB/SBGT A. l.

Declare required 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Instrument Air feature (s), supported by Condition A concurrent with subsystem the inoperable inoperability of redundant inoperable.

CB/SBGT Instrument required feature (s)

Air subsystem, inoperable when the redundant required feature (s) are inoperable.

AND A.2.

Restore the CB/SBGT 7 days Instrument Air subsystem to OPERABLE status.

B.

Required Action and B.l.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Associated AND Completion Time of Condition A not B.2.

Be in MODE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months m et.

OR Both CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystems inoperable.

DAEC 3.7 ' 9 TSCR-006

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System 3.7.9 1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

' SR 3.7.9.1 Operate each CB/SBGT Instrument Air 31 days compressor for 2 20 minutes.

{

SR' 3.7.9.2 Verify each CB/SBGT Instrument Air 92 days subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal and maintains air pressure 1

2 75 psig in the receiver.

T W

DAEC 3.7-20 TSCR-006

1 l

TABLE OF CONTENTS a

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (continued)

B 3.7.6 Main Condenser Offgas B 3.7-30 B 3.7.7 Main Turbine Bypass System............

B 3.7-33 R 17.8 SDent Fuel Storaan Pool Water Level B 3.7-37 j - [$ 3 7. ')

Ce& e tkidir3/S%Jy Gas 7Mw huk. a / 4.~r. S,snm.

5.T.7 4c}

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS...............

BT. 8-1 ~

B 3.8.1 AC Sources-0]erating B 3.8-1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources - S lutdown...............

B 3.8-26 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel 011. Lube Oil, and Starting Air B 3.8-32 8 3.8.4 DC Sources-0]erating B 3.8-41 4

B 3.8.5 DC Sources - S lutdown...............

B 3.8-52 B 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters B 3.8-56 i

B 3.8.7 Distribution Systems-0)erating B 3.8-63 8 3.8.8 Distribution Systems -S1utdown..........

B 3.8-74 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS.................

B 3.9-1 l

B 3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks..........

B 3.9-1 B 3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock B 3.9-5 B 3.9.3 Control Rod Position...............

B 3.9-9 B 3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication B 3.9-12 B 3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling........

B 3.9-16 B 3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level B 3.9-19 B 3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)-High Water Level B 3.9-22 B 3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR)-Low Water Level...

B 3.9-27 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS..................

B 3.10-1 B 3.10.1 System Leakage and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.

B 3.10-1 B 3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing B 3.19-6 8 3.10.3 Sin le Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown B 3.10-11 B 3.10.4 Sin le Control Rod Withdrawal-Cold Shutdown B 3.10-16 B 3.10.5 Sin le Control Rod Drive (CRD) emoval-Refueling B 3.10-21 B 3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal-Refueling....

B 3.10-26 8 3.10.7 Control Rod Testing-Operating.....

B 3.10-29 B 3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test-Refueling B 3.10-33 1

DAEC iii Amendment 223

l PCIVs 1

B 3.6.1.3 BASES ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 (continued) automatic valve. a closed manual valve. a blind flange. and a check valve with flow through the valve secured.

For a penetration isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1.

the device used to isolate the penetration should be the closest available valve, flange etc.. to the primary containment.

In addition for the valve or flange to be acceptable for use as the OPERABLE isolation device, it must meet all the design requirements for the PCIV it is replacing, such as. 10 CFR 50. Appendix J leakage testing.

a//G Jismic qualifications, piping code class provisions, etc.

(sw Ihe Required Action must be completed within the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months gg Completion Time (8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for main steam lines).

The i

Completion Time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months is reasonable considering the time required to isolate the penetration and the relative importance of supporting primary containment OPERABILITY during MODES 1. 2. and 3.

For main steam lines, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months l

for the main steam lines allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact that MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) t and a potential for plant shutdown.

4 For affected penetrations that have been isolated in accordance with Required Action A.1. the affected penetration ' low path (s) must be verified to be isolated on a periodic basis. This is necessary to ensure that primary containment penetrations required to be isolated following an accident and no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur.

This Required Action does not require any testing or device manipulation.

Rather, it involves verification that those devices outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position. The Completion Time of "once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment" is appropriate because the devices are operated under administrative controls and the probability of their misalignment is low.

