ML050260671

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Combined Slides from Government-to-Government Meeting on December 16, 2004
ML050260671
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/16/2004
From: Collins S
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety I
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Download: ML050260671 (89)
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Government to Government Meeting Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator NRC Region I December 16, 2004

2 Welcome

  • Introductions
  • NRC Strategic Plan - Openness Goal

- Annual performance related meetings

- Communication plans

- Web site

  • Government-to-Government Meeting

- Responsive to local officials

- Nuclear regulation is the publics business

  • Objectives

- Common understanding

- Update local officials on NRC actions

Meeting Structure and Agenda Brian E. Holian Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Region I

4 Meeting Structure

  • Previous Public Meetings
  • Agenda For This Meeting
  • Official Use Only Information
  • Logistics

5 Agenda 9:00 Welcome and Introductions Sam Collins 9:10 Meeting Structure and Agenda Brian Holian 9:15 Plant Performance Overview Brian McDermott 9:20 Q & A 9:35 Security & Safeguards Alan Madison 9:50 Q & A 10:05 Emergency Preparedness (EP)

Patricia Milligan 10:20 Q & A 10:35 BREAK 10:50 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Larry Camper 11:05 Q & A 11:20 General Q & A (including carryover topics) 11:55 Closing Remarks Sam Collins 12:00 Meeting Adjourns

Plant Performance Overview Brian J. McDermott, Chief Projects Branch2 Division of Reactor Projects Region I

7 Reactor Oversight Program Strategic Performance Areas

& Safety Cornerstones Action Matrix Regulatory Response Inspection Findings Performance Indicators Significance Determination Significance Determination

8 NRC Action Matrix

9 Licensee Response All Assessment Inputs (Performance Indicators

[PIs] and Inspection Findings) Green; Cornerstone Objectives Fully Met

10 Regulatory Response One or Two White Inputs (in different cornerstones) in a Strategic Performance Area; Cornerstone Objectives Fully Met

11 Degraded Cornerstone One Degraded Cornerstone (2 White Inputs or 1 Yellow Input) or any 3 White Inputs in a Strategic Performance Area; Cornerstone Objectives Met with Moderate Degradation in Safety Performance

12 Multiple/Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone, Multiple Degraded Cornerstones, Multiple Yellow Inputs, or 1 Red Input; Cornerstone Objectives Met with Longstanding Issues or Significant Degradation in Safety Performance

13 Indian Point Unit 3 Performance 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Licensee

Response

Reg.

Resp.

Licensee

Response

Unit 3 Unplanned Scrams PI Turns White NRC Action Matrix and Oversight

14 Indian Point Unit 2 Performance 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 Multiple Degraded Cornerstones Degraded Cornerstone Regulatory

Response

ROP Deviation Memorandum Licensee

Response

NRC Action Matrix and Oversight Degraded Fire Barrier Finding Operator Training Finding Electrical Distribution Finding Steam Generator Tube Leak Finding Degraded Cornerstone

15 NRC Performance Assessment

  • Both units operated safely
  • Overall performance at the station has improved, albeit slowly
  • Improvement in the area of human performance; Unit 2 substantive cross-cutting issue closed
  • Mixed results in improving corrective action program effectiveness; Unit 2 substantive crosscutting issue remains open
  • Noteworthy challenges continue to require significant management attention

16 NRC Planned Actions

  • Continue focus on corrective action effectiveness
  • Additional oversight of large projects challenging the site

- Integration of Units 2 and 3

- Backlog reductions

- ISFSI

- Design Basis Initiative

  • Maintain heightened management involvement and oversight

17 Performance Overview Questions ?

Overview of NRC Security Activities Alan Madison, Chief Security Performance Evaluations Section Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response December 16, 2004

19 Topics

  • Security Orders Issued in 2002 & 2003
  • NRC Review and Approval of Security Plans
  • Baseline Security Inspection Program
  • Force-on-Force Exercises
  • Vulnerability Assessments and Mitigative Strategies
  • Information Security
  • Security Response and Preparedness

20 Security Orders Issued in 2002 & 2003

  • 2002 Security Orders

- Additional Security Measures for Reactors

- Additional Security Measures for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSIs)

  • 2003 Reactor Security Orders

- Access Authorization

- Training and Qualifications

- Security Officer Work Hour Limits

- Design Basis Threat

21 NRC Review and Approval of Security Plans

  • NRC Review and Approval Process

- 198 New Security, Contingency, and Training and Qualification Plans

- Review Complete

  • Indian Point Insights

22 Baseline Security Inspection Program

  • Development of Revised Program in Concert with Regions and NRR
  • Commensurate Inspection Resource Increase

