ML16182A067

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6/8/2016 - Indian Point Units 2 & 3 Annual Assessment Meeting - NRC Presentation Slides
ML16182A067
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/30/2016
From:
Reactor Projects Branch 2
To:
Dentel G
References
Download: ML16182A067 (14)


Text

Annual Assessment Meeting for Indian Point Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 8, 2016 ML16182A067 1

NRC SPEAKERS David Lew, NRC Region I Deputy Administrator Ray Lorson, Director of the Division of Reactor Safety, Region I Glenn Dentel, Branch Chief in the Division of Reactor Projects, Region I Jack McHale, Chief of the Vessels & Internals Integrity Branch, NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mike McCoppin, Chief of the Radiation Protection and Accident Consequences Branch, NRCs Office of New Reactors 2

Presentations on Plant Performance and Topics of Interest 3

Degradation of Baffle-former Bolts 4

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

5

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

6

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

7

Summary of Bolt Degradation The degraded bolts were identified through required inspections.

Unit 2 is safe to restart based on bolt replacements and supporting analyses.

There are no immediate safety concerns with the current operation of Unit 3.

8

Installation of Pipeline 9

Thresholds for Damage Overpressure Consequence 1 psi Glass shatters 2-6 psi Serious structural damage to houses 6-9 psi Severe damage to reinforced concrete structures 10 psi Destruction of Buildings

  • No safety-related structure necessary to safely shutdown IPEC exposed to >1 psi Thermal Heat Flux (KW/m2) Consequence 2 Pain within 60 sec 5 Tolerable to escaping personnel 12.6 Plastic melts 31.5 Building Damage
  • Max heat flux at SOCA boundary found to be about 1/2 of that which melts plastic 10

Installation of Pipeline (Contd.)

11

Installation of Pipeline (Contd.)

12

Summary of Pipeline Installation Independent and diverse analysis (NRC, Entergy, DOT) demonstrate no safety impacts.

Actual explosions confirmed NRC analysis is conservative.

Plant equipment needed to shut down would remain available during a pipeline explosion.

13

Additional information/questions Contact Neil Sheehan, NRC Public Affairs Officer, at 610-337-5331 or via e-mail at Neil.Sheehan@NRC.GOV 14

Annual Assessment Meeting for Indian Point Nuclear Plant U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 8, 2016 ML16182A067 1

NRC SPEAKERS David Lew, NRC Region I Deputy Administrator Ray Lorson, Director of the Division of Reactor Safety, Region I Glenn Dentel, Branch Chief in the Division of Reactor Projects, Region I Jack McHale, Chief of the Vessels & Internals Integrity Branch, NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Mike McCoppin, Chief of the Radiation Protection and Accident Consequences Branch, NRCs Office of New Reactors 2

Presentations on Plant Performance and Topics of Interest 3

Degradation of Baffle-former Bolts 4

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

5

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

6

Degradation of Bolts (contd.)

7

Summary of Bolt Degradation The degraded bolts were identified through required inspections.

Unit 2 is safe to restart based on bolt replacements and supporting analyses.

There are no immediate safety concerns with the current operation of Unit 3.

8

Installation of Pipeline 9

Thresholds for Damage Overpressure Consequence 1 psi Glass shatters 2-6 psi Serious structural damage to houses 6-9 psi Severe damage to reinforced concrete structures 10 psi Destruction of Buildings

  • No safety-related structure necessary to safely shutdown IPEC exposed to >1 psi Thermal Heat Flux (KW/m2) Consequence 2 Pain within 60 sec 5 Tolerable to escaping personnel 12.6 Plastic melts 31.5 Building Damage
  • Max heat flux at SOCA boundary found to be about 1/2 of that which melts plastic 10

Installation of Pipeline (Contd.)

11

Installation of Pipeline (Contd.)

12

Summary of Pipeline Installation Independent and diverse analysis (NRC, Entergy, DOT) demonstrate no safety impacts.

Actual explosions confirmed NRC analysis is conservative.

Plant equipment needed to shut down would remain available during a pipeline explosion.

13

Additional information/questions Contact Neil Sheehan, NRC Public Affairs Officer, at 610-337-5331 or via e-mail at Neil.Sheehan@NRC.GOV 14