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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML23328A0132023-11-22022 November 2023 Supplement - Security Rule Exemption Request ISFSI Docket No. Reference (L-2023-LLE-0028) ML23304A0162023-10-30030 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RCI - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - LaSalle 1 & 2 - Exemption from Security Rule (L-2023-LLE-0028) ML23268A0022023-09-22022 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0 ML23264A7992023-09-21021 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Fleet Request License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-580, Revision 1 ML23237B3972023-08-24024 August 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request - Acceptance of Alternative Request to Use Updated BWRVIP Guidelines ML23163A2292023-06-12012 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-580, Revision 1 ML23153A1562023-06-0202 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI LaSalle pressure-temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Amendment Request ML23151A6602023-05-31031 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of I4R-14 ML23150A2482023-05-25025 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Re LaSalle Downcomer Analysis Amendment Request ML23095A1892023-04-0505 April 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Audit Plan PTLR Amendment Request ML23074A0372023-03-14014 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Implementation of Exigent Amendment ML23046A1132023-02-13013 February 2023 Transmittal Email, Paul Bessette to Gibson, 2/13/23, Filing of Formal Opposition to PG&E Exemption Request ML23044A0452023-02-13013 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Revise Lower Downcomer Braces Analysis ML23052A2042023-01-10010 January 2023 E-mail from Paul Bessette Dated 01/10/2023 Regarding Diablo Canyon ML22357A0382022-12-23023 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request to Relocate the Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves ML22354A2622022-12-20020 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request - Acceptance of Request to Use Certain Provisions of the 2019 Edition of the ASME BPV Code, Section XI ML22301A0902022-10-28028 October 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-301, Revision 2 ML22256A0112022-09-12012 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 License Amendments Related to Fuel Storage ML22200A0782022-07-19019 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Fleet Request to Use Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 R Supplied Air Suits ML22138A4112022-05-18018 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Lasalle 1 and 2 - (RAI) License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies, with Changes to TS Sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.5 (EPID-L-2021-LLA-0124) ML22126A0392022-05-0606 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Lasalle 1 and 2 Draft (RAI) License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies, with Proposed Changes to TS Sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.5 ML22066A7622022-03-0707 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Verbal Authorization - EPID-L-2022-LLR-0028, LaSalle Unit 1 Request for Alternative Examination for Repairs of Flow Control Valves 1B33-F060A and 1B33-F060B ML22062B0232022-03-0303 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - EPID-L-2022-LLR-0028, LaSalle Unit 1, Request for Additional Information (Rai), LaSalle Unit 1, Relief Request I4R-13 Relief from Code Examinations for 1B33-F060A and 1B33-F060B Repairs ML22041B5362022-02-10010 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding Fleet License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-541 ML22020A0692022-01-14014 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) IEMA Response: State Consultation - LaSalle 1 and 2: License Amendment Request Re; Revision of Technical Specifications to Incorporate GNF CRDA Methodology ML22020A0642022-01-13013 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Fleet Alternative for Repair of Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzles ML21361A2982021-12-0606 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA) Implementation Schedule ML21301A0672021-10-28028 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-541 ML21256A1902021-09-10010 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Transfer Application ML21252A0482021-09-0707 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Fleet Alternative Request for Repair of Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzles ML21215A3502021-08-0303 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-554 ML21210A0942021-07-29029 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - La Salle, 1 & 2 - Acceptance of Licensing Action License Amendment Request New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Methodologies, with Changes to TS Sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.5 (EPID-L-2021-LLA-0124) ML21207A0072021-07-26026 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - La Salle Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) License Amendment Request to Incorporate Licensing Topical Report NEDE-33885P-A, Revision 1, GNF CRDA Application Methodology(EPID-L-2021-LLA-0016) ML21190A0192021-07-0808 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Fleet - Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of TSTF-582 and TSTF-583-T ML21154A0112021-05-28028 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension of Comment Period for the Exelon Generation Company, LLC License Transfer Application ML21154A0142021-05-28028 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension of Comment Period for the Exelon Generation Company, LLC License Transfer Application ML21154A0132021-05-28028 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension of Comment Period for the Exelon Generation Company, LLC License Transfer Application ML21144A2132021-05-24024 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Transfer Application ML21120A0552021-04-29029 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 - Closeout of Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System ML21119A2282021-04-29029 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information (RAI) - LaSalle, EPID-L-2020-LLA-0018, License Amendment Request (LAR) TSTF-505 ML21117A0442021-04-26026 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Proposed Fleet Alternative to Documentation Requirements for Pressure Retaining Bolting ML21089A0562021-03-30030 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle Unit 2 - Verbal Authorization of LaSalle Unit 2 Request for an Alternative I4R-12, Revision 2 Valve Repairs on Valves 2B33-F060A and 2B33-F060B ML21084A2532021-03-24024 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Acceptance of License Transfer Application ML21084A1292021-03-22022 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Delay in Issuance of the LaSalle TSTF-505 LAR (L-2020-LLA-0018) ML21082A0252021-03-22022 March 2021 Email to Licensee for Delay in Completion of LAR LAR TSTF-505 ML21077A1902021-03-18018 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Lasalle Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) Request for License Amendment Regarding Ultimate Heat Sink, (EPID-L-2020-LLA-0165) ML21075A1582021-03-15015 March 2021 E-mail from T. Silko to J. Parrott, NMSS, Vermont Yankee on the State of Vermont Comments on the Review of the Draft Final SER and EA for 20.2002 Alternate Disposal Request ML21089A0542021-03-15015 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - LaSalle Unit 2 - Verbal Authorization of LaSalle Unit 2 Relief Request I4R-12, Revision 1 Valve Repairs on Valves 2B33-F060A and 2B33-F060B ML21068A2762021-03-0909 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - La Salle Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) Relief Request I4R-12 Relief from Code Surface Examinations for 2B33-F060B Valve Repair (EPID-L-2020-LLA-0016) ML21067A6752021-03-0808 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - La Salle Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) UHS Amendment Request (EPID-L-2020-LLA-0165) 2023-09-22
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARBVY 24-005, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-01-30030 January 2024 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G IR 05000373/20230042024-01-24024 January 2024 County Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000373/2023004 and 05000374/2023004 ML24024A1332024-01-24024 January 2024 Confirmation of Initial License Examination BVY 24-004, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2024-01-23023 January 2024 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G IR 05000373/20230122024-01-18018 January 2024 County Station - Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000373/2023012 and 05000374/2023012 ML23354A2902024-01-0505 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0028 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) BVY 24-003, Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance2024-01-0404 January 2024 Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance BVY 24-001, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2024-01-0202 January 2024 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust ML23360A6082023-12-27027 December 2023 County Station Request for Information for NRC Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection: Inspection Report 05000373/2024010 and 05000374/2024010 BVY 23-030, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-12-20020 December 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G ML23278A1292023-12-14014 December 2023 Units 1 & 2; Limerick, Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2; and Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3 -Revision to Approved Alternatives to Use Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project Guidelines ML23305A1402023-12-13013 December 2023 Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3; and Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt Traveler TSTF-580 BVY 23-029, Proof of Financial Protection2023-12-12012 December 2023 Proof of Financial Protection BVY 23-028, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-11-28028 November 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust BVY 23-027, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-11-21021 November 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-026, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-11-13013 November 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G RS-23-120, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums IR 05000373/20230032023-11-0909 November 2023 County Station Integrated Inspection Report 05000373/2023003, 05000374/2023003, and 07200070/2023001 ML23286A2602023-11-0808 November 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 260 and 245 to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses Relocation of Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves to the Pressure Temperature Report IR 05000373/20234012023-11-0707 November 2023 County Station Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000373/2023401 and 05000374/2023401 BVY 23-025, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-11-0202 November 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust RS-23-103, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-13013 October 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans IR 05000374/20230102023-10-11011 October 2023 NRC Inspection Report 05000374/2023010 BVY 23-023, License Amendment Request Addition of License Condition 3.K, License Termination Plan; Proposed Change No. 3172023-10-10010 October 2023 License Amendment Request Addition of License Condition 3.K, License Termination Plan; Proposed Change No. 317 IR 07200059/20234012023-10-0505 October 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200059/2023401 IR 05000373/20233012023-09-15015 September 2023 Errata to NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000373/2023301; 05000374/2023301 RS-23-080, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs2023-08-30030 August 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs BVY 