Text

Technical Specification Change TS-07-04, Reactor Trip System/Engineered Safety Feature Logic, Reactor Trip Breaker Allowable Outage Time, and Surveillance Testing Interval Relaxations
	ML071660106
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	06/08/2007
From:	James Smith; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	TS-07-04, WBN-TS-07-04
	Download: ML071660106 (116)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 JUN 0 8 2007 WBN-TS-07-04 10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket No.50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE TS-07-04, REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM/ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE LOGIC, REACTOR TRIP BREAKER ALLOWABLE OUTAGE TIME, AND SURVEILLANCE TESTING INTERVAL RELAXATIONS The purpose of this letter is to request that Appendix A of Facility Operating License NPF-90, Watts Bar Unit 1 Technical Specifications, be amended in accordance with 10 CFR 50.90.

The proposed amendment affects several Technical Specification sections to allow relaxations of various Reactor Trip System/

Engineered Safety Feature logic completion times, bypass test times, allowable outage times, and surveillance testing intervals previously reviewed and approved by NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (Technical. Specification Task Force (TSTF) 418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF 411, Revision

1) and incorporates TSTF Travelers (listed in the table below which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants:"

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 JUN 0 8 2007 TSTF No.! Incorporated Description Date of NRC Rev No. into NUREG Approval 1431, Rev No. Letter 169/1 1 Deletion of Condition 10/31/2000 3.3.1.N 311/0 0 Revision of 04/21/1999 Surveillance Frequency for TADOT on Turbine Trip Functional Unit 411/1 3 Surveillance Test 08/30/2002 Interval Extensions for Components of the Reactor Protection System (WCAP-15376-P-A) 418/2 3 RPS and ESFAS Test 04/02/2003 Times and Completion

,Times (WCAP-14333-P-A)

Provided in Enclosure 1 is a description and justification of the proposed amendment. Annotated versions of the affected Technical Specification pages are provided in Enclosure 2. provides for information only the annotated version of the TS bases pages. Enclosure 4 provides the plant specific confirmation that analysis and component failure probabilities are applicable to WBN as required by condition 1 of both WCAP safety evaluation reports. Portions of Enclosure 4 are proprietary to Westinghouse. Enclosure 5 provides a non-proprietary version of the document contained in Enclosure 4.

Accordingly, Enclosure 6 includes a Westinghouse Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, and an accompanying Affidavit signed by Westinghouse, the owner of the information. Also included are a Proprietary Information Notice and a Copyright Notice. The affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission, and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b) (4) of 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. TVA respectfully requests that the Westinghouse proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 JUN 0 8 2007 Correspondence regarding the proprietary aspects of the Westinghouse report listed above, the Copyright Notice, or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit, should reference CAW-07-2275 and should be addressed to J. A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory compliance and Plant Listing, Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b) (1), a copy of this proposed license amendment is being forwarded to the state designee for the State of Tennessee.

There are no regulatory commitments in this submittal and TVA has not defined a specific schedule or milestone by which the approval of the amendment is needed. However, the surveillance frequency relaxations allowed by this amendment will allow for improvement in Maintenance Rule unavailability for several components, including the Reactor Trip.Breakers. There, TVA requests approval as soon as practicable. TVA requests that once the amendment is approved, 120 days be allowed for implementation.

If you have any questions about this proposed change, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on this 8th day of June 2007.

Sincerely,

j. D. Smith Manager, WBN Site Licensing and Industry Affairs (Acting)

Enclosures cc: See page 4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 JUN 0 8 2007 Enclosures cc (Enclosures):

NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Mr. Brendan T. Moroney, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9a One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. Lawrence E. Nanny, Director Division of Radiological Health 3 rd Floor L & C Annex 401 Church Street Nashville, Tennessee 37243

ENCLOSURE 1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 07-04 TVA'S EVALUATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

This letter proposes an amendment to Appendix A, "Technical Specifications (TS)," of the WBN Operating License, NPF-90. The proposed amendment affects several Technical Specification sections to allow relaxations of various Reactor Trip System/Engineered Safety Feature logic completion times, bypass test times, allowable outage times, and surveillance testing intervals previously reviewed and approved by NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF-411, Revision

1) . (WCAP-14333-P-A and WCAP-15376-P-A are henceforth referenced as WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376.) The proposed amendment also incorporates approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

The proposed changes, as approved in WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418, Revision 2)and WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411, Revision 1), allow increases in the bypass test times for instrumentation channels and Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs); test completion times for instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, master and slave relays, and RTBs; and surveillance test intervals for instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, master relays, and RTBs. The proposed changes in these test times and frequencies are listed in Section 3.0 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 of this Enclosure.

In addition, the proposed amendment implements approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

The TS markups are provided in Enclosure 2. The following numbered listing of proposed changes (1-33) identifies the basis (TSTF) and the affected Functions for each change. Note that the referenced Conditions, Surveillance Requirements, Functions, and notes reflect the WBN TS and are, in some cases, numbered differently than the equivalent items in NUREG 1431 and the TSTFs.

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ENCLOSURE 1

1. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition D and associated Required Actions. Power Range Neutron Flux - High (Function 2a). TSTF-418.

2. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition E and associated Required Actions. Power Range Neutron Flux - Low (Function 2b) and Power Range Neutron Flux

- High Positive Rate (Function 3a). TSTF-418.

3., Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition M and associated Required Actions. Undervoltage RCPs (Function 11) and Underfrequency RCPs (Function 12).

TSTF-418.

4. Changed TS 3.3.1 Condition N description and Required Action N.2 to indicate applicability to both Reactor Coolant Flow -

Low single loop (Function 10a) and two loop trip (Function 10b) functions which are being combined by this change into a single Function 10. TSTF-169.

5. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition N and associated Required Actions. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low (Function 10). TSTF-418.

6. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition 0 and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip -

Low Fluid Oil Pressure (Function 14a). TSTF-418.

7. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition P Required Actions. Safety Injection (SI) Input from ESFAS (Function 15) and Automatic Trip Logic (Function 19). TSTF-418.

8. Changed bypass time and completion times (TSTF-418) and deleted Note 2 (TSTF-411) for TS 3.3.1 Condition Q and associated Required Actions. Reactor Trip Breakers (Function 17).

9. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition U and associated Required Actions. SG Water Level Low-Low (Function 13). TSTF-418.

10. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition V and associated Required Actions. SG Water Level Low-Low - Vessel AT (Functions 13a and 13b). TSTF-418.

11. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition W and associated Required Actions. Overtemperature AT (Function 6), Overpower AT (Function 7) and Pressurizer Pressure - High (Function 8b). TSTF-418.

12. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition X and associated Required Actions. Pressurizer Pressure - Low (Function 8a) and Pressurizer Water Level -

High (Function 9). TSTF-418.

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ENCLOSURE 1

13. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.1 Condition Y Required Actions. Turbine Trip - Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Function 14b). TSTF-418.

14. Changed SR 3.3.1.4 TADOT Frequency. RTBs (Function 17) and RTB Undervoltage and Shunt Trip Mechanisms (Function 18).

TSTF-411.

15. Changed SR 3.3.1.5 Actuation Logic Test Frequency. Automatic Trip Logic Function 19. TSTF-411.

16. Changed SR 3.3.1.7 COT Frequency. Instrumentation Functions 2a, 2b, 3a, 6, 7, 8a, 8b, 9, 10, 13, 13a, and 13b. TSTF-411.

17. Changed SR 3.3.1.14 TADOT Frequency. Turbine Trip - Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b). TSTF-311.

18. Combined TS 3.3.1 Reactor Coolant Flow - Low single loop and two loop trip Functions 10a and 10b into a single Function 10 and deleted associated Notes (g) and (h). TSTF-169.

19. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition C Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Safety Injection (Function ib), Containment Spray (Function 2b), Containment Isolation - Phase A (Function 3a(2)),

Containment Isolation - Phase B (Function 3b(2)), and Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump (Function 7a).

TSTF-418.

20. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition D and associated Required Actions. Safety Injection on Containment Pressure - High (Function ic), Safety Injection on Pressurizer Pressure - Low (Function id), Safety Injection on Steam Line Pressure - Low (Function le), Steam Line Isolation on Steam Line Pressure - Low (Function 4d(1)),

and Steam Line Isolation on Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High (Function 4d(2)). TSTF-418.

21. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition E Required Actions. Containment Spray on Containment Pressure - High High (Function 2c), Containment Isolation - Phase B on Containment Pressure - High High (Function 3b(3)), and Steam Line Isolation on Containment Pressure - High High (Function 4c). TSTF-418.

22. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition G Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Steam Line Isolation (Function 4b) and Auxiliary Feedwater (Function 6a). TSTF-418.

23. Changed completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition H Required Actions. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays for Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Function 5a). TSTF-418.

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ENCLOSURE 1

24. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition I and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation on SG Water Level High-High (Function 5b) . TSTF-418.

25. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition K and associated Required Actions. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level - Low coincident with SI and Containment Sump Level - High (Function 7b). TSTF-418.

26. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition M and associated Required Actions. Auxiliary Feedwater on SG Water Level Low-Low (Function 6b). TSTF-418.

27. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition N and associated Required Actions. Auxiliary Feedwater on SG Water Level Low-Low - Vessel AT (Functions 6b(1) and 6b(2)) . TSTF-418.

28. Changed bypass time and completion times for TS 3.3.2 Condition 0 and associated Required Actions. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation on Main Steam Valve Vaults Water Level -

High (Functions 5d and 5e). TSTF-418.

29. Changed SR 3.3.2.2 Actuation Logic Test Frequency. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Functions ib, 2b, 3a(2),

3b(2), 4b, 5a, 6a, and 7a. TSTF-411.

30. Changed SR 3.3.2.3 Master Relay Test Frequency. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Functions ib, 2b, 3a(2),

3b(2), 4b, 5a, 6a, and 7a. TSTF-411.

31. Changed SR 3.3.2.4 COT Frequency. Instrumentation Functions Ic, id, le, 2c, 3b(3), 4c, 4d(1), 4d(2), 5b, 6b, 6b(1),

6b(2), 7b, 8b(l), and 8b(2). TSTF-411.

32. Changed SR 3.3.6.2 Actuation Logic Test Frequency. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Function 2. TSTF-411.

33. Changed SR 3.3.6.3 Master Relay Test Frequency. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays Function 2. TSTF-411.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The WBN TS were initially developed as Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS) based on Revision 0 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants,"

and proposed changes to the NUREG incorporated in Revision 1.

The TSTF process is an industry and NRC controlled process for proposing and incorporating improvements to the ISTS. The revisions proposed by this amendment impact Technical Specifications 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS)

Instrumentation," 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation E1-4

ENCLOSURE 1 System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and 3.3.6, "Containment Vent Isolation (CVI) Instrumentation," and are based on four TSTFs (169, 311, 411 and 418). All of the above TSTFs have been incorporated into the current revision of NUREG 1431 (Revision 3.0 dated March 3, 2004).

The initial issue of the WBN TS included the relaxation of RTS and ESFAS test times, allowed outage times (AOT) / completion times (CT), bypass test times (BT), and surveillance test intervals (STI) which were justified in the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Technical Specification Optimization Program (TOP) document WCAP-10271-P-A and supplements thereto (References 11 and 12). The justification was based on the high reliability of the protection system equipment and the small impact of the changes on overall plant risk.

WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418)

WCAP-14333 provides the justification for increasing the bypass test times and the completion times for RTS and ESFAS instrumentation. The approach used in WCAP-14333 is consistent with that established by the WOG TOP, including fault tree models, actuation signals, component reliability, and most of the test and maintenance assumptions. Several enhancements in modeling were implemented as discussed in the WCAP. The changes justified in WCAP-14333 are summarized in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1 WCAP-14333 RTS and ESFAS Completion Time and Bypass Test Time Changes Component Completion Time Bypass Test Time Analog Channels 6+6 hours to 72+6 hours 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Logic Cabinets 6+6 hours to 24+6 hours no change Master & Slave 6+6 hours to 24+6 hours no change Actuation Relays These improvements will allow additional time to perform maintenance and test activities, enhance safety, provide additional operational flexibility, and reduce the potential for forced outages related to compliance with the RTS and ESFAS instrumentation Technical Specifications. Industry information has shown that a significant number of trips that have occurred are related to instrumentation test and maintenance activities, indicating that these activities should be completed with caution and sufficient time should be available to complete these activities in an orderly and effective manner.

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ENCLOSURE 1 The NRC issued a Safety Evaluation on July 15, 1998, approving WCAP-14333. Southern Nuclear Operating Company submitted a License Amendment Request on October 13, 1999, for the Vogtle Units 1 and 2 to adopt the relaxations that were generically approved in WCAP-14333. As a result of the NRC review of this application, incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) values were developed generically for all WOG plants. License amendments were issued for Vogtle approving the changes proposed in WCAP-14333.

WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411)

WCAP-15376 provides further improvements to the RPS, building on the approved changes of WCAP-10271 and WCAP-14333 and including changes to the fault tree models and incorporation of updated component failure probability data. WCAP-15376 provides the justification for increasing the bypass test time and the completion time for the reactor trip breakers and for increasing the surveillance test intervals for the reactor trip breakers, instrumentation channels, logic cabinets, and master relays of the RPS instrumentation. The changes justified in WCAP-15376 are summarized in Table 3.2 below.

Table 3.2 WCAP-15376 RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Interval and Completion Time Changes Component Surveillance Test Completion Time and Interval Bypass Time Analog Channels 3 months to 6 months No change Logic Cabinets 2 months to 6 months No change Master Relays 2 months to 6 months No change Slave Relays No change No change Reactor Trip 2 months to 4 months AOT: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Breakers Bypass Time: 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

The approach used in WCAP-15376 is consistent with the NRC's approach for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on plant-specific changes to the licensing basis as presented in Regulatory Guides 1.174, "An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Current Licensing Basis," and 1.177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications." The approach E1-6

ENCLOSURE 1 addresses the impact on defense-in-depth and safety margins, as well as an evaluation of the impact on risk. The risk evaluation considers the three-tiered approach as presented by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.177 for the extension to the RTB completion time.

TSTF-169 TSTF 169 combines the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions (3.3.1-i0a and 10b) into one function. Table 3.3.1-1 notes g and h associated with this function are deleted, Condition N description is revised and Condition X is no longer applicable to this function. This change resolves an inconsistency with respect to the WCAP-10271 analyses by removing the potential for exceeding the AOT allowance evaluated in the WCAP.

TSTF-311 The proposed change revises the Frequency of SR 3.3.1.14 for performing a TADOT for Turbine Trip on Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b) . The LCO requires the Functions to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9 (50% RTP). The change will allow the test to be performed at power prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock instead of prior to reactor startup while continuing to ensure that the functions will be OPERABLE when required.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 This analysis follows the implementation guidelines provided by the WOG for WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 and addresses the conditions and limitations specified in the NRC's safety evaluations (SE) for the WCAPs. In addition, although not specifically listed as a condition in the SEs, one commitment is addressed as stated in the response to NRC RAI 18 (Reference 10).

The analysis demonstrates the applicability to WBN of the generic analyses performed to support the changes.

The approach used in this program and presented in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 is consistent with the approach established by WOG TOP. The changes justified in the WCAPs were evaluated using a probabilistic risk assessment approach. The analyses included assessment of the impact of the changes on signal unavailability and plant risk. The justification for the acceptability of the changes was the small increase the changes had on plant risk. The probabilistic risk analysis, benefits of the program and E1-7

ENCLOSURE 1 conclusions, and the relationship of the Technical Specification changes to the analysis are discussed in the WCAPs.

4.1.1 Risk Evaluation The changes being considered in this analysis were evaluated consistent with the three-tiered approach defined in Regulatory Guide 1.177. Tier 1 addresses PRA insights and includes the risk analyses and sensitivity analyses to support the proposed Technical Specification changes. Tier 2 addresses avoidance of risk-significant plant configurations. Tier 3 addresses risk-informed plant configuration control and management.

4.1.1.1 Tier 1, PRA Capability and Insights The Vogtle Electric Generating Plant PRA model was used for the generic risk analysis documented in WCAP 14333 (Reference 2) and WCAP 15376 (Reference 3). Enclosure 4 addresses the applicability of the generic analysis to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The remainder .of this section summarizes applicable information from references 2 and 3, and the associated NRC Staff Safety Evaluation Reports, References 18 and 21.

WCAP 14333 The NRC evaluation of WCAP-14333 is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Reference 18. The staff used a three-tiered approach in its evaluation. The first tier evaluated the PRA model and the impact of the change on plant operational risk.

The staff's review focused on the approach taken to develop a model and its capability to analyze the risk stemming from the proposed changes.

Most of the fault trees used in the WCAP-14333 analysis came directly from the WCAP-10271 analysis that had been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff. Additional fault trees were developed as necessary to model the addition of operator actions either to manually trip the reactor or to initiate safety injection.

Major aspects of the PRA modeling used in the WCAP-14333 analysis were evaluated including data, screening and truncation limits, level of detail, sensitivity, and uncertainty. Assumptions for the analysis are provided in Reference 2, paragraph 7.2. The NRC staff found these aspects of the PRA modeling to be reasonable.

The common cause failure approach and the approach to assess the unavailability of components due to maintenance activities were changed from the WCAP 10271 analysis to provide a more E1-8

ENCLOSURE 1 representative analysis. These modeling approaches are discussed in Reference 2, paragraph 7.1.

The risk quantification conservatively did not take credit for potential trip reduction due to the implementation of revised technical specifications. Sensitivity cases were quantified to show the potential impact on plant safety due to trip reduction (Reference 2, paragraph 8.1).

In response to a NRC staff request, Westinghouse performed sensitivity studies on several important parameters assumed in the risk analysis, i.e., human error probability, maintenance frequency, common cause failure probability, and ATWS mitigating system actuation circuitry (AMSAC) availability. The studies indicated that the impact of the variation in those parameters on plant risk is insignificant (Reference 18).

The NRC staff qualitatively considered the impact of the proposed TS changes on the risk from external events such as fire and earthquake events. From its review, the NRC staff found that the proposed TS changes will have only a very small impact on the risk from external events; that small impact on risk is acceptable to the NRC staff.

The impact of the proposed changes on CDF and LERF are provided in TSTF-418, Revision 2, Table 1.3 (which presents the same information contained in Table 8.4 of WCAP-14333) and Table 1.4 (which presents the same information provided in the response to RAI Question 13 in OG-96-110, Reference 8), respectively. The CDF and LERF values are provided for the pre-TOP, TOP, and the WCAP-14333 proposed changes. The ACDF and ALERF values are also provided referenced to pre-TOP and TOP conditions. The results of a sensitivity analysis are also provided that credit a 0.5/year reduction in the reactor trip initiating event frequency due to reduction in the number of analog channel tests. The ICCDP and ICLERP values are provided in Table 1.5 of TSTF-418, Revision 2 (which presents the same information as in RAI Question 11 in OG-96-110).

The ACDF, ICCDP, ALERF, and ICLERP values provided in the WCAP and subsequent RAIs met the criteria of small changes in risk defined in RG-1.174 and 1.177. Based on the Tier 1 evaluation, the NRC staff found that the PRA model used for the proposed TS changes in WCAP-14333 is reasonable.

WCAP-15376 The NRC staff evaluation of WCAP-15376 is documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Reference 21. The PRA model used in E1-9

ENCLOSURE 1 WCAP 15376 is similar, but not identical, to the model used in WCAP-14333. The WCAP-14333 model has been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC staff.

In previous studies, the logic cabinets were modeled to the component level using generic data. In the WCAP-15376 analysis, the logic cabinets are modeled at the card level. This was done because industry-specific failure rate data is available at the card level. Westinghouse collected card failure data via an industry survey. The results of that survey are considered proprietary by Westinghouse.

In WCAP-15376 independent models were developed for selected RPS signals. These signals include safety injection; pressurizer pressure low interlocked with P-Il; auxiliary feedwater pump start signal from steam generator level io-io in one loop; reactor trip single source from pressurizer pressure high; reactor trip diverse source from pressurizer pressure high or over temperature delta T. The safety injection and reactor trip signals were evaluated with and without manual reactor trip. The proposed TS changes were evaluated both individually and combined with changes proposed in WCAP-14333 for the bounding SSPS plant.

The results were consistent with those reported in WCAP-14333.

Assumptions for the analysis are provided in Reference 3, paragraph 8.3.2.

A review of WBN maintenance records for SSPS determined that the failure data for SSPS cards was bounded by the component failure data and corrective maintenance intervals reported in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376. Therefore, these analyses are considered applicable to WBN.

Common cause failure modeling, based upon the Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method, is described in reference 3, paragraph 8.3.1.

The risk quantification conservatively did not take credit for potential trip reduction due to the implementation of the revised analog channel STIs in WCAP-10271 (Reference 3, paragraph 8.4).

Section 8.4 of WCAP-15376 provides the risk analysis results for the proposed changes in CT and STI. The ACDF and ALERF values are provided in Tables 8.29 and 8.32, respectively, referenced to a base case which represents the changes previously approved in WCAP-14333. The response to NRC RAI Questions 4 and 11 in WOG letter OG-02-002 (Reference 9) provided the impact of the requested Completion Time change (24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months CT plus 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to reach MODE 3, or a total of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months ) on ICCDP and ICLERP for a El-10

ENCLOSURE 1 RTB undergoing preventative or corrective maintenance with the associated logic train inoperable for the bounding 2/3 logic.

The risk metrics as identified in RG 1.174 and 1.177 were met for the proposed changes.

The NRC staff found that the quality of the PRA was sufficient for the evaluation of the proposed changes.

Cumulative Change WCAP-15376 provides the cumulative change to CDF from technical specification changes associated with both WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 (Reference 3, paragraph 8.4.4). The ACDF and ALERF values are cumulative from WCAP-10271 to WCAP-15376. The ALERF acceptance criterion is satisfied. The ACDF acceptance criterion going from WCAP-10271 to WCAP-15376 is slightly exceeded. This is addressed in WCAP-15376 Section 8.4.4 and Table 8.33. The cumulative ACDF from pre-TOP conditions to WCAP-15376 conditions is discussed using the sensitivity analysis values from Table 8.4 of WCAP-14333 for 2/4 logic and 2/3 logic combined with the ACDF values from Table 8.29 of WCAP-15376. The cumulative ACDF for the 2/4 logic is 5.7E-07 per year, which is close to but slightly exceeds the acceptance criterion of 5E-7. The cumulative ACDF for the 2/3 logic change is 1.1E-06 per year, which slightly exceeds the acceptance criterion. However, at WBN, since the DCCP is only changing from the TOP to WCAP-15376 conditions (not pre-TOP), the ACDF acceptance criterion is satisfied. Another consideration in support of meeting the ACDF acceptance criterion with the extended completion times is the avoidance of shutdown risk.

4.1.1.2 Tier 2, Avoidance of Risk-Significant Plant Configurations Tier 2 requires an examination of the need to impose additional restrictions when operating with the proposed changes in order to avoid risk-significant equipment outage configurations.

WCAP-14333 Westinghouse performed an evaluation of equipment according to its contribution to plant risk while the equipment covered by the proposed changes is out of service for maintenance or testing in response to RAI Question 18. Westinghouse performed an importance analysis for 25 top events for each of the test or maintenance configurations associated with the proposed TS changes. The analysis determined the system importances for plant configurations with no ongoing test or maintenance activities (all components available) and, then, for plant El-11

ENCLOSURE 1 configurations with test or maintenance individually on analog channels, logic trains, master relays, and slave relays. It was assumed that during test or maintenance activities the corresponding component/train was unavailable. The system importances for both cases were compared. The importance rankings for systems did not change for the analog channels, master relays, or slave relays. For the case of a SSPS logic train in maintenance, the following systems had a relatively significant increase in their importance ranking: Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW), reactor trip, high pressure injection, low pressure injection, and containment cooling.

The response to RAI Question 11 also discussed an inoperable logic train as the only configuration that would significantly impact core damage. Therefore, it is concluded that the only plant configuration with proposed TS changes implemented with a significant impact on CDF or the relative importance of other systems is one logic train inoperable. Therefore, the Tier 2 limitations are only appropriate when a logic cabinet is out of service. There are no Tier 2 limitations when a slave relay, master relay, or other analog channel is out of service.

WBN uses a risk matrix in plant procedure TI-124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix" (Reference 15), to determine risk significant equipment outage configurations. The matrix currently addresses trains of SSPS removed from service, and analog channels placed in trip or bypass (most testing at WBN is performed with the channel in bypass). With a train of SSPS removed from service, the risk matrix currently prohibits several systems including the reactor trip breakers and auxiliary feedwater system level control valves from being removed from service.

