ML050260671
ML050260671 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Indian Point |
Issue date: | 12/16/2004 |
From: | Collins S Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I |
To: | |
References | |
Download: ML050260671 (89) | |
Text
Government to Government Meeting Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator NRC Region I December 16, 2004
Welcome
- Introductions
- NRC Strategic Plan - Openness Goal
- Annual performance related meetings
- Communication plans
- Web site
- Government-to-Government Meeting
- Responsive to local officials
- Nuclear regulation is the publics business
- Objectives
- Common understanding
- Update local officials on NRC actions 2
Meeting Structure and Agenda Brian E. Holian Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Region I
Meeting Structure
- Previous Public Meetings
- Agenda For This Meeting
- Official Use Only Information
- Logistics 4
Agenda 9:00 Welcome and Introductions Sam Collins 9:10 Meeting Structure and Agenda Brian Holian 9:15 Plant Performance Overview Brian McDermott 9:20 Q&A 9:35 Security & Safeguards Alan Madison 9:50 Q&A 10:05 Emergency Preparedness (EP) Patricia Milligan 10:20 Q & A 10:35 BREAK 10:50 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Larry Camper 11:05 Q&A 11:20 General Q & A (including carryover topics) 11:55 Closing Remarks Sam Collins 12:00 Meeting Adjourns 5
Plant Performance Overview Brian J. McDermott, Chief Projects Branch2 Division of Reactor Projects Region I
Reactor Oversight Program Strategic Performance Areas
& Safety Cornerstones Inspection Performance Findings Indicators Significance Action Significance Determination Matrix Determination Regulatory Response 7
NRC Action Matrix 8
Licensee Response All Assessment Inputs (Performance Indicators
[PIs] and Inspection Findings) Green; Cornerstone Objectives Fully Met 9
Regulatory Response One or Two White Inputs (in different cornerstones) in a Strategic Performance Area; Cornerstone Objectives Fully Met 10
Degraded Cornerstone One Degraded Cornerstone (2 White Inputs or 1 Yellow Input) or any 3 White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area; Cornerstone Objectives Met with Moderate Degradation in Safety Performance 11
Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or 1 Red Input; Cornerstone Objectives Met with Longstanding Issues or Significant Degradation in Safety Performance 12
Indian Point Unit 3 Performance Unit 3 Unplanned Scrams PI Turns White 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Reg.
Resp.
Licensee Licensee Response Response NRC Action Matrix and Oversight 13
Indian Point Unit 2 Performance Electrical Steam Operator Degraded Distribution Generator Training Fire Barrier Finding Tube Leak Finding Finding Finding 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Multiple Degraded Cornerstones Degraded Degraded Cornerstone Cornerstone Regulatory Response Licensee
Response
NRC Action Matrix ROP Deviation Memorandum and Oversight 14
NRC Performance Assessment
- Both units operated safely
- Overall performance at the station has improved, albeit slowly
- Improvement in the area of human performance; Unit 2 substantive cross-cutting issue closed
- Mixed results in improving corrective action program effectiveness; Unit 2 substantive crosscutting issue remains open
- Noteworthy challenges continue to require significant management attention 15
NRC Planned Actions
- Continue focus on corrective action effectiveness
- Additional oversight of large projects challenging the site
- Integration of Units 2 and 3
- Backlog reductions
- ISFSI
- Design Basis Initiative
- Maintain heightened management involvement and oversight 16
Performance Overview Questions ?