23-022, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-08-23023 August 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust IR 05000271/20230012023-08-15015 August 2023 Northstar Nuclear Decommissioning Company, Llc., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, - NRC Inspection Report 05000271/2023001 RS-23-087, Revision to Approved Alternatives Associated with the Use of the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Code Requirements on Reactor2023-08-0404 August 2023 Revision to Approved Alternatives Associated with the Use of the BWRVIP Guidelines in Lieu of Specific ASME Code Requirements on Reactor ML23212A9012023-08-0303 August 2023 Regulatory Audit Report to Support the Review of the Amendments to Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report BVY 23-021, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G2023-08-0202 August 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 10 CFR 20, Appendix G BVY 23-020, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-08-0202 August 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust IR 05000373/20230022023-08-0101 August 2023 County Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000373/2023002 and 05000374/2023002 ML23208A3182023-07-27027 July 2023 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and RFI RS-23-084, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Application to Revise Design Basis to Allow Use of Plastic Section Properties in Lower Downcomer Braces Analysis2023-07-24024 July 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the Application to Revise Design Basis to Allow Use of Plastic Section Properties in Lower Downcomer Braces Analysis BVY 23-019, Update to 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report2023-07-24024 July 2023 Update to 2022 Radiological Effluent Release Report BVY 23-018, Update to Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance2023-07-12012 July 2023 Update to Nuclear Onsite Property Damage Insurance ML23192A5272023-07-12012 July 2023 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000373/2023301; 05000374/2023301 ML23186A2062023-07-0606 July 2023 Information Request for a NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal 05000374/2023010 ML23181A1502023-06-30030 June 2023 Combined Response to Request for Additional Information and Supplemental Information in Support of LAR to Relocate Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves to the Pressure and Temperature Limits Report BVY 23-017, Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust2023-06-29029 June 2023 Pre-Notice of Disbursement from Decommissioning Trust ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III IR 05000373/20230112023-06-26026 June 2023 County Station - Quadrennial Fire Protection Team Inspection Report 05000373/2023011 and 05000374/2023011 RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23167A0352023-06-16016 June 2023 Registration of Use of Cask to Store Spent Fuel ML23171A9562023-06-12012 June 2023 Post Exam Ltr BVY 23-015, Report of Investigation Pursuant to 1O CFR 20, Appendix G2023-06-0505 June 2023 Report of Investigation Pursuant to 1O CFR 20, Appendix G 2024-01-05
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T n Gorham - Please review'LaSalle SP'P From: "Mike Mulligan" <steamshovel@adelphia.net>
To: <vld@nrc.gov>
Date: 12/13/02 1:36PM
Subject:
Please review 'LaSalle SPC' Actually I meant to send this one. Please ignore the one I sent on Dec 13,2002 @ 1:31pm.
3aorham - LaSalle SPC.doc Gorhm -La~lleSPCdocPage 1:Page 1!
MEMORANDUM TO: Geoffrey E. Grant, Director Division of Reactor Projects Region III From: Mike Mulligan PO Box 161 Hinsdale, NH Dec. 13, 2002 This memo is in response to my previous concern about SRV leakage, excessive safety equipment operation: a series of 2.206 with LaSalle, Vermont Yankee, and other similar situation within the nuclear industry. I admit I don't know just where to send this too:
Although I request this be entered into Adams.
I find it amazing the tech spec characterization of SPC. I though a fundamental nuclear philosophy was; we only go down the well worn path of plant planned and engineered operation. I though plant design and operational characterization (UFSAR and TS) defined "what was permissible operation" and thus properly build and planned for. Now you are telling me that the bureaucratic regime (rules) only defines what is non permissible; that any plant safety equipment and operational strategy is "very permissible and safe", if it is not expressly prohibited in plant design and operational characterizations. Anybody with any technical ability, and any administrator of rules, can clearly see through the huge hole in this UFASAR characterization and its disconnected statements. You can't be serious with this as the controlling wording in which our government characterizes the ability of LaSalle to control the potential release of radioactivity.
"The heat removal capability of one RHR pump in one subsystem is sufficient to meet the overall DBA [design basis accident] pool cooling requirement to limit peak pool temperature to 208 degrees F for loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) and transient events such as a turbine trip or stuck open safety/relief valve (S/RV). S/RV leakage and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System testing increase suppression pool temperature more slowly. The RHR Suppression Pool Cooling System is also used to lower the suppression pool water bulk temperature following such events."
Per Microsoft Bookshelf 98 definition of "event": 5. Physics. A phenomenon or occurrence located at a single point in space-time, regarded as the fundamental observational entity in relativity theory.1 "Events" generally defines a specific occurrence and it generally doesn't speak of prolonged problems.
] Excerpted from The American HentageGA Dictionaryof the English Language, Third Edliton 0 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Company Electronic version licensed from INSO Corporation, further reproduction and distribution in accordance with the Copyright Law of the United States All rights reserved.
[lTajuan Gorham - LaSalle SPC.doc .. .