For the devices i

inside primary containment, the time period specified " prior i

to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4. if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4. if not performed within the previous 92 days" is based on engineering judgment and is l

considered reasonable in view of the inaccessibility of the t

i devices and other administrative controls ensuring that device misalignment is an uniikely possibility.

t i

(continued) i DAEC B 3.6-19

-Mendment-223-TOCR.occ

INSERT for A.I The 18 inch primary containment purge valves are equipped with resilient seats that require compressed air to ensure leak tightness. Therefore, both inboard and outboard 18 inch 1

containment purge valves for the affected penetration are required to have functional resilient seals in order to provide an isolation barrier that cannot be affected by a single active failure.

Thus, an acceptable isolation barrier is established when both inboard and outboard purge valves are de-activated in the closed position, with th resilient seals pressurized to ensure leak tightness of both purge valves.

TSCR-006

PCIVs B 3.6.1.3

"[.

B'ASES '

a ACTIONS (continued)

E.1 C 2. and E -S- *-

In the event one or more containment purge valves are not within the purge valve leakage limits, purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits or the affected 3enetration must be isolated. The method of isolation must 3e by the use of at least one isolation barrier that carnet-

@ll***.+=. id-bc adversely affected by a siagle active failuFe, Isolation fp+w.es u

l.ce * ^3 barriers that meet this criterion are a closed and j

(c,a;#,ns.

J de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, and blind flange.

In addition. for the valve or flange to be acceptable for use as the OPERABLE isolation device, it must meet all the design requirements for the PCIV it is replacing, such as.10 CFR 50. Appendix J 1eakage testing, seismic qualifications, pging code class provisions, etc.

_!f a purge valve 'crith resi,ient seals is utiliced to sat-tsfy

-Required Action C.1. it must have be6n dememtrated te i eet

-the leakage requirements of SR 0.C.1.0.4 The specified l

Completion Time is reasonable -con:idering that-one.

-contair"'ent purge valve r: tins closed 50 that a gress-

%,e~

w m acr..ar ch of ccateinment dee not exist.

ma,, m e.7 'n pfGL a t,< t<a-p r u a%

f,,,, m t, L

In accordance with Required Action E.. this penetration flow path must be verified to be iso ated on a periodic F*j.] s,, ye.#

basis. The periodic verification is necessary to ensure

x,,.c that containment penetrations required to be isolated

[ fd following an accident, which are no longer capable of being automatically isolated, will be in the isolation position should an event occur. This Required Action does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather it involves verification that those isolation devices outside

pl containmentandpotentiallycakableofbeingmispositioned are in the correct position.

he Completion Time of "once 9[

f per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment" is appropriate because the devices are 03erated under administrative controls and the proba3111ty of their misalignment is low. Jcr the containment purge valve with

.ces444ent seal that i: isolated in accer4ance-with-Requtred-ection-E.1. SR 0.5.-l.3 A must be performed at least ance =

-ever-y-92-days. Thi: prev 4derr-assurance-that-d eg r adat4 co-of-the resilient seal is detected and conf 4rms-that-the-leakege--

rate of tMonttinment-p6F90-valVG-does--not--44 Grease-during-

-th time the penetrat4cn-is isolated. The nomal Frequency-for SR 3.5.1.3.4 i; 484-days.

Since more reliance-is-j> laced--

e gle valve while in thts-C-ennt4cn. it is petident-to-n

- en a

- erform the SR more often.ned:R<J fp ~ We +L<* afS +o a

4 Yrd Askn G. 5 Ls nd s ite.ss y a va,-;pJ G as s & pl. edw*aadmWsWve '"*q(co' ses is#=ld*% devic *s lo < <id k h

+sem os a~sdered AW. A., vae: k - % G h.l.,:r k % e meme

+e g l gin e

, -h Hess < arva.s i.1 nst e-ea te M r.

ThercSors, m,,as<,.y,Qnegy + a.s. w, sx2g y 3 f,j - - - % %

DAEC

.f.g

,4

j PClVs B 3.6.1.3 3,k BASES '

W ACTIONS kIEIan[E.3/(co inued

]

t I

he for, a requ cy of nce r 92 ay as ch en a h

be sh t be ac ptab baspdon eratpg i

perf enc.