Incorporation of the evaluation and results from WCAP-14333 at WBN will involve modifying TI-124 to discuss the implications of removing a logic cabinet from service and limit the simultaneous removal of Tier 2 functions from service. There will be no restrictions applied when a logic train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass allowance. Entry into these conditions is not typically planned during power operation other than for surveillance testing. Since these Conditions are typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the following Tier 2 restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition entry. If this situation were to occur during the extended CT, the Tier 3 Configuration Risk Management Program discussed below will assess the emergent condition and direct activities to limit risk. There will be no Tier 2 limitations when a slave relay, master relay, or other analog channel is out of service.

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ENCLOSURE 1 The following restrictions are applicable to incorporate the evaluation and results from WCAP-14333:

" To preserve ATWS mitigation capability, activities that degrade the ability of the AFW system, reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure relief system (pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and safety valves), AMSAC, or turbine trip should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

To preserve loss of coolant accident mitigation capability, one complete emergency core cooling system train thatcan be actuated automatically must be maintained when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

" To preserve reactor trip and safeguards actuation capability, activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

Activities in electrical systems (e.g., AC and DC power) and cooling systems (e.g. essential service water and component cooling water) that support the systems or functions listed in the first three bullets should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance. That is, one complete train of a function that supports a complete train of a function noted above must be available.

To preserve capabilities to prevent large early releases, activities that degrade the ability of the containment spray system, air return fans, and ice condenser should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance.

WCAP-15376 WCAP-15376, section 8.5, provides recommended Tier 2 restrictions when a RTB train is inoperable for maintenance. These restrictions do not apply when a RTB train is being tested under the 4-hour bypass allowance. Entry into a Condition where an RTB train is removed from service is not a typical pre-planned evolution during power operation, other than for surveillance testing. Since this Condition is typically entered due to equipment failure, it follows that some of the following Tier 2 restrictions may not be met at the time of Condition entry. If this situation were to occur during the extended 24-hour CT, the Tier 3 Configuration Risk Management Program discussed below will El-13

ENCLOSURE 1 assess the emergent condition and direct activities to limit risk.

The following restrictions will be put in place:

The probability of failing to trip the reactor on demand will increase when a RTB train is removed from service; therefore, systems designed for mitigating an ATWS event should be maintained and available. RCS pressure relief system (pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and safety valves), AFW flow (for RCS heat removal), AMSAC, or turbine trip should not be scheduled when a RTB is inoperable for maintenance.

Due to the increased dependence on the available reactor trip train when one logic train or one RTB train is inoperable for maintenance, activities that cause master relays or slave relays in the available train to be unavailable and activities that cause analog channels to be unavailable should not be scheduled when a RTB is inoperable for maintenance.

Activities in electrical systems (e.g. AC and DC power) and cooling systems (e.g. essential service water) that support the systems or functions listed in the first two bullets should not be scheduled when a logic train is inoperable for maintenance. That is, one complete train of a function that supports a complete train of a function noted above must be available.

4.1.1.3 Tier 3, Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management Tier 3 requires a proceduralized process to assess the risk associated with both planned and unplanned work activities. The objective of the third tier is to ensure that the risk impact of out-of-service equipment is evaluated prior to performing any maintenance activity. The following is a discussion of the program in place at WBN.

At WBN, the following procedures control the risk evaluation process and aid in the avoidance of risk-significant plant configurations.

" Standard Programs and Processes (SPP) 7.1, "Work Control Process"

" Technical Instruction (TI) 124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix" El-14

ENCLOSURE 1 SPP-7.1 specifies the general responsibilities and standard programmatic controls for the work control process. This procedure applies to all work activities that affect or have the potential to affect a plant component, system, or unit configuration.

WBN's long-term maintenance plan is a product of the preventive and surveillance process and specifies the frequency for implementation of maintenance and surveillance activities necessary for the reliability of critical components in each system. An established 12-week rolling schedule includes the preliminary defense-in-depth assessment, which documents the allowable combinations of system and Functional Equipment Groups (FEGs) that may be simultaneously worked online or during shutdown conditions. FEGs are sets of equipment that have been evaluated for acceptable out-of-service combinations. They are used to schedule planned maintenance and establish equipment clearances.

Predetermined FEG work windows are established for online maintenance and outage periods. The work windows are based on recommended maintenance frequencies and sequenced to minimize the risk of online maintenance. Work windows are defined by week and repeat at 12-week intervals. The work windows ensure required surveillances are performed within their required frequency and that division/train/loop/channel interferences are minimized.

The WBN scheduling organization maintains a long-range schedule based on required surveillance testing of online activities and plant conditions.

The surveillance testing schedule provides the "backbone" for the long-term maintenance plan. Other periodic activities (preventive maintenance items) are scheduled with related surveillance tests to maximize component availability. FEGs are used to ensure work on related components is evaluated for inclusion in the work window. Related corrective maintenance activities are also evaluated for inclusion in the work window provided by surveillance and preventive maintenance performance.

The inclusion of identified work in the FEG work window with the surveillance tests and preventive maintenance items maximizes component availability and operability.

The TI-124 risk assessment methodology is used for online maintenance activities. For online maintenance, a risk assessment is performed prior to work window implementation and emergent work is evaluated againstthe assessed scope.

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ENCLOSURE 1 In general, risk is evaluated based upon the WBN Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) and maintaining defense in depth relative to key safety functions. The TI-124 risk assessment guidelines utilize the results of the WBN PSA. Other safety considerations, such as Technical Specifications, maintenance rule risk significant systems, structures, and components (SSCs), and significant changes in weather or offsite power availability, are considered in the site-specific configuration risk management program (CRMP) and are used to determine which system, component, and FEG combinations may be worked online. In addition, an assessment of scheduled activities is performed before implementation of a work window. The assessment includes reviews for the following:

" The schedule is evaluated against the risk bases outlined in the WBN PSA.

Maximizing safety (reducing risk) when performing online work.

Avoidance of recurrent entry into a specific limiting condition for operation (LCO) for multiple activities.

Activities that require entering the same LCO are combined to limit the number of times an LCO must be established, thus maximizing the equipment's availability.

" If the risk associated with a particular activity cannot be determined, site engineering is requested to perform a risk assessment.

" Implementing compensatory measures and requirements for management authorization for higher risk configurations.

Paragraph (a) (4) of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," became effective in November 2000. The requirements of (a) (4) and the CRMP as defined in RG 1.177 appear to overlap in certain areas.

This was acknowledged by NRC in the "Statement of Considerations" for 10 CFR 50.65 (Federal Register: July 19, 1999, Volume 64, Number 137). In this statement, NRC indicated that, after the revision to 10 CFR 50.65 is effective, NRC will expeditiously support licensee requests to remove the CRMP requirements from plant TS. Considering this, a description of the CRMP will not be added to the Technical Specifications.

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ENCLOSURE 1 4.1.1.4 Maintenance Rule Control In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.177, paragraph 3.2, corrective action for RPS/ESFAS hardware within the scope of the proposed TS changes which fails to meet performance criteria will include an evaluation to determine if the AOT or STI should be decreased.

4.1.2 Safety Evaluation Conditions NRC approval of WCAP-14333 was subject to the following conditions requiring plant-specific information:

1. Confirm the applicability of the WCAP-14333 analyses for the plant.

2. Address the Tier 2 and Tier 3 analyses including the Configuration Risk Management Program insights and confirm that these insights are incorporated into the decision making process before taking equipment out of service.

NRC approval of WCAP-15376 was subject to the following conditions requiring plant-specific information:

1. Confirm the applicability of the topical report to the plant and perform a plant-specific assessment of containment failures and address any design or performance differences that may affect the proposed changes.

2. Address the Tier 2 and Tier 3 analyses including risk significant configuration insights and confirm that these insights are incorporated into the plant-specific configuration risk management program.

3. The risk impact of concurrent testing of one logic cabinet and associated reactor trip breaker needs to be evaluated on a plant-specific basis to ensure conformance with the WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 evaluation, and RGs 1.174 and 1.177.

4. To ensure consistency with the reference plant, the model assumptions for human reliability in WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 should be confirmed to be applicable to the plant-specific configuration.

5. For future digital upgrades with increased scope, integration and architectural differences beyond that of Eagle 21, the staff finds the generic applicability of WCAP-15376-P, Rev. 0 to future digital systems not clear and should be considered on a plant-specific basis.

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ENCLOSURE 1

6. An additional commitment from the response to NRC RAI Question 18 in Reference 10 requires that each plant review their setpoint calculation methodology to ascertain the impact of extending the COT Surveillance Frequency from 92 days to 184 days.

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 SE Condition 1, Topical Report Applicability Determination In order to address SE Condition 1 for both WCAPs, Westinghouse issued implementation guidelines for licensees to confirm the analyses are applicable to their plant. The applicability evaluation is provided in Enclosure 4.

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 SE Condition 2, Tier 2 and Tier 3 Analyses SE Condition 2 for both topical reports is addressed above under the Tier 2 and Tier 3 discussions.

WCAP-15376 SE Condition 3, Concurrent Testing Risk The response to NRC RAI Question 4 in Reference 9 provided the ICCDP for the configuration where both the logic train and associated RTB are out of service for preventive maintenance for a total time of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , which includes a CT of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months plus 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to enter Mode 3.

The ICCDP for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months of unavailability for this configuration is 3.2E-07, which meets the RG 1.177 acceptance criteria of less than 5E-

07. Since this ICCDP value is based on the logic train and reactor trip breaker being out of service concurrently for 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months , bypassing one logic train and associated RTB train for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for testing will also meet the RG 1.177 ICCDP guideline.

SE Condition 3 is addressed by demonstrating the applicability of the WCAP-15376 analysis as discussed in the response to SE Condition 1 (see Enclosure 4).

WCAP-15376 SE Condition 4, Human Reliability The evaluation of the applicability of the model assumptions for human reliability in WCAP-15376 to WBN are provided in Enclosure 4.

WCAP-15376 SE Condition 5, Future Digital Upgrades This condition does not currently apply to WBN. Future digital upgrades will require separate evaluation.

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ENCLOSURE 1 WCAP-15376 RAI Question 18 Commitment, Setpoint Calculations The response to this RAI in Reference 9 noted that plant-specific RTS and ESFAS setpoint uncertainty calculations and assumptions, including instrument drift, will be reviewed to determine the impact of extending the Surveillance Frequency of the COT from 92 days to 184 days.

The rack drift terms used in the applicable WBN RTS and ESFAS setpoint calculations are documented in WCAP-12096 (Reference 13). For the Eagle 21 process protection channels, the calculations include a conservative one-year drift allowance.

The Eagle 21 system is designed to continuously perform self-diagnostics and self-calibration of analog input signals so that drift is continuously corrected. This feature will not be affected by the proposed changes to the COT frequency. Further, a board which failed auto calibration would be alarmed by the system. Based on the use of a conservative drift allowance in the setpoint calculation and the continuous auto-calibration of the Eagle 21 channels, it is concluded that the setpoint calculations for the Eagle 21 channels are not impacted by the increase in the COT surveillance frequency.

The rack drift value used for the Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) racks is a generic value for analog channels as documented in Reference 13. In support of the COT extension from 92 days to 184 days, WBN analyzed drift data for NIS Technical Specification reactor trip and permissive functions using a large population (more than 500 data points) of as-found and as-left values from COT performances over more than four fuel cycles. Typically, no adjustments were required for long intervals, i.e., since the bistable setting was found to be within the as-left tolerance, it was left in the as-found state, in some instances for as long as three cycles without adjustment.

In no case did the as-found value exceed the acceptable as-found allowance. In only two cases did the as-found values exceed the acceptable as-left allowance, thereby requiring adjustment to within the as-left allowance, and in both instances, the as-found value was still within the acceptable as-found allowance. The data shows that drift is minimal for these channels and is well within the uncertainty allowance. Therefore, it is concluded that increasing the COT surveillance interval will have no impact on the Power Range NIS setpoint calculation.

4.1.3 Plant-Specific Evaluations of Functions not Evaluated Generically in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Insert 7 of TSTF-411 Revision 1 and Insert 14 of TSTF-418 Revision 2 state that in order to apply TS relaxations to plant-El-19

ENCLOSURE 1 specific functions not evaluated generically, licensees must submit plant-specific evaluations for NRC review and approval.

Section 4.0 of TSTF-418 states that several utilities completed plant-specific evaluations to demonstrate that the changes in WCAP-10271 and its supplements are applicable to functions not generically evaluated. As noted in Section 11.0 of both WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376, as well as in TSTF-418, the changes approved in the WCAPs are also applicable to those plant-specific functions for which evaluations have been performed to demonstrate applicability of WCAP-10271. Therefore, for those cases, additional plant-specific evaluations are not required to demonstrate applicability of WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 to these plant-specific functions.

As indicated previously, the initial issue of the WBN TS included the changes which were justified in WCAP-10271 and its supplements (References 11 and 12). An evaluation of the applicability of the generic analyses to the WBN RTS and ESFAS functions was performed and is documented as Reference 9 of TS Bases 3.3.1 and Reference 10 of TS Bases 3.3.2. This applicability evaluation documented an additional evaluation of those WBN functions which were not generically evaluated in WCAP-10271 and demonstrated applicability of the WCAP-10271 analyses to certain plant-specific functions. These plant-specific evaluations included the Eagle 21 digital process protection system and, therefore, the changes in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are also applicable to Eagle 21.

Based on the above, the changes in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are applicable to the following plant-specific functions which were not generically evaluated: (1) Reactor Trip on SG Water Level Low-Low with Trip Time Delay (Function 3.3.1-13), (2) Auxiliary Feedwater actuation on SG Water Level Low-Low with Trip Time Delay (Function 3.3.2-6b), (3) the Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump on Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Low coincident with Safety Injection and Containment Sump Level High (Function 3.3.2-7b), and (4) Feedwater Isolation on Main Steam Valve Vaults Water Level High (Functions 3.3.2-5d and 5e).

4.2 Other TSTFs TSTF-169 TSTF-169 combines the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions (3.3.1-10a and 10b) into one function. In addition, Table 3.3.1-1 notes g and h associated with this function are no longer required and are deleted, the Condition N description is revised, and Condition X is no longer applicable to this function.

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ENCLOSURE 1 This change resolves an inconsistency with respect to the WCAP-10271 analyses by removing the potential for exceeding the AOT allowance evaluated in the WCAP. As described in the TSTF justification, if a single Reactor Coolant Flow channel is inoperable above P-8, Action N.1 requires the channel to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or power reduced below P-8 within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . If the channel cannot be tripped, the Applicability of the two-loop trip function is entered (below P-8) and Action X.1 again requires the channel to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months or power reduced below P-7 (per Action X.2) in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Since many loop components are common to both trip functions, sequential entry into N then X would allow a 22 hour2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months AOT when only a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months AOT for maintenance was evaluated in WCAP-10271 and its supplements.

A 22 hour2.546296e-4 days 0.00611 hours 3.637566e-5 weeks 8.371e-6 months allowance is also inconsistent with the TOPS Guidelines, WOG-90-18, dated 11/1/90. The changes to AOT and BT are justified by WCAP-14333.

TSTF-311 The proposed change revises the Frequency of SR 3.3.1.14 for performing a TADOT for Turbine Trip on Low Fluid Oil Pressure and Turbine Stop Valve Closure (Functions 14a and 14b) to be consistent with the applicability for these Functions. The LCO requires the Functions to be OPERABLE in MODE 1 above P-9 (50% RTP). Currently the test is required to be performed prior to reactor startup if it has not been performed within the previous 31 days. The change will allow the test to be performed at power prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock instead of prior to reactor startup.

Since these reactor-trip-on-turbine-trip Functions are not required until reactor power is above the P-9 setpoint, testing in MODE 1 prior to reaching 50% power will continue to ensure the Functions will be OPERABLE when required. These Functions can be tested at power with minimal perturbations to plant systems.

4.3 Deviations from Approved Changes WCAP-14333 (TSTF-418)

TSTF-418 Revision 2, Inserts 1, 2 and 3 were not included in proposed change based on the following justification:

The Functions do not have installed bypass capability.

The bypass test Note is already included in the WBN TS.

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ENCLOSURE 1

" For 3.3.1 Condition Q, Reactor Trip Breakers (Function 17),

the changes in TSTF-418 were superseded by TSTF-411, which did not include Note 3 (Insert 3). WBN is implementing option 3 of TSTF-411 Insert 6.

" WBN TS does not have a reactor trip function for RCP Breaker Position (Function 3.3.1-11 in TSTF-418) or the applicable Conditions L (existing) and M (proposed).

The TSTF-418 changes to TS Section 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP)

Diesel Generator Start Instrumentation, do not apply to WBN and, therefore, are not implemented, due to differences between the WBN TS and NUREG 1431 format of Section 3.3.5. The Completion Time for Required Action A.1 will remain 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

WCAP-15376 (TSTF-411)

TSTF-411 Revision 1 change in frequency for SR 3.3.1.8, which applies to the source and intermediate range flux instrumentation, was not included in the proposed change because the Gamma-Metrics equipment used at WBN for the source and intermediate ranges was not evaluated in the WCAP.

TSTF-169 As a result of combining the single loop and two loop Reactor Coolant Flow Low reactor trip functions into one function, Condition N for the single loop function was deleted and the remaining Conditions of 3.3.1 were renumbered in the TSTF. The WBN implementation of this change retains Condition N for the function and Condition X is no longer applicable to the function.

Condition X is still applicable to other Functions.

TSTF-311 No deviations.

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS The proposed amendment would revise TS sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.6 to implement relaxations of Reactor Trip System and Essential Safety Features Actuation System test times and test intervals previously reviewed and approved by the NRC under Westinghouse WCAP-14333-P-A (TSTF-418, Revision 2) and WCAP-15376-P-A (TSTF-411, Revision 1). The proposed amendment also incorporates approved TSTFs-169 and 311, which were incorporated into Revisions 2 and 3 of NUREG 1431, "Standard Technical Specifications Westinghouse Plants."

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ENCLOSURE 1 It is important to note that Diablo Canyon (another Eagle 21 plant) has submitted (February 13, 2004 and received approval (January 5, 2005) of similar changes as proposed in this amendment request.

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration The following evaluates the proposed amendment to determine whether a significant hazards consideration exists by addressing the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c):

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

The proposed changes do not result in any modifications to RTS and ESFAS hardware, design requirements, or functions.

No system operational parameters are affected. The protection system will continue to perform the intended design functions consistent with the design bases and accident analyses. The proposed changes will not modify any system interfaces and, therefore, could not increase the likelihood of an accident described in the UFSAR. The proposed amendment will not change, degrade or prevent actions, or alter any assumptions previously made in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident described in the UFSAR.

Plant-specific evaluations confirm the applicability of the WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 analyses to WBN. Implementation of the approved changes is in accordance with the conditions of the NRC safety evaluations for these reports and will result in an insignificant risk impact.

The proposed changes to the completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies reduce the potential for inadvertent reactor trips and spurious actuations and, therefore, do not increase the probability of any accident previously evaluated. The proposed changes to the allowed completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies do not change the response of the plant to any accidents and have an insignificant impact on the reliability of the RTS and ESFAS signals. The RTS and ESFAS will remain highly reliable and the proposed changes will not result in a significant increase in the risk of plant operation. This is demonstrated by showing that the impact on plant safety as measured by core damage frequency is less than 1.OE-06 per year and the impact on large early release frequency is less than 1.0E-07 per year. In addition, for the completion time El-23

ENCLOSURE 1 change, the incremental conditional core damage probabilities and incremental conditional large early release probabilities are less than 5.OE-07 and 5.OE-08, respectively. These changes meet the acceptance criteria in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Therefore, since the RTS and ESFAS will continue to perform their functions with high reliability as originally assumed, and the increase in risk as measured by CDF, LERF, ICCDP, and ICLERP is within the acceptance criteria of existing regulatory guidance, there will not be a significant increase in the consequences of any accidents.

The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components from performing their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating the radiological consequences of an accident previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types or amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public radiation exposures. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and resultant consequences.

Therefore, this change does not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

The proposed amendment does not require any design changes, physical modifications or changes in normal operation of the RTS and ESFAS instrumentation. Existing setpoints will be maintained. The changes do not affect functional performance requirements of the instrumentation. No changes are required to accident analysis assumptions. The changes do not introduce different malfunctions, failure modes, or limiting single failures. The changes to the completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequency do not change any existing accident scenarios nor create any new or different accident scenarios.

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ENCLOSURE 1 Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by these changes.

Redundant RTS and ESFAS trains are maintained, and diversity with regard to the signals that provide reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation is also maintained. All signals credited as primary or secondary and all operator actions credited in the accident analyses will remain the same. The proposed changes will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The calculated impact on risk is insignificant and meets the acceptance criteria contained in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1.177. Although there was no attempt to quantify any positive human factors benefit due to increased completion time, bypass test time, and surveillance frequencies, it is expected that there would be a net benefit due to a reduced potential for spurious reactor trips and actuations associated with testing.

Therefore, it is concluded that this change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Conclusion Based on the above, it is concluded that operation of WBN Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed change to the Technical Specifications does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The regulatory bases and guidance documents associated with the RTS and ESFAS functions affected by the proposed changes include:

GDC-13 requires that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrity of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated El-25

ENCLOSURE 1 systems.

GDC-20 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed (1) to initiate automatically the operation of appropriate systems including the reactivity control systems, to assure that specified acceptable fuel design limits are not exceeded as a result of anticipated operational occurrences and (2) to sense accident conditionsand to initiate the operation of systems and components important to safety.

GDC-21 requires that the protection system(s) shall be designed for high functional reliability and testability.

GDC-22 through GDC-25 and GDC-29 require various design attributes for the protection system(s), including independence, safe failure modes, separation from control systems, requirements for reactivity control malfunctions, and protection against anticipated operational occurrences.

Regulatory Guide 1.22 discusses an acceptable method of satisfying GDC-20 and GDC-21 regarding the periodic testing of protection system actuation functions. These periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.

Regulatory Guide 1.174 describes a method for using probabilistic risk assessment in risk-informed decisions on changes to the licensing basis. Regulatory Guide 1.177 addresses evaluating the impact of technical specification changes on defense-in-depth and safety margins and describes a three-tiered approach to the risk evaluation.

Implementation of the proposed changes will not compromise compliance with the requirements of these documents.

Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or a significant increase in individual or El-26

ENCLOSURE 1 cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c) (10). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-1431, Revision 3, "Standard Technical Specification Westinghouse Plants."

2. WCAP-14333-P-A, Revision 1, "Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times," October 1998.

3. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003.

4. TSTF-169, Revision 1, "Deletion of Condition 3.3.1.N."

5. TSTF-311, Revision 0, "Revision of Surveillance Frequency for TADOT on Turbine Trip Functional Unit."

6. TSTF-411, Revision 1, "Surveillance Test Interval Extensions for Components of the Reactor Protection System (WCAP-15376-P-A)."1

7. TSTF-418, Revision 2, "RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times (WCAP-14333-P-A)."

8. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-96-110 dated December 20, 1996 (copy included in the back of Reference 2 above).

9. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-02-002 dated January 8, 2002 (copy included in Appendix D of Reference 3 above).

10. Westinghouse Owners Group letter OG-01-058 dated September 28, 2001 (copy included in Appendix D of Reference 2 above).

11. WCAP-10271-P-A Supplement 2, Revision 1, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System," June 1990.

12. WCAP-10271-P-A and Supplement 1-P-A, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," May 1986.

13. WCAP-12096 Revision 9, "Westinghouse Setpoint Methodology for Protection Systems Watts Bar Unit 1 Eagle 21 Version,"

March 2005.

14. TVA WBNP Probabilistic Safety Assessment, Summary Report, Revision 3, June 2005.

15. TVA WBN TI-124, "Equipment to Plant Risk Matrix," Rll.

El-27

ENCLOSURE 1

16. TVA Calculation CN-NUC-WBN-NTB-WBNOSG4031, Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown per 10CFR50 Appendix R, R33.

17. TVA WBN TI-119, "Maintenance Rule Performance Indicator Monitoring, Trending, and Reporting - 10CFR50.65," R27.

18. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Approval of WCAP-14333P (Proprietary) and WCAP-14334NP (Non-proprietary), "Probabilistic Risk Analysis of the RPS and ESFAS Test Times and Completion Times,"

7/15/1998.

19. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis.

20. Regulatory Guide 1.177, An Approach for Plant-Specific Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications.

21. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, WCAP-15376P, Rev 0, "Risk-Informed assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," Westinghouse Owners Group Project No. 694, 12/20/2002.

22. SPP-7.1, TVAN Standard Programs and Processes, "On Line Work Management."

El-28

ENCLOSURE 2 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 07-04 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES - MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST 3 .3-2 3.3-14 3 .3-3 3.3-17 3 .3-5 3.3-25 3 .3-6 3.3-26 3 .3-7 3.3-27 3 .3-8 3.3-28 3 .3-9 3.3-29 3.3-10 3.3-30 3.3-11 3.3-31 3.3-12 3.3-55 II. MARKED PAGES See attached.

