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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17312A7631996-05-0808 May 1996 Calculation Summary of Radiological Doses for SG Tube Rupture W/Loss of Offsite Power & Stuck Open Adv. ML20117J0491996-05-0808 May 1996 At&T Round Cell Nuclear Util User'S Council Charter ML20113E1631996-05-0808 May 1996 PVNGS Unit 3 SG Eddy Current Exam Fifth Refueling Outage Nov 1995 ML17311A2031994-08-11011 August 1994 Forwards Unit 2 SG IR from Last Mid Cycle Outage.Aps Stated That It Would Present,Within Four & One Half Months of Breaker Closure,Final Regulatory Guide 1.121 Evaluation Results of Pulled Tube Analyses & Statistical Treatment ML20062M5111993-12-31031 December 1993 1993 Certification Submittal Simulation Facility Simulator Training Suite a ML20058N7161993-09-21021 September 1993 Independent Safety & Quality Engineering GL-89-01 Motor Operated Valve Programmatic Assessment ML17306A9361992-08-20020 August 1992 Rev 1 to JCO-91-02-01, Justification for Continued Operation Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis Concerns. ML17305B3381991-01-18018 January 1991 Justification for Continued Operation - Potential for Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Due to Tube Rupture in Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooler. ML17305A9811990-07-31031 July 1990 Conceptual Design for Palo Verde Nuclear Generator Station for Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys (Dafas). ML17305A3351989-10-20020 October 1989 Rev 3 to Justification for Continued Operation Control Element Assembly (CEA) Drop Events. ML17305A3211989-10-0505 October 1989 Procedure 43OP-3ZZ16,RCS Drain Operations,Not Appropriate for Circumstances. ML17305A3401989-07-18018 July 1989 Unit 3 Steam Generator Eddy Current Exam,First Refueling Outage Apr 1989, NDE Summary Rept ML17304B2941989-06-0909 June 1989 Justification for Continued Operation,Control Element Assembly Drop Events. ML17304B2321989-06-0101 June 1989 Essential & Emergency Lighting Sys Rept. ML17304B2151989-05-22022 May 1989 Revised Electrical Distribution Sys Design Assessment. ML17304B2141989-05-19019 May 1989 Unit 3 Reactor Trip Following Large Load Reject. ML20244B0961989-05-0808 May 1989 Rev 0 to Compressed Gas Sys Evaluation & Analysis for Palo Verde Units 1,2 & 3 ML20247L6921989-05-0808 May 1989 Electrical Distribution Sys Design Assessment ML20247L6851989-05-0808 May 1989 Compressed Gas Sys Evaluation & Analysis Rept ML17304B2051989-05-0606 May 1989 Steam Bypass Control Sys Overall Final Rept. ML20247L7271989-04-30030 April 1989 Atmospheric Dump Valve Engineering Analysis ML17304B0121989-01-31031 January 1989 Final Rept on Pressure-Temp Limits for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Stations. ML17304A7551988-11-0707 November 1988 Analysis of Equipment Functionality W/Essential Chiller Sys Inoperable. ML20082D9761988-10-30030 October 1988 EE580 Field Verification Suppl to Final Rept Ref NRC Allegation RV-87-A-047 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Oct 1988 ML17304A7601988-10-13013 October 1988 Loss of Qualified Life & Functionality of Electrical Equipment Due to Loss of Essential Cooling Sys in Unit 1. ML17304A2211988-06-0909 June 1988 Justification for Continued Operation of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. ML20082D9991988-05-30030 May 1988 EE580 Field Verification Final Rept Ref NRC Allegation RV-87-A-047 ML17303A8871988-02-16016 February 1988 Special Plant Event Evaluation Rept 87-02-019 & Mods to Valves Sga Uv 134 & Sga Uv 138 Render 2AFA-P01 on 871127 ML17303A6291987-09-24024 September 1987 Arizona Nuclear Power Project Metallurgical Investigation Rept,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Diesel Generator 3B Number 9L Piston Pin. ML17303A4541987-06-0404 June 1987 Unit 1 Steam Generator Eddy Current Exam,Feb 1987, NDE Summary Rept ML17303A3571987-03-12012 March 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis KSV-20-T SN-7183-88 SO-0391. ML17303A3071987-02-28028 February 1987 Rev 0 to Rept on Steam Generator Tube Leak at Unit 1. ML20215G2981987-02-24024 February 1987 Technical Evaluation Rept for SPDS for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2 & 3 ML17300A8211987-02-0606 February 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis of Repaired Crankshaft, KSV-20-T & SN-7187. ML17303A3551987-02-0606 February 1987 Torsional Vibration Analysis of Repaired Crankshaft KSV-20-T SN-7187 Arizona Public Svc Co,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Diesel Generator III-B. ML17303A2421987-01-22022 January 1987 Rev 0 to 10CFR50,App R Safe Shutdown