IR 05000245/2004011

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IR 05000245-04-011, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., Millstone Power Station Unit 1, Waterford, Connecticut
ML041910480
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/09/2004
From: Mark Miller
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
To: Price J
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
References
IR-04-011
Download: ML041910480 (13)


Text

uly 9, 2004

SUBJECT:

INSPECTION 05000245/2004011, DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC., MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 1, WATERFORD, CONNECTICUT

Dear Mr. Price:

On June 10, 2004, the NRC completed an inspection of your Millstone Unit 1 nuclear reactor facility at Waterford, Connecticut, which covered an inspection period that began on January 11, 2004. The findings of the inspection were discussed with Mr. Stephen Scace and members of his staff on June 10, 2004. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection.

Your spent fuel pool safety, design modification, corrective action program, radiation protection, radioactive waste effluent, and radioactive waste shipping programs were inspected during this inspection period. The inspection consisted of selected examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector. The programs were generally implemented in a safe manner. No safety concerns were identified.

.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if you choose to provide one) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) and will be accessible from the NRC web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Marie Miller, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Docket No. 50-245 License No. DPR-21

J. Alan Price 2 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 05000245/2004011 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I==

INSPECTION REPORT Docket No. 50-245 License No. DPR-21 Inspection No. 05000245/2004011 Licensee: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Facility: Millstone Power Station, Unit 1 Location: Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 Dates: January 10, 2004 - June 11, 2004 Inspector: Robert Prince, Health Physicist Approved by: Marie Miller, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Material Safety Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

NRC Inspection Report No. 05000245/2004011 This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations and plant support during decommissioning activities. The report covers announced inspections by regional inspectors.

No violations were identified.

Operations and Decommissioning The licensee maintained an effective spent fuel pool safety program. Operator tours, the chemistry control program, and maintenance of equipment important for the safe storage of spent fuel were adequately conducted. Equipment operational parameters and chemistry parameters were being maintained within required limits. The licensee response to a loss of offsite power event identified the need for improved procedural guidance to maintain operability to a SFP component important to safety. Though the ultimate increase in SFP temperature was well below specified action levels the established measures were not effective in maintaining the operability of the DHR system and resulted in an unplanned increase in SFP temperature.

The temporary liquid waste processing system was adequately designed, installed and tested to support the processing, analysis and release of reactor cavity and reactor vessel water. The design and field work were completed in accordance with appropriate work instructions The licensee effectively utilized the established corrective action program to self-identify and correct issues and problems. The threshold for identifying issues important for the safe storage of spent fuel continues to be adequate.

Plant Support and Radiological Controls The licensee has provided adequate controls to limit exposures of workers to external sources of radiation. Posting and labeling of radioactive materials and radiation areas continues to meet regulatory requirements. Radiological controls and dose estimates for the segmentation project were adequate and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) measures effectively implemented to achieve dose goals.

Calibration and functional tests performed on the spent fuel pool island ventilation exhaust radiation monitor were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The licensee has provided adequate controls to ensure that radioactive effluent releases are processed, analyzed and released in compliance with regulatory requirements.

Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the receipt inspection and survey requirements associated with incoming radioactive material shipments. Receipt surveys were performed in an adequate manner and in accordance with procedural requirements.

ii Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS I. Operations and Decommissioning Status 01 Conduct of Operations 01.1 Spent Fuel Pool Safety b. Inspection Scope (60801)

The inspector reviewed the condition and operational status of equipment and components important to the safe storage of spent fuel. The inspection consisted of tours of plant areas, visual observation of plant equipment, reviews of licensee procedures and surveillance records and interviews with cognizant personnel.

c. Observations The inspector reviewed selected records of Operator logs for the first quarter of 2004 associated with Unit 1 systems and components important to the safe storage of spent fuel. The inspector observed a Plant Equipment Operator (PEO) during his shift rounds.

The PEO was knowledgeable of the surveillance requirements and adequately inspected components and equipment for proper operation. No concerns were noted.