TSTF::418, R2::

REPLACE WITH RTS Instrumentation

...... . ... . . . 3 .3.1 12

CONDITION REQUIRE ACTION COMPLETION TIME,

. . . . . . . . i, - , , i " ~ ~.. . . . . . . . . .. . . . ., - , - ,",

C. One channel or train C.I Restore channel. or 48:hours inoperabl e. train*to OPERABLE.

status. ..

C.2: Open RTBs 49. hours 4.

O. One. Power Range :-... ...- NOTEi -L . .-- . .

Neutron :Flux-High The inoperable char7*ii.may be I channel inoperable. bypassed forý up:to' mIhours TSTF 418, R2 for surveillance:te'fing and setpoint adjustment ofother channels. REPLACE 72))))*

WITH *~))))

D:.,1.. Place channel in

... . trip (. ... . 78)iiii)!)))i 0.-1.2 Reduce.THERMAL POWER i))) 72)iii~

))))))))))

to S75%* RTP.

QR 0.2.11 Place channel in trip.

AND Only when-the required to :be performed Power Unge Neutron Flux iinput.to QPTR is:

inoperable.

DI.2:2 Perform: SR 3.2.4.2.

DR D4.31 Be in MODE 3.

(cont.inued)

Watts :Bar-Uni~t 1 3ll3 .,* :

RTS& Instrumentation 3.3.1 ACTIONS continued):

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION: TIME,

, . . ..,. .==

.. .. . . .. . .. .. ... . . .j . . . . . . . .. . .. .,. .. . . ... . . . . . . .

E. ..One channel inoperable. The Inoperable cha 1may be TSTF 418, R2 byp~assed for up:,to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for:surveillance. ting of REPLACE

other' channel s. WITH El.I Placec:.hannel, in 72 trip.

OR LZ 6e:in MODE 3.1 78

..F. THERMAL POWER: > P1-6: Fý 1. Red.o.ce THERMAL .:POWER -:2hours and <:P-0:i, :one ýto ý-cPý-:6ý1

!I ntermediate::i Range Neutron Flux. channel OR inoperable..

F.2 .IncrnseJHERMAL 2: ho~urs POWER :toý-> Plwl,0ý G:ý T.H.E.4mAL POWER: > P`6 6. i Suspend operations, lmed-iately and. P-10, ýtwo involving.,posit.ive Intermediati:'Range reactivity. additions. I

ýieutron.:Flux:thannels inoperab.le, ANQ G.: 2: ReducelkOKALPOWER 12. :hours to 0 R. THERMAL POWER.< Pý-6, H.1ý :Restore::channel(s) to Pri:or to.

one or-two OPERABLE.::-status. lAcreasing aermed i at.e...Range THERMALPOWER.to Notron.:..Flux channel s > P76 ffioOrable:;

(continu.0d).

Watts.$Ar.-Unit I 1.3-3

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.41 TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE i i i i ii i i i i i7iii2ii i iiWITH TSTF 418, R2 REPLACE WITH TSTF 169, Ri REPLACE WITH P -7.~iiiiiW

H iiiiiiiii Watts:Bar-Unit 13 3.375

RTS Instrumentation

3.3.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRE ACTIONI COMPLETION TIME

0. One Low Fluid ýOilI -------------- -,NOTE ------------

Pressure Turbine Trip

.hanneli .The Inoperable :cha 1 may be i:;noperable, bypassed :fr f up to:4 hours: TSTF-418, R2 Cor surveillance s.iIgof*

REPLACE WITH i iiiii i72 ii6ii 7 i i i iii i i i ii 0.1 place channel in::

0.2 Reduce THERMAL .IPOWER to: < P-g.

4 J.

P..*., One train i noperable. -----------------.-- NOTE----------

One tra~in -may beq:bypanssed for TSTF-411, :Rl Sup to .4.hours for

.urveillance tes~ting provided: REPLACE the other :traini:s .OPERABL:E.. WITH 24

P.1 Restore train: to OPEMRABLE:status OR P.2 Be in MODE 3.

(continued)

Watts ..Ba~r-Uni .3 1, 1!. 3-6:

RTS .Instrumentation

3.3.l irioperabl e., I 7STF-11,RT (conti nued)

Watts Bar'Unit I L.3rl

ýRTS Instrumentation 3.31.1 AeTTANýý tionninuedl C....... I CO.MPLETION TIME CONDITION ~~REQUIRED 'ACTIONCOPEONTM T. :One trip mechanism 1T.1 Restore inoperable :48: hours inoperabl e for:one trip .mec hanism to RTB. OPERABLE status.

OR T.r:2.1 Be in MODE: 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days 0.015 hours 8.928571e-5 weeks 2.0547e-5 months AND T2.2 Ope~n:RTB.. .55 hours6.365741e-4 days 0.0153 hours 9.093915e-5 weeks 2.09275e-5 months U On.:e Steam Generator; Water Level: Low-Low One. chann may:be bypassed TSTF-418, R2 cha~nnel inoperable. for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveil.l4 testing. REPLACE WITH tl.P1 Place channel.in

t r ip.

P~

72*iii:

72

iii~ii TSTF-418, R2 AND REPLACE WITH V.1.2. For. the:affected 12 pr Iotection, set,.: set

the Trip Tmej:o elay:

(Ti)to match the Trip :Time Delay.:.(TH).

OR, V..2 :Beý in MODE.3 . 78 (continuued)

Watts Bar-Unit 3

1:.13.:

RTS Instrumentation 3..3. 1 ACTIONS (continued CONDITION .....

IIITII..II.............. JREQUIRED I IT..

ACTION

- .* i:.: ........ :......:.

COMPLETION TIME V. One.:Vessel aT channel NOTE-- 7 -----------

i noperabl e., One for ,channel may be.far:

.up. to:F1hour.s bypassed

,surveila testing:.

"V Set the: Trip:: Time Delay threshold power r vlevel for (TS) and (TM) t: O' power. "

ORu V2 Be in MODE 3:.

Ill

(

W;.: One: channel --------

*.--NOTE**------------ -TSTF-418, R2 inoperable. One chanqe- 1may be bypassed for up t Uhours for for REPLACE r }vnce testing. iiiii~

72i~

iiiiii WITH iiiiiii

.W.I1 Place :channel in c .~iiii!

P78~))i:

trip.

OR:

\N I. '

Be in:MODE.:3.

1~

X. One channel NOTE------

inoperable. One0chae*Lh .nay be: bypassed TSTF-418, R2::

for up:tt 4 ours for surveill testing. REPLACE WITH Pl ace: channel in ... 72 trip. iiiiiii

78iiiiiii OR X. t Reduce: THERMAL POWER

ýto < P-7..

(continued)

Watts Bar-tUnit1r r :3 . 3L.

RTS. Instrumentation6 3i3 .1!

J ACTIONS (continued) TSTF-418, R2

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION Ii TIO REPLACE WITH 72 Y. One, two: or three: Y.1 PIace :channel(s) i~n Turbine ::Stop. Valve Cliosure :channels i4noperable. . DR 76 Y:.z Reduce THERMAL POWER 0hour s to <. P-9..

.. .. . . . . '" . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . ......... . .. ".. L.. .. . . . . .. . .

Z. :Two:RTS Trains 17.1 Enter ICO: 3.02.1 Immed iately inoperable ...

SURVEILLANCE REQUJREMENTS

.------- NOTE------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.1-I to ::determine::whth: SR:s apply :for e~ach :RTS: Function.

SURVE1 LLANCE. FREQUENCY SR 3:3.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SR 3.3..1.2 ---------- ----- ---- NOTES.:-- - -----

. Adjustýý NIS channel: if:' absol:ute 1i di fference is.: > 2Y.

2. Required to-be performed: wi.thin 12::hours after THERMAL*POWER is i* 15%.:R~IP. . ..... . ...

Compare results of calTori*metri c heat :24 hours balance calculation to::Nuclear Instrumentation System (.NIS), channel

.:output.

... .... .( .. .. c..

(on~t:nued)4:

Watts: Bar-Unit .1 :3.+3716]

RUS Instrumentat omn 31.3.1 SURVEILLANCEUREQUIREMENTS (continued),

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY.

iSR a.3.3,1.3: ---- ~-----------NOTES----------

1. Adjust NJIS channel: if absolute-difference iS : 3%.

2. Required to be performed within:

96::hours:: after THERMAL POWER :is..

> 15i RTP.:

Compar,e results of the i:ncore detector 31 effective measurements to NIS:. AFD. full':power days (EFIPD)

- TSTF-411, Ri

.SR 3.;3.1:.4: -:---:--- -NOTE-------------

This Surveillance must be: performed on. the: REPLACE reactor trip bypass -:breaker prior to WITH placing the bypa-s: breaker- in service.

62 Perlform TAOT.

RED. TEST SR 3.R3..5 Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 1 days. on a

GERED TEST BAS*S I_TSTF-411, Ri REPLACE SR 3.3-1.6 -~~~~NOTE--------- WITH Required t:Obe performed: within: 6 days:

after THERMAL POWER jIs::; -S0% :RTP.. 92 Calibrate excore channels :to agree with 92 E P ...

incore detector measurements.

. . .. . . . . . .. . . . I .. . . . . . . .. .

(continued)

Watts Bar-Un it I3 3.3i*3-I

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1:

kIIiViFTi i1 AN.F RFflIIT~FI4FNT~ (enntinued~

-...... :...1. - t--.-*i -- ,__________________

SURVE ILLANCE FREQUENCY t

SR: 3.3.1.7 For Functions:-and .3 ('Power Range:

Fnstrumentation), 2 this Survei lance: hal:1 TSTF-411, R1 inclrudentverification) thati:Snterllock e h0ls inc the rerquirdistate for existinge unit REPLACE condi t i ronese. WITH on ti n ...---- .------ ..-...- ..- -. .

iiiiiiiii1 84 i~iiiiiii Perform: COT. 9? ays

...................ýýIýI- ýýýý ... ..................I.. .. ...... ........-

SR: 13.3..18. --------- ...... NOTES ------------------ :----NOTE- - -.. -

1. :,Not requiired: to be performed for Only: required Source Range- instrumentation prior to when:: not ..

entering MODE 3 from tODE 2 until 4 :performed

.hours after entry ýinto:MODE 3.. within previous

31 days

.2. This Surve.illance shall include, verification that interlock P-6 :is in the: required state for existing§.unit ctonditions.,

rorm o.... .. ... .

Perform tOt. .Prior. to reactor startup Four hours

after: reducing 0owerbellow lO for:

intermediate range instrumentation.

ýAND.

Four* hours after reducing power below P-6

for source rang e inst rumnentation:

AND

Every 31 days,

thereafter, (continued)

.Watts Bar-Unit: 1- 13-.3 1:2

RTS Instrumentation 3.3.1 SURVEI.LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE: FREQUENCY S4R .31.

' - - - - - -- NO E I - - - -~ - - -- -- NT-- -

Verification of setpoint :i nto required. ...Only: required

--- ---------- --- --- --- --- --- .when. not, performed within previous 31 days Perform TADOT. PriHor- to reactor startup SR 3.3:

.... 1 .. 5. ....

=,-

.. ' .'NO E.. , ..........

- * - -- =. .,

SR 3.3. 1. - - ---- - -N T - - _ ._ _ _ _.

Neutron: detectors :are exc! uded. :f rom response: time :testing. .

Verify RTS RESPONSE TIME is ::within imifts. 1.8 months on :a STAGGERED TEST

BASIS TSTF-311, RO REPLACE WITH Prior to exceeding the P-9 interlock whenever the unit has been in MODE 3, if not performed within the previous 31 days Watts: Bar-Unit:.I3 3,37'14

RT5S.Instnrmentation TSTF-169, Ri 3..1.

REPLACE WITH i i iiiii l( f)ii : i ii i i~

Taba .3A.1-1 (pag Ie 3: of 9)

Reac~tor Trip. system. Instrumentiatijon CABLE MODES / * ., .,/....... . .......... ,..* / ...... : : ......... :

... NMINAL.

O~tR~THER SPECIFIED REPXQUIRED StJRViLI.ANCE ALLOWABLE TRIP FUNCTION: NDITI .ONS UIANNIE1S C0ND-ITIONS:. RE . U.W.MEJTS VALUE SF IPOINT

9ioswtvi Water 1 3. X 3.3.13 .92.7%

0SR 92% span

.. R .:S 3 .3 7 :Sp an SR 33.117: spa M~W-Low TSITF-.1169, R11- MOVE INFORMATION OFBOUPT E

'j, :S cL4oo 'I .3pcr. N S3.3.ý1. 1 Ž 9.-1% 90%:flow loop: :.SR 3.3.1.7 flow SR 3.3.1.10

\SkS13:31 5?

- SR 3.3.1f5 oopSR331.7 fidb"

.R T '\s 3crX \RR.31.Ž07 331,10 fv KOO .. 33J.15 LI.

Undcol e M.uSR:3.31.9 4734V 4830 V RCPS

2. :u, *.,*-* :l~p,:*.: R: 33.9..

iSR:*3 10 I Hz*:m inc "" "R :.33 .1 .15 . . . . ...

S(f): Above he P-7 (Low. Power Reactor Trips Block) interlock.:

(g) Above the P-8 (Power Range: Neutron. Flux): interlock.

(h) Above the P-7. (Low Power Reactor Trips Block) interl*ck and beloaw the iP-8 (Power Range:Nutrozn Flux) interlock.

Watts Bar-Unit 2 1 1 . 3*:17 Amendmeant. .47:

ESFSAS: Instrumentation 3.3. 2 ACTIONS [continued)

CONDITION IREDACTCOMPLETION TIME C. one train: inoperable. C. NOTE -.----

One. trainmay be bypassedjfor up.:to.

4-hours for TSTF-418, R2 surveillance testing:

p rovided o the other REPLACE train is OPERABLE.: WITH 24

Rest~ore *tra~in to OPERABLE status.

TSTF-418, R2 C.2:. Be :i n MODE 3..

REPLACE WITH

.AND: = ==

= = =7=

2==

= == = = = = =

12 C.*2.2 Be in:MODE 5:.

I: iiiiw T~ iiiiiii 78i~

4 -. 4.

). One: channel:

.inoperable.. '

D:.I\ .- NOTE- ...--...

bOne :channe:l i:may- be:

.1 I ::8..:

TSTF-418, R2 4- : : :: : : : :

bassed for up to.

4 !urso Jfor .. REPLACE veillance testing; WITH Pace: channel in t.r:I p..

OR D0.2. 1 Be in, MOODE 3.

AND D.Z.2 :Be in: MODEý 4.

I (Continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 13- 31 3-:25.

iESFASi Inst rumentati.on 3 . 3:32:

ACTIONS (continuedi)

........... C N .D.I...

CONDIT . R E......

A TI N C E...

ION REQUI!RED i ACTiION :COMPLET ION TIME

ýE. One Containment Pressure channel ...... One inoperable.. -nel maybe' bypass~ed ..for UP: to hours for

.surveillance testing.

FSF-18 ] -2 Place channel in 6 bypass:.

E.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 1_2ours AND E.2.2 Be in MODE:4. 18ours.

.I ... ..... ..........

F. One channel or train VF.I 'Restore chan.ne ).:or 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months inoperable. .train to .OPERABL:E statu:s.

ORA VF.:2,.1 Be :in *MODE :3:.

5*4 hours AND V:. 2 .2i .Be in MODEA4. :60. hours i(cont inued).

Watts.tBar-Unit I .3.3-26:

ESFAS Instrumentation

... . . . . ... . 3 .i *2 ACTIONS (r~nnt.intu~d'i ACTI .- ONS .tR ATNO E NT CONDITION".REQUIRED.ACTION *_OMLET : ION TIME G. One train inoperable. G.1I -ýNOTE-----

One: trai vmay be bypassed for :up to TSTF-418, R2 41 hours4.74537e-4 days 0.0114 hours 6.779101e-5 weeks 1.56005e-5 months for surveillance testing REPLACE provided the other WITH train. is, OPERABLE:.;

24iii;;;; !!i i:ii Restore. trainn .to OPERABLE . status... :: :: :: :3 : 0::

OR G.2..1 Be InA MODE: 3.

AND.2

Be in MODE:4. 36 H... One train :inoperable. H.1

'One.trainNOTE----

may be bypassed for up to 4survei1lance.

hours for:

test~ing TSTF-418, R2 provided the. other

train is OPERABLE.w. RE PLACE WITH Restore: train: to 24 OPERABLE status.:;

OR H.2 :1 :Be in MODE 3. 30 AND:

H.2.2 Be in MODE ý41. 36

-*.-----.---------**--------.---.--. I I (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit :1 1A:.3:27:

ESFAS :Instrumentation

.. .....3 .3

.2

I. One Steam Generator ::-.*NOITE--.-----.... --.

Water Level- High H-igh I One channel *may be TSTF-418, R2 channel Ainoperabl e... passed for up to.,

4 Ihours 'for REPLACE rvei I lance testing. WITH Place channell in 72 trip.

TSTF-418, R2 OR 1.2.!1 78 REPLACE Be in MODE: 3.

WITH

.OR 12 11.2.2ý Be .in MODE. 4. 84 J. One Main Feedwater Res.tore channel :to Pumps .trip cthannel: OPERABLE status."

inoperabIe.

Be :in :MODE 3.

.K. One channel inoperable.

test'ing. TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE Place channel in Ours: WITH bypass.

72 OR (cont inued)

Watts Bar-Uni't 1: 3.34+8

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.*3.12 TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH K. (continued) K.:2. 1. Be in MODE: 3. 78 AND:

K.:2.2: Be :in: MODE 5. 108 L. One P-ll interlock L..1 Verify, interlock is I hour*r channel inoperable. in required ýstateJfor

.existi.ng unit

condit:ion.

OR

L2I, Be in :MODEi 3.. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days 0.00194 hours 1.157407e-5 weeks 2.6635e-6 months AND L.2.2 Be in MODE 4.: 13: hours (continued).:

Watts Bar-Unit 1 !A-,329

ESFAS Instrumentat ion 3.3.2 AflIONS (cont1nu~cfi CONDITTION REQUiRED ACTION COMPETIO TIME W. .ýOne Steam: Generator TSTF-418,

-~~-NOTE.------ R2

.WaLter Level:- -Low,--Low: One :chan ay be: bypassed

.channel Inoperable. for up t.4 ours for REPLACE WITH su~rvei'll: . testing:.

M.1. Place channel in 72 ii 72ii:i~ iiiiiii~

trip.

AND M.]2.2 For the. affected: i i iii i i7i8i; i i iii i i i l l I protection. set,, set.

the Tip Time Del.ay (TO)to match-the. Trip:

Time. DelAY(m i : i: i : i8*i 4ii i i ii i i i i l

TSTF-418, R2 OR REPLACE.WITH::

M.2. 1. Be j .inMODE :3:.,

1.2 .:AND.

\2, Be in:MDE4 N. One.Vessel AT channel -.. ,*-.;NOTE -:-*-.,-*:7-------

inoperable,., One chaL ay be bypassed TSTF-418, RP2 for.Up t*4 ours:for REPLACE su.r vel.. ae t.estinq..

WITH N. Set thek Trip.T-ime ii~ iiiiiii72 il

.Delay :threshold powqer level for (TMEand (T.m) to 0% power..

i !i!!!: !7! !8 ! ! !i i ! i [ i i OR

.Be in MODE 3-..

(continued)

Watts .Bar-Unit !1 3.33 3.1-30.

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (Continued):

I I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPL ETION T"IME r : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : :

I I-I T"ST * :R2

0. One MSVV Room Water - - - -- -- NOTE-

.The inoperable cha*1I -----------

Level Hi h4 channnel

.inoperabZe mayIbe REPLACE bypassed fq lfor up. to 4 IhouIs WITH for. survef. 1Ing of

"".... . " n'I' TI '-**.

S"* '* : .- "- :..

TSTF-418, R2- 72~:!!!iii!iiiiiiiii REPLACE WITH :0.1: Place channel in trip LUrs 7 8~iiiiiiiiiiiii iiii 12 :OR 0.2 Be ir MODE:. 3. Shours SURVEILLANCE :REQUIREMENTS Refer.to Table 3.31.- to determine whitchSRs apply for each ESFAS: Function.

............... . .............. TS T 41 1 , R (continued)

Watts Bar.-Unit 1.3 3.3r-3l:

.Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3 6 TSTF-411, Ri INSERT

NT-----NOE-------------------------------------------

This surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the ESFAS instrumentation.

ere=r to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply fox each Containmrent Vent Isolation Furiction,

./ ......... /~ '*::?

.SR P3.3.6.

Perform CHANNEL CHECK.O 12 ou REPLACE

____ ___ ______ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___WITH SR 3.3.6.2 Perform:ACTUATION LOGIC TEST, :3 dason 92

ýSTAG RED T SR .33.6,3 Perform: MASTER: RE AY TET.. -3 days on 92 STAi~GGERE T1

., , ,,,::s ..... ... T......i~

G

Ep E D ; :T..

BASIS. i* :*

SR 3.3.6.4 erformcO. . 92 d. yS --

SR 3.3-6.5 Periorm SLAVE R*ELAY TEST, days OR, 18 muonths for Westinghouse type::AR relay~s.

SRý 3.34:6..6 ------------ NOTE-----------

Ver ifica tion o~f :setpoinit is, not Oiquired.

Perform TADOT. 18 months.

S 3.3.6.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRA5ION. .18 months:

.Watt~s Bar-Unit ,1: ý343-55 .Amendment 17 TSTF-411, Rl::

INSERT v: ::: :.

I----I----NOTE ---------------------------------------

This surveillance is only applicable to the master relays of the ESFAS instrumentation.

ENCLOSURE 3 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 DOCKET NUMBER 390 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) CHANGE NUMBER 05-01 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES - MARKED PAGES I. AFFECTED PAGE LIST B 3.3-23 B 3. 3-62a B 3.3-24 B 3.3-63 B 3.3-25 B 3.3-102 B 3.3-26 B 3.3-103 B 3.3-33 B 3.3-104 B 3.3-34 B 3.3-105 B 3.3-41 B 3.3-106 B 3.3-42 B 3.3-107 B 3.3-46 B 3.3-108 B 3.3-47 B 3.3-109 B 3.3-48 B 3.3-110 B 3.3-50 B 3.3-111 B 3.3-51 B 3.3-112 B 3.3-52 B 3.3-113 B 3.3-53 B 3.3-114 B 3.3-56 B 3.3-115 B 3.3-57 B 3.3-116 B 3.3-58 B 3.3-118a B 3.3-59 B 3.3-120 B 3.3-61 B 3.3-160 B 3.3-62 B 3.3-162 II. MARKED PAGES See attached.

RT< :ns3tir-amntatcn.

B~s e ~

APPL 1CAE~L1~ r . .. .ru !a..

.................. r~

~

I.CC, and r.42ACt': t~rip it- a',txa~teda prelor to th zrorzr APPL1CM~ ILITY

~erLeEŽ

.Pr~s 'zitc1'yter, A touth char-nel is..

eyý v h~1i~p ir~'~Lot - trio 4-ve'l~hct due: to a1 " a1'.Ž*Wf:M3 thaýC safe'ty wtlve to0. 2L L 6.~rCI tcac'TcI hji orre GU ee:*

In MOD i :.; t har ,.s a tc,.'-Lhta' f f ,r.1 oC,/< 1n tn: EP SLEýL This tri lo ýurct~orn ow!ý a--' om ca 1.1

6 ~cr-ili

-ýle vw-~ by: the P Ine1

On o w.oV-7 bel~' P kEi-aw. t'-e p w týv t tr.Ž t

[TSTF-169, R DELETE oolato Peýr FColaft 4 L0*1 ti N~~~~ ~~ 4..... ::t~o~iI Io- !I 0w caectoe c . o 'o Th.ICC rLr~tIeeR~a~o:C~i.qa,-rd chanrMoIq PcCi.r o Ec C.PFRA5LF in.MODE I abo.ve I~ ~ ~.MO2i:atv h *: ** ~ I{

a . o.~

TSTF-169., Ri INSERT Above the P-7 setpoint, the reactor trip on low flow in two or more RCS loops is automatically enabled.