17
Overview of NRC Security Activities Alan Madison, Chief Security Performance Evaluations Section Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response December 16, 2004
Topics
- Security Orders Issued in 2002 & 2003
- NRC Review and Approval of Security Plans
- Baseline Security Inspection Program
- Force-on-Force Exercises
- Vulnerability Assessments and Mitigative Strategies
- Information Security
- Security Response and Preparedness 19
Security Orders Issued in 2002 & 2003
- 2002 Security Orders
- Additional Security Measures for Reactors
- Additional Security Measures for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs)
- 2003 Reactor Security Orders
- Access Authorization
- Training and Qualifications
- Security Officer Work Hour Limits
- Design Basis Threat 20
NRC Review and Approval of Security Plans
- NRC Review and Approval Process
- 198 New Security, Contingency, and Training and Qualification Plans
- Review Complete
- Indian Point Insights 21
Baseline Security Inspection Program
- Development of Revised Program in Concert with Regions and NRR
- Commensurate Inspection Resource Increase 22
Force-on-Force Exercises
- Initial post 9/11 enhanced Pilot Force-on-Force (FOF) exercise program complete
Force-on-Force Exercises
- Fully enhanced FOF program began November 2004
- Areas of focus:
- Use of laser-simulation weapons
- Adversary realism
- Controller training
- Exercise format and content 24
Vulnerability Assessments and Mitigative Strategies
- Detailed Analyses addressing a broad range of threats
- Broad use of NRC and contractor expertise
- Continued development of mitigative strategies to minimize potential security vulnerabilities 25
Information Security
- Appropriate Balance in Disclosure
- Security Findings in Reactor Oversight Program No Longer Public
- Licensee Security Clearance Program
- Public Access to Adams 26
Security Response and Preparedness
- Coordination among the key on-site and off-site responders is essential
- Enhanced sharing of threat information
- Ongoing exercises of capabilities, roles, and responsibilities incorporating key assets 27
Overview of NRC Security Activities Questions ?
28
Emergency Preparedness Patricia A. Milligan, CHP Emergency Preparedness Directorate Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
Emergency Preparedness The NRC recognizes that many things have changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of responses to protect the public from the impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant.
30
Emergency Preparedness Post 9/11
- NRC believes the Emergency Preparedness planning basis for nuclear power reactors remains valid.
- Challenges for Emergency Preparedness in post 9/11 world:
- Revised design basis threat
- Communication strategies
- Coordination among federal agencies (including creation of the Department of Homeland Security and state DHS offices)
- Revised national response plan 31
Emergency Preparedness Post 9/11 (Contd)
- Evaluation of nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness planning basis adequacy in the post 9/11 threat environment.
- Generic communications to licensees addressing post 9/11 EP issues
- Study of Protective Action Recommendations with Sandia national laboratory
- Pilot drill program to look into licensee EP response with terrorist based scenarios 32
Exercises
- Force-on-Force security exercises with an Emergency Preparedness component
- Significant, but less extensive challenges to EP interface
- Detailed demonstration and rigorous analysis of security challenges 33
Exercises (Contd)
- Emergency Preparedness Exercises (public)
- Detailed demonstration and rigorous analysis of EP-Operations challenges involving offsite response organization participation
- Security interface limited; terrorism component not required
- Terrorist-Based Exercise Scenarios
- Indian Point in 2004
- Diablo Canyon in 2003
- Palo Verde in 2000 34
Force-on-Force Lessons Learned
- Observation of transitional Force-on-Force exercises conducted with select licensees through October 2004
- Lessons-learned shared with industry
- NRCs Emergency Preparedness Directorate will continue to cover Force-on-Force exercises
- Inspection procedure drafted 35
Enhanced Emergency Action Levels
- Current implementation of Emergency Preparedness is based on radiological consequences
- Moving toward implementing Emergency Plans based on confirmed threats
- Enhanced security-related Emergency Action Levels
- Would raise the classification sooner 36
Enhanced Emergency Action Levels (contd)
- The current Emergency Action Levels will not be changed
- Addition of enhanced security Emergency Action Levels enable licensees to inform states more quickly of a threat
- If a licensee is aware of a threat, they will notify state instead of waiting for actual plant damage 37
Evacuation Study Overview
- Public evacuations have been successful in protecting public health & safety.
- Study validates NRCs use of evacuations as an important protective measure.
38
Evacuation Study Supports Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis
- Evacuations successfully protect the public health & safety over a broad range of initiating circumstances & challenges.
- Public evacuations occur frequently (~once every 3 weeks).
- Shadow evacuations do not affect the effective implementation of adequate protective actions.
- Emergency workers report to duty when asked.
- Public education is an important contributor to efficient & effective evacuations.
- Route alerting is effective & a significant contributor to efficient & effective evacuations. 39
Evacuation Study Investigative Approach
- Perform extensive background search on evacuations in general, as well as on specific evacuation experiences.
- Identify universe of evacuation incidents meeting specified criteria.
- U.S. Mainland public evacuation
- Occurred after January 1, 1990
- Evacuation >1,000 people
- Evacuation from more than a single building or industrial facility
- Identify factors contributing to efficient and 40 effective evacuations.