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Can't you hear this in current events in the industry? Well, with 50 Ibms of high carbon steel missing from the vessel head - there are no prohibitions of this in the UFSAR and TS. Why should we measure this trend and worry about safety. Even if the vessel deformed liner, which has cracks in it becomes the pressure boundary; it is safe because there is no safety evaluation at the current time which proves that this is unsafe. Massive rust and boron on the head, leak detection system who are getting clogged up; hey there is no specific prohibition of this operation so why worry.
What really concerns me is the agency absolute hyper focus on the highly simplified and disconnected control wording of TS and the UFSAR -in which the agency designs to be vague and opened to interpretation. It's is appalling that nobody in the agency has challenged this. The first responsibility of a utility and the agency in any event, and prolonged occurrence, is to first question if the UFSAR statement is an adequate method of control of the accident precursor. The very next step is if the UFSAR and TS doesn't fully characterize the "event"; is for the agency and utility to place conservative limits on this new trend and activity. It is not to set a course to decade's of ignorance and inactivity.
At the top of any future NRC report like this, you should clearly express the potential consequence of an agency adverse ruling on a event. You have to give the public an idea of what kind of pressures the agency will face by an adverse ruling. You should clearly state what the potential adverse consequence to the power plant and what are the generic consequences are to the industry. This would give the public a much better understanding why ruling come out as they do. In other words, if SPC was limited to a very small percentage of operation, what would be the expected fallout to the industry?
You should query the industry about excessive SPC and if they submitted their 10 CFR50.59.
What the public doesn't understand; is that the agency interpretation of rules and conflict is absolutely consequence driven for the industry. The rules are bent (illusion) at the very beginning to limit consequence to the industry. I bet you this is their highest priority. In other words, the interpretation of the rules is targeted to limit consequences to the industry. Even better yet, the TS and UFASR is written in a very intentionally vague and opaque manner, in that the wording of rules defies any logical rational and specific explanation, except to give wiggle room within prolonged operation of a plant with degraded safety components.
The NRC NRR conclusion of "The NRC staff has determined that continuous long term operation of a single train of the RHR system in the SPC mode is within the LaSalle design basis" is absolutely disconnected from the initial questions by region III and from the facts of the safety questions raised in the report itself. Region III asks two separate questions: 1) is SPC long term operation characterized in the design bases and 2) does it have a waterhammer problem.
We really know that the long term operation of the SPC, like in the summer of 2001
-the single train training that was continuously running was really not functional. There can be no doubt that many other facilities have been excessively using SPC. and in that use, the component should have been declared as INOP. You should have
ITajuan Gorham mLaSalle SPC.doc Page 31 followed TS with one train INOP.
Another issue of the intentional NRC selectivity; is the agency limited the discussion of SPC operation in the summer of 2001. My bet is that LaSalle was repetitively destructively starting and stopping the SPC based on some temperature consideration throughout the recent years. We should have had the data and trends on the last ten years of operation with SPC and SRV leakage at both plants. The agency is being intentionally selective in this limited disclosure and the portrayal as this problem only being in the summer of 2001. I will bet you for many years LaSalle didn't meet the limitation of less than 2% operation. Like how many startups are allowed in the 92 day period.
Let us talk about another nuclear "absolute" safety philosophy. That a safety system engineering analysis is highly detailed and accurate, and its adequacy of the safety evaluation is never questoned, or the system is declared broken. In other words, if the adequacy of the evaluation is questioned: 1) you should not ever depend of the equipment in a safety situation and 2) You should define its functionality as broken until all of the questions are clear up. You should even question now if "other"safety system evaluations - "contains many simplifying assumptions for which the staff has identified numerous concerns that reflect on the adequacy of the waterhammer evaluation". I mean how wide spread is this problem in other systems. We absolutely know the shallow and simplified evaluation of the waterhammer issue comes directly from the top, with the horribly simplified control wording of the UFSAR state and TS. The agency really needs to explain what that wording allows.
Another very serious problem is the length of delay to the public in getting this report.
What really happens is there is a large set of questions that the utility just doesn't have the answers to, in a situation like the SPC. Like I said, if a nuclear safety system is not fully characterized in an engineering evaluation - than the equipment should be thought of as broken. What we are doing, is we are facilitating a plant's operating with safety equipment and analysis being inadequate for a prolonged period. We are giving the utilities a benefit with being uncharacterized.