Watts sai:ýnlt I Tl3.Kz 3 :.3- 20,.

aTSTF-:l:169, 1i INSERT and above the P-7 setpoint,

~i 1013 0 ot,~ n' c"o: or ~* ~'.~~.i' ~'i~Cl TSTF-169, RI t'!:a:tt -z a1 tr-1'ý-Q:1r" !'r1'P mc~i~~l

... 6I 1:-e lower P-b'el REPLACE WITH ' . I- it

10. The -eac?_-, Cool~ant I'low ":-n --ri~n seto-Mr-an

___________~Valtie are speitiv I I'L W11aI.C a tý.

TSTF-169, Ri -hr.iuh -he t'iI"I1 a'ý6 s fec nEd',.n INSERT

.because..of...the higher power level. ~"~"1

<ReAc~ ~ . 7177

, 1 an TSTF-169, Ri DELETE l

'is rrr fit o' *.: L:_1 L Q I~ ~ ~~ý't~ c.- o~c~~ 1o*te s1' sc o

.1 "AU, rea rerlsc 'Re ~' b~l~ c

Te "O -~~ t'e~P-actor c oolat At

Th~~r. I- a - ~ t ^pa i jiitrc ~ oC r' i L

S.irtr 1 c-cU Qc-l.4Z . .. .. ....