Evaluation.Outside Control Room Fire Spurious Actuation Study for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 3. ML17303A2331987-01-21021 January 1987 Loose Part Monitoring Sys,Loose Part Detection Program Rept. ML17300A6181986-10-31031 October 1986 Description of Proposed Enhancements to Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Control Bldg Elevation 74-Ft 0-Inches Masonry Walls for Units 1,2 & 3. ML17300A5861986-09-30030 September 1986 Evaluation of Block Masonry Walls at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Technical Rept ML17300A5301986-09-18018 September 1986 Factors Influencing Deflections in Grouted Hollow Unit Concrete Masonry Walls. ML20212A7011986-07-31031 July 1986 Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2 (Sys 80 Nonprototype - Category 1),Evaluation of Precore Hot Functional Insp Program, Final Rept ML17303A3141986-07-29029 July 1986 Suppl to 860610 Application Re Sale & Leaseback Transactions by Public Svc Co of New Mexico ML20215E9291986-05-23023 May 1986 Observations & Comments,Initial Reactor Startup & Low Power Reactor Physics Tests,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2,NRC Region V Insp ML17299A5771985-08-30030 August 1985 Rev 0 to 10CFR50,App R Safe Shutdown Evaluation,Outside Control Room Fire Spurious Actuation Study. ML20137A6691985-06-21021 June 1985 Observations & Comments,Initial Reactor Startup & Low Power Reactor Physics Tests,Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Unit 1,NRC Region V Enhanced Insp ML20116N4701985-04-30030 April 1985 Refueling Cavity Water Seal, Summary Rept in Response to IE Bulletin 84-03 ML17298B9321985-02-28028 February 1985 SPDS Sar. ML20107H5181984-12-31031 December 1984 Assessment of Bolting Integrity at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1,2 & 3 ML17298B6851984-12-17017 December 1984 Bechtel Study 13-ES-600, Reg Guide 1.75 Low Energy Circuit Analysis. 1999-03-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17300B3811999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 991007 Ltr ML17300B3271999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3 ML17313B0751999-08-27027 August 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990730,test Mode Trip Bypass for EDG Output Breakers Not Surveilled.Cause Under Investigation.Operations Personnel Conservatively Invoked SR 3.0.3 for SR 3.8.1.13. with 990827 Ltr ML17313B0611999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990810 Ltr ML17313B0191999-07-16016 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990618,RT on Low DNBR Was Noted.Caused by Hardware Induced Calculation Error.Cr Operator Was Taken to Place Reactor in Stable Condition IAW Appropriate Operating Procedure ML17300B3151999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990714 Ltr ML17313A9921999-06-21021 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990525,RMS mini-computer Was Removed from Service to Implement Yr 2000 Mod & Was OOS Longer than 72 H Allowed.Caused by Planned Y2K Mods.Preplanned Alternate Sampling Program Was Initiated ML17313A9911999-06-18018 June 1999 Special Rept:On 990510,loose-part Detection Sys Channel 2 Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Malfunction of Mineral Cable Connector to Accelerometer.Licensee Will Implement Modifications Which Will Enhance loose-part Detection Sys ML17313A9731999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990608 Ltr ML17313A9281999-05-0707 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990408,PSV Lift Pressures Were Outside of TS Limits.Caused by Lift Pressure Setpoint Drift.Psvs Have Been Tested,Disassembled,Inspected,Reassembled & Certified at Wyle Labs ML17313A9201999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990512 Ltr ML17313A8951999-04-14014 April 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990317,required Surveillance Requirement Not Completed Due to Deficient Procedure,Was Determined. Caused by Cognitive Personnel Error.St Procedures Revised to Require Chiller to Be Operating & Oil Temperature Checked ML17313A8921999-04-13013 April 1999 LER 98-003-01:on 980902,discovered That MSSV as-found Lift Pressures Were Outside TS Limits.Caused by Bonding of Valve Disc to Nozzle Seat.Affected Valves Were Adjusted,Retested & Returned to Svc ML17313A8891999-04-0909 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990310,RT on High Pressurizer Pressure Was Noted.Caused by Loss of Heat Removal.Cr Supervisor Was Removed from Shift Duties for Diagnostics Skills Training. with 990409 Ltr ML17300B3071999-03-31031 March 1999 Seismic Portion of Submittal-Only Screening Review