Potential Degradation of Secondary ContainmentML031130355 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
01/22/1990 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-90-002, NUDOCS 9001160420 |
Download: ML031130355 (9) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
i- I ft I
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 22, 1990
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-02: POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF SECONDARY
CONTAINMENT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for boiling water
reactors (BWRs).
Purpose
This information notice is intended to alert addressees to potential problems
involving degradation of secondary containment as a result of unforeseen inter- actions with various normal plant ventilation systems and inadequate surveillance
testing of secondary containment integrity. It is expected that recipients will
review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Detcription of Circumstances:
Duane Arnold Energy Center
During a reactor building exhaust ventilation inspection, an Iowa Electric
system engineer discovered a large hole in the duct work (see Figure 1).
This hole allowed the main plant ventilation system to communicate directly
with the reactor building ventilation system, thus bypassing the standby gas
treatment system (SGTS) and providing a direct path for an untreated release
of radioactive effluents to the environment. This pathway would have existed
even with an automatic Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) isolation of the reactor
building ventilation system and an autostart of the SGTS. The licensee dis- covered that .its normal secondary containment integrity surveillance test
(which requires a measurement of 0.25 inch water vacuum with one train of
SGTS operating) was still apparently satisfied with the main plant ventilation
fans running. This has been the test configuration used at the plant since
initial startup in 1974. However, upon conducting the test with the SGTS
operating as designed and the main plant ventilation secured, the 0.25-inch
vacuum could not be achieved because of numerous secondary containment leaks.
A 10 CFR 50.72 4-hour notification was made to the NRC upon this discovery.
The licensee determined that during the performance of the secondary contain- ment integrity surveillance as it was previously conducted, the main plant
9001160420 Zjl
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6,6CA_
IN 90-02 January 22, 1990 ventilation, turbine building ventilation, and the radwaste building ventila- tion exhaust fans had aided the SGTS in drawing the required vacuum. Because
surveillance tests performed since initial unit startup usually indicated that
the required negative pressure had been obtained, numerous secondary contain- ment integrity deficiencies went undetected and uncorrected. The maintenance
to correct this overall degradation of the secondary containment required more
than 3 weeks of effort to locate and repair numerous door seals, electrical
penetrations, steam tunnel boot seals, dampers, building seals, and duct systems.
These repairs resulted in an improvement in the measured secondary containment
vacuum from less than 0.08 inch of water to greater than 0.25 inch of water, as
determined by retesting with a new surveillance test procedure. This test now
requires all major plant exhaust ventilation fans that potentially communicate
with secondary containment to be secured.
Continued testing after repairs has shown that one main plant exhaust ventilation
fan can still draw an approximate 500 to 1000 standard cubic feet-per-minute (SCFM)
volume' from the reactor building ventilation system (the secondary containment
boundary) when the ESF-required isolation is in effect. As this circumstance
could result in an untreated ground-level release under certain accident scenarios, the licensee developed alarm response procedures designed to secure the main
plant ventilation fans when secondary containment isolation is initiated and
main plant exhaust ventilation radiation monitors reach specified values. Iowa
Electric is also considering long-term corrective action involving hardware
modifications that would prevent main plant ventilation from drawing air out
of the reactor building under accident conditions.
Monticello
As a result of the secondary containment deficiencies identified at Duane Arnold, the NRC resident inspector contacted the licensee for the Monticello plant con- cerning the procedures and practices for testing the secondary containment system.
The licensee had normally tested the secondary containment integrity with the
main plant exhaust fans running and isolated both supply and exhaust fans in
the reactor building. However, on October 14, 1989, the licensee conducted
the secondary containment integrity test with the main plant exhaust fans
secured and was not able to maintain the 0.25-inch water vacuum required by
the technical specifications. The vacuum reached in the reactor building was
only 0.1 inch of water. Preliminary investigation revealed that failure of
the test was due to leaks in the reactor building supply and exhaust system
dampers and various other secondary containment leaks. The licensee also
believes that the operation of the main plant exhaust fans assisted the SGTS
in drawing the required vacuum on the secondary containment, thus establishing
a path that bypassed the SGTS. A 10 CFR 50.72 notification was made to the NRC.