23 Force-on-Force Exercises

  • Initial post 9/11 enhanced Pilot Force-on-Force (FOF) exercise program complete
  • Transitional FOF exercise program in progress (4 FOF exercises per NRC region)

24 Force-on-Force Exercises

  • Fully enhanced FOF program began November 2004
  • Areas of focus:

- Use of laser-simulation weapons

- Adversary realism

- Controller training

- Exercise format and content

25 Vulnerability Assessments and Mitigative Strategies

  • Detailed Analyses addressing a broad range of threats
  • Broad use of NRC and contractor expertise
  • Continued development of mitigative strategies to minimize potential security vulnerabilities

26 Information Security

  • Appropriate Balance in Disclosure
  • Security Findings in Reactor Oversight Program No Longer Public
  • Licensee Security Clearance Program
  • Public Access to Adams

27 Security Response and Preparedness

  • Coordination among the key on-site and off-site responders is essential
  • Enhanced sharing of threat information
  • Ongoing exercises of capabilities, roles, and responsibilities incorporating key assets

28 Overview of NRC Security Activities Questions ?

Emergency Preparedness Patricia A. Milligan, CHP Emergency Preparedness Directorate Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

30 Emergency Preparedness The NRC recognizes that many things have changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and has been working with Federal, State, and local organizations to improve coordination of responses to protect the public from the impact of a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant.

31 Emergency Preparedness Post 9/11

- Revised design basis threat

- Communication strategies

- Coordination among federal agencies (including creation of the Department of Homeland Security and state DHS offices)

- Revised national response plan

32 Emergency Preparedness Post 9/11 (Contd)

  • Evaluation of nuclear power reactor emergency preparedness planning basis adequacy in the post 9/11 threat environment.

- Generic communications to licensees addressing post 9/11 EP issues

- Study of Protective Action Recommendations with Sandia national laboratory

- Pilot drill program to look into licensee EP response with terrorist based scenarios

33 Exercises

- Significant, but less extensive challenges to EP interface

- Detailed demonstration and rigorous analysis of security challenges

34 Exercises (Contd)

- Detailed demonstration and rigorous analysis of EP-Operations challenges involving offsite response organization participation

- Security interface limited; terrorism component not required

  • Terrorist-Based Exercise Scenarios

- Indian Point in 2004

- Diablo Canyon in 2003

- Palo Verde in 2000

35 Force-on-Force Lessons Learned

  • Observation of transitional Force-on-Force exercises conducted with select licensees through October 2004
  • Lessons-learned shared with industry
  • Inspection procedure drafted

36 Enhanced Emergency Action Levels

- Enhanced security-related Emergency Action Levels

- Would raise the classification sooner

37 Enhanced Emergency Action Levels (contd)

  • The current Emergency Action Levels will not be changed
  • Addition of enhanced security Emergency Action Levels enable licensees to inform states more quickly of a threat

- If a licensee is aware of a threat, they will notify state instead of waiting for actual plant damage

38 Evacuation Study Overview

  • Public evacuations have been successful in protecting public health & safety.
  • Study validates NRCs use of evacuations as an important protective measure.

39 Evacuation Study Supports Emergency Preparedness Planning Basis

  • Evacuations successfully protect the public health & safety over a broad range of initiating circumstances & challenges.

- Public evacuations occur frequently (~once every 3 weeks).

- Shadow evacuations do not affect the effective implementation of adequate protective actions.

- Emergency workers report to duty when asked.

- Public education is an important contributor to efficient & effective evacuations.

- Route alerting is effective & a significant contributor to efficient & effective evacuations.

40 Evacuation Study Investigative Approach

  • Perform extensive background search on evacuations in general, as well as on specific evacuation experiences.
  • Identify universe of evacuation incidents meeting specified criteria.

- U.S. Mainland public evacuation

- Occurred after January 1, 1990

- Evacuation >1,000 people

- Evacuation from more than a single building or industrial facility

  • Identify factors contributing to efficient and effective evacuations.