of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units Ipeee. ML17313A8801999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990412 Ltr ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results ML20207H7471999-03-10010 March 1999 1999 Emergency Preparedness Exercise 99-E-AEV-03003 ML17313A8361999-03-0101 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990103,TS Violation for Power Dependent Insertion Limit Alarm Being Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Procedure to Clarify How Computer Point Is to Be Returned to Scan Mode.With 990302 Ltr ML17313A8501999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.With 990311 Ltr ML17313A7791999-02-0505 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Rev to Emergency Plan That Would Result in Two Less Radiation Protection Positions Immediatelu Available During Emergencies ML17313A8061999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1999 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990218 Ltr ML17313A7701999-01-15015 January 1999 LER 96-008-00:on 960507,inadequate Procedure Results in Nuclear Power Channels Not Calibrated During Power Ascension Tests Occurred.Caused by Deficient Procedure.Procedure Revised ML17313A7381998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.With 990113 Ltr ML20206H2101998-12-31031 December 1998 SCE 1998 Annual Rept ML17313A7031998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Pvngs,Unit 1,2 & 3. with 981209 Ltr ML17313A6701998-11-0404 November 1998 Rev 2 to PVNGS Unit 2 Colr. ML17313A6741998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.With 981109 Ltr ML17313A6611998-10-24024 October 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980729,EQ of Electrical Connectors Were Not Adequately Demonstrated.Caused Because Test Was Conducted with Only Single Lv Connector & Without Fully Ranged Inputs. Revised EQ Requirements ML17313A6561998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for PVNGS Units 1,2 & 3.With 981007 Ltr ML17313A5961998-09-14014 September 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 980814,B Train H Recombiner Was Noted Inoperable Due to cross-wired Power Receptacle.Cause of Event Is Under investigation.Cross-wired Power Supply Receptacle for B Train H Recombiner Was re-wired ML17313A5761998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980113,discovered That One Channel of RWT Level Sys Had Failed High.Caused by Water Intrusion Into Electrical Termination Pull Box.Weep Holes Were Drilled Into Bottoms of Pull Boxes Nearest Level Transmitters ML17313A5591998-08-28028 August 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980730,entered TS 3.0.3 Due to Safety Injection Flow Instruments Being Removed from Svc.Caused by Personnel Error.Transmitters Were Unisolated & Returned to svc.W/980828 Ltr ML20151S0941998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 6 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 3 ML20151S0861998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 1 ML20151S0901998-08-21021 August 1998 Rev 1 to COLR for PVNGS Unit 2 ML18066A2771998-08-13013 August 1998 Part 21 Rept Re Deficiency in CE Current Screening Methodology for Determining Limiting Fuel Assembly for Detailed PWR thermal-hydraulic Sa.Evaluations Were Performed for Affected Plants to Determine Effect of Deficiency ML17313A5401998-08-13013 August 1998 Special Rept:On 980715,declared PASS Inoperable.Caused by Failure of Offgas Flush/Purge Control Handswitch HS0101. Handswitch Replaced & Post Maintenance Retesting Was Initiated ML17313A5301998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Pvgns,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980812 Ltr ML17313A5201998-07-30030 July 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980630,personnel Discovered That Pressure Safety Valve Had Not Received Periodic Set Pressure Test for ASME Class 1 Pressure Safety Valve.Caused by Personnel Error.Pressure Safety Valve reviewed.W/980730 Ltr ML17313A5791998-07-0707 July 1998 to PVNGS SG Tube ISI Results for Seventh Refueling Outage Mar & Apr 1998. ML17313A5001998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980710 Ltr ML17313A4671998-06-19019 June 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980520,CR Personnel Observed Flow & Pressure Perturbations on Chemical & Vol Control Sys Letdown Sys.Caused by Cyclic Fatigue Due to Dynamic Pressure Transients.Unit Letdown Piping Replaced ML17313A4521998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 5 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4501998-06-19019 June 1998 Rev 4 to COLR for Pvngs,Unit 3. ML17313A4131998-06-0505 June 