qic~

a us . - coni e.-rn a t El 1.,~ .)Y \

~~~&o~~~~e~ r i t>ie ta~-a' A.1: o cv 1ký-' s~ 6 in P. t o u t -

tw 6ctr--;rr, r eeW- 4 a oho oc iru~ -U I -

TSTF-l69, Ri INSERT Below the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trips on low flow are automatically blocked since there is insufficient heat production to generate DNB conditions. [

'.1

'Auenie . 4-

A "T "R 'O Pq ac . e 1,lit R. Li-19 'A a t c 'G.

12..........t

- ~~ ~ ~ 7 1 fi 7-p - ~r.*

de .% :

iý- ýa -

f." ~~ ~ -1et ~ A'W!7 ~ ey- ~ -

RTS Instrumentation 8 3.3.1 BASES,:

APPLICABLE .12. Underfreguency.Reactor Cool ant Pump.s. (contilnued)

SAFETY ANALYSES,

]

and.

nLCO .... thereby reducing their coastdown time followi APPLICA8LITY trii. The proper coastdowný time :is equired ng a pump so that reactor heat can be .'removed, immediately -after reactor tri The freq uencc of each: RCRP bus, is monitore d.

Above the P-7 setpoi aýl is..os f frequency detected, on two:: or more:,RCP buse, 11,initiate a reactor trip.

Thi!s trip Functi n:*will n trip beforee the Reactor Co0olant n low-Low w L a Trip Setpo int is reached Time :de~lays: .are: incoirporated-. int the

,Underf*requ ncy RCPs channels :to prevent reactor tri ps

.due:::to mom ntary eIl.ec:tr.i c¢al power transients.

The LCO.. re iuires one Underfrequency RCP cInannel per bus::tosbe PERABLE.

,,:::,:TSTF-169, Ri L MInMDE I above the P*7 setpoint:, the Unde-rfrequency INSERT .RCPstrip: must be:OPERABLE.ý Beow the P-7 setpoint, all reactor trip:s on loss of flow are automat:icaliy in two or more RCS biocked since no conce.ivable power distribultions could loops.

occur :that.: would ca:use a ONE concern at ýth is.low power level.. Abave ýjtheo P.-7 ssetpoint, the react.or .riip .o.n l o:ss f flow: in two.or more RCS loops is.automaticall enabled.

13. Steam. Generator W:a't.er Level -Low :Low Losfthe. steaim generator as Qa :heat :s:nk can :be caused ..by the losiofnormal f-e:edwatera s t a:t i or black.okut or a feedl ine rupture. :Feed-i inze rup:tures esidecontainment are: protac:ted Dy tLhe 01'1timn high p*eslsure trip Function, bas:ec on a 1994 IVA analysis (Ref. 3).i Feedline. r!upýtures oulsi-de.

containment and the other cauustes o;'f t he heat si nk 0 s-s, are protected by :the :SG: Water LaeieV- Low -Low. t.r:i P F:unctUi:on.

The SG WaterLevrel-Low LowIo trip Function. ensuressthat protectioný :is provilded against. a*los's of: hea:t:: sinkV and actuates the AFW System prior .t*o :.uncIoveri:ngý t.he. SG:

tube s:.:: :The SGs are the heat si nk for th.e reac t or. In order to act as a.+heiatt si nk, he :SGs must contain a minimum :amount of:: water. A nafrrow range. low low: levei:

in any SG. is indicaltive of :a loss of :heat. sink for tbe reactor* The level ,tansmitters provide i npUt to th*e:

(canti nueui, W"att s: Bar-Un r - i3t: 1:2 B :3.1,:-25:

.RT$ Instrumeinta t-.on-3.33.

BýASES APPL IABE 16.. Rector-Tip .. Inter~locks: (continued)

SAFETY A4ALYSE.r1ý LCCi and: Above. the P6.interlocc setpoint, the-IS. Source APPL ICALIMITY .range lveU Lton. Flux reactcr Itrip may bei bl*ockedý.

and thisjFunct on woul*ro longer te necessary.

Ir MODE,,..i 5, or :6, the Pi6 interlock is not required to be :PER-ALE, because the NIS Source

ýRange :is prov dng core praotection-i10. Power Reactcr T-iossBlcck.ý P-7.

The Low. Power Rýc*cto ' r. Trps B-ck 7 fitero is.atuateC by furom .e ither the Poer. Range&

Neutron. :*F*X P-A., or thie Turbine lnpiuuls.

-Pressure, P-13. interlocki The :LC requi rement*

Ifo.r *heP::-P7 nteei ock ensureis that :the- follI ow.ng Functionsar oni

) on 1ric[rea si ng p er Uthe P - nnterlocka au toMa t'aIlIy enabl es:: reactcr tkrips. on: the l

f c,,i, ng.Funct i or.Sý PrsUszer Pressure-Low,,,:

.Press~ur.zer Wate,. L.ve.r---Hich:

!React;or C.:oo:ant::.F lo.-*!L04 Wow :[os):

Under /0 1ý ei RCPs ::. and

" Unde&f re"Quency RC Psi.

TSTF-169, Ri ihez..e re:ctor t'i*s areeo ry r*ur d::wher REPLACE WITH opera:in above sheP-7, ^se~pot

.(.a~pxima~t~eiy"i power)0. he eajctor (in two or more RCS :t:rips pr;idecprotectiOn against viOla*tng

- loops) te: :DNu .i.m.. :.Below. the P7 setpoin..

RCS kthe capable of provid.ng suf*icien 3s ma'tur al circUaatqion.:witho**h any RC .

rurzit.ig .

(2) On deecreasing. power, the P-7 :i nte ,rlock autremiaitat y blocks: reactor t-rips on:: the

fol:I owir'g Funct i ons

Pressuri zer:ý Plressure-L-,:

.Pressurlzer wat:er.Level -H.gn.

ne4 L:ot l~~~atzsCO Ba-Ui 1B3.2 Waus :Bar-unlt B, 3-4-3-*33 Revision 13 Ajiendment 7

RT$. Instrumeritati on:

. .1R1321 APPLICALE .... t Low Power Reactor Trihos Flnock. Pý*7. (continuedY SAFETY ANALYSEt LCO:. and: ReaCtor Coitlant Flow-Lo, .Two Loops APPLICAER1LITY Unde*rvoi't:abe: RCfPs; :and Underfrequency RCPs.::

Tri.* Setpon't ard Al.owable Value. are not.

a poli cab:le to the: PR7.V nterl ock because:::J. is:. a.

lo9i.C Furnct."i on and thus has no par;ameter vil th w.hJch to: :a~ssoc:ate. an. LSSS.

The P-7 *nter:ock is a logic Function. with.train.

and not d*inei identlt:y Therefoe. the LCO

reures: oe channe: per t(rain: oqfIO, Power iReactor Tips Block:: 7 i:nerlock to be OPER.ABLE ni.:MO) 1.1 .

The o1.potertips: aire bloked .belo*! the. P 7 se.tooint :.and .bumb! iove the P*7 seP p.0 nu1L.

in: MODE 2. ::3,4* .,. . 6..ths1 IFunc ti.or does not have: to :be: OPERABEbecause the. int&er7.ck prfo. IStsFunriC.110T when: poer leve drops te:!o,* !:0 pr. .hich is: in MODE I.

C, Pow * . . .Rance Neutron .Flu..

P-8 The: Power Ranie:- Neutroin .Fux, P-8 interrlock :i:s

actuatedtv:.6. ox:ately.48%1 p.oerd as :eterminec TSTF-169, Ri ,v L.o-out-cffour.NI$ power rannge detectors.

Aue pro;xRimatel:

p y 48Opowerr the P 8 irtir1ock:

ath1l

-D,; Coolnt:

Cow r ,heactoz DELETE -o ow, reaýctor tip* on ltow f:lcw

-in one or more RCS .lcps :on inrcreasing power.:

The ILO equirementhfe.-t:h s trip Function.

ensures t'-:l' p.otýecticn,; *s orovided ag;zins ::a Soss of fovl Y r R l!thalt o -0 d esU in SO cn~dit ons.

lapproi!ma~te:b i4y.i: :eio.t .n

...core: On:

e. when greater decne~asi t'han rg :po-wer, thez reac:tor::.t .bii:o.ni lw flow :ii . kop isý iy autom~atkd l.ja:

ck!ed. ** '

LfO :requir 0The f*ur dhannels of Power:: Range Neut:r~on: iFlux.. & ihtrlcktCo be O.tRABL1 in.

NCO*E 1. ' * " '"

Watts Bar-iUni:t 1 B 3,:34 'ReViSion 13 Amendment: 7

TSTF-418, R2 InstrumentatV RTIS.. ..... ch.

... .. :8 : 3. 13

]

REPLACE WITH BASES _____- 72

CT:ont::

S(co~nt inued:): D ,L.

I11 21 0 2. and. 13 Cond itcn D apphles to the, Power Rariga Neutron FlTux-!Hg ... ...

,Function: .

TSTF-418: :R2::::::

Th*e IS pw, r'Irange cetectors provide m*ui u t: to h:the -CRD

... REPLACE..W1ITH:::*:::::::: System and t e SG Wa ter Level Cntrol Sys em "nd:therefore have ýa t Wq. t*:of tripplofc dfour A kno inoperabl:n :

Reference 14 channel must be plalced in `the. tripped': cond ion. This results i~n a artiai ti ontin requir oi...

one,:-ýout:-o -th eeoicora tjton. :The E .oursý &Hc~ed.

~ th~ ~rnpr~hi~rh~nr...

~n t-ho frir~~r~.~

TSTF-418, R2 rIn.addition to pl acng.the: inoperable chane. in. the tripped REPLACE WITH diticn. THEPRYAL POWER rniustbe re4duced to *5 :-RTP within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . Reducing the: power leývel:peet orat-or of 78 e:Liecore with rada.l pwie r isItrbutions beyord te design

]Ui:4imLs, Wi:h one of the, NIS power ran-e detectos*: :

.)r~ate :1/4: of the radial oower.: d.istribut i on monit*or ing TSTF-418, R2 cap iýty isl los t REPLACE WITH \As an. alternative to the :above actions, the irbopeý-able lonel can be: pl~acedI in te.I tripoed condition wti:n" 72 I6liours and the QPTR :mnitKd: once :e-r**.12 h:.ours as per 1 13,2 . `4 I:QPTRý venr ifica',n TSTF-418, Calcati at TR every DELETE R 12.::hurs compensates :47for: the lost: monitoring crpab.-.li ty due

-].to :the inoperable NIS power range channe and .a los:

(QPTR)..

.tinorun..

~,:

r...... . . o w 6: hour Comp!et-ior TifAand te '2:hour Frequercyar.

~ "

leI. s

~RANT POWER TILT

Ž 75tR, The TSTF-418, R2 As .an alteer.atiVeto the above act~ions. tie pl:an t t be REPLACE WITH pllaced in= ere thiIIFunct ion is nol.onger- equired OPERABLE.Twelve, ours are:allowed to pl:aze tt.e phant i Seventy-eight rireason.able,DE:e..based

t. Aon:pe4aJing experi ce. to reach M7DE:3 from- fullI power in:an rderly:

a nd withoumItchllengi p systes I e c eiird TSTF-418:,::: R2 cannot: be coirpiDeted winhin their lailoed Cmplietioh INSERT The Requi red:. Act!ions .have -beer-.mod::fled by a Note :1hat:

alIows placing the. inoperable: channein tIhe bypas*.

The 78-hour ccndilticnfoIr up to lhours whi:e paeformirng routiJ le.

Completion Time su rveill1: _l:ance tes:in fother' chan1eis :T'e I O Ncte includes 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for channel TSTF-418, R2 1J . . .. . . .

corrective REPLACE WITH maintenance and an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for the MODE *** S *

****

12 *****II 2 1*! 8is *********

reduction as TSTF-418, R2 required by Required Action REPLACE WITH D.3.

(onti nu ecd) 4' eid L L: tDd T7 1:U IL 3: i:*

URTS Ins.trumentatioln

.... 1B3:.3 1

. ES.. . ..

i

0... .:7 ....~

..... , iO O!

ArT l -

2, .DR.....iA..* 0.2 O . : .. 2:.A6:D

i. : . O .:,.. C:cO tt,1nmied) i d TSTF-418, R2 alows: placing he 7ncperabhe tha, ý m t:in:he bypass REPLACE WITH

Cond:ltic to i ow setloint adjus)t nts: of: other Channels

,hen reqire to reduce th e setpoin: :accorda.nce wi:t'hll

-,tnher 7Tchn ' h' , t:f S Th j h owr it limit us tifj:edin *n: eference 7 Required:*tlor :0.2,2 has been modified by :a Note wich only TSTF-418, R2 r: r SR. 3.2:,2.4A.? to be- performed: i f th*-e Power Ra!- e .

Neutronp:Flux input. to:.QPTR becones iFane'able. Faiure oflý a REPLACE WITH component :in the Po.-wer Range NeutrInOFluxchanniml wih

.... renders:the High Flux tri p FunctIn inoperablemay. rot affect t*he capability to m-onitor. QPTR.,.:. As such, .determnnin.

Reference 14 OPTR, usirng t:e movabl e":1n.ore cetectors: once' per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

.may:no.t be. necessary....

-. E:.anI .E.2R TSTF-418, R2 Cor'ditibn £ leslto the -f~o116iq ireactoý' tr1Fuiptir:

REPLACE WITH

Pqw er nce . tron Fl ux-Ldw: and 72 FlPoer:Ra ge Neutrov ý'I-UHigh PaS it'.ive RAte

A kno.wn i.1 .noperam. hannel inus eplaced in the trirope6d condt:ion:: w:in 6 ours, Placin he: cha nnenl: In týthe t d: condition results in a parti ci

--t .ogic for uat.ion f t.:.the

.two-out-o6f-three trips and one-out-of-:thl iC: fOr actuation olf the two-ouit-of -foul, tri :s:.. .Th 6hour's allowedl

.. . toplacerathe

Ik -I h " r : : . . -1. in.:* tr,:i s hannel : :. : . c~ondition

is neferente Putfe 7 If thoe in e* r ,:xchan.el cannot be placed In the trip ccnd it*io within Ithe secf Ied Ciyn.letlon Time, the ,T1rn:

must:ý. plaed in a-MOIDr where tnnese.. Functions are t reqi', ed OPERABLE P;An a Idttinal 6:hburs i]s ai cwen to

pYede on theoperatinpIan t in MNODE 3.: Sixtohobur:s experiene. is a .r easOnab'le:

place:the t'IMe.

in MOtE.3

-ant from fu01 power in an orderly.:rmanner and without :chal IIencing TSTF-418, R2 The ired Actions h. Deen 'dif ied by .a ,Note :th..:t REPLACE WITH g: .theo" allows ra chainei :"inthe: bypassed co-dition0 fo to ou.rs w fo.rmIng

.4 rau .l Reference 14 survei 1lanc~e tes th o-t heNc-nes T k'u :m limit is justified I. Keren 7

.- 11 Watts Bar-unit :B 3**.-.:3-42. ýAmendent: 18*

Revi s:i on :27.

TSTF-418, R2 TSTF-418, R2 RTS Instrumentation B 3.3.1 REPLACE WITH REPLACE WITH 14A 72 BASES ,_____-I___

p i

.. TSTF-418, R2 I I TSTF-169, Ri M.1 add .2 REPLACE WITH. Condi lo M applies to the follow ng eactor trip Functions:

TSTF-418, R2 Placing the channel in

Und-rvoltage RCPs; and the tripped condition when above the P-8 :.

....REPcLACE setpoint results in a 1 Unde frequency RCPs. WITH partial trip condition requiring only one Wit one hannel inoperable, th mop le hann 1 additional channel in pla ed in the tripped condition with 6 h rs. 1 the same loop to cha nel i the tripped conditio results a par lal trip initiate a reactor t) initiate trip. Two tripped cc ition requiring only one: a ditional an channels in each of two a eactor rip above the P-7 s tpoint a below tie P,8 RCS loops are required se point. These Functions do ot have o be OPERkBLE below to initiate a reactor th P-7 se point because the are no oss of flov trips trip when below the P-8 ow the -7 setpoint. The hours allowed to p ace. the setpoint and above the c annel i e tripped t condition is justified in P-7 setpoint. This R ferenc 7. An additional 6 hour is allowed to reduce Function does not have to be OPERABLE below T ERMAL I *R to below P-7 if t inoperable chaniel cannot the P-7 setpoint restored to OPERABLE status placed in trip qithin the because there is no pecified Completion Time.

loss of flow trip below the P-7 setpoint.

There is insufficient llowance of this time inter al takes into consid ration the heat production to .edundant capability provid d by the remaining relundant generate DNB conditions OPERABLE channel, and the ow probability of occurrence of below the P-7 setpoint. an event during this pen d that may require the rotection The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed afforded by the Functioav~e )y--Not( M.

Conditi )nthat to place the channel in The .Required Actions the tripped condition r te p sed allows placing nfrupthe toeu,e is justified in DELETE Reference 14. An oijuFt -=igru additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , is allowed to reduce surveillance 11 the oth 7 channel. Th hour tirie THERMAL Power to below li~mit is. justified inRee P-7 if the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERAB3LE N:. I and N.2 status or placed in trip within the Condition N s to the Reactor Coolant Flow-Low i Kl specified Completion or trip Function. With one. channel inoper, Time. . operable H channel must be placed inord trimpwithin to\OPER ABLE.

L, w'*Z-1ourS, Il ý'ne chal\e] cannot be rt Allowance of this time l~at or the *hnel laced in trip *it~hin the\6 hours,\ "

interval takes into *tke TIE M L P(ER mus* be re ced blw "he P8stoink consideration the lwi in, he )ext hours\ Tslce~s - e unit in~ MOD redundant capability lw he t* LC* is o long r ap~plicable. This trip *unction\

provided by the

,does ot ave~to b*OPERA *LE \bel* the F-A setpoi~nt~ecause\

remaining redundant OPERABLE channel, and the low probability of occurrence of an event during this period that may require the -:...TSTF-418, R2 (continued) protection afforded by the Function associated REPLACE WITH with Condition N.

B 3.3-46 72

RTS .Instrumentation.

B: 3.3.4 BASES

ACUTONS NIi]:and.NI:2 4 (clonitinued)

TSTF-169, Ri DELETE TSTF-418, R2

] iP-e. o 1.al 1o d*

R ABESBL*-*t trip:nctior kher adre j stifile- :in I e rence u*edus*

c place provvi e core IA. 6r, hoLs a*4o1 ed to os..

iERMAL NoQ*ER t he :equed :Acton~s* have been :modied: by a. Note.that tn trip nd roteclton belikthe-the:4 stor-2 he cha add i iorna1 below: the P*8 setpo i to t

ýurs.

REPLACE WITH Surve :1 an:.channel. i els.. Thle i lsn.b 121 ...... .. c q .a + 1t he bypas:e1 Iableý:.channe-

]

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH Reference 14 Pressure. Wita: chan bperabyes . e i+: the0.op ourab

. ts u:.r tet pase bb, idn the triped condi in TSTF-418, R2 S ours. :laei~in d~f Th~e, itiripped: coin~ditiao- t~hi r:lesu!!t~s 0ý 2e Iozr and 1 on~el oR2h REPLACE WITH ,ir. .a."pirtii l. :tri*p .ondit~ior r*e]*uir*ilng: only' aidditiot:ndal ch.An.elo initiateapth racytor.trp If chantimel.. toun C~na tr i un. a)Junn 1 ; :ito~ trb irtd cric p : on Low Flu 1 4 hc- u r Placing the *bel rest::i*o~re t. Oi.*EmR4LE :sltiatLS o' .plalced in.* .the; tr:~iipped.:

coIF It :IO 1tH poer 1eei ni t hi, d.U!, be 1 the P:1 se+.t.1 channel Piresc F u-re -j ps WithHduie t:ac e::iLaedi chan erbareoperut.e&

the hann~el cnd tne jh~ b : re.n hi~enfe h TSTF-418, R2 su01ea:c testin f d'. handij reul s.

L/

REPLACE WITH 72 o rnden b: iv..app1i a.te: ýr~ .the i,;+t::t If 4e~I channl canot.r

rondieit~hn ~o~r ,uip to41 h0Urs w~ile pieifour*n he::.the; jti,:addryess cr i~a L F. c i on th S 1~, 4 kP%

[..nc

1. ions.

an d L~n 1.110 ' t1 hý ! f P... .i:t1 ~

~ "P:rain itnop

:::: : :......::: : :.::L::I::A_:::r e ~rn b1:h Ant SFSre/cAtr hos a re..l.

ip:

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH I3-VA 12 REPLACE WITH TSTF-41:8, R2 24 REPLACE WITH Watts E~a.r-4Y.it v 9 Rfrence::14

TSTF-418, R2 RWiS instrumentation.

iB3:. 3.1i REPLACE WITH fBASES. 24

. . . . I TSTF-418, R2 P:,.. and P.2: (continued)

INSERT to restore the train to .OPERA LE statuJ.(Requiir.edf The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed 'Actio*n P.1) or the .plant ýmust e plac *in MODE 3 Within the to restore the .next 6 hors "The CoMpltet~i.on ime of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months (Requi.red:

inoperable RTS :Action: P I) i s reas6nable coans dein:n . a in thnUis.

Automatic Trip Logic .Condition:. the remainiing OPERA LE train.is adequate to...

train to OPERABLE :perform thei safety::functiion. an given the low probability of status is justified an. event du!ring:.th*s interval. The. :Completion VTirle loi in Reference 14. 6 ::hours (fRequired Acttion RP.2)iis :reas:on.ible, 'based on.

toperatingeper~ience:, to reach MODE 3 :from full power in an

.orderly maanner and w~ithut. challenging: plant systems:,

TSTF-411, RI The Re quired Actions have :bb en modi'fied by a Note that REPLACE WITH allows bypass ing one. trai~n u to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillanc:e testing, provi*ed th.e o:thler It an :1s :.OPERABL E:...

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months are allowed for train corrective maintenance Condition Q.. applii.e:s to the RT8:s 'n -MODES 1.aid:::2. These actions address :the: trai:n :o0rient :-, t:h: Riý for tthe '.n RBVs. With one tralin inoperable, I hour ed týo restore the' train. to OPERABLE sta: ~r 3 It15: bp_

TSTF-411, Rl ptaced in !MOD 3 nith in the next 6ho1us*?,S. The:.Completion Timle of6 hk0us. i.s reasonable. ba*ed:on oper ating INSERT

e.xperience, to. .:re ach. M.ODE :3 fr:om*: full power ijln an orderlIyV The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months iannei-and wAthouti havebemneina nlantodifie:d:: " . he Not: h-0 Completion Time is justified in Reference 15.

Iiýr h..e 16,par ueirh and teb 'no prp ed oi: r1hn%

TSTF-411, Rli 0 ~ OonLErIe. eRIB to b Cri-1 2alrso f ,~

Ny rsfrf 'audowen ano) n'týI ceov I ansý

m. ~

sisi ~ h te ~ f rin is IPR~ e 64:th.

REPLACE WITH Placing the unit in t*inc imi:]*si ti0 ustifi-hned in.:f 'e*5* 7as *:*::ui**:*:io::

Mode 3 results in Condition C entry while RTB(s) are inoperable. one~~~~~~~~~~

inpial fos:eo:o~w chnc o ~-tto- u The Required Actions Cc:nrditein r'app::ie 4Vtoe the I ov ii6 and ed caontiued

.:0t I oP-niOinerocks. Witr

,,:,have been modified by a Note. The Note

.,allows one train to bebypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing, provided the other train is OPERABLE.

The 4-hour time limit is justified in Reference 15. 'I

'RTS Instrumentation

B 3:. 3..1 BASES * . * . . . . . ......... . .. . . . * '. . . . . . . . . . .. . ...

ACTIONS& 1:1 T:21] anQ T.2 (continued)

The, CorTpleiou Time of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is a reaSon able..time, basedý on operating experience, toa reach MODE 3 from full power in an orderly manner and withou" challenging plait systems.

With the RTBs open and the plant in MODE.3, this trip:

Function is nolonger:.required to :be OPERABiLE. The affected RTB shall not be bypassed while one:of Te. diverse :features, is. inoperable except: for the. time:. required to perform maintenance to one of the: diverse.:featu:res.

time.for: performing maintenance of the:divers:eThefeaatues :alIowable is hou~rs for. the reas*onsstated under Coditio :.Q, The? Completii:n. Tiime of 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months for Required iActon T is reasonable. consijder-i ng t4hat in tnthis Cond iItilon there is ýone remaninitr. diverse. featur-e fcr tiheaffected RTB,l and one OPERABGLE RTB capabRe of perforning the4 .safety .funct ion and.

gi ver the low probability of an evenit c*,curr.ing:during this itnterval.

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH ...

72 ._Covcdi t)on.:U. apip. ies: to: Ke: Steam Genera r.Water Level-

72. :L ow reator trip Fction,1.

known inoperable hannel mustbe restored to* ABLE:

status .0or placed 'T the tripped condition wthi 6 ho-uIrs.

PlnaO the. cha el. iný the. trippled c*.oindi :tionhe reqpup i:rts only:

on otf oic fr attio of the two ouoth~ree: t

ýtrifb. Th1 6 huS: allowed: to !ace th L iTI4perd lechnl

ýin the t rippe 0condit ion is justified. in Re f Erence Ifahananel "a iIs, i.t: i p Ta ed Antetipd O~to and does.ot a:::ffect.. theý T TD:p mt Calculai s for .:C ri.r.a in.:ing.:OPERABL:E. channels.: :t.is ithen nr -sary for thýe

.opera tor to6 force the use ofl. theh -shorter :i T i d y by adjUstiment o*fb the single ste:am g tonr:ie d*e Ixay calculation (s to. match the multi ple:e ear*n .eneat a or t*ime:

delay calculation (TM) for .the aiffect protectio

...................... ltro!ug~h :the Man*: M:ac~iti:ne. iiint~erface.. * : : ' set.,

TSTF-418, R2..

.If the i*.no:rprablbe channel] cannot be: restored+ or placed in-REPLACE WITH the ripped coendi tio* withinhe specified :Coml*etiion T*iýi:.,

the plat*.. st be pl:: acedL Pa :O.0W.ere h es'Eunc.tions are 14.Inot. requ.red OPERABLE, An add.-itiional 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s: i :...aiowe .to (cbnt i nue~d}

Watts. Bar,-U4it , 8::33-.1.3ý50O

RIS lnstrumientati~on RAS ES

. I, ... -and U.:2: (continued) place :the p1ait in MODE 3. Six. hours, is a re ason able.: tir.C based.on operating experi.ence, to: pl:ace, the:..plant: in.. MODE 3 from.111ODE"E 1 from ful .:power in an ord;ery mranner.nd.without

!Cha4]enginq:: p an.t. sy.steim s.

TSTF-418, R2

The R equIJrd Actions.: have. been mo'if ied by a: Nole that REPLACE WITH a: I ows. p.!lac irg Ian: 1, e:r.albl c: ha*rni I in the bypaissed:.

.. oC.Wdi.Oil:.tion fo'r up t o 4 hpour.irs while:: e~rforming roUti:neý 14 surve~ill:a nc te0s ting 9o the ot her' canne s. T he Iso all*o:s:a channel t be:p ced In by as for upeto 4 ho* *:s for testiny::of the channelI

.s Howevefr. 0 y 1 may 11S*bI jLuS

!time ] -ilt placAed kchanoe

ti:ie:ýd*ininbyw R f at c a one t Th 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months

V.n.Ief V kd /,

TSTF-418, R2

Crdi*:ion .applie to0: the Vessel *T, Equivalent :to Power.

REPLACE iiiiiii~ii * .iiWITH

~ iii12iiii reactor. tip Funp t i o. n Failei:e of the ves~sel *X channel input.(failure of."more: th ar.:

oinec T7Hr RTO or fAilure: of both: Tý RTDs) afft*týhe 110 ca1:Cu.aýtiO.n fo.r :a proterct ionl set*t. ThiSresulis in. the

.re2'!:(:rer1eint :tnhat the operato-r adjust the: threchoid piower el-! farn zero secoon ds tti5m 7.. de:d v:froi 5:00o( RIP to0 0. RRTP.

th~rouogh: :th t... hi n* ]IIC!*F ntlrf~a.ce..

.t..ne....,oper e achael b6 re-tored cr th' anol.

t hrP. shI.d po0.4 er: eve: tfor ze s* s. tst dc.j a d:d-:u:-:

w"thit n Ath:f s p *: ied ... "ar o p:t Pi't-i on r: L..-..

a caced i

, p * ..... ra MODE where*these An add . . . ... Fucttillns. c. ot .

be CPERAFBLE. n o: U a1 .oec to. 0itioni ol~art in MIODr :: $iy ho0ur s raub tv e

*rati-' " . x" e.... " to pl ace th:. plaýrt *n:tDO-MIOD E I frofrm ::full power ri anr :o.*rdery el.ln<a:::. tr.

-.halt T]er]igi:g :l~a:nt::t.:sys:te~m*:.

TSTF-418, R2 TrriP:S P.eCl r e d Ac-r: :s have b een. o.Ji: a. Not h REPLACE WITH a *lo. .":) s 17 . . , ni t he b._ : ..

rnc. ti on or p 14. hours..whi pe rfarri rCC nil-12 ~ur*v~e i- rrl*eate ,j of th,*"vther:channees .

"l;;ws, a cha-n eli nb-ý:pl.aced in binas f .u i .

iiiii~i~i~~iii~iiiii~iiii TSTF-418, iiiiii14~

l~i~ii R2 i for festirn of: tht byp -ed cn h ian w '.v n rhamnne tia hr p~ ac inqwp~sS at a n e tfmce

hf0l hu:a REPLACE WITH tiame Il.:i, rit i(s J4UsltJ f14 ed.: in Re fiee,-. n * " "

Watts Bar-U*i:.t1 I R :3 ....... P

RTS lInstrumentation B 3.;3.1 BASES ACT IONIS. CI and:c W:ea2fu (Corltiptued) Co:ndi:tio.en. W :iappliie~s toe the;follo0wi~ng :re~ac.tor :tri~p f:unctiors::

Overtemperature: AT;

-::Overpower 1A; and:

-Prels.ssurizer Pressure-High TSTF-418, R2 A known inoperabochanne .tý e ppl acedý fn the tripOped REPLACE WITH on~dition wiithi n Placing the cha nel in the t ri ppedý cond i ti.o suj-l s ip condition:

72 requirirg only one-:out-o.f-totw logic fo,.r actu tion of the two-out-of -three trips and one-out-*(-Ithree ic fr actuatito.n:.. of the two-n.ut-of-tfour trips.,, The hours allowed to p ace.the:t in perbl'1hann e rinte tripp.ed condition is justifite.d. in ReferenAl TSTF-418, R2 I the perabe. chanrnel cannot be. restore ::or placed *n the REPLACE WITH trip. cord ition with~in: the ýsp0ec ifij-ed Complet~ion T1ime, th p]an t: mus:t be placed :rin. ýa: .MODE where .these FuncttIons are ri 14 .... ::required: OPERABLE . :An addtin:a 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is allowed t. not place tihe:-pPlantiinOtD::olDE3::.3.: S::ix hours 'is: a :.reas onabl:e::tilme:,.

based on onperatin*gexperience, to:place: the ME '

.plantin forom fu l poIwer .1 an:orderly manner and without challenging pla*ant. sy s te *lls.

TSTF-418, R2 Te: Re quilred Actio.ns ha vo becn mro& y a Note tha:

REPLACE WITH at IowsqVpACig r an i noic3f ann] i~n: the:byuas~sed I 12 "cunditio for up to 4 I rs, wh:il ee erfor m:i n .rUtine i ne s'urveillac est t-o -PIPthrca:n~s.Te~~~

allIo ws: a"charinel Vto :be placed i*n byPtpaos for .*upt I o4i s for.terting of the :bypas stetd-cha~ne oweveor.ý only. or".

,channel. may be, p:laced: .inbypass at a. on.e. T Itie.hetj.ou.r t- ei li*5i .. jtbustfited in Refrence X.ýI a~nd X. 2 TSTF-418, R2 Condition X ap001ies .to the fobloIwnQ reactor.trip. fu:Cti.QsFn:

REPLACE WITH

, Pressurize Pre:ssjre..L.ow; 14 Pr P seriiLs si te0.erLe:veli-Hi.h; and

( ont.ionuý dO)

Watts Bar-Unit: 1.3I

RTS Instruimentation TSTF-418, R2 DELETE BASES . ...... ........ .

X..

7--

and X.2. fcontiinued)

TSTF-418, R.2 REPLACE WITH I 4,Nct cýo 6

F1ýb;ý ~ 0"ýý With aonie channel inoperable, the inoperablTe: channel mu st:: be I

placed:in the tripped condition. within1 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , Placing the With one channel t ri"pI inoperable, the channel::, in the t~ripped: conditi-n resul ts :in a part.i.alI inoperable channel must conditioi requir.ing only :one additi:onal channel: to ini tiate

a reactor trip abOve:the 1PW7 setpoint &andbelow: the .:P-8:

be placed in the tripped condition within 72 setpoAnt.. :hese Funci ons do nq have.to: be C.PER. BLE:::.below hours. Placing the the P .setpoint :because there areýc, no: loss: of flow t iri ps channel in the tripped below:.the P- 7: s~etpoi nt.. The 6:hours allowed. to:pl]:aceie the condition when above the c~nannel in: the tr:i pped conditi~on i.s justified i: nRkef.efeence:

P-7 setpoint results in a 7. An:-additional :6 fhours :is alldwed* to reduce THERMAL POWER partial trip condition to below: P-7: if the inoperabl'e.. cahn*e0cannot be restored :to:

requiring only one OPERABLE statui0s or placed in tri.p: wihin the specified additional channel to Completion Time.T" initiate a reactor trip.

These Functions do not Allowance of this time interval take.s into consideration the have to be OPERABLE below redundant capabillity provided by the.:remaininq redundant the P-7 setpoint since OPERABLE ::chan*n*., a.nd, theýiOi r p`robabili ity of! occurrence of there is insufficient a-,(event durn*g. thics period that.a require the :protection heat production to afforded: by t-he. unctions associ:ated with Cond ion :X.

generate DNB3 conditions an i have below tne Ps allowedton t.e Pequired The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .hannelithed allows placi9gActions.. .rab-ebe.n. modlified channl in by thie a: bpassed:

Note that place the c:hne . iine,thef t oho s: -whi n r :

tripped conidition is c..... d. up to1 hInr S.l e justified i :n:Reference te]ti.of ..o the 0Sherc:O....... sO

14. An add litional 6 alo' hr Qcbe placed in:~s fr r 4in

.hours is a].lowed to f incg of A t.hpe abIpan Ir e**-.-4o hore'i on reduce THEFr-MAL POWER to ::0::y::li 0 . S &t aPa..S t irmr.4 below P-7 i.f the tl i i it .**., " e.....

i.noperable channel cannot be restorec to OPERAB3LE _______

status or placed in trip within the specified C0 h. Y a. pe to the rbine B p I Va..

-Completion Time. :::::: . ne, two or tht:- tiaml e, jerS 'e r .. c Qha:nnels must be p1t:d .in the cn*,

e-. i.J.

i hn 6 tours. all tic vI ~e s niuz : tlp_

TSTF -418, R2 fJI Jly I.. n.order for .he reac.or tripp Iral ,

c ne ted, .ii blee:d !op1/2:. Prethain naccept: :IT'r'r REPLACE WITH tp/Va!e C1Losuire cha r e in Ahe tr*i: codintc .*.

W .

or 'ore channeis in tnie tr ip copdi ýti o0 tr p condi~titon xoS:s. Mt.l .of Ithe i:

, a p*artidl r:ea' Vtoý inr :TulPil: \.

12:

V1' ceane s1'a-- r" e ,U- i b ert r rec~~~ctor~F Iro k-i 11,0 Lhn~ e r'e'Stvd oLEk

-1.i TSTF -418, R2 ~ tts o u~ nte rpc~i TSTF-41.8.,.R2.

rL to-belov, Lh.& ~CP r, t ~it:hi REPL ACE ITHThea ors llowd t ~ ~nr~u'r; REPLACE WITH 7trp cond:ition a-d the 4::hours all:owed 72 .. .... .. ..... ............... ... fi..in 14 .

,.TSTF-418, R::2:::::::::

REPLACE WITH" iWatts Bar-:Lr- it. B 3 5 14

RTS Instrumentation.

B 31..31 iBASES :

.SURVEILL:ANCE: SR 3:3.3i1<3:

REQUIREMENTS.

(conFti. nued) 3om3.13 copares.

cSR the .inCocre system to the NIS channelI output every .31 EFPD. if 1t.he absolI uteL djifference

- c.P--,i is the: NBs chsannel is still OPERABLE, but must be r-eadjLsted'..

If the NIS Channel cannot be: properly readjusted, the

.channel is :decl .ared inoperable. This Suorveillance is perFormed to verify the f(AI) input to: the: Overtemperature AT Function.

Two: Notes modify SR 3.3.3..Note. indicates that the

.exco~re NIS. :Channel shall be adjusted :if..the-absolute

.diifference :between.: the i ncore . and: excor*e AFD i s 3%.

No.te: 2-cl:.rifies thlat. the. Surveillanceis required. only ...iif.

reactor power: isŽ15%RTP and that 96 hurs:

is al lowed.for perforhmi ng the. ffirst Survei:llI!ance aftýer: reaching 15'%RIP, survilance

.Th.i's s.typicall.y. peformed at50% ... RTP to ensure the results of :the evaluation are more accurate and the adjustments more rel iable. Nin ety-,six:: (96). hours are

.allowed to. ensure: Xenon. stabilTity and all:ow. for int rumentation al ignments.

The Frequenicy of every 31 EFPD is:adequate.- It is based o~n unit. operati:ng experi*ence, consideriing .instrumient rel,1iability and Operatig his:tory-datza for, in:strument drift.

ýAlso,:the. slow cha-nge.s in neutron fluxduri:ng the fuel cyvcl}eý

can. be detected, during this. inte.val.

TSTF-411, R1 REPLACE WITH

:*:ii~ii~iiiiiiiiiii *: ::13:.i/*:::

L43

ýR :.:i iis :h per~f'or.rmýnc.Lýe of:.a: ev 1on::TADDI a 62 .t.......R... TEST BAS.S. T..i. test s"hall verf OPERABIT b

Uati ict Jof the end devkies.

The R:79 test sh:all include separate. ver1ification of the.

undervol tage and shunt t rip mec.hrani sms:. Indenende t veri:fica.ion i Of RTB undervoltage. a-nd :shunt tribp Functi i.s i not required :ýf or the bypass br-ecak:ers,.. No capability i:S provi:ded :for, pPerforming such .a t.eAst aýt .power. The byp-ass.

brelak:er test shall: include a lo.al shunt trig. ýANot h<I

.eben.n.aded..'to indicate that thiS, te:.t.mu-st. e-p-eýfo , .

the..bpAss Ibreaker prio :toac::int: in: serv;iceý.

(ttrt nued)

. fat.t5 :lbar- Urlitý :1 :B: 3./3.:

.3 56

RTSý In~strumentation TSTF- 411, Ri R 3 31A REPLA~CE WITH TSTF-411, Ri 3AS ES 92 REPLACE WITH cSURVEILLANCE SP . 1,3, J, 4 (cont i:Add) 62 RF0 UI. EiM ENTS:

. .. I . 1.14 adequate. It is basel on. industry operating expe*rience, I eri~i%::in~stu' t~r~el~iia~b~i.iity:and oper.ating.history I TSTF-411, Ri

-LL+/-

SR 3.3 1.5 REPLACE WITH SR ý3.3 1.5 is.the perfor* of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST.

justified in The:: :iSPS. is tested ev 3, ays oqn a:ý STAGGERED TS*T BWASI.S Reference 15. usi g semiautomlat~ic tester. :The :trainý bein6g tested i s.

d in th0e:y. onitioni thu s preve ning . i5ad.v.e r.t e.nt.

adcltuation. Throbgh: thel: semi aut.oaMtic tester..aa .l: possiibll.e:

TSTF-411, Ri loga toninto*ns, wi* and withi ut ap1licable permnissives, REPLACE WITH are:.- .foreach! pfrotection uFnctio*an The Frequency:of er 31. .a's :on"a STAGGERED:.TESTBASI`:SS: i q uP "

92 ba sed on.. industry Iopera:ting..ex:p.er ienCel. coPnsi!deri ng instrume'nt re:liabilit.y and qper:a.ing: :hi :story. daata.

ISR 3.31.1 6 /

TSTF-411, Rli

SR 3.3 .1.6 j.:.::a cal*i brat.i on of the excore chan*nPes: t~o:- l.e REPLACE WITH ncre ch~anlels- If :.measureit: do:lno~t..agree. the:

excore .cbhain~r s are:: not dec-ar-ed Ioperabli: : bu tI must b justified in cal ibrate~d to- aq ee: wi i t h:"iinore detector omeasuremenits.

Reference 15.

if the.ex channeL.c ,nnnt.be adju:ted, :.tlne! channels are:.S decl-ared -noPperable.,. T'sSieil.ne i pSer ormedt: t

ývie-rify the: f(i)j nput .. tO*h.-: C teo

A. lote miocies SR 3.3.1... RieNOt: sat"es..t thnt h:

SurvP1ilac is reqi only if regtC po;rv 0fP.

a .'d: that 6 days: is-- allow.ed f .or verfor(Ring .th. f.:. r Ls su.ýrveill ance: :after reachilng :50 RTP.

the Frequ enzv:o f :92 FPD: is adeqia:e :t-i.sbased o'i indu s t~ry:: oper a ti:ing: i explerieicee, t ion-de i. : n:i*tfit ent.

rel::i:.ab :i: ty and operating h:i:tsqtovr:: d:a.ta.:-or i: wistrum:en:t d*rift-:

. . . . . . */. . / . .. / . . . ...

. . r . . .... . . ./. . . . . . . . . [ . . ..

Ea-7 6,.ts Uý, +1 1.-5 iBi 3.. 3:: 5iI

.R.S BInstrumentat ion 8B3.3. 1.

BASES SURVEI LLANKE SR: 3. 31.7 RE QU IREMENT S (conrt inue d) SR .3.:3.1.7 is the performance of a .COT .every21day:s.

A: COT i Isperformed on each requireId, channel to en~s~ure t.he entirýeý channel will perfcrm the initended:: F not ion..

Setpoijnts must be Within the Allowable :V ues specified in T*able 3:;3,; i ]. .

TSTF-411, Ri The difference between the current ":as found" values and :the:

REPLACE WITH previous test "as e ft. v a lues must. be consi stent wi t.h,.the dr i ft aIlI owance used in the setpo fnttmethodology.:: The 184 setpoin~t shall be .eft set consi stent : with the:assumptions of the current un It specific setpoint methodology..

The "as found" andGa.s: lef t" Values mustiso b1 e recorded and: reviewed Re:ferences 6*andi :,...for con6.sistency. . . ..i ..

with1 the assu tion* s of TSTF-411, R1 SR 3.3.1..7 i s modIfi:ed bLy a No(te that thi:s tes shall:1 REPLACE WITH includje vtei ation that the P-O interlock is n. th 0e required state for the exist ing :unit conditi1 The Frequency o*f9 as is ju:sti fied in,Refence.7 except for Funct;ioni { ' tificaton Funcoofor is pro.i tieid *:i:: Pc-ýe~re:*:e ;.9 184 S 3 ..3... .

TSTF-411, R1i S.R 3 .3 1: .8 A.:S.: :the. Že rfo rmace of a. CIT :as described in REPLACE WITH SR.: 3:.1. 7,. exc*ep.:.i is modified 1i.. " . Noit ]

prov:ideýesý a 4 hoti~ur. dJel:ay in the requi* rmen t!tperform th is References 9 and 15. sU ~el 1:1 an.ce or!-5ource ranqpe instrumimrtat iii when:i entei r VO:DE 3:.:fom .ODE ::21.. Thi:s. Note :allows a noi:d. shutdown 1o0 proceed wtota ea o test0n Ei2uard: for .;a shlort tinre: in MODE 3 .until the RTBs. :re oQpe and SR. .3, 3 .:

I

0 d d to be perforned req J reoolaier Ifft ht,:h:un:it S..to be in MO.[DE 3 with the RTBs closed for .reat~i- thank 4:hour th~iis Survei11anCe .must be per:fo rmed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months after entry ilnto MDE.3I. No te. 2. sltaite:s that this teit salI iinc lunde.:.ver.ifficalti on: tha.::t he ýP-P6 in.nterlock `S: in the requi**red s*ate fd the. exlistin g. :nit iconrdit i on,:. The Frequncy is nuod i fi ed ::by:: a: Note: that .ll :S surve:i I.I ance toa U teisfied if it...has Ibeen petrfoqrmed 'Wi thUiri 31 days pr:e. p I:re tro aL Lton startup and&. :4.ihu:rS zfte: Ae. :rd,ICi r gr pow e.r: be* 1owP:-O 1andK Rt.. Theb: r*x,,i eucy of ",prio.o Yt.0 startup" en sure S t:ii s: urvei 1ann*e i:s u:rm*d :pri or to

ý(cont inuv-r, att" Bar-Unit I B3.-S

3::.:3:- 58

RTS Instrumentatlion :B 3.:3:.

BASES 5I.'RW ILLANCE sR 3.s3.1. (continued)

F:LQUIREME' T5 criticla oper-atitns aand applies to the source and ipnt-er.mfddiate range iins~trfument channels. The Frequ:ency of, "4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: after reducing?*poweri :.:beow. P-10" (appl.i- ablee 1:.to intermediate channel s) and: !"4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: at:r reducing-power below P. 6" (appi ic.abe to source range channels) alloS a norm.al :::shutdown t* be c::oGampl.eted. and: the unit removed.fJrori tLhe MODE of Apptlic:abil :it:y o::r'Of.r t hi:s surveillance with:out a:

-dpt: .Y: :tn n-'ý*testing :required by this surveillance.:

I DELETE I Thea Frequency plaqt. remains ýi h1::ýofi

ý er if there aft er ap.plI ie s i f t he yafter the initial per*fr.orma nce s of Yrior tc re Actotr startou r.hur .

A n i.A.:iI ityVor thi~s .s~urveiflance ii < P-ior fo t:he. r I low and intermed iate ranrje chanhel s: and: <P::P6 :f

. n els

-h: .Once theiunti.t . in MODE: 3* thii s

.surveillance is :no longer:requiqred:. If power:. is to :be man*nta ined :, P. .-:10 or - for mre than: 4: hours, then the P-6 tes tin g requi red by: Jthis .surveillarxce mustM bperp*.~forme d pri.orto the: expiration of.the. 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months limi:it. Fou:r :hours*:i:s a rea sonable tie toý complete the required te~stingi br p.aC,¢ the.init,ii .:.a MODE w#r.i tis sutrve i1 lanc(1 is rno lon ."

r(:q4jIi:ived. This: ftest fens;ures* th t: the N S1iso-u[7.67I liý t .of Pi i a :i

,'I a-n d , YraJ

' .n g o*', l h.6w i [; a p M L 7 Ihi

/*5nor~i*4q hointo to, tain uirs i . th e rPeactqd critical., ndrccfter.I

.. l:* . . ... .power PKiY

. or:..<

rddu~ci

.. . p6 . . .r ::,-rio*-, .. .

REPLACE WITH jR 33..

.SR3.K .19 is the: :perf*rformance c0 a TYA}DT arJd .s: P V-1 0 1 source and intermediate eve.ry :92 d.ys, as :Justi f ie d i .. e.....

range channels are

.itn' OPERABLE channels The SR is modi fi ed by,:. a -Note that excludes: venr .iF slet.pi01ints. from: the TADOT :in:S:inc* thii:S SR: a 1 . o unmdervo.* :age and In~deri-cquen*:: icl~y. :s2tlpuoH~rt:

....e ) t ,* .. e, S. e.. b0 a t;:... b n, c h :..a:. ra t...,: o.: .:L O:c ,-

eni:f: at ion requ ,rhes elCab ra.., bC.-i.

a.cco~ipl j ~shed dur ing.: he. C**I:.th~*:.L C*:BR:MOa I .'A I .. ..

1....

. . ,j~

Watts Bar-Uni*t I3

RT$S.I nst rumem ta:tict.

B 3.3.,1 BASES SUR.VEilANCE SR 3,3-1.11 (conti-:ue..

QREU'RtMENTS:

th potenr,t i al for . Can unpl anned trans i ent if tfhe. Surýei pe n.l.a Ce we re perf ormecd :wi t h. :t he rea c tor*: a t Ip oPwer, .. :Opera t- '

tniq experience has shown: these components usuzally past: ýie:

Surveillance when p erfo:rmed 'on the S1m8nth:Frequency.

SR 3J.3I.-1 2 SR .:3A*i2 is. the.perfrmance of a COT of Is i.nte~rl:oc.ks ev .ery IS. Months.

The Frequnyis. b.sed on.the known reliabillity : the, interlocks.: and :.the mul:tlchannel r.edundancy avatlabl.e, :a nd has: been be acceptable through o*perating tsown.to

expeerience.

.SR, 3.3. 1 i3 SR 3.3.1.13 is the perfoman.ce oft:a TADOT o.f the:: Maual Reactor Tripi, :Re~acto*r Trip Ifrom Manual :Si:, and: the Reac-tor Trip. from Automaticý S: Input:: fromSAS. This .TADOT is peirformed every 1:8 .mon'ths:. Tihe test shalli:ndependently.,

verify. the- OPERABI LITY Of the undbxrvdltageýý and ::shun#t,ý tri.p..

mechani sms for these Reactor Tip Fuicti ons for the ReAct:r Tri:p. Breaker-sý. The. tesi: s.. hall also verify. OFPE£RABILITY of.

the Reactor Trip. Bypass reaers for these Functicns Independent Verif:ication of the Reactor Tri Bypass Breake-undervoltage, and shunt trijp mechanisms 7s not required.

The Frequency is based orn the..kn]w, qf re:. 5::bi:. ty: :t.h.

fun tions and thremuitichannel*.eddaic: .ai:* lab:e: :.c..

t).eer, shown, to be: a:cceptable through:-.era..::.experience.

. h: SR:::ij:s modified by::a .ioe thratIexcNuces .er.i. . atOn sep.6pint*s from the TADOT.. The:.:Funnctions :eed ha.e r.c

- bhts ass:ociated wiith: them.

betpo REPLACE ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::P(

..WITH .. :::: .. . . . ':7 C) exceeding the P-9 F3U cti..on. This TADOT : :as descrie n S--... 33 1 .

interlock whenever rd P the unit has been in N.te stat that thi Surveillance is :not r lujrd if J .

MODE 3. This the peiu 1dy, Vrha

oY

...... vo

~4~tt.s L~r-LThit> I 8:B :3,:3.

3.3-61:*6.:1

RI

.S~~ 3ntrrrraio

.6ASEES.

ýSOIRQE1 LLA HE SRP 14 (cqntinue

REQUI*RE E*-,J ti! :heini etooinr' no hv :)n, pc liirr& fo~r ths TSTF-311 SuH,- 3n,, P~fwt Cf Tv'trw REPLACE WITH reactor c' ri tcalI Thi~~es 'not promd e~ w tr

.reactor a% k:'owqer and ius. thEe or,- ofor-d o tar exceeding the P-9 interlock.

ý~R '51/2 verfeNA%"dualw i d.1arII n

_:~ ic. resos ~e r ~ ~ or eqpu&a t Ima f<Lm t' va1J :acsuec ~rk qit a - uricut d fn~ssReso t~~~~n~~~ r!tr tPi:r.

6c~t

- 3 " /0Lnc nl3.e ii.

RPe... -irmn-s M~a ruaL eii' '~f )Tdb1

r. LIn~"~ o bcn:

Lemrrmled in the ,

Tlie, i~ses rnodpl L -zra o, U) al elapsed ie.trom7

.at thL :slSor 'i mt.

hq i at*nrtL.e-i F thechremhL ui red funkcItribna ýt' e cntoln shut~wnrodfuly iser~-iw te ractor c:'e.

ýFo r annels. that Iircdue dyr arn tr ans fer Ftvnctiors (~~

ea/ag, rateIla etc ) Li response6 time Letmy 148V nt p- bmrred .0 h the: transfer i-unction se[. to on.with :the ie,

"~Frsos~.te-n teI t- r,', pons 1m est can be ~rcmdwith ~rsat J tt ri ~mn c~~cdasuP~~t:h ,ns-an:s: are.:.set at the 1r

-,me rnal nil va: :T he.resports ti'emyoneurdya series P seqpentilal. test~s S,~ thFtI rtr rso isk. ux-<-. theeuCjre icsp,~rici verh i~f d bv b- c response ,in s

'1n0 ay o SrE n_ a 'Ove Iarpping or total chaninel or im~~~ur~~~ on aoc ena.i ris syi.g~~tu Prcoesr and r~u~Al~iesponse: tim~e:, wi~it atual riasyujcnP.tirua te ts on he rm'ri~der of :the. cha ri 1 V-h,)j o~'ir s e deoon: ac c t~b 1e respo'n-s timre L'~ ,rs J.d~t1c: noi or p~o.r ts 24r'rpin ae_ Is'~ C?? OA

E: (4§~

t 'o+/-t muesu remne .,

in

-mg.tlvendor: engivneer nu ,rei ficar-i ohs 1. CAP l3'32, fl~ison3:1 2.. ET1 mfaol Seso Time~s:

TeaS LI qLqu ftd. 'i tese bas is ad me:thoddogy ;F 1

1/2rpnsrda tIe~~

tns.

messiný the over aiI "rI z at.i onf the cnne respoWsa tMe.frspc~

i-nti fled in t.WrAD, or tC v~ler - Icatiofl e,(I'rs biortypeý mi S~ L s 6 1tr~tdb

&~

.... ...... i

.. . . .(coni nwe~

Wa3tt~s iar 4Jm;

Amendmentt,

SPRV. Tntcrrai~

CEl LJVELAN SP,~. .2311 "Conitirl~ued),

REQU t EWDIT3 W~AP-1dO'A?i A r.-,t I~vsin.0n of Pc-dc.

'and Frn-ýbogy: a U5 crm alIca- ,e ~ -Pm s-eir ina ta 7epn

. tUa io()hqa~'a iie -~f hr~

the prki-tectibn vtr i snJt h*11/4 TSTF-411, Ri trs ollr~~trq m vit -yc~pw per tiona ser~vice and::re. L,(rif 'd folWri rnitea INSER r da sit.-Ty aff~ pr~ v- In q'-e eiect< a r-ar worý: does not 1 pact, respi.~r~pc1~

p~s ~dfor.repair are nif tnc t~h 't, Z.~ a LIe SpecI' comTpo!,ýrts ic1enzi~d the: W.AP m~y be replaedý oU. e n Onrt.ao ie eXa Dle ee eon te d: be dic~f t c.U ~avi-no t~he..nrlj ~sgrn Ty icf a:

As2 pporepriat-e each. channel 's re~spo~nsa mlust be verified.

evvrv IRP O 'i o,*, a, STAGGERED TEST17 13AS IS.. Tes ti nqlof the f ino, artuiltibri devi resýi n lc td"ed in the teStirig.:

RO:rersD*ns times cai lot bt- determwed- dur ino mi~t ipeiratiOn eaue quliprner- oyeration is ~i red to mieasure. respon se tim,-s , Ex rience nem shmim Utfin; compomevnts iially pass '-h i:s survei~llance-wen pert'Tm!ýJ : mon-th Atte Freq ueTI T'ieefore. .tnl eýy,er Ue:F as zo nc'.u dd: to be acceptlPt ~ a. e"i aW.J:I ty s 3c ar n~t

-S 3, 31-4,5 is rdf ieoi b a.Note. statl'rig that neutr~on:

de~tectors *ar'e: irRTS RESP.&ISE Tm tes tirq:, hs:

fromd~

in6te i S necesý v eas e ~ff;~1t ~ngir ati n a~

appropri ate: de~etz, t lusg& Exc.l:] u n hedtetr ars ,

ccta bIctdus--: Pthp rpirwc Iles of -deec-ýtor operatn~on ensure&.a:V r~trlall wv ýntcle rc rcs-n Wats Br-niv vaý 2)2- :Revi.i~on .3' iArnenulle oPt.:

~v t~Z~ien

~ 3 FREFZ FN'OES 1 atts Baz TSAR, SeD-tiorn 6-, E:- 1:erz.!~~

3 d~tJ &+/-LFS. S,.ckior o: r0:ncc r.it 71yts TSUE 279+I157.1. "C.'it~erio,fo~r:P c~~.£~~v:o euiý-:r :o< ~ n ttes.ArLL5 GEkt Z.111t 6f ~piCf t: S7cI 'ii,I l1 Nl,: tt-,u ,ý J 00.0. ,~*v ~ ~ ~ ~ *.* ~ ~ cr V~~t~3j *3e-A~Jrii*t 2':

Amene1dzmt-eýt 24. 4-7

ES FAS: 1:6 In'tuMe nt aLion i3:3.32 B3AS ES ACTIONS.813 1ad82. cn~ud

-olat.io faiu of .one or bo*th ch:n s in:one train r:nh.-.ndrs thte tr~un i . inoperable. Condition .. therpre:,

er.ncopasses both situations. [he s*pccif ied Comfeti0r Ti.e.

i.s rpeaort o biabe F.consideri ig that titheer e: are: two automatic.

PC:t:U(at`Qni t-a is and an:tfiher .. iimhal :i.j Ani atJ nt tra inr

-D E r .:for:each::Func*'ion, a1~d the l6w pro~b*bi1it:y,.of A.II event iring du.r inglgthi intrval:.

Q, If the :train c~annot.

oe restoed to OPERABLE4 stat.us, the pl"an tmust.be pla:ced i n a :M.ODE( in.Which.:.tihe L.! does not appl]y. his i:sdone by ph.]*ac.i1g tile plant in at IleA s t NODE..3 w.i~tiin an:n additional Ctious (54 ho6rs tota" ý:tlime) and i:n. M0*oE. !5 %wi:thinann ad diola" :hourS. !34 :s ttt il . eItii- The allow'iabbe e in es: ari &oricn :jron i abl eb ab:sedo :opera t i 9g.

exIpeC i.encce. to. r:eachý the:. reu ired.plant condt:i:6on.s fron.:.:, il pbiwer condlition s 1iýn: an o.derly :nanner and wiit hiout chalc.~ii ::pl:ant~ system.I The allowance of 4.8hour S jl ti.i: ed in Reference V7 TSTF-418, R2.

C, .2.1 and: .. 2:

INSERT The 24hours Cond'ition C a'IPP ie.s 1ti the automatic actuation logic and The. h. . ... . .. . ... .... . .. . .... II . . ..

allowedfo restoring'fhjts. in :thfr the. fokai:ii functiio: e inoperable train.TsT R2 to OPERABLE a,c Uit 0[:sr,:t~

i~~~. f, ý:ti.c, ; F, oza status are justified in REPLACE WITH Reference 17. sPe A: A... .

if.tsr*aic: Switch.Vn:r to Con d tmie Su.: um h is.cac on.

ia :.a dd r he t raiBn: tor.:it.ntathiof.*:tf te th: SSP :0nd

~'emaeand JlV 1 .ifon traini is oerable;

iii:::::*

*

pla.:ed -:ini a 140DE:c:in vih ci h::the ~LiO: do~e&. DLb~anipily. ThMi~s i~s.

..... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~Tm aol e allanGh ..

p1o n.

Iti . ..

re.

a txaJt?

re *.......

t. *LZ~_LLL.iL::***-..

t.n

.irnDE 5a.

(contf: nCnued:)

1~at

ý ar n.i t. I~3.-

ESFAS Irnstrumentafti3n 8 3.3. 2 BASE.S:

... -. .. . . . . . -. . = . ...........

ACTIONS CA.1 :C:22.1: and C>2.2 (continued) within atn additinal1 30 hous (42 iours:-otal time). The Comple~t.on Tfimes are rasm e, ased on operatm9 exp erience,. to. r:each the req ired ::plant.conditions from Iful power:: conditins q in an orde:r y manner and without.

TSTF-418, R2.......

The: Required. Actions are mdi-ied :by a,Note that aliows one REPLACEWITH. train to be bypassed up to 4.hours, for surveil ance or

testing, provided the othhOPERABLE. tain is Thi 60 ..... allowance::s ba:sed n th ..rae iability: analysi s as~sumption :of.

.WCAP:-:.10271- *( ReA f ' )that: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months iS theI avesra time requ ired:to. perform-channel surveill ance:.

PA, Q..2. 1: and 02."

TSTF-418, R2 Cond tion D appli~es to::

REPLACE WITH

, * ....:Co~ntai]nment

... ........ . .. :P~re

. . ssur!e-FHi]g

. h;i~ ~ i*:

iiiiiiiii:!i; c *: z:i ~ :ii*i

' TPres s urizer Pressure-Low:;

steam Li.ne Pre~ssure-Low:; arid

... :Steam Line Pres:sure TSTF-418, R2 Rt-ih If one:: channel i.s inoperable k) iho,4rs are alowed:to restore REPLACE WITH the channel to OPMER-ILEý. statust-r to, place it In the , r p--d cwOndit ion. fGenerally this Coqdition azpp *is to functions 72bthat operate on two-out-of-thre~e ]irfe.. .I er_ re .......

of one: channel pl ace,ýs. the Function in a. cw- uout-of-twN configurat ion, OrŽech :rm imist be trippec to lace the Func t i on.a onne-.o . o0fntree cOnfi nt(rg urfatt n tt sat is fis

redundancy requ:reien tis.

TSTF-418, R2 INSERT The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months allowed to restore the channel to OPERAB.LE~ status, orto place it in the tripped condition are justified in Reference 17.

U Watts -B:rB-Unit 1 B.--l0 103

ESFAS Instrumenitation,

E WITH :B 3.3,2 7 ~ ::*..

~ ~ ~ ~ . . *////:*

72 BASESL ACT IONSD DtL D. 21. and R.2.2 (continued)

Failure to restore. te.inoprable channet .PERABLE status or place it in the trippd condi.tion within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months requires the pllant be placed i:nJIODE 3wi~thin the fbllowinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

a~nd MODE 4 :Wi~thin t.he next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

The al low,,d CoQplwtin.:Tme: are reasonable, based on operazting experienc.e, to..rear-f tlhe requ:i~red":pl.an:t conditions TSTF-418, R2 p orom. cwriodil.ions: i:n an o.r.d.erly: manner and without challengi0ng 4plsems.:. In:r..0DE 4, :th:ese Funct:ionis are REPLACE WITH 12 The Reqti:i red Acti nsiid by a: Note. that:

a~llos placinga n a hne 'bypassed.

TSTF-418, R2 codto or 0p hours wh ilei verfori roultine DELETE .surveiillarce t I Other chanelms.The.oT al lows a chan nel to: be plIa ce~d in byr),iaSS fo(,r: t;p 4 or for *tesfting of th : y. Channel. H ever,: r y. o.ne channel nay be pAced in :bypass at any: one: ti me.. The

-- ~ ~&* . ~ ~ : L.I, rs, a~llo-wed foir -test'n~t~ are juIStificd. i

....TSTF-418, R2 TSTF-418, R2 ?1 a nd E. 2...DELETE

................ II REPLACE WITH "iorl' :[T,--

ap ie: . :.

/. Contai nrent Spray .Con:-jinMe(l r***..V r-H:gi* :Hi:gh.;.

TSTF-418,R2 ............. qtte-an: Lin.e 1ol:oiat,-ion Con aiinmtent Pressure Hiiigh:" High9;.

REPLACE WITH::::ý 01 Containment Phase:B. iola.ion:Containm.n..pressure-17 High High.

None o-f these sighnals has in~pvt to a control f.unction.

Thus: two-out÷:bf-otf iLee logic is necessary :to meret ac-p.tabl6e woul.dro:-euirel ri ýt-)ipi.. a fai.ed channal. This.is unrdesiral".AIe bec(au:s~e a single failure .wuld thepn cause spurous.cont-c.i on -pray-.nitiatona , Spurious spray a ctuation. i.S {rdesi.al e becauseo::df the clearnup:. pr*oblems.

pr-e::s 2nt*de! Therefore, :the~s~e channely i-e.,d:siigned 'i th

(.continued).

Watts Badr- U-it k'L 1 Pi 3-::3.o10:4

ESFAS Instrumen P at io n B.3 3-32 EBASES AC"T TCjtJS L.*2 J 1 F? Pnd (continued).

tw.ut;ofi- *our :logi~c SO that a faild Uc.anne:. .may be bypya.sc.ed rather than t-ipped: Note that: one c.hanel Pay. be bypass~ed and still satisfy tie single fdailur'criterion.

Furtheirmori`e, ..with one chIrannel byp a'ass.ed, ia single in~stru:mentation channel failure. will n.t. spuriously :initiia t e containment spray.

TSTF-418, R.2 To: avoiid Le irnadIertent :ac t:uion f containment spray an REPLACE WITH Phase.8 -cn isolation. the Ji6n0perab~l h.. ch an nel1 hsoul d1 ainment not :be p.1 c in the: t~ri pEed condi:tJion. Anstead I it is bypassed: R ýstoring the channel.to or.OPERAbLstaus, pldaci oprable,

-. channel iný the':bypass con.di1ti On withiq 6 h utr iS 1 Su f'fIci :na to. as~sure that the Functocn r~emi : R E .and minimizes the time that the 1unction may be. il a pa . 1atrýip codto asrirg:~eio.rab chIhrnul has f aJ ed: h (I b.) .. h:Comp1Ie tjonim i S fu'th

'_st i FiedG balsed 'n the lcwr~a~iiL of ::a n. t

~ -&

dur:ithi 1 ine F va1.. i.FaIi:ure to restore t** *:rip:erabloh channel to OPFR ts alu pI lac i in: the: byp*sed con'ditob. iti 6ý hours, redurstepatb lrdi MODE . inti ' o. i ,lgoig 66 h~ours and MOH 4 with:ini the neext :6 hours. Thei allowedCompleti.onTimes are reas'onabl e, REPLACE WVITH based on: operatig experience, to. rnech the Iequired plant conrSdnitions from .full power conditions in an orderly manner The Required n : afit.out chzllenginq plant. systems. :In MODE 4., t:hesie.

Actions are Funlctions.s are no T, modified by a lo jer requirAe: IOPERABIEI Note that allows placing one S u edbActi ns.arc, :ieed:y a:Not*o:Lh U ddiitJon a Ch anne Lo be_b, a ýs ed~fi r up' t :4 hour. for ow:s* Ie channel in bypass for up to vej1

.v Han. e:: t es~ti l~ac. i g a sec rid ah:rr.Ih hel~

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months while by, as s: tonhc tioan for up, to 4 hoaur s -Fo testji purp , es i~s performing aec Meble sod on res fR ee C routine surveillance testing. The FL: 21 -and. F 2.2 channel to be

.tested can be Cond:ititon::i F applie s t:o::

,tested in bypass with the

Manu al. nitia tion of Steam line. I:soi.a tio*

inoperable channel also in bypass.

LO~ss of Offs~ite Powpr; The time limit is justified in

uKi 1 i *r: Fpnedwater PumP Slct 1ion*i'T an:*Sr LIn Surn Xt. ion Reference 17. 1lftscure-tLow; and.

(con'ti nued)

Vatts: Bar-Unlit BTA- 3. 3 105.

[SEAS. Tnstrum entat .i o.n:

B 3_32 BA SES

.ACTIONINS. I.ýF F. 2' 2.. (co nt;i nt ed) e ~' OtOl (-4k tot th~t flionua]Initiatlion Faic te P-14 Interlock: Funct 1o1'S, LhiS1~ a I io ddr.I~ n t rin u-r 1 ota i. f i S For thc. 10,S; of:.0 '1 f t~ Power Func i on thl' :action:.

-eICC hi1e the: Iac k of manua I trp iP i'o fo~r a. fafl ed chan~ o th AW ystem pui'i)ý s~utti~on tra. sfer. ch alnelis;.

hns: Actionm recognizes that. pla c in b fa4::f a hanne: H trip d:riAq: opI t) on is. niot :nece~ il 1 : :CQrisevat iveC:1cticn Spuri'us: triip 0,- t h i.s fin u. t:W Joo~ . ain th i

,S cr c e ~~t isat t:i frie1: t4 t ly :.cab .oe of. suor nv it I :-I:trairi r'r cv, umnl 1f isin rop he ,* 4,1) hours i d OW eo o .:r'c, t t r nJ t: to 'SL sPtatus . hepc IFCC fi.ed TSTF-418, R2 Cor jlet Tjm r s. reas' -I Jn c- dei in~g thi', natukir of INSERT F utI~~ the ~ cndanicv ia~ md t a- olow I Ofbban event c, Jrr i v dijriqn th.Iý, -1'5erva-.J if The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months allowed for p1 ý , h' cie dd ri MI- '1" 3 vdlt nl hrc<6 h..rS an1d restoring the 1Dý4. rltr, h: t h6 f 1lowi:~ G: h CU.) sý The ..Cl~o-vd Eotti Orl channel to iI S1(:.V 3 meeii cmVe,

.na tM-s o n op era tinc exp'l Ce C o.

OPERABLE status reach th~i re~qivjred paI orr)ii tto from.:ftill Powr4~Iin or to place it in oreely mannrlcýand hUo la rhalir"~j]flg. Piran, sy S ms i the tripped 1'DDE 4: thN ýP!Tnt: does no bav e ainy Y J~aIaV s iFft5:r condition are ci ItII IH'ri~li upl i~iu UIS:- GU the p tCif justified in 2f:ctions oted: above Reference 17.

~,- G.:2:A and** G*.2,:.

TSTF-418, R2 Condit 0 d es:i0to 'the aut()S4 PfIC 41 CLtJ'6r'. o. To~ ic: ad REPLACE WITH IC~tuat i'O i I elav&y [ci t ha S 3il eI~I solati on and ANW actaLo'IHntir.Unn:;.

2.4

.00t l aaddresses J; the t.-ai ý ihiat~ipn of t-he SSPS :and triovC r1~ lIv for thký0 fIA014 i*(.nS% If UrMe tU 1ýn i~opet aý-I =uo are ai1: vt-2 toi restoi athe IIrai' t~a CIPRAPBtE: st-tus.. .1he Coinpietjen. lime for retoiinc4

.a train tofwP~1L ttsi esnbeOOiC ~t~

there: iS -o'ther tnra im0 E~ 8L F .anI:t: ý l ow b1.oba i.Ttya (rl QVCI 0 CCUi) 1J(4din 1-j t!Ih i s iraitrre rv i t t r,' in Ca. tbe rt e urn:ed: to01 tut O AtBL E st at u s the.:plant: muet be, brogh. o MODUE w Iin i t - ex nt 6 ho n'r s :adr 1"ICE 4 Withii tnUh OI~i in 6 :ho.urs. Th al wfnd Cornnii6i4. ný I ini , -j

ýCwnptinwkfl Watts:: Bar...Uni.: I B*, a-]0 63.

ESF.AS I ns..trumentatio"n B.3.3.2

BASES ACTION'S G.. .2.1 ::and Gý2 J: (conJthin ued:):

req edpcendit clant (ons from full.poer -ondit.on in:-an o-deQrl:y manner :and: witJhout challengn*g p'ant systems.:

Placing. t:1 e:eunit ini*: IMODE:4.removes ý:a~lli requirements for:

OPERABILITY: of the protection channels and actuation Ofuhdions. In this !1ODE:the plant doesnot:have ana.lyz -d tranients or :ndi ton,0 nthat* require the: exptlicit use of

the C ct io[I fur,n(tAi o ns no t.e:d :a boD6ve:.

Th' Rquired Acti o ns a.re rmodi fifed :by a 1Note that allo: :one traiin to be b-ypassedI for up Do4 hours. for srveilan~ce testinr:g proviied the, other tr-ain is OPERABLE,. This

'allowance iS based on the rel bility analysis ,:(Ref-: 7) assunption :that 4ihours is he a'eraqe time r eui ed t:

p(erformj channel' surveillanceq.

TSTF-418, R2 INSERT: : f.2:1 :and H The 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Condition: Happl~ie-s t'O the: a'utorfatic datUtiMH0.1i :and:

Coq allowed for actainrlyfo to uie.Tipo an Fee ter restoring the Isolation Function. .. . .

channel to OPERABLE status This acti:n addresses he: :traIi n.orientation of: the SSPS and or to place it in: the :Mater an ave.: relays F forti s Function. f on train the tripped is i aperablJhour'sareJ al:lowed to restore-t e t a'int condition are ERABLE: stas o h plaftihe :must be :p laced DinL*t)E3 3'ith.ir justified.in : hours and .-n 1'1DE 4 in the fol:lo.wing 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . u he Reference 17. Comip on o restoIring a train to OPERABLE qstats iF a1reaoa c nside t:htha:t thr* is 'anothe"r r iin OPABLE, and:theUw probabCI:iitCy of.an: event occ q rri ng du:rmig t s TSTF-418, R2. interval. The allowed Coniil&tion iiIs are rcasbnabl ,

R Wd onpa rre, ting 11lto toareach MODE 4 frorm *1*1 powcr cr ions ri:t iin a manner and vithout .orerly ch4 eirgpn t.

yteriS~ T~hesti 1Uhfuncons ar no C1n~r requiredI e in 143ODE p1!,ac ing thly:plant. in> M1':ODE.1::I reIMove6s ili1 requie~en:t S :for oP'B [IT: of] :te pI- roLection channels and act-l attio)n IFunctitoncs.. In thjis M.: LE,the pIar...It dc,es not have analzyedt:ransents or condit:ions: tha:t requiire. ithe exp*lici use :of thfe protection f~unc ti~on noted :above.

The :Required 1Act i ohs are mod fied by.da N0ot e that a:ll o0ws Voie 1train to Le bypassed for: up to 4 ho:urs for sorvei!l:anc-:E.

tes~ting provided* the other t*.rain is. OPERABLE Th'is allowance i:s based oin. the r:liabilit :analyl:silsý (Ref. 7)

Watts B4ar-U't :BBI-8 i.37*1:07

ESFAS nst-ru:mertatton 3Z.3.

BAES:.

ACTIONS. 11.:i 1 ::.i?.: and 1.2*..2,: (*oniti nu~ed)

TSTF-418, R2 a.s U p:t:ion that. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .:st. the a-verIPage :ime i*jnm:iijed to REPLACE WITH pe4- O.ro.. c:h:annn:el sur %eFi:1lahkc C.

72