41 Evacuation Study Major Issues Considered

  • Evacuation decision-making
  • Notification of response personnel/officials
  • Citizen notification and warning
  • Citizen action
  • Emergency communications
  • Traffic movement & control
  • Congregate care centers
  • Law enforcement Issues
  • Re-entry Issues
  • Shadow evacuations
  • Special facilities evacuations
  • Training & drills
  • Community preparedness &

history of emergencies

  • Number of deaths/injuries
  • Unusual, or special, circumstances

42 Protective Action Recommendation Study

  • Review of NRC Protective Action Recommendation guidance documents
  • Review sheltering
  • Examine innovative strategies
  • Involve state/local response organizations in evaluation
  • 2 year project to examine technical issues
  • If beneficial, changes will be recommended

43 Sheltering

  • Staff reviewed potential generic aspects of reactor licensees implementation of protective action recommendations
  • NRC guidance to licensees issued in 2004 clarifying that licensees must consider sheltering in the range of Protective Action Recommendations

44 Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles

  • Public health security and bio-terrorism preparedness and response act of 2002, P.L.107-188, section 127

- Signed into law on June 12, 2002

- Act is intended to improve the ability of the USA to prevent, prepare for, and respond to bio-terrorism and other public health emergencies

45 Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles (Contd)

  • Section 127 requirements:

- The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services will make KI available to state and local governments for stockpiling and for distribution in quantities sufficient to protect the public within 20 miles of a nuclear power plant.

- State/locals must submit a plan for stockpiling, distribution, and utilization of KI.

- State must approve local plan(s) and ensure consistency with state plans.

46 Potassium Iodide - 20 Miles (Contd)

  • The KI subcommittee of the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee developed the guidelines
  • One stop shopping for KI,

- Requests will go to one agency

  • 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone will not change,

- No new requirements for licensee

  • Guidelines will be issued to states/stakeholders for input, followed by issuance in the federal register

47 Emergency Preparedness Questions ?

Dry Cask Storage at Indian Point Larry Camper, Deputy Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

49 Overview

  • Regulatory Framework
  • Security Considerations

50 General and Specific Licensed ISFSIs 0

10 20 30 40 50 60 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 Number of Sites General and Specific Licensed ISFSIs

51 Calvert Cliffs Surry Oconee*

H.B. Robinson Palisades Prairie Island Fort St. Vrain Point Beach Davis-Besse Information as of October 8, 2004 ANO

= General License

= Site-Specific License

  • Uses Both Site Specific and General License
    • Uses wet storage GE Morris**

North Anna Diablo Canyon DOE - INEEL Susquehanna Rancho Seco Peach Bottom Hatch Dresden McGuire Oyster Creek Columbia Gen. Station Big Rock Point San Onofre Duane Arnold Palo Verde Trojan Millstone Haddam Neck Sequoyah Operating Spent Fuel Storage (ISFSI) Locations

52 Dry Cask Storage System for Indian Point OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

- ARKANSAS NUCLEAR (2003)

- COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION (2002)

- DRESDEN (2003)

- EDWIN I. HATCH (2003)

- FITZPATRICK (2002)

- RIVER BEND (2004)

- SEQUOYAH (2004)

- TROJAN (2003)

PLANNED

- BROWNS FERRY (2005)

- HOPE CREEK/SALEM (2006)

- QUAD CITIES (2005)

- DIABLO CANYON (2006)

- PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE FACILITY (2005)

Hi - Storm 100 (Certificate of Compliance 1014)

53 HI-STORM 100 Cask

54 Dresden ISFSI

55 Regulatory Framework

  • Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982
  • Waste Confidence Decision
  • Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO)

56 ISFSI Licensing Pathways

  • General License - Indian Point

- With Certificate of Compliance

  • Specific License

57 General Licensing Process

  • Certificate of Compliance
  • Power Plant Selects, Evaluates, and Constructs the Dry Cask Storage System
  • NRC Inspections

58 General Licensing Process

  • Power Plant License Holder Actions

- Evaluate and modify existing programs to support the ISFSI

  • Quality Assurance
  • Physical Security
  • Emergency Planning
  • Training
  • Health Physics
  • Procurement

59 General Licensing Process

  • Power Plant License Holders

- Inform NRC 90 days prior to first planned loading

- Register each cask with the NRC within 30 days

- Maintain individual cask records

- Maintain casks in accordance with Certificate of Compliance

60 Review and Approval Process for Certificates of Compliance

  • Application submitted to NRC
  • Application made available for public inspection
  • NRC Safety Review
  • Draft Safety Evaluation Report and draft Certificate of Compliance
  • Notice of Rulemaking is published in Federal Register
  • NRC Review of public comments
  • Final Safety Evaluation Report and Issuance of Certificate of Compliance

