ML20041D804

Proposed Tec Specs 3/4.5.4 & 3/4.6.1 Re Boron Injection Sys & Primary Containment,Respectively

ML20041D804
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire
Issue date:	03/02/1982
From:	DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20041D800	List: ML20041D799 ML20041D804
References
TAC-48049, NUDOCS 8203090232
Download: ML20041D804 (6)

Text

Attachment IC McGuire Nuclear Station EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.4 BCRON INJECTION SYSTEM BORON INJECTION TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume s: 900 gallons, and

b. Between 2,000 and 4,000 ppm of boron.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% Ak/k at 2000F within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verifying the contained berated water volume at least once per 7 days, and

b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water in the tank at least once per 7 days.

McGUIRE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-11 8203090232 820302 PDR ADOCK 05000369 P PDR

Attachment 2A McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3/4.5.4 - Baron Injection System Proposed Change Change 3.5.4.2 as follows:

Delete entire specification (3.5.4.2) on heat tracing for boron injection tank.

Change 4.5.4.2 as follows:

Delete entire surveillance requirement (4.5.4.2) on heat tracing for boron injection tank.

Justification and Safety Analysis The current requirement for heat tracing is due to high boron concentration required in the BIT tank and associated piping. Reduction of this require-ment to less than 4,000 ppm eliminates the need for heat tracing, resulting in cumulative maintenance savings on the heat tracing equipment associated with the BIT. Heat tracing is only required for boron concentration above 4 weight percent, corresponding to approximately 7,000 ppm.

ArTAcunwT 1B ~.%

4 y ..

m.G.auf N.<a6w. sinnc~

Q E~E 3ENCY .'CRE COOL:';G SYSTEZS _

HEAT TRACI.*:G LL. TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

\

/

3.5.4.2 At least two independent channels of heat traci shall be OPEPABLE for the ron injection tank and for the heat traced por ions of the associate flow paths.

APDLICABILI  : MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACT!ON:

With only one cha el of heat tracing on either 6he boron injection tank or on the heat traced po ion of an associated flow th OPERABLE, operation may centinue for up to e days provided the tank nd flow path temperatures are verified to be greate than or ecual to 145* at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; otherwise, be in at le t HOT STANDBY withi 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 h urs.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREPENTS

/ \

4.5.4.2 Each heat tracing ch nnel for t boren injection tank and associated flow path shall be demonstra ed OPERABLE:

a. At least once pe 31 days by energiz ng each heat tracing channel, and

b. At least onc per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying th tank and flow path tempera ture to be greater than or ecual to 45'F. The tank tempera tur shall be determined by measurement The flow path temoera tur shall be determined by either measur . nt or recir-culation . low until establishment of ecuilibrium t peratures within the tan T_:;,E f. NIT ! 3/a E-12

Attachment 2B (cont.)

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 3000F provides assurance that a

~

mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) Prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout con-ditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration,-(2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank udnimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

! 3/4.5.5 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK i

! The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient l supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of l a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that l 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain suberitical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

I McGUIRE UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2

Attachment 3A McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3/4.6.1 - Primary Containment Proposed Change Change 3.6.1.5a to read:

"a. between 75 F* and 100 F in the containment upper compartment, and" Justification and Safety Analysis The low temperature limit is set because of the density of air at the pre-scribed temperature. In an accident condition, the volume increase which would result in heating up dense air could significantly increase the pressure in containment. A review of the various containment integrity analyses (including Westinghouse and FSAR analyses) performed as a result of a recent difficulty in maintaining this limit revealed that the minimum temperature assumed in these analyses was 75 0F. Thus, the current Technical Specification limit of 85 F is overly conservative, and may result in unnecessarily detrimental effects on plant availability. Most plants have a 750F minimum temperature. The inadvertent 85 F limit was probably the result of a typo-graphical error.

The foregoing assessment demonstrates that the proposed Technical Specifica-tion change reducing the minimum average air temperature in the primary con-tainment upper compartment from 85 F to 75 F does not have any adverse effect on safety of plant operation or the health and safety of the public.

I l

l l

I

I w

• Attachment 3B McGuire Nuclear Station CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING _ CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5 Primary containment average afr temperature shall be maintained:

a. between 750F* and 1000F in the containment upper compartment, and

b. between 1000F* and 1200F in the containment lower compartment.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature not conforming to the above limits, restore the air temperature to within the limits within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

d SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 6.1. 5.1 The primary containment upper compartment average air temperature shall be the weighted average ** of all ambient air temperature monitoring stations located in the upper compartment. As a minimum, temperature readings will be obtained at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />'from the following locations:

Location l a. Elev. 826' at the inlet of upper containment ventilation Unit 1A.

b. Elev. 826' at the inlet of upper containment ventilation Unit 1B.

c. Elev. 826' at the inlet of upper containment ventilation Unit IC.

l

d. Elev. 826' at the inlet of upper containment ventilation Unit 1D.

O

• Lower limit may be reduced to 60 0F in MODE 2, 3 and 4.

l **The weighted average is the sum of each temperature multiplied by its j respective containment volume fraction. In the event of inoperable tempera-ture sensor (s), the weighted average shall be taken as the reduced total divided by one minus the volume fraction represented by the sensor (s) out of i service.

! McGUIRE UNIT 1 3/4 6-11

{

l l