F.1 and F.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot l

be met in MODE 1, 2. or 3. the plant must be brought to a l

MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within l

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and to MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed l

Completion Times are reasonable. based on operating l

experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

G.1 and G.2 If any Required Action and associated Completion Time cannot be met for PCIVs required to be OPERABLE in NODES 4 or 5.

i the unit must be placed in a condition in which the LC0 does Action must be imediately initiated to suspend not apply.

operations with a potential for drainin the reactor vessel (OPDRVs) within the RHR Shutdown Coolin System boundary to minimize the probability of a vessel dr indown and

. subsequent potential for fission product release. Actions must continue until OPDRVs are suspended and valve (s) are restored to OPERABLE status.

If suspending an OPORV would result in closing the residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling isolation valves, an alternative Required Action is provided to imediately initiate action to restore the valve (s) to OPERABLE status. This allows RHR shutdown cooling to remain in service while actions are being taken to restore the valve.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.1.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR ensures that the primary containment purge valves are closed as required or, if open, open for an allowable If a purge valve is open in violation of this SR.

reason.

the valve ts considered inoperable.

(continued)

DAEC B 3.6-E

-. =c-t

^

--r-

-9.-

em,.,.%,

c.--

-m e>---

--,.-.s.

+--

.-. ~.-

t 1

l l

. El If a purge valve with resilient seal is utilized to satisfy Required Action E.1, unlimited operation is not permitted as this method ofisolating the penetration is susceptible to single failures that l

could compromise the leak tightness of the entire penetra' ion (e.g., loss of air compressor, DG l

failure, etc.). Thus, per the Note to Required Action El, if this method ofisolation is used, the containment purge valve leakage must be restored to within limits within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . The j

specified Completion Time is reasonable, considering that one containment purge valve remains sealed so that primary containment integrity is maintained, although not single failure tolerant and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period.

Required Action E.2 is modified by a Note indicating this Required Action is only required to be performed if a purge valve with resilient seal is used to satisfy Required Action E.1. If the J

method ofisolation is by the use of at least one isolation barrier that cannot be adversely affected l

by a single active failure, then Required Action E.2 is not required because the integrity of the l

affected penetration flow path is being maintained by a passive device and unlimited operation is permitted.

l f

f v

1 i

i i

i f

2 I

TsCL-c04 a

i i

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System B 3.7.9 i

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.')

Control Building / Standby Gas Treatment (CB/SBGT) Instrument Air System BASES BACKGROUND The CB/SBGT Instrument Air System is designed to provide compressed air to support:

closure of the reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breaker butterfly valves leak tightness of the reactor bai! ding-to-suppression e

chamber vacuum breaker butterfly valves (by pressi:rizing the T-ring seals) when closed leak tightness of the primary containment purge system isolation valves (by pressurizing the T-ring seals) when closed closure of the drywell cooling water containment isolation valves SBGT flow control and filter cooler bypass damper opening Standby Filter Unit (SFU) flow control ventilation flow path and temperature control for the Control Building Chiller (CBC) System, which is also the ventilation flow path for the SFU System These systems and components function to limit fission product release and control the environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a Design Basis Accident (DBA).

The CB/SBGT Instrument Air System consists of two independent and redundant whsystems. Each of the two CB/SBGT Instrument Air mosystems is made up of a compressor, a' receiver, associated instrumentation, and piping. fhe air receivers are normally supplied by the plant l

instrument air system. If the pressure in the a'c receiver decreases below 78 psig (nominal), then the CB/SBGT Instrument Air compressor will automatically start. With the air receiver pressure higher than the plant instrument air system, check valves will close to provide isolation of each DAEC B 3.7-40 TSCR-006

l CB/SBGT Instrument Air System B 3.7.9 l

CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem.

Either of the two subsystems is capable of providing compressed air to support the required systems. The two i

subsystems are seperated from each other so failure of one subsystem will rot affect the OPERABILITY of the other subsystem.

APPLICABLE SAFETY The ability of the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System to provide ANALYSES compressed air is an implicit assumption in evaluations of the equipment required to limit fission product release and control the environment from which the unit can be safely operated following a DBA.

