ML20024B121

Response to 830610 First Set of Interrogatories Re Design Qa.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20024B121
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	06/17/1983
From:	Reynolds J CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, JOINT INTERVENORS - DIABLO CANYON
To:	PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8307050242
Download: ML20024B121 (13)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9H J U M ;~ r "'3 3 > 42

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A')'

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

)

In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.

) 50-323 0.L.

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) ) (Reopened Hearing --

) Design Quality

-) Assurance)

JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES Joint Intervenors hereby respond to Pacific Gas and Electric Company's (" Applicant") June 10, 1983 First Set of Interrogatories to Joint Intervenors, as follows:

Response to Interrogatory No. 1:

Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory on the ground that it is overly broad, burdensome and oppressive, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. In addition, the information requested is fully available to the Applicant at any time since the subject employees are employed by the Applicant or its contractors. Thus, the requested information can be obtained simply by asking the employees themselves.

8307050242 830617 DR ADOCK 0500027 L

Response to Interrogatory No. 2:

At this time, Joint Intervenors have not decided what persons, if any, they may call or subpoena as _ witnesses at the reopened hearing on the issue of design quality assurance. >

Response to Interrogatory No. 3:

To the extent that this interrogatory is directed at'the individual Joint Intervenors, the response is that no such examinations have been conducted other than the review of IDVP and/or DCP reports already in the public record and in PGandE's possession. To the extent that this interrogatory is directed t

at counsel for the Joint Intervenors, Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as calling for information protected by the attorney-work product privilege.

Response to Interrogatory No. 4:

"Important to Safety" -- see 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, Introduction.

" Safety-related" -- see 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A, l

III(c).

I See also Memorandum, Denton to NRR Personnel, " Standard Definitions for Commonly-Used Safety Classification Terms" (November 20, 1981) ("Denton Memorandum").

Response to Interrogatory No. 5:

To the extent-that this interrogatory requests identification of each individual structure that is "important u.

to safety" but not Class I, Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as overly broad, burdensome and oppressive, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint Intervenors state that they are unable to provide the information requested because the Applicant's FSAR.for Diablo

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Canyon fails to distinguish between structures that are "important to safety" and structures that are " safety-related."

Those terms are apparently used interchangeably by the Applicant.

e Response to Interrogarory No. 6:

To the extent that this interrogatory requests identification of each individual system that is "important to safety" but not Class I, Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as overly broad, burdensome and oppressive, and

not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint Intervenors state that they are unable to provide the information requested because the Applicant's FSAR for Diablo Canyon fails to distinguish between systems that are "important to safety" and systems that are " safety grade." Those terms are apparently used interchangeably by the Applicant.

Response to Interrogatory No. 7:

To the extent that this interrogatory requests identification of each individual component that is "important

I to safety" but not Class I, Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as overly broad, burdensome and oppressive, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint Intervenors state that that they are unable to provide the information requested because the Applicant's FSAR.for Diablo Canyon fails to distinguish between components that are "important to safety" and components that are " safety-grade."

Those terms are apparently used interchangeably by the Applicant.

Response to Interrogatory No. 8:

See (1) 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A; (2) 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A; (3) Denton Memorandum; (4) Supplemental Affidavit of Richard B. Hubbard Concerning Breakdowns In the Diablo Canyon Quality Assurance Program, at 28-33 (March 26, 1983). For Mr. Hubbard's background and qualifications, see Affidavit of Richard B. Hubbard Concerning Breakdowns In the Diablo Canyon Quality Assurance Program (May 24, 1982).

Responses to Interrogatory No. 9:

None.

Response to Interrogatory No. 10:

None.

Response to Interrogatory No. 11:

None.

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Response to Interrogatory No. 12:

None.

Response to Interrogatory No. 13:

Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory on the ground that Mr. Hubbard is not employed by the Joint Intervenors, and thus the request should be directed either to Mr. Hubbard or to the Governor of California. To the extent that this interrogatory calls for the Joint Intervenors' definition of terms used by Mr. Hubbard, Joint Intervenors object that such information is irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint Intervenors supply the following responses:

(a), (b). The following definitions are based on standard English usage as expressed in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary:

(1) " safety-significance": that which is materially relevant to safety; (2) " errors": acts or beliefs which involve a departure from accuracy; mistakes; discrepancies; deficiencies; (3) " deficiencies": acts or states of being which are inadequate in scope or extent to comply with a specified program i

l or to accomplish a specified objective; (4) " safety implications": that which has import or relevance with respect to a condition of safety; (5) " design QA": see 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Introduction, as applied to the design process; (6) " safety hazard": a condition or state of being which imposes or threatens to impose a danger of harm.