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980507,determined That Plant Was Outside Design Basis Due to SI Discharge Check Valve Reverse Flow. Check Valve Was Disassembled,Examined & Reassembled, Whereupon Valve Met Acceptance Criteria ML17313A4211998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Pvngs,Units 1,2 & 3.W/980609 Ltr ML17313A3951998-05-26026 May 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980428,noted That Required Response Time Testing Had Not Been Performed.Caused by Personnel Error. Coached I&C Personnel Responsible for Reviewing Work Authorization Documentation ML17313A3691998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for PVNGS.W/980412 Ltr ML17313A3251998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980304,safety Valves as-found Pressures Out of Tolerance.Cause of Event Is Under Investigation.Three Mssv'S & Psv Will Be Replaced W/Refurbished & Recertified Valves During Refueling Outage U1R7 1999-09-30
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ARIZONA NUCLEAR POWER PROJECT PALO VERDE II LOOSE PART MONITORING SYSTEM LOOSE PART DETKTION PROGRAM REPORT PDR P. '.-
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS P/N Part Number NVT Integrated neutron flux (neutron/cm')
RAD Radiation Exposed Unit pc Pico coulomb Pico Farad Gravitational acceleration unit v/g Volt per g LED Light emitting diode
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SYSTEM DESCRIPTION A. LOOSE PART MONITORING SYSTEM (LPMS)
The LPMS consists of eight channels. Each channel is made up of the following:
a). A piezoelectric crystal sensor (accelerometer).
b). A preamplifier (charge converter).
c). A signal processing unit.
These sensors are positioned in the- following location:
a). Two sensors are mounted on the reactor vessel upper head.
b). Two are clamped on the in-core instrumentation guide tube (penetrating the reactor vessel lower position).
c). Two are on steam generator (S/G) inlets d). Two sensors are on steam generator outlets (leg 1A for SGl and Leg 2A for SG2).
B. SENSOR SPECIFICATION AND MOUNTING DETAILS F
The sensor (P/N 76M1) and cabling (P/N 3075M6) are manufactured by Rockwell International. They are high temperature, radiation resis-tant and hermetically sealed.
76M1 ACCELEROMETER WITH 3075 M6 CABLE Temperature: ('F) -65 to 700 Radiation: neutron (nvt) 10 Radiation: Gamma (rad) 10 Vibrations (g) 500 Pressure (psig) 70 Sensitivity (ft. lb.) 0.05 The sensor mounting installation was performed in accordance with vendor procedure ER-001-530-001 (Reference procedure attached).
C. PREAMPLIFIER (Charge Converter)
The Remote Charge Converter (P/N 52M9), manufactured by Rockwell International, is used,to change the charge developed by the accelerometer into a voltage signal that is proportional to vibrations/impacts. The system sensitivity (accelerometer and preamplifier) is 100 mV/g. The preamplifiers are located outside of biological shield, inside the containment building (see attached drawing for location).
REMOTE CHARGE CONVERTER 52M9 Sensitivity: '0mv/pc Frequency Response: +bodb .45 to 50kHz Accuracy: +1X of full scale with source capabilities of 1000 pf or less Operating Range: -67'F to 180'F D. FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF LPMS, The LPMS performs two primary functions: 1) detects the pres-ence of loose parts in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) and alert the operator of any abnormal condition, and 2) provides sufficient diagnostic information to locate the loose parts.
The piezoelectric sensors detect loose parts by measuring the acoustic signals which are generated when the loose parts impact the RCS components or structures. The sensors produce a charge signal that is proportional to the impact forces.
This signal is sent to a charge converter which converts the charge signal to a proportional voltage signal. The voltage signal is then sent to a signal processing unit for amplification, signal conditioning and detection. The signal is bandpass filtered to the resonance frequency of the accelerometer (28kHz) before it is sent to the detector and comparator section of the processing unit.
Upon receipt of an alarm, a logic signal is sent from the alarm module to the logic card. The logic card performs two functions. It illuminates the proper alarm (LED) on the front panel. If the alarm is the first alarm, the indica-tor will flash. All the alarms are latched-on type, thus will remain on when the system returns to normal, and will not clear until the alarm is reset. The other function of the logic card is to send a signal to the analog card, and the analog card will send a signal to start the recorder.