The CB/SBGT Instrument Air System satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO The CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystems are independent of each other to the degree that each has separate controls, power supplies, and the operation of one does not depend on the other. In the event of a DBA, one subsystem of CB/SBGT Instrument Air is required to support operation of SBGT, SFU, CBC, and containment isolation assumed in the safety analyses. To ensure this requirement is met, two subsystems of CB/SBGT Instrument Air must be OPERABLE. At least one subsystem will operate if the worst single active failure occurs coincident with the loss of offsite power.

The isolation of the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System to components or systems may render those components or systems inoperable, but does not affect the OPERABILITY of the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System.

APPL.ICABILITY In MODES 1,2, and 3, the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System is required to be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the equipment serviced by the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System. Therefore, the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System is required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

In MODES 4 and 5, the OPERABILITY requirements of the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System are determined by the systems it supports, and Nrefore, the requirements are not the same for all facets of operation in MODES 4 and 5. Thus, the LCOs of the systems supported by the CB/SBGT Instrument Air System will govern OPERABILITY requirements in MODES 4 and 5.

DAEC B 3.7-41 TSCR-006

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System B 3.7.9 ACTIONS A. I Required Action A.1 is intended to provide assurance that a loss of the plant instrument air system, during the period that a CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem is inoperable, does not result in a complete loss of safety ftmetion of critical systems.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal

" time zero" for beginning the allowable out of service time

" clock." In this Required Action the Completion Time only begins on discovery that both; An inoperable CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem a.

exists; and b.

A required feature on the other division is inoperable.

If, at any time during the existence of this Condition (one CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem inoperable), a required feature subsequently becomes inoperable, this Completion Time begins to be tracked.

Discovering one required CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem inoperable coincident with one or more inoperable required support or supported features, or both, that are associated with the OPERABLE CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem results in starting the Completion Time for the Required Action. Four hours from the discovery of these events existing concurrently is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration before subjecting the unit to transients associated with shutdown. Additionally, ths Four Completion Time d

takes in to account the capability of the OPERABLE CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem, reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of a Dl3A during this period.

l A.2 With one CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem inoperable, the CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. With the unit in this condition, the remaining OPERABLE CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem is adequate to support the SBGT, SFU, CBC, and containment isolation functions. Ilowever, the overall reliability is reduced because a single failure in the DAEC 113.7-42 TSCR-006

~

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System B 3.7.9 j

l OPERABLE CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem could result 1

in a loss of the supported functions.

i The 7 day Completion Time is based on the redundant CB/SBGT Instrument Air System capabilities afforded by the OPERABLE subsystem, the low probability of an accident l

occurring during this time period, and is consistent with the allowed Completion Time for restoring an inoperable DG or ESW subsystem.

B.1 and B.2 If the CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time l

or both CD/SBGT Instrument Air subsystems are inoperable, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without l

challenging unit systems.

)

i 4

DAEC B 3.7-43 TSCR-006 1

~-

. - - ~

CB/SBGT Instrument Air System B 3.7.9 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.9.1

' REQUIREMENTS Operating each CB/SBGT Instrument Air compressor for 2 20 minutes allows the oil and other components to reach their operating temperature. This periodic operation removes condensation which may cause rusting in the cylinders, ifit were to accumulate. The 31 day Frequency and the operating time are based on vendor recommendations.

SR 3.7.9.2 This SR verifies that each CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem has the capability to deliver sufficient quantity of compressed air to support the SBGT, SFU, CBC, and containment isolation functions. This SR takes into account both the compressor capacity and the integrity of the distribution system.

This SR also verifies the automatic start capability of the CB/SBGTInstrument Air compressor in each subsystem. This is demonstrated by the use of an actual or simulated initiation signal.

The 92 day Frequency is consistent with the Frequency for pump testing in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program requirements. Therefore, this Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

1 REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 9.3.1.

2 UFSAR, Section 6.2.4.

3. UFSAR, Section 6.2.5.

4. UFSAR, Section 6.5.3.3.

5. UFSAR, Section 6.4.2.

6. UFSAR, Section 9.4.4.

1 DAEC B 3,7-44 TSCR-006 w.,

--,

ML20154P662

Text

Navigation menu

Search