~~~~~

. . -. < . ./ . .........

TSTF-4l8, R2

Con*ition I applies S.GQ.te',l.v-a(t:4141.- i High:

REPLACE WITH S.one channel is i: pera 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months s:.are allowed to restore The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months o.ne: chanan*el1t.o: OPER LC. ta . to pla.ce: it: in: the trip ped allowed to :onditi :.. Ip*.ac.d:i* r t .. ipp:ed:c:ondition, 'the Function restore the rt t) on h Con channel to s nsfeaf e 31.I ce Fa il:ure o E1 StatUS or restore OPERABLE status or to place it in inopermbc e: channcin:} to: OP- place itthe in-the the tripped etdi It cn dit in Withi1.11 1bur's requires-thelot tob b6 condition are :p4 ~Med in: 3 n 6E1in..rs MODE. 4 in the f- 1, iq l justified in [oursS alof Copeto TSTF-418, R2 Reference 17. on oeaýgexoine to reach` WIDE 4 fr cond'tion*& inan (oIrde-rly marine!; and:::[ witho*t REPLACE WITH plant. :, tm.J -In OM4 h Funct-ions a:

h2ojui red OF"A~tE 72 TSTF-418, R2 2Rc5equired . s h~,v w 1:'r-ip bv a etat v~

REPLACE WITH azl1ow. :l an .inuperai" h7r: : 'y ed : condtn tor . t*4 tpr hours whi f ou*ni.i surrveii]

12 e t :tJ ngq th er ch anr 1s Thi . ls alo a anl t* ~c t:p] !acind '.n bypass foru to.4L ours or tes tiwrwj ofo the hb ap's seed. {'i nnhe:l: H'2;eve I r-, I If.-pi Di S I a v C CA t\ \a "t no. abý ci ntr r~e od o dV4Ln a ow, fo~ a s~ o ndra AypPl th L PC hrs nq, rýustli ied P 3/4rn 7 TSTF-418, R2 J . r REPLACE WITH Congdition apples. to the AFW pu:mp stalrt-on trip o:f all NMF1

pumps.. ... **

The 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed for Th:e :OPERA B.LITY of :the AWFW Sys:tem must be. assuw-ed :by testing are aio.wing automnatic start:of the: AFW. ::Syste. pIFps justified by a chatmnnel i:s inoperabl]:L :48: ho*u:rs: arallowed to rtUrn. it Reference 17.

(cqnit i nued~

Watts: tBard) it W.1 133l 1083

EISFASý Ins~tru-ment ati on R 3.3.2 BAS ES .. .. . ..

Ac IorNS J. anlJ.Z (continue

an 016EIARLElstatus, Hf theý Funct ion:ca~nnot` be returned to.

an OPRABLF.statu.s, .6 houirs are alloWed to place the plant in 17ODE 3. The allowed Comp Ietiion Time of 6 hour- is ir:a~so~-ia~l ,operating:

a&( n experience,.to toeah OD 3 from full power condition.s iJn. ýan orderly manner and: :without:

chiallengi ng, plant systems:. In MODE 3.:: theý p-lanirt doe snot a~ve any analyzed transients or::conditions t4hat rqire the

.explicit usr. ( of the pr!)otection::funfction nioted above: The:

aztl owance: of 4S hoforý to reu*+rn :the train to an 0oPERA L F

stiaus ji js cifed i n, kefe:rance:nc 7.

K, K . 1: and K.2.

Codi-tA, iuon K a pp0. i~e:s: todý.RWSTLLvel.+.Low ICoi ncidetit.t. th Safety InJection and. Coinci~dent . with Cortaihmient Snu SLeve-l-High " ....

RWS T.Level. - coincident With SI and ::Co nci'denL Vih*h Con tia~i nmen~t. Suminp Level -High:p:ovides : u:ati.on C" swift.0hlvr: t:o the.co'ntai:nment sumV. Note t~ this Furi-*tJon

~'&rsthe compatrators: to. e.crqi to perfor their

............. r.qui.e ction. The failure- of up to tw'o chanen.ls :will nolt REPLACE WITH 2

f~ailed ci nT inthe trip:ped: coniditibn could rlKpe:raion r(atr..itc o t Is.fFunctiln:.: Ho e:v'e r, placing a ver. to the s~utip, prior: to thcý- nij 1.i c'of lties n a:

"._theii n I mPlacing mtie". RWST.:, IthC, In pýab e chnnl bass re t na tooto~ r~1 CGn r: t, I w eN sa sliiees. the requirement. to i I no!t fa :ur withOu t:.x g CtLIa'

-,b'ifi a ir- of ..

s 1ihv i n v .;..va -tqorijng the c[annJ to OPRAiLLE statu:c orp1 he nopeab -chiannel in thob'- s coi ion wi hr hours is SUi -it to entur that the Functionriaw' n anid min nJ e:sSYRABLE, thth a1tt a ht Function ma'y in.a: partIlal trip cw l 'on (aSsulm ino h irior h ha nel hil a. T..oh6: h~owj or.

'op t n fth- anne:.. ca;niiu*h be returned to OPE, :SB LU u :a ced0 in tihe bypaJ'ss cond t i thi

.... MOCE 3 -vi t hin t 6Ohos,3 thl plantr-ust be brought to

..ollowin g::::::::

I hours L... a d: UH :5 w n OE5wt hJ h -

h TSTF-418, R2 n mpletion i

ba sed.on operating experience, to"reac~h. tb -reu"ired: plant RELAE IT rcndtirtons from full :power cniin inanordrl,-y manner:

Refe and

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~wihtthODEg~gpand:ysea

~ I 5 the parnt

-ences 10, 17, and 19. n iht hlnigpltssts (cootfinueC)ý Watts. Bar-unit I R "1.1 -*1:]j:

IESFAS: Instrumentation B 3.3.*..2, FA.S ES.

ACT 6%N K, .K.21 and K.2.2 . (tontinued.)

!does: not have. any or.cond-itions c.alyzed.transients thalt re.,qu.ir er the explicit use of.the protection aboeoe.. C functions noted ..

e re A*c~tio ns. :ar,e. modA f ied. by ýa:Note -that:: alliows pla:cinl a cond.channel in the bypass ond.tion for Up to.

4 thour-1s for surv eilla nce test ing', The:PIt.ot.oa]. oF 12 hovurs:to rJeach MOE 3 and 4hours for, a second chanr Cef to bG U."oassed byt p

is ac-eptatleý bas:edI on .the r-esults:of Refe: erce .7.

an. ...

L. 2.2.

REPIACE WITH J COI~dA tiorn L ap;PAiesi.:e9s to to, P-I 1 interlo-cik:.

TeRequired Actions are ...

With han nprabie, non th-.re 4he "":

ato"t " verify tha.

modified by a Note the interlockoý i: n.is L reqtire.d s.aI:o the exist*nj n*it that allows condition. Thi a. onihim;ýiýn:iu aly accomil:slhes the, finctioion:

placing one of the inte.rkock..:, e rmi r ieon must be mail: within Iou.

channel in bypass The I h*u' Comwletion Time is.equl <t" the time: ali owd: b.

for up to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months LCO :30.3 to int.iat. shut(do0wn, actionsn.n...n even t Of a.

While performing Comprl:]ete loss of.ISFAS function. If the: interlock is:::not .:,in routine the :requi red state. (6r plac;d in the* relu ie~d. sta te). for the-surveillance ex i:sti nci plant. conJition., the pl'ant. must..be pl:aced: i"n MODE: 3 testing. The channel to be within the next i6...hours nd MOUE 4_wi thin the followin9.

tested can be S:hours. The allo6wed Comp#letion Time.s ar e re asronable, bas~ed tested in bypass on :opteratingp*eperi~ence, týo reach te riequired plant with the condi-tOins fJI:fiul.:ll .nrcoitioun s itn an o rdely manner inoperable channel and: w ith.iout ch allIOg iriing 0 tP.1iacving s . t~h.e pnlan*t i:in also in bypass. MODE 4 removes all. requtierrenrts Ifor OPERABILITY of. the*S. e The time limit is justified in Reference 17.

(co ntin ut; d):

'Watts~Bar-UJnit I .:B.:

£ 3:÷.-3 *!i:i i O:

TSTF-418, R2 E.SFAS nstrumentation REPLACE WITH 313

.~. . .......

BASES. 72 ACTTIOjS M. 1.1 and_ M-2 C(onti nueld)

"Conditiion M:1is appl'iicabJle too. :tih S erLe. 1 terLow Function. .......

TSTF-418, R2 known channel inoperable: must: be restdord: to: RSE*

REPLACE WITH tuIs, or. placed in the trip pd cond. ti.n. i. hi oUr i:::: r~g.::*e

canne: in[he.::tlfippe di.dtionin to restore the parti- 1 tiipP .condii *rCequiinj onl on uo logi channel to f or ac tlon of tile two Out o:f thao tr op J - 6 urs OPERABLE status or allo: wed 4 he e to place it cnion is i ti fied i~n Re feec 7.T If :(I:. t t fails., it is placq t.in tb .r ipd -condiior:;

TSTF:4l8,R . or 0 af noR2t acflf euctt t her w eft ii: a it t he REPLACE WITH rtrnamnari C s. Itis ispERABLE tWhon necessary. for the cper ator: to c t. u o t, i~a.dju tsment:l~\ i th toWe dey !1 t'e t bhor T:TD TJiin ra~lcu Cv tVt*:i b e.] (:T tiT a y t:)by ar ac u p~S i:' del:ay cal culý 0. :4 mli R for the

.:affetcd ot*ct iun s tthrihtThe M MtR41 chirin TSTF-418,

.LAChE R2 1 i]:f~h iooperabl]e chan" canot . be rstOred r terface:

e J.....

WTH t e

.ion whi.n

,PCEI.I h o :th&. speci:fi ed Compei.en.c. li .

the_ plIant must 11e plcdiMD ihnte lown 6

17. . hours and. MODE *4thin the next. 6. bors. The al.lomwed

..................................... C~p]:*ib ~:s~onabte,*

Com~pletion :~ im S *r:*

11tries, ar-c *rca .based. on::ope~raiting::

npea~ ýng exp-erien.e, to: tIhe a plat: ih:n:: MO .3 f.'or 'oMOE I: fvlil.:

powe r. oditn, s n a n. o1ý r"d er mya nn re. an d i A ho ut chd*afe.*n~gin n :pliant s:Yst~ems:. ". ...

The Re-quired Act*ionrs ha beni modified: by a :.[*ote tihat al ows ip !-ac in"ga... . a..

. bl e ých.ann:el in ,4 6e.bvo :.assed t-cnd:i ti cn f or- M *4 1uj while. routine di

'erorni Survei 11 amc: es t i h~er channel s:. Teh. s I TSTF-418,R2 REPLACE WITH 1

allows a fretio channel ar d tII

o b ray bf placedncrIrn'i-or ie h

l ace in bypass at ~oneý tIne.

ie fi rf ! U.

a:ss up ] hr::our&

4 -

V 12o d

.TSTF-418; R2 REPLACE WITH (coat iud' Wat t S:DSar.unmitm .] B :. 3' 1,1,:I

ES.F ASBIn3tu :en.tin B,3.13-.2

ýBASES ACTIONS: 4,i .and :.:2 ocn ti~ ued)ý Condi*ition N applies to the Vesse:. 4l LEtuI t Power jailure. ofAhe: vessel .ch-annel.T input *iiu Of:more. than

.one::T RTD or fail u0re :o. both T. RTDs) wil~l. affect the ITTD

.ca]icu.y!a1t:i on for. a::pro*oett::i:On set . This.sreSl .. : in the requremnt hattheoe atoadjujst :the threshol d: Power

eve:. for:.zero :se~conds. time delay from 5o%: RTP:tLo 0% RTP:,

th..rq:ugh: -the lMan-a eie interface.

If the iJno pe r abl e: :ch an1e10 cannot be restored or the thrcshol.d.. power level. for zero secondfs ti me delay adjusted wiJthin-1*lr) thpe* SPekified Con,!letion Ti me, the pla*t musL be

.plae i'thOE hre is Functioný is not required to be OPERA.BLE.E :An:: add: itii on o AlI 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months S-s i IalI owed 1t0o place the.

p:1 ant: in 1O11DE .: Six h hr s iis a reasonable t ime based on h-:ic:

0e0..rat*d tin9: :emxpperienche, 1o place the plant in tLDE 3. from IMODE 1:: .fUllI power confdit*ions int an orderl"y.anrc" and: without.

c¢hal]il e~n gi] g: il*!: n s y.* :t.;t: ern.s . . . . . . .. .

The Required Actji.o n s have be n modi fied by a ttha h t all:ows cing an * ........ ;n the by0 ds:sed ondi.ionl o ut. Ae ifo t* .rou nh :itie S's 0,*: ' .

TSTF-418, R2 77 "a~ ....... .... in i v a REPLACE WITH 'Oi~le: IiMlit-:..T*S -U:*stk!)1-,J e jI~nR2: 6 Iý.

12 TSTF-418, R2 C,ý1OnditAon 0 8-01 i es: to Nort-h Or South 1lSVV Rc-17 Water Level REPLACE WITH 17 I. oi n. channe,is i.noperabie- ouPrs arýe :. ed to raestore that cdhann.l Lo. .. P.R .ABLE. ., r plac,:e p.I if i t ,:he tri.pped Cw, idI Liton: 1:a:l:.ac ad h t .i trie rei n i c, , thneie Fun t.i on TSTF-418, R2 l:It a jpar ial 1t1)ip .IS- *nIe one,-out:-of -two 7l

i:O 11: i l t ::i: i u, tt n. 1h 6 oiar*S :al :U-ed to REPLACE WITH

,p4.tA~::*h e.:i *i the,. ped coi ndition i.s 72 us.tffed Rinefeferenc~e 1 '

TSTF-418, R2 REPLACE WITH mnd References 10. and 17:

ýWatts: Bar-.UnMit.: I3 18. 3:. 3:.11:2

TSTF-418, R2 ESFAS: Instrumentation REPLACE WITH ýB 3.3-2

. ...72 BASES r AIC iONS1 02and .0.2 o INSERT Fa~ilre tor~es:oe .the inope rable cha'\nel ERABLE status or" p-itaeC1:. in th:e thr.i. )ppedcondition wthii 6 ours requires hour tllan.tto be paced.in MOE 3 :within:h:: owinq 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . The: al:loed.Completion lwim.o- is reasonrabe ba.s ad: on opera:ting. e*xp.e r eincle to ro-ach MuDE .3:f rom ffu:ll

ýpmWr condi ti ons: *in::a o.nrderl1y mtan.ner.and withotlt .....

chall eng i:ng pl ant. sy.tems.. in NODE .3, these funct ions fare no: lnger requi re: OPERABLE.

Ihe: PRequir.-ed Acti s Ia mod ifid by :a Noteý that RE PLACE WITH allows pla-cing AbT chr 4.: he bY passed 12 survrefllanc*e. testi: f the other channels. The 4: our t:ie imi is:justified in:Retrencf . 11.

SURVEILLANCE The SRsfo.. foS. Fu10in:cFti .ontmare: :ideintified. b- the SR s REQU [IREMENTIS c C,1n of T.abl:e T.2l 3 Aote has 6 e added to the SR Tale 1o.o ct ari ni,: t it ha t able 3..3..2 ,1etemirnes ,,hich SRs ap:v:to Which ESFAS TSTF-418, R2 Note that .each: channel of fpn :r0cess esbpoth pot srppI iac REPLACE WITH trai:n~s o be:.

.f.. SFAS. When ttesLing chan-e] !i, t*aiin: Aand traian: :B:vmus~tbe examiinei,- SiiHarly, train A and train B, References 10 and 17. mU s t :be, cxumu.ped :wbh en t*esting c ,anne I. chanel III, an hanel IV.. theLCA.BA IO a- nd COTs are perf ormed P manner t.hlat i s cons stQe .t w.fith thýý..assumnp:t 1*:.: . in

.analytica1 ly. .:C.l! :*cit a i ti. Ahe retuiired cýhannel acCur cie:s (cont riued)

.Watts 8ar*-UnJit .13 13 1:"3::-:3

[SEAS .Irtureen tatin B- .3.2.

BA SES.

SURVIE iTLiANCiE Te:. v.:.:Ut.n i..im jS ssoc i at ed wi~th4the EAGE -

REQUIREMENTS: Pr.oes Protection Syst-mh::. h :;..an: in.sta.Ied by.poass:

(continued) capabili:ty,: andl may be te~sted: i:n ei:.thbe4r .the:itrip: or bypa'Ss

'mode, :as apprwoved In ::Ref erence7. h-en testing is perform:ed.

Vinte: bypass mode the :SSPS :'input:re.lalys are::not- operdted, as: ustif*ied: in Pefer.enceO 10. The input: r.0elays are .checked.

duri n the.:.HANN EL .CA.IBRNAI.ON every :monhs.

Per.tforman:ce. o:- the CHANINE. CHECK onc every ::2. hoUrs ensures that. a aur rgross instI ni ume rtuti i I h:as. no0t oc ý,u:rrekd. A CHANEL. CHEC:K is ial :y : cm.arison: of the zparameter indIcate on:o: c hann i to a . im .ar parametfer on other

ha:s. :ft, is .ased on"iL a ssu'i ptiS that in.strurit chanrod s men i Lor if-- ppsm pran li~ ouI d re ad

'ap.prox~iraitdy: t sai' .v~a iu Si~gfii"iat: r devi at~ionsu :.betweent

thpe: twe: t charii*es co ld :be an:indi~cation of:

excealiVe .i hins trunter.dri ft. in c:f the channelis:or of somethlnc even umoi ci:sericus. " A"iAEL CHECK wi dettect:

gross tcha, n. I faiuire; th*us, i ' lIey to voerifying14 the minLiruml-t:at ion can v: U'es LO' :1e;rý t9e. pIropekrl Y b.6:t een. each.

CHAMNE L :,CAL BRATJON Ag" eee men cr1.t-e . a a e de:termitI :d: by the:uni:.*t:aff., based

.o:n: a uc1Rhbinatio. rhanel of t.e iitrunent unce rat antines, i:nclud-ing indication: afnd reli~abi~Ity. If a.channel is:

qiutside:: tle cri teria, it Flay Vbeai-ýind.i:hictn: that: the

.senscr. or the igiiaI-prrocessi g: ecu?9pment has dri: fteed outsiide i ýts li1 t.

The. Freaquency ish base d -on o e~r*at:iq: e0pex:pie-in thlat

de mion.strates..channfl fai:*1* u e.. is :Ic r :r, Th e CHiNiANtANNEL CHECK

.- uppi me.:ts less: ornal but nore :requ *nt, ihe-ks or c:hacI s du ring, nor*arl ope: aet.at:on~al:, Ose of the: di::sPlayS:

aisiio: the e W t h: t LP c-.ai- tinns.

.pI.ac~ed! :in thie b~t,:a*: *Thid*i~* iorn th~u~s p~f2ile<*~t:*ngq::flnd/ur'er.l;te actu~ation. Thro*'ug h sth2.::*se:lautiJopat..i:.testj e7(e. :. o .i,..i. ... . ....

eLr, ia:ll T piaSis~ii:.e~

tlei s, tnh q::O95::Td:,,cOeu-)h nn awu~.

t*om ut iw c t..e* aef ! l.pI::ida e:ur i.s:it- e~s c- Di a ion -,dw b~ pp Ia TýpevO 's re! .

Watts Rar-. Uinit .I IB 3. 3 -] :14.

ESFAS:I! nstrlumetaIt 1On

.3:2 J

BASE S SIJRVE I LLAIcE _R 2:2__ (contiued)

REO UIAEMENTS

.are tested for ekah protection function, In :add:iton .he mas-ter:.re1iy.Ciol :is i pulsei teSited for continuity:. This "

TSTF-411, R1 ven f.es: that the i.c modul es are OPERABLE and that there i:s 3r! flt!CCt Voltage path ýto the master relay coils REPLACE WITH The :FreqUency f everI n31:) a's on a STAGGERED TFStcRr 92 TSTF-411, R1 SR 3 :3,2.1 REPLACE WITH

SR 3,2,:3 is the performance. of a PLASTER RELAY TEST. The, justified in MASTER RELAY TEST 'is the energizing of the ma ster re l ay Reference 18. verifying contact coperation and a lOw voltagecontinuity c:heck ,of the slave reliay O . upon* master relay :contact operatio:.

-7i7-s avolow voltage isinjected.to.the TSTF-411, R1 I cage 7*s..nsU TiCent :to.ck sla4e:rel u the sl ave ay relay, but 1arge enoug* t*oemnstrate: S path.

REPLACE WTTH cOntin*u ity. This test iýs perforn'ed everyý, days:on a

.TAGGEIR T ASI:

'E - , .

92 e.

ienz)771cd rdennstru r re I ya~ eain trd TSTF-411:, R1 I SR 33.3.2.4 SR ,:2.4 is -the.perforance:o a COT A:COT is performed on.:each required channel to: ensure the i REPLACE WITH entire: channewl 11pertcfm.the intendedU Function.

The Frequency of 92 Set.o.nts must be fouýd:%iiJthin the :Altlowable Valýuesý days is justified :spec.i fied in Table3.1 - .

ýýin Reference 18.

The di ffierence: between the :current "as- found val:ues.andthe Pre*IOLIs test "asle.:left'* v:aluesn:ust be :consistent with the, drift !*llowance usedI. in the setpoint methodocgy'. The TSTF-411, R1 ,setpoint shaIl be left set conslstent with the assumrptons:

of the:" f ren. un a it "":ifi et point methodology.,

REPLACE WITH

.The ".as. found' and "'as le-1ft" values lus~t also he recor

.... Reference 6. and revIewed for cons istency.With the :ýassvm NT n rv~arex.Te\1s15Ton nys\s tionsý: o' .

.. h ai~ie d eeon rthJog (ReN 6)

(continrued)

Watts:.Ba.r. Unit 1 :B 3.3,:!i5:

r: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

TSTF-411, R1 ESFAS: Instruntat i.on TSTF-411, RiB 1332 REPLACE WITH REPLACE WITH eASES184

____________________18 SO RVE ILLAN CE S 3324 (Continued):

IIREIMENS The. Frecuencgy: of E y .is just i fe ays. .T- d -in Referenc1ceE7 excepr.

fOlb:giin tin 7: ,The FreqpuencY. ýfor Function 7 is justI:ified "

I in_Fee erence 101 TSTF-411, R1 WIT SRP: 3.

S 1C 5.. is.t e- er*hr a AVE RELY ATEST- The References 10.and 18. SSLAVE RELAY TEST Is the eriergizinq of the:slave relays.

Contact operat*cn: is.: erified :-n :one o~f two ways. Actuation equ ipment that may be :*operated i'nthe.design mitigatiPon.DE:

is:: eit*her al*lorwed to funttio~n:,o.::or is.. pl!ac'ed. in :a condition where ,the r el ay contact: operaton can: be verified without operaStion of the. equipment.ý : Actualtion equipment that mayy not operation byi:n.the:,SLAVE from be.operaterJ the destignRRLAYTEST 'mitigation:.MOOE cFrcit.is preented::

Four this 1atter, c::Aas.. contact operation .s verified by. a continuity check of. the circuit. containing the slave relay This test is performed every 92 days The FIrequercy is adequate.

based on industry operating experience, considering.

ins~t~rument reli :i tand: .operati.ng:: history. daitýa.

For:ESFAS slave. relays whih :are Westinghouse type AR relays. the SLAVE REL.Y TEST isiperformed every 18months The frequency is based :on: the rel ay reliabi*ity assessment presented In

Reference:

13. This reliability. assessment is rel'ay specific and appli es on ly to wes.tingho se: ype: AR relays: wi:th ýAC ýco o:lote:::that., for normma:l ly energized app*ic'ations. the relays may requir:p&e'iddi.:rep!acement in

.. rdane with thei gUgida.ce given. i

Reference:

13:.