(7) " quality control": see 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B, Introduction; (8) " root cause": an occurrence or state of being which accurately could be characterized as having been the precursor to a specific result or condition; (9) " basic cause": an occurrence or state of being which accurately could be characterized as having been the necessary precursor to a specific result or condition; (10) "QA breakdown": the failure of a program, action or ,

series of actions designed or intended to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service; (11) " extreme likelihood": a condition of being which strongly militates towards a specified result.

(12) " major errors": mistakes of material significance which are extreme in character.

(13) " rigorous and thorough design verification program":

l a program as described in Response to Interrogatory No. 21 infra; l

! (14) " design product": the ability of a program of quality assurance to attain certain levels of performance and safety.

L (15) " minor QA breakdown": a potentially damaging but l-i relatively less significant failure to comply with a program as described in subparagraph (10) above; (16) "QA finding": an error, deficiency, discrepancy, or

. other failure to comply with a prescribed QA program; (17) "QA observation": the gathering of data or conclusion of fact as a result of inquiry mandated by a program or system designed to monitor and assure certain levels of performance.

(c) The term " safety-significance" differs from the term "important to safety" and " safety-related" insofar as the latter have specfic meanings as outlined in Response to Interrogatory No. 4, supra.

(d) See answers 13 (a) (2) and 13 (a) (12) above.

(e) See answers 13 (a) (2) and 13 (a) (3) above.

(f) The term " major QA breakdown" refers to the occurrence of a more serious failure to comply with prescribed QA requirements or procedures than does the term "QA breakdown."

(g) See answers 13 (a) (10) and 13 (a) (16) .

(h) See answers 13 (a) (10) and 13 (a) (17) .

Response to Interrogatory No. 14:

I Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as vague and ambiguous, overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or i admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint 1

Intervenors state that given the significant number of ITRs, the cryptic manner in which they are written, the complexity of the subjects being reviewed, and the fact that Joint Intervenors' l _7-i

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. I review of the ITRs is continuing and not yet complete, they are unable to respond to this interrogatory at this time.

Response to Interrogatory No. 15:

Joint Intervenors object to this interrogatory as vague and ambiguous, overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant or admissible evidence. Without waiving such objections, Joint Intervenors state that given the size of the Final Report, the

! complexity of the subjects reviewed, and the fact that Joint Intervenors' review of the Phase I Final Report is continuing and not yet complete, they are unable to respond to this i

interrogatory at this time.

Response to Interrogatory No. 16:

Joint Intervenors have direct knowledge only of items viewed during site tours of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.

Response to Interrogatory No. 17:

(a) Because Mr. Hubbard is not employed by the Joint Intervenors but by Governor Deukmejian, this interrogatory is not properly directed to the Joint Intervenors.

(b) See Response to Interrogatory No. 17 (a) .

(c) To the extent that this interrogatory _ calls for documents upon which Mr. Hubbard relied when preparing his affidavits, such documents are attached to said affidavits. To

the extent that it calls for documents upon which Joint Intervenors relied, see the Hubbard affidavits and attachments, as well as the Commission's November 19, 1981 Order Suspending License.

Response to Interrogatory No. 18:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 17(a).

Response to Interrogatory No. 19:

Letter, Lawroski (ACRS) to Hendrie (NRC), " Report on Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 (July 14, 1978)."

Response to Interrogatory No. 20:

No. Conservatism is required by NRC regulations notwithstanding a superior QA/QC program. The record in this case has established that no such QA/QC program existed at Diablo Canyon.