The inspector reviewed procedure SP 852, Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Chemistry Control that specifies the sampling and analysis requirements for the spent fuel pool (SFP)

water and associated systems. The inspector noted that appropriate acceptance criteria are provided and the procedure specifies appropriate actions in the event that any acceptance criteria are exceeded. The inspector reviewed selected chemistry records covering a several month period for the SFP, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system and the spent fuel pool makeup storage tank. No adverse trends or safety concerns were noted.

The inspector reviewed the listing of open maintenance work, first quarter 2004 Condition Reports (CR) and listing of recently completed maintenance activities for Unit 1. The inspector toured the facility and verified that components and equipment important to the safe storage of spent fuel were operable and adequately maintained.

Material condition of plant equipment and building areas was adequate. No safety concerns were identified.

The inspector reviewed the circumstances associated with an event that occurred on March 21 and 22, 2004, that resulted in the loss of offsite power to Unit 1. Offsite power was lost due to an offsite fire that damaged a utility pole. The licensee followed procedural guidance that contained criteria for draining the DHR system during periods when outside temperatures are less than 32oF coupled with an extended period of loss of forced flow. The licensee also implemented contingency measures that included obtaining temperature readings at specific locations on portions of the DHR system located in outside areas. Despite these efforts, during the period that the Flanders Line was unavailable (approximately 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />) the DHR system coolers froze. The SFP Enclosure

temperature increased from 81oF to almost 89oF during this period, but was below the 145oF Technical Requirements Manual limit. The licensee entered this event in their corrective action program as CR number CR-04-02630.

The inspector reviewed procedures ONP 540F, Loss of Normal Power and OP 310, Fuel Pool Cooling System that specified the actions to be taken in the event that offsite power is lost. Even though procedural guidance is available the licensee concluded as part of their investigation of the incident that the specified procedural guidance was inadequate. The inspector noted that the licensee revised procedure ONP 540F adding specific time requirements for the commencement of draining of the DHR system when loss of power is experienced during cold weather conditions. The procedure was also revised to specify that the preferred action is to restore power utilizing the Unit 1 backup diesel generator thus eliminating the need to drain the DHR system. Based on discussions with cognizant personnel the inspector concluded that either action could be implemented within an approximately 30 minute time frame. The inspector reviewed the investigation results and corrective actions associated with CR-04-02630 and discussed details with cognizant personnel. Specified corrective actions are adequate to prevent recurrence of a similar event.

d. Conclusions The licensee maintained an effective SFP safety program. Operator tours, the chemistry control program, and maintenance of equipment important for the safe storage of spent fuel were adequately conducted. Equipment operational parameters and chemistry parameters were being maintained within required limits. The licensee response to a loss of offsite power event identified the need for improved procedural guidance to maintain operability to a SFP component important to safety. Though the ultimate increase in SFP temperature was well below specified action levels the established measures were not effective in maintaining the operability of the DHR system and resulted in an unplanned increase in SFP temperature.

01.2 Safety Reviews, Design Changes, and Modifications a. Inspection Scope (37801)

A review was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees safety review program and if design changes, tests, and modifications were conducted in accordance with regulatory requirements.

Enclosure

b. Observations and Findings The inspector reviewed Design Change Notice (DCN) number DM1-01-0007-02, Installation of Reactor Cavity/Vessel Water Sample/Processing System and the associated test plan. This DCN covered the installation of four tanks, each with a capacity of 10,500 gallons, a sample pump, a discharge radiation monitor, an automatic isolation valve and the associated piping system. The DCN adequately addressed the installation and operation of the temporary liquid waste processing system.

The inspector performed a field walk-down of the processing system with cognizant personnel. The installation of the four processing tanks, interconnecting piping and associated valves were inspected for leak tightness and for conformity with installation details specified in the DCN. The Work Order (WO number M1-03-00070) under which the equipment was installed was reviewed. The inspector observed licensee personnel perform a pre-operational test on the discharge line radiation monitor and isolation valve. The isolation valve automatically closed upon receipt of a radiation test signal that exceeded an established set point. The inspector observed the initial test stages that involved filling one of the process tanks with clean water. No leakage from the tank or associated piping was observed. No safety concerns were identified.

c. Conclusions The temporary liquid waste processing system was adequately designed, installed and tested to support the processing, analysis and release of reactor cavity and reactor vessel water. The design and field work were completed in accordance with appropriate work instructions.

01.3 Self Assessment, Auditing, and Corrective Action Program a. Inspection Scope (40801)

A review was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee controls in identifying, resolving, and preventing issues that degrade safety or the quality of decommissioning activities. The inspector evaluated the licensees corrective action program through a review of CRs over the period from January to early June 2004, and interviews with licensee personnel.

b. Observations Condition reports were reviewed for safety-related issues and for the identification of any adverse trends or generic concerns. The threshold for identification of issues continues to be adequate. Selected CRs were reviewed to evaluate the licensees effectiveness in identifying appropriate corrective actions and the implementation of those corrective actions. The inspector discussed the tracking, current status, and closure of selected corrective actions with cognizant personnel. The inspector noted that adequate corrective actions were established to address identified issues and that corrective actions were being tracked to closure utilizing established processes.

Enclosure

c. Conclusions The licensee effectively utilized the established corrective action program to self-identify and correct issues and problems. The threshold for identifying issues important for the safe storage of spent fuel continues to be adequate.

II Plant Support and Radiological Controls R1 Radiological Protection Controls R1.1 Occupational Exposure Controls a. Inspection Scope (83750)

The inspector reviewed the licensees program to determine the capability to monitor and control radiation exposure to employees and to determine adequacy of the licensees radiation protection program. The inspection consisted of interviews with cognizant personnel, review of radiological survey records, and inspection of radiological postings.

b. Observations The inspector reviewed the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) summary and radiological survey records for the grid segmentation project. This project involved the cutting of the upper fuel grid into small segments and packaging these segments into canisters for storage in the spent fuel pool. Work activities were performed underwater utilizing specialized tooling and equipment. A goal of 3100 mrem was established for the project. The licensee stated that they expected to complete the project with an additional 125 mrem of exposure. This would result in a total project dose of approximately 2425 mrem versus the goal of 3100 mrem. The inspector reviewed radiological survey records for the project and noted that they were thorough and adequate. No safety concerns were identified.

The inspector reviewed selected radiological survey records and radiation work permits.

The inspector observed that areas of the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) were appropriately posted and labeled for radioactive material. Radiological postings were readily visible, well maintained and adequately reflected radiological conditions in the posted areas. High radiation areas and technical specification locked high radiation areas were properly posted and locked as required.

Enclosure

c. Conclusions The licensee has provided adequate controls to limit exposures of workers to external sources of radiation. Posting and labeling of radioactive materials and radiation areas continues to meet regulatory requirements. Radiological controls and dose estimates for the segmentation project were adequate and ALARA measures effectively implemented to achieve dose goals.

R1.2 Radioactive Waste Effluent and Environmental Monitoring a. Inspection Scope (84750)

The inspector reviewed calibration and functional test procedures and work packages for the SFP island ventilation exhaust radiation monitor. The inspector reviewed preparations for the drain-down, processing and release of reactor cavity water. The inspection consisted of interviews with cognizant personnel, visual observation of plant equipment, and review of associated procedures.

b. Observations The inspector reviewed calibration and functional test procedures associated with the SFP island ventilation exhaust radiation air monitor. The calibration procedure and functional test procedure were noted to be thorough and contained appropriate acceptance criteria. The most recent calibration and functional test packages for the SFP island vent radiation monitor were reviewed. The test packages were thorough and appropriate acceptance criteria as specified in the procedures were met. No safety concerns were identified.

The inspector reviewed procedure U1-OPS-FP-OP-040, Operation of Reactor Cavity Liquid Waste Processing System at Millstone Unit One. This procedure was associated with the operation of the temporary system and components installed to process reactor cavity liquid waste. The procedure specified sampling and analysis requirements, performance of radiation monitor operation checks and preparation of liquid discharge permits. The operating procedure adequately addressed the installation and operation of the temporary liquid waste processing system.

The inspector observed licensee personnel perform a pre-operational test on the radiation monitor and isolation valve. The isolation valve automatically closed upon receipt of a radiation test signal that exceeded the allowable set point. No safety concerns were identified.

c. Conclusions Calibration and functional tests performed on the SFP island ventilation exhaust radiation monitor were performed in accordance with procedural requirements and satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The licensee has provided adequate controls to ensure that radioactive effluent releases are processed, analyzed and released in Enclosure

compliance with regulatory requirements.

R1.3 Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation a. Inspection Scope (86750)

The inspector observed the receipt survey of an incoming shipping cask. The inspection consisted of interviews with cognizant personnel, review of shipping papers and observation of receipt activities.

b. Observations The inspector observed the receipt of a Type B shipping cask. The shipment was an exclusive use vehicle and consisted of an empty cask that was arriving onsite to be utilized for the shipment of radioactive waste material. The cask was internally contaminated and labeled as a Yellow-II radioactive material shipment with a Transport Index of 0.2. The inspector reviewed the shipping manifest and radiological survey data for the incoming shipment. The inspector observed a licensee Health Physics technician perform radiation and contamination surveys of the incoming vehicle. The inspector discussed acceptance criteria and procedural requirements with the technician associated with radioactive material receipt inspections and surveys. No issues or safety concerns were identified.

c. Conclusions Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the receipt inspection and survey requirements associated with incoming radioactive material shipments. Receipt surveys were performed in an adequate manner and in accordance with procedural requirements.

V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management during exit meetings with Mr. Alan Price and others on March 4, 2004 and Stephen Scace and others on June 10, 2004. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented by the inspector.

Enclosure

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee

    • F. Altvator, Radiation Protection
  • J. Bergin, Supervisor - Operations G. Blackburn, Supervisor - Chemistry B. Borchert, Reactor Engineering
    • B.. Bracall, Unit 2 Operations
    • C. Chapin, Unit 2 Operations
    • D. Dodson, Supervisor, Licensing B. Eakin, Radiological Engineering
  • B. Gorman, Supervisor - I&C
  • S. Heard, Acting Director Nuclear Safety & Licensing
  • S. Jordan, Engineering Director
    • B. Kaufman. Nuclear Oversight F. Kral, Environmental Coordinator
      • B. Krauth, Senior Analyst, Licensing
  • J. Kunze, Unit 2 Operations Manager
      • J. Eric Lane, Radiation Protection & Chemistry Manager
    • R. Leach, Radiation Protection G. Nay, I&C W. McCollum, Unit Supervisor Operations B. McDonald, Chemist
    • D. Meekhoff, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
    • F. Neff, Nuclear Oversight J. Olson, Unit 1 Project Operations Supervisor, Operations
  • F. A. Perry, Shift Supervisor Health Physics, Radiation Protection
      • F.T. Perry, ALARA Engineer, Radiation Protection
  • A. Price, Site Vice President
    • D. Regan, Radiation Protection B. Robertson, Radiation Protection
      • P. Quinlan, Project Engineer, Unit 1 Projects B. Salen, I&C
  • S. Sarver, Director Nuclear Station Operations & Maintenance
    • Stephen Scace, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing T. Touw, Unit 2 Operations, Plant Equipment Operator
  • Denotes attendance at the onsite exit meeting held on March 4, 2004.
    • Denotes attendance at the onsite exit meeting held on June 10, 2004.
      • Denotes attendance at both the March 4 and June 10, 2004 exit meetings.

Attachment

A-2 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 37801 Safety Reviews, Design Changes and Modifications 40801 Self Assessment and Corrective Action 60801 Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently Shutdown Reactors 62801 Maintenance and Surveillance at PSD Reactors 83750 Occupational Radiation Exposure 84750 Radwaste Treatment and Effluent and Environmental Monitoring 86750 Solid Radwaste Management and Transportation ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable CR Condition Report DCN Design Change Notice DCR Decay Heat Removal PDR Public Document Room PEO Plant Equipment Operator RCA Radiologically Controlled Area SFP Spent Fuel Pool Attachment