ML20038C851

Proposed Revised Tech Spec Pages Re Containment Isolation Valves & New Tech Spec 3/4 6.1.7

ML20038C851
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	12/07/1981
From:	BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20038C847	List: ML20038C846 ML20038C851
References
NUDOCS 8112140194
Download: ML20038C851 (25)

Text

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Docket No. 50-Qi Attachment Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications 8112140184 811202 December, 1981 PDR ADOCK 05000336 p PDR

• IF.E.1hs CEI?.ATIONS Sut'T33,N C00'.IhG AND COOLANT CIRCULATION LitGTING C0'.01T10N FOR OPERATION 3.9.E.1 At least one shutdown ecoling loop shall be in operation *.

AFFLICABILITY: MDDE 6 at,all reactor water levels.

ACTION:

k'ith less than one shutdown cooling loop in operation, suspend all operations ir.v:lving ar. increase in the reactor decay heat load or a re~ duction in boron cr.centratic1 of the Reactor Coolant Syster.. C. lose all containment penetra-tiens providing direct access from the containc.ent atmosphere to the outside atecsphere within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

3.9.8.2 Two ir. dependent' shutdown cooling loops shall be OPERABLE **

Applicability: Mode 6, whenever the following conditions are not

.. satisfied:

a.

reactor vessel water level at or above the vessel flange, and;

b. the reactor v'essel pit seal installed, and; c.

the combined av.ailable volume of water in the refuel pool and refueling water storage tank exceeds 370,000 gallon,s , and;

d. (1) the LPSI pump not in service is OPERABLE ** and can be '

~ aligned to take suction from the WST and deliver flow to the RCS, or (2) one HPSI pump is OPERABLE ** and can be aligned to take suction from the RWST and deliver flow to the RCS.

Action:

With less than the required shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE, initiate corrective action to return the loop (s) to OPERABLE status within one hour.

The provisions of Specification 3.03 are not applicable for 3.9.8.1 and 3.9.8.2.

• • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable for each shutdown cooling loop.

Millstone - Unit 2 3/4 9-8

SURVEILLANCE RE001REtiENTS 4.9.8.1 At least one shutdown cooling loop shall be verified to be in opera-tien and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal >

to 3000 gpm at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.9.8.2 Once per 7 days, the required shutdown cooling loops, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability for pump and shutdown cooling valves, or:

Verifying that the reactor vessel water level is at or above the vessel flange, the reactor vessel pit seal.is installed, and greater than 370,000 gallons or water is available as a heat sink, as indicated by either:

a. refuel pool level greater than 23 feet, above the reacto,r -

vessel flange, or;

b. the combined volume of the refuel pool and refueling water storage t2 ink exceeds 370,000 gallons and a flow path is available from the refueling water storage tank to the refuel pool.

4s. -

The shutdown cooling loop may be removed from operation for up to I hour per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS in the vicinity of the reactor pressure vessel hot legs.

• • The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable for each shutdown cooling loop.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-Ba

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' I REFUELINGOf}iTIONS BASES 3/4.9.6 CRANE OPERA 5!LITY - CONTAINMENT BUILDING The OpEEAEILITY requirements of the cranes used for movement of fuel assemblies ensures that: 1) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel ele .ert, and 2) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifing cperations. .

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - SPENT FUEL STORAGE BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nomina'l weight of a fuel assembly and CEA over irradiated fuel assemblies ensures that no more than- the contents of one. fuel essembly will be ruptured in the event of a fuel handling accident. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.9.8 SHUTD3'a'N COOLING AND COOLANT CIRCULATION .

The requirement that at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove gecay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation

,is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification. .

The requirement to have two shutdown cooling. loops OPERABLE, when the refuel pool is unavailable as a heat sink, ensures that a single failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel water level at or above the vessel flange, and the reactor vessel pit seal installed, and a combined available volume of water in the refuel poor and refueling water. storage tank in excess of 370,000 gallons; a large heat sink is readily available for core cooling. Thus allowing adequate time to initiate emergency e procedures to provide core cooling in the event of a failure of the operating shutdown cooling loop.

3/4. 9. 9 and 3/4.9.10 CONTAINMENT RADI ATION MONITORING AND CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of these systems ensures that the containment purge valves will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. -Ohe OPERABILITY of these systems is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

3_/4. 9.11 and 3/4. 9.12 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL HATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minir:um water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 9-2