Response to Interrogatory No. 21:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 17 (a) . To the extent that the interrogatory requests Joint Intervenors' understanding of the phrase in the context of this proceeding, such a basis can be achieved only through a complete, statistically valid design verification and physical inspection of all Diablo Canyon SS&C's and other important safety features as outlined in the Ilubbard Supplemental Affidavit, the completion and verification of all modifications to such SS&C's, and the reverification and

_ . . . - . - . - - _. - _ _ _ . . _ . = . _ _

I l

retesting of all pre-op tests of SS&C's affected by the reverification, redesign, and reconstruction effort.

i Response to Interrogatory No. 22:

Such errors and discrepancies, as well as their significance and probable causes, are identified in Mr. Hubbard's affidavits and the attachments thereto, as well as in Joint Intervenors' June 7, 1982 and May 10, 1983 motions.

Response to Interrogatory No. 23:

The documents relied upon include, but are not necessarily limited to, those documents referred to in or attached as exhibits to Joint Intervenors' June 7, 1982 Motion; Joint Intervenors' May 10, 1982 Motion; Joint Intervenors' May 31, 1983 Response to Motion of Governor Deukmejian to Reopen the Record on Construction Quality Assurance; and the various affidavits of Richard B. Hubbard, each of which has been filed in this proceeding. As Joint Intervenors' review of the documents issued by the IDVP, DCP, and NRC progresses, the foregoing list will obviously increase.

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Response to Interrogatory No. 24:

These responses were prepared by Joint Intervenors with the assistance of councel.

DATED: June 17, 1983 Respectfully submitted, JOEL R. REYNOLDS, ESQ.

JOHN R. PHILLIPS, ESQ.

ERIC HAVIAN, ESQ.

KENNETH GOLDENBERG, ESQ.

Center for Law in the Public Interest l 10951 W. Pico Boulevard '

Los Angeles, CA 90064 (213)470-3000 D".VID S. FLEISCHAKER, ESQ.

P. O. Box 1178

, Oklahoma City, OK 73101 4

By _.

EL R. ICE?N#LDS Attorneys for Joint Inter-venors 1

SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE SCENIC SHORELINE PRESERVATION

' CONFERENCE, INC.

ECOLOGY ACTION CLUB SANDRA SILVER ELIZABETH APFELBERG JOHN J. PORSTER

\

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD

)

'In the Matter of )

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-275 0.L.

) 50-323 0.L.

(Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power )

Plant, Units 1 and 2) )

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on this 27th day of June, 1983, I have served copies of the foregoing JOINT INTERVENORS' RESPONSE TO PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES, mailing them through the U.S. mails, first class, postage prepaid.

Thomas S. Moore, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board Mr. Fredrick Eissler U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Scenic Shoreline Preservation Commission Conference, Inc.

Washington, D.C. 20555. 4623 More Mesa Drive Santa Barbara, CA 93105 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety'& Licensing Malcolm H. Furbush, Esq.

Appeal Board Vice Presid1nt & General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Counsel Commission Philip A. Crane, Esq.

Washington, D.C. 20555 . Pacific Gas & Electric Company Post Office Box 7442 i Dr. John H. Buck San Francisco, CA 94106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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T Docket & Service Branch David S. Fleischaker Office of the Secretary Post Office Box 1178 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Oklahoma City, OK 73101 Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 MHB Technical Associates 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suite K San Jose, CA 95725 Lawrence Chandler, Esq.

Office of the Executive Legal Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.

Director - BETH 042 Snell & Wilmer U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 3100 Valley Center Commission Phoenix, AZ 85073 Washington, D.C. 20555 Virginia and Gordon Bruno Herbert Brown, Esq. Pecho Ranch Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq. Post Office Box 6289 Alan Dynner, Esq. Los Osos, CA 93402 Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill, Christopher, et al. Sandra and Gordon Silver 1900 M Street, N.W. 1760 Alisal Street Washington, D.C. 20036 San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 Nancy Culver Jance E. Kerr, Esq. 192 Luneta Lawrence Q. Garcia, Esq. San Luis Obispo, CA 93401 J. Calvin Simpson, Esq.

California public Utilities Carl Neiburger Commission Telegram Tribune 5246 McAllister Street Post Office Box 112 San Francisco, CA 94102 San Luis Obispo, CA 93402 John Van de Kamp, Attorney Bruce Norton, Esq.

General Norton, Burke, Berry Andrea Sheridan Ordin, Chief & French, P.C.

Attorney General 2002 E. Osborn Michael J. Strumwasser, Special Phoenix, AZ 85016 Counsel to the Attorney General State of California 3580 Wilshire Boulevard Suite 800 Los Angeles, CA 90010

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