The recorder operation is enabled when the front panel Auto-Manual switch is in the auto position and the tape re-corder is set for standby recording. The tape recorder will start within seven seconds upon receipt of the signal. Four selected channels will be recorded onto a cassette tape at frequencies from O.OHZ to 5KHZ. These signals are recorded for approximately ten minutes.
II. OPERATING PROCEDURES A. SYSTEM CALIBRATION PROCEDURES AND RESULTS Initial and subsequent calibrations: Initially, the system was calibrated by the vendor ultilizing an actual input from an impact instrument with an equivalent force of 0.5 ft. lb. Palo Verde ultilizes the same method of calibration, repeating the impact 10 times for each sensor. An output value is obtained. To ensure system sensitivity, the alarm setpoint utilizes 70X of average output. In doing so the system sensitivity is enhanced, thus assuring a conservative approach.
- 2. Functional check: The LPMS functional check is performed by the surveillance program at a frequency of 31 days in Mode 1 and Mode 2. The functional test includes verify-ing that the alarm indicators (LED), tape recorder auto-start at the LPM cabinet, the main control board in-dicator, and plant computer events log operate correctly.
- 3. Channel check: The channel check and audio sound check for each loose parts channel (eight (8) channels) is per-formed by a surveillance procedure, at 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> intervals.
B. PLANT OPERATOR INSTRUCTION FOR USE OF LPMS The procedure to be used following indication of a loose part, "Operating the Loose Part and Vibration Monitoring System", is an Administrative Control Procedure to direct the operator in the event of a LPMS alarm condition. The operator is to verify that the alarm is valid by trying to clear the alarm. If the alarm will not clear, he or she will notify the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) of the condition. The STA will follow the instruction in "Loose Parts and Vibration Monitoring System STA Analyses" procedure to analyse the alarm by comparing audio levels between channels and signal traces of alarm channels.
The spectrum from the alarming channel is compared to quarterly spectrum data to verify the presence of loose parts. The STA will also notify the System Engineer and, Vibration and Loose Parts Engineering Group for further advice.
- 2. Method to diagnose loose parts: Presently, there are three methods being ultilized: 1) relative time at ar-rival, 2) relative amplitude at arrival, and 3) the audio level detection. The relative time and amplitude analysis is conducted by Vibration and Loose Parts Engi-neering Group. The most common method of verifying and locating loose parts, within a general region, is by audio level comparisions between channels using the systems audio speaker.
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III. EXPERIENCE WITH LPMS A. FALSE ALARMS The system experienced a high false alarm rate during no-core and off design condition operation. The false alarm rate dur-ing normal operation is higher than Unit One. The Unit is experiencing several false alarms per hour. The major source of the false alarms is the operation of various support sys-tems operations. An example of this is control rod motion which activates the upper reactor vessel alarms. The system has also alarmed due to major feedwater flow chan'ges to the Steam Generator. When the Steam Bypass Control System has a sudden large flow rate this is also detected by the system's sensors. One contributing cause to the false alarm rate is the difficult alarm setting procedure. If the person doing the "impacting" is not very careful in holding the punch, a low reading will be obtain. This results in the setpoint being set to low, and thus being overly sensitive to the high background noise and high amplitude standing waves which pro-duced by the Reactor Coolant Pumps.
B. LOOSE PARTS n
4f There have been no loose parts.
~ 'I C. SYSTEM AVAILBILITY The system has been available for loose parts determination at all times. There have been two problem areas.
1 . The high false alarm rate due to the high background levels. Further investigation is being conducted for the affected sensors.
- 2. The tape recorder has had tape transport malfuctions which have been reworked.
IV. EVALUATION FOR CONFORMANCE TO R.G.1.133 A. LOOSE PART DETECTION PROGRAM The Palo Verde Loose Parts Detection Program is in accordance with the guide lines established in Regulatory Guide 1.122, with the exception of the 92 day background noise level mea-surement during normal plant operation (section e.3.2.8).
This exception has previously been approved by NRC. Technical Specification 4.3.3.8 for Palo Verde takes exception to the 92 day background noise level measurements. However, the maintenance program does obtain background data on a time permitted basis. As currently configured the system meets R.G. 1.133; However, there are several modifications which have been or will be recommended to reduce the false alarm rate and improve analysis capabilities.
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