They should never have been an unanswered questions as this, in an operational reactor. By the time a report like this comes out, and all the back door communications between the NRC and the utility; the public never gets a real time perception of all of open questions on the situation. These opened questions generally ask if a component is degraded or broken. It's only in hindsight, after years of not knowing, that the public finds out of the problem and the length of time delay has allowed the utility to answer the problem. It is corrupt and you know it. Basically the special deal the NRC has given the industry is -we will give you have many years of delay to correct this problem - in which the NRC and the utility should have never allowed the facility to go into. Are you going to make a retroactive 10 CFR 50.59?
"While it is clear from the TS Bases that the NRC staff acknowledged RHR operation in the SPC mode for S/RV leakage, it was the staffs expectation that the S/RVs would be well maintained such that any leakage would be minor and the use of SPC would be infrequent and of short duration." - This statement is very troubling. It basically tells us what the NRC's long term expectation of the limits with SPC and SRV. Why didn't the NRC enforce those limits in the summer of 2001? Further, why didn't the inspection
I Tajuan Gorham - LaSalle SPC.doc Paoe 4 I TauanGoram La~lleSPCdocPaae 4 program fully characterize these deficiencies and force the utility into performing a tmelylOCFR 50.59? Why didn't the NRC fully characterize the SRV in inspection reports, such that they are "well maintained" in the summer of 2001? As I said before, if you don't know what the characterization is on the degradation of a safety component is, you define the component as broken until proven reliable.
I find these two NRC statements very troubling:
- 1) "The NRC staff has determined that continuous long term operation of a single train of the RHR system in the SPC mode is within the LaSalle design basis."
- 2) Although SPC operation is bounded by RHR system analysis and its frequency is not restricted, unless otherwise specified in the licensing basis, the staff expects that use of SPC during normal operation would be of short duration and that any significant increase in frequency be reviewed in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 change process.
Wait a minute, where do you get that the 'frequency is not restricted". Does it come form the absence of a specific prohibited wording on the simplified wording of the UFSAR and TS. Is it a just a matter of regulatory wording -and not an actual safety analysis and engineering evaluation of the operating regime. Is it just a matter of your simplified wording: you have got to be kidding? Where do I get the RHR system analysis? I wonder how many numerous simplifying assumptions are made within the specific RHR system Analysis for LaSalle?
The only conclusion you can get from this is that the design bases wording is inadequate and the NRC is unwilling to challenge this. I will bet you an adverse NRC finding of this will have a huge consequence to the industry-with most of the control wording at the plant's being vague and designed to be open to interpretation. As I said before, the UFSAR wording of this is so opaque and vague, (you should be ashamed of it) and it is plain wrong if you allow plant operation regimes that are not expressly characterized (expressly analyzed, designed, tested and proceduralize) in the TS and the UFSAR.
You know the risks of this activity has not been evaluated. The risk of a premature component breakdown, the risk of a breaker explosion and fire, the risk of personnel being caught up with a problem with the operation of SPC and being distracted from more important problems, and let us not forget, from the SPC tiring the shift leading to errors. And there has been preventable errors already seen by this improper operation at multiple sites, from the excessive operation of safety equipment as the SPC. We know you passed the buck by telling us it is a maintenance issue - without telling us just what extra maintenance action has occurred do to the excessive operation of the components (delta change). We also know that SRV leakage, to the extent of that as LaSalle, was never planned for in initial plant design and the initial generic design of GE.
The pressures which led to this have been well expressed. We had enormous political and economic pressures place on the industry. And it can't be forgotten; we had two somewhat subtle trends that have been interacting. We had the heat sink and weather
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[ ITajuan Gorham - LaSalle SPC.doc Page Page 55 1 1
I Tajuan Gorham LaSalle SPC.doc patterns interacting with the long term maintenance failures with SRV valves. And again and again, we get around to the rather vague NRC declarations that SRV problems and leakage has been improving without any detailed explanation. Of course, what we worry about is the NRC will just look like a selective set of facts on the SRV problems and thus gives us an intentionally misleading indication of the problems.
From IN 87-10 "Extended use (increased frequency and long duration) of the RHR system in the SPC mode during normal operation may be outside the original design-basis analysis (LOCA) assumptions." And "In addition, a significant increase in the amount of time the RHR system is operated may affect the amount and types of preventive maintenance and monitoring activities that are required to ensure that it is capable of performing its intended function."
Can you believe that the agency does not have any absolute regulatory stance about this yet? What I can't figure out, why the utilities can't figure out a way, such that the energy and water is directed away and accurately measured from the suppression pool.
Sincerely, Mike Mulligan PO Box 161 Hinsdale, NH 16033367179
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