Evacuation Study Major Issues Considered
- Evacuation decision-making
- Shadow evacuations
- Notification of response
- Special facilities evacuations personnel/officials
- Training & drills
- Citizen notification and warning
- Type of emergency plan
- Citizen action
- Community preparedness &
- Emergency communications history of emergencies
- Traffic movement & control
- Number of deaths/injuries
- Congregate care centers
- Unusual, or special, circumstances
- Law enforcement Issues
- Re-entry Issues 41
Protective Action Recommendation Study
- Review of NRC Protective Action Recommendation guidance documents
- Review sheltering
- Examine innovative strategies
- Involve state/local response organizations in evaluation
- 2 year project to examine technical issues
- If beneficial, changes will be recommended 42
Sheltering
- Staff reviewed potential generic aspects of reactor licensees implementation of protective action recommendations
- NRC guidance to licensees issued in 2004 clarifying that licensees must consider sheltering in the range of Protective Action Recommendations 43
Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles
- Public health security and bio-terrorism preparedness and response act of 2002, P.L.107-188, section 127
- Signed into law on June 12, 2002
- Act is intended to improve the ability of the USA to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bio-terrorism and other public health emergencies 44
Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles (Contd)
- Section 127 requirements:
- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services will make KI available to state and local governments for stockpiling and for distribution in quantities sufficient to protect the public within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant.
- State/locals must submit a plan for stockpiling, distribution, and utilization of KI.
- State must approve local plan(s) and ensure consistency with state plans. 45
Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles (Contd)
- The KI subcommittee of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee developed the guidelines
- One stop shopping for KI,
- Requests will go to one agency
- 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone will not change,
- No new requirements for licensee
- Licensees will not be expected to change their emergency plans/procedures
- Guidelines will be issued to states/stakeholders for input, followed by issuance in the federal register 46
Emergency Preparedness Questions ?
47
Dry Cask Storage at Indian Point Larry Camper, Deputy Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Overview
- Regulatory Framework
- ISFSI Licensing Pathways
- Security Considerations 49
General and Specific Licensed ISFSIs 60 50 Number of Sites 40 30 20 10 0
19 19 19 1980 83 86 19 19 1989 92 95 98 20 20 20 2001 04 07 10 General and Specific Licensed ISFSIs 50
Operating Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Locations Columbia Gen. Station Point Beach DOE - INEEL Rancho Seco GE Morris** Davis-Besse Trojan Prairie Island Big Rock Point Duane Arnold Palisades Haddam Neck Millstone Susquehanna Oyster Creek Peach Bottom Calvert Cliffs Surry Diablo North Anna Canyon McGuire San Onofre Palo Verde H.B. Robinson
= Site-Specific License Dresden Oconee*
= General License ANO Hatch
- Uses Both Site Specific and General License Fort St. Vrain Sequoyah
- Uses wet storage Information as of October 8, 2004 51
Dry Cask Storage System for Indian Point Hi - Storm 100 (Certificate of Compliance 1014)
- OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE
- ARKANSAS NUCLEAR (2003)
- COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION (2002)
- DRESDEN (2003)
- EDWIN I. HATCH (2003)
- FITZPATRICK (2002)
- RIVER BEND (2004)
- SEQUOYAH (2004)
- TROJAN (2003)
- PLANNED
- BROWNS FERRY (2005)
- HOPE CREEK/SALEM (2006)
- QUAD CITIES (2005)
- DIABLO CANYON (2006)
- PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (2005) 52
HI-STORM 100 Cask 53
Dresden ISFSI 54
Regulatory Framework
- Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
- Waste Confidence Decision
- Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) 55
ISFSI Licensing Pathways
- General License - Indian Point
- With Certificate of Compliance
- Specific License 56
General Licensing Process
- Certificate of Compliance
- Power Plant Selects, Evaluates, and Constructs the Dry Cask Storage System
- NRC Inspections 57
General Licensing Process
- Power Plant License Holder Actions
- Evaluate and modify existing programs to support the ISFSI
- Quality Assurance
- Physical Security
- Emergency Planning
- Training
- Health Physics
- Procurement 58
General Licensing Process