61 Areas of Evaluation

  • Principal Design Criteria
  • Structural
  • Thermal
  • Shielding
  • Criticality
  • Confinement
  • Operating Procedures
  • Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program
  • Radiation Protection
  • Accident Analyses
  • Conditions for Use
  • Quality Assurance
  • Decommissioning

62 Hazards Considered

  • Normal Operations
  • Off-Normal Operations
  • Design Basis Accidents
  • Design Basis Natural Phenomena (e.g.,

Tornados, earthquakes, floods, lightning, tsunami, hurricanes)

63 Publicly Available Information

  • NRCs Web-site (www.nrc.gov)

- Electronic Reading Room (ADAMS web-based access)

  • Indian Point Proposed ISFSI

- Docket No. 07200051

  • Holtec HI-STORM 100 Certificate of Compliance

- Docket No. 07201014

64 NRC Inspection Program

  • Component Fabrication
  • Preoperational Testing
  • Operations
  • Security

65 Security Considerations

  • Issuance of Security Advisories
  • Issuance of Security Orders
  • Vulnerability Assessments
  • NAS Study on Spent Fuel Storage

66 Dry Cask Storage at Indian Point Questions ?

Closing Remarks Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator NRC Region I December 16, 2004

68 End of Slide Show

69 BACKUP SLIDES

70

71

= General License

= Site-Specific License PFSF Owl Creek Humboldt Bay DOE - INEEL Privatized Farley (Based on NRC and Public Notification)

Browns Ferry Hope Creek - Salem Grand Gulf River Bend Indian Point Quad Cities Monticello Brunswick Catawba Potential Near-Term ISFSIs

72 General Licensing Process

  • Certificate of Compliance Usage

- 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart K

- Limited to Part 50 Reactor Licensees

- Requires Use of NRC-Certified Cask Designs

73 Technical Review Guidelines

  • Standard Review Plan for Dry Cask Storage Systems (NUREG-1536)
  • Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities (NUREG-1567)
  • Interim Staff Guidance Documents

74 Conditions for Use

  • Operating Procedures
  • Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Program
  • Quality Assurance
  • Heavy Loads
  • Design Features
  • Pre-Operational Testing and Training

75 Approved Contents

  • Fuel Loading Patterns
  • Cladding Type
  • Enrichment
  • Burnup
  • Minimum Cooling Time
  • Decay Heat

76 Component Fabrication

- Conditions of Certificate of Compliance are met

- Prior NRC approvals obtained

- No significant increase in occupational radiation exposure

- No significant unreviewed environmental impact

77 ISFSI Construction

- Construction of Systems, Structures, and Components in accordance with:

  • Safety Analysis Report
  • Certificate of Compliance

- Containers Maintain Function

  • Confinement
  • Criticality
  • Shielding
  • Heat Removal

- Prevent damage to SNF containers during handling

- Health and safety of public is maintained

78 ISFSI Construction

  • IP 60853, Onsite Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI

- Concrete storage containers built in accordance with:

  • Safety Analysis Report
  • Safety Evaluation Report
  • Certificate of Compliance
  • Quality Assurance program

- Pad constructed to specifications

  • Sub-soil compaction
  • Rebar
  • Concrete compressive strength
  • Qualification construction workers

79 Preoperational Testing Reviews

- NRC observes and independently evaluates licensees capability

- Test program and test procedures

- Final determination of readiness to load spent fuel into an ISFSI

80 Licensing Document Reviews

- Emergency Plan

- QA Program

- Radiation Protection Program

- Training Program

- Facility changes under certain conditions w/o prior NRC approval

81 Operations

- Loading Campaigns

  • Frequency

- Long-term Operations and Surveillance

  • Qualifications of Personnel
  • Security/Safeguards
  • Fire Protection
  • Environmental Monitoring
  • Maintenance

82 Security

- Security Plan

- Patrols

- Barriers

- Detection Aids

- Access Control

- Local Law Enforcement Interface

- Compensatory Measures

- Contingencies

- Guard Training and Qualifications

- Audits and Assessments

83 Transferring Cask to Pad

84 Transferring Cask to Pad

85 Cask on Pad

86 Cask Transfer Facility

87 Surry ISFSI

88 Surry ISFSI

89 Surry ISFSI

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