Discussion of Safety Significance:
Plant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems are diverse
among boiling water reactors. Interactions between these systems and the
standby gas treatment system could mask degradation of the secondary contain- ment boundary during surveillance testing and could exacerbate such degradatiof+t'
by diverting flow from the SGTS following an accident. -
K>
IN 90-02 January 22, 1990 For those plants discussed above, a portion of the secondary containment
boundary is formed by the ductwork and isolation dampers of the reactor build- ing ventilation system. This system exhausts to a common plenum area within
the reactor building, but outside secondary containment, where ventilation
flows from other plant HVAC systems are also directed. The high-capacity main
plant ventilation exhaust fans take suction from the plenum area and discharge
the flow through the reactor building roof stacks. Because of the high capa- city of the main plant exhaust fans and their proximity to the reactor building
ventilation system components that form part of the secondary containment
boundary, the potential exists for air flow to bypass the SGTS even when the
secondary containment is isolated. Further, if the main plant ventilation fans
are operated during surveillance testing, degradation of secondary containment
could go undetected as the main plant fans and the SGTS fans could collectively
draw the required vacuum.
In view of the possibility of the main plant ventilation systems masking
deficiencies in SGTS and/or secondary containment integrity and of creating
possible untreated release paths under accident conditions, licensees for other
BWR plants may wish to review the design and operation of major plant ventila- tion systems and to review their secondary containment integrity surveillance
procedures.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: William L. Axelson, Region III
(708) 790-5574 John A. Kudrick, NRR
(301) 492-0871 James R. Hall, NRR
(301) 492-1391 Attachments:
1. Figure 1 - Reactor Building Ventilation
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 90-02 January 22, 1990 Failed DucUng
Isolatlon Dampers
Reactor Buiding
VentShaft
Fgure 1
Reactor Building Ventilation
Iw/I1-89 A1087
K>
Attachment 2 IN 90-02
- . . .11- 1 January 22, 1990 ti e
. .,
-1-LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
Importance of Proper 1/12/90 All holders of NRC
90-01 Response to Self-Identified materials licenses.
Violations by Licensees
89-90 Pressurizer Safety Valve 12/28/89 All holders of OLs
Lift Setpoint Shift or CPs for PWRs.
89-89 Event Notification 12/26/89 All holders of OLs
Worksheets or CPs for nuclear
power reactors.
Recent NRC-Sponsored 12/26/89 All holders of OLs
89-88 Testing of Motor-Operated or CPs for nuclear
Valves power reactors.
89-87 Disabling of Emergency 12/19/89 All holders of OLs
Diesel Generators by or CPs for nuclear
Their Neutral Ground-Fault power reactors.
Protection Circuitry
89-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage 12/15/89 All holders of OLs
Supp. 2 Power Circuit Breakers or CPs for nuclear
Refurbished with power reactors.
Substandard Parts
89-86 Type HK Circuit Breakers 12/15/89 All holders of OLs
Missing Close Latch Anti- or CPs for nuclear
Shock Springs. power reactors.
89-85 EPA's Interim Final Rule 12/15/89 All medical, academic, on Medical Waste Tracking industrial, waste
and Management broker, and waste
disposal site licensees.
89-84 Failure of Ingersoll Rand 12/12/89 All holders of OLs
Air Start Motors as a Result or CPs for nuclear
of Pinion Gear Assembly power reactors.
Fitting Problems
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 90-02 January 22, 1990 For those plants discussed above, a portion of the secondary containment
boundary is formed by the ductwork and isolation dampers of the reactor build- ing ventilation system. This system exhausts to a common plenum area within
the reactor building, but outside secondary containment, where ventilation
flows from other plant HVAC systems are also directed. The high-capacity main
plant ventilation exhaust fans take suction from the plenum area and discharge
the flow through the reactor building roof stacks. Because of the high capa- city of the main plant exhaust fans and their proximity to the reactor building
ventilation system components that form part of the secondary containment
boundary, the potential exists for air flow to bypass the SGTS even when the
secondary containment is Isolated. Further, if the main plant ventilation fans
are operated during surveillance testing, degradation of secondary containment
could go undetected as the main plant fans and the SGTS fans could collectively
draw the required vacuum.
In view of the possibility of the main plant ventilation systems masking
deficiencies in SGTS and/or secondary containment integrity and of creating
possible untreated release paths under accident conditions, licensees for other
BWR plants may wish to review the design and operation of major plant ventila- tion systems and to review their secondary containment integrity surveillance
procedures.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one
of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: William L. Axelson, Region III
(708) 790-5574 John A. Kudrick, NRR
(301) 492-0871 James R. Hall, NRR
(301) 492-1391 Attachments:
1. Figure 1 - Reactor Building Ventilation
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: INFO NOTICE - JACKIW, KIESSEL
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RPB:ARM *D/DST:NRR
E CHBerlinger TechEd AThadani
01//190 01/10/90 12/21/89 12/18/89
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RIII *PD33:DRSP:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR*C/SPLB:DST:NRR
RJKiessel EGGreenman JRHall JKudrick CEMcCracken
11/16/89 11/21/89 11/16/89 12/12/89 12/12/89
IN 90-XX
January xx, 1990 For those plants discussed above, a portion of the secondary containment
boundary is formed by the ductwork and isolation dampers of the reactor build- ing ventilation system. This system exhausts to a common plenum area within
the reactor building, but outside secondary containment, where ventilation
flows from other plant HVAC systems are also directed. The high-capacity main
plant ventilation exhaust fans take suction from the plenum area and discharge
the flow through the reactor building roof stacks. Because of the high capa- city of the main plant exhaust fans and their proximity to the reactor building
ventilation system components that form part of the secondary containment
boundary, the potential exists for air flow to bypass the SGTS even when the
secondary containment is isolated. Further, if the main plant ventilation fans
are operated during surveillance testing, degradation of secondary containment
could go undetected as the main plant fans and the SGTS fans could collectively
draw the required vacuum.
In view of the possibility of the main plant ventilation systems' masking
deficiencies in SGTS and/or secondary containment integrity and of creating
possible untreated release paths under accident conditions, licensees for other
BWR plants may wish to review the design and operation of major plant ventila- tion systems and to review their secondary containment integrity surveillance
procedures.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: William L. Axelson, Region III
(708) 790-5574 John A. Kudrick, NRR
(301) 492-0871 James R. Hall, NRR
(301) 492-1391 Attachments:
1. Figure 1 - Reactor Building Ventilation
2. Figure 2 - Exhaust Fan Room
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: INFO NOTICE - JACKIW, KIESSEL
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:D CByt;*RPB:ARM *D/DST:NRR
CERossi CHBerline j) TechEd AThadani
01/ /90 01/Y,/90- ' 12/21/89 12/18/89
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RIII *PD33:DRSP:NRR *SPLB:DST:NRR*C/SPLB:DST:NRR
RJKiessel EGGreenman JRHall - lf JKudrick CEMcCracken
11 11/21 11/16/8w 12/12/89 12/12/89
441/44s~4
IN 89-XX
%2 ~November xx, 1989 standby gas treatment system could mask degradation of the secondary contain- ment boundary during surveillance testing and could exacerbate such degradation
by diverting flow from the SGTS following an accident.
For those plants discussed above, a portion of the secondary containment
boundary is formed by the ductwork and isolation dampers of the reactor build- ing ventilation system. This system exhausts to a common plenum area within
the reactor building, but outside secondary containment, where ventilation
flows from other plant HVAC systems are also directed. The high capacity main
plant ventilation exhaust fans take suction from the plenum area and discharge
the flow out through the reactor building roof stacks. Due to the high capa- city of the main plant exhaust fans and their proximity to the reactor building
ventilation system components that form part of the secondary containment
boundary, the potential exists for air flow to bypass the SGTS even when the
secondary containment is isolated. Further, if the main plant ventilation fans
are operated during surveillance testing, degradation of secondary containment
could go undetected as the main plant fans and SGTS fans could collectively
draw the required vacuum.
In view of the possibility of main plant ventilation systems masking deficien- cies in SGTS and/or secondary containment integrity and of creating possible
untreated release paths under accident conditions, other BWR plants may wish to
review the design and operation of major plant ventilation systems and to
review their secondary containment integrity surveillance procedures.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: William L. Axelson, Region III
(708) 790-5574 John A. Kudrick, NRR
(301) 492-0871 James R. Hall, NRR
(301) 492-1391 Attachments:
1. Figure 1 - Reactor Building Ventilation
2. Figure 2 - Exhaust Fan Room
3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Document Name: INFO NOTICE - JACKIW, KIESSEL
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ARO'
sit Al'
D/DST:NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd ni
11/ /89 11/ /89 ftH/.Zf/ MAK /89
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RIII *PD33:DRSP:NRR SPLB: R C/SPLB:DST: WG9 RJKiessel EGGreenman JRHall *udri CEMcCracken,_ - -
11/16/89 11/21/89 11/16/89 WMI /d 89
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list | - Information Notice 1990-01, Importance of Proper Response to Self-Identified Violations by Licensees (12 January 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-02, Potential Degradation of Secondary Containment (22 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-03, Malfunction of Borg-Warner Bolted Bonnet Check Valves Caused by Failure of the Swing Arm (23 January 1990, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-04, Cracking of the Upper Shell-to-Transition Cone Girth Welds in Steam Generators, (26 January 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1990-05, Inter-System Discharge of Reactor Coolant (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels (29 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-07, New Information Regarding Insulation Material Performance and Debris Blockage of PWR Containment Sumps (30 January 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards from Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-08, KR-85 Hazards From Decayed Fuel (1 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-09, Extended Interim Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Waste by Fuel Cycle and Materials Licensees (5 February 1990, Topic: Decommissioning Funding Plan)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-10, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking of Inconel 600 (23 February 1990, Topic: Boric Acid, Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-11, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid-Operated Valves (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-12, Monitoring or Interruption of Plant Communications (28 February 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-13, Importance of Review and Analysis of Safeguards Event Logs (5 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-14, Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials (6 March 1990, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1990-15, Reciprocity Notification of Agreement State Radiation Control Directors Before Beginning Work in Agreement States (17 March 1990, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1990-16, Compliance with New Decommissioning Rule (7 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-17, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Valves (8 March 1990, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems with Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-18, Potential Problems With Crosby Safety Relief Valves Used on Diesel Generator Air Start Receiver Tanks (9 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-19, Potential Loss of Effective Volume for Containment Recirculation Spray at PWR Facilities (14 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-20, Personnel Injuries Resulting from Improper Operation of Radwaste Incinerators (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-21, Potential Failure of Motor-Operated Butterfly Valves to Operate Because Valve Seat Friction Was Underestimated (22 March 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-22, Unanticipated Equipment Actuations Following Restoration of Power to Rosemount Transmitter Trip Units (23 March 1990, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1990-23, Improper Installation of Patel Conduit Seals (4 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model Spec 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-24, Transportation of Model SPEC 2-T Radiographic Exposure Device (10 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power With Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-25, Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Heat-Up (16 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-26, Inadequate Flow of Essential Service Water to Room Coolers and Heat Exchangers for Engineered Safety-Feature Systems (24 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-27, Clarification of the Recent Revisions to the Regulatory Requirements for Packaging of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) for Transportation (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error In High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-28, Potential Error in High Steamline Flow Setpoint (30 April 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-29, Cracking of Cladding and Its Heat-Affected Zone in the Base Metal of a Reactor Vessel Head (30 April 1990, Topic: Nondestructive Examination, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1990-30, Ultrasonic Inspection Techniques for Dissimilar Metal Welds (1 May 1999, Topic: Dissimilar Metal Weld)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste Form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-31, Update on Waste form and High Integrity Container Topical Report Review Status, Identification of Problems with Cement Solidification, and Reporting of Waste Mishaps (4 May 1990, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1990-32, Surface Crack and Subsurface Indications in the Weld of a Reactor Vessel Head (3 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-33, Sources of Unexpected Occupational Radiation Exposures at Spent Fuel Storage Pools (9 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-34, Response to False Siren Activations (10 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-35, Transportation of Type a Quantities of Non-Fissile Radioactive Materials (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-37, Sheared Pinion Gear-To-Shaft Keys in Limitorque Motor Actuators (24 May 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-38, License and Fee Requirements for Processing Financial Assurance Submittals for Decommissioning (6 November 1990, Topic: Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1990-39, Recent Problems with Service Water Systems (1 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-40, Results of NRC-Sponsored Testing of Motor-Operated Valves (5 June 1990, Topic: Weak link)
- Information Notice 1990-41, Potential Failure of General Electric Magne-Blast Circuit Breakers and Ak Circuit Breakers (12 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-42, Failure of Electrical Power Equipment Due to Solar Magnetic Disturbances (19 June 1990)
- Information Notice 1990-43, Mechanical Interference with Thermal Trip Function in GE Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (29 June 1990)
... further results |
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