Th 1i SRpI s: modifi ed by a:Note, which states that performance of: th.is test is not required.:.or those re.a.s. tested by £ SR. 3.3.2':.i6i.

SR:3.* 3.6 is the. per forma.nceý of a TADOT :every..:-2. :days.

This test is a -t-erk of :the Loss ..of OffTS te. Power unction 6-:d). AFW Pump :,Suction Transfer or Suct-ow .r f motor.driven and tirbi ne. driven :pu.n os (Funct~ions 6.fanid 6.g:

respect W.iely). and Turbire Trip and Feecwater IS:olat-ion Main 5(d)*.Stem.:Valve. .. . Vault

. . Rooms .... Wat er Level - High (Furcticn The:SR :Sis. *modif)ied by::a::. note that excliudes verification of setpoin:s for rel ays Rel'ay::setpi nts require iel:aborate bench calibrat on and. aire verified duri~ng CHCAN (EIL CALIB5RAt1-I:N. Tre FrequEncy is aequate :It is: bNsd. on:r Industry operating :exoerience. considering instr'ument reliabit ai OperatinghiS y dat ..... ..

(conti nued)

Watts :Ba-Urit: I8 3.3-1ia Re*i.sion 20.

Amendmnt. i1

TLLf AoCfE Sp i 32~.(u11re' REOQ1~~ET A fi iivna t-n oTr ~res~rýý f-nslur i~j im

[

~A7 ie~'~rne epdne sim acril Dz 'I-TSTF-411, Rilhdi n 0J~21av~~ oc s,- t mire/VTCSgA nat~ orn1h , iFra I'ev 1 ii ~ ~i~f 1'

chresrc evti s ti me for Ti repe s t Scp sý Lru be oi prm i tcime -rIpe "l (Reference 15)',cmnntiopra'wlsrc drve doHi' ricnteic th . a(),1 1,El 1rAec repon~ Pioe C rote&.ect annl repairls Time dons.E"n rot riu*.-- inpc-thýbsnse ae

.and thodolSteci fic crpn o. a jIden Lr1~n al~ r)rr C may l c ed wtithout repla1, Ifi~a tip ur c~n~eII ,

a, tnrit 31)ri the -3

-eci, ts .estn retu tiefrrr~e r t i np ri i os Lr m' ccf,,-,onent it operationga exprinc C .hw hc tha 9.

iu miae jrceradt h 1- bt notachaernely a~ ure a-di-ornie occurr; eenc rcls.al: .' r2e itir r timerprc th: pats.:use..:oý-,

jdeý IC Wicon4.-7k -Ne d r-i l,ýC

ýzov onor-.-U: ii~ i~ e Arma ben int2

ESFAS I rlsurentat~iron BASES.

REF ER EIC ES :.Code: ofFe al Peuitins: Titlelo Far 50.'49, (conti nued) v~i r rment aiual ,f: i Cat, ir)c~of:L- alEqipen TSTF-411, Ri; TSTF-418, R2 I 1(.-ortmnt. 16 Sýa f~ tvn.fnN'i tr I ,,r Propr' PT1.li-5:CA.2~5f.7j. W'esttnghouseSton Z:td -) og~fr INSERT Pi~teti Ys~tem. Watts Bar 1: arnd, 2:- M'rch 1997.

17. WCAP-14333-P-A,

WrAP4271.PA.Suoppement 1. anjd:Suppl~ermnt: 2. Rv:

Revision 1, Wvauation t' )f urveil anc'e Frecjuenc s :ard Cut, 0o: Ser Ji-2 "Probabilistic Risk Tfmfne, for t;oý. R."iGc'tor Prot.,!I .2on. Instr eit-ion? Systf7-m.

Analysis of the RPS <randEv I tio-r~ of Stkrveil1la3nCe.Frqoutz cies and GOr and ESFAS Test Times S,.-rv Ice Tir; - fo~r tl'e Engine~ered -.Safety Fea~ture,-A ~ ir and Completion Systent laylAS and.Juhe :1990.

Times," October 1998.:

8. Wa tS 8:a~ Tkhiichm Peui r e e.1 ts :Mana jcio 39

18. WCAP-15376-P-A, c.fhihneeed :%t" ty Featm e Resporise Thmes.

Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment f 7? ete lbvenber 59,.1084, t or of the RTS and ESFAS Ex>;ti o;n Quartelrly St ave Rp: a et~r.

Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," Suplren 1 nd Su lPneý: .Revision 1.to Wats Bar, March 2003.

W~tý..eslti~nggh seý :.lefLteri:*c0to * (WAT-U-83417'). ::e t~~:2ý

19. Westinghouse letter ,1v, ..Chargiqn/tLetdown Isolation Trarsi ets" to TVA, WAT-D-11248, 12: (T:231: 911231 8 ote0). " "o, , ............ . .. .

121Z 0m i ci n Tfihang: ýNo ti Ce VJ-`8213:6s.aso i ateý* doc -rýW

13. ACP-I3377, Rev. 1 -R,-,Iiýb~i Assess. a,,e of ý .

eSti nghcsIselays. qyAR Used As.:s SlAzve:RelTays.

14:. TA'.sLeterI to NRC dated Feb~'ua:

Requ~est for:- TS Ame~ndmren:for TS 1,I 2* ESFAS Inst.eVnu 1ta -Iion.

T'~r-Tw Tev.irq R pl~rements, J.h ary.19036

,I" :W2AP 14",3 A. R v3/4i v .Oi1 ~ ~ f.]l~~

Cn~M',

Drr~re.'~t.~n Tam Teti nso~71:ofr1d.

tc"e INSERT Y Westinghouse letter to TVA WAT-D-10128 MWatts 130ar-.n',t A B ý33-:20 Revis 'On 3.0.,A.:

Arinfdfre nt: 231..24

Containment Vent Isolat ion.. I nst**uin at if-,n 3.

3.3. E SR. 3..3.6.:1l Jpcontirlued)

REQUJIREM]ENT S Aqreemen t c:ri teri a :are determined by the .unit .staff., bas5ed on a combination df the channel. instrument unceritajln1,1es,

.ncudi: ind~i~ca:i or.and readab!i.Aty. If a :chananel.i outside the criteria, it may be an indicati:on cnhat .the;:

sensidr o te ýýit ial pr.ocesl u h ifted outsirde its limit, TSTF-411:, Rl Tlie Frequency.i~s based on,,oper.at.ing experience: that REPLACE WITH .deonestraes channel :fai:iire .it rare.T CA111N.EL CH-ECK su..iPpe.mernt es or*malh but imore frequeent, chezksl.f:.*ofl justified in Reference *channe!sduringq ormaý operational us~ lo the d'isplay associiated with tl-&e LCO.required channels.:

SR :3.3.:6.2:

TSTF-411, Ri

SR:.>3-:1:.2 i:s:1:the Ipe rma.n-e9 of an: ACTUATION :LOGIC::TEST.:

1REPLACE WITH F n Te einie.t. i.paced i n t* heIb .a*.ss co.ndi ti o n-:.

2iiiiii iii9 ZZIZ .................... thupreent~ing. imadvertent actuation. Through, th:e

isens tt rOjic{ t~estet-,- all .possr+bl.e: 0i:o*c *comb~ination s, Witf~.

and- rithou t applica b lep fe rMi s :i,e5 a-; TýýSe for e~ah

pait tion functio:n... In: addiion., the. :master rela.y coill is pts tsed tfor conti~n.ity.. This vei tis th1i ti the I Uq.

~o~*ul~s, .ar.e OPERABLE andi the e i an intact r vltacte signai

.pit he ma'ter .elay coils!., ýtes his is .erored vry31 da1Ys cn a SITAGGERED TEST P, Tht. 5 z euave l . -.e:e t

i n*u~s~t~r cxpa *.n.: et iencee TSTF-41l, R1 INSERT The SR. 3.6 :3 is the::perforrmance::of na MASTER REY TEST.

MA*STER RELAY .TEST i the. enero-zi ng.: of tihe master :rqlay, The SR is modified by a 9-rifyii tpera iona*nrid a low- vltaqu cc-,tiulity Note stating that the *.check o.:f thie ý:slav.. relay: coil. Upon master relay-taact-surveillance is only operatio~n, lwvoltagpAs injecýte-d t-o the 61lave valay:

applicable to the accil. Thi:s vltage.is.insufficent. to pip-P-Ick u-p the slýave actuation logic of the r elay, 1.00 iage eanough to demonstrate si ath ESFAS instrumentation. co-tin. ult-v. ThiS t estt is :"erformed everý 31iays.:on a STAGGERED. TEST. BASIS. The Surveiliance.. i*n c-.

acceptabhe -bated on instrument reliability arri :indu TSTF-411, Rl TSTF-411ý,:ýRl:ý TSTF-411, R1 INSERT REPLACE WITH REPLACE WITH justified in Reference 4. 92 ... n n The SR is modified by a ::: :::: :::: :::: ::: : ::: . : : :: :: ::

: ::: :::: :::::: ::: l : :: :: : : :: : :: :: :: :: ::o .......::

t:: ::: :: n:::

Note stating that the surveillance is only applicable to the actuation logic of the 85:3 35-60 ESFAS instrumentation.

Co.-tainment-Vent t n, 1c B3.3-61 BASES SURVE VAJCE S:R J:3.26Af3

RQVIREMN .To' Ccon inuecul SR 33-6,.:G liss the performanceý o~f a TADOTL. hstes s*

C:he k, o0f te Naua Fctio~ns an~d Is p Tformed:

7cuio eve.y..1 .ons.. *Each** Manual. Actuation Function ;is tested up to, and jilcluding, th ase elycol.Kns

~nsta~ce: :the test include:s adctuation ofthe :end device.

'i., Pumo starts:: vaL're cyclest et.).

For the:se tets,' the relay trip setpoints are :-Lerl.i:ed :andc ad -Justed a.s nees*"ay, The "rrequency::s based: on the known l}i A..i.. J. f the. Function and the redanc' available, and: jta been shoWn ::t be- a6cceptable thzough operang experience.

The. SR is: modlified by 1aNte that excludes verJ*icat0or*

setpoints during: the-T DOT. of, The Functions t etdhie..no 3e.s3:a.6. sR AACHANEL C WLIBRAT0Nt ls performed e ve *l . or approximawtelY. at: everyrefueling." CHANEL CALi&RATZ.ON$ i .

complete chec of th :instrumen t loop,. includ*'dýh the SensOr, The te**t veritfies: that the. channel iesponds to a inazisu red:

pa rme~r~ithji the.noc~s~srane raMa nd .aczuaracy; The Freque.cy i: býased.on operating experience :and.i consistent w1ith the typical. industry refue.irniq4 CYC..ce.

RZF'~kENC ES Ti-le M.i.. Code o~fIederal Regulations, Part 1.0.0:11, "Deterr.inat."

ahd Popu4:aeioin. o" : Exclusion Area, Low, Pop" ation Caeter Dis*tance .,". . z.,.,

2. NuR E( -13:66;, "In..i

pr:c.ve zen~t t~o T[

e chnica _l. S_ e' if..l".: t.....

... .....

e i fkaw-. on

.ueVel l.ance Requi.enenýt, December 1992.

3. KCA.-?138:T, Rev..I..1. .Re-liability Assess.ment.:of W6,stJnghouAse Type P.R Rel1ays Ulsed :as. SSPS Slave.

Rela*ys." :August. 19-q,*8 ...

INSERT

4. WCAP-15376-P-A, Revision 1, "Risk-Informed Assessment of the RTS and ESFAS Surveillance Test Intervals and Reactor Trip Breaker Test and Completion Times," March 2003.

watts Ea-nit.1 B 3".3-162 Revision 26 Ame~ndment::.7

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Safety Evaluation Condition 1 for WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Condition 1 of the Safety Evaluations for both WCAPs requires confirmation that the analyses and component failure probabilities are applicable to the plant and a plant-specific assessment of containment failures. This evaluation follows the implementation guidelines issued by Westinghouse to address this condition.

Applicability Evaluation

](a~c The information provided confirms the applicability to WBN of the generic analyses of WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376.

WBN component failure data was not included in the reports since the data was collected prior to commencement of commercial operation. A review of maintenance records for approximately four recent operating cycles shows that the component failure data and corrective maintenance intervals reported in WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 are representative of WBN and, therefore, the analyses are considered to be applicable to WBN.

Containment Failure Assessment I

(a, c)

E5-1

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version The WBN PSA includes all credible containment failure modes for an ice condenser containment. Thus, the PSA provides the means to assess the impact of the proposed technical specification changes upon LERF. The appropriate risk measure to evaluate the impact on LERF is the Conditional Large Early Release Probability (CLERP).

CLERP is defined as the conditional probability, given a core damage accident that the containment fails in such a manner as to result in a large early release. By comparing CLERP due to Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) scenarios to the CLERP due to all initiating events, it can be determined whether ATWS scenarios pose a significant threat to the containment.

Calculations of CLERP are provided in the table below. It can be seen that the CLERP for ATWS-related core damage events is less than the CLERP for all core damage events. It can therefore be concluded that ATWS events do not pose a significant threat to the containment.

This finding supports the conclusion that the proposed Technical Specification changes do not adversely affect defense in depth.

CDF LERF CLERP ATWS 1.34E-6 2.28E-8 0.0170 All Initiators 1.41E-5 1.16E-6 0.0823 Safety Evaluation Condition 4 for WCAP-15376 Table 5 lists the operator actions credited in the WCAP-15376 analysis. I (a, c)

E5-2

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-14333 Analysis Plant-Specific Assumptions Parameter Logic Cabinet Type SSPS or Relay SSPS Component Test Intervals z

Analog channels 3 months 3 months

Logic cabinets (SSPS) 2 months 2 months

Logic cabinets (Relay) 1 month NA

Master Relays (SSPS) 2 months 2 months

Master Relays (Relay) 1 month NA

Slave Relays 3 months 3 months 'u

" Reactor trip breakers 2 months 2 months Analog Channel Calibrations 3 Yes No 3

" Done at-power 18 months 18 months 3

Interval Typical At-Power Maintenance Intervals 4

" Analog channels 24 months > 24 months

Logic cabinets (SSPS) 18 months > 18 months

Logic cabinets (Relay) 12 months NA

" Master relays (SSPS) Infrequent Infrequent

Master relays (Relay) Infrequent

NA

Slave relays Infrequent

Infrequent

Reactor trip breakers 12 months > 12 months 4 AMSAC b Credited for AFW Credited for AFW pump start pump start Total Transient Event Frequency 3.6/year 2.56/year ATWS Contribution to CDF (current PRA model)

8.4E-06/year 1.34E-6/year E5-3

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 (continued)

WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-14333 Analysis Plant Specific Assumptions Parameter Total CDF from Internal Events (current PRA model)' 5.8E-05/year 1.41E-5/year Total CDF from Internal Events (IPE)9 Not Applicable 3.3E-4/year NOTES FOR TABLE 1

11. SSPS logic cabinets are included in WCAP-14333. Therefore, the analysis is applicable to WBN.

12. Since the WBN test intervals are equal to or greater than those used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN.

13. Since the WBN analog channel calibration interval is equal to or greater than that used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN. Note that analog channel calibrations are performed at-power when feasible, but, otherwise, are performed during refueling outages.

14. Since WBN maintenance intervals are equal to or greater than those used in WCAP-14333, the analysis is applicable to WBN. Note that the analysis applies to maintenance at power (i.e.,

maintenance activities which cause an analog channel, logic train, or RTB to be unavailable).

WBN typically performs preventive maintenance on the analog channels, logic trains, and RTBs while shutdown.

15. Only corrective maintenance is done on the master and slave relays. The maintenance interval on typical relays is relatively long, that is, experience has shown they do not typically fail completely. Failure of these relays usually involves failure of individual contacts. Since WBN experience is that slave relay failures are infrequent, the WCAP-14333 analysis is applicable to WBN.

16. AMSAC will initiate AFW pump start at WBN. Therefore, the WCAP-14333 analysis is applicable to WBN.

17. Total frequency for initiators requiring a reactor trip signal to be generated for event mitigation, not including events initiated by a reactor trip.

E5-4

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 1 (continued)

WCAP-14333 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters

18. Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) is not modeled as an initiating event in the WBN PSA. Because it is a significant event, the accident sequences that involve ATWS have been pulled out of the individual initiating event groups and presented as a group. This was performed by grouping all sequences that have either Top Event RT (Reactor Trip) or RODS (Control Rods Fail to Insert) in the failed state and an end state of either LERF or NOLERF (the two possible core damage end states).

19. The current WBN PSA model is revision 3 (Reference 14). The IPE submittal was made in September 1992 and was based on the plant design, procedures, and training in place in 1991.

Since the original IPE submittal, the Watts Bar PSA model has undergone four update cycles:

Revision 1 of the IPE Submittal (April 1994) addressed numerous design changes, procedure upgrades and enhanced operator training.

" Revision 2 of the PSA Model (November 1999) included plant design changes as a result of the Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDA) study.

" Revision 2A of the PSA Model (May 2000) integrated the Level 2 model with the Level 1 model to allow calculation of the LERF. This modeling feature was incorporated with the model developed for an EDG AOT extension.

Revision 3 (June 2005) is the model of record. The WOG PSA peer review team reviewed a draft revision 3. Major changes in this revision were to update plant-specific data and initiating events, incorporate the Westinghouse seal-LOCA model, revise the main and auxiliary feedwater models to include all four steam generators, and eliminate the loss of shutdown boards as initiating events.

The WOG PSA peer review team rated the WBN PSA elements at a minimum of grade 2, with most elements at grade 3C or 3. Of significance to this proposed technical specification change, the systems analysis element, the dependency analysis element, and the containment performance element were all rated grade 3. There were no A or B level findings related to reactor trip or ESFAS signals.

20. Some slave relays are tested quarterly, but most are tested on a refueling frequency.

E5-5

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 2 WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters E5-6

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 2 (continued)

WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Analysis General Parameters Parameter WCAP-15376 Analysis Plant Specific I Assumption Parameter 1- t 4.

(a,c)

Notes for Table 2

[

(a, c)

E5-7

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 3 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Reactor Trip Actuation Signals Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP- Plant-Specific Parameter' 15376 Analysis Assumption E5-8

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 3 (continued)

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Reactor Trip Actuation Signals WCAP-14333 and WCAP- Plant 15376 Analysis Assumption Notes for Table 3 1

](a c)

E5-9

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 4 WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signals L

Safety Function Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Plant Specific Parameter' Analysis Assumptions

____ .1_____ 1 _______ I _______ I

+ + 4

.1.

I(a, c)

E5-10

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 4 (continued)

WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of Analysis Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signals I

Safety Function Event WCAP-14333 and WCAP-15376 Plant-Specific Parameter'

_I I Analysis Assumptions

.1. I I ""'

Notes for Table 4

[

(ac)

E5-11

ENCLOSURE 5 Non-Proprietary Version Table 5 WCAP-15376 Implementation Guidelines:

Applicability of the Human Reliability Analysis

[

Operator Action Are plant procedures in place that provide for operator action that results in a success path prior to the action becoming ineffective to mitigate the event?'

i i

& - (aC, (a, c)

Note for Table 5

[ (a, c)

E5-12

ENCLOSURE 6 Westinghouse Affidavit Proprietary Information Notice Copyright Notice E6-1

Westinghouse Electric Company OWestinghouse Nuclear Services P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355 USA U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Directtel: (412) 374-4643 Document Control Desk Directfax: (412) 374-4011 Washington, DC 20555-0001 e-mail: greshaja@wcstinghouse.com Our ref: CAW-07-2275 June 7, 2007 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING PROPRIETARY INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

Subject:

WCAP-15376 Implementation Guideline for WCAP-15376-P-A, Rev. 1, "Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation" (Proprietary)

The proprietary information for which withholding is being requested in the above-referenced report is further identified in Affidavit CAW-07-2275 signed by the owner of the proprietary information, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC. The affidavit, which accompanies this letter, sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.

Accordingly, this letter authorizes the utilization of the accompanying affidavit by TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1.

Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the application for withholding or the Westinghouse affidavit should reference this letter, CAW-07-2275, and should be addressed to J. A. Gresham, Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC, P.O. Box 355, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355.

Very truly youis, J. A. Gresham, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Enclosures cc: Jon Thompson (NRC O-7EIA)

CAW-07-2275 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

ss COUNTY OF ALLEGIHiENY:

Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared J. A. Gresham, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behal r of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief:

J. A. Gresham, Manager Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing Sworn to and subscribed before me this 7th day of June, 2007 Notary Public COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Notarial Sea)

Sharon L.Markle, Notary Public Monroeville Boro, Allegheny County My Commission Expires Jan. 29,2011 Member. Peinsylvania Association of Notaries

2 CAW-07-2275 (1) 1 am Manager, Regulatory Compliance and Plant Licensing, in Nuclear Services, Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse), and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheld from public disclosure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing and rule making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of Westinghouse.

(2) 1am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations and in conjunction with the Westinghouse "Application for Withholding" accompanying this Affidavit.

(3) 1have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse in designating information as a trade secret, privileged or as confidential commercial or financial information.

(4) Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

(i) The information sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse.

(ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not customarily disclosed to the public. Westinghouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it and, in that connection, utilizes a system to determine when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence.

The application of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required.

Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:

(a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutcs a competitive economic advantage over other companies.

3 CAW-07-2275 (b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability.

(c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

(d) It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.

(e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Westinghouse or customer funded development plans and programs of potential commercial value to Westinghouse.

(f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following:

(a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its competitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive position.

(b) It is information that is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the information.

(c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense.

(d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the total competitive advantage. If competitors acquire components of proprietary information, any one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage.

4 CAW-07-2275 (e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition of those countries.

(f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage.

(iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.390, it is to be received in confidence by the Commission.

(iv) The information sought to be protected is not available in public sources or available information has not been previously employed in the same original manner or method to the best of our knowledge and belief.

(v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this submittal is that which is appropriately marked in WCAP-1 5376 Implementation Guideline for WCAP-15376-P-A, Rev. 1, "Approach to Address the Conditions and Limitations in the NRC's Safety Evaluation" (Proprietary) on behalf of the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group (PWROG), being transmitted by TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 letter and Application for Withholding Proprietary Information from Public Disclosure, to the Document Control Desk. The proprietary information as submitted for use by the Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group for TVA Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant Unit I is expected to be applicable for other licensee submittals.

This information is part of that which will enable Westinghouse to:

(a) Provide risk-informed assessment of the RTS and ESFAS to extend the interval for surveillance testing.

(b) Provide licensing defense services.

Further this information has substantial commercial value as follows:

5 CAW-07-2275 (a) Westinghouse plans to sell the use of similar information to its customers for purposes of extending surveillance testing intervals.

(b) Westinghouse can sell support and defense of extending surveillance testing intervals.

Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar assessments and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses. Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.

The development of the technology described in part by the information is the result of applying the results of many years of experience in an intensive Westinghouse effort and the expenditure of a considerable sum of money.

In order for competitors of Westinghouse to duplicate this information, similar technical programs would have to be performed and a significant manpower effort, having the requisite talent and experience, would have to be expended.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE Transmitted herewith are proprietary and/or non-proprietary versions of documents furnished to the NRC in connection with requests for generic and/or plant-specific review and approval.

In order to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations concerning the protection of proprietary information so submitted to the NRC, the information which is proprietary in the proprietary versions is contained within brackets, and where the proprietary information has been deleted in the non-proprietary versions, only the brackets remain (the information that was contained within the brackets in the proprietary versions having been deleted). The justification for claiming the information so designated as proprietary is indicated in both versions by means of lower case letters (a) through (f) located as a superscript immediately following the brackets enclosing each item of information being identified as proprietary or in the margin opposite such information. These lower case letters refer to the types of information Westinghouse customarily holds in confidence identified in Sections (4)(ii)(a) through (4)(ii)(f) of the affidavit accompanying this transmittal pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390(b)(1).

COPYRIGHT NOTICE The reports transmitted herewith each bear a Westinghouse copyright notice. The NRC is permitted to make the number of copies of the information contained in these reports which are necessary for its internal use in connection with generic and plant-specific reviews and approvals as well as the issuance, denial, amendment, transfer, renewal, modification, suspension, revocation, or violation of a license, permit, order, or regulation subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 regarding restrictions on public disclosure to the extent such information has been identified as proprietary by Westinghouse, copyright protection notwithstanding. With respect to the non-proprietary versions of these reports, the NRC is permitted to make the number of copies beyond those necessary for its internal use which are necessary in order to have one copy available for public viewing in the appropriate docket files in the public document room in Washington, DC and in local public document rooms as may be required by NRC regulations if the number of copies submitted is insufficient for this purpose. Copies made by the NRC must include the copyright notice in all instances and the proprietary notice if the original was identified as proprietary.

ML071660106

Contents

Text

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

7.0 REFERENCES

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Reference:

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ML071660106

Text

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

7.0 REFERENCES

= = =7=

= == = = = = =

Reference:

Reference:

Subject:

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