- Power Plant License Holders
- Inform NRC 90 days prior to first planned loading
- Register each cask with the NRC within 30 days
- Maintain individual cask records
- Maintain casks in accordance with Certificate of Compliance 59
Review and Approval Process for Certificates of Compliance
- Application submitted to NRC
- Application made available for public inspection
- NRC Safety Review
- Draft Safety Evaluation Report and draft Certificate of Compliance
- Notice of Rulemaking is published in Federal Register
- NRC Review of public comments
- Final Safety Evaluation Report and Issuance of Certificate of Compliance 60
Areas of Evaluation
- Principal Design
- Acceptance Tests Criteria and Maintenance
- Structural Program
- Thermal
- Radiation Protection
- Shielding
- Accident Analyses
- Criticality
- Conditions for Use
- Confinement
- Quality Assurance
- Operating Procedures
- Decommissioning 61
Hazards Considered
- Normal Operations
- Off-Normal Operations
- Design Basis Accidents
- Design Basis Natural Phenomena (e.g.,
Tornados, earthquakes, floods, lightning, tsunami, hurricanes) 62
Publicly Available Information
- NRCs Web-site (www.nrc.gov)
- Electronic Reading Room (ADAMS web-based access)
- Indian Point Proposed ISFSI
- Docket No. 07200051
- Holtec HI-STORM 100 Certificate of Compliance
- Docket No. 07201014 63
NRC Inspection Program
- Component Fabrication
- ISFSI Construction
- Preoperational Testing
- Operations
- Security 64
Security Considerations
- Compliance with 10 CFR Part 73
- Issuance of Security Advisories
- Issuance of Security Orders
- Vulnerability Assessments
- NAS Study on Spent Fuel Storage 65
Dry Cask Storage at Indian Point Questions ?
66
Closing Remarks Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator NRC Region I December 16, 2004
End of Slide Show 68
BACKUP SLIDES 69
70 Potential Near-Term ISFSIs DOE - INEEL Privatized Humboldt Bay Quad Cities Indian Point Monticello Hope Creek - Salem Catawba Brunswick Browns Ferry PFSF Owl Creek Farley
= Site-Specific License River Bend Grand Gulf
= General License (Based on NRC and Public Notification) 71
General Licensing Process
- Certificate of Compliance Usage
- 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K
- Limited to Part 50 Reactor Licensees
- Requires Use of NRC-Certified Cask Designs 72
Technical Review Guidelines
- Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems (NUREG-1536)
- Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities (NUREG-1567)
- Interim Staff Guidance Documents 73
Conditions for Use
- Operating Procedures
- Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program
- Quality Assurance
- Heavy Loads
- Design Features
- Pre-Operational Testing and Training 74
Approved Contents
- Fuel Loading Patterns
- Cladding Type
- Enrichment
- Burnup
- Minimum Cooling Time
- Decay Heat 75
Component Fabrication
- Conditions of Certificate of Compliance are met
- Prior NRC approvals obtained
- No significant increase in occupational radiation exposure
- No significant unreviewed environmental impact 76
ISFSI Construction
- Construction of Systems, Structures, and Components in accordance with:
- Safety Analysis Report
- Certificate of Compliance
- Containers Maintain Function
- Confinement
- Criticality
- Shielding
- Heat Removal
- Prevent damage to SNF containers during handling
- Health and safety of public is maintained 77
ISFSI Construction
- Concrete storage containers built in accordance with:
- Safety Analysis Report
- Safety Evaluation Report
- Certificate of Compliance
- Quality Assurance program
- Pad constructed to specifications
- Sub-soil compaction
- Rebar
- Concrete compressive strength
- Qualification construction workers 78
Preoperational Testing Reviews
- NRC observes and independently evaluates licensees capability
- Test program and test procedures
- Final determination of readiness to load spent fuel into an ISFSI 79
Licensing Document Reviews
- IP 60856, 10CFR72.212(B) Evaluations
- QA Program
- Radiation Protection Program
- Training Program
- IP 60857, 10CFR72.48 Evaluations
- Facility changes under certain conditions w/o prior NRC approval 80
Operations
- Loading Campaigns
- Frequency
- Long-term Operations and Surveillance
- Qualifications of Personnel
- Security/Safeguards
- Fire Protection
- Environmental Monitoring
- Maintenance 81
Security
- Security Plan
- Patrols
- Barriers
- Detection Aids
- Access Control
- Local Law Enforcement Interface
- Compensatory Measures
- Contingencies
- Guard Training and Qualifications
- Audits and Assessments 82
Transferring Cask to Pad 83
Transferring Cask to Pad 84
Cask on Pad 85
Cask Transfer Facility 86
Surry ISFSI 87
Surry ISFSI 88
